Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Surely there has to come a time when enough is enough, how much longer is CDS and CAS etc just going to roll over and tow the party line. The forces as a whole are broke and broken. Someone needs to tell this uncaring, self serving, bunch of left wing lunatics that we cannot carry on like this.
As usual, it is the brave men and women in uniform that pay the ultimate sacrifice, I hope that at the going down of the sun and in the morning the politicians will remember them … I know I do.
As usual, it is the brave men and women in uniform that pay the ultimate sacrifice, I hope that at the going down of the sun and in the morning the politicians will remember them … I know I do.
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Airworthy is Airworthy - Yes the Risks are Different
Gas Fitter,
Whilst I actually agree with the underlying implications of your comments, namely that MOD has little option but to carry on flying the Nimrods, you are very wrong to criticise the Coroner in the way you have - a similar criticism was made by very senior RAF officers about results of the Mull of Kintyre FAI when the Sheriff did not agree with the RAF's position and unjustified verdict.
An airworthy aircraft is just that airworthy! A RAF aircraft should indeed be as airworthy as a 737 flying from Luton - the MOD definition of airwothiness in JSP 318 used to be "the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown.” I doubt it has been relaxed since the JSP 553 came in. Where the difference and hence the risks come is what you do with this airworthy aircraft, and there the risks of military aviation are inevitably significantly higher in many cases. As one of the parents said to me "if my son had been shot down I would still have grieved", but to know that he has been killed because of lack of money and, as has now been revealed at the Inquest, a lack of professional standards and failure to follow procedures by the very people who were supposed to be giving him an aircraft that was "fit for purpose" is probably more than the families can bear - and that came over if you saw their post verdict press conference.
Given how few resources we have there is, I suggest, nothing either operational or professional, if the RAF is to lose these scarce resources because they have failed, whether for lack of money or poor engineering judgement or any other reason, to provide equipment that is fit for purpose and meets their legal obligations for a duty of care - obligations that rightly, in my view, apply to MOD as to any other walk of life. The Coroner was right!
JB
Whilst I actually agree with the underlying implications of your comments, namely that MOD has little option but to carry on flying the Nimrods, you are very wrong to criticise the Coroner in the way you have - a similar criticism was made by very senior RAF officers about results of the Mull of Kintyre FAI when the Sheriff did not agree with the RAF's position and unjustified verdict.
An airworthy aircraft is just that airworthy! A RAF aircraft should indeed be as airworthy as a 737 flying from Luton - the MOD definition of airwothiness in JSP 318 used to be "the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown.” I doubt it has been relaxed since the JSP 553 came in. Where the difference and hence the risks come is what you do with this airworthy aircraft, and there the risks of military aviation are inevitably significantly higher in many cases. As one of the parents said to me "if my son had been shot down I would still have grieved", but to know that he has been killed because of lack of money and, as has now been revealed at the Inquest, a lack of professional standards and failure to follow procedures by the very people who were supposed to be giving him an aircraft that was "fit for purpose" is probably more than the families can bear - and that came over if you saw their post verdict press conference.
Given how few resources we have there is, I suggest, nothing either operational or professional, if the RAF is to lose these scarce resources because they have failed, whether for lack of money or poor engineering judgement or any other reason, to provide equipment that is fit for purpose and meets their legal obligations for a duty of care - obligations that rightly, in my view, apply to MOD as to any other walk of life. The Coroner was right!
JB
Last edited by John Blakeley; 23rd May 2008 at 16:00.
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Gas Fitter,
Would you have felt the same if the jet had fallen out of the sky onto say..........your house? or a loved one??
Would you still feel the same?
I fear that CAS will do nothing. He has shown himself to be utterly spineless and I suspect that he is quietly lining himself up for the next CDS job (after all, he is clearly on this shambolic governments' side)
CDS will do nothing because he is awaiing an invite to join the board of some big defence co'
Would you have felt the same if the jet had fallen out of the sky onto say..........your house? or a loved one??
Would you still feel the same?
