Future Carrier (Including Costs)
From an RN viewpoint, the reason for not making a fuss over Tranche 3 is that (in the event it's cut) the 138 JSFs (JN - wossallthis about 82, especially as the final numbers decision is out in the future) will be filling in for the cut-back land-based fighters. Their Airships would then be entirely justified in switching a substantial portion of the buy to the much less expensive and much better performing Dave-A.
The crunches for CVF now are delivering the ships within a million miles of schedule and budget; ensuring that Dave-B works; and solving the MASC issue. It's all going to cost a lot of money, more than anyone thinks now. The risk is that they spend the first five-to-seven years as a hollow force with a small number of performance-limited jets and inadequate AEW, unable to stray too far from a CVN with Super Hornets and E-2s. It will be a shame to have built big boats for 30-plus fighters and then never see them with more than 20 embarked.
Dave-B is not out of the woods. I suspect that it needs more power to perform most of its missions, and that may be forthcoming as long as the F136 stays alive; and that may still cost money and time. AEW&C is going to need a new platform to match the range of the fighters.
Where JN has it right is in challenging the assumption that CVs are an alternative to land-based air. They are complementary. OK, they are Scud-proof - but if the adversary has a serious ability to toss chem-laden missiles at fixed targets, then I suggest that you're not going to be sustaining a lot of land forces in the theater either, in which case the CV air wing is going to be providing air cover and CAS for exactly what?
The crunches for CVF now are delivering the ships within a million miles of schedule and budget; ensuring that Dave-B works; and solving the MASC issue. It's all going to cost a lot of money, more than anyone thinks now. The risk is that they spend the first five-to-seven years as a hollow force with a small number of performance-limited jets and inadequate AEW, unable to stray too far from a CVN with Super Hornets and E-2s. It will be a shame to have built big boats for 30-plus fighters and then never see them with more than 20 embarked.
Dave-B is not out of the woods. I suspect that it needs more power to perform most of its missions, and that may be forthcoming as long as the F136 stays alive; and that may still cost money and time. AEW&C is going to need a new platform to match the range of the fighters.
Where JN has it right is in challenging the assumption that CVs are an alternative to land-based air. They are complementary. OK, they are Scud-proof - but if the adversary has a serious ability to toss chem-laden missiles at fixed targets, then I suggest that you're not going to be sustaining a lot of land forces in the theater either, in which case the CV air wing is going to be providing air cover and CAS for exactly what?
On Typhoons and fighters generally (I'm quoting myself from another thread)..
But what can go from a standing start to anywhere in a 600 mile circle inside an hour, whether or not the natives are cooperating, ID the good guys and the bad guys, and place ordnance within 5-10 metres of the latter, all on its own and without breaking a sweat? (Hint: it's not a helicopter or a tank.)
What can cover the same kind of distance and then launch a missile that will defeat the toughest air defenses and nail the President's dunny? (Hint: it's not a frigate.)
And do self-escorted ISR, given the appropriate pod? (Hint: it's not a drone.)
And what are the longest-serving weapon systems in most countries? (Hint: they're not warships.)
Yes. Fighters are toys.
You can launch them off a ship, yes. But in the case of CVF, you can guarantee a maximum of 30-some JSFs for any operation, with no organic tanking. That's called a small operation, with targets at a maximum of 300 miles inland.
But what can go from a standing start to anywhere in a 600 mile circle inside an hour, whether or not the natives are cooperating, ID the good guys and the bad guys, and place ordnance within 5-10 metres of the latter, all on its own and without breaking a sweat? (Hint: it's not a helicopter or a tank.)
What can cover the same kind of distance and then launch a missile that will defeat the toughest air defenses and nail the President's dunny? (Hint: it's not a frigate.)
And do self-escorted ISR, given the appropriate pod? (Hint: it's not a drone.)
And what are the longest-serving weapon systems in most countries? (Hint: they're not warships.)
Yes. Fighters are toys.
You can launch them off a ship, yes. But in the case of CVF, you can guarantee a maximum of 30-some JSFs for any operation, with no organic tanking. That's called a small operation, with targets at a maximum of 300 miles inland.
