CVF
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I'm sorry Bismarck I can't let that go past without at least a small comment.
a. The Hawk line has dried up has it? Please define dried up as I assume the aircraft currently being built for domestic use in the RAF and Export to the IAF do not count?
b. Oh yes the IAF, now I may have been dreaming but I have a distinct memory of being in India on what was almost solely a Defence Diplomacy Exercise in 2006 and then again at home in 2007. Spooky... Oh and hang on I could have sworn that in the tour before that I taught a succession of junior IAF fast jet pilots. Nah, I must be imagining it because as you say
c.
Again I must have been reading something else because I could swear The BBMF was included in the whole historic/recruitment vs current capability argument.
So Cranwell, well I assume by that statement you are happy to shut Sandhurst and Dartmouth too and outsource officer training to Tesco?
d.
What? I'm simply flabbergasted...
e. No you know what I can't be bothered. You are clearly not interested in digesting opinion or indeed researching evidence. No instead you and a number of other blinkered CVF fans do the RN no favours in trying to convey to the doubters why they feel CVF is essential.
I sincerely, desperately hope you are not a serving member of HM Forces with such a woeful lack of service knowledge and yet such a keen desire to demonstrate your ignorance.
RANT OFF.
Damn that feels better I'm off for a long night in a dutch bar.
a. The Hawk line has dried up has it? Please define dried up as I assume the aircraft currently being built for domestic use in the RAF and Export to the IAF do not count?
b. Oh yes the IAF, now I may have been dreaming but I have a distinct memory of being in India on what was almost solely a Defence Diplomacy Exercise in 2006 and then again at home in 2007. Spooky... Oh and hang on I could have sworn that in the tour before that I taught a succession of junior IAF fast jet pilots. Nah, I must be imagining it because as you say
Defence Diplomacy (the latter only covered by the RN, neither the Army or RAF do this).
And why no mention of BBMF and Cranwell? There's another £12M+ per year each.
So Cranwell, well I assume by that statement you are happy to shut Sandhurst and Dartmouth too and outsource officer training to Tesco?
d.
The reason that the Harrier Force is in such dire straits is that the senior RAF have lost interest in it and will not invest money in solving the training dilemma. Now if the RN were to pull out of it I suspect we would see a change of priority, surprise, surprise.
e. No you know what I can't be bothered. You are clearly not interested in digesting opinion or indeed researching evidence. No instead you and a number of other blinkered CVF fans do the RN no favours in trying to convey to the doubters why they feel CVF is essential.
I sincerely, desperately hope you are not a serving member of HM Forces with such a woeful lack of service knowledge and yet such a keen desire to demonstrate your ignorance.
RANT OFF.
Damn that feels better I'm off for a long night in a dutch bar.
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Jacko,
If it would do any good I could invite you to the Joint Services Command and Staff College where we regularly join in tri-service informed debate on all things defence and foreign policy related. As a student on the said course of 320 'high quality' officers of all three services I can tell you that your viewpoint does not reflect the long term views of the majority Army and Air Force students. If you were to attend our fiesty debates you would understand the need for a balanced view of the Armed Forces of the future that is suited not only to the current conflicts but those of the future where the security of our country, in economic as well as military terms will depend on our ability to counter threats well away from our nation without a reliance on host nation support. With the increasing dangers of global warming and sea-level rise our interests and ability to protect them will be additionally challenged and a reliance on fixed based operations will be a serious weakness.
Success on current operations is not directly linked to the spending decisions of the government on projects to be delivered in 5-10 years time, but on coherent strategic outcomes and operational plans which focus on a comprehensive approach with other government departments and nations. As has been continiously stated by the governments of both the UK and the US our NATO partners must assist in delivering these by providing combat troops and support in the more difficult areas of the country (these we cannot supply since we do not have big enough armed forces).
Current defence policy as laid out in SDR and the susbsequent New Chapter remains the best way to deal with the broad thrust of future threats beyond those in Afghnanistan and Iraq laid out coherently in the DCDC future trends paper. http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk/Current operations have different challenges more to do with politics than procurement policy, and the successlful application of UORs shows the flexibility that can be applied when required.
Money is always tight in defence and prioritisation is a difficult task that is currently demanding much from our management team. Some would accuse us of mismanagement but with an oil price that has risen by some 30-40% in the last year who should be surprised that previous plans have required revision.
Personally I don't think you will ever be persuaded that our decisions on force structures fit with your air centric ideology, but, as I have this year, try to look beyond your own experience and bias to the broader needs of this country to guarantee its future security.
Si
If it would do any good I could invite you to the Joint Services Command and Staff College where we regularly join in tri-service informed debate on all things defence and foreign policy related. As a student on the said course of 320 'high quality' officers of all three services I can tell you that your viewpoint does not reflect the long term views of the majority Army and Air Force students. If you were to attend our fiesty debates you would understand the need for a balanced view of the Armed Forces of the future that is suited not only to the current conflicts but those of the future where the security of our country, in economic as well as military terms will depend on our ability to counter threats well away from our nation without a reliance on host nation support. With the increasing dangers of global warming and sea-level rise our interests and ability to protect them will be additionally challenged and a reliance on fixed based operations will be a serious weakness.