I fear that CAS will do nothing. He has shown himself to be utterly spineless and I suspect that he is quietly lining himself up for the next CDS job (after all, he is clearly on this shambolic governments' side)
CDS will do nothing because he is awaiing an invite to join the board of some big defence co'
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From the BBC article
This week a senior engineer from defence and aerospace firm BAE Systems told the inquest that his predecessors, who made the Nimrod some 40 years ago, failed to fit a fire protection system on a key area of risk on the aircraft. And the firm's head of airworthiness Tom McMichael said that if the evidence heard was correct, the Nimrod planes had, at the time of the tragedy, been flying in an unairworthy state for 37 years.
If this has been reported correctly, does it mean that even BWOS (sorry, BAe Systems) have doubts about the state of the Nimrod fleet???
This week a senior engineer from defence and aerospace firm BAE Systems told the inquest that his predecessors, who made the Nimrod some 40 years ago, failed to fit a fire protection system on a key area of risk on the aircraft. And the firm's head of airworthiness Tom McMichael said that if the evidence heard was correct, the Nimrod planes had, at the time of the tragedy, been flying in an unairworthy state for 37 years.
If this has been reported correctly, does it mean that even BWOS (sorry, BAe Systems) have doubts about the state of the Nimrod fleet???
Last edited by Len Ganley; 28th May 2008 at 09:18. Reason: Complaint about use of BWOS
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If I can just add in my thoughts here please.
It's rather unfair and also unproffesional (in my opinion) to claim that the aircraft is un-airwirthy now and never was airwirthy. Of course it was airworthy once, but the current decision making process is being based on current technology and design - the Nimrod is not current in either, it is a very old design.
Now, when it was designed from the Comet, it is reasonable to assume that the then-current aviation designers, working to the standards and guidelines of the day, weren't to know that passing a main refuel duct through an engine bay or passing a hot air duct through a dry-bay fairly adjacent to a fuel line would be an issue - because the hot air duct was lagged and the fuel line was leak-free. That was the current thinking at that time and as such it was airworthy.
Move on to current times and it's pretty obvious with hindsight that maybe it wasn't such a good idea (and probably wouldn't be declared airwirthy if it was a new design today), but it isn't practical to try and redesign something that doesn't lend itself to such process due to the very nature of the design and technology used - i.e. there is no other space through which to pass these components.
It is relatively rare to have such an age of design still in-use actively, hence the current situation. The easy answer of course is to say "replace it with something better".... well, that's happening but an awful lot slower than we would all like in an ideal world. (Oh, and the MRA4 has a TOTALLY different design of fuel system, before anyone starts trying to tell me it hasn't changed! I've had access to the maintenance manuals and seen it for myself!!)
Let's not forget that the MOD started the process to replace the MR2 in, what, 1994/5? It isn't the MOD's fault that things are running so late, but that does not excuse a perceived lack of attention towards maintenance on the "old" model. I say perceived as a lot of people just don't know what work is going on behind the scenes engineering-wise, that much is obvious when I read down this thread and see some of the comments made - comments based more than likely on how things were a long time ago, and comments made from people who are obviously not engineers or technicians but seem to think they are because they maybe once flew on it. There are currently active programmes being undertaken at ISK to check and/or replace on spec. various component parts of the aircraft, and certain systems have been isolated from use and operating procedures changed. I will not add anything else to that or enter into any deeper detail so don't ask please. These measures make the aircraft safe to fly in my personal opinion and if asked to, I'd fly on one tomorrow without any doubts or concerns.
Going back to what happened and why, IF the engineers were left to get on with what they do best and were given the funding for the parts that THEY say are required WHEN they say it, then things would be very different indeed but we all know that'll never ever happen.
Two things must change...
1 - The officers who do a university course and think they know all about engineering when they don't know how to use a spanner MUST start to listen to their experienced tradesmen/women.
2 - IF a problem is encountered, funding MUST be made available to resolve it.
As for current ops, well, that is the big issue.
