CVF
Suspicion breeds confidence
My point is/was this. HMG thought they were needed and were sent. In the end they did a useful job in showing coalition resolve, not to mention good training. Sending even a small carrier has a political impact as well. Uncle Sam is aware that large airbases cannot move and make easy targets for IRBMs, which they were. That's why the carrier is the weapon of choice in these situations. In the case of HMG it is a joint asset. A power projection tool for all services. If you don't like the navy having it, maybe we should give it to the army? 
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Uncle Sam is aware that large airbases cannot move and make easy targets for IRBMs, which they were.
Of course the threat posed by a few C-802s against one big floating airfield in a relatively small piece of oggin may be slightly higher.
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A power projection tool for all services. If you don't like the navy having it, maybe we should give it to the army?
And maybe it's about time HMG realised that this country is no longer a world power and should reconsider the "gunboat" part of Gunboat Diplomacy.
And maybe it's about time HMG realised that this country is no longer a world power and should reconsider the "gunboat" part of Gunboat Diplomacy.
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If we don't have any carriers with effective air arms, just who is going to protect HMS Ocean etc with air cover? Or the troops on board? And give air support if they were to attempt any beach landings, carry out operations on land etc etc?
And don't say it will never happen cause you have plan for the battles that you may expect to fight in 10-30 years time. Who says that we will be in America pocket in 5 years time? Can they prove it 100%?
This kind of short sightedness lead the yanks to remove guns from fighters in the 60's which was a big mistake. Of course we would never make that mistake would we??
And don't say it will never happen cause you have plan for the battles that you may expect to fight in 10-30 years time. Who says that we will be in America pocket in 5 years time? Can they prove it 100%?
This kind of short sightedness lead the yanks to remove guns from fighters in the 60's which was a big mistake. Of course we would never make that mistake would we??
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Originally Posted by Jackonicko
I'd agree with you that the Reds, and Scampton are indefensible, and that they should probably go, along with Victory and all that historic Portsmouth stuff, at least one of the naval bases, Dartmouth, the Household division, the King's Troop, RHA.
Regarding getting rid of a Naval Base, you may well get your wish in the next 5 years. Remember, though, that the assumption is that the Navy will continue to shrink to an unknown implosion point. The size of a Fleet is dictated by the means of supporting it, both in and out of Fleet Time. If events in the future, such as resurgent big nasty buggers or World shortages of raw materials, food and water require an increased Naval capability, we are going to find it very hard and expensive to expand or build new Bases. Dockyards and capacity are a whole new matter.
Expeditionary warfare, like it or not, is Government policy. A lot of chaps with big rings round their sleeves and batons on their shoulders, and many experts without them, seem to think Carriers are a key asset for that form of warfare.
For what it's worth, I also have doubts about Government policy and worries about how CVF and JSF are going to skew Naval finances and force balance. We need for the protection of UK assets and interests 30+ DD/FFs, 8+ SSNs, an amphibious capability and a balanced force of MCMVs and OPVs. Maybe that's the plan; take the Navy to implosion point and force us into a federal EU force structure to plug the gaping gaps.
GBZ,
In an ideal world, I'd keep all of the heritage and display stuff, but when the frontline is stretched to breaking, and we're getting rid of PR9, Jaguar, and Sea Harrier, when we've slashed the Nimrod MR force, when there aren't enough SH, and when there's a threat to the full Typhoon buy, to two of the existing GR4 squadrons, then no, none of the nice peripheral stuff should be kept.
GPMG,
We can't afford everything, and though I'd like us to be prepared for eventuality - that's a non-starter, and it's not what the defence assumptions plan for.
But if we do need to do something without the USA, and without our European allies, I guarantee that we'll need tankers, recce, SEAD, and all of the other stuff that we're sacrificing to pay for the CVFs, whereas there's no guarantee at all that we'll NEED carrier air.
