Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Buoy 15: (With reference to his own Nimrod close-calls)
I though the cavalier attitude towards Nimrod safety was reserved for the Nimrod IPT. I just hope I never have to fly with you.
but was lucky to sort them and walk away
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Is the coroner saying that the MR2 is not airworthy until proved ALRAP? The MOD have incorrectly classed it to be airworthy before the accident, it would be understandable that the coroner is asking for proof if they now state it is airworthy.
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Inter Arma Enim Silentius Lex Legis
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Boy 15 is a numpty, he could be admin guru in disguise for all we know. Or of course an Air Rank Officer, he has the same lack of honour and integrity!
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Sumps the words of Mr Walker;
The crew and passengers were not to know that this aircraft like every other aircraft within Nimrod fleet was not airworthy. What is more the aircraft was in my judgement never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 following its conversion from the Comet 4C Civil Aircraft to the Nimrod MR1-through modification to the Nimrod MR2 completed in 1979 - to the point where the Nimrod MR2 XV 230 was lost.
I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the design modifications for the MR1 contained a serious design flaw that made the MR1 unsafe to fly. I am similarly satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly and that this serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the IPT and the manufacturer.
If this were not enough an incident involving the potential ignition of fuel that had been drawn into lagging on a hot duct on a different aircraft with the consequent loss of that aircraft passed without any follow up investigation despite a recommendation by the board of inquiry.
THIS CAVALIER APPROACH TO SAFETY MUST COME TO AN END.
This in my view was the very source of ignition that on balance of probability caused the loss of XV230 with all souls on board.
There were failures within the operation of the Cassandra hazard log that should if the information had been correctly recorded and acted upon have led to the discovery of this design flaw within the Nimrod fleet. I simply do not understand why it was not noticed that according to that hazard log a fire detection and suppression system existed within the dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system within dry bay 7 and never had been.
If the A s Low As Reasonably Practicable standard is the standard accepted it is not airworthy today.
The crew and passengers were not to know that this aircraft like every other aircraft within Nimrod fleet was not airworthy. What is more the aircraft was in my judgement never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 following its conversion from the Comet 4C Civil Aircraft to the Nimrod MR1-through modification to the Nimrod MR2 completed in 1979 - to the point where the Nimrod MR2 XV 230 was lost.
I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the design modifications for the MR1 contained a serious design flaw that made the MR1 unsafe to fly. I am similarly satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly and that this serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the IPT and the manufacturer.
If this were not enough an incident involving the potential ignition of fuel that had been drawn into lagging on a hot duct on a different aircraft with the consequent loss of that aircraft passed without any follow up investigation despite a recommendation by the board of inquiry.
THIS CAVALIER APPROACH TO SAFETY MUST COME TO AN END.
This in my view was the very source of ignition that on balance of probability caused the loss of XV230 with all souls on board.
There were failures within the operation of the Cassandra hazard log that should if the information had been correctly recorded and acted upon have led to the discovery of this design flaw within the Nimrod fleet. I simply do not understand why it was not noticed that according to that hazard log a fire detection and suppression system existed within the dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system within dry bay 7 and never had been.
If the A s Low As Reasonably Practicable standard is the standard accepted it is not airworthy today.
Last edited by nigegilb; 23rd May 2008 at 23:03.
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Airsound
A first class post, I agree with everything you said about Andrew Walker, a remarkable man.
I was however less than impressed wqith some of the evidence given by, and about the Nimrod IPT.
The much vaunted "Nimrod Safety Case", discussed previously on this thread, was produced by a contractor, no doubt at great expense, on behalf of the IPT. This resulted in a number of hazards and subsequent risks being identified where, if they occurred, would have"catastrophic"
consequences (ie loss of aircraft and crew). The risk was assessed as "Remote" but did require remedial action. IPT had the category re-assessed as "Improbable" so that action was no longer required.
The requirement to manage risk so that it was ALARP is a requirement of the MOD's own system of regulation, so it would not be unreasonable to expect compliance from the MOD, however when questioned by the Coroner the IPTL kept insisting the aircraft was tolerably safe, and did not appear to understand the concept of ALARP, but said they "were working towards ALARP compliance". He refused however to acknowledge the requirement for risk to be ALARP.
