Future Carrier (Including Costs)
Engines,
“And it took the GR3s quite a few extra weeks to get there.”
Absolutely. You have to remember that the RAF’s Harrier GR3s of the period were in no way fit to operate aboard carriers without several weeks’ worth of modifications, the engineers working 24/7 to achieve this. These included replacement of corrodible metal parts, waterproofing of panels, fitting of an I-band transponder and installing Sidewinder wiring and a control panel from scratch.
All of this came about because there was no operational plan to operate RAF GR3s from carriers before 1982.
Hence the delay. The initial plan when the balloon went up was for the GR3s to embark on Atlantic Conveyor in UK. This was impossible because of the sheer magnitude of engineering work required. We caught up with the Conveyor by ferrying to Ascension, so we still didn’t arrive in theatre until 18 May.
“And it took the GR3s quite a few extra weeks to get there.”
Absolutely. You have to remember that the RAF’s Harrier GR3s of the period were in no way fit to operate aboard carriers without several weeks’ worth of modifications, the engineers working 24/7 to achieve this. These included replacement of corrodible metal parts, waterproofing of panels, fitting of an I-band transponder and installing Sidewinder wiring and a control panel from scratch.
All of this came about because there was no operational plan to operate RAF GR3s from carriers before 1982.
Hence the delay. The initial plan when the balloon went up was for the GR3s to embark on Atlantic Conveyor in UK. This was impossible because of the sheer magnitude of engineering work required. We caught up with the Conveyor by ferrying to Ascension, so we still didn’t arrive in theatre until 18 May.
LO
Have you not seen AL1?
PEOPLE TO BLAME FOR THIS MESS
(A) THE RAF
(B) RETIRED RAF VSOs
(C) THE OTHER PARTY, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RAF
(D) SEPTICS, PARTICULARLY THE USAF AND ANY OTHERS WHO HAVE UNDERTAKEN AN EXCHANGE TOUR OR WORKED WITH THE RAF.
(E) ANYONE APPLYING TO JOIN THE RAF
STANDARD USE ONLY
HH - It is in a red folder marked
PEOPLE TO BLAME FOR THIS MESS
PEOPLE TO BLAME FOR THIS MESS
PEOPLE TO BLAME FOR THIS MESS
(A) THE RAF
(B) RETIRED RAF VSOs
(C) THE OTHER PARTY, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RAF
(D) SEPTICS, PARTICULARLY THE USAF AND ANY OTHERS WHO HAVE UNDERTAKEN AN EXCHANGE TOUR OR WORKED WITH THE RAF.
(E) ANYONE APPLYING TO JOIN THE RAF
STANDARD USE ONLY
I just hope someone has a cunning plan
The public resent giving foreign 'aid' so I'm sure they will look at sea going carriers as a irrelevant, pointless waste of money.
There is an entire thread discussing this.
From https://www.gov.uk/government/news/b...-carrier-build
The forward island, fitted today, houses the bridge where the captain and navigation crew will operate. The enormous steel section was built in Portsmouth and transported by barge to Fife, where the carriers are being assembled.
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Cancelled F-35 !
The one with the dead weight dustbin behind the cockpit and an arrester hook that cannot be fitted? Costing more billions than a bankrupt Eurozone country?
Oh Ye of little faith.
Then the untried electro-magnetic catapult that cannot be fitted to the UK carriers.
Or the traditional steam catapult.
Well there are Harriers, helicopters and a retro fit ski-jump.
If a catapult can be fitted for the cost of a couple of billion quid.
Rafale, or a navalised Typhoon.
Deep joy.
The one with the dead weight dustbin behind the cockpit and an arrester hook that cannot be fitted? Costing more billions than a bankrupt Eurozone country?
Oh Ye of little faith.
Then the untried electro-magnetic catapult that cannot be fitted to the UK carriers.
Or the traditional steam catapult.
Well there are Harriers, helicopters and a retro fit ski-jump.
If a catapult can be fitted for the cost of a couple of billion quid.
