Nimrod MRA.4
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mra4eng
If you actually work for said private company you should be very familiar with the IT Acceptable Use Policy.
So, you are either completely unprofessional or an utter troll…
None of your business how I spend my time in the Private company that I work within.
4.1 Company IT facilities shall not be used in any way that could be damaging to BAE Systems' public image, is for purposes not in the interest of the Company or is abusive, offensive, defamatory, obscene or indecent or of such a nature as to bring the Company or its employees into disrepute.
5.1 Company IT facilities shall not be used for any activity that will cause offence to BAE Systems employees, customers, suppliers, partners or visitors or violates the BAE Systems principles of ethical business conduct or People Policy as set out in the Operational Framework.
5.1 Company IT facilities shall not be used for any activity that will cause offence to BAE Systems employees, customers, suppliers, partners or visitors or violates the BAE Systems principles of ethical business conduct or People Policy as set out in the Operational Framework.
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I have tried to keep off here as long as I could but recent postings have got to me slightly.Firstly it would be good to remind mra4eng and others what Mr Haddon-Cave said :
BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case. Phases 1 and 2, carried out by BAE Systems were poorly planned, poorly managed and poorly executed, and work was rushed and corners were cut. The end product was seriously defective. There was a big hole in its analysis: BAE Systems had left 40% of the hazards "Open" and 30% "Unclassified". The work was anyway riddled with errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation. The critical catastrophic fire hazard relating to the Cross-Feed/SCP duct had not been properly assessed and, in fact, was one of those left "Open" and "Unclassified". Further, at handover meetings in 2004, BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the MOD Nimrod Integrated Project Team (IPT) and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off. BAE Systems deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left "Open" and "Unclassified", many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required. The MOD IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These matters raise question marks about the prevailing culture at BAE Systems. The regrettable conduct of some of BAE Systems’ managers suggests that BAE Systems has failed to implement an adequate or effective culture, committed to safety and ethical conduct. The responsibility for this must lie with the leadership of the Company. Throughout my Review, BAE Systems has been a company in denial.
Secondly the MRA4 is late because:
1...The wings were ordered and when they arrived they fitted the air frame that was measured but not the others so they were sent back.
2... When the wings where fitted and the engines arrived they realized the engine housings were the wrong size so sent them back.
3... Large areas of corrosion where found and had to be treated.
Defence Procurement can be linked directly to my son's death. Originally the MR2 had an 'out of service' date of 1995. As the RAF/MOD waited for its replacement, the MRA4, the 'out of service' date on my sons aircraft kept getting deferred time and again. The BOI and the Inquest both found that the age of the aircraft components was a major contribution to the loss of Nimrod XV230.
If the Defence Procurement programme had not been in chaos and had been up to date with its orders then Nimrod XV230 would have been replaced, and not flying on 2nd September 2006.
Amen
BAE Systems bears substantial responsibility for the failure of the Nimrod Safety Case. Phases 1 and 2, carried out by BAE Systems were poorly planned, poorly managed and poorly executed, and work was rushed and corners were cut. The end product was seriously defective. There was a big hole in its analysis: BAE Systems had left 40% of the hazards "Open" and 30% "Unclassified". The work was anyway riddled with errors of fact, analysis and risk categorisation. The critical catastrophic fire hazard relating to the Cross-Feed/SCP duct had not been properly assessed and, in fact, was one of those left "Open" and "Unclassified". Further, at handover meetings in 2004, BAE Systems gave the misleading impression to the MOD Nimrod Integrated Project Team (IPT) and QinetiQ that the task had been properly completed and could be signed off. BAE Systems deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards it had left "Open" and "Unclassified", many with only vague recommendations that ‘further work’ was required. The MOD IPT and QinetiQ representatives were lulled into a false sense of security. These matters raise question marks about the prevailing culture at BAE Systems. The regrettable conduct of some of BAE Systems’ managers suggests that BAE Systems has failed to implement an adequate or effective culture, committed to safety and ethical conduct. The responsibility for this must lie with the leadership of the Company. Throughout my Review, BAE Systems has been a company in denial.
