Campaign Medal for Bomber Command?
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Sadly I think that despite petitions or whatever appeal may be made to the high and good the award of another medal for WW2 will never happen, it is simple too long ago. Perhaps those campaigning for the institution of a new medal for the Bomber Command crews might console themselves of the fact that the Air Crew Europe Star is seen by many as the bomber crew's medal. This, I think, is reflected in the fact that in the medal collecting world, of the eight WW2 Stars, the Defence Medal and the War Medal only three are valued as individual pieces in excess of £20. The Atlantic Star and the Pacific Star are quoted at between £30 and £35 whereas a genuine Air Crew Europe Star (and sadly there are forgeries around) would be valued at between £160 and £180. A reflection on the respect that people have for the recipients. Only an acredited 1939-45 Star with the Battle of Britiain clasp tops that at £450-£550.
Sadly I think that despite petitions or whatever appeal may be made to the high and good the award of another medal for WW2 will never happen, it is simple too long ago. Perhaps those campaigning for the institution of a new medal for the Bomber Command crews might console themselves of the fact that the Air Crew Europe Star is seen by many as the bomber crew's medal. This, I think, is reflected in the fact that in the medal collecting world, of the eight WW2 Stars, the Defence Medal and the War Medal only three are valued as individual pieces in excess of £20. The Atlantic Star and the Pacific Star are quoted at between £30 and £35 whereas a genuine Air Crew Europe Star (and sadly there are forgeries around) would be valued at between £160 and £180. A reflection on the respect that people have for the recipients. Only an acredited 1939-45 Star with the Battle of Britiain clasp tops that at £450-£550.
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Chugalug2
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.
Chugalug2
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.
Don't misjudge the motives of medal collectors, the majority have the utmost respect for the recipients of the pieces they collect, be they gallantry, campaign or long service awards. but back to the thread, - should the new award be instituted and were it include groundcrew then I can see a column of ex-Fighter Command groundcrew marching on Downing Street rightly demanding recognition of their role in the Battle of Britain. Aircrew were awarded the 39-45 Star with clasp Battle of Britain, groundcrew nothing.
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Campaign medal
Sixty two years ago today our crew arrived at RAF Syerston to train on Lancasters at No 5 Lancaster Finishing School. A fortnight later we would be flying our first operation with 61 Sqdn.
One military historian wrote that every time a bomber crew flew over enemy territory they were engaging in another battle. It was equivalent to soldiers in WW1 going over the top with bayonets fixed. LMF - Lack of Moral Fibre - have you heard of it? This was hanging over our heads continually, if we showed any sign of deviating from the routine of being sent on an operation. You could be removed from your crew, spirited away secretly, maybe placed in the hands of the Medical Officer, could be stripped of your rank and doing a ground job. I had to put up with air sickness on almost every flight, training or operational. If I had reported that, would they accuse me of LMF?
Professor Richard Holmes, a military historian, wrote:
"People whose courage I admire most greatly are people who carry on, even though they know what they are doing is likely to get them killed, and even though they often know that there is very little they can do about it. In other words thereis danger, there is sustained danger."
One military historian wrote that every time a bomber crew flew over enemy territory they were engaging in another battle. It was equivalent to soldiers in WW1 going over the top with bayonets fixed. LMF - Lack of Moral Fibre - have you heard of it? This was hanging over our heads continually, if we showed any sign of deviating from the routine of being sent on an operation. You could be removed from your crew, spirited away secretly, maybe placed in the hands of the Medical Officer, could be stripped of your rank and doing a ground job. I had to put up with air sickness on almost every flight, training or operational. If I had reported that, would they accuse me of LMF?
Professor Richard Holmes, a military historian, wrote:
"People whose courage I admire most greatly are people who carry on, even though they know what they are doing is likely to get them killed, and even though they often know that there is very little they can do about it. In other words thereis danger, there is sustained danger."
Thank you Hugh for your post. There have been very few, if any, from those, like yourself, who are the object of this campaign. May I therefore cut to the quick and ask you for your opinion? Do you think that a Bomber Campaign Medal should be struck, or do you consider that the existing Campaign Star with which you presumably were awarded, be it Air Crew Europe or France/Germany suffices? If receiving the new medal meant surrendering the old one would that alter your outlook? You may have read some of the preceding posts in which it is suggested that the CinC wanted Groundcrew as well as Aircrew to receive the medal. Is that how you remember it? As has been said, it would have made it nigh-on impossible to have done so bearing in mind the many other service personnel base in the UK not eligible for any campaign medal, and for that very reason.
Lastly thank you for reminding us all of the cold courage required to go out night after night on those long and dangerous missions. I think that is far more remarkable than the courage that shows itself in the face of sudden danger, although heaven knows enough of that was called upon as well!
I hope that your post encourages more of your contemporaries to follow your example. Thank you once again.
With much respect, Chugalug
Lastly thank you for reminding us all of the cold courage required to go out night after night on those long and dangerous missions. I think that is far more remarkable than the courage that shows itself in the face of sudden danger, although heaven knows enough of that was called upon as well!
I hope that your post encourages more of your contemporaries to follow your example. Thank you once again.
With much respect, Chugalug
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Hi Chugalug,
Thanks for your remarks. I wonder, but doubt, whether many ex aircrew of WW2 are able to contribute to these discussions but I wish they could, or would. Coping with computers at my age requires determination, that is if nature has been kind enough to leave you with sufficient mental facilities to cope with it.
I have expressed my feelings about the treatment of Sir Arthur Harris and his wish for a campaign medal for his 'lads' in several other websites and I am totally behind the idea. What some of the aircrew had to tolerate in WW2 must be recognised and appreciated. I cannot see any point in asking for the return of the Aircrew Europe or France and Germany Star. Just make it a new award to aircrew.
I appreciated and still admire the tenacity with which ground staff devoted their long hours to maintain our aircraft even through the night. I recall that we returned from Farge with all four tanks holed - fortunately they were selfsealing - the port inner engine feathered and the rudders peppered with shrapnel holes. The groundstaff had to work on our Lancaster throughout the night to have it ready for the next day. Please try to persuade as many friends as possible to sign the petition which a few days ago stood at 1152.
Cheers.
Thanks for your remarks. I wonder, but doubt, whether many ex aircrew of WW2 are able to contribute to these discussions but I wish they could, or would. Coping with computers at my age requires determination, that is if nature has been kind enough to leave you with sufficient mental facilities to cope with it.
I have expressed my feelings about the treatment of Sir Arthur Harris and his wish for a campaign medal for his 'lads' in several other websites and I am totally behind the idea. What some of the aircrew had to tolerate in WW2 must be recognised and appreciated. I cannot see any point in asking for the return of the Aircrew Europe or France and Germany Star. Just make it a new award to aircrew.
I appreciated and still admire the tenacity with which ground staff devoted their long hours to maintain our aircraft even through the night. I recall that we returned from Farge with all four tanks holed - fortunately they were selfsealing - the port inner engine feathered and the rudders peppered with shrapnel holes. The groundstaff had to work on our Lancaster throughout the night to have it ready for the next day. Please try to persuade as many friends as possible to sign the petition which a few days ago stood at 1152.
Cheers.
Hugh, whether others of your ex-colleagues post or not, and I truly hope they do, you make a most worthy spokesman, Sir! I am really pleased that you are for this idea, for some say that after so much time there is no real interest now, well there most obviously is! How the mish-mash that was done in 1945/6 can be resolved now, if it is to be, is for those in the corridors of power to decide. I feel strongly, as you do, that as far as possible, Sir Arthur Harris's wish for a Bombing Campaign Award be honoured, particularly as he was not at a time when others were! The stumbling block appears to be that only one such medal can be awarded, with a clasp for another. As I understand it you would all have been awarded the 1939/45 star, along with the Aircrew Europe or France Germany star. Those pilots who fought the Battle of Britain received the Battle of Britain Clasp to their 1939/45 star. It would seem appropriate if a Battle of Germany Clasp be awarded to those who fought that battle, as Harris named it. Whether that would accord with your wishes, medal protocols and all the other stumbling blocks, I know not. Perhaps those more qualified than I might give us their views, and I hope offer a solution.
Meanwhile thank you again for your contributions Hugh. Your mention that your aircraft could be flying the next night after so much battle damage is a reminder of the can-do attitudes of those days and the skill and dedication of the ground crews. We must never forget the debt we owe a remarkable generation!
Meanwhile thank you again for your contributions Hugh. Your mention that your aircraft could be flying the next night after so much battle damage is a reminder of the can-do attitudes of those days and the skill and dedication of the ground crews. We must never forget the debt we owe a remarkable generation!
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Is it permissable for someone never part of UK forces to offer an opinion here ?
My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.
They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.
I’ve often thought that the attention focused on the pilots of fighter command to be somewhat disproportionate... natural, as this was the modern day version of Knights in combat.... and there’s no doubting that there were some very special people doing the job. Courage is a quality that we each have to a varying degree but I think can be divided into at least two types... the courage of instant combat...high adrenaline rush and short lived action... and cold courage... the sort of courage that I think of as 4 o’clock in the morning courage. Going out knowing that for many hours ahead you will be in constant peril doing what you’re doing... The crews of bomber command faced this night after night... interceptors, flak, going in and coming out...and every day a few empty seats at the table... not surprising that they avoided getting to know the replacements... No glamour just losses and darkness before the next 5, 6 or 7 hour trip and more empty seats... a grinding down of ones courage over weeks and months. These men were not for the most part self elected warriors... they were draftsmen, insurance actuators, mechanics and plumbers and those that survived went back to those mundane occupations... Very special people...
As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.
They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.
I’ve often thought that the attention focused on the pilots of fighter command to be somewhat disproportionate... natural, as this was the modern day version of Knights in combat.... and there’s no doubting that there were some very special people doing the job. Courage is a quality that we each have to a varying degree but I think can be divided into at least two types... the courage of instant combat...high adrenaline rush and short lived action... and cold courage... the sort of courage that I think of as 4 o’clock in the morning courage. Going out knowing that for many hours ahead you will be in constant peril doing what you’re doing... The crews of bomber command faced this night after night... interceptors, flak, going in and coming out...and every day a few empty seats at the table... not surprising that they avoided getting to know the replacements... No glamour just losses and darkness before the next 5, 6 or 7 hour trip and more empty seats... a grinding down of ones courage over weeks and months. These men were not for the most part self elected warriors... they were draftsmen, insurance actuators, mechanics and plumbers and those that survived went back to those mundane occupations... Very special people...
As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
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true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
The RAF reached a total strength of 1,208,000 men and women, of whom 185,000 were aircrew. About 70,000 RAF personnel were killed. Bomber Command had the highest loss rate of any major branch of the British armed forces, with 55,000 aircrew dying in bombing raids over Germany.
Hugh Spencer, you are one of a unique band and hats off to you, your kind, and especially those that paid the price. God knows how you did it.
Poorwunderingwun wrote:
Is it permissable for someone never part of UK forces to offer an opinion here ?
My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.
They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.
As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
Is it permissable for someone never part of UK forces to offer an opinion here ?
My own feeling has always been that the crews of bomber command suffered a terrible injustice.
They were never consulted as to the rights or wrongs of the campaign ... as forces of the crown they were given orders and like loyal combatants carried out those orders to the best of their ability and many died doing it, night after night.... after night.
As for the rights and wrongs of the campaign... well... the Japanese war ended after two bombs were dropped that caused the sort of devastation that bomber Harris was trying to achieve with thousand bomber raids... so maybe the strategy was sound but it was taking just too many aicraft and bombs to achieve it. It’s a never ending debate that must not be allowed to detact from the true heroism of very ordinary men doing a very extraorinary job... under orders.
The dilemma facing Churchill, the War Cabinet, the Air Ministry and Harris was that the only way to win the war was to seriously damage German war production. The only way to do that was to take the war to them. The only way to do that was to bomb them, and to bomb them with such an effort that, despite the very severe navigational limitations resulting from the combination of technology and counter measures during the war, they would lose the arms race to their opponents. The result as we all know, was devastation that shocked us when it was revealed, and the campaign came to represent the evil of war on which we turned our backs. Hugh and his fellow survivors paid the cost that we are now discussing. I truly believe if that campaign had not been fought (for instance if we had not produced a Strategic Bomber Force), that German war production would have grown unhindered to match that of its enemies. Russia would have been defeated, and Hitler's butchers, Himmler, Heydrich (yes I know), Eichmann etc would have made their 20 million dead a mere overture to the resulting ethnic cleansing. We could not have invaded and would have had to sue for peace confronted with the Nazi WMD's, or drop the first atom bombs on Germany (for which they were intended). Thus, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Bombing Campaign saved far more lives than it cost, such is the grim book keeping of war. So let us salute these brave men now, not for carrying out orders, but for making victory possible!
There are two related but separate issues here. One concerns the issue of a specific campaign medal to the men of Bomber Command, the other concerns the conduct, efficacy and morality of the Bomber War as directed by Harris.
They need to be considered separately, as one might reach the judgement that it was right to recognise those who participated in the Bomber Campaign even if one disapproved of its conduct and its architect.
However, I would argue that however much Harris boasted that he could win the war through strategic bombing alone (and that was his claim), and however much he claimed a disproportionate share of resources, Bomber Command was always part of an integrated air campaign against the enemy, and as such, its members received the appropriate campaign medals (eg the Air Crew Europe or France and Germany Stars).
It is not that their efforts went unrecognised and unrewarded, it’s just that they were (rightly in my view) recognised in the same way that we recognised and rewarded the Coastal Command crews (who suffered heavy losses, were often equally unlikely to survive a tour, but who did rather more damage to the German war economy) and to those who flew intruder missions, agent-dropping, or resupply missions to the partisans and resistance movements. All of them required just as much 4 am courage, and received rather less attention from the newspapers and newsreel, and rather less attention post war from Gaumont British and Pinewood. To single out Bomber Command’s contribution above and beyond these contributions would be unjustified, offensive and unjust.
Let me make it clear. The issue of a Bomber Command medal (especially if extended to groundcrew) is a slap in the face to all of the other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations, further relegating the importance of their efforts (Bomber Command has already been glorified again and again in print and on the big and small screens), even though many of them flew longer, more uncomfortable and more dangerous missions.
We would all condemn the “Hollywoodisation” of history, and yet many of those here are doing something very similar, allowing ingrained prejudice and ignorance (fed on a diet of ‘Target for Tonight’ and the ‘Dambusters’, and by hordes of books by Bomber Command vets) to give a very distorted version of history.
The claim that “the only way to win the war was to seriously damage German war production. The only way to do that was to take the war to them. The only way to do that was to bomb them” is risible.
If you go first to the Bomber Command war diaries, and examine the losses for a given night, and then at the (typically efficient) German records of damage sustained, and then do so again, for night after night after night, the truth about Bomber Command’s war becomes shockingly clear.
Night after night, we lost tens of aircraft (and their crews) and achieved nothing – killing a cow here, and damaging five houses there. Everything achieved by Bomber Command’s heavies up to the end of 1943 could have been achieved better, and at lower cost, by smaller tactical bombers, which were more likely to ‘live to fight another day’ and which put more bombs more accurately on target.
Bomber Command’s greatest successes were achieved in spite of Harris, not because of him, since they were often viewed by him as being ‘diversions’ from the Main Force effort. (Peenemunde, the tactical ops in the wake of D-Day, Tirpitz ops, bridge dropping with the big bombs, even Augsburg and the Dams Raid.)
It has been calculated that a single four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy as the same aircraft allocated to Bomber Command’s main force, yet Harris resolutely and forcefully argued against any allocation of resources to other Commands.
One can only imagine the potential effect had the resources devoted to the four engined heavies instead been used to build up a much larger force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos.
One can only admire the spirit of Bomber Command veterans, and their loyalty to their former Commander, but one cannot help but think that if it was ever reciprocated, Harris had a blo.ody strange way of showing it. He always preferred the Lancaster to the Halifax, because an average Lanc dropped 154 tonnes of bombs during its brief life, while a Halifax crew dropped only 100. The fact that the Halifax was easier to escape from, and that a higher proportion of Halifax crews survived was of no interest to Harris, to whom live aircrew in a Stalag or Offlag were of no interest whatever. The fact that Lancaster crews, bombing from greater height, in greater discomfort, further from base, over more of the heavily defended heartland targets were less accurate than the late mark Halifaxes was of similarly little concern.
In Harris’ mind, a heavier tonnage of bombs dropped inaccurately on area targets in the vicinity of Berlin were of more value than smaller tonnages dropped more accurately on vital industrial targets closer to home.
Harris claimed, on 7 December 1943, that his planned campaign against Berlin would destroy the German capital and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. History records his lack of success, except in increasing absenteeism in the German workforce to 23.5 days per year….. and that at a cost of an average 5.4% loss rate (that had reached an unsustainable 9% by the time the campaign was abandoned).
By contrast, the success of Bomber Command against tactical targets in France in 1944 was huge, yet Harris itched to return to the sterile and marginal operations which he believed were “The real business of winning the war.”
The claim that: “if that campaign had not been fought (for instance if we had not produced a Strategic Bomber Force), that German war production would have grown unhindered to match that of its enemies.” Is simply unsustainable.
Had the four engined heavies been used in larger numbers against the U-Boats and in protecting convoys, and in tactical operations like those which led up to, accompanied and followed D-Day, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses would have been lower, and victory would have been quicker.
Had the industrial capacity and service man power expended on the Bomber Command Main Force been used instead to build up a huge force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos, the damage to German industrial and military targets would have been greater, and losses would have been slashed.
Small wonder that the Luftwaffe CoS, Jeschonnek remarked that:
“Every four-engined bomber the Western Allies build makes me happy, for we will bring these down just as easily as we brought down the two-engined ones, and each four engined aircraft constitutes a much greater loss to the enemy.” It’s hard to imagine him being quite so sanguine had he been facing a larger Main Force consisting entirely of Mosquitos!
I’m all for saluting the men who participated in the Bomber War, but lets keep away from inaccurate mythologizing about its effectiveness, and let’s view Harris for what he was – a narrow-minded and inflexible commander who showed little concern for casualties among his own people, who resisted what he saw as diversions (even when they were clearly war-winning efforts!), and who blindly followed the aim of defeating the enemy by destroying civilian morale through bombing, even after it became clear that it did not work. (Did the reaction of Londoners to the Blitz not give anyone pause for thought as to how difficult that might prove?)
A fair judgement would be that Harris was as much an obstacle to Allied victory as he was one of its architects.
They need to be considered separately, as one might reach the judgement that it was right to recognise those who participated in the Bomber Campaign even if one disapproved of its conduct and its architect.
However, I would argue that however much Harris boasted that he could win the war through strategic bombing alone (and that was his claim), and however much he claimed a disproportionate share of resources, Bomber Command was always part of an integrated air campaign against the enemy, and as such, its members received the appropriate campaign medals (eg the Air Crew Europe or France and Germany Stars).
It is not that their efforts went unrecognised and unrewarded, it’s just that they were (rightly in my view) recognised in the same way that we recognised and rewarded the Coastal Command crews (who suffered heavy losses, were often equally unlikely to survive a tour, but who did rather more damage to the German war economy) and to those who flew intruder missions, agent-dropping, or resupply missions to the partisans and resistance movements. All of them required just as much 4 am courage, and received rather less attention from the newspapers and newsreel, and rather less attention post war from Gaumont British and Pinewood. To single out Bomber Command’s contribution above and beyond these contributions would be unjustified, offensive and unjust.
Let me make it clear. The issue of a Bomber Command medal (especially if extended to groundcrew) is a slap in the face to all of the other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations, further relegating the importance of their efforts (Bomber Command has already been glorified again and again in print and on the big and small screens), even though many of them flew longer, more uncomfortable and more dangerous missions.
We would all condemn the “Hollywoodisation” of history, and yet many of those here are doing something very similar, allowing ingrained prejudice and ignorance (fed on a diet of ‘Target for Tonight’ and the ‘Dambusters’, and by hordes of books by Bomber Command vets) to give a very distorted version of history.
The claim that “the only way to win the war was to seriously damage German war production. The only way to do that was to take the war to them. The only way to do that was to bomb them” is risible.
If you go first to the Bomber Command war diaries, and examine the losses for a given night, and then at the (typically efficient) German records of damage sustained, and then do so again, for night after night after night, the truth about Bomber Command’s war becomes shockingly clear.
Night after night, we lost tens of aircraft (and their crews) and achieved nothing – killing a cow here, and damaging five houses there. Everything achieved by Bomber Command’s heavies up to the end of 1943 could have been achieved better, and at lower cost, by smaller tactical bombers, which were more likely to ‘live to fight another day’ and which put more bombs more accurately on target.
Bomber Command’s greatest successes were achieved in spite of Harris, not because of him, since they were often viewed by him as being ‘diversions’ from the Main Force effort. (Peenemunde, the tactical ops in the wake of D-Day, Tirpitz ops, bridge dropping with the big bombs, even Augsburg and the Dams Raid.)
It has been calculated that a single four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy as the same aircraft allocated to Bomber Command’s main force, yet Harris resolutely and forcefully argued against any allocation of resources to other Commands.
One can only imagine the potential effect had the resources devoted to the four engined heavies instead been used to build up a much larger force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos.
One can only admire the spirit of Bomber Command veterans, and their loyalty to their former Commander, but one cannot help but think that if it was ever reciprocated, Harris had a blo.ody strange way of showing it. He always preferred the Lancaster to the Halifax, because an average Lanc dropped 154 tonnes of bombs during its brief life, while a Halifax crew dropped only 100. The fact that the Halifax was easier to escape from, and that a higher proportion of Halifax crews survived was of no interest to Harris, to whom live aircrew in a Stalag or Offlag were of no interest whatever. The fact that Lancaster crews, bombing from greater height, in greater discomfort, further from base, over more of the heavily defended heartland targets were less accurate than the late mark Halifaxes was of similarly little concern.
In Harris’ mind, a heavier tonnage of bombs dropped inaccurately on area targets in the vicinity of Berlin were of more value than smaller tonnages dropped more accurately on vital industrial targets closer to home.
Harris claimed, on 7 December 1943, that his planned campaign against Berlin would destroy the German capital and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. History records his lack of success, except in increasing absenteeism in the German workforce to 23.5 days per year….. and that at a cost of an average 5.4% loss rate (that had reached an unsustainable 9% by the time the campaign was abandoned).
By contrast, the success of Bomber Command against tactical targets in France in 1944 was huge, yet Harris itched to return to the sterile and marginal operations which he believed were “The real business of winning the war.”
The claim that: “if that campaign had not been fought (for instance if we had not produced a Strategic Bomber Force), that German war production would have grown unhindered to match that of its enemies.” Is simply unsustainable.
Had the four engined heavies been used in larger numbers against the U-Boats and in protecting convoys, and in tactical operations like those which led up to, accompanied and followed D-Day, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses would have been lower, and victory would have been quicker.
Had the industrial capacity and service man power expended on the Bomber Command Main Force been used instead to build up a huge force of Whirlwinds and Mosquitos, the damage to German industrial and military targets would have been greater, and losses would have been slashed.
Small wonder that the Luftwaffe CoS, Jeschonnek remarked that:
“Every four-engined bomber the Western Allies build makes me happy, for we will bring these down just as easily as we brought down the two-engined ones, and each four engined aircraft constitutes a much greater loss to the enemy.” It’s hard to imagine him being quite so sanguine had he been facing a larger Main Force consisting entirely of Mosquitos!
I’m all for saluting the men who participated in the Bomber War, but lets keep away from inaccurate mythologizing about its effectiveness, and let’s view Harris for what he was – a narrow-minded and inflexible commander who showed little concern for casualties among his own people, who resisted what he saw as diversions (even when they were clearly war-winning efforts!), and who blindly followed the aim of defeating the enemy by destroying civilian morale through bombing, even after it became clear that it did not work. (Did the reaction of Londoners to the Blitz not give anyone pause for thought as to how difficult that might prove?)
A fair judgement would be that Harris was as much an obstacle to Allied victory as he was one of its architects.
The claims made by Harris, his personality, his attitudes to his crews, his aircraft, his resentment at being diverted from the Strategic Bombing Campaign were not part of my argument, nor thus of my reply, Jacko. Rather it is what his bombing campaign did or did not achieve. A campaign medal acknowledges just that, participation in a major campaign. Coastal Command's major campaign was the Battle of the Atlantic, and like the bombing campaign, lasted from the start to the finish of the European War. It was essential that we prevailed, or we would have lost the war. I acknowledge the effort and sacrifice by all those who fought that battle. The equivalent campaign fought by the bomber crews was what Harris called the Battle of Germany. Same duration but suffering a much greater loss, both in rate and actual numbers. The campaign did not have a medal struck, not because to issue it would have been "a slap in the face to other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations", but because the Bombing Campaign had been disowned for political reasons.
The importance of that campaign is not down to "Hollywoodisation", really Jacko we must elevate the argument a little don't you think? Rather I would point to the lack of Luftwaffe response to D-day, where it was conspicuous by its absence, because of the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Of course it could have been conducted better in hindsight. What campaign couldn't? The essential thing was that it was conducted, in order to win the war. You may find that risible, well let us agree to disagree!
Coastal Command could count success in numbers of u-boats sunk, versus allied shipping not sunk. Tactical bombing could likewise be judged in its ability to clear the way for advancing armies. Bomber Command had a more difficult equation to resolve, much of which was in the negative, i.e. shortages of equipment on the Eastern Front, lack of missions flown by the Luftwaffe, etc. However, Robin Neillands' The Bomber War gives some interesting numbers to conjure with. In 1944, 30% of artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of optical and 50% of electronic output together with 900,000 men all allocated to Reich Air Defence.
Speer said that up to 1943 German industry worked a 10 hour day, after that they changed to 3 shifts, 24 hour operation and the expanding use of slave labour. Despite all that production only rose by a small part of what was expected. The reason was the bombing. He made the point that it had opened an enormous second front long before D-day.
You quote Jeshonnek as favouring twin rather than four engined bombers. Well he would wouldn't he? It was that very decision by the Luftwaffe that prevented them from bombing the T-34 factories that had been evacuated to the east. Combined with their own tank production difficulties it led to the long German withdrawal via Kursk to the Reich.
You say that my statement that German war production could have matched Allied production without the bombing is unsustainable. Perhaps, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey found that Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse.
Finally your two contentions:
1. A single 4 engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy compared to main force.
2. Had the 4 engined bombers been used in larger numbers against u-boats, convoy protection and tactical ops, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses lower and victory quicker.
I do not understand these statements. Surely the losses to the Germans would be in u-boats and their crews, i.e. at the margins of total industrial output? Obviously sinking u-boats and surface units was essential to prevail in the maritime war, but I cannot see how that ensured victory, rather it was essential to avoiding defeat.
Regards, Chug
The importance of that campaign is not down to "Hollywoodisation", really Jacko we must elevate the argument a little don't you think? Rather I would point to the lack of Luftwaffe response to D-day, where it was conspicuous by its absence, because of the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Of course it could have been conducted better in hindsight. What campaign couldn't? The essential thing was that it was conducted, in order to win the war. You may find that risible, well let us agree to disagree!
Coastal Command could count success in numbers of u-boats sunk, versus allied shipping not sunk. Tactical bombing could likewise be judged in its ability to clear the way for advancing armies. Bomber Command had a more difficult equation to resolve, much of which was in the negative, i.e. shortages of equipment on the Eastern Front, lack of missions flown by the Luftwaffe, etc. However, Robin Neillands' The Bomber War gives some interesting numbers to conjure with. In 1944, 30% of artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of optical and 50% of electronic output together with 900,000 men all allocated to Reich Air Defence.
Speer said that up to 1943 German industry worked a 10 hour day, after that they changed to 3 shifts, 24 hour operation and the expanding use of slave labour. Despite all that production only rose by a small part of what was expected. The reason was the bombing. He made the point that it had opened an enormous second front long before D-day.
You quote Jeshonnek as favouring twin rather than four engined bombers. Well he would wouldn't he? It was that very decision by the Luftwaffe that prevented them from bombing the T-34 factories that had been evacuated to the east. Combined with their own tank production difficulties it led to the long German withdrawal via Kursk to the Reich.
You say that my statement that German war production could have matched Allied production without the bombing is unsustainable. Perhaps, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey found that Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse.
Finally your two contentions:
1. A single 4 engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy compared to main force.
2. Had the 4 engined bombers been used in larger numbers against u-boats, convoy protection and tactical ops, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses lower and victory quicker.
I do not understand these statements. Surely the losses to the Germans would be in u-boats and their crews, i.e. at the margins of total industrial output? Obviously sinking u-boats and surface units was essential to prevail in the maritime war, but I cannot see how that ensured victory, rather it was essential to avoiding defeat.
Regards, Chug
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Medal for Bomber Command
I am getting a little tired of repeating myself on the subject of the benefit of hindsight. I was around in WW2 and experienced all the things which were said, discussed and the general feeling of the public. Where were you, Jacko? You are like so many of the writers since WW2 who are only to willing to neg atively criticise what went on. If we knew in 1942 what we found out in 1943 or in 1944 what we knew in 1945 all of our actions would have been modified. Do a little more studying, especially what was known about things at that time. Of course with a little bit more intelligence at the time our leaders would have directed efforts towards greater successes. Give credit where credit is due.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Chug, I side with your argument over Jacko's although it would be fascinating to listen you you both in a civilised debating chamber (not the BBC where you can both talk at once 
).
Chug mentions the switch from a 10 hour day to a 24 hour production day. Historians acknowledge that that we the first time Germany actually mobilised. Up until then they had produced and fought to order so to speak. Only in 1943 did they have to ramp up their efforts.
That operations such as Hamburg did not bring the German's to the peace table had nothing to do with the strategic bomber campaign but to a failure to understand the philosophies attached to modern warfare. Shock and Awe become Acceptance and Fatalism once the shock has worn off.
I don't know the true extent of Coastal Command losses but given that the top scoring squadron achieved just 10 confirmed kills and that many sorties were flown without contacts, the stress levels had to be different.
To my mind, a most poignant example of the confidence of the bomber crews may be found in a side room of the USAAF museum hall at Duxford. In a display case is a bomb aimer's collection of arming pins. Each pin represents ne mission and a small label on each bears the date and the target. The collection is complete. Did he believe that he would collect all 30 pins necessary to complete the collection? That is courage.
).Chug mentions the switch from a 10 hour day to a 24 hour production day. Historians acknowledge that that we the first time Germany actually mobilised. Up until then they had produced and fought to order so to speak. Only in 1943 did they have to ramp up their efforts.
That operations such as Hamburg did not bring the German's to the peace table had nothing to do with the strategic bomber campaign but to a failure to understand the philosophies attached to modern warfare. Shock and Awe become Acceptance and Fatalism once the shock has worn off.
I don't know the true extent of Coastal Command losses but given that the top scoring squadron achieved just 10 confirmed kills and that many sorties were flown without contacts, the stress levels had to be different.
To my mind, a most poignant example of the confidence of the bomber crews may be found in a side room of the USAAF museum hall at Duxford. In a display case is a bomb aimer's collection of arming pins. Each pin represents ne mission and a small label on each bears the date and the target. The collection is complete. Did he believe that he would collect all 30 pins necessary to complete the collection? That is courage.
Pontious, thank you for your support, it is appreciated. As for a debate, this is it, so if people have a view let's have it here! You illustrate dramatically the truth that, for all the numbers involved, this was a campaign based on quiet individual courage.
Hugh, you take Jacko to task far more effectively than I or any other contributor on this thread can. You put your finger on the nub of the matter when you say; "Do a little more studying, especially what was known about things at that time". It is what is known now about things at that time, or rather not known, by military aviators let alone the general public that concerns me. At least Jacko cares enough to post here. I think his passion clouds his judgement, but better that than nothing. And nothing is what we have from the overwhelming majority!
This thread may be primarily about issuing a campaign medal or bar for the RAF WWII Bombing Offensive against Germany, but it is ultimately about the rehabilitation of that campaign and the brave men who fought it. The limbo in which they have existed since 1945 is an indictment of this nation and their service. Explanations abound as to why this has happened but are really only excuses from the war time and post war generations. It is now for the present practitioners of the art of military aviation to set the record straight.
We now have information that was not available previously, but essentially the facts are straight forward enough. The German tank commander who saw countless numbers of T34s in his visor far outnumbering his own tanks, the American GI fighting for his life on Omaha who at least had the comfort of knowing that any aircraft he heard were ours, were both directly affected by the bombing campaign. If you were unaware of all this, then take Hugh's advice, study! If you are aware then share your thoughts with the rest of us. If you disagree with the point of the thread, then post. Now is the time for this debate, and if those concerned with military aviation have no view, who should?
It is time that this wrong was righted. This campaign was the biggest effort, at the biggest cost, in the history of military aviation. If that isn't reason enough to post on this forum, I can't think what is. So post!
Hugh, you take Jacko to task far more effectively than I or any other contributor on this thread can. You put your finger on the nub of the matter when you say; "Do a little more studying, especially what was known about things at that time". It is what is known now about things at that time, or rather not known, by military aviators let alone the general public that concerns me. At least Jacko cares enough to post here. I think his passion clouds his judgement, but better that than nothing. And nothing is what we have from the overwhelming majority!
This thread may be primarily about issuing a campaign medal or bar for the RAF WWII Bombing Offensive against Germany, but it is ultimately about the rehabilitation of that campaign and the brave men who fought it. The limbo in which they have existed since 1945 is an indictment of this nation and their service. Explanations abound as to why this has happened but are really only excuses from the war time and post war generations. It is now for the present practitioners of the art of military aviation to set the record straight.
We now have information that was not available previously, but essentially the facts are straight forward enough. The German tank commander who saw countless numbers of T34s in his visor far outnumbering his own tanks, the American GI fighting for his life on Omaha who at least had the comfort of knowing that any aircraft he heard were ours, were both directly affected by the bombing campaign. If you were unaware of all this, then take Hugh's advice, study! If you are aware then share your thoughts with the rest of us. If you disagree with the point of the thread, then post. Now is the time for this debate, and if those concerned with military aviation have no view, who should?
It is time that this wrong was righted. This campaign was the biggest effort, at the biggest cost, in the history of military aviation. If that isn't reason enough to post on this forum, I can't think what is. So post!
At the age of 65, Chugs, you may have 'been there', but only technically.
Hugh, you may have been there, at the frontline, and therefore have the benefit of direct experience of the Bomber War, as it was fought by your squadron, at your station. I've merely gained an overview by talking to scores of veterans, and by exhaustively going through the Bomber Command war diaries (and I'll bet they kept the extent of losses from you chaps) and the reports from Germany as to what damage was done. And my Dad was operational aircrew during the War, and his crew included second tourists from both Bomber Command (Hampdens - who knew all about heavy losses) and Coastal, so I have some idea as to what was what at the time. And even in 1944, very many people questioned the conduct of the Bomber war - I'm not some kind of revisionist chump approaching this with 20:20 hindsight.
As long as people want and try to equate "rehabilitation of those who fought the bomber war" with apologism for, and rehabilitation of the reputation of its AOC, and with wild and inaccurate claims of its effectiveness and success, then they are doomed to losing the argument.
No-one questions the bravery of Bomber Command, though I would strongly oppose the notion that their courage, sacrifice, skill or mettle was any greater than that displayed by Army Co-operation Command, Coastal Command, Fighter Command, the Desert Air Force, etc.
They qualify for Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany. No other aircrew got a specific campaign medal, and nor should they.
With the precedent set by the Arctic emblem and the 'Battle of Britain' and other clasps, I'd be marginally less hostile to a 'Bomber Command' bar or badge on Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany.
Harris: A narrow minded, inflexible commander who threw away his crews carelessly, who resisted what he thought of as diversions (when many of them were far more effective than the routine ops), who boasted of what he could achieve and who signally failed to achieve it. A man who presided over a costly, and inefficient use of precious resources, and who became an obstacle to victory.
Effectiveness of the bombing campaign: Even after 1943, the ratio of losses to actual damage against German military and industrial infrastructure was pitifully low, and we could have done much more by using air power more intelligently.
With regard to Coastal Command, I can help, I hope, to provide some appreciation of what was achieved, and at what cost.
My Dad's first Captain had been posted to a Coastal Anson squadron, which was cut to pieces soon after his arrival - losing more than three quarters of its strenth during a single mission. The squadron reformed, and the same thing happened again.
Even in Liberator days, crews simply failed to return at regular intervals, claimed by the weather, flying into high ground, flying into the sea, knocked down by enemy fighters, or blown to pieces by the fuel-burning heater systems. Crews who did the calculations realised that the odds were stacked against their completing a tour of operations. Just like Bomber Command. 1,777 aircraft were lost, and the official History "Royal Air Force 1939-1945" Vol III, gave a total of 5,866 personnel killed in action. The Coastal Command & Maritime Air Association gives a higher total of 10,875 lives lost. The lower figure may not have included the many missing personnel, later assumed killed, nor those killed who were allied and dominion personnel serving with the RAF.
Heavy losses, in other words, for a Command that was very much smaller than Bomber Command. And I see no merit in throwing away highly trained aircrew - the flower of the nation's youth - without wreaking commensurate damage on the enemy. If pointless suicidal loss rates were to be the measure, then we'd celebrate the Battle and Blenheim crews as war-winners!
But a Command which clocked up an impressive record. During the war Coastal Command flew over 240,000 operations, sinking 212 U-boats and destroying 478,000 tons of shipping in the process. (And that doesn't include many of the U-boats found by Coastal and later destroyed by Naval forces). And even the 'no contact' patrols kept enemy aircraft tied down countering them, kept the U-Boats transiting to their operational areas via circuitous routes shortening their patrols, often rendering them unable to hunt by day and later even by night, and helping to reinforce the blockade that strangled German industry (by cutting off the raw materials on which it depended) far more effectively than bomber efforts that knocked down a row of workers' houses or killed a cow or two.
The official calculation was that a four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command had 20 times greater impact on German industrial production than it would have done if allocated to Bomber Command.
Hugh, you may have been there, at the frontline, and therefore have the benefit of direct experience of the Bomber War, as it was fought by your squadron, at your station. I've merely gained an overview by talking to scores of veterans, and by exhaustively going through the Bomber Command war diaries (and I'll bet they kept the extent of losses from you chaps) and the reports from Germany as to what damage was done. And my Dad was operational aircrew during the War, and his crew included second tourists from both Bomber Command (Hampdens - who knew all about heavy losses) and Coastal, so I have some idea as to what was what at the time. And even in 1944, very many people questioned the conduct of the Bomber war - I'm not some kind of revisionist chump approaching this with 20:20 hindsight.
As long as people want and try to equate "rehabilitation of those who fought the bomber war" with apologism for, and rehabilitation of the reputation of its AOC, and with wild and inaccurate claims of its effectiveness and success, then they are doomed to losing the argument.
No-one questions the bravery of Bomber Command, though I would strongly oppose the notion that their courage, sacrifice, skill or mettle was any greater than that displayed by Army Co-operation Command, Coastal Command, Fighter Command, the Desert Air Force, etc.
They qualify for Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany. No other aircrew got a specific campaign medal, and nor should they.
With the precedent set by the Arctic emblem and the 'Battle of Britain' and other clasps, I'd be marginally less hostile to a 'Bomber Command' bar or badge on Air Crew Europe and/or France and Germany.
Harris: A narrow minded, inflexible commander who threw away his crews carelessly, who resisted what he thought of as diversions (when many of them were far more effective than the routine ops), who boasted of what he could achieve and who signally failed to achieve it. A man who presided over a costly, and inefficient use of precious resources, and who became an obstacle to victory.
Effectiveness of the bombing campaign: Even after 1943, the ratio of losses to actual damage against German military and industrial infrastructure was pitifully low, and we could have done much more by using air power more intelligently.
With regard to Coastal Command, I can help, I hope, to provide some appreciation of what was achieved, and at what cost.
My Dad's first Captain had been posted to a Coastal Anson squadron, which was cut to pieces soon after his arrival - losing more than three quarters of its strenth during a single mission. The squadron reformed, and the same thing happened again.
Even in Liberator days, crews simply failed to return at regular intervals, claimed by the weather, flying into high ground, flying into the sea, knocked down by enemy fighters, or blown to pieces by the fuel-burning heater systems. Crews who did the calculations realised that the odds were stacked against their completing a tour of operations. Just like Bomber Command. 1,777 aircraft were lost, and the official History "Royal Air Force 1939-1945" Vol III, gave a total of 5,866 personnel killed in action. The Coastal Command & Maritime Air Association gives a higher total of 10,875 lives lost. The lower figure may not have included the many missing personnel, later assumed killed, nor those killed who were allied and dominion personnel serving with the RAF.
Heavy losses, in other words, for a Command that was very much smaller than Bomber Command. And I see no merit in throwing away highly trained aircrew - the flower of the nation's youth - without wreaking commensurate damage on the enemy. If pointless suicidal loss rates were to be the measure, then we'd celebrate the Battle and Blenheim crews as war-winners!
But a Command which clocked up an impressive record. During the war Coastal Command flew over 240,000 operations, sinking 212 U-boats and destroying 478,000 tons of shipping in the process. (And that doesn't include many of the U-boats found by Coastal and later destroyed by Naval forces). And even the 'no contact' patrols kept enemy aircraft tied down countering them, kept the U-Boats transiting to their operational areas via circuitous routes shortening their patrols, often rendering them unable to hunt by day and later even by night, and helping to reinforce the blockade that strangled German industry (by cutting off the raw materials on which it depended) far more effectively than bomber efforts that knocked down a row of workers' houses or killed a cow or two.
The official calculation was that a four engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command had 20 times greater impact on German industrial production than it would have done if allocated to Bomber Command.
Jacko, posting effectively the same message over and over hardly advances the debate. A swipe at Harris, a reminder of the sacrifice and achievements of Coastal Command, an attempt to rope in all the other Operational Commands with Bomber as part of an integrated European Air Campaign, for which a medal was struck, a swipe at the ineffectiveness of the Bomber Campaign once again culminating in your killer phrase that a Coastal 4 engine aircraft had twenty times greater impact on German industrial production than a Bomber one (which other than labelling it "official" you never substantiate), seem to constitute your manifesto, always the same words, though not necessarily in the same order, sunshine!
Well let's address them yet again. We are not discussing Harris, we are discussing his campaign and his men. He may have been a right "B", in which case he was in very good company, for RAF wartime career ladders seemed to favour the Leigh-Mallorys and Baders rather than the Dowdings and Parks, so what? Once again no-one is trying to detract from Coastal's record, it is you who keep raising it. They fought a long and arduous campaign and helped save us from defeat. They should, and do, wear their Atlantic Star with pride. As I have said before you could have had just one Aircrew Star, but it was more appropriate that those who fought the vitally important Battle of the Atlantic, be it on or above the waves be so acknowledged. Equally (I say no more than that!) it is fitting that those who fought the vitally important Battle of Germany, without which there might have been peace but no victory, should be so acknowledged. It wasn't in 1945, for political reasons, but should be now. As Hugh has said, there was a gradual improvement throughout the war of the effectiveness of the Bomber Offensive, despite a similar increase to the enemy's counter measures. As it prevailed towards the end, its destructive power was awesome. That is surely the measure of military success? Why did the Luftwaffe virtually cease flying at the end, why wasn't it thrown against the beaches on D-day, why did German industrial production scarcely rise, despite the total mobilisation mentioned earlier, by sinking u-boats?
You seem to be approaching this from a personal angle. You say that your father served in Coastal Command. It is a recorded fact that the 4 engined bombers went first to Harris, and the delay and scarcity of them had its detrimental effect in the u-boat war. Naturally he was aware of that, naturally he resented it. It doesn't follow that they were wrongly allocated. The Atlantic was for us a defensive war, the Bombing of Germany was an offensive one (and for some years the only one). To paraphrase Churchill, wars are not won by defensive measures, rather they are thus not lost. Who is to say that if those 4 engined aircraft had not gone to Harris, Speer could have pushed out the Tigers to stop the T34s, and refined and transported the fuel to keep the Luftwaffe flying. We sink every single one of Donitz's u-boats but get turned back on D-day! Either Hitler or Stalin would have ruled continental Europe from Siberia to Brest. A bit OTT? No more than the repeating a mantra about a Liberator having twenty times the impact on German industry with Coastal rather than Bomber Command.
BTW, my background is transport, so everyone alike can have a sneer, and my father was in LAA, so had it in for all of us!
Well let's address them yet again. We are not discussing Harris, we are discussing his campaign and his men. He may have been a right "B", in which case he was in very good company, for RAF wartime career ladders seemed to favour the Leigh-Mallorys and Baders rather than the Dowdings and Parks, so what? Once again no-one is trying to detract from Coastal's record, it is you who keep raising it. They fought a long and arduous campaign and helped save us from defeat. They should, and do, wear their Atlantic Star with pride. As I have said before you could have had just one Aircrew Star, but it was more appropriate that those who fought the vitally important Battle of the Atlantic, be it on or above the waves be so acknowledged. Equally (I say no more than that!) it is fitting that those who fought the vitally important Battle of Germany, without which there might have been peace but no victory, should be so acknowledged. It wasn't in 1945, for political reasons, but should be now. As Hugh has said, there was a gradual improvement throughout the war of the effectiveness of the Bomber Offensive, despite a similar increase to the enemy's counter measures. As it prevailed towards the end, its destructive power was awesome. That is surely the measure of military success? Why did the Luftwaffe virtually cease flying at the end, why wasn't it thrown against the beaches on D-day, why did German industrial production scarcely rise, despite the total mobilisation mentioned earlier, by sinking u-boats?
You seem to be approaching this from a personal angle. You say that your father served in Coastal Command. It is a recorded fact that the 4 engined bombers went first to Harris, and the delay and scarcity of them had its detrimental effect in the u-boat war. Naturally he was aware of that, naturally he resented it. It doesn't follow that they were wrongly allocated. The Atlantic was for us a defensive war, the Bombing of Germany was an offensive one (and for some years the only one). To paraphrase Churchill, wars are not won by defensive measures, rather they are thus not lost. Who is to say that if those 4 engined aircraft had not gone to Harris, Speer could have pushed out the Tigers to stop the T34s, and refined and transported the fuel to keep the Luftwaffe flying. We sink every single one of Donitz's u-boats but get turned back on D-day! Either Hitler or Stalin would have ruled continental Europe from Siberia to Brest. A bit OTT? No more than the repeating a mantra about a Liberator having twenty times the impact on German industry with Coastal rather than Bomber Command.
BTW, my background is transport, so everyone alike can have a sneer, and my father was in LAA, so had it in for all of us!