Rafale, or a navalised Typhoon.
Deep joy.
Last edited by Stuffy; 17th Mar 2013 at 19:27.
Glad Rag,
It was only a quote I found whilst 'researching' your question. I was always concious that it may still have ben a turn of phrase. So probably don't take my word for it. Shipbuilding is not my thing, although Radio 4 had a very good half hour on a Soul Music anout a song of that ilk.
Seriously, shipbuilding, why ask me?
It was only a quote I found whilst 'researching' your question. I was always concious that it may still have ben a turn of phrase. So probably don't take my word for it. Shipbuilding is not my thing, although Radio 4 had a very good half hour on a Soul Music anout a song of that ilk.
Seriously, shipbuilding, why ask me?
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Islands of Steel
carrier waves Issue 1 - January 2009
http://www.aircraftcarrieralliance.c...s-jan-2009.pdf (0.9Mb)
"Mock-up of Aft Island page 6
At Cowes on the Isle of Wight, a structure is being built to represent part of the carriers’ Aft Island, which carries a huge array of radars and other communication equipment.
Steve Dowdell said: “There’s a new radar being introduced into the entire UK fleet – the ARTISAN 3D medium-range radar and the new carriers have a pole mast right in the centre of its near field, carrying important antennae for tactical data links and the TACAN beacon.
“There’s also a crown of thorns antenna carrying VHF transmissions. We wanted to put the three systems together to avoid electro-magnetic emission problems later.
“If we have to reshape the islands because of reflections, we have the chance to change the paper drawings before any steel is cut for the islands.”"
http://www.aircraftcarrieralliance.c...s-jan-2009.pdf (0.9Mb)
"Mock-up of Aft Island page 6
At Cowes on the Isle of Wight, a structure is being built to represent part of the carriers’ Aft Island, which carries a huge array of radars and other communication equipment.
Steve Dowdell said: “There’s a new radar being introduced into the entire UK fleet – the ARTISAN 3D medium-range radar and the new carriers have a pole mast right in the centre of its near field, carrying important antennae for tactical data links and the TACAN beacon.
“There’s also a crown of thorns antenna carrying VHF transmissions. We wanted to put the three systems together to avoid electro-magnetic emission problems later.
“If we have to reshape the islands because of reflections, we have the chance to change the paper drawings before any steel is cut for the islands.”"
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Stuffy,
There is a thing called an 'internal combustion catapult', a bit like a giant mess cannon I think. Apparently it's quite cheap and only uses 6 gallons of AVTUR per launch. That'll come in handy to launch our Rafales/F18s one day!
If a catapult can be fitted for the cost of a couple of billion quid.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
So another capability "holiday". Only 4 years - assuming no slippages, and there are always slippages.
Defense News: UK Advances New AEW Capabilities
LONDON — A program to replace the Royal Navy’s airborne early warning capability has moved a step forward with approval for assessment phase work on the Merlin Mk2 helicopter-based system being awarded to Lockheed Martin UK. At the same time, though, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed the in-service date of the new system, dubbed Crowsnest, as 2020 — four years after the existing Sea King Mk7 capability is due to be stood down.
The MoD said in a statement last week that it had awarded Lockheed Martin an initial £3 million (US $3.5 million) scoping contract ahead of the expected autumn start of what is known as Assessment Phase 3. Phases 1 and 2 were conducted under the auspices of the earlier Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control program, which concluded in early 2010 before being overtaken by the requirements of the Conservative-led Governments strategic defense and security review.
“Crowsnest is funded as part of the core [equipment] program, and approval has been obtained for AP3 to take the project to the main gate [development and manufacture] investment decision,” said the MoD April 19.
The MoD said it was premature to discuss detailed costs, timelines and subcontractors ahead of the AP3 work but it did confirm a Defense News story from September 2012 that there would be a four-year gap between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the introduction of the Merlin-based replacement. “The Crowsnest helicopters are planned to enter service in 2020 with a deployable capability following shortly afterward. In the interim, following the retirement of the Sea King Airborne Surveillance and Control aircraft in 2016, a level of capability will be provided through the use of embarked maritime helicopters, shore-based assets or shipborne sensors,” said the statement.