Secondly the MRA4 is late because:
1...The wings were ordered and when they arrived they fitted the air frame that was measured but not the others so they were sent back.
2... When the wings where fitted and the engines arrived they realized the engine housings were the wrong size so sent them back.
3... Large areas of corrosion where found and had to be treated.
Defence Procurement can be linked directly to my son's death. Originally the MR2 had an 'out of service' date of 1995. As the RAF/MOD waited for its replacement, the MRA4, the 'out of service' date on my sons aircraft kept getting deferred time and again. The BOI and the Inquest both found that the age of the aircraft components was a major contribution to the loss of Nimrod XV230.
If the Defence Procurement programme had not been in chaos and had been up to date with its orders then Nimrod XV230 would have been replaced, and not flying on 2nd September 2006.
Amen
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Incidentally, BAES employees and RAF personnel are working together - not had a bacon buttie yet - to help ensure that, when we do get an ac at ISK, the groundcrew and aircrew will be as well prepared as they can be to deliver Airpower. That doesn't mean that there are no hurdles still to be overcome; however, we are working together to try to resolve them.
I am glad, however, that I am woking with BAES employees at ISK rather than at Warton; me thinks that mra4eng seems to have a bit of a chip.
Duncs
I am glad, however, that I am woking with BAES employees at ISK rather than at Warton; me thinks that mra4eng seems to have a bit of a chip.
Duncs
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mra4eng’s tirade set me thinking…
After spending half my working life serving her majesty in the RAF (the sharp end) & the other half working for the so called t’bungling baron (banter) I feel I’m well qualified to pass comment on both & I’ve come to the conclusion that both have their fair share of “gross incompetence, amateurish fingers, know-it-alls, personnel who, in between eating bacon sandwiches and surfing the internet, persist in the sort of idle talk that many of us left behind at school, glorified spanner monkeys, t*ssers and career animals”,prima donna’s,documented thieves and those who are well versed in the art of ‘Dodgy Dealing’et al…
Oh, & Hadden-Cave slated all three… RAF, BAE & QinetiQ
BAE & the RAF will have to live with each other… They may not like it, but it’s a fact… Move on
After 11 years on MRA4 (ah, so it’s your fault…) where I have worked closely with the RAF on many issues I cannot concur a single observation of mra4eng’s. Indeed, quite the opposite has been the case.
There are many who make statements on here without the benefit of any knowledge of what has gone before or of what is happening within a project, many jump to conclusions & blame the wrong party - MoD, RAF, BAE, (QintetQ & HM Gov rarely get a mention), those in the know merely smile & move on, some cannot… mra4eng.
Banter is something that is not exclusive to, but has risen to quite a high art form in the RAF. Something that civilians have a problem with on occasion…. mra4eng
Whatever the reason, & there are good & bad on both sides, we are where we are. The what, where, how & why need to be analysed & lessons learnt, but we’ve been there before haven’t we?
In short…The RAF will shortly be getting PA4 (Airtest scheduled for next Tuesday) & the crews can then get to grips with working themselves up.
After spending half my working life serving her majesty in the RAF (the sharp end) & the other half working for the so called t’bungling baron (banter) I feel I’m well qualified to pass comment on both & I’ve come to the conclusion that both have their fair share of “gross incompetence, amateurish fingers, know-it-alls, personnel who, in between eating bacon sandwiches and surfing the internet, persist in the sort of idle talk that many of us left behind at school, glorified spanner monkeys, t*ssers and career animals”,prima donna’s,documented thieves and those who are well versed in the art of ‘Dodgy Dealing’et al…
Oh, & Hadden-Cave slated all three… RAF, BAE & QinetiQ
BAE & the RAF will have to live with each other… They may not like it, but it’s a fact… Move on
After 11 years on MRA4 (ah, so it’s your fault…) where I have worked closely with the RAF on many issues I cannot concur a single observation of mra4eng’s. Indeed, quite the opposite has been the case.