In an ideal world, I'd keep all of the heritage and display stuff, but when the frontline is stretched to breaking, and we're getting rid of PR9, Jaguar, and Sea Harrier, when we've slashed the Nimrod MR force, when there aren't enough SH, and when there's a threat to the full Typhoon buy, to two of the existing GR4 squadrons, then no, none of the nice peripheral stuff should be kept.
GPMG,
We can't afford everything, and though I'd like us to be prepared for eventuality - that's a non-starter, and it's not what the defence assumptions plan for.
But if we do need to do something without the USA, and without our European allies, I guarantee that we'll need tankers, recce, SEAD, and all of the other stuff that we're sacrificing to pay for the CVFs, whereas there's no guarantee at all that we'll NEED carrier air.
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Get rid of the Tornado force too then, rather than desperately try to keep them relevant, keep Typhoon purely AD rather than try and turn it into something it isn't, get rid of the harrier force, as when it comes out of afghanistan it won't be of any use and they can't man it fully, the F3's can go too, as they don't really know how to do AD properly (AMRAAM), and then buy JSF to fill in the gaps. We don't need CVF, but we need to have something that actually does what it is designed for, rather than these poor legacy examples we have now.
I apologise for my earlier vitriol but Jackonory's rhetoric is getting about as tiresome as WEBF going on about the SHAR. Thank you MM for bringing some informed sense to this debate. I echo the comments about the CVS (and lets not forget the French with their carrier as well (Think it was Foch at the time)) utility in the Adriatic and I know that General "Bear" was equally grateful on several occasions to have a mobile asset that did not require tankers, while the whole of Italy was socked in!
We are likely to have many conflicts in the future over resources. British Antarctic Territory is an area rich in resource but is also claimed by other countries too. The gloves are on at the moment due to international agreements on Antarctica, but when they come off, it is going to be those nations with Airfields (fixed and mobile) and ports close to Antarctica that will have the upper hand. So that means Chile, Argentina, UK, Australia and New Zealand plus anyone with a Carrier group.
We are likely to have many conflicts in the future over resources. British Antarctic Territory is an area rich in resource but is also claimed by other countries too. The gloves are on at the moment due to international agreements on Antarctica, but when they come off, it is going to be those nations with Airfields (fixed and mobile) and ports close to Antarctica that will have the upper hand. So that means Chile, Argentina, UK, Australia and New Zealand plus anyone with a Carrier group.
Allow me to repeat the top and tail the Magic one’s argument:
“It is fair to say that carriers have not been essential to any of our ops since 1982. People can bang on about HNS but this has not been a show stopper in practice. However, carriers have been exceptionally useful in many ops and particularly during the Balkans where carrier assets sometimes allowed air to be maintained over B-H when all the Italian bases were red.”
“In summary, land based and maritime air power each have their pros and cons. I don't think carriers are essential and those who describe CVF as being the 'cornerstone' of UK defence for the next 50 years are imho exaggerating. Is it ‘highly desirable’ enough a capability to push through? Personally, I think so and I think CVF/JCA will offer an exceptionally versatile and flexible capability that we need and should be funded.”
Where MM and I disagree is as to whether CVF/JCA is useful enough to justify spending on it at a time when that’ puts capabilities that really are essential (not just nice to have) at risk.
He thinks that it is, whereas I’d rather spend the money on tankers, a NimR replacement, a PR9 replacement, robust SEAD, more recce, etc. And the carriers and JSF would pay for a great deal of kit
And if you think that’s as tedious as WEBF banging on about SHar, or if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’, I’d suggest that you take the plank (of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice) out of your own eye, Widger.
These are difficult, dark times, and we need to challenge our assumptions and be prepared to slaughter a number of sacred cows or risk complete collapse. I’ve tried to react to the new budgetary realities since the end of the Cold War, and we have to realize that while we might personally support the increased taxation that would allow Cold War levels of spending, (or taking the money from areas which we don’t view as a priority) the general public don’t agree, and so it’s not going to happen. And that’s why, very reluctantly and sadly, I no longer automatically support the ‘nice to haves’ that divert money away from core capabilities that we need.
