Future Carrier (Including Costs)
The MoD briefed the press at 1200 today that this story was wrong and categorically stated that the programme was to go ahead as planned.
Or as this young lady....
...once said
Or as this young lady....
...once said
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Least surprising news ever
"Next-generation fighters will not be ready for new carriers"
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/to...cle3273488.ece
"Next-generation fighters will not be ready for new carriers"
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/to...cle3273488.ece
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Rosyth Gearing Up
Looks like they are getting ready to do some rebuilding at Rosyth.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/...st/7238829.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/...st/7238829.stm
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Not sure which is more depressing, the original crap design, or the fact that, by 2022 it will be a museum piece...
Flight International: UK Budget Crisis to put years on Sea King 7 Fleet.
The UK could extend the service life of its Royal Navy Sea King 7 airborne surveillance and control system helicopter until 2022, because funding pressures look likely to force the deferral of of its successor MASC programme..........
The previous planning assumptions for MASC had been to migrate the Sea King 7s Thales Searchwater 2000 AEW radar and Cerberus mission suite into 12 new-build AW101 Merlin airframes with minimal re-engineering.
The current aircraft had been slated for replacement from 2018, but with intense pressure on equipment funding in the MOD's current planning round, the MASC programme is likely to slip 5 years.
The MOD and the RN are now planning a capability sustainment programme for the Sea King 7 that will maintain the operation and support through to a revised out-of-service date of 2022.......
Flight International: UK Budget Crisis to put years on Sea King 7 Fleet.
The UK could extend the service life of its Royal Navy Sea King 7 airborne surveillance and control system helicopter until 2022, because funding pressures look likely to force the deferral of of its successor MASC programme..........
The previous planning assumptions for MASC had been to migrate the Sea King 7s Thales Searchwater 2000 AEW radar and Cerberus mission suite into 12 new-build AW101 Merlin airframes with minimal re-engineering.
The current aircraft had been slated for replacement from 2018, but with intense pressure on equipment funding in the MOD's current planning round, the MASC programme is likely to slip 5 years.
The MOD and the RN are now planning a capability sustainment programme for the Sea King 7 that will maintain the operation and support through to a revised out-of-service date of 2022.......
ORAC
“Not sure which is more depressing, the original crap design, or the fact that, by 2022 it will be a museum piece...”
What was the crap design?
Sea King
The conversion to AEW Mk2
Searchwater / Its adaptation for Sea King
Its mid-life upgrade for Sea King AEW Mk2
The conversion to AEW Mk7
Searchwater 2000 (3/4 life upgrade to Searchwater)
The conversion to ASaC Mk7
Cerberus
Merlin??!!
I don't think it's crap design that's the problem, but crap decisions (although I concede the RN thought they were getting FOAEW in 2012). No engineer would make the idiotic assumption that Cerberus/Searchwater could be transferred to Merlin/ FOAEW / MASC with minimal engineering. If the RN wanted Merlin they shouldn't have specified Sea King; that way the design solution would be completely different (a Blue Vixen variant). It makes the politics very difficult. "You had your chance, but said no". Your can just hear the beancounters rattling their bags.
“Not sure which is more depressing, the original crap design, or the fact that, by 2022 it will be a museum piece...”
What was the crap design?
Sea King
The conversion to AEW Mk2
Searchwater / Its adaptation for Sea King
Its mid-life upgrade for Sea King AEW Mk2
The conversion to AEW Mk7
Searchwater 2000 (3/4 life upgrade to Searchwater)
The conversion to ASaC Mk7
Cerberus
Merlin??!!
I don't think it's crap design that's the problem, but crap decisions (although I concede the RN thought they were getting FOAEW in 2012). No engineer would make the idiotic assumption that Cerberus/Searchwater could be transferred to Merlin/ FOAEW / MASC with minimal engineering. If the RN wanted Merlin they shouldn't have specified Sea King; that way the design solution would be completely different (a Blue Vixen variant). It makes the politics very difficult. "You had your chance, but said no". Your can just hear the beancounters rattling their bags.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
FT: We must question the case for aircraft carriers By Michael Quinlan
The defence budget is in deeper trouble than at any time since Labour came to power. But so are the general public finances, so the Treasury will not come to the rescue. In such situations, squeeze-and-postpone never suffices. Nettles have to be grasped - the sooner, the better.
Ministers must surely take a hard look at large programmes where costs are not yet too far committed. There may well be several of these. But one that stands out is the plan for two big aircraft carriers to deploy joint Royal Navy and Royal Air Force combat aircraft. If the case for these has been rigorously tested in Whitehall, little has emerged to outside view. The Commons defence committee, though keenly interested in the procurement arrangements, has scarcely attempted deeper scrutiny. There has been no public debate as there was over the Trident force.
Britain cannot afford everything that might conceivably come in handy one day. Defence planning has to make choices that limit what we can do. But with direct military threat a remote possibility, almost everything we take on far from home is ultimately optional. Do big carriers give us choices that other forces do not and that are wide, important and likely to warrant the costs?
Carriers are an expensive way of providing a modest amount of air power. Like all forces, they have limitations. They are more vulnerable than airfields and harder to repair after damage, even if not sunk. Against serious opposition much of their effort goes into defending themselves, and they need a protective entourage. Even then, a single carrier is at severe risk within range of enemy air power (or missiles, or submarines). It cannot give much if any support if the operational theatre is deep inland. Two carriers cannot guarantee, as a basis for political commitment, the timely availability of one in the right place. A distinguished admiral has said that there is a case for three or none, but not two.
Carriers can support land forces where no airfields are available or deployment problems prevent other combat aircraft getting there. Recovering the Falklands would have been impossible without them. But the -scenario where carriers are essential is still narrow. If the US is engaged (and the government does not plan for big intervention operations without that) success cannot turn on a British carrier contribution alongside far greater US carrier power, and our involvement can take other forms at least as welcome militarily and politically.
Without the US, an operation dependent upon carriers yet not too tough for us has to fit a tight specification. Land forces must have gone in without an airfield for deployment and supply. They must need combat air support, but not more than a carrier can provide after allowance for its own defence. The operational location must be within range of carrier-based aircraft. The task must be one that cannot be done, in the 2020s and 2030s, by systems such as unmanned aircraft that do not need a big flight-deck. The adversary's striking power must not be too much for the carrier. And the operation must be so important to Britain that we cannot stand aside, as we have done from many conflicts.
No one can prove that this scenario could never arise. But against its likelihood and importance we have to weigh its costs. We have been told the estimate for the ships (£4bn), but even if it holds good there is more to a carrier force than that.
Does it cover all the operational outfitting? Would new infrastructure, such as deeper-dredged harbours, be needed? Would there still, without these ships, be the same numbers and types of aircraft bought, with similar equipment, training costs and wastage allowance? Would there be no inroads upon personnel and supporting vessels for other tasks? Would there be no opportunity costs bearing down on the already impaired size and readiness of the destroyer and frigate fleet - upon which the carriers themselves would place demands?
Abandoning the carriers would be painful for the Royal Navy, constituency and industrial interests and procurement relationships with France. But in hard times for defence these are secondary considerations.
The prime criterion must be strategic utility as compared with alternative resource uses (including perhaps big ships to deploy helicopters, unmanned air vehicles and logistic and communications support). There is a case to answer.
Sir Michael Quinlan was permanent undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Defence 1988-92
The defence budget is in deeper trouble than at any time since Labour came to power. But so are the general public finances, so the Treasury will not come to the rescue. In such situations, squeeze-and-postpone never suffices. Nettles have to be grasped - the sooner, the better.
Ministers must surely take a hard look at large programmes where costs are not yet too far committed. There may well be several of these. But one that stands out is the plan for two big aircraft carriers to deploy joint Royal Navy and Royal Air Force combat aircraft. If the case for these has been rigorously tested in Whitehall, little has emerged to outside view. The Commons defence committee, though keenly interested in the procurement arrangements, has scarcely attempted deeper scrutiny. There has been no public debate as there was over the Trident force.
Britain cannot afford everything that might conceivably come in handy one day. Defence planning has to make choices that limit what we can do. But with direct military threat a remote possibility, almost everything we take on far from home is ultimately optional. Do big carriers give us choices that other forces do not and that are wide, important and likely to warrant the costs?
