Nimrod Information

[chappie]

BOI DO NOT ALWAYS GIVE YOU THE ANSWERS!!! DO NOT BE SO GULLIBLE. FOR GOD SAKE WHY ELSE DO YOU THINK THAT FOR THE BEST PART OF NEARLY TWO YEARS MYSELF AND OTHER VERY IMPORTANT PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SPENT PUSHING FOR WHAT IS THE ACTUAL TRUTH AND JUST NOT ACCEPTING WHAT WE ARE FED. IT IS BOTH OKAY AND NECESSARY TO QUESTION ANYTHING THAT YOU ARE TOLD, AND AS THE ABSOLUTE TRUST THAT YOU HAVE IN THE BOI PROCESS SEEMS UNSWERVING THEN WHY IS TD AND ANY OTHER BEREVED FAMILY MEMBER NOT ALLOWED TO INVEST THEIR TRUST IN WHO THEY CHOOSE?

FINALLY.....IT IS NEVER, NOR WILL IT EVER BE THE INTENTION OF THOSE OF US LEFT BEHIND TO DEMORALISE THE DEDICATED AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE OF THE FORCES. WE ARE SO BLOODY PROUD OF YOU. I STRONGLY SUGGEST YOU POINT THAT FINGER AT THE PEOPLE BEHIND THEIR DESKS WHO DECIDE WHAT YOU CAN AND CAN'T HAVE AND DO IN WHITEHALL AND SEE YOU AS NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXPENDABLE ASSET.

sorry guys, and i'm sure i will calm down soon but i felt the need to rant at the ramblings of EBTB and THHH!!

[nigegilb]

It is informative that when AAR Ops were suspended, AOC 2Gp allowed AAR to continue when operationally necessary. This order came out around 48 hours after the crash. If this does not indicate that Op necessity is the only driving force in the RAF at the moment, what does?

A £1bn shortfall in Defence Budget is also being reported in the press today, what chance securing the funding for bomb bay protection and fuel tank protection for MRA4 in this climate? Overdue a bit of leadership perhaps?

A very senior officer told me that he would love to have this protection on board, but the money simply is not there. This is no way to run our Armed Forces in a time of war.

[Chugalug2]

As Chugalug2 said there is independent regulation of the civil world. It is there for a reason. In the event of an accident (or incident) an investigation is launched by an independent body who is there to find out what went wrong. FACT not blame. The AAIB establishes fact, and if necessary the authorities allocate blame (CAA/Coroner/CPS?).

And by comparison it seems to work.

As compared to:

I assume you don't agree with the (various) 2* and 4* (I never mention the 3* as he refused to respond to correspondence) that it is acceptable to knowingly make false declarations -re airworthiness?

Thank you for picking up on my point, DEL Mode, for unsurprisingly I think it is fundamental to Military Airworthiness at the moment. Taken in concert with Tucumseh’s shocking testimony above it paints a very sobering picture of the senior direction of the RAF. It comes as little surprise to me that this long awaited BoI has been postponed, postponed, and postponed again. I will not be surprised if it is postponed yet again. If it is it will not be the fault of TD, the media, PPRune or Uncle Tom Cobley, but of the MOD and its manipulative ways. To attack those who seek to bring light into such darkness as undermining morale and operational capability is in effect shooting the messenger. I would look to Whitehall for the guilty parties. In the meantime I second Nigegilb’s challenge, Publish and be Damned!

[Distant Voice]

Well said DEL Mode, self regulation always fails. And let us not forget MoD's own definition of "Unacceptable". It is a level of risk that is tolerable under exceptional circumstances (as per DEF STAN 00-56). So in other words, the bottm line is zero.

DV

[Safeware]

In relation to some of the immediately foregoing, it may help to divide the arguments into 2 areas:

1. Would RAF Engineering personel release an aircraft to fly that did not comply with published limitations and maintenance directives, or use their common sense to consider an accumulation of fuel leakage issues against the whole picture?

I would be shocked if the answer to this was "Yes". I don't know the limits, the tanks etc, but I'm sure those directly involved were satisfied that the aircraft as it was, was within limits. Within the bounds of their knowledge, the aircraft (ie in terms of specific airframes) would therefore be considered "airworthy".

2. Does the aircraft meet the regulatory standard as required in JSP 553?

If it is shown that the aircraft (ie the Nimrod as a fleet) doesn't meet that, and the designer and customer knew this, and knew what could be done to improve the situation and did not address the issues, then that is a different matter entirely. The guys directly involved in maintaining the aircraft wouldn't know that they were dealing with a problem beyond their influence.

Going back to cars for a moment, if you have a car that appears perfect, but has an inherent flaw, what visibility of this do you the owner or the garage that services it have visibility of the problem? As an example, have a search for info on Ford and the Pinto car fuel tank. One article on the matter is here: http://www.autosafety.org/article.php?did=522&scid=8

In the case of XV230, and sitting on the sidelines, I'd be looking more at answers to the second question rather than the first question.