Success on current operations is not directly linked to the spending decisions of the government on projects to be delivered in 5-10 years time, but on coherent strategic outcomes and operational plans which focus on a comprehensive approach with other government departments and nations. As has been continiously stated by the governments of both the UK and the US our NATO partners must assist in delivering these by providing combat troops and support in the more difficult areas of the country (these we cannot supply since we do not have big enough armed forces).
Current defence policy as laid out in SDR and the susbsequent New Chapter remains the best way to deal with the broad thrust of future threats beyond those in Afghnanistan and Iraq laid out coherently in the DCDC future trends paper. http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk/Current operations have different challenges more to do with politics than procurement policy, and the successlful application of UORs shows the flexibility that can be applied when required.
Money is always tight in defence and prioritisation is a difficult task that is currently demanding much from our management team. Some would accuse us of mismanagement but with an oil price that has risen by some 30-40% in the last year who should be surprised that previous plans have required revision.
Personally I don't think you will ever be persuaded that our decisions on force structures fit with your air centric ideology, but, as I have this year, try to look beyond your own experience and bias to the broader needs of this country to guarantee its future security.
Si
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Bismarck,
What is this 'training dilemma' of which you talk? Is it the difficulty of maintaining a ludicrously small cadre of RN fast-jet pilots using entirely the same training system as teh RAF but without anywhere to send them if they don't quite cut it as single-seat and no career prospects above Commander?
My solution - the RN gets 2 CVF, the RAF flies and maintains all the jets. best value for defence all round.
What is this 'training dilemma' of which you talk? Is it the difficulty of maintaining a ludicrously small cadre of RN fast-jet pilots using entirely the same training system as teh RAF but without anywhere to send them if they don't quite cut it as single-seat and no career prospects above Commander?
My solution - the RN gets 2 CVF, the RAF flies and maintains all the jets. best value for defence all round.
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OA
Thats an interesting suggestion and would probabl;y work if we were not all somewhat imperfect human beings. The problem with it being that in times of conflict the RN and RAF drive off in two different directions, each according to its doctrines. I could cite historic examples if required.
Perhaps a better solution would be for the FAA to man three squadrons for each carrier, with the RAF providing the wartime "surge" if required? This would leave the RN in command of the fighters needed to defend itself with the RAF chipping in for anything beyond fleet defence.
Thats an interesting suggestion and would probabl;y work if we were not all somewhat imperfect human beings. The problem with it being that in times of conflict the RN and RAF drive off in two different directions, each according to its doctrines. I could cite historic examples if required.
Perhaps a better solution would be for the FAA to man three squadrons for each carrier, with the RAF providing the wartime "surge" if required? This would leave the RN in command of the fighters needed to defend itself with the RAF chipping in for anything beyond fleet defence.
The combination of carriers and JSF together represent a massive investment (even ignoring the massive support that a CBG requires) - but one which will give us the ability to deploy only a relatively modest air wing at relatively modest speed and huge expense.
It will only be affordable via a most unlikely hike in defence spending, or by dramatic cuts to other, less exciting but more useful capability areas.
As such, spending on carriers unbalances our forces, and makes them less useful.
Call me cynical (and though I'd kill to be exposed to the informed debate that goes on there), but it doesn't surprise me that the distinguished students at Shrivenham largely support the policy that they'll be expected to implement in their subsequent careers, and it certainly doesn't surprise me that there isn't too much intra-service bickering and argument (on a single service basis, criticising another service's pet programme, and especially one to which our political masters are so firmly committed).
I've never heard a senior officer publicly criticise PFIs - the best anyone's managed having been a vaguely apologetic, mildly regretful, even slightly embarrassed admission that "in other circumstances...."
Nor does the record of half stars and one stars standing up against the way in which 'Smart' has been distorted and twisted to cover a risk averse shuffling off of all support to a monopolistic and monolithic BAE in a succession of DA mods and DA upgrades and an orgy of availability based support contracting. The most distinguished exception to the rule of craven collaboration soon found himself losing his job as the head of his IPT......
So the fact (?) that Army and Air Force students at the Joint Services Command and Staff College are in agreement as to the usefulness and need for carriers does not entirely surprise me.....
It will only be affordable via a most unlikely hike in defence spending, or by dramatic cuts to other, less exciting but more useful capability areas.
As such, spending on carriers unbalances our forces, and makes them less useful.
Call me cynical (and though I'd kill to be exposed to the informed debate that goes on there), but it doesn't surprise me that the distinguished students at Shrivenham largely support the policy that they'll be expected to implement in their subsequent careers, and it certainly doesn't surprise me that there isn't too much intra-service bickering and argument (on a single service basis, criticising another service's pet programme, and especially one to which our political masters are so firmly committed).