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My point was not that we haven't needed fighters. My point was that they opposition was so low tech that they did not need to be state of the art by any means.
If you seek to justify not having a carrier because we have got away without proper carriers for a while, then you must also look at how long we have got away with not having a decent fighter.
If you seek to justify not having a carrier because we have got away without proper carriers for a while, then you must also look at how long we have got away with not having a decent fighter.
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Thought it timely to return to the fray:
There does seem to be a flavour of 'either/or' in the thread, as well as more than a hint of 'my idea/aircraft/platform' is better than yours, so we must have mine'. Here are a few thoughts to stir the pot:
1. CVF has been a central element of our defence planning since 1998. The papers setting out doctrine, concepts, et al have been prepared to a level that is IMHO, unmatched for many years. The joint conclusion (and I do mean Joint) is that having the ability to deliver a credible precision strike option with limited or no Host Nation Support is what the UK needs, AS WELL AS our other capabilities. That's why CVF is being bought. Time to get with the programme?
2. There's a lot of argument over 'how fast' a capability can be deployed. I personally find the rehashing of Sierra Leone as irritating as Jackonicko does, but for the opposite reason - the decision to send CVS in that case was a good example of generating a flexible and useful response in a short time. The decision was approved and agreed at all levels, except possibly a certain Group HQ. Sometimes the answer is sending RAF units, sometimes it isn't. Get over it.
3. Speed is not always the key. Falklands lesson, still relevant, is that maritime air allows a force to deploy and 'poise' in support of diplomacy, or exert political pressure. Maritime force gives the politicos some really good options.
4. Typhoon as a strike aircraft - yes, it will perform strike missions (in the future), but this is an out and out air combat optimised aircraft with a secondary strike capability - a good one, but secondary. Adding large external tanks and large weapons will severely hit its range, and look for the additional dorsal tanks to appear sooner rather than later. It's not a Cold War dinosaur in my view - but it is not yet anything like a long range strike platform.
5. Shocking distortion of priorities? Don't think so. Typhoon is currently consuming a large (huge) part of the defence equipment budget - and the assertions about costs of supporting and operating carriers are, in my view, being a little overdone. Let's not also forget that the CVF will be a great platform for the SH force and amphibious operations.
Bottom line - this is a good decision for the UK - the race will now be on to get the best position for future use of the CVF. A joint manned Fleet Air Arm is, in my view, a 'win-win'.
There does seem to be a flavour of 'either/or' in the thread, as well as more than a hint of 'my idea/aircraft/platform' is better than yours, so we must have mine'. Here are a few thoughts to stir the pot:
1. CVF has been a central element of our defence planning since 1998. The papers setting out doctrine, concepts, et al have been prepared to a level that is IMHO, unmatched for many years. The joint conclusion (and I do mean Joint) is that having the ability to deliver a credible precision strike option with limited or no Host Nation Support is what the UK needs, AS WELL AS our other capabilities. That's why CVF is being bought. Time to get with the programme?
2. There's a lot of argument over 'how fast' a capability can be deployed. I personally find the rehashing of Sierra Leone as irritating as Jackonicko does, but for the opposite reason - the decision to send CVS in that case was a good example of generating a flexible and useful response in a short time. The decision was approved and agreed at all levels, except possibly a certain Group HQ. Sometimes the answer is sending RAF units, sometimes it isn't. Get over it.
3. Speed is not always the key. Falklands lesson, still relevant, is that maritime air allows a force to deploy and 'poise' in support of diplomacy, or exert political pressure. Maritime force gives the politicos some really good options.
4. Typhoon as a strike aircraft - yes, it will perform strike missions (in the future), but this is an out and out air combat optimised aircraft with a secondary strike capability - a good one, but secondary. Adding large external tanks and large weapons will severely hit its range, and look for the additional dorsal tanks to appear sooner rather than later. It's not a Cold War dinosaur in my view - but it is not yet anything like a long range strike platform.
5. Shocking distortion of priorities? Don't think so. Typhoon is currently consuming a large (huge) part of the defence equipment budget - and the assertions about costs of supporting and operating carriers are, in my view, being a little overdone. Let's not also forget that the CVF will be a great platform for the SH force and amphibious operations.