I hope that we can keep the Reds, the QCS, the horses and breastplates and busbies, Victory, Dartmouth et al, but can’t seriously argue that we should spend money on them and watch core capabilities being sacrificed. And I have moved from being a dyed in the wool believer in carriers (as I always used to be, in the glory days of Cold War spending levels - especially after visiting USS America and USS Forrestal and watching them in action).
“It is fair to say that carriers have not been essential to any of our ops since 1982. People can bang on about HNS but this has not been a show stopper in practice. However, carriers have been exceptionally useful in many ops and particularly during the Balkans where carrier assets sometimes allowed air to be maintained over B-H when all the Italian bases were red.”
“In summary, land based and maritime air power each have their pros and cons. I don't think carriers are essential and those who describe CVF as being the 'cornerstone' of UK defence for the next 50 years are imho exaggerating. Is it ‘highly desirable’ enough a capability to push through? Personally, I think so and I think CVF/JCA will offer an exceptionally versatile and flexible capability that we need and should be funded.”
Where MM and I disagree is as to whether CVF/JCA is useful enough to justify spending on it at a time when that’ puts capabilities that really are essential (not just nice to have) at risk.
He thinks that it is, whereas I’d rather spend the money on tankers, a NimR replacement, a PR9 replacement, robust SEAD, more recce, etc. And the carriers and JSF would pay for a great deal of kit
And if you think that’s as tedious as WEBF banging on about SHar, or if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’, I’d suggest that you take the plank (of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice) out of your own eye, Widger.
These are difficult, dark times, and we need to challenge our assumptions and be prepared to slaughter a number of sacred cows or risk complete collapse. I’ve tried to react to the new budgetary realities since the end of the Cold War, and we have to realize that while we might personally support the increased taxation that would allow Cold War levels of spending, (or taking the money from areas which we don’t view as a priority) the general public don’t agree, and so it’s not going to happen. And that’s why, very reluctantly and sadly, I no longer automatically support the ‘nice to haves’ that divert money away from core capabilities that we need.
I hope that we can keep the Reds, the QCS, the horses and breastplates and busbies, Victory, Dartmouth et al, but can’t seriously argue that we should spend money on them and watch core capabilities being sacrificed. And I have moved from being a dyed in the wool believer in carriers (as I always used to be, in the glory days of Cold War spending levels - especially after visiting USS America and USS Forrestal and watching them in action).
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Jackonicko - apart from the fact that tourists enjoy the spectacle, I don't know how you can even think of comparing HMS Victory and the Red Arrows.
HMS Victory - Still a commissioned warship (yes, I know in name only) had her Keel laid on the 23rd July 1759 and continued to serve the Royal Navy (her final guise was as home to the naval school of telegraphy) until 1904.
Obviously there is a cost for maintainance, but she is a static display... one that attracts over 350,000 visitors per year.
Regardless of your service, I defy anyone to think that HMS Victory should be sold off etc, in much the same way that The Red Arrows should remain because of what they bring to the UK.
Museums and other armed forces attractions are a relatively low cost, yet invaluable marketing tool for the forces. Only someone myopic and small minded could fail to see their worth, even in todays harsh financial climate.
HMS Victory - Still a commissioned warship (yes, I know in name only) had her Keel laid on the 23rd July 1759 and continued to serve the Royal Navy (her final guise was as home to the naval school of telegraphy) until 1904.
Obviously there is a cost for maintainance, but she is a static display... one that attracts over 350,000 visitors per year.
Regardless of your service, I defy anyone to think that HMS Victory should be sold off etc, in much the same way that The Red Arrows should remain because of what they bring to the UK.
Museums and other armed forces attractions are a relatively low cost, yet invaluable marketing tool for the forces. Only someone myopic and small minded could fail to see their worth, even in todays harsh financial climate.
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Grinds my gears
It's your arrogance and sensationalism that annoys Jacko. Calling CVF a 'Bloody Disgrace' is simply bellicose rubbish, because while you are clearly never going to except it as a worthy asset, there are plenty who can see its benefits.
