232 too many?
Jacko,
whilst I see where you're coming from, current plans (and therefore funding) does not see us operating anything like 137 Typhoon - in fact, the fast-jet force in toto is looking at less than 100 FE@R. So, although you may feel that we should have more, I would politely remind you of your earlier point that we can't have all the toys we fancy.
Why is that important on a thread about CVF? Well, those numbers include JSF, and how you look at this little conundrum significantly affects whether carriers are really the answer for UK defence in the round.
If we were to assume that we do manage to keep one of the two CVs at sea all the time, then we have to think very hard about whether we tie a really substantial portion of the UK's air power securely to those decks, or whether we're a bit more flexible about it. This is what caused my (admittedly long) knee-jerk about SaN's intimation that the carrier air should be under fleet command. There is a real dilemma here: to be effective, the ships have to be used to working with aircraft and the aircrew used to operating off ships (although the latter is slightly less of a problem) - but to get the most out of the small FJ force we will have there is no way that we can keep jets on the carriers just for training, or while they steam to the scene of a crisis at fast walking pace.
Also, from an admittedly parochial single-service perspective, the seats in those cockpits are far more valuable to the RAF than they are the RN, as that is where the core seed-corn of our warfighters and future commanders come from, whereas I have yet to be convinced that either single list RN pilots have a realistic career beyond commander, or that general-list officers will be able to devote enough of their career to flying to be effective in a complex platform like JSF. Added to which the current practice and future plan is that RN pilots will do exactly the same training and operate in exactly the same way as their RAF counterparts (stand fast Dartmouth) and I don't see where the value of trying to maintain this unsustainably small cadre lies. Sea-mindedness comes from operating at sea, not wearing gold on your shoulder - I'm sure no-one would suggest that the Naval Strike Wing is any less adept at doing CAS in Afghanistan than the RAF, so why would it be any different the other way round?