There are many who make statements on here without the benefit of any knowledge of what has gone before or of what is happening within a project, many jump to conclusions & blame the wrong party - MoD, RAF, BAE, (QintetQ & HM Gov rarely get a mention), those in the know merely smile & move on, some cannot… mra4eng.
Banter is something that is not exclusive to, but has risen to quite a high art form in the RAF. Something that civilians have a problem with on occasion…. mra4eng
Whatever the reason, & there are good & bad on both sides, we are where we are. The what, where, how & why need to be analysed & lessons learnt, but we’ve been there before haven’t we?
In short…The RAF will shortly be getting PA4 (Airtest scheduled for next Tuesday) & the crews can then get to grips with working themselves up.
methinks that mra4eng seems to have a bit of a chip
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In defence the test engineers at Woodford have been working in excess of 60 hours a week for the last few years, they want the same as us and provide the best aircraft they can and by jesus they work very hard. They are restricted by manpower, unions and all the other stuff that is beyond there control.
On the same note you go to Warton the workforce there is the opposite. I know due to the runway issue at Woodford, why the hell did they not do the test flying and acceptance flying all from Woodford where the specialist guys are located. warton is a traditional fast jet factory, but it would appear BAE did not want Woodford to have its final glory. If it stayed at Woodford then things would be sorted now.
Anyway next week , things will improve and hopefully flying will commence at a very fast rate
On the same note you go to Warton the workforce there is the opposite. I know due to the runway issue at Woodford, why the hell did they not do the test flying and acceptance flying all from Woodford where the specialist guys are located. warton is a traditional fast jet factory, but it would appear BAE did not want Woodford to have its final glory. If it stayed at Woodford then things would be sorted now.
Anyway next week , things will improve and hopefully flying will commence at a very fast rate
Tapper’s Dad, quite rightly, said;
This being so, I continue to struggle with why Mr Haddon-Cave would single out for praise, by name, one of the MRA4 IPT Leaders when it was his job to (a) Be continually assured that the MR2 was airworthy and (b) Meet the Nimrod2000/RMPA/MRA4 In Service Date. Congratulations on the subsequent promotions, sir.
There is also a seldom mentioned section discussing the role and demise of the RAF Chief Engineer post. Mr Haddon-Cave strongly implies that the disestablishment of this post (in about 1998) was closely connected to the onset of MoD’s systemic airworthiness problems. This is utter nonsense, as Mr Haddon-Cave was presented with irrefutable evidence these systemic failings went back to, at least, 1990. (Papers have subsequently emerged pushing this back to 1985).
Questions. Why did Mr Haddon-Cave misrepresent this timeframe and who did this shield from criticism? Who was the Chief Engineer from, say, 1991-1996? Perhaps in his arrogance at being “cleared” by Mr Haddon-Cave, he chose to put his name to a letter to the Telegraph in January this year (along with the CAS of the day), the clear aim being to divert attention from precisely the same problems on Chinook HC Mk2 in 1992-94. That is, under his stewardship, these systemic problems were already biting on other aircraft and nothing was done even though his junior staffs were continually raising concerns about the effect these policies were having. If the Chief Engineer post was so influential in this respect, then he failed miserably. Congratulations on your promotions, sir.
We all know who made themselves look extremely foolish at the Inquest and who Mr Haddon-Cave named and shamed. In time, I hope the policy makers who abrogated their management oversight and Duty of Care obligations, are similarly brought to book.
Defence Procurement can be linked directly to my son's death. Originally the MR2 had an 'out of service' date of 1995. As the RAF/MOD waited for its replacement, the MRA4, the 'out of service' date on my sons aircraft kept getting deferred time and again. The BOI and the Inquest both found that the age of the aircraft components was a major contribution to the loss of Nimrod XV230.