As an example: “Typhoon and those who support it are directly responsible for Private XXx death, because if it hadn’t been purchased we could have provided adequate armour”. .....Now is that statement helpful? Or is it sensationalist claptrap?
As an example: “Typhoon and those who support it are directly responsible for Private XXx death, because if it hadn’t been purchased we could have provided adequate armour”. .....Now is that statement helpful? Or is it sensationalist claptrap?
Growbag, I'm trying to figure out whether your post is a waaah or not.... on the off chance that it isn't however, having gotten rid of the GR4 & the Harrier, & made the Typhoon revert to AD, who do you suggest moves mud between now and the time when JSF is actually ready for ops (circe 2018 at a guess?)
Also, how exactly does the F3 not know how to do AD properly? Seeing as how it's an ASRAAM/AMRAAM/JTIDS equipped jet?
Also, how exactly does the F3 not know how to do AD properly? Seeing as how it's an ASRAAM/AMRAAM/JTIDS equipped jet?
Jackonicko - apart from the fact that tourists enjoy the spectacle, I don't know how you can even think of comparing HMS Victory and the Red Arrows.
Easy. Both are non-essential, non-core items being paid for from the over-stretched Defence Budget, when real, urgently needed capabilities are being sacrificed because they can't be afforded.
I happen to think that both are worth preserving, but that if I'm right, and if there is such a case, then they should be paid for by the Department for Culture (or whatever it's called this week), or perhaps even by industry/corporate sponsorship. And if that meant that Victory would survive, and that the Reds wouldn't, then that wouldn't be a disaster, in my view. It's all about priorities. Neither is a defence priority (though the Reds might rank slightly higher in defence terms, for their training value and potential war role), but in heritage terms, Victory is infinitely more valuable than the Reds, and is (in those terms) a much higher priority.
How much more key capability has to be sacrificed before Victory and the Reds are deemed unaffordable, or is Victory to be the very last ship to go, and are the Reds to be the very last flying unit in the RAF?
Hulahoop,
When we're losing core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, then anything that diverts money away from what's NEEDED to pay for something that merely 'might be useful' is a bloody disgrace.
I'm sorry if that grinds your gears.
And the fact that plenty of people think it has benefits is immaterial. Plenty of people can be badly wrong, as is apparent every time the subject of disbanding the RAF comes up!
Easy. Both are non-essential, non-core items being paid for from the over-stretched Defence Budget, when real, urgently needed capabilities are being sacrificed because they can't be afforded.
I happen to think that both are worth preserving, but that if I'm right, and if there is such a case, then they should be paid for by the Department for Culture (or whatever it's called this week), or perhaps even by industry/corporate sponsorship. And if that meant that Victory would survive, and that the Reds wouldn't, then that wouldn't be a disaster, in my view. It's all about priorities. Neither is a defence priority (though the Reds might rank slightly higher in defence terms, for their training value and potential war role), but in heritage terms, Victory is infinitely more valuable than the Reds, and is (in those terms) a much higher priority.
How much more key capability has to be sacrificed before Victory and the Reds are deemed unaffordable, or is Victory to be the very last ship to go, and are the Reds to be the very last flying unit in the RAF?
Hulahoop,
When we're losing core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, then anything that diverts money away from what's NEEDED to pay for something that merely 'might be useful' is a bloody disgrace.
I'm sorry if that grinds your gears.
And the fact that plenty of people think it has benefits is immaterial. Plenty of people can be badly wrong, as is apparent every time the subject of disbanding the RAF comes up!
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Originally Posted by Jackonicko
When we're losing core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, then anything that diverts money away from what's NEEDED to pay for something that merely 'might be useful' is a bloody disgrace.
What used to inspire your fighting spirit when you were In? Surely not the pure and noble cause of preservation or creation of World freedom and democracy?
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Jackonicko,
The reasons behind your arguments are laudable - I am sure no one on here can deny that more money needs to find its way into essential kit.
However, can you not see how narrow minded and short term your solutions are?
So if you have your way, you will bin CVF and a few other projects because to paraphrase you 'at this moment in time they are not needed'.
So what happens 10 or 15 years down the line when those very assets are needed? We will then start to hear the complaints and cries of lack of suitable equipment for the task in hand, just as you are doing now (and quite rightly, you are not alone in this aspect).
The solution is not to cancel projects - the solution is to get more money and employ smarter procurement methods.
This may seem pie in the sky - and given the Government's track record, it quite possibly is, but the short term outlook that you display in your arguments is the same short term outlook and lack of foresight from years ago that has got the Armed Forces in the mess they are in now.
Cancelling sensible future projects would send an entirely wrong message to the Government - it implies that the Armed Forces are happy to bend over and take whatever this government wants to throw at them.
The reasons behind your arguments are laudable - I am sure no one on here can deny that more money needs to find its way into essential kit.
However, can you not see how narrow minded and short term your solutions are?
So if you have your way, you will bin CVF and a few other projects because to paraphrase you 'at this moment in time they are not needed'.
So what happens 10 or 15 years down the line when those very assets are needed? We will then start to hear the complaints and cries of lack of suitable equipment for the task in hand, just as you are doing now (and quite rightly, you are not alone in this aspect).
The solution is not to cancel projects - the solution is to get more money and employ smarter procurement methods.
This may seem pie in the sky - and given the Government's track record, it quite possibly is, but the short term outlook that you display in your arguments is the same short term outlook and lack of foresight from years ago that has got the Armed Forces in the mess they are in now.
Cancelling sensible future projects would send an entirely wrong message to the Government - it implies that the Armed Forces are happy to bend over and take whatever this government wants to throw at them.
"The solution is not to cancel projects - the solution is to get more money and employ smarter procurement methods." That would be the best solution, yes. It would be my preferred solution. But it's not going to happen. More money to defence will not happen unless and until it's too late, and when we're fighting for our lives. That's why Drayson went motor-racing, I suspect.
Smarter procurement would also be laudable, but the very concept has been hijacked by risk-averse engineers who think that the term equates to sloughing off all support and upgrade activity to a single monolithic and monopolistic supplier.
This doesn't just seem like pie in the sky.
In the real world, budgets will continue to dwindle, and fighting for increases that will never come will prevent the radical restructuring that is required to maintain the best possible overall capability.
You have two choices. The first is to sacrifice real world warfighting capabilities, force structure and force levels and to rob the current equipment budgets in order to pay for glamorous, high profile, big ticket prestige programmes.
Some of those are essential, and some are merely nice to have, but should be judged unaffordable.
The forces have to be equipped using the money allocated by the democratically elected government. You and I might wish to see higher spending. We might even recognise that that would require higher taxation. But it ain't going to happen.
And the question: "On what are we going to spend this limited and inadequate budget" requires an analysis of priorities and needs, and then needs to be answered with a list of what we need to spend money on. Insisting that we need more money will be fruitless, and will merely ensure that the cuts made are decided on the basis of political and not military requirements, influenced by whichever service chiefs manage to shout loudest.
They won't give us a full set of clubs. While we're arguing that we need the full set to be funded, they're selling off clubs without reference to the player as to which he needs, and are buying new clubs based on what the sports shop and the caddy are shouting about, rather than on the basis of what the player needs to play a normal round. We'll end up with a few rusty irons (7, 8 and 9) and a couple of high tech carbon fibre drivers, with no mid-range clubs, no putter, no tees and no balls!
GBZ,
I have every sympathy with the need for traditions and heritage, and find it all personally inspiring. I don't want our armed forces to become a tradition-blind force along the lines of the Canadian model.
But the money isn't there, however much you and I would like it to be, and there must come a time when tough choices have to be made. How small does the RAF frontline have to be before you'd make the choice between the Reds and a frontline squadron? I think that we're past that point, and I seriously doubt whether the two high profile medal winners today were inspired by the efforts of the Reds.