Bottom line - this is a good decision for the UK - the race will now be on to get the best position for future use of the CVF. A joint manned Fleet Air Arm is, in my view, a 'win-win'.
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Engines,
All very good points. But no one from the FAA has yet come forward with either 1. the reason why they haven't been able to fully man their 2 tiny sqns for the last 25+ years, or more importantly 2. given this record how they're going to fully man an embarked wing of Daves. It's all very well hoping that you can call them Joint sqns and expect the RAF to pick up the slack (yet again), but you might be even harder pushed to persuade the young blades at Valley that it's a great idea to go Harrier / Dave now there's a Typhoon option because that way you get to go to sea a lot...
I have no issue with the RN getting some new big boats. But it seems crass to my small brain to buy the 2 biggest things we've ever had, and just gaff off any serious amphibious capability. With hulls that size there must be room for a well deck & some troop carrying capability. But the RN would rather have a quarterdeck and the illusion of a US level of naval air power projection. In the same vein, I still don't understand why Ocean was procured with a rail all around the deck - was it intentionally to deny themselves the option of having Harriers / Daves on board and having the capability to send a single ship to an area of interest with troops, vehicles, helicopters and some organic CAS. If you've got a relatively small number of assets, then surely to achieve maximum effect in as wide an area as possible, don't you want them to be jacks of all trades? Did the RN honestly look at the USN/USMC Marine Expeditonary Units and think 'nah, don't want that capability'?
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
All very good points. But no one from the FAA has yet come forward with either 1. the reason why they haven't been able to fully man their 2 tiny sqns for the last 25+ years, or more importantly 2. given this record how they're going to fully man an embarked wing of Daves. It's all very well hoping that you can call them Joint sqns and expect the RAF to pick up the slack (yet again), but you might be even harder pushed to persuade the young blades at Valley that it's a great idea to go Harrier / Dave now there's a Typhoon option because that way you get to go to sea a lot...
I have no issue with the RN getting some new big boats. But it seems crass to my small brain to buy the 2 biggest things we've ever had, and just gaff off any serious amphibious capability. With hulls that size there must be room for a well deck & some troop carrying capability. But the RN would rather have a quarterdeck and the illusion of a US level of naval air power projection. In the same vein, I still don't understand why Ocean was procured with a rail all around the deck - was it intentionally to deny themselves the option of having Harriers / Daves on board and having the capability to send a single ship to an area of interest with troops, vehicles, helicopters and some organic CAS. If you've got a relatively small number of assets, then surely to achieve maximum effect in as wide an area as possible, don't you want them to be jacks of all trades? Did the RN honestly look at the USN/USMC Marine Expeditonary Units and think 'nah, don't want that capability'?
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
Low Observable
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109...awk#Royal_Navy
For questions about the numbers of RN pilots..see here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watchkeeper_WK450
The writing is on the wall. Pilots cost too much money!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BGM-109...awk#Royal_Navy
For questions about the numbers of RN pilots..see here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watchkeeper_WK450
The writing is on the wall. Pilots cost too much money!
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Bismark,
Well that could well be true. But I don't think 20(R) can be blamed for:
1. The lack of fully manned SHar sqns over 20 odd years.
2. Not being fully staffed when the RN swore blind they would provide 50% of the staff and then stumped up with what? (do they provide 2 at the moment - is it even that many?)
3. Routinely getting provided utterly unqualified inexperienced RN engineers to replace their experienced RAF engineers in the constant drive to achieve a 50% manned OCU. So actually their training and supervision is increased by the RN 'help'.
When will the RN actually fess-up and admit they shoulder a huge proportion of the blame for this?
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
Well that could well be true. But I don't think 20(R) can be blamed for:
1. The lack of fully manned SHar sqns over 20 odd years.
2. Not being fully staffed when the RN swore blind they would provide 50% of the staff and then stumped up with what? (do they provide 2 at the moment - is it even that many?)
3. Routinely getting provided utterly unqualified inexperienced RN engineers to replace their experienced RAF engineers in the constant drive to achieve a 50% manned OCU. So actually their training and supervision is increased by the RN 'help'.
When will the RN actually fess-up and admit they shoulder a huge proportion of the blame for this?
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
Suspicion breeds confidence
The RN used to draw on 899 Sqn for support in Ops, it seems reasonable for 20 R to contribute in the same way.
Expect the expression "Malvinas Argentinas" to fade into history because with T45 and CVF, they'll never get it back.
Expect the expression "Malvinas Argentinas" to fade into history because with T45 and CVF, they'll never get it back.
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The RN used to draw on 899 Sqn for support in Ops, it seems reasonable for 20 R to contribute in the same way.
Suspicion breeds confidence
That's always been the case in special circumstances. Look at the 1000 bomber raid on Cologne and Hamburg. Everything that could fly and carry a bomb was used.
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Ok, have to weigh in on this one.
SSSETOWTF, the assertion that the RN 'couldn't man their tiny SHAR squadrons for over 20 odd years' is plain wrong.
The SHAR squadrons were manned to requirement. They met all their operational commitments and maintained good currency in a wide range of roles. Just as professional, in short, as their RAF counterparts. And extremely capable and innovative - ask who first did 'swing role' sorties for the UK.
The SHAR training pipeline was incredibly slow, true, and one of the big gains of JFH was to get the RN to buy into the RAF training philosophy.
'utterly unqualified inexperienced RN engineers' ?! - that one is well out of order. If RN engineers get to an aircraft, it's only because they are qualified and safe to do so, just like their RAF counterparts. (Do you mean engineers or technicians? AEOs or AETs?) Either way, that last assertion is plain wrong. The RN are not there to 'help', as you patronisingly put it, they are there to do the job they have been trained to. Incidentally, last I heard, the RAF engineers have adopted the RN system for qualifying Jengos - sounds as if the people on the ground are doing the 'joint' stuff.
I always recognised the professionalism and quality of the RAF whenever I served with them - and that was for many years. Joint is the way forward - some of these posts show how far some people have to go to recognise that.
SSSETOWTF, the assertion that the RN 'couldn't man their tiny SHAR squadrons for over 20 odd years' is plain wrong.
The SHAR squadrons were manned to requirement. They met all their operational commitments and maintained good currency in a wide range of roles. Just as professional, in short, as their RAF counterparts. And extremely capable and innovative - ask who first did 'swing role' sorties for the UK.
The SHAR training pipeline was incredibly slow, true, and one of the big gains of JFH was to get the RN to buy into the RAF training philosophy.
'utterly unqualified inexperienced RN engineers' ?! - that one is well out of order. If RN engineers get to an aircraft, it's only because they are qualified and safe to do so, just like their RAF counterparts. (Do you mean engineers or technicians? AEOs or AETs?) Either way, that last assertion is plain wrong. The RN are not there to 'help', as you patronisingly put it, they are there to do the job they have been trained to. Incidentally, last I heard, the RAF engineers have adopted the RN system for qualifying Jengos - sounds as if the people on the ground are doing the 'joint' stuff.
I always recognised the professionalism and quality of the RAF whenever I served with them - and that was for many years. Joint is the way forward - some of these posts show how far some people have to go to recognise that.
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SSETOWTF,
I agree ( as an outsider ) about ' Ocean' - the CIWS right on the end of the flight deck always struck me as a deliberate " this is not a Harrier carrier " move - and plain stupid re. flexibility in a small Navy.
My father ( still around & still an irritatingly good engineer ) was on Escort Carriers in WW2, engine fitter on Seafires then Hellcats - then did nearly 40 years with Hawkers / BAe.
He reckoned the Navy maintenance system on the Sea Harriers etc was far better than the RAF's...certainly not through any devotion to the Navy either !
I agree ( as an outsider ) about ' Ocean' - the CIWS right on the end of the flight deck always struck me as a deliberate " this is not a Harrier carrier " move - and plain stupid re. flexibility in a small Navy.
My father ( still around & still an irritatingly good engineer ) was on Escort Carriers in WW2, engine fitter on Seafires then Hellcats - then did nearly 40 years with Hawkers / BAe.
He reckoned the Navy maintenance system on the Sea Harriers etc was far better than the RAF's...certainly not through any devotion to the Navy either !