If the Defence Procurement programme had not been in chaos and had been up to date with its orders then Nimrod XV230 would have been replaced, and not flying on 2nd September 2006.
If the Defence Procurement programme had not been in chaos and had been up to date with its orders then Nimrod XV230 would have been replaced, and not flying on 2nd September 2006.
This being so, I continue to struggle with why Mr Haddon-Cave would single out for praise, by name, one of the MRA4 IPT Leaders when it was his job to (a) Be continually assured that the MR2 was airworthy and (b) Meet the Nimrod2000/RMPA/MRA4 In Service Date. Congratulations on the subsequent promotions, sir.
There is also a seldom mentioned section discussing the role and demise of the RAF Chief Engineer post. Mr Haddon-Cave strongly implies that the disestablishment of this post (in about 1998) was closely connected to the onset of MoD’s systemic airworthiness problems. This is utter nonsense, as Mr Haddon-Cave was presented with irrefutable evidence these systemic failings went back to, at least, 1990. (Papers have subsequently emerged pushing this back to 1985).
Questions. Why did Mr Haddon-Cave misrepresent this timeframe and who did this shield from criticism? Who was the Chief Engineer from, say, 1991-1996? Perhaps in his arrogance at being “cleared” by Mr Haddon-Cave, he chose to put his name to a letter to the Telegraph in January this year (along with the CAS of the day), the clear aim being to divert attention from precisely the same problems on Chinook HC Mk2 in 1992-94. That is, under his stewardship, these systemic problems were already biting on other aircraft and nothing was done even though his junior staffs were continually raising concerns about the effect these policies were having. If the Chief Engineer post was so influential in this respect, then he failed miserably. Congratulations on your promotions, sir.
We all know who made themselves look extremely foolish at the Inquest and who Mr Haddon-Cave named and shamed. In time, I hope the policy makers who abrogated their management oversight and Duty of Care obligations, are similarly brought to book.
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Like 641st, I spent a considerable length of time in a blue suit (including 8 years supprting the Nimrod fleet) and almost the same length of time working for "a certain British defence company" which is getting the flak here. When I was in the mob, I used to give "British Wasteofspace" grief, and also received it when I went back to one of my old stations on a contractors working party. On that occasion however my colleague and I (he was an ex-blue suit as well) joined in the mickey taking, much to the annoyance of the guy giving it.
When I was a civvie I used to get grief from my civvie colleagues about the lazy incompentant military always changing it's mind or not using the kit properly, and I wasn't university qualified therefore what did I know about engineering.
Both sides have their faults, but the one thing I have leant along the way is that unless you take the time to understand where the other guy is coming from you'll never get the job done properly.
I apologise for trying to inject some common sense to this thread, I shall endeavour to resist in future.
When I was a civvie I used to get grief from my civvie colleagues about the lazy incompentant military always changing it's mind or not using the kit properly, and I wasn't university qualified therefore what did I know about engineering.
Both sides have their faults, but the one thing I have leant along the way is that unless you take the time to understand where the other guy is coming from you'll never get the job done properly.
I apologise for trying to inject some common sense to this thread, I shall endeavour to resist in future.
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Greenwood VPI reunion 2011
Any idea of the chances for an MRA 4 appearing at Greenwood for the VPI reunion in June 2011? I guess I won't be holding my breath.
If your interested in attending please visit
RV2011- History and Fellowship
If your interested in attending please visit
RV2011- History and Fellowship
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Ogre said
Don't apologise and don't resist, a little common sense never goes amiss, especially from one who has experience of both sides.
Both sides have their faults, but the one thing I have leant along the way is that unless you take the time to understand where the other guy is coming from you'll never get the job done properly.
I apologise for trying to inject some common sense to this thread, I shall endeavour to resist in future.