Lack of equipment funds until the second half of the decade is largely to blame for the introduction of the capability gap. The decision to delay introduction of Crowsnest places further strain on British maritime surveillance capabilities following the scrapping of the Royal Air Force’s Nimrod MRA4 patrol aircraft force in 2010 as part of an effort to cut defense spending. The introduction of the Crowsnest capability will coincide with the entry into service of the Royal Navy’s new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier with it’s F-35 jets .
The UK arm of Lockheed Martin has been appointed prime contractor on the program to replace the Sea King AEW capability, and along with the MoD will conduct a competition to supply the Crowsnest mission system. That competition is likely to boil down to a two-horse race between the incumbent Searchwater 2000 radar supplier Thales UK and Lockheed Martin itself with the Vigilance system developed with Northrop Grumman.
Lockheed Martin is the Merlin prime contractor, although the helicopter itself was designed and built by AgustaWestland, and has more recently been responsible for a major capability sustainment program on the machine.
Defense News: UK Advances New AEW Capabilities
LONDON — A program to replace the Royal Navy’s airborne early warning capability has moved a step forward with approval for assessment phase work on the Merlin Mk2 helicopter-based system being awarded to Lockheed Martin UK. At the same time, though, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed the in-service date of the new system, dubbed Crowsnest, as 2020 — four years after the existing Sea King Mk7 capability is due to be stood down.
The MoD said in a statement last week that it had awarded Lockheed Martin an initial £3 million (US $3.5 million) scoping contract ahead of the expected autumn start of what is known as Assessment Phase 3. Phases 1 and 2 were conducted under the auspices of the earlier Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control program, which concluded in early 2010 before being overtaken by the requirements of the Conservative-led Governments strategic defense and security review.
“Crowsnest is funded as part of the core [equipment] program, and approval has been obtained for AP3 to take the project to the main gate [development and manufacture] investment decision,” said the MoD April 19.
The MoD said it was premature to discuss detailed costs, timelines and subcontractors ahead of the AP3 work but it did confirm a Defense News story from September 2012 that there would be a four-year gap between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the introduction of the Merlin-based replacement. “The Crowsnest helicopters are planned to enter service in 2020 with a deployable capability following shortly afterward. In the interim, following the retirement of the Sea King Airborne Surveillance and Control aircraft in 2016, a level of capability will be provided through the use of embarked maritime helicopters, shore-based assets or shipborne sensors,” said the statement.
Lack of equipment funds until the second half of the decade is largely to blame for the introduction of the capability gap. The decision to delay introduction of Crowsnest places further strain on British maritime surveillance capabilities following the scrapping of the Royal Air Force’s Nimrod MRA4 patrol aircraft force in 2010 as part of an effort to cut defense spending. The introduction of the Crowsnest capability will coincide with the entry into service of the Royal Navy’s new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier with it’s F-35 jets .
The UK arm of Lockheed Martin has been appointed prime contractor on the program to replace the Sea King AEW capability, and along with the MoD will conduct a competition to supply the Crowsnest mission system. That competition is likely to boil down to a two-horse race between the incumbent Searchwater 2000 radar supplier Thales UK and Lockheed Martin itself with the Vigilance system developed with Northrop Grumman.
Lockheed Martin is the Merlin prime contractor, although the helicopter itself was designed and built by AgustaWestland, and has more recently been responsible for a major capability sustainment program on the machine.
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For a number of years I have read posts stating how these ships would be relatively easily to convert to operate conventional fixed wing aircraft.
Now I am reading Parliamentary Defence Committee reports which describe this purchase of the carriers as
They then criticise the decision to change aircraft from the 'B' variant to the 'C' because
. (My use of bold and red ink but their words)
They then go into some detail criticising costing and higher pricing but to me they have completely missed the ball.