I've never heard a senior officer publicly criticise PFIs - the best anyone's managed having been a vaguely apologetic, mildly regretful, even slightly embarrassed admission that "in other circumstances...."
Nor does the record of half stars and one stars standing up against the way in which 'Smart' has been distorted and twisted to cover a risk averse shuffling off of all support to a monopolistic and monolithic BAE in a succession of DA mods and DA upgrades and an orgy of availability based support contracting. The most distinguished exception to the rule of craven collaboration soon found himself losing his job as the head of his IPT......
So the fact (?) that Army and Air Force students at the Joint Services Command and Staff College are in agreement as to the usefulness and need for carriers does not entirely surprise me.....
JN, in fairness to the inmates, you'd be surprised...
Si Clik (who I fear I will have bored more than once...) uses the word 'feisty' to describe the debate, and believe me it always is. There isn't an almost sheep-like acceptance of things just for the sake of it, far from it.
I have seen RN officers who begin the course as dyed-in-the-wool 'bin Typhoon, more JCA, consider disbanding the RAF, no CVF would mean the end of civilisation as we know it' advocates turn into vocal proponents for the full Tranche 3 Typhoon buy, and previously sceptical RAF officers warm to the notion of a CVF purchase, even if they will dispute/banter frequently with their RN colleagues about whether or not there should be any 800-series squadrons flying the JCA.
Indeed, I have even heard an Army officer say ' RAF pilots are worth every penny of their flying pay, and it'd be a disgrace to chop Typhoon.' And he was sober and in full possession of his mental faculties when he said it, too!
Si Clik (who I fear I will have bored more than once...) uses the word 'feisty' to describe the debate, and believe me it always is. There isn't an almost sheep-like acceptance of things just for the sake of it, far from it.
I have seen RN officers who begin the course as dyed-in-the-wool 'bin Typhoon, more JCA, consider disbanding the RAF, no CVF would mean the end of civilisation as we know it' advocates turn into vocal proponents for the full Tranche 3 Typhoon buy, and previously sceptical RAF officers warm to the notion of a CVF purchase, even if they will dispute/banter frequently with their RN colleagues about whether or not there should be any 800-series squadrons flying the JCA.
Indeed, I have even heard an Army officer say ' RAF pilots are worth every penny of their flying pay, and it'd be a disgrace to chop Typhoon.' And he was sober and in full possession of his mental faculties when he said it, too!
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Excuse my lack of knowledge here but are there any estimates of the running costs of two CFV (after initial build and purchase of air compliment) compared with the cost of three Illustrious class carriers?
Are we suggesting that once the three mini carriers and the GR9's become too old to be used, then there should be no replacements? Would this not weaken the capability the RN's expensive new amphibious units?
Are we suggesting that once the three mini carriers and the GR9's become too old to be used, then there should be no replacements? Would this not weaken the capability the RN's expensive new amphibious units?
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Sunk at Narvik,
I was actually just trolling. However:
Our JOINT doctrine places carrier-based air under the joint force air commander. The joint force maritime commander then bids for the assets required for fleet defence - which could be from the carrier, or could be from elsewhere - for example, if we needed the stealthy JSF to fly a 'day one' mission, they could all fly off and do that, whicle the fleet might be defended by rear-based Typhoon, or F-18 flying off a US carrier. In terms of how much of the force is allocated to what role, that is naturally the joint commander's call on the day, but you may be interested to note that SRO(C) is working on the assumption that four JSF per carrier are nominally assigned to AD, with all the rest available for land attack. How would that stack up with your three RN squadrons per carrier?
Actually, despite the impression you may have gained from my previous post, I really think we need to get away from the short-sighted ownership issues. Jets on a carrier are not the fleet's toys to use for defending the fleet; they are the joint commander's assets and are used like any other element of air power - they just happen to be on a floating airfield. And no, I'm not overlooking the specialist skills, training, practise and mindset needed to operate an effective carrier air group - ship, aircraft, C2 etc. To an extent, all these arguments apply to an expeditionary air wing too. In capability terms, that is what a carrier is.
Despite what you may think of Jacko, not everything he says is wrong. Carriers ARE an expensive way to project a modest amount of air power at fast walking pace. However, that's not an argument against them - helicopters are an expensive and inefficient way of moving not very much payload not very far not very fast - but we still need them because we want to have the capability to put soldiers and kit in and out of places where there aren't runways. A similar argument could apply to carriers - it is about what kind of country we want to be. However, we must think clearly about what it is we want to achieve - if it's all about Land Attack (as many in the RN are outwardly portraying it), then you can get expeditionary in many other ways too - in Afghanistan and Iraq, more than half the ordnance dropped was by aircraft that took off from US soil - and hardly in a politically sympathetic atmosphere in the case of Iraq.
I haven't really come down on one side or the other - and yes, Jacko, the debates are pretty feisty. However, having come to it with an open mind, the only person who seems consistently balanced on this is Magic Mushroom - and actually the most blinkered and prejudiced views seem to be on the pro-carrier side. Anyone questioning carriers (and all requirements should come under scrutiny) seems to be dismissed as not understanding or abused if they come back for a second go.