The BOI should address both, and, to ally TD's concerns about membership of the BOI having no crash investigation experience I'd advise not geting hung up on that. It is the nature of the composition of a BOI. They aren't there to be expert accident investigators - there aren't enough people in the RAF on each type, or enough accidents (thank goodness) to generate expertise. To get the full picture (or as full a picture as possible without access to the aircraft) the BOI will have sought expert advice form a range of organisations. Been there, done that, so would discourage harassment of the BOI.

sw

[r supwoods]

We seem to be forgetting that these aircraft were never designed to the current levels of Safety as per decreed in JSP550 srs ..These are legacy aircraft and hence it is up to the individual platform to declare their own levels and get stakeholder buy in.

[Safeware]

r supwoods

JSP 553 still applies, but it does contain caveats for legacy equipment and pointers to 00-56. There is also MoD policy on 'at least as good as' and identification and action on areas where legacy equipment may have particular issues in such areas.

sw

[Papa Whisky Alpha]

I have no knowledge of JSP 553 or the servicing procedures on the Nimrod but I do have an interest in knowing the cause of the explosion that lead to the crash of XV230.
The comments made by "Safeware" are in my view the most erudite that I have seen on this subject. I also, believe that the ground crews and engineering staff will have done everything they can to maintain serviceable aircraft to the standard demanded by the RAF. For this they deserve the thanks of everyone, especially those who fly any aircraft.

However - in the case of XV230, if it subsequently transpires that the manufacturer had advised fire suppressant measures which were not implemented on the grounds of cost then it shows a remarkable lack of appreciation of the level of risk posed to those flying the aircraft and a low level of risk management. In other words incompetence. Should it be shown that the hazard was identified but a conscious decision was taken to ignore it on commercial, financial or political grounds, that is criminal.

[Tappers Dad]

Papa Whisky Alpha

See your PMs

[Distant Voice]

Safeware: The gripe is not with the people who are required to maintain and fly the aircraft to the prescribe limits, it is with the people who constantly adjust the limits. As one leaked email states "so the goal posts have changed yet again"

It is all very well saying "I would never fly an unsafe A/C" or " I would never sign off an unsafe A/C", but the limits which define "safe" and "unsafe" are set by other, based on risk acceptance. And the acceptance level fluctuates with pressures and policy. Please read my earlier posting regarding MoD's definition of "unacceptable".


DV

[Distant Voice]

Mighty Hunter AGE: I would like to refer you back to your posting # 1001 in which you state;

So DV what you are saying then is that the MU is not doing its job properly? That jets are being sent up with fuel leaks that are not being rectified.

The answer to that, in XV230's case, is YES. Came in with 12 fuel leaks, went out with 7 remaining. Why - Need the a/c, civilian contract, penalty clauses, must get it out when MoD require it.

Give us the benefit of your vast scheduling policy experience.

Well as someone who helped to formulate scheduling policy for Nimrod, I am probably a little more experienced than a "Crew Chief". I have seen Equalized maitenance in other forms; "Day Group Servicing, Progressive Servicing etc". But the bottom line is that when an a/c is sent in for servicing with ADD's, that the flight line does not have time to clear, then they are cleared during that servicing. If not, when will they be cleared.

DV

[Safeware]

DV,
What I was getting at is the focus of the last page or so on leaks and what is or is not acceptable. Acceptability in this sense is clearly defined for the maintainers.

As regards tolerability wrt risk assessment, I think I've posted enough on that matter not to need to revisit that theme.
sw

[r supwoods]

SW

JSP 553 and Def Stan 00-56 cannot lay down hard and fast levels of safety, the RAF operates such a wide diversity of equipment. Guidance is taken but the Operator and the Technical Authority set the targets and measure against them. These levels set the policy for management of risks with any significant hazards assigned to the appropriate owner.

[Safeware]

r supwoods,

And I always thought that JSP 553 was about "Military Airworthiness Regulations" and not "Military Airworthiness Guidance"

sw

[Distant Voice]

Safeware: Yes I agree, acceptabilty is clearly defined for maintainers and operators. My point is that "acceptability" is constantly changing. It was acceptable for XV260 to fly out of Basra on 4th Sept 2006, one day after a fractured pipe was discovered in the bomb bay of XV255 on 3rd Sept (ONE DAY after the crash). A visual inspection was considered acceptable, when normally eddy current testing would be called for as a minimum. Who decided on this: IPT

DV

[airsound]

Despite the great degrees of expertise on display here, are we in danger of losing sight of what this is all about? A large, sophisticated aircraft suffered sudden catastrophic failure, with multiple fatalities. Those bland words ‘multiple fatalities’ do, of course, conceal personal, human tragedies on a large scale. And the phrase ‘catastrophic failure’ can imply far-reaching consequences for the operator of the aircraft concerned.

Catastrophes like this are vanishingly rare, whether in military or civilian operations, mostly because all the possible causes have been foreseen, considered and dealt with. When this rarest of events does occur, it is surely unlikely to be because of something totally unforeseen - but rather because a known, recognised risk has been miscalculated, or worse, ignored.

My fear is that the investigation of this broad view will turn out not to have been ‘within the remit’ of the BOI.

airsound

[Biggus]

Many people on here say wait for the BOI report before commenting, don't pre judge it, etc. I have a lot of sympathy for that arguement. However, when is the report finally going to be published?