Bouy 15
Bob Ainsworth stated on the BBC today that the fleet had "not been airworthy for many years prior to the accident" !
Andrew Walker recommended that the fleet should be grounded until the ALARP condition could be achieved, whilst I do not expect this to happen it may speed up the process to make Nimrod a safer aircraft
A first class post, I agree with everything you said about Andrew Walker, a remarkable man.
I was however less than impressed wqith some of the evidence given by, and about the Nimrod IPT.
The much vaunted "Nimrod Safety Case", discussed previously on this thread, was produced by a contractor, no doubt at great expense, on behalf of the IPT. This resulted in a number of hazards and subsequent risks being identified where, if they occurred, would have"catastrophic"
consequences (ie loss of aircraft and crew). The risk was assessed as "Remote" but did require remedial action. IPT had the category re-assessed as "Improbable" so that action was no longer required.
The requirement to manage risk so that it was ALARP is a requirement of the MOD's own system of regulation, so it would not be unreasonable to expect compliance from the MOD, however when questioned by the Coroner the IPTL kept insisting the aircraft was tolerably safe, and did not appear to understand the concept of ALARP, but said they "were working towards ALARP compliance". He refused however to acknowledge the requirement for risk to be ALARP.
Bouy 15
Bob Ainsworth stated on the BBC today that the fleet had "not been airworthy for many years prior to the accident" !
Andrew Walker recommended that the fleet should be grounded until the ALARP condition could be achieved, whilst I do not expect this to happen it may speed up the process to make Nimrod a safer aircraft
Alba
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Rigger1
"Someone needs to tell this uncaring, self serving, bunch of left wing lunatics that we cannot carry on like this.
As usual, it is the brave men and women in uniform that pay the ultimate sacrifice, I hope that at the going down of the sun and in the morning the politicians will remember them … I know I do."
They will not remember them past the first line of their speech 'offering' their 'condolences'.
"Someone needs to tell this uncaring, self serving, bunch of left wing lunatics that we cannot carry on like this.
As usual, it is the brave men and women in uniform that pay the ultimate sacrifice, I hope that at the going down of the sun and in the morning the politicians will remember them … I know I do."
They will not remember them past the first line of their speech 'offering' their 'condolences'.
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Can somebody help me too please? 
Setting aside the legal definitions argument and systemic failures for a moment, the accident was initiated by the unfortunate interaction of the SCP/X feed pipe and the AAR system. The ‘design flaw’ did not cause the accident, but clearly failed to mitigate that interaction with disastrous results.
Given that neither system is currently in use, what exactly are the remaining risks that justify the grounding of the fleet?
Setting aside the legal definitions argument and systemic failures for a moment, the accident was initiated by the unfortunate interaction of the SCP/X feed pipe and the AAR system. The ‘design flaw’ did not cause the accident, but clearly failed to mitigate that interaction with disastrous results.
Given that neither system is currently in use, what exactly are the remaining risks that justify the grounding of the fleet?
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Oil can, an engineer should really answer your question and I do not claim to be an engineer, but these are some of the outstanding issues.
FRS Couplings, seals checked every 30 days but dry out in 5,(plus annual check), misaligned pipes, chief source of continuing leaks, checked by eye(only gross misalignment can be found), couplings that can't be checked,fuel leaks over hot and electrical sources, even more important as Coroner challenged BoI version of fuel leak source, this risk to hot and electrical sources exists at low level, but was discounted by IPTL.
Hickman confirmed Nimrod was not ALARP, HSWA requires aircraft to be ALARP, it is not!
Tolerable not safe unless ALARP, only other option exceptional circumstances. Due process for this clearly not being carried out, exceptional circumstances claim has been rightly (in my view), rejected.
"Their weakness is, I think, their inability to show they complied with this rigorous process which requires constant review. Elsewhere I noted the frequency with which the IPTL must carry out certain reviews, and if he has a hazard which would result in explosion/fire/loss of aircraft then, frankly, his Safety Manager, the Safety Committee and the Contractor should be employed full time."