I am also mightily fed up of the RAF being portrayed as the author of all the RN's ills. We are NOT briefing aginst CVF, nor are we scheming to undermine it. Yes, thirty-five years ago there may have been an issue over where Diego Garcia was on the map, but having read what Dennis Healey (who made the decison) has to say on the subject, there was a lot more to it than that - in fact at one point he indicated that one of the things that swung it was that the RN were unwilling even to engage in debate - "we need two carriers and that's it." Ring any bells?
And while I'm ranting, the other issue I'd like people to have more balance about is Typhoon. Now, like it or not, it will be the cornerstone of our future air power. Nevertheless, the RAF is not insisting on 232 aircraft at any cost. we all know this number is too high - but we do need Trance 3, not for the airframes but for the capability it gives us. Anyone who thinks we could save any money at all by cancelling Trance 3 needs to find out more about the programme and how we, the Brits, locked everyone in to it, and then take a look at what money is where in the EP and explain how it would actually help - as most of it has already been spent and is is separated by several clear years from the main spend on CVF, Astute, FRES etc. And talking of capability, why are people still chuntering on about lashing up an AD aircraft for CAS? Typhoon was ALWAYS going to be swing role. I can remember going to a presentation at BAe Warton before the Berlin Wall came down and discussing how EFA (remember that) was going to replace the RAF's Buccaneers and Jaguars, as well as what was then the F2.
That's all for now, but I'd be delighted to hear other opinions!
I was actually just trolling. However:
Our JOINT doctrine places carrier-based air under the joint force air commander. The joint force maritime commander then bids for the assets required for fleet defence - which could be from the carrier, or could be from elsewhere - for example, if we needed the stealthy JSF to fly a 'day one' mission, they could all fly off and do that, whicle the fleet might be defended by rear-based Typhoon, or F-18 flying off a US carrier. In terms of how much of the force is allocated to what role, that is naturally the joint commander's call on the day, but you may be interested to note that SRO(C) is working on the assumption that four JSF per carrier are nominally assigned to AD, with all the rest available for land attack. How would that stack up with your three RN squadrons per carrier?
Actually, despite the impression you may have gained from my previous post, I really think we need to get away from the short-sighted ownership issues. Jets on a carrier are not the fleet's toys to use for defending the fleet; they are the joint commander's assets and are used like any other element of air power - they just happen to be on a floating airfield. And no, I'm not overlooking the specialist skills, training, practise and mindset needed to operate an effective carrier air group - ship, aircraft, C2 etc. To an extent, all these arguments apply to an expeditionary air wing too. In capability terms, that is what a carrier is.
Despite what you may think of Jacko, not everything he says is wrong. Carriers ARE an expensive way to project a modest amount of air power at fast walking pace. However, that's not an argument against them - helicopters are an expensive and inefficient way of moving not very much payload not very far not very fast - but we still need them because we want to have the capability to put soldiers and kit in and out of places where there aren't runways. A similar argument could apply to carriers - it is about what kind of country we want to be. However, we must think clearly about what it is we want to achieve - if it's all about Land Attack (as many in the RN are outwardly portraying it), then you can get expeditionary in many other ways too - in Afghanistan and Iraq, more than half the ordnance dropped was by aircraft that took off from US soil - and hardly in a politically sympathetic atmosphere in the case of Iraq.
I haven't really come down on one side or the other - and yes, Jacko, the debates are pretty feisty. However, having come to it with an open mind, the only person who seems consistently balanced on this is Magic Mushroom - and actually the most blinkered and prejudiced views seem to be on the pro-carrier side. Anyone questioning carriers (and all requirements should come under scrutiny) seems to be dismissed as not understanding or abused if they come back for a second go.
I am also mightily fed up of the RAF being portrayed as the author of all the RN's ills. We are NOT briefing aginst CVF, nor are we scheming to undermine it. Yes, thirty-five years ago there may have been an issue over where Diego Garcia was on the map, but having read what Dennis Healey (who made the decison) has to say on the subject, there was a lot more to it than that - in fact at one point he indicated that one of the things that swung it was that the RN were unwilling even to engage in debate - "we need two carriers and that's it." Ring any bells?
And while I'm ranting, the other issue I'd like people to have more balance about is Typhoon. Now, like it or not, it will be the cornerstone of our future air power. Nevertheless, the RAF is not insisting on 232 aircraft at any cost. we all know this number is too high - but we do need Trance 3, not for the airframes but for the capability it gives us. Anyone who thinks we could save any money at all by cancelling Trance 3 needs to find out more about the programme and how we, the Brits, locked everyone in to it, and then take a look at what money is where in the EP and explain how it would actually help - as most of it has already been spent and is is separated by several clear years from the main spend on CVF, Astute, FRES etc. And talking of capability, why are people still chuntering on about lashing up an AD aircraft for CAS? Typhoon was ALWAYS going to be swing role. I can remember going to a presentation at BAe Warton before the Berlin Wall came down and discussing how EFA (remember that) was going to replace the RAF's Buccaneers and Jaguars, as well as what was then the F2.
That's all for now, but I'd be delighted to hear other opinions!
"This would leave the RN in command of the fighters needed to defend itself with the RAF chipping in for anything beyond fleet defence."
S-a-N, Be very careful with statements like that. You just feed the "self-licking lollipop" school of thought, and make it look like all the RN is interested in is ownership of toys. The purpose of the CVF is eloquently described by OA; it is a joint force asset, with it's TAG normally chopped to the JFACC. The TAG might just as easily, if it is BH/AH heavy, be under the control of COMATG or the JFLCC.
"Chipping In" is just not a good enough reason for CVF; it must be able to PROJECT power, not just defend itself. Anyway, I thought the RN was claiming all sort of wondrous AD capabilities for the T45, so nearly all the TAG could be used for offensive action....
S-a-N, Be very careful with statements like that. You just feed the "self-licking lollipop" school of thought, and make it look like all the RN is interested in is ownership of toys. The purpose of the CVF is eloquently described by OA; it is a joint force asset, with it's TAG normally chopped to the JFACC. The TAG might just as easily, if it is BH/AH heavy, be under the control of COMATG or the JFLCC.
"Chipping In" is just not a good enough reason for CVF; it must be able to PROJECT power, not just defend itself. Anyway, I thought the RN was claiming all sort of wondrous AD capabilities for the T45, so nearly all the TAG could be used for offensive action....
I wouldn't want anyone not to question Typhoon (especially Tranche 3), as no sacred cow should be viewed as being sacrosanct in these difficult times, and any means of saving money should be assessed on its merits.
Unless we do so, we'll have a bizarre force mix, of the Brass's favoured toys (CVF, Typhoon, FRES) and the odd bits and pieces that win support on nostalgic grounds, or because they are well known to the Public (The Reds, Dartmouth, the Kings Troop RHA), while the Canberra PR9 and Nimrod R1 (for example) will go unreplaced.
In fact, any informed debate would VERY quickly conclude that Typhoon is:
a) Needed, both for UK AD and as a flexible, deployable, cost effective A-G platform (It's clear that with a modest resurgence in Russian air activity, four AD squadrons is barely enough for UK AD, and three extra squadrons to support expeditionary requirements, etc, is hardly controversial, surely?). Even with seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, we'd have fewer Typhoon units than those they're supposed to replace.
b) Largely paid for already, with cancellation penalties making cancellation financially unattractive
as OA says.
The only point I'd take issue with is the claim that "we all know" that 232 is 'too many'. 232 is meant to sustain a fleet of 137 through to the planned OSD (a bloody long way away when the figure was dreamed up, and likely to slip to the right, quite rightly, with no rapid development in the threat). 137 aircraft was supposed to support seven frontline squadrons, with 15 aircraft each, (plus an in-use reserve each), four aircraft in the Falklands, an OCU with 24 jets (plus two in-use reserves), and an OEU with four jets.
Seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, to replace three Jag and five Tornado F3 units (and some of the dwindling GR4 fleet) does not seem to me to be in any way excessive.
Unless we do so, we'll have a bizarre force mix, of the Brass's favoured toys (CVF, Typhoon, FRES) and the odd bits and pieces that win support on nostalgic grounds, or because they are well known to the Public (The Reds, Dartmouth, the Kings Troop RHA), while the Canberra PR9 and Nimrod R1 (for example) will go unreplaced.
In fact, any informed debate would VERY quickly conclude that Typhoon is:
a) Needed, both for UK AD and as a flexible, deployable, cost effective A-G platform (It's clear that with a modest resurgence in Russian air activity, four AD squadrons is barely enough for UK AD, and three extra squadrons to support expeditionary requirements, etc, is hardly controversial, surely?). Even with seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, we'd have fewer Typhoon units than those they're supposed to replace.
b) Largely paid for already, with cancellation penalties making cancellation financially unattractive
as OA says.
The only point I'd take issue with is the claim that "we all know" that 232 is 'too many'. 232 is meant to sustain a fleet of 137 through to the planned OSD (a bloody long way away when the figure was dreamed up, and likely to slip to the right, quite rightly, with no rapid development in the threat). 137 aircraft was supposed to support seven frontline squadrons, with 15 aircraft each, (plus an in-use reserve each), four aircraft in the Falklands, an OCU with 24 jets (plus two in-use reserves), and an OEU with four jets.
Seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, to replace three Jag and five Tornado F3 units (and some of the dwindling GR4 fleet) does not seem to me to be in any way excessive.
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No real need to get all excited about this small hiccup in the steady politically induced decline of the UK armed forces, there are many long months to go yet of evaluation and testing, oh and then the committee stage were intelligent individuals will prognosticate for days on subjects thinly connected to cabbage and it’s medicinal effects on the average Royal Navy enlisted mans dietary requirements all followed by a round of jolly House discussions after which they will Cancel the whole idea and put themselves up for re-election.
So no matter who or what is too blame or how many millions of your money they manage to waste in the process the UK will never have a pair of carriers for anyone to consider putting our non existent aircraft on.
So no matter who or what is too blame or how many millions of your money they manage to waste in the process the UK will never have a pair of carriers for anyone to consider putting our non existent aircraft on.
And if you think that’s as tedious as WEBF banging on about SHar, or if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’, I’d suggest that you take the plank (of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice) out of your own eye, Widger.
I think you owe me an apology. You seem to have credited someone else's rant (if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’,) to me. You might like to check previous posts.
I do apologise, Mr W.
I see that the "F*cked Parrot" post has been removed in toto. I apologise for attributing it to you - truth is I can't remember who said it, and your graceful apology for your 'earlier vitriol' led me to assume - without checking.
Sincere apologies.
I couldn't actually see any vitriol in anything you'd posted (if you think that your post at the bottom of page 1 was vitriolic, you need to eat more red meat) and I assumed that you'd removed the post (though I now see that it wasn't yours to remove!), though comparing me to WEBF "banging on about SHar" in your 'apology' was, if anything, worse than the parrot remark!
I see that the "F*cked Parrot" post has been removed in toto. I apologise for attributing it to you - truth is I can't remember who said it, and your graceful apology for your 'earlier vitriol' led me to assume - without checking.
Sincere apologies.
I couldn't actually see any vitriol in anything you'd posted (if you think that your post at the bottom of page 1 was vitriolic, you need to eat more red meat) and I assumed that you'd removed the post (though I now see that it wasn't yours to remove!), though comparing me to WEBF "banging on about SHar" in your 'apology' was, if anything, worse than the parrot remark!
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232 too many?
Jacko,
whilst I see where you're coming from, current plans (and therefore funding) does not see us operating anything like 137 Typhoon - in fact, the fast-jet force in toto is looking at less than 100 FE@R. So, although you may feel that we should have more, I would politely remind you of your earlier point that we can't have all the toys we fancy.
Why is that important on a thread about CVF? Well, those numbers include JSF, and how you look at this little conundrum significantly affects whether carriers are really the answer for UK defence in the round.
If we were to assume that we do manage to keep one of the two CVs at sea all the time, then we have to think very hard about whether we tie a really substantial portion of the UK's air power securely to those decks, or whether we're a bit more flexible about it. This is what caused my (admittedly long) knee-jerk about SaN's intimation that the carrier air should be under fleet command. There is a real dilemma here: to be effective, the ships have to be used to working with aircraft and the aircrew used to operating off ships (although the latter is slightly less of a problem) - but to get the most out of the small FJ force we will have there is no way that we can keep jets on the carriers just for training, or while they steam to the scene of a crisis at fast walking pace.
Also, from an admittedly parochial single-service perspective, the seats in those cockpits are far more valuable to the RAF than they are the RN, as that is where the core seed-corn of our warfighters and future commanders come from, whereas I have yet to be convinced that either single list RN pilots have a realistic career beyond commander, or that general-list officers will be able to devote enough of their career to flying to be effective in a complex platform like JSF. Added to which the current practice and future plan is that RN pilots will do exactly the same training and operate in exactly the same way as their RAF counterparts (stand fast Dartmouth) and I don't see where the value of trying to maintain this unsustainably small cadre lies. Sea-mindedness comes from operating at sea, not wearing gold on your shoulder - I'm sure no-one would suggest that the Naval Strike Wing is any less adept at doing CAS in Afghanistan than the RAF, so why would it be any different the other way round?
whilst I see where you're coming from, current plans (and therefore funding) does not see us operating anything like 137 Typhoon - in fact, the fast-jet force in toto is looking at less than 100 FE@R. So, although you may feel that we should have more, I would politely remind you of your earlier point that we can't have all the toys we fancy.
Why is that important on a thread about CVF? Well, those numbers include JSF, and how you look at this little conundrum significantly affects whether carriers are really the answer for UK defence in the round.
If we were to assume that we do manage to keep one of the two CVs at sea all the time, then we have to think very hard about whether we tie a really substantial portion of the UK's air power securely to those decks, or whether we're a bit more flexible about it. This is what caused my (admittedly long) knee-jerk about SaN's intimation that the carrier air should be under fleet command. There is a real dilemma here: to be effective, the ships have to be used to working with aircraft and the aircrew used to operating off ships (although the latter is slightly less of a problem) - but to get the most out of the small FJ force we will have there is no way that we can keep jets on the carriers just for training, or while they steam to the scene of a crisis at fast walking pace.