I apologise for trying to inject some common sense to this thread, I shall endeavour to resist in future.
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Surprised nobody has picked up on this yet:
RAF launches first Nimrod MRA4 training course
Interesting comments from CAS at the bottom of the article too.
RAF launches first Nimrod MRA4 training course
Interesting comments from CAS at the bottom of the article too.
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RAF offers up the MRA4 in SDSR
Well you wouldn't want the truth and quotes from people in the know getting in the way of journalistic license would you. Shame on some of the more respected publications for spreading stories with no substance. 
Let's just hope the RTS happens soon!
Let's just hope the RTS happens soon!
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tucumseh,
whilst I neither wish to still anything up, nor cover old ground, may I suggest this is an MRA4 thread? Your comments refer to MR2 "issues", and have been visited elsewhere on PPRuNe.
whilst I neither wish to still anything up, nor cover old ground, may I suggest this is an MRA4 thread? Your comments refer to MR2 "issues", and have been visited elsewhere on PPRuNe.
Betty
I thought the two were inextricably linked! This thread is about N2000/RMPA/MRA4, which is a (rather large) modification to the MR2. The programme was, or should have been, schemed as such. Failure to implement the procedures governing modification programmes, of which about 90% are common to airworthiness, explains many of MoD's procurement failures. The management failures on MR2 confirmed by Haddon-Cave help explain many of the MRA4 programme delays.
If you read the following (the report was dated 1998) you'll see why H-C's comments didn't come as any surprise. The report is headed "Modifying Defence Equipment". In his evidence, CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) admitted systemic airworthiness failings; only without mentioning the "A" word. If this was you reading this in 1998/9, the first thing you'd do is ask for an audit of any modification programme in progress, because it is a very clear statement that things are not right - but he clearly doesn't realise it or know what to do. Over a year later, he ruled that aircraft need NOT be functionally safe when the contract is paid off and they are offered to the Service. That is not the act of a Department learning from the experience of being publicly trashed by the Public Accounts Committee.
House of Commons - Public Accounts - Thirty-Second Report
I thought the two were inextricably linked! This thread is about N2000/RMPA/MRA4, which is a (rather large) modification to the MR2. The programme was, or should have been, schemed as such. Failure to implement the procedures governing modification programmes, of which about 90% are common to airworthiness, explains many of MoD's procurement failures. The management failures on MR2 confirmed by Haddon-Cave help explain many of the MRA4 programme delays.
If you read the following (the report was dated 1998) you'll see why H-C's comments didn't come as any surprise. The report is headed "Modifying Defence Equipment". In his evidence, CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) admitted systemic airworthiness failings; only without mentioning the "A" word. If this was you reading this in 1998/9, the first thing you'd do is ask for an audit of any modification programme in progress, because it is a very clear statement that things are not right - but he clearly doesn't realise it or know what to do. Over a year later, he ruled that aircraft need NOT be functionally safe when the contract is paid off and they are offered to the Service. That is not the act of a Department learning from the experience of being publicly trashed by the Public Accounts Committee.
House of Commons - Public Accounts - Thirty-Second Report
Re. CAF's statement - It's excellent news that the MRA4 is safe.
However, a word of caution, another senior officer's statement that I remember was:
"If AEOps get down-banded - I'll resign" (AOC 18Gp).
However, a word of caution, another senior officer's statement that I remember was:
"If AEOps get down-banded - I'll resign" (AOC 18Gp).
Betty:
tuc:
Well he got it right for the MR2, it wasn't!
Siggie:
Er, just a minute, I think we might have a problem here!
may I suggest this is an MRA4 thread? Your comments refer to MR2 "issues", and have been visited elsewhere on PPRuNe.
In his evidence, CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) admitted systemic airworthiness failings.............Over a year later, he ruled that aircraft need NOT be functionally safe when the contract is paid off and they are offered to the Service.
Siggie:
It's excellent news that the MRA4 is safe.