I do not understand the response from Torpy and his ilk. I believe he is wrong.
I believe Mr Walker has accurately described the airworthiness of Nimrod.
FRS Couplings, seals checked every 30 days but dry out in 5,(plus annual check), misaligned pipes, chief source of continuing leaks, checked by eye(only gross misalignment can be found), couplings that can't be checked,fuel leaks over hot and electrical sources, even more important as Coroner challenged BoI version of fuel leak source, this risk to hot and electrical sources exists at low level, but was discounted by IPTL.
Hickman confirmed Nimrod was not ALARP, HSWA requires aircraft to be ALARP, it is not!
Tolerable not safe unless ALARP, only other option exceptional circumstances. Due process for this clearly not being carried out, exceptional circumstances claim has been rightly (in my view), rejected.
"Their weakness is, I think, their inability to show they complied with this rigorous process which requires constant review. Elsewhere I noted the frequency with which the IPTL must carry out certain reviews, and if he has a hazard which would result in explosion/fire/loss of aircraft then, frankly, his Safety Manager, the Safety Committee and the Contractor should be employed full time."
I do not understand the response from Torpy and his ilk. I believe he is wrong.
I believe Mr Walker has accurately described the airworthiness of Nimrod.
Further to Nige’s post, and in addition to my previous comments on the recent (2007) QQ report containing 30 recommendations, may I offer some detail from a previous QQ report dated 17th March 2006 entitled ”Nimrod Fuel Leak Study” (which itself refers back to reports from 1995 and 1997).
It is in 3 sections, plus a summary, addressing;
1. Repair and Maintenance Issues
2. Materials and Processes
3. Structural Integrity
Section 1 contains 8 recommendations, 7 of which are directly related to airworthiness.
Section 2 contains a table of 12 Deficiencies, their consequences and recommended corrective action. All relate directly to airworthiness. Section 2 also contains 12 recommendations, all relating to airworthiness.
Section 3 is less well presented and contains 5 conclusions each of which affect airworthiness.
The report correctly states many of the above are interrelated and so approaches issues from different viewpoints. It therefore summarises the 3 sections with 17 recommendations, all related to airworthiness.
It is unclear what action has been taken on these but, of those I’m familiar with (generic problems common across MoD), I can assure you they are long term and need an awful lot of investment as there is up to 20 years regression work required. Others could have been implemented immediately, the remainder following a major recruitment drive in RAF and MoD to claw back the experience and expertise that was ditched. This last is a specific criticism in the report.
I understand there are further QQ reports in a similar vein which have not been released, presumably because they are even more shocking.
It is in 3 sections, plus a summary, addressing;
1. Repair and Maintenance Issues
2. Materials and Processes
3. Structural Integrity
Section 1 contains 8 recommendations, 7 of which are directly related to airworthiness.
Section 2 contains a table of 12 Deficiencies, their consequences and recommended corrective action. All relate directly to airworthiness. Section 2 also contains 12 recommendations, all relating to airworthiness.
Section 3 is less well presented and contains 5 conclusions each of which affect airworthiness.
The report correctly states many of the above are interrelated and so approaches issues from different viewpoints. It therefore summarises the 3 sections with 17 recommendations, all related to airworthiness.
It is unclear what action has been taken on these but, of those I’m familiar with (generic problems common across MoD), I can assure you they are long term and need an awful lot of investment as there is up to 20 years regression work required. Others could have been implemented immediately, the remainder following a major recruitment drive in RAF and MoD to claw back the experience and expertise that was ditched. This last is a specific criticism in the report.
I understand there are further QQ reports in a similar vein which have not been released, presumably because they are even more shocking.
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I have no knowledge of the Nimrod's fuel system so I pass no comment. What is of interest is the risk that CAS and SofS have just taken; if there were another crash, they would have few options other than suicide or long jail terms.
If I were them I would consider one half of the monkey tree syndrome - the half which says that all the monkeys at the top of the tree can see is happy faces looking up. All the monkeys at the bottom of the tree can see is a***holes at the top.