I would want to know WHY these ships were not designed from the outset to operate with cats and traps, we are a sea faring nation. We led the World in the development of aircraft carriers. We led the way in introducing most of the technology that is being used on all the World's operational fixed wing carriers but we built the largest carriers this country has ever built and decided not to have catapults OR even arrester wires?? During this design stage was there NO option for buying or designing any type of launch system? Did the designers not know the harriers were being scrapped and we were going down a path where the option was either the F-35B or the F-35B. There is no future replacement for that aircraft and once it goes we will be left withn yet another aircraft=less carrier sailing the high seas under the guise of being called a helicopter carrier complete with a nice ski ramp for fans of winter sports?? Don't talk about unmanned aircraft as those being developed for armed carrier operations are all launched by catapult.
Who made the decision and let us see them being made accountable as I still believe those ships should have been designed from the very outset with catapults and once that error had been spotted then convert them to that role or stop building these 'white elephants'
(slightly tongue in cheek anger).
There are scathing attacks on the rotor wing department and the huge problems that are about to land on our flight decks but that is for another fred (thread)
Now I am reading Parliamentary Defence Committee reports which describe this purchase of the carriers as
The most spectacular example of the procurement system getting it wrong, on the basis of inadequate information, namely the decision regarding the aircraft to be flown from the QE class carriers.
The design of the ship was not easily convertible to accommodate the F-35C. There had been a fundamental misunderstanding, namely that the carriers would be very easy to convert and had been designed for conversion. But that was not true
They then go into some detail criticising costing and higher pricing but to me they have completely missed the ball.
I would want to know WHY these ships were not designed from the outset to operate with cats and traps, we are a sea faring nation. We led the World in the development of aircraft carriers. We led the way in introducing most of the technology that is being used on all the World's operational fixed wing carriers but we built the largest carriers this country has ever built and decided not to have catapults OR even arrester wires?? During this design stage was there NO option for buying or designing any type of launch system? Did the designers not know the harriers were being scrapped and we were going down a path where the option was either the F-35B or the F-35B. There is no future replacement for that aircraft and once it goes we will be left withn yet another aircraft=less carrier sailing the high seas under the guise of being called a helicopter carrier complete with a nice ski ramp for fans of winter sports?? Don't talk about unmanned aircraft as those being developed for armed carrier operations are all launched by catapult.
Who made the decision and let us see them being made accountable as I still believe those ships should have been designed from the very outset with catapults and once that error had been spotted then convert them to that role or stop building these 'white elephants'
(slightly tongue in cheek anger). There are scathing attacks on the rotor wing department and the huge problems that are about to land on our flight decks but that is for another fred (thread)
To save time, and cut down on the size of the thread, the answer to any questions on anything that has gone wrong with carrier procurement / Harrier cancellation / scrapping of SHAR / F35B or C or B etc is (in no particular order):
The current CAS
Any previous CAS
The current ACAS
Any previous ACAS
Any Air Staff
The RAF
MOD CS
It most definitely isn't the fault of anyone in Dark Blue or the Naval Staff. Particularly nothing to do with the Dark Blue who don't give a monkeys about the FAA and just want a big capital ship, reagrdless of whether there is anything to fly off it or not, and damn the rest of the fleet.
The current CAS
Any previous CAS
The current ACAS
Any previous ACAS
Any Air Staff
The RAF
MOD CS
It most definitely isn't the fault of anyone in Dark Blue or the Naval Staff. Particularly nothing to do with the Dark Blue who don't give a monkeys about the FAA and just want a big capital ship, reagrdless of whether there is anything to fly off it or not, and damn the rest of the fleet.
Glojo - it's not often I'm roused to be rude, but in this case, despite your background in naval aviation, you need to dismount from your high horse, sharpish.
If you read through the evidence in the report (particularly the sessions) it is clear that no-one is really interested in probing what the actual costs to convert PoW comprised. Unsurprisingly, they are relatively easily fobbed off as soon as someone mentions changing lots of compartments. You'll note they don't get into what those changes actually were......or the "factors" that meant the publically available costs for the USN EMALS/EARS systems suddenly became much more expensive.