Also, from an admittedly parochial single-service perspective, the seats in those cockpits are far more valuable to the RAF than they are the RN, as that is where the core seed-corn of our warfighters and future commanders come from, whereas I have yet to be convinced that either single list RN pilots have a realistic career beyond commander, or that general-list officers will be able to devote enough of their career to flying to be effective in a complex platform like JSF. Added to which the current practice and future plan is that RN pilots will do exactly the same training and operate in exactly the same way as their RAF counterparts (stand fast Dartmouth) and I don't see where the value of trying to maintain this unsustainably small cadre lies. Sea-mindedness comes from operating at sea, not wearing gold on your shoulder - I'm sure no-one would suggest that the Naval Strike Wing is any less adept at doing CAS in Afghanistan than the RAF, so why would it be any different the other way round?
It's too often 'one rule for one, a different rule for the other.'
This extends to the very justification for carriers.
All sorts of capabilities (and even overall force levels) are predicated on the basis (enshrined in the defence assumptions) that we will never mount a major operation without allies or as part of a coalition.
I don't like it, but I do wonder whether we have either the money, the national will, or the political b*llocks to assume anything else.
Officially, that's why we don't need the kind of air force we had when we participated in Granby (31 frontline fast jet squadrons, including 39/1 PRU, compared to just 13 today!). In shrinking to meet the requirements of this new reality the RAF's frontline has contracted more dramatically, in a shorter time, than the Royal Navy (measured by frontline surface fleet ships) did, and yet faces further shrinkage to pay for these carriers.
And yet the CVF adherents argue for their cause based on the idea that we may one day 'go it alone' in some major operation, and insist that we are supposed to fund such a remote eventuality (something for which there has been no essential NEED since '82), while cutting the core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, whether with an ally, coalition or alone.
Why should the RN alone not have to cut its coat according to the cloth outlined in the defence assumptions? Especially when what it proposes will cost so much that it will dramatically distort force levels and force structure across the remainder of the board.
And make no mistake, the money about to be spent on carriers and JSF could fund a dramatic increase in those workaday capabilities and equipment areas that we need and use all the time - SH, tankers, Nimrod R replacement, PR9 replacement, FJ squadrons etc. Funding these instead would increase our useable combat power (and thus our influence) and reduce overstretch.
But no, we're a maritime island nation, the heirs to Raleigh, Drake, Nelson and the rest, and so we need a blue water navy that can boldly go and project power across the globe, independent of any allies, even if paying for it bankrupts us, and means that we can't afford the capabilities that we actually need and use all the time. Unlike Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia we need strike carriers, and apparently they are worth any sacrifice elsewhere in the defence budget.
In an ideal world, I'd want the kind of forces that would allow us to do exactly that, and to be able to do another Suez (without relying on France and Israel), with half a dozen carriers, fleets of bombers, and the ability to drop paras in brigade strength, all the while with a nuclear deterrent consisting of SLBMs, cruise missiles, and a stand off air launched weapon. But such an ambition is as unrealistic as the delusion that we can or should afford CV(F). That's simply no longer the world that Britain inhabits.
This extends to the very justification for carriers.
All sorts of capabilities (and even overall force levels) are predicated on the basis (enshrined in the defence assumptions) that we will never mount a major operation without allies or as part of a coalition.
I don't like it, but I do wonder whether we have either the money, the national will, or the political b*llocks to assume anything else.
Officially, that's why we don't need the kind of air force we had when we participated in Granby (31 frontline fast jet squadrons, including 39/1 PRU, compared to just 13 today!). In shrinking to meet the requirements of this new reality the RAF's frontline has contracted more dramatically, in a shorter time, than the Royal Navy (measured by frontline surface fleet ships) did, and yet faces further shrinkage to pay for these carriers.
And yet the CVF adherents argue for their cause based on the idea that we may one day 'go it alone' in some major operation, and insist that we are supposed to fund such a remote eventuality (something for which there has been no essential NEED since '82), while cutting the core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, whether with an ally, coalition or alone.
Why should the RN alone not have to cut its coat according to the cloth outlined in the defence assumptions? Especially when what it proposes will cost so much that it will dramatically distort force levels and force structure across the remainder of the board.
And make no mistake, the money about to be spent on carriers and JSF could fund a dramatic increase in those workaday capabilities and equipment areas that we need and use all the time - SH, tankers, Nimrod R replacement, PR9 replacement, FJ squadrons etc. Funding these instead would increase our useable combat power (and thus our influence) and reduce overstretch.
But no, we're a maritime island nation, the heirs to Raleigh, Drake, Nelson and the rest, and so we need a blue water navy that can boldly go and project power across the globe, independent of any allies, even if paying for it bankrupts us, and means that we can't afford the capabilities that we actually need and use all the time. Unlike Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia we need strike carriers, and apparently they are worth any sacrifice elsewhere in the defence budget.
In an ideal world, I'd want the kind of forces that would allow us to do exactly that, and to be able to do another Suez (without relying on France and Israel), with half a dozen carriers, fleets of bombers, and the ability to drop paras in brigade strength, all the while with a nuclear deterrent consisting of SLBMs, cruise missiles, and a stand off air launched weapon. But such an ambition is as unrealistic as the delusion that we can or should afford CV(F). That's simply no longer the world that Britain inhabits.