Everybody knows the pressure to deliver effective support to the troops on the ground in Afghanistan, what does that pressure do to self-censor the honest views of those who advise the men at the top? I don't know but I hope the men at the top have thought about it.
If I were them I would consider one half of the monkey tree syndrome - the half which says that all the monkeys at the top of the tree can see is happy faces looking up. All the monkeys at the bottom of the tree can see is a***holes at the top.
Everybody knows the pressure to deliver effective support to the troops on the ground in Afghanistan, what does that pressure do to self-censor the honest views of those who advise the men at the top? I don't know but I hope the men at the top have thought about it.
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If Gp Capt Hickman, as the Delegated Airworthiness Authority, has stated that the Nimrod currently IS NOT ALARP, we are in trouble. I wasn't there to hear his words on oath, but if he used those words, or similar, he is contradicting virtually everyone (from SoS down to NLS liney) involved with the aircraft. Given his appointment, there should be no way that he would be contradicted by his superiors. I believe he has been mis-represented here.
Buoy 15, I don't known what caused your outbursts yesterday, but you should study JSP 553 (its on every sqn) and have a rethink. I think you are confusing serviceability with airworthiness, which is a subject not normally on the minds of aircrew. We have a right to expect that our aircraft have been designed to meet the definition of airworthiness. The definition is in the JSP. Read it and then try to reconcile the JSP with a design that has a collection of very hot pipes and fuel pipes in the same small bay, such that a small fuel leak (single failure) will have catestrophic consequences.
I miss my mates on that crew and, furthermore, I consider that all of us here today are fortunate to be still alive.
Ed
Buoy 15, I don't known what caused your outbursts yesterday, but you should study JSP 553 (its on every sqn) and have a rethink. I think you are confusing serviceability with airworthiness, which is a subject not normally on the minds of aircrew. We have a right to expect that our aircraft have been designed to meet the definition of airworthiness. The definition is in the JSP. Read it and then try to reconcile the JSP with a design that has a collection of very hot pipes and fuel pipes in the same small bay, such that a small fuel leak (single failure) will have catestrophic consequences.
I miss my mates on that crew and, furthermore, I consider that all of us here today are fortunate to be still alive.
Ed
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Deputy Coroner Andrew Walker’s Verdict
I should like to begin by offering my deepest sympathies to members of the fourteen families.
I realise that there is nothing that I could ever say that would be enough to comfort them in their grief and if this were not enough to bear by itself they have had to wait far too long for this inquest to be heard and like so many families should not have had to fight for access to documents to help understand this tragedy.
Of one thing there can be no doubt, the crew and passengers on that aircraft were highly trained, highly professional, brave and courageous and it is clear to me as I have sat here over the last three weeks I can see in the families sitting in court that same determination and courage reflected in their drive to uncover the truth and in their concern for those who have still to fly this aircraft.
I will never forget the crew's last words as they calmly dealt with the fire on their aircraft with every intention that they should land safely having diverted to Kandahar airport.
I have no doubt that these fine men will never be forgotten and their loss will be keenly felt by their families their friends and our armed forces.
The weather was fine and there was nothing unusual as the crew and passengers of the Nimrod XV230 took off for their mission over Afghanistan from their deployment base at 09.13 in the morning.
The crew and passengers were not to know that this aircraft like- every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet-was not airworthy. What is more the aircraft was in my judgment never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 following its conversion from the Comet 4C Civil Aircraft to the Nimrod MR1- through the modification to the Nimrod MR2 completed in 1979- to the point where the Nimrod MR2 XV 230 was lost.
I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the design modifications for the MR I contained a serious design flaw that made the MR1 unsafe to fly. I am similarly satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly and that this serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the IPT and the Manufacture.
If this were not enough an incident involving the potential ignition of fuel that had been drawn into lagging on a hot duct on a different aircraft with the consequent loss of that aircraft passed without any follow up investigation despite a recommendation by the board on inquiry.
This cavalier approach to safety must come to an end.
This in my view was the very source of ignition that on the balance of probability caused the loss of the XV230 with all souls on board.