There is no such thing as an "easy" conversion where you just "drop-in" EMALS and EAR (or Mk13-3 and Mk 7 Mod 4 for that matter). The designers were perfectly well aware that SHAR was being scrapped and that a STOVL ship was inexorably tied to F35B. Unfortunately for you and them, they were in no position to change the contracted design to accommodate this knowledge, when the customer (the Equipment Capability community in Main Building and to a lesser degree the JCA IPT) were proceeding on a STOVL assumption. The Alliance are contracted to build the design requested by their customer. The later you change requirements, the more it is going to cost.
It remains perfectly possible to fit EMALS (and EAR) to both QE and PoW. They are designed with sufficient space and margins to receive those systems. What the contract does not (and never did) include was the actual detailed design to system level (ie the actual structural seatings, cutting plans, weld procedures, cabling and power management system software) and subsequent supply of the hardware.
For a variety of reasons (some credible, some less so) the "cost of modification" (which may or may not include other elements) for one ship was "estimated" this time last year at £1.9Bn which exceeded what MoD was prepared to pay. As a contrast, you're not talking here about the sort of work required to convert Victorious, Ark or Eagle in the fifties. There are no major additions required to the flightdeck structure, there is no need reduce the ship to the hangar deck and start again. There almost certainly will be a need to put structural channels and seatings for EMALS on the port bow and the waist, empty the compartments on two deck for both those areas and where the EARS system is required and run some hefty cabling in the vicinity. there will also be quite a bit of software development for the power management system on the ship. As ship conversions go, that is relatively easy and would certainly not have been possible on something much smaller.
The real problem is that the Equipment Capability customer in town started with the assumption that STOVL was the way forward and that view never really changed. CTOL was maintained only as a fallback in the event that JSF STOVL either did not meet the performance requirement or was canned. All sorts of esoteric discussions trying to balance range of one variant against numbers of the other took place. All were irrelevant.
Neither the RN nor the RAF actually wanted to face the implications of what a CTOL force and the associated structure meant. The RAF feared (correctly) that to make a CTOL force work correctly, that a larger FAA would be necessary or the RAF would need to dedicate itself to going to sea on a more frequent basis. One meant giving up budget share, the other meant giving up OPCON of a sizeable chunk of it's force structure. Hence the rumour campaign typified by Wrathmonks comment above, suggesting that the RN just wanted a big ship - hinting that it was the size of the ship that was the problem, rather than the inferred change of role. "If only they'd stuck to smaller ships like CVS everything would have been alright", which conveniently ignores the fact that smaller ships would not have been substantially cheaper and would have been even more hostage to the aircraft choice.
The RN feared (also correctly) that it would have to fight an attritional battle to secure that budget change, which it didn't have the stomach for, leaving the possibility of having to fund a larger FAA from the same share of the pie. This at a time when most of the RN was in need of replacement (Astute, T26 and to a lesser extent T45), when the RAF already had it's primary programme (Typhoon) in place. It is also entirely fair to suggest that there was a lack of understanding of how all the capabilities fit together to make the whole at senior RN levels (see transmogrification of MASC to Crowsnest for details). The last 1SL did not help himself with the remarks attributed to him regarding who was to fly off the ship. Bizarrely enough he was trying to make the joint case, but showed complete lack of understanding of the organisational consequences for his own team and others.
It's not a conspiracy by RAF or RN. It is a simple failure to balance competing vested interests. When contracted for (2007) the army was screaming for helos on Herrick, could not get as much as it wanted due to both deficient budgets for operations and entire fleets (Merlin HC3, Puma, SK4) that were unable to help due to either commitment elsewhere or unsuitability. Unsurprisngly, they looked at the RAF/RN CDEL lines with some jealousy and demanded their share. It's a brave man (RN or RAF) who would have demanded cuts in the army budgets at the time to pay for CTOL carriers. Hence STOVL was the assumption, right up until the press regarding Dave B began to get cancellation-serious. Then the brainwave for going to C, which was fine right up until the same long-term organisational and budget implications came out again. Then back to B.