Carriers are an expensive way of providing a modest amount of air power. Like all forces, they have limitations. They are more vulnerable than airfields and harder to repair after damage, even if not sunk. Against serious opposition much of their effort goes into defending themselves, and they need a protective entourage. Even then, a single carrier is at severe risk within range of enemy air power (or missiles, or submarines). It cannot give much if any support if the operational theatre is deep inland. Two carriers cannot guarantee, as a basis for political commitment, the timely availability of one in the right place. A distinguished admiral has said that there is a case for three or none, but not two.
Carriers can support land forces where no airfields are available or deployment problems prevent other combat aircraft getting there. Recovering the Falklands would have been impossible without them. But the -scenario where carriers are essential is still narrow. If the US is engaged (and the government does not plan for big intervention operations without that) success cannot turn on a British carrier contribution alongside far greater US carrier power, and our involvement can take other forms at least as welcome militarily and politically.
Without the US, an operation dependent upon carriers yet not too tough for us has to fit a tight specification. Land forces must have gone in without an airfield for deployment and supply. They must need combat air support, but not more than a carrier can provide after allowance for its own defence. The operational location must be within range of carrier-based aircraft. The task must be one that cannot be done, in the 2020s and 2030s, by systems such as unmanned aircraft that do not need a big flight-deck. The adversary's striking power must not be too much for the carrier. And the operation must be so important to Britain that we cannot stand aside, as we have done from many conflicts.
No one can prove that this scenario could never arise. But against its likelihood and importance we have to weigh its costs. We have been told the estimate for the ships (£4bn), but even if it holds good there is more to a carrier force than that.
Does it cover all the operational outfitting? Would new infrastructure, such as deeper-dredged harbours, be needed? Would there still, without these ships, be the same numbers and types of aircraft bought, with similar equipment, training costs and wastage allowance? Would there be no inroads upon personnel and supporting vessels for other tasks? Would there be no opportunity costs bearing down on the already impaired size and readiness of the destroyer and frigate fleet - upon which the carriers themselves would place demands?
Abandoning the carriers would be painful for the Royal Navy, constituency and industrial interests and procurement relationships with France. But in hard times for defence these are secondary considerations.
The prime criterion must be strategic utility as compared with alternative resource uses (including perhaps big ships to deploy helicopters, unmanned air vehicles and logistic and communications support). There is a case to answer.
Sir Michael Quinlan was permanent undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Defence 1988-92
To me, this reads like an opening salvo from the "establishment".
PUS (Chief Accounting Officer) from 88-92? Ah, memories. Some of the rulings introduced under his watch, and which still stand today, include; conducting “scrutiny” (he mentions this) is a disciplinary offence, maintaining airworthiness is optional, war reserve shall be held unserviceable. I’m depressed already.
PUS (Chief Accounting Officer) from 88-92? Ah, memories. Some of the rulings introduced under his watch, and which still stand today, include; conducting “scrutiny” (he mentions this) is a disciplinary offence, maintaining airworthiness is optional, war reserve shall be held unserviceable. I’m depressed already.
It's worse than that. Sir Michael has previous on carriers and one wonders how much of his argument is actually fact-based and how much is based on his early career as :Background: Michael Quinlan was born in 1930. After National Service in the Royal Air Force he entered the United Kingdom Home Civil Service in 1954. Most of his career was spent in the defence field, especially in policy posts. He was Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air 1956-58, and to the Chief of Air Staff 1962-65. From 1968 to 1970 he was concerned in particular with arms control, and from 1970 to 1973 he was Defence Counsellor in the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO (heading also the secretariat of the Eurogroup). From 1974 to 1977 he served in the Cabinet Office. In 1977 he became Policy Director in the Ministry of Defence, closely involved with nuclear-force modernisation both nationally and in NATO. After service in the Treasury 1981-82 as Deputy Secretary (Industry) he became Permanent Secretary at the Department of Employment 1983-88. He then returned to the Ministry of Defence as Permanent Under-Secretary of State until retirement in 1992.Clearly someone is briefing the media to get both FT (Quinlan) and ST (Jenkins) commenting on the same subject (and same vein) in the last couple of weeks.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 27th Feb 2008 at 16:05.
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Both the Jenkins and Quinlan articles seem to focus on current ops which whilst difficult are perhaps not particulalry representative of the future geopolitical context beyond 2018 when the carriers, FRES et al will be in Service.
Take at look at the DCDC future trends documents http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4DFA2...DCDCIMAPPS.pdf
for their take on the threats of the future. If you don't get the maritime element of it then you must be blind.
There also needs to be a degree of considering the time late issues here. The Defence Board sat last week to make its decisions and both of these articles came after it. With Minister's directing that no programmes are to be cut (FT sourced as well) and just delayed to reduced the spending peak over the next two years then these arguments become a little fallacious. Since Jenkins was involved in the process underpinning SDR which went for the carriers in the first place, his current change of mood seems a bit rich.
The most interesting thing about the current spend issues is that many of them were taken on risk for Medium Term Work Strands in 05 which made some big assumptions on ops, commodity costs (oil) and probable increases in spending. You could say that we played the risks and lost.
I am not saying that the Govt should not have given us a bigger CSR slice to cover these costs and the current op tempo drains on resource, but realism does not get votes.
With an election barely 2 years away do not expect any massive changes in policy or a Defence Review which may reprioritise capabilities. Too many votes in Scotland depend on defence!
Si
Take at look at the DCDC future trends documents http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4DFA2...DCDCIMAPPS.pdf
for their take on the threats of the future. If you don't get the maritime element of it then you must be blind.
There also needs to be a degree of considering the time late issues here. The Defence Board sat last week to make its decisions and both of these articles came after it. With Minister's directing that no programmes are to be cut (FT sourced as well) and just delayed to reduced the spending peak over the next two years then these arguments become a little fallacious. Since Jenkins was involved in the process underpinning SDR which went for the carriers in the first place, his current change of mood seems a bit rich.
The most interesting thing about the current spend issues is that many of them were taken on risk for Medium Term Work Strands in 05 which made some big assumptions on ops, commodity costs (oil) and probable increases in spending. You could say that we played the risks and lost.
I am not saying that the Govt should not have given us a bigger CSR slice to cover these costs and the current op tempo drains on resource, but realism does not get votes.
With an election barely 2 years away do not expect any massive changes in policy or a Defence Review which may reprioritise capabilities. Too many votes in Scotland depend on defence!
Si
The point being is that you can use the format of an opinion column to make a case for or against practically anything, The impact of the piece depends 99.5 per cent on the author's style and rhetorical chops and 0.5 per cent on the real-world validity of the arguments presented. If there are any arguments that don't support your case, you just leave them on the cutting-room floor.
Last edited by LowObservable; 28th Feb 2008 at 12:33.
"Clearly someone is briefing the media to get both FT (Quinlan) and ST (Jenkins) commenting on the same subject (and same vein) in the last couple of weeks."
If you accept that: "Britain cannot afford everything that might conceivably come in handy one day. Defence planning has to make choices that limit what we can do." Then Quinlan's article merely reflects a common sense statement of the case against carriers - or at least points out that there is a case to answer.
While the case 'for' the carriers is being widely briefed by the Admirals, the pressure groups and the enthusiasts, I've seen no evidence of any concerted briefing of the case against them.
Believe it or not, the cost, vulnerability, limited combat power, slow deployability, and other drawbacks of carriers are self evident common sense. Anyone who has been close to defence issues (let alone professionally involved as Quinlan was) could formulate much the same argument without needing to be spoon-fed.
Indeed, had Quinlan been briefed, I'd have expected more points - including the way in which the carriers tie us into JSF, with all of the uncertainties and costs that that programme entails.
If you accept that: "Britain cannot afford everything that might conceivably come in handy one day. Defence planning has to make choices that limit what we can do." Then Quinlan's article merely reflects a common sense statement of the case against carriers - or at least points out that there is a case to answer.
While the case 'for' the carriers is being widely briefed by the Admirals, the pressure groups and the enthusiasts, I've seen no evidence of any concerted briefing of the case against them.
Believe it or not, the cost, vulnerability, limited combat power, slow deployability, and other drawbacks of carriers are self evident common sense. Anyone who has been close to defence issues (let alone professionally involved as Quinlan was) could formulate much the same argument without needing to be spoon-fed.
Indeed, had Quinlan been briefed, I'd have expected more points - including the way in which the carriers tie us into JSF, with all of the uncertainties and costs that that programme entails.
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I've seen many forums discussing the RN's new carriers. People often harken back to the Falklands War. "What if there is another Falklands?" or "The Falklands war taught us such and such."
I'm no analyst, but surely the only Falklands like scenario for Great Britain would be...another Falklands War with Argentina? If this then is the be all and end all reason for having carriers (as some would imply) then would it not be more cost effective to scrap the idea of having carriers and spend the money instead on fortifying the Islands themselves? It is better to deny the possibility of losing the islands than to have to wage an expensive (in terms of money and lives!) war to recover them.
Personally I believe the carriers should be built so that Britain and its European partners can look after their own back yard while at the same time do our fair share of work on the international scene so if a serious threat does come on the horizon (a resurgent Russia?) then our cousins in the USA might feel inclined to assist.
I'm no analyst, but surely the only Falklands like scenario for Great Britain would be...another Falklands War with Argentina? If this then is the be all and end all reason for having carriers (as some would imply) then would it not be more cost effective to scrap the idea of having carriers and spend the money instead on fortifying the Islands themselves? It is better to deny the possibility of losing the islands than to have to wage an expensive (in terms of money and lives!) war to recover them.
Personally I believe the carriers should be built so that Britain and its European partners can look after their own back yard while at the same time do our fair share of work on the international scene so if a serious threat does come on the horizon (a resurgent Russia?) then our cousins in the USA might feel inclined to assist.
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I agree that constant reference back to 1982 can be tiresome, however when asked for examples of carrier utility it is the classic post WW2 example. Carrier ops around Indonesia during the "confrontation" or all the exercises and planning for fighting the Red Navy in the Norwegian Sea arn't well known so don't carry the same resonance.
When asked for future possible scenarios life also gets tricky as the debate then descends into a discussion about the probability of such scenarios occuring.
David Hobbs- a carrier enthusiast and curator of the FAA musuem at Yeovilton makes an interesting point in this article:
""Looking into the future" is not easy. A planner looking forward for the life of a major warship, say 30 years, in 1932 would have had to predict the rise to power of Hitler in Germany, appeasement, militarism in Japan, the end of US isolationism, the Second World War with Russia as an ally, the Cold War with Russia as an enemy, the Korean War, the decline of the British Empire and the Suez Crisis!
On a tactical level, the demise of the battleship and the rapid development of aircraft, radar and guided missiles were significant. Similar prophesies in our own era made in 1980 might not have included the South Atlantic War, the end of the Cold War and the spread of regional conflicts requiring western intervention. They should have placed more emphasis on counter-terrorist operations however.
Since 1945, British forces have been in action against "stateless" terror groups in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Borneo, the Former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone and others.
If looking into the future is so difficult, what can we do to 'future proof' our forces? Experience of the recent past can be analysed in a process known as 'hindcasting' in the USA, and we can look for weapons systems that survived the period like those I have illustrated. Aircraft carriers not only survived the 20th century but also continued to grow in importance and capability. Battleships did not. Aircraft carriers, in a variety of forms and shapes, are important national assets. The very fact the future carriers, CVF, are seen today as the cornerstone of Britain's future defence posture 37 years after the 'death' of CVA01 illustrates that their importance has transcended the opposition of ill-informed politicians."
http://navyleag.customer.netspace.net.au/fc_07car.htm
How predictable is the future and will the UK require a fleet built around carriers? Will the world grow more peacefull? We all hope so, but history tends to indicate otherwise. In an age obsessed with climate change and resources we forget that we've already had one catastrophic world war over oil...WW2. Will we suffer another resource war in the next fifty years? I'd lay money on it.
Will Russia re-arm? I'd put money on it. Will the next world war break out in the Far East? Quite probably. Will British interests be affected? You bet.
Will we be able to rely upon allies for carrier air power?
Any takers?
How many RN warships were lost before the US joined WW2? How many after?
Will be be aligned with the French as at Suez? Will UK and US commercial interests coincide?
Taking the long view, neither Iraqi insurgients or the Taleban are threats to UK - they remain "wars of choice". We are fighting the wrong wars in the wrong place when better border controls and a sensible policy towards integration of minorities at home would provide more security at less cost in servicemens lives. However, this requires a major realignment of Labour political thinking- its far easier to expend servicemen abroad than face difficult decisions at home. All the time the RM and Paras are fighting in Helmand, the real terrorists are running around the Lake District playing paintball.
In the meantime these wars are an ideal stick to beat the forces with as reams of equipment programs can be sacrificed on their alters ("not relevent to current ops" etc) when in fact any sensible Govt would equip and train the forces to provide options when real world threats emerge to British security and commercial interests.
When asked for future possible scenarios life also gets tricky as the debate then descends into a discussion about the probability of such scenarios occuring.
David Hobbs- a carrier enthusiast and curator of the FAA musuem at Yeovilton makes an interesting point in this article:
""Looking into the future" is not easy. A planner looking forward for the life of a major warship, say 30 years, in 1932 would have had to predict the rise to power of Hitler in Germany, appeasement, militarism in Japan, the end of US isolationism, the Second World War with Russia as an ally, the Cold War with Russia as an enemy, the Korean War, the decline of the British Empire and the Suez Crisis!
On a tactical level, the demise of the battleship and the rapid development of aircraft, radar and guided missiles were significant. Similar prophesies in our own era made in 1980 might not have included the South Atlantic War, the end of the Cold War and the spread of regional conflicts requiring western intervention. They should have placed more emphasis on counter-terrorist operations however.
Since 1945, British forces have been in action against "stateless" terror groups in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Borneo, the Former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone and others.
If looking into the future is so difficult, what can we do to 'future proof' our forces? Experience of the recent past can be analysed in a process known as 'hindcasting' in the USA, and we can look for weapons systems that survived the period like those I have illustrated. Aircraft carriers not only survived the 20th century but also continued to grow in importance and capability. Battleships did not. Aircraft carriers, in a variety of forms and shapes, are important national assets. The very fact the future carriers, CVF, are seen today as the cornerstone of Britain's future defence posture 37 years after the 'death' of CVA01 illustrates that their importance has transcended the opposition of ill-informed politicians."
http://navyleag.customer.netspace.net.au/fc_07car.htm
How predictable is the future and will the UK require a fleet built around carriers? Will the world grow more peacefull? We all hope so, but history tends to indicate otherwise. In an age obsessed with climate change and resources we forget that we've already had one catastrophic world war over oil...WW2. Will we suffer another resource war in the next fifty years? I'd lay money on it.
Will Russia re-arm? I'd put money on it. Will the next world war break out in the Far East? Quite probably. Will British interests be affected? You bet.
Will we be able to rely upon allies for carrier air power?
Any takers?
How many RN warships were lost before the US joined WW2? How many after?
Will be be aligned with the French as at Suez? Will UK and US commercial interests coincide?
Taking the long view, neither Iraqi insurgients or the Taleban are threats to UK - they remain "wars of choice". We are fighting the wrong wars in the wrong place when better border controls and a sensible policy towards integration of minorities at home would provide more security at less cost in servicemens lives. However, this requires a major realignment of Labour political thinking- its far easier to expend servicemen abroad than face difficult decisions at home. All the time the RM and Paras are fighting in Helmand, the real terrorists are running around the Lake District playing paintball.
In the meantime these wars are an ideal stick to beat the forces with as reams of equipment programs can be sacrificed on their alters ("not relevent to current ops" etc) when in fact any sensible Govt would equip and train the forces to provide options when real world threats emerge to British security and commercial interests.
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What's the problem ?
Look, let's by 3 carrier's, it's only an extra £2-3 billion. If we can afford to bail out a private bank to the tune of £30-100 billion this is small change.
Surely the security anddefence of the country is more important than bailing out a private bank ?
Or am i being to logical ? After all no one saved our manufacturing base, so there must be spare cash some where.
Look, at the end of the day we live on an island, so if we want to do anything poitically away from our shore's we need ship's and aircraft, it's that simple.
Surely the security anddefence of the country is more important than bailing out a private bank ?
Or am i being to logical ? After all no one saved our manufacturing base, so there must be spare cash some where.
Look, at the end of the day we live on an island, so if we want to do anything poitically away from our shore's we need ship's and aircraft, it's that simple.