Nimrod MRA.4

[Mad_Mark]

There is now such an organisation called the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) that is still in its infancy. The MRA4 is the first new aircraft that the MAA has handled and it is therefore still finding its feet with how to do it. When the MAA has got its s#1t in one sock then maybe the RTS will follow shortly thereafter?

Meanwhile, those that need to know what is going on know and those that don't can continue with their conspiracy theories

MM!!!

[tucumseh]

MAA

Mad Mark

I can think of no greater condemnation of the MoD than what you've just said. They are still finding their feet? Have they found the extant regulations yet, which numerous inquiries, inquest and reports over the last 20 years showed MoD had completely ignored? Something Haddon-Cave simply reiterated. The vast majority of his recommendations could be summed up with "Implement your existing regulations". Nothing but the same old story. 20 years of neglect swept under the carpet and everything is going to be ok; but we're on a learning curve so we may just screw up until things settle down in a few years. Sounds like 1993 all over again, when the need for Safety Cases and repeal of the CPA meant we needed more funding to consolidate and stabilise, but were actually cut.

But there again, I suppose the MAA are struggling with the fact that the only Def Stan dedicated to maintaining airworthiness was declared obsolete half way through the Haddon-Cave Review. (That's the one that has two parts, but D/Stan haven't been able to find a copy of one part for 17 years). Nevertheless, it remains the Bible for those who know how to do the job properly, and all D/Stan had to do was ask...... Those of us with airworthiness delegation at last amendment (1990) were all issued with our own copies.

To be fair, I imagine they are also struggling with the fact that every question on anything remotely connected with airworthiness is now offloaded onto them by IPTs who have now realised the above neglect has denuded them of anything approaching the experience or competence to make robust decisions. Did you know that MoD have taken to answering Freedom of Information requests with "The MAA have no knowledge of....."? Well, they wouldn't, would they?

I'm afraid this doesn't fill me with confidence.

[Chugalug2]

Mad Mark:

There is now such an organisation called the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) that is still in its infancy.

And likely to remain there IMHO. Unless and until it be truly independent of the operators (the MOD and the military services) it will remain compromised. The scandal of Mull happened because Regulation, Operation and Investigation were all controlled by the MOD. The same applies now no matter how many "infant" authorities are produced from the MOD's hat. There needs to be an independent MAA and an independent MAAIB, both of the MOD and of each other. Airworthiness matters and cannot be fudged. That is accepted as a sine qua non by the civvies. Time the military re-learnt that vital lesson. Self Regulation never works, and in Aviation it kills!

[Squidlord]

Notwithstanding tucumseh and Chugalug2's lack of confidence, the MAA is making something of a difference already. They have started auditing aircraft Safety Cases and, without going into detail, they have, in a very short space of time, put a rocket up at least one Project Team's arse becasue their Safety Case was so poor. This has led to a very short time-scale, very intense, heavily scrutized remedial action plan to sort the Safety Case out.

In some sense, this is good news but, as tucumseh says in a slightly different context, you have to wonder why it needed the MAA to do this. Why hadn't the Project Team got its Safety Case in order already?

And Chugalug2 might be wondering ... well, I'm wondering ... if the Safety Case was so bad, how come the MAA didn't ground the aircraft? It's one thing to have the power to make Project Teams sort out a Safety Case quickly. But it's quite a different, greater power to ground the aircraft pending that satisfactory Safety Case. Perhaps it is appropriate to keep the aircraft in question flying but the MAA would look a lot more powerful if it took that ultimate sanction.

[tucumseh]

Why hadn't the Project Team got its Safety Case in order already?

Simple. Numerous senior MoD staffs and Ministers have consistently ruled, over the last 17 years, that it is unnecessary to maintain the Build Standard, which is a mandatory prerequiste to a valid Safety Case. If you're denied funding for the former, it rather follows the latter is difficult to achieve.

The first 2 Star in MoD(PE) to make this ruling (to me) was the very same 2 Star in charge of Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4. That speaks volumes. I retain his letters to me confirming both attaining and maintaining airworthiness is optional and that staff may be instructed to ignore the regs. Despite numerous requests for an overrule over the years, his rulings still stand; although that doesn't necessarily mean they were followed. Sensible people disobeyed his orders and made their kit safe. But some didn't. Faced with that degree of negligence, and top level Ministerial support for that negligence (also in writing), I'm very pleased to hear the MAA has had one little victory. But, like I said above, Haddon-Cave's bottom line was "implement existing regs". 'Tis very simple.

[Chugalug2]

tuc:

... the very same 2 Star in charge of Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4...confirming both attaining and maintaining airworthiness is optional and that staff may be instructed to ignore the regs.

deliverance:

he must be exposed and face the consequences of his actions, or has this already been done?

Well you'd think so wouldn't you? But it doesn't work like that it would seem. Such illegal orders have cost 62 lives IMHO, if you count the cost of airworthiness related accidents listed in this forum. More likely the cost is much greater given the lack of objective military air accident investigation. We know of at least one person who defied such illegal orders, a CS. No doubt there were others as well. How many I wonder were in the Armed Forces, who are duty bound to defy illegal orders?

[tucumseh]

Deliverance

Sorry, both he and the 4 Star who supported him are now retired, gongs in hand. I don't mention the 3 Star who sat between them - when he was advised (in 2000) of the airworthiness failings noted by Haddon-Cave (in 2009) he simply didn't reply, so I have no evidence of his views. Clearly, though, had action been taken then.....

You are right to cite Chinook. When the PAC criticised "failure of management oversight" on Chinook HC Mk3, it was the same individuals they were talking about. This is why I feel very uncomfortable over Haddon-Cave naming 10 individuals, including two serving officers - demonstrably, far more senior people committed far greater offences, and were rewarded. But I'm sure that will come out in the wash.

[Ginger Beer]

Back to MRA4.

I had a conversation with a senior BAE chap from Warton recently and the the MRA4 is now unlikely to be in the hands of the RAF (for crew training purposes) until Oct/Nov 2010 at the earliest. This is due to RTS issues.

Ginge

[tucumseh]

Back to MRA4

Point taken, but what so few seem to grasp is that, for example, the same 2 Star was responsible for delivery of both Nimrod and Chinook - and was warned in great detail about the precise problems that would befall each programme. Same man happily ruled that airworthiness could be ignored if it meant delivering to time and cost (not that either of these programmes achieved that!). MoD is widely condemned for such procurement cock-ups, but actually it is down to the management ethos of a few individuals. Management sets the tone.

[Chugalug2]

Ginger Beer:

the MRA4 is now unlikely to be in the hands of the RAF (for crew training purposes) until Oct/Nov 2010 at the earliest. This is due to RTS issues.

And is no doubt both annoying and irksome for those awaiting postings, training, and operating her. In much the same way as the present Government may expect only brickbats in its necessary work to put right the excesses of its predecessor, so too do those determined to have the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations fully enforced know that they are as welcome as the proverbial by many who post here. So be it. The very Operational Capability of the Royal Air Force has been seriously reduced by the actions of certain RAF Air Officers. It is they who should be held accountable for the illegal orders that were given and of the consequences that followed. Will they be....?

[Biggus]

Chug,

No...they won't.

It's not that they shouldn't be (in my opinion), but I expect there will be no appetite for retrospective investigations uncovering unsavory findings. I hope to be proved wrong - but I doubt it!

[RumPunch]

The delay that Angus Roberston mentioned a few weeks ago yet nobody on the station knew anything about it except laughing at the Scottish MP making a fool of himself. It would appear he is actually quite correct and seems to know more of what going on with MRA4 than the actual company.

One nail left and a delay for October when the SDR gets released. Timely perhaps

[Rhys S. Negative]

A rather different story than told in this press-release from 12-March:

Nimrod MRA4 Declared 'Ready to Train'

[Squidlord]

Ginger Beer:

I had a conversation with a senior BAE chap from Warton recently and the the MRA4 is now unlikely to be in the hands of the RAF (for crew training purposes) until Oct/Nov 2010 at the earliest. This is due to RTS issues.

My understanding is that this is because ACAS wants an MAA "tick in the box" before signing off the RTS. Presumably, this will become universal MoD practice and will be planned into the process in future.

Incidentally, tucumseh answered my (meant to be rhetorical) question:

Why hadn't the Project Team got its Safety Case in order already?

Simple. Numerous senior MoD staffs and Ministers have consistently ruled, over the last 17 years, that it is unnecessary to maintain the Build Standard, which is a mandatory prerequiste to a valid Safety Case. If you're denied funding for the former, it rather follows the latter is difficult to achieve.

Not the right answer (in this case).

[fincastle84]

I had a conversation with a senior BAE chap from Warton recently and the the MRA4 is now unlikely to be in the hands of the RAF (for crew training purposes) until Oct/Nov 2010 at the earliest.

I imagine that the broken flap securing bolt which caused the fast heart rates during flight testing won't have helped much either.

[tucumseh]

Squidlord

Not the right answer (in this case).

It may not be the only reason in this case, but what I said is demonstrably true. Perhaps you don't realise what maintaining the build standard entails, and why failing to maintain it progressively compromises the Safety Case and, by definition, the Release to Service. Are you saying the Nimrod and all its equipment were, uniquely, afforded funding from 1990 to maintain this mandated requirement? I can assure you they were most definitely not. In 1990 I was project manager for over 40 equipments fitted to both MR and R and know exactly what warnings were conveyed to the RAF when we were denied funding to maintain airworthiness. And what action they took against us for this insubordination, while instructing us to just sign that everything was ok! I will never forget the staff responsible for maintaining airworthiness being told they were the "rump end of MoD(PE)", by the very officer who initiated the swingeing cuts I speak of.

[Chugalug2]

Squidlord:

ACAS wants an MAA "tick in the box" before signing off the RTS.

"One Staff Officer jumped over another Staff Officer's back, then another Staff Officer jumped over the second Staff Officer's back....
Oh they were only playing leapfrog, they were only playing leapfrog, oh they were only playing leapfrog, when one Staff Officer jumped over another Staff Officer's back!"
And thus the fun begins. We shall shortly see what manner of beast the MAA is. Will they simply do as bid or do their job which, for the reasons given by tuc, is to do no such thing?

[Distant Voice]

RTS and Safety Case

Many years ago, when I worked at Boscome Down, I was deeply involved in the RTS trials for the Nimrod aircraft. Before entering service it was issued with a RTS certificate by CA. That, basically said, that the aircraft was safe to fly and operate within certain parameters. In effect it was its "safety case", and remained that way until around 2002.

Can someone explain to me what the difference is, now, between RTS and the Safety Case?

DV

[Shell Management]

Shell invented the safety case as a way to manage major hazards. Other industries are now finally adopting the concept. It is an analytical assessment of hazards and their effects that is far more effective than the old prescriptive testing required for a Release to Service. Your Nimrod RTS failed to identify the problems with the Nimrod fuel system for example.

[Distant Voice]

Shell Management

Many thanks for your reply. It seems that the "safety case" approach missed the fuel problem on the Nimrod as well. In the end it is down to people.

The question that I wanted to ask is, can we now have an RTS without the completion of the safety case? If we can not, then when will the safety case for the MRA 4 be completed?

DV