Fact - The aircraft is needed to do a job as long as the troops are there.
Fact - There is NO other platform that can step in and take over the same roles, a lot of which aren't talked about!
Fact - The replacement won't be ready for another few years.
Fact - The government aren't about to pull the troops out!
This leaves only one realistic option - make it safe to remain in-use....
Fact - This IS being done.
None of this detracts from the fact that this was a terrible accident that we all wish had never happened and hope to God that legislative measures will prevent from ever happening again on ANY piece of equipment.
It's rather unfair and also unproffesional (in my opinion) to claim that the aircraft is un-airwirthy now and never was airwirthy. Of course it was airworthy once, but the current decision making process is being based on current technology and design - the Nimrod is not current in either, it is a very old design.
Now, when it was designed from the Comet, it is reasonable to assume that the then-current aviation designers, working to the standards and guidelines of the day, weren't to know that passing a main refuel duct through an engine bay or passing a hot air duct through a dry-bay fairly adjacent to a fuel line would be an issue - because the hot air duct was lagged and the fuel line was leak-free. That was the current thinking at that time and as such it was airworthy.
Move on to current times and it's pretty obvious with hindsight that maybe it wasn't such a good idea (and probably wouldn't be declared airwirthy if it was a new design today), but it isn't practical to try and redesign something that doesn't lend itself to such process due to the very nature of the design and technology used - i.e. there is no other space through which to pass these components.
It is relatively rare to have such an age of design still in-use actively, hence the current situation. The easy answer of course is to say "replace it with something better".... well, that's happening but an awful lot slower than we would all like in an ideal world. (Oh, and the MRA4 has a TOTALLY different design of fuel system, before anyone starts trying to tell me it hasn't changed! I've had access to the maintenance manuals and seen it for myself!!)
Let's not forget that the MOD started the process to replace the MR2 in, what, 1994/5? It isn't the MOD's fault that things are running so late, but that does not excuse a perceived lack of attention towards maintenance on the "old" model. I say perceived as a lot of people just don't know what work is going on behind the scenes engineering-wise, that much is obvious when I read down this thread and see some of the comments made - comments based more than likely on how things were a long time ago, and comments made from people who are obviously not engineers or technicians but seem to think they are because they maybe once flew on it. There are currently active programmes being undertaken at ISK to check and/or replace on spec. various component parts of the aircraft, and certain systems have been isolated from use and operating procedures changed. I will not add anything else to that or enter into any deeper detail so don't ask please. These measures make the aircraft safe to fly in my personal opinion and if asked to, I'd fly on one tomorrow without any doubts or concerns.
Going back to what happened and why, IF the engineers were left to get on with what they do best and were given the funding for the parts that THEY say are required WHEN they say it, then things would be very different indeed but we all know that'll never ever happen.
Two things must change...
1 - The officers who do a university course and think they know all about engineering when they don't know how to use a spanner MUST start to listen to their experienced tradesmen/women.
2 - IF a problem is encountered, funding MUST be made available to resolve it.
As for current ops, well, that is the big issue.
Fact - The aircraft is needed to do a job as long as the troops are there.
Fact - There is NO other platform that can step in and take over the same roles, a lot of which aren't talked about!
Fact - The replacement won't be ready for another few years.
Fact - The government aren't about to pull the troops out!
This leaves only one realistic option - make it safe to remain in-use....
Fact - This IS being done.
None of this detracts from the fact that this was a terrible accident that we all wish had never happened and hope to God that legislative measures will prevent from ever happening again on ANY piece of equipment.
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My sympathies also to the bereaved; you have shown great courage...
I know this is a sensitive issue but I think it needs raising.
My concern is this, would an insurance company now honor the insurance policy of a person injured or killed in/by a Nimrod crash, given the Coroners verdict?
I know this is a sensitive issue but I think it needs raising.
My concern is this, would an insurance company now honor the insurance policy of a person injured or killed in/by a Nimrod crash, given the Coroners verdict?
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I was present during the press conference today, when Paul Adams informed the assembled families that Ainsworth had stated during a simultaneous interview that Nimrod was airworthy and would continue to fly. The anger in the room was palpable. Ainsworth had responded to the Coroner's verdict before the ink had dried on the report.
Just one more clumsy, thoughtless, I would even say heartless reaction from a discredited ministry.
Justifiably, family members who I spoke to, were appalled by the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was given by Gp Capt Hickman IPTL. If Ainsworth has based his statement on advice given by the IPTL, then he could be open to a criminal charge of gross negligence for authorising the Nimrod fleet to continue flying.
It is absolutely clear in my view, that there is a systemic failure in the implementation of airworthiness regulations in the RAF and MoD.
Just one more clumsy, thoughtless, I would even say heartless reaction from a discredited ministry.
Justifiably, family members who I spoke to, were appalled by the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was given by Gp Capt Hickman IPTL. If Ainsworth has based his statement on advice given by the IPTL, then he could be open to a criminal charge of gross negligence for authorising the Nimrod fleet to continue flying.
It is absolutely clear in my view, that there is a systemic failure in the implementation of airworthiness regulations in the RAF and MoD.
Last edited by nigegilb; 23rd May 2008 at 17:11.
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If this happened in a civilian firm then there would be charges of corporate manslaughter at the very least for the officers in charge of the station, engineering, and operations. Is the MOD and the RAF completely devoid of all morality in this or what?
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As someone has allready said, I wonder what the CAA think? If there is doubt about an aircrafts serviceability can the CAA prevent it's use in UK airspace? What about using civvy airports as divs? What about other aviation regulators around the world? Will they ban the Nimrod in their airspace?
Gas Fitter
Reference your comments along the lines of....'war is war, get on with it, risks must be taken, etc'...... XV230 was not lost due to enemy action. It happened to be lost while taking part in a conflict, but it was as a result of AAR which is routinely carried out. The aircraft could just have well been lost after AAR on the way to the Falklands, or some other more mundane AAR tasking.
As for the line taken by politicians and senior RAF officers to the effect....'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!
Reference your comments along the lines of....'war is war, get on with it, risks must be taken, etc'...... XV230 was not lost due to enemy action. It happened to be lost while taking part in a conflict, but it was as a result of AAR which is routinely carried out. The aircraft could just have well been lost after AAR on the way to the Falklands, or some other more mundane AAR tasking.
As for the line taken by politicians and senior RAF officers to the effect....'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!
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It’s interesting that many of you chaps are baying for the blood of ACMs Glenn and Jock but breath not a word about Gen Kevin. Remember him? He’s the 4 * head shed for kit who undertook to provide (sorry, we call it "deliver" now, don’t we) the FLCs with safe, capable and available platforms and equipment. Mission statement: "To equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future." http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/Mi...tegy200812.htm
Perhaps it's a good thing the "V" Force entered service when it did. The Coroner would have had a field day with H Broadhurst's early touchdown at Heathrow with just the 2 bang seats.
Perhaps it's a good thing the "V" Force entered service when it did. The Coroner would have had a field day with H Broadhurst's early touchdown at Heathrow with just the 2 bang seats.
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Ok then air expert Mr Coroner Walker - if XV230 "has never been airworthy" - how did I manage to complete 306 hrs and 5 minutes in that frame, flying from 1973 as a Mk1 and converting in the 80's to a Mk2, and be here today writing this thread?