Nor do I think that the queue of recruits for the Royal Navy would evaporate if HMS Victory was sold off to become an exhibit in some Disney theme park, and certainly not if its upkeep was paid for from heritage and culture funds, rather than from the defence budget.
Smarter procurement would also be laudable, but the very concept has been hijacked by risk-averse engineers who think that the term equates to sloughing off all support and upgrade activity to a single monolithic and monopolistic supplier.
This doesn't just seem like pie in the sky.
In the real world, budgets will continue to dwindle, and fighting for increases that will never come will prevent the radical restructuring that is required to maintain the best possible overall capability.
You have two choices. The first is to sacrifice real world warfighting capabilities, force structure and force levels and to rob the current equipment budgets in order to pay for glamorous, high profile, big ticket prestige programmes.
Some of those are essential, and some are merely nice to have, but should be judged unaffordable.
The forces have to be equipped using the money allocated by the democratically elected government. You and I might wish to see higher spending. We might even recognise that that would require higher taxation. But it ain't going to happen.
And the question: "On what are we going to spend this limited and inadequate budget" requires an analysis of priorities and needs, and then needs to be answered with a list of what we need to spend money on. Insisting that we need more money will be fruitless, and will merely ensure that the cuts made are decided on the basis of political and not military requirements, influenced by whichever service chiefs manage to shout loudest.
They won't give us a full set of clubs. While we're arguing that we need the full set to be funded, they're selling off clubs without reference to the player as to which he needs, and are buying new clubs based on what the sports shop and the caddy are shouting about, rather than on the basis of what the player needs to play a normal round. We'll end up with a few rusty irons (7, 8 and 9) and a couple of high tech carbon fibre drivers, with no mid-range clubs, no putter, no tees and no balls!
GBZ,
I have every sympathy with the need for traditions and heritage, and find it all personally inspiring. I don't want our armed forces to become a tradition-blind force along the lines of the Canadian model.
But the money isn't there, however much you and I would like it to be, and there must come a time when tough choices have to be made. How small does the RAF frontline have to be before you'd make the choice between the Reds and a frontline squadron? I think that we're past that point, and I seriously doubt whether the two high profile medal winners today were inspired by the efforts of the Reds.
Nor do I think that the queue of recruits for the Royal Navy would evaporate if HMS Victory was sold off to become an exhibit in some Disney theme park, and certainly not if its upkeep was paid for from heritage and culture funds, rather than from the defence budget.
I was only 'in' as a VR on a UAS, for three brief and carefree years.
So my opinion is irrelevant.
What fired my desire to join the RAF was a desire to fly military aeroplanes, and to be part of (and even do well in) an organisation that I'd always admired and respected (having grown up in it), and which I hoped I'd be good enough to be a part of. Health issues intervened, and who's to say that I would not have been chopped along the way anyway? I was more inspired by seeing operational aeroplanes doing their job than I was by watching the Reds or historic flight Spits and Hurricanes, and though I always found HMS Victory fascinating, awe inspiring and not a little humbling, visiting her did not tempt me to toddle off to the RN careers office. Had it done so, I'd suggest that my reasons for joining would not have been sensible, and I would not have made a good candidate.
I'm more mindful of history and tradition than most, but I don't believe that it's more important than frontline capability, and I do believe that it can be maintained, nurtured and fostered without spending millions on the reds, or by slowly building an exact replica of the Victory from new timber!
But as I say, my thoughts on it are irrelevant.
I did, however, ask someone who shares my thoughts about the need to prioritise scarce funding to where it's most needed and best deployed, and who shares my views on carriers and the Reds.
Since he served as aircrew from '42, and finally retired in '78, and since his 'fighting spirit' saw him through several wars - including the big one - I'd venture to suggest that his credentials are impeccable.
Freedom, the fight against tyranny, and a desire to fly motivated him to join, stretching himself and progressing in a top-class organisation, as well as serving his country and his service kept him in after that.