There were failures within the operation of the Cassandra hazard log that should if the information had been correctly recorded and acted upon have led to the discovery of this design flaw within the Nimrod fleet. I simply do not understand why it was not noticed that according to that hazard log a fire detection and suppression system existed within dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system within dry bay 7 and never had been.
If the As Low As Reasonably Practicable standard is the standard accepted it is not airworthy today.
For each of the service personnel who lost their lives I record the following narrative verdict.
The fourteen members of crew and passengers of the XV 230 Nimrod mark 2 aircraft which left from an operational base to fly a mission into Afghanistan on the 2nd September 2006 at 9 13 were lost when shortly after air to air refuelling when fuel from a fuel leak, most likely from a fuel feed pipe, was ignited by a hot duct within or closely associated with dry bay 7 on the starboard side of the aircraft. As there was no fire detection and suppression system within dry bay 7 the crew could do nothing to prevent the fire and the aircraft broke up in the air following an explosive ignition of fuel from fuel tank 7 as the crew were preparing for an emergency landing at Kandahar airport.
Their deaths were in part the result of failures, some of them serious, that resulted in the dangers inherent within dry bay 7 of the aircraft, created by the introduction of a hot air engine cross feed system and subsequently a bleed from that system, on the part of the aircraft manufacturer and the those responsible for the safety of the aircraft, going un noticed.
The creation of a baseline safety case and Cassandra hazard log that contained serious errors failed to deal adequately with the dangers posed by dry bay 7 and the danger remained until its discovery after the loss of the aircraft, crew and passengers.
The different aircraft reffered to was a Tornado that had a fuel leak onto a hot Air duct the Nimrod IPT were told about in 2004 .The Tornado was lost but the crew ejected hence no BOI or Inquest.The Nimrod IPT took no action to look at the Nimrod to see if it could have a similar acident.
I should like to begin by offering my deepest sympathies to members of the fourteen families.
I realise that there is nothing that I could ever say that would be enough to comfort them in their grief and if this were not enough to bear by itself they have had to wait far too long for this inquest to be heard and like so many families should not have had to fight for access to documents to help understand this tragedy.
Of one thing there can be no doubt, the crew and passengers on that aircraft were highly trained, highly professional, brave and courageous and it is clear to me as I have sat here over the last three weeks I can see in the families sitting in court that same determination and courage reflected in their drive to uncover the truth and in their concern for those who have still to fly this aircraft.
I will never forget the crew's last words as they calmly dealt with the fire on their aircraft with every intention that they should land safely having diverted to Kandahar airport.
I have no doubt that these fine men will never be forgotten and their loss will be keenly felt by their families their friends and our armed forces.
The weather was fine and there was nothing unusual as the crew and passengers of the Nimrod XV230 took off for their mission over Afghanistan from their deployment base at 09.13 in the morning.
The crew and passengers were not to know that this aircraft like- every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet-was not airworthy. What is more the aircraft was in my judgment never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969 following its conversion from the Comet 4C Civil Aircraft to the Nimrod MR1- through the modification to the Nimrod MR2 completed in 1979- to the point where the Nimrod MR2 XV 230 was lost.
I am satisfied on the balance of probability that the design modifications for the MR I contained a serious design flaw that made the MR1 unsafe to fly. I am similarly satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly and that this serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the IPT and the Manufacture.
If this were not enough an incident involving the potential ignition of fuel that had been drawn into lagging on a hot duct on a different aircraft with the consequent loss of that aircraft passed without any follow up investigation despite a recommendation by the board on inquiry.
This cavalier approach to safety must come to an end.
This in my view was the very source of ignition that on the balance of probability caused the loss of the XV230 with all souls on board.
There were failures within the operation of the Cassandra hazard log that should if the information had been correctly recorded and acted upon have led to the discovery of this design flaw within the Nimrod fleet. I simply do not understand why it was not noticed that according to that hazard log a fire detection and suppression system existed within dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system within dry bay 7 and never had been.
If the As Low As Reasonably Practicable standard is the standard accepted it is not airworthy today.
For each of the service personnel who lost their lives I record the following narrative verdict.