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Jointery
Yes, absolutely Jointery is the way to go. However, we also need best value for money for defence. Most capabilities are delivered to the joint commander by the single services (not components!). What no-one has yet adequately explained to me is how it is best value for defence to maintain a separate tiny cadre of RN pilots to fly some of what are RAF assets (yes, even the Sea Harriers were RAF assets when JFH was formed - get over it, to quote a previous poster) when they go through exactly the same training and nominally bring exactly the same skills to the party.
I am all for jointery but it must be a realistic solution offering VFM.
I am all for jointery but it must be a realistic solution offering VFM.
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Good evening, my first and probably last post, whilst I enjoy reading your forums I have never felt the need to post. That is until I read the most ill informed comment I have ever had the misfortune to notice.
SSSETOWTF,
Just exactly who do you think is allowing "utterly unqualified inexperienced engineers" to work on JFH jets? Utter rubbish!
Whilst I agree the RN has let the guys on 20(R) down through a lack of training and career support, this was undoubtedly due to a lack of understanding and false assumption as to the actual throughput of trainees. The RN believed, because they were told so by the RAF, that the throughput of phase 2b trainees could be supported by RAF SNCO's in place within HaMS and 20(R), this has not proved to be the case. That in mind Fleet is currently increasing the number of trainee support staff, now that they are aware of the issue.
To account for the loss of RAF experience involves following a paper trail of incoherent, ill informed and downright wrong asumptions. The loss is due to the culmination of end to end savings, resource reconfiguration, 3 tranche's of redundancy, a war in Afghanistan, civilian involvement in aircraft modification......... oh and not drawing all those personnel down in any form of phased framework but leaving it until a set date and reacting rather than planning.
I don't blame the RAF for that, it was even more complicated thn it seems. but neither do I think it is fair to blame the RN. There has been so much change in JFH as a whole, all piled up to the point that no change is complete before the next is implemented. 20(R) have suffered as a unit by both the loss of experience and the combination of two totally different and inconsolable career patterns, it is an issue. BUT never has an unqualified engineer been let lose on an aircraft or an inexperienced technician been allowed to take primacy over the work of an experienced one. There is a lot of bitching, whining and general bloody mindedness going on up here, from both sides, often disguised as "banter" it is nearly always ill informed, your comments are no different!
SSSETOWTF,
Just exactly who do you think is allowing "utterly unqualified inexperienced engineers" to work on JFH jets? Utter rubbish!
Whilst I agree the RN has let the guys on 20(R) down through a lack of training and career support, this was undoubtedly due to a lack of understanding and false assumption as to the actual throughput of trainees. The RN believed, because they were told so by the RAF, that the throughput of phase 2b trainees could be supported by RAF SNCO's in place within HaMS and 20(R), this has not proved to be the case. That in mind Fleet is currently increasing the number of trainee support staff, now that they are aware of the issue.
To account for the loss of RAF experience involves following a paper trail of incoherent, ill informed and downright wrong asumptions. The loss is due to the culmination of end to end savings, resource reconfiguration, 3 tranche's of redundancy, a war in Afghanistan, civilian involvement in aircraft modification......... oh and not drawing all those personnel down in any form of phased framework but leaving it until a set date and reacting rather than planning.
I don't blame the RAF for that, it was even more complicated thn it seems. but neither do I think it is fair to blame the RN. There has been so much change in JFH as a whole, all piled up to the point that no change is complete before the next is implemented. 20(R) have suffered as a unit by both the loss of experience and the combination of two totally different and inconsolable career patterns, it is an issue. BUT never has an unqualified engineer been let lose on an aircraft or an inexperienced technician been allowed to take primacy over the work of an experienced one. There is a lot of bitching, whining and general bloody mindedness going on up here, from both sides, often disguised as "banter" it is nearly always ill informed, your comments are no different!
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Albert Driver - the names could ( just ) be worse - the Americans have / had a warship called USS Ponce !
I've wondered how the crew got on if on an ashore run around Portsmouth with that on their caps...
Jackonicko - " Land based air power always get there quicker every time " - only for cocktail parties with friendly states handy, methinks...
I've wondered how the crew got on if on an ashore run around Portsmouth with that on their caps...
Jackonicko - " Land based air power always get there quicker every time " - only for cocktail parties with friendly states handy, methinks...
Last edited by Double Zero; 28th Jul 2007 at 00:18.
Widger,
TacTom is a good piece of kit, but unless its camera/datalink is a whole lot hotter than we think it is, it cannot give you eyes on target/select aimpoint/commit ordnance.
TacTom is a good piece of kit, but unless its camera/datalink is a whole lot hotter than we think it is, it cannot give you eyes on target/select aimpoint/commit ordnance.
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Strewth, it would seem I'm stirred up a hornets nest.
Navaleye - Are you actually suggesting that Telic/Herrick is somehow akin to the 1000 bomber raids????
Engines & chieftiff- calm down old chaps. I don't know how on earth you managed to miscontrue my post quite the way you did. If you replace an RAF JNCO with 10 years of experience of working on Harriers with an RN chap, who, through no fault of his own, is straight out of basic school, it adds a significant burden to 20 Sqn. Or do you disagree? I am led to believe that the RAF are holding the RN to the promise of being able to provide 50% of the manning across the OCU. But as the RAF reduce their manning, the RN are filling the posts with very junior engineers. I am NOT suggesting that unqualified guys are signing off work that they are not qualified to do. But guys straight out of basic school are not qualified to do very much at all = 'unqualified', and if they don't have years of experience to draw on then they are also 'inexperienced'. Therefore, through no fault of their own, they ARE a training and supervision burden. If you land at Wittering today you may well be marshalled in by a junior RN rating, with an old hand (RAF or RN) standing over his shoulder - I was the other day. This is not the fault of the guy who hasn't done it before. But if you insist on sticking your head in the sand and saying that it doesn't need to happen, or that it's the RAF's fault, I'm afraid I disagree. If 2 guys are out marshalling a jet in, surely it means 1 person that could be isn't working on fixing aircraft? And I'm not suggesting this is the only issue, it's just an example of what happens. Fewer guys fixing aircraft = fewer serviceable jets on the line at 20 = fewer training sorties flown per day = OCU courses run late = a thinly manned front line. Of course nothing's that simple, but are you seriously saying that I'm completely out to lunch and that actually the problem is that there's some other cunning RAF plan to make the Naval Strike Wing under-manned????
And as for the manning of SHar Sqns prior to JFH - when I embarked with 801 Sqn in 2000 three of their eight pilots were either foreigners or RAF exchanges. And one of their RN pilots was from 800. Similarly when you read any account of the Falklands - from Sharkey's to Pookie's - it's quite clear that a significant proportion of the SHar Sqns were RAF exchange officers. So, yes their Sqns were all fully manned when they went for a cruise. But in normal peacetime ops, if you're relying heavily on other sources to fill your 'junta', then you're masking a serious problem. If the RN could, they'd have stood up 800 and 801 by now. They can't. And the reason isn't hard to figure out if you look at recent history. Or if you look at 25 years of history. It IS NOT the fault of 20 Sqn or the RAF.
I'm not trying to knock the SHar force's achievements, which are legion and uncontestable. But to suggest that the SHar provided a true swing role capability in any modern sense of the word is barking. Carrying one dumb 1000lb on the centreline, with no night or precision capability, isn't exactly the kind of 'swing role' that most people think of, is it? If you're arguing that it is, then a GR7/9 carrying a wing-full of PGMs, rockets, dumb bombs, a TIALD or recce pod + a couple of AIM-9s could be called 'swing role' too couldn't it? Or can you only be 'swing role' if you carry an AMRAAM? (I think it's a pointless semantic argument myself)
While some of you may think otherwise, I am not against Jointery in any form - I welcome it. I'm a firm believer that almost all of the guys at Flt Lt / Lt level are more than happy with the way things are going. I love the concept of the new carriers and only wish they actually had some amphib capability too. But somehow things seem to get skewed as soon as you get to Wg Cdr / Cdr and above and career chaps start to build train sets. Does it really matter what service a Dave pilot is in? Does it matter which chuffing Sqn badge they have - apart from offending a few crusty dinosaurs that used to fly xxx in yyy war for zzz Sqn?? I'm obviously wrong though, which is why I'll never be promoted.
Maybe I'm scarred by my experience in 2000 when SHar boys were gleefully stuffing in my face the fact that I, as a GR7 pilot, would have to spend more time on their boat with JFH. It was funny and banter then as far as the SHar boys and the RN were concerned. Now the boot's on the other foot, the RAF are supposed to be all cuddly to the RN and not offend their delicate sensibilities. To banter otherwise is now deemed 'unjoint'. Frankly if you can't take a bit of banter (with a core of truth) now, you (or your brethren) shouldn't have been so smug about dishing it out in the past.
Single Seat, Single Engine, The Only Way To Fly
Navaleye - Are you actually suggesting that Telic/Herrick is somehow akin to the 1000 bomber raids????
Engines & chieftiff- calm down old chaps. I don't know how on earth you managed to miscontrue my post quite the way you did. If you replace an RAF JNCO with 10 years of experience of working on Harriers with an RN chap, who, through no fault of his own, is straight out of basic school, it adds a significant burden to 20 Sqn. Or do you disagree? I am led to believe that the RAF are holding the RN to the promise of being able to provide 50% of the manning across the OCU. But as the RAF reduce their manning, the RN are filling the posts with very junior engineers. I am NOT suggesting that unqualified guys are signing off work that they are not qualified to do. But guys straight out of basic school are not qualified to do very much at all = 'unqualified', and if they don't have years of experience to draw on then they are also 'inexperienced'. Therefore, through no fault of their own, they ARE a training and supervision burden. If you land at Wittering today you may well be marshalled in by a junior RN rating, with an old hand (RAF or RN) standing over his shoulder - I was the other day. This is not the fault of the guy who hasn't done it before. But if you insist on sticking your head in the sand and saying that it doesn't need to happen, or that it's the RAF's fault, I'm afraid I disagree. If 2 guys are out marshalling a jet in, surely it means 1 person that could be isn't working on fixing aircraft? And I'm not suggesting this is the only issue, it's just an example of what happens. Fewer guys fixing aircraft = fewer serviceable jets on the line at 20 = fewer training sorties flown per day = OCU courses run late = a thinly manned front line. Of course nothing's that simple, but are you seriously saying that I'm completely out to lunch and that actually the problem is that there's some other cunning RAF plan to make the Naval Strike Wing under-manned????
And as for the manning of SHar Sqns prior to JFH - when I embarked with 801 Sqn in 2000 three of their eight pilots were either foreigners or RAF exchanges. And one of their RN pilots was from 800. Similarly when you read any account of the Falklands - from Sharkey's to Pookie's - it's quite clear that a significant proportion of the SHar Sqns were RAF exchange officers. So, yes their Sqns were all fully manned when they went for a cruise. But in normal peacetime ops, if you're relying heavily on other sources to fill your 'junta', then you're masking a serious problem. If the RN could, they'd have stood up 800 and 801 by now. They can't. And the reason isn't hard to figure out if you look at recent history. Or if you look at 25 years of history. It IS NOT the fault of 20 Sqn or the RAF.
I'm not trying to knock the SHar force's achievements, which are legion and uncontestable. But to suggest that the SHar provided a true swing role capability in any modern sense of the word is barking. Carrying one dumb 1000lb on the centreline, with no night or precision capability, isn't exactly the kind of 'swing role' that most people think of, is it? If you're arguing that it is, then a GR7/9 carrying a wing-full of PGMs, rockets, dumb bombs, a TIALD or recce pod + a couple of AIM-9s could be called 'swing role' too couldn't it? Or can you only be 'swing role' if you carry an AMRAAM? (I think it's a pointless semantic argument myself)
While some of you may think otherwise, I am not against Jointery in any form - I welcome it. I'm a firm believer that almost all of the guys at Flt Lt / Lt level are more than happy with the way things are going. I love the concept of the new carriers and only wish they actually had some amphib capability too. But somehow things seem to get skewed as soon as you get to Wg Cdr / Cdr and above and career chaps start to build train sets. Does it really matter what service a Dave pilot is in? Does it matter which chuffing Sqn badge they have - apart from offending a few crusty dinosaurs that used to fly xxx in yyy war for zzz Sqn?? I'm obviously wrong though, which is why I'll never be promoted.