In post 1189 Tappers Dad says he has been told successively that it will be published in June 07, Sep 07, Nov 07 and finally somewhen next year, ??? 08! In another post Nigegilb says the report was written 'several months ago' and that the board had been re-conviened to re-examine it (not unheard of I believe). I don't know where Nige gets his facts from, or if they are correct. However, perhaps the status/progress of the BOI report needs to be addressed as much as anything else by people persuing this issue.

Now don't get me wrong. I am not advocating that the BOI report be rushed. Neither am I saying it is being delayed as part of some conspiracy or cover up. But if Nige's comments are correct it would appear that the report has been completed by the BOI inself, and is now in the senior officer/management chain. Hopefully it is considered important enough not to spend any length of time in someones 'In' tray.

Given Tappers Dads comment reference publishing somewhen in 08 can we expect another 2 months plus of debate on this thread while we await the offical findings???

[tucumseh]

JSP 553 has been mentioned a few times. (Military Airworthiness Regulations).

It has to be said that this is voluminous to say the least. 7 Chapters, 20+ Annexes, a dozen Appendices. Very few know it by heart. It’s the kind of publication you dip into when a question arises.

Nevertheless, it sets out the Regulations. But, if you were to sit most IPTLs down and ask them to highlight JSP requirements that they simply do not have the funding, manpower or expertise to implement, then you would be horrified.

The part I refer to most often, as it is the one which causes project managers and Design Authorities most hassle, is Ch. 5.53. “It must be possible to establish the actual design of the aircraft (i.e. as flown) has been assessed for safety. The IPTL is to ensure that the design of the aircraft after a Service engineered change is clearly and unambiguously documented, and covered by an identified issue of the safety case”. The reason it is hassle is because the Services and In Service IPTs often ignore it. More often than not, an aircraft will be delivered to a contractor for, say, modification, bearing no resemblance to the build standard reflected in the “up to date” safety case or drawings. (And the knock-on effect is felt by Service maintainers, who indeed “follow the book” but have no control whatsoever over its currency).

The processes and procedures to do this, for both aircraft and equipment, have remained unchanged for over 16 years. Yet, as I have said before many times, the apathy in this general field is appalling. Criminally so. “Complete waste of money” is a typical cry.

I mentioned two sample accidents in a previous post. Read the BoI reports. Then ask if Ch. 5.53 or other fundamental regulations for ensuring airworthiness is (a) achieved and (b) MAINTAINED were investigated by the BoI. And then dig deeper and ask if the BoI were given all the information, or even sought it. Frankly, both reports are a joke. The only possible conclusion, given the information that would answer key questions they ask (but apparently can’t answer) is freely available, is that embarrassment had to be avoided. And this is why I support what TD is doing now. If nothing else, he is very publicly forcing the MoD to ask questions they don’t like the answers to. He may or may not get satisfaction, but if the way MoD implements its own Regulations changes for the better, then this can only be good.

[SpannerSpinner]

May I ask a question,

I've not contributed to this thread for some time now. Having seen the Sky News report about XV230 having "serious fuel leak defects" prior to and during ops, why is all the emphasis on rib 7 leaks?

I dealt with those very repairs and maybe I've missed something massive (and forgive me if I have), but why was all the emphasis on these prblems when it is widely speculated that a bomb bay fire caused her loss?

Rib 7 fuel leaks are linked with underwing stores (Boz etc) as eluded to in the report but what do they have to do with the cause of the crash?

As a very recent MR2 man I'd be astonished (although I am ready to be corrected) if they were the main cause of the crash.

Standing by for countless correction/counter correction and safety quote....

[Mick Smith]

BOI remit

IMHO Airsound has put his finger on a key point:

My fear is that the investigation of this broad view will turn out not to have been ‘within the remit’ of the BOI.

Charlie Luncher said in his plea to TD

I think, if it is worth anything to you, is that you are delaying the BOI and its findings.

The MoD is saying the BOI will not now report next month so Charlie Luncher seems to be correct. The most likely explanation for that given official briefings last week that it would report in late November seems to me to be that the BOI had not seen those emails.
If that is the case, then the leaking of those emails can only help the BOI get to the bottom of this and I suspect whoever leaked them almost certainly did it out of concern that the BOI was not aware of their existence.
What is more worrying is that this is not the first time the BOI has been recovened following publication of information uncovered by TD and others. Biggus what Nigel says about the report being written several months ago is absolutely correct and was confirmed off the record by the MoD back in June when it was reconvened for the first time.
It was reconvened after it emerged that the Kinloss Station Commander had warned in August 2005 - in the wake of the burst hot air pipe on XV227 - that an “unexpected failure” was likely on Nimrod given that it was already 10 years past its out-of-service date.
The most sensible interpretation of reconvening to look at the XV227 case is that the BOI’s remit did not go back that far. What is more puzzling is why its remit did not include the discussions covered in the emails, which ran from December 2005 to February 2006 and centred on the need to get XV230’s leak problems fixed.