The fourteen members of crew and passengers of the XV 230 Nimrod mark 2 aircraft which left from an operational base to fly a mission into Afghanistan on the 2nd September 2006 at 9 13 were lost when shortly after air to air refuelling when fuel from a fuel leak, most likely from a fuel feed pipe, was ignited by a hot duct within or closely associated with dry bay 7 on the starboard side of the aircraft. As there was no fire detection and suppression system within dry bay 7 the crew could do nothing to prevent the fire and the aircraft broke up in the air following an explosive ignition of fuel from fuel tank 7 as the crew were preparing for an emergency landing at Kandahar airport.
Their deaths were in part the result of failures, some of them serious, that resulted in the dangers inherent within dry bay 7 of the aircraft, created by the introduction of a hot air engine cross feed system and subsequently a bleed from that system, on the part of the aircraft manufacturer and the those responsible for the safety of the aircraft, going un noticed.
The creation of a baseline safety case and Cassandra hazard log that contained serious errors failed to deal adequately with the dangers posed by dry bay 7 and the danger remained until its discovery after the loss of the aircraft, crew and passengers.
The different aircraft reffered to was a Tornado that had a fuel leak onto a hot Air duct the Nimrod IPT were told about in 2004 .The Tornado was lost but the crew ejected hence no BOI or Inquest.The Nimrod IPT took no action to look at the Nimrod to see if it could have a similar acident.
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Interview on R4's 'Today' with Jimmy Jones, a Nimrod engineer & AM Sir Barry Thornton available here:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/in...e=today&js=yes
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/in...e=today&js=yes
Nigeglib
Thank you for your informative posts yesterday.
Not all had the opportunity or the proximity to do this. I think we were greatly let down by the media who stopped reporting the inquest when it became "too technical" for them to follow.
Can you clarify what incident and timescale Mr Walker is referring too?
TD has just answered my question:
Oilcan
As correctly highlighted, if the 'design flaw' had been identified and ignition source removed this accident would not have happened. I agree that with the ignition source removed, one side of the fire triangle (oxygen/fuel/ignition) has been removed. However, the risk of fuel leaking has not been addressed and as stated by Jimmy Jones on TV it will be years before a seal replacement programme could be carried out on all aircraft. What has never been discussed here is how difficult jet fuel is to ignite. Even at the 400C temperature, it can take 'minutes' for fuel to ignite, if it has not evaporated first. This does not excuse the mistakes and oversights that lead to this tragedy, but might explain some people's thinking up to this point.
Thank you for your informative posts yesterday.
Might I suggest you should have gotten off your arrse and turned up at the Inquest?
If this were not enough an incident involving the potential ignition of fuel that had been drawn into lagging on a hot duct on a different aircraft with the consequent loss of that aircraft passed without any follow up investigation despite a recommendation by the board of inquiry.
TD has just answered my question:
The different aircraft reffered to was a Tornado that had a fuel leak onto a hot Air duct the Nimrod IPT were told about in 2004 .The Tornado was lost but the crew ejected hence no BOI or Inquest.The Nimrod IPT took no action to look at the Nimrod to see if it could have a similar acident.
The ‘design flaw’ did not cause the accident, but clearly failed to mitigate that interaction with disastrous results.
Given that neither system is currently in use, what exactly are the remaining risks that justify the grounding of the fleet?
Given that neither system is currently in use, what exactly are the remaining risks that justify the grounding of the fleet?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
What are the implications of this for the MRA4 contract, if any? I presume the wing change and refurbishment has rigorously identified and covered all these issues, right?
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firstly and most importantly i absolutely echo the words of andrew walker, this cavalier approach to safety must come to an end.
there needs to be no more said on this matter.
for those of you who disagree, you are of course entitled to do so. this would not be a discussion forum if we all agreed, but there are those of you who's views belong to an era, nay a culture which no longer has any place in the 21st century. it is also to be noted, and no doubt ignored that the way in which the opposing views are communicated in the most ignorant and offensive way. of course i am making reference to buoy 15 and his disgusting reference to the widows and wringing of compensation etc, blah blah. this is all about keeping the lives of serving aircrew safe protected and MAINTAINED! HOW DARE YOU TRY AND ATTACH THAT KIND OF REFERENCE TO US. the RAF is one of the finest in the world. we are keen to maintain that.
to tappers dad and others
KEEP THE FAITH
there needs to be no more said on this matter.
for those of you who disagree, you are of course entitled to do so. this would not be a discussion forum if we all agreed, but there are those of you who's views belong to an era, nay a culture which no longer has any place in the 21st century. it is also to be noted, and no doubt ignored that the way in which the opposing views are communicated in the most ignorant and offensive way. of course i am making reference to buoy 15 and his disgusting reference to the widows and wringing of compensation etc, blah blah. this is all about keeping the lives of serving aircrew safe protected and MAINTAINED! HOW DARE YOU TRY AND ATTACH THAT KIND OF REFERENCE TO US. the RAF is one of the finest in the world. we are keen to maintain that.
to tappers dad and others
KEEP THE FAITH
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Des Browne was forced to admit liability and was wrong to do so - hitherto, Nimrod performed safely prior to this event, and still does
Spitfires and Hurricanes in WW2 were not fitted with foam/fire depressant, but we don't see those pilots widows trying to wring money out of the MoD
There was a war on then, as there is now - Churchill must have had some sort or ALARP to get the job done otherwise we would have lost - as we have done under New Labour anyway
You hand wringing, bleeding heart, health and safety, ambulance chasing brigade need to get real and go and spend 2 months in the sand with the lads - then we might get some sensible debate on this thread
Spitfires and Hurricanes in WW2 were not fitted with foam/fire depressant, but we don't see those pilots widows trying to wring money out of the MoD
There was a war on then, as there is now - Churchill must have had some sort or ALARP to get the job done otherwise we would have lost - as we have done under New Labour anyway
You hand wringing, bleeding heart, health and safety, ambulance chasing brigade need to get real and go and spend 2 months in the sand with the lads - then we might get some sensible debate on this thread
Implications for MRA4
What are the implications of this for the MRA4 contract, if any? I presume the wing change and refurbishment has rigorously identified and covered all these issues, right?
However, I cannot see how the problems could have been rigorously identified by the MRA4 team, yet not advised to the MR2 team and corrective action taken. What will (should) have happened is that the issues arising from the raft of reports (and I mentioned the QQ/DERA ones go back to 1995 at least and the same fuel problems were identified concurrently on VC10 and corrected) will have been advised to the RMPA/Nimrod 2000/MRA4 team by MR2 and, I would hope, VC10. As mutual stakeholders (they were dependent on each other when separate entities) they would agree an action plan. Judging by the QQ report, the action plan was fix VC10 but not Nimrod.
Furthermore, it is a fundamental up front requirement of any modification programme (MRA4) to establish the Induction Build Standard of the aircraft to be modified. Given the programme timescales, this would be bottomed out in the period 1997-99 and kept up to date through 10 or so years of slippage(!!). If it was not, this is a grave oversight and alone would force years of delay in the MRA4 programme, even without the major design issues that were known at the time. Note – not yesterday as a result of the Coroner’s verdict, or last year with the issue of the BoI report, but over a decade ago for specific fuel related problems and nearly two decades ago for generic Build Standard deficiencies. As it is, we know the Build Standard has not been maintained and one should be asking the MRA4 team what they did about it and were they climbing all over the MR2 team, and their stakeholders, to resurrect the Build Standard?
Given this, see here;
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...imrod_mra4.htm
Under the Smart Procurement Initiative, the Nimrod MRA4 was identified as one of the pilot Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) in November 1998, led by Air Commodore Barry Thornton. Although the project was established around an integrated team concept from the outset, both at Abbey Wood and in industry, the latest initiative enabled the Nimrod Integrated Project Team to re-focus and embrace other personnel who work full time on Nimrod MRA4 from other areas which were previously outside the IPT.
My opinion is that there is a conflict of interest here which may explain why MRA4 is seldom mentioned. But the two are inextricably linked and I imagine there will be much to discuss in the coming months. Perhaps the past IPTL (and contributor to the BoI report) will be asked to comment.