Maybe I'm scarred by my experience in 2000 when SHar boys were gleefully stuffing in my face the fact that I, as a GR7 pilot, would have to spend more time on their boat with JFH. It was funny and banter then as far as the SHar boys and the RN were concerned. Now the boot's on the other foot, the RAF are supposed to be all cuddly to the RN and not offend their delicate sensibilities. To banter otherwise is now deemed 'unjoint'. Frankly if you can't take a bit of banter (with a core of truth) now, you (or your brethren) shouldn't have been so smug about dishing it out in the past.
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SSSETOWTF,
Thanks for coming back and supplying some detail.
I've taken pains not to 'dish out' any banter, and I hope I've not come over as smug. You are absolutely right that 'banter' can sometimes be 'edgy', and in retrospect, it's not too surprising.
Joint Force was set up as a combination of SHAR and GR7. Much talk of 'bringing all the good to the table', bridge to JSF/CVF, etc. The press releases of the day make interesting reading. The intention was to build on the SHAR and GR7 force foundations to converge and develop truly joint CONOPS, force structures, procedures, etc.
Once the SHAR was canned, much of the 'convergence' went straight in the bin. The other main challenge was that the RN's personnel system now had to switch from 'convergence' to 'conversion' - working to a full set of RAF rules, orders, authorisations, etc. And timescales were compressed on orders from on high. There were some fairly edgy discussions at the time where the challenges of relocating, retraining, rebadging at the same time were aired - but as I say, people were told to 'get on with it'. Not a nice experience, when you are trying to look after your people.
It sounds as if the integration of the training systems has not gone properly - but note that the RN always had trainees on the OCU (899 as was), so seeing a baby maintainer being backed up on the line is 'ops normal'.
Where you are bang on the money is the issue of higher rank attitude. My experience was that the JFH 'vision' was bought into by the more junior ranks, but at the higher levels, there was some pretty unseemly behaviour taking place - building train sets, as you call it. What the people now have to do is analyse the problems, build a 'get well' plan that builds the bridge to JSF/CVF, and execute it . That will take some good leadership - hope they get it.
If you are 'scarred' by the experience of 2000, think what some of the RN guys have had to give up to form JFH. Like you, they are good people. Like you, change has become a burden for them. Like you, it's not their fault. Now, you all have the task of building the world's first truly joint maritime strike capability.
Transmission ends....
Thanks for coming back and supplying some detail.
I've taken pains not to 'dish out' any banter, and I hope I've not come over as smug. You are absolutely right that 'banter' can sometimes be 'edgy', and in retrospect, it's not too surprising.
Joint Force was set up as a combination of SHAR and GR7. Much talk of 'bringing all the good to the table', bridge to JSF/CVF, etc. The press releases of the day make interesting reading. The intention was to build on the SHAR and GR7 force foundations to converge and develop truly joint CONOPS, force structures, procedures, etc.
Once the SHAR was canned, much of the 'convergence' went straight in the bin. The other main challenge was that the RN's personnel system now had to switch from 'convergence' to 'conversion' - working to a full set of RAF rules, orders, authorisations, etc. And timescales were compressed on orders from on high. There were some fairly edgy discussions at the time where the challenges of relocating, retraining, rebadging at the same time were aired - but as I say, people were told to 'get on with it'. Not a nice experience, when you are trying to look after your people.
It sounds as if the integration of the training systems has not gone properly - but note that the RN always had trainees on the OCU (899 as was), so seeing a baby maintainer being backed up on the line is 'ops normal'.
Where you are bang on the money is the issue of higher rank attitude. My experience was that the JFH 'vision' was bought into by the more junior ranks, but at the higher levels, there was some pretty unseemly behaviour taking place - building train sets, as you call it. What the people now have to do is analyse the problems, build a 'get well' plan that builds the bridge to JSF/CVF, and execute it . That will take some good leadership - hope they get it.
If you are 'scarred' by the experience of 2000, think what some of the RN guys have had to give up to form JFH. Like you, they are good people. Like you, change has become a burden for them. Like you, it's not their fault. Now, you all have the task of building the world's first truly joint maritime strike capability.
Transmission ends....