He's a big fan of the Reds, but does not see how they can be justified when real frontline capabilities are being cut to the bone. He does not believe that a single penny of the defence budget should be diverted to the BoBMF or the Victory, which should be supported from heritage/culture funding.
So my opinion is irrelevant.
What fired my desire to join the RAF was a desire to fly military aeroplanes, and to be part of (and even do well in) an organisation that I'd always admired and respected (having grown up in it), and which I hoped I'd be good enough to be a part of. Health issues intervened, and who's to say that I would not have been chopped along the way anyway? I was more inspired by seeing operational aeroplanes doing their job than I was by watching the Reds or historic flight Spits and Hurricanes, and though I always found HMS Victory fascinating, awe inspiring and not a little humbling, visiting her did not tempt me to toddle off to the RN careers office. Had it done so, I'd suggest that my reasons for joining would not have been sensible, and I would not have made a good candidate.
I'm more mindful of history and tradition than most, but I don't believe that it's more important than frontline capability, and I do believe that it can be maintained, nurtured and fostered without spending millions on the reds, or by slowly building an exact replica of the Victory from new timber!
But as I say, my thoughts on it are irrelevant.
I did, however, ask someone who shares my thoughts about the need to prioritise scarce funding to where it's most needed and best deployed, and who shares my views on carriers and the Reds.
Since he served as aircrew from '42, and finally retired in '78, and since his 'fighting spirit' saw him through several wars - including the big one - I'd venture to suggest that his credentials are impeccable.
Freedom, the fight against tyranny, and a desire to fly motivated him to join, stretching himself and progressing in a top-class organisation, as well as serving his country and his service kept him in after that.
He's a big fan of the Reds, but does not see how they can be justified when real frontline capabilities are being cut to the bone. He does not believe that a single penny of the defence budget should be diverted to the BoBMF or the Victory, which should be supported from heritage/culture funding.
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Just what do the Reds bring to the party? I can't really think of anything apart from people to airshows and pride in their airships breasts. What training do they provide? And what war role? It can hardly be said that they bring in export orders as we are not exactly a great exporter of indigenous UK FW a/c - do we have any such aircraft apart from the Nimrod and the VC10 tanker? The Hawk line appears to have dried up.
And why no mention of BBMF and Cranwell? There's another £12M+ per year each.
Re CVF, SEAD etc, the fact is that in comparison to the US we have virtually nothing to bring to the party in these areas, so perhaps we should spend our money on the capabilities that we do dominate in....MCMV, small ship attack helos, SF, Defence Diplomacy (the latter only covered by the RN, neither the Army or RAF do this). I am struggling to think of RAF and Army niche capabilities that the US do not have. However, what all of our capabilities bring, and this is where CVF is important, is political purchasing power and overt support to our allies in periods of tension/day1-3 effect.
The reason that the Harrier Force is in such dire straits is that the senior RAF have lost interest in it and will not invest money in solving the training dilemma. Now if the RN were to pull out of it I suspect we would see a change of priority, surprise, surprise.
I am not anti-RAF but they and their supporters tend to protest a little too much.
And why no mention of BBMF and Cranwell? There's another £12M+ per year each.
Re CVF, SEAD etc, the fact is that in comparison to the US we have virtually nothing to bring to the party in these areas, so perhaps we should spend our money on the capabilities that we do dominate in....MCMV, small ship attack helos, SF, Defence Diplomacy (the latter only covered by the RN, neither the Army or RAF do this). I am struggling to think of RAF and Army niche capabilities that the US do not have. However, what all of our capabilities bring, and this is where CVF is important, is political purchasing power and overt support to our allies in periods of tension/day1-3 effect.
The reason that the Harrier Force is in such dire straits is that the senior RAF have lost interest in it and will not invest money in solving the training dilemma. Now if the RN were to pull out of it I suspect we would see a change of priority, surprise, surprise.
I am not anti-RAF but they and their supporters tend to protest a little too much.