OA,
How many FE@readiness would the 137 aircraft Typhoon force give us, bearing in mind that 28 are immediately discounted by being assigned to the OCU and OEU?
If we only have 100, then how many do we tie to the carrier?
It sounds to me as though a mix of Typhoon and FCAC JSF (none of them tied to a carrier) will give us the most cost effective, flexible and useful force mix.
How many FE@readiness would the 137 aircraft Typhoon force give us, bearing in mind that 28 are immediately discounted by being assigned to the OCU and OEU?
If we only have 100, then how many do we tie to the carrier?
It sounds to me as though a mix of Typhoon and FCAC JSF (none of them tied to a carrier) will give us the most cost effective, flexible and useful force mix.
In shrinking to meet the requirements of this new reality the RAF's frontline has contracted more dramatically, in a shorter time, than the Royal Navy (measured by frontline surface fleet ships) did, and yet faces further shrinkage to pay for these carriers.
Sorry Jacko - can't let that one lie. You can't call "surface ships" like with like for the FJ community. In 1990, the RN had over 40 FF/DD - it is likely to be under half that shortly (it's already only 25). In addition there were 14 SSN and four SSK (now 8 and none respectively) and the RN had to look after the deterrent (which really doesn't add much to the non-bomber FE@R) and as I've mentioned before, ought to be funded centrally.
I won't go into the impact on RFA (see 3 basin in Portsmouth for what has been withdrawn) or the FAA. Suffice to say I believe the RN still has a lower manpower establishment than the RAF, so the pain has undoubtedly been shared and not just "to pay for the carriers". I would suggest that the pain has been imposed to pay for the best part of a decade operating well above the DP assumptions yet without the necessary funding from the Treasury. There are a number of procurement f8ck-ups that are contributing to this, many of them a direct result of the centre blithely shuffling the budget to "pay for" the ongoing underfunding.
CVF is not about going it alone - it's about giving "some" independence from HNS. I have suggested before that someone turning off the fuel dump pumps or locking the bomb dump is more likely than losing a carrier.
JCA, Typhoon, CVF and all the other clubs are complementary capabilities. Now - on with agreeing to disagree........
Sorry Jacko - can't let that one lie. You can't call "surface ships" like with like for the FJ community. In 1990, the RN had over 40 FF/DD - it is likely to be under half that shortly (it's already only 25). In addition there were 14 SSN and four SSK (now 8 and none respectively) and the RN had to look after the deterrent (which really doesn't add much to the non-bomber FE@R) and as I've mentioned before, ought to be funded centrally.
I won't go into the impact on RFA (see 3 basin in Portsmouth for what has been withdrawn) or the FAA. Suffice to say I believe the RN still has a lower manpower establishment than the RAF, so the pain has undoubtedly been shared and not just "to pay for the carriers". I would suggest that the pain has been imposed to pay for the best part of a decade operating well above the DP assumptions yet without the necessary funding from the Treasury. There are a number of procurement f8ck-ups that are contributing to this, many of them a direct result of the centre blithely shuffling the budget to "pay for" the ongoing underfunding.
CVF is not about going it alone - it's about giving "some" independence from HNS. I have suggested before that someone turning off the fuel dump pumps or locking the bomb dump is more likely than losing a carrier.
JCA, Typhoon, CVF and all the other clubs are complementary capabilities. Now - on with agreeing to disagree........
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Fight The Real Enemy
Pruners
It's not CVF or Type 45. It's not Typhoon or MRA4. It's not FRES or Watchkeeper.
At a time when there is clearly not enough money to go around, and there will very soon be even less, there is one insane, monumental waste of resources that towers over all else.
Trident.
Eliminate the pointless rent-a-nuke independent-I-don’t-think-so-deterrent and you will free up enough money and resources to fix everything.
It’s not the carriers, it’s not Typhoon, it’s not even JSF…it’s the nukes.
The single greatest thing the UK the could do to restore its place in the world would be to give it all up tomorrow.
If that has you all freaking out then fine – put some warheads on a Storm Shadow, or buy into ASMP-A. But dump Trident. Dump the missiles. Dump the boats. Dump the bases. Dump the W76s with the M&S labels stuck on to them. Dump it all.
Do it now.
VC
It's not CVF or Type 45. It's not Typhoon or MRA4. It's not FRES or Watchkeeper.
At a time when there is clearly not enough money to go around, and there will very soon be even less, there is one insane, monumental waste of resources that towers over all else.
Trident.
Eliminate the pointless rent-a-nuke independent-I-don’t-think-so-deterrent and you will free up enough money and resources to fix everything.
It’s not the carriers, it’s not Typhoon, it’s not even JSF…it’s the nukes.
The single greatest thing the UK the could do to restore its place in the world would be to give it all up tomorrow.
If that has you all freaking out then fine – put some warheads on a Storm Shadow, or buy into ASMP-A. But dump Trident. Dump the missiles. Dump the boats. Dump the bases. Dump the W76s with the M&S labels stuck on to them. Dump it all.
Do it now.
VC