The upshot is this.
Two ships are in build and progressing well. They are certainly not massively expensive by carrier standards (the latest USN CVN is running at $11Bn), but people like their expensive white elephant myths.
They will cost more than they should have, but this is largely a result of failure to commit to contract earlier and the paralysis of the 2003-2007 period, coupled with the ludicrous ISD slippage of 2008 that cost the best part of £1Bn (20% of total) alone. By that measure the B-C-B reversion is chump change. If you knock off the billion incurred by the ISD slippage, were getting two very capable ships for about £5Bn the pair - about $7.5Bn or $3.8Bn each for those who struggle to convert £ to $. Their manning costs will be hugely less than anything else of comparable capability - largely due to the size of their flightdeck.
Those ships will remain capable of embarking the best part of 40 cabs each, plus r/w - a capability that exceeds that of CVS by some distance. Good thing too as these learned gentlemen suggest (well worth reading overall).
House of Commons - Uncorrected Evidence - HC 1090-i
They won't have E2 and won't immediately have Crowsnest. There remains uncertainty as to how many fast jets we will eventually buy. AAR remains a concern. Only one may be in service.
However, much as we might all like a full-up F35C, E2, S3, F14, A6 etc etc airwing and we are not getting one, that does not make the ships valueless or white elephants. There is a huge amount of myth and legend surrounding their supposed deficiencies (see bastardeux's comment for details) - the reality is somewhat different.
Most importantly - over a fifty year lifespan we will be able to change them and they won't suddenly become irrevocably incapable of operating aircraft.
Perfect? No.
White elephants? No.
Great capability? - Depends on our collective ability to stick the course, which is not helped by over-dramatic wailing over what might have been, by implication suggesting that what is coming is worthless.
If you read through the evidence in the report (particularly the sessions) it is clear that no-one is really interested in probing what the actual costs to convert PoW comprised. Unsurprisingly, they are relatively easily fobbed off as soon as someone mentions changing lots of compartments. You'll note they don't get into what those changes actually were......or the "factors" that meant the publically available costs for the USN EMALS/EARS systems suddenly became much more expensive.
There is no such thing as an "easy" conversion where you just "drop-in" EMALS and EAR (or Mk13-3 and Mk 7 Mod 4 for that matter). The designers were perfectly well aware that SHAR was being scrapped and that a STOVL ship was inexorably tied to F35B. Unfortunately for you and them, they were in no position to change the contracted design to accommodate this knowledge, when the customer (the Equipment Capability community in Main Building and to a lesser degree the JCA IPT) were proceeding on a STOVL assumption. The Alliance are contracted to build the design requested by their customer. The later you change requirements, the more it is going to cost.
It remains perfectly possible to fit EMALS (and EAR) to both QE and PoW. They are designed with sufficient space and margins to receive those systems. What the contract does not (and never did) include was the actual detailed design to system level (ie the actual structural seatings, cutting plans, weld procedures, cabling and power management system software) and subsequent supply of the hardware.
For a variety of reasons (some credible, some less so) the "cost of modification" (which may or may not include other elements) for one ship was "estimated" this time last year at £1.9Bn which exceeded what MoD was prepared to pay. As a contrast, you're not talking here about the sort of work required to convert Victorious, Ark or Eagle in the fifties. There are no major additions required to the flightdeck structure, there is no need reduce the ship to the hangar deck and start again. There almost certainly will be a need to put structural channels and seatings for EMALS on the port bow and the waist, empty the compartments on two deck for both those areas and where the EARS system is required and run some hefty cabling in the vicinity. there will also be quite a bit of software development for the power management system on the ship. As ship conversions go, that is relatively easy and would certainly not have been possible on something much smaller.
The real problem is that the Equipment Capability customer in town started with the assumption that STOVL was the way forward and that view never really changed. CTOL was maintained only as a fallback in the event that JSF STOVