The claims made by Harris, his personality, his attitudes to his crews, his aircraft, his resentment at being diverted from the Strategic Bombing Campaign were not part of my argument, nor thus of my reply, Jacko. Rather it is what his bombing campaign did or did not achieve. A campaign medal acknowledges just that, participation in a major campaign. Coastal Command's major campaign was the Battle of the Atlantic, and like the bombing campaign, lasted from the start to the finish of the European War. It was essential that we prevailed, or we would have lost the war. I acknowledge the effort and sacrifice by all those who fought that battle. The equivalent campaign fought by the bomber crews was what Harris called the Battle of Germany. Same duration but suffering a much greater loss, both in rate and actual numbers. The campaign did not have a medal struck, not because to issue it would have been "a slap in the face to other operational RAF aircrew who flew in the European theatre of operations", but because the Bombing Campaign had been disowned for political reasons.
The importance of that campaign is not down to "Hollywoodisation", really Jacko we must elevate the argument a little don't you think? Rather I would point to the lack of Luftwaffe response to D-day, where it was conspicuous by its absence, because of the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Of course it could have been conducted better in hindsight. What campaign couldn't? The essential thing was that it was conducted, in order to win the war. You may find that risible, well let us agree to disagree!
Coastal Command could count success in numbers of u-boats sunk, versus allied shipping not sunk. Tactical bombing could likewise be judged in its ability to clear the way for advancing armies. Bomber Command had a more difficult equation to resolve, much of which was in the negative, i.e. shortages of equipment on the Eastern Front, lack of missions flown by the Luftwaffe, etc. However, Robin Neillands' The Bomber War gives some interesting numbers to conjure with. In 1944, 30% of artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of optical and 50% of electronic output together with 900,000 men all allocated to Reich Air Defence.
Speer said that up to 1943 German industry worked a 10 hour day, after that they changed to 3 shifts, 24 hour operation and the expanding use of slave labour. Despite all that production only rose by a small part of what was expected. The reason was the bombing. He made the point that it had opened an enormous second front long before D-day.
You quote Jeshonnek as favouring twin rather than four engined bombers. Well he would wouldn't he? It was that very decision by the Luftwaffe that prevented them from bombing the T-34 factories that had been evacuated to the east. Combined with their own tank production difficulties it led to the long German withdrawal via Kursk to the Reich.
You say that my statement that German war production could have matched Allied production without the bombing is unsustainable. Perhaps, but the US Strategic Bombing Survey found that Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse.
Finally your two contentions:
1. A single 4 engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command produced 20 times as much damage to the German economy compared to main force.
2. Had the 4 engined bombers been used in larger numbers against u-boats, convoy protection and tactical ops, the damage to the German economy would have been much greater, losses lower and victory quicker.
I do not understand these statements. Surely the losses to the Germans would be in u-boats and their crews, i.e. at the margins of total industrial output? Obviously sinking u-boats and surface units was essential to prevail in the maritime war, but I cannot see how that ensured victory, rather it was essential to avoiding defeat.
Regards, Chug