A BOI is far more in depth than any Coroners inquest (viz, 12 months vs 2 weeks) and should be accepted in good faith, not dismissed in the pursuit of compensation - particularly from an alleged 'MoD hostile Coroner'
I have flown in every Nimrod in the fleet and have had more than my fair share of in-flight heart stoppers, but was lucky to sort them and walk away
This was a unique, tragic accident due to an in-flight system failure rather than systemic engineering ignorance that some of this audience would imply
As this drags on, it starts to insult the memory of Al Squires, his crew and the groundcrew who honestly signed for, and produced, a serviceable ac for that sortie, that day
A BOI is far more in depth than any Coroners inquest (viz, 12 months vs 2 weeks) and should be accepted in good faith, not dismissed in the pursuit of compensation - particularly from an alleged 'MoD hostile Coroner'
I have flown in every Nimrod in the fleet and have had more than my fair share of in-flight heart stoppers, but was lucky to sort them and walk away
This was a unique, tragic accident due to an in-flight system failure rather than systemic engineering ignorance that some of this audience would imply
As this drags on, it starts to insult the memory of Al Squires, his crew and the groundcrew who honestly signed for, and produced, a serviceable ac for that sortie, that day
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Agreed.
And if you look at some of the other inquests that Mr Walker has conducted that is exactly the opinion he is trying to convey - do it properly or don't do it at all.
Defence on the cheap has been acceptable for too long and MOD, it is about time that you stop trying to punch above your weight.
.
G
And if you look at some of the other inquests that Mr Walker has conducted that is exactly the opinion he is trying to convey - do it properly or don't do it at all.
Defence on the cheap has been acceptable for too long and MOD, it is about time that you stop trying to punch above your weight.
.
G
A BOI is far more in depth than any Coroners inquest (viz, 12 months vs 2 weeks) and should be accepted in good faith, not dismissed in the pursuit of compensation - particularly from an alleged 'MoD hostile Coroner'
Please do not forget that Mr Walker has simply agreed with the statement made in the BoI report by ACM Sir Clive Loader – that the mandated airworthiness regulations have NOT been implemented properly. Mr Walker could reach no other conclusion. He did not dismiss the BoI – but he did dig deeper. I’m sure the BoI did, but their findings weren’t published. I’m not surprised, given the conflict of interests which exists.
In also accepting the BoI report, Des Browne admitted liability. Underpinning this decision was a QinetiQ report which listed 30 recommendations. It is not clear if these are the same 30 recommendations one hears MoD speak of, where 20 or so are either in hand or implemented and half a dozen not. But, speaking as someone who has both been on the tools and held airworthiness delegation for a very long time, I’ll tell one certain, irrefutable fact. Of these 30 recommendations, some 29 refer DIRECTLY to MANDATED airworthiness regulations which have not been implemented. The 30th (recommending introduction of a Master Minimum Equipment List) is probably not actually mandated but if one doesn’t exist it casts doubt on the currency (or otherwise) of other mandated documents, like Appendix A of the Aircraft Specification.
And this is just one of many such reports. The main “QQ report” referred to in this thread is, quite frankly, the single most damning piece of evidence I’ve ever read. It is utterly shocking. It discusses causes, whereas I believe the MoD have successfully managed to compartmentalize the issues (as I feared) and what is reported today discusses the effect – and not in any great depth. Notably, the report refers back to previous reports on the SAME SUBJECT from 1995 and 1997. The tone of the report throughout is one of “here we go again”. Nothing came as a surprise.
I sincerely hope in due course what Tapper’s Dad, and others, have achieved today will be seen as one huge step forward in military aviation safety. Judging by the two planks who spoke on behalf of MoD today, I have my doubts.
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Group Captain Hickman IPT leader for the Nimrod told the coroner on Wednesday that the ac was not ALARP . If you read JSP 553 Chapter 2 Page 13- The justification for the airworthiness of the aircraft, sys em or equipment is the safety Case.The health and safety commission defines a safety case as" A suite of documents providing a written demonstration that risks have been reduced as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
This is why it is NOT AIRWORTHY
ian176 If you can get better witnesses than Rolls Royce The head Engineer of BAe systems and the AAIB then tell me were they are. The head Engineer of BAe systems told Mr Walker this ac is not airworthy.
This is why it is NOT AIRWORTHY
ian176 If you can get better witnesses than Rolls Royce The head Engineer of BAe systems and the AAIB then tell me were they are. The head Engineer of BAe systems told Mr Walker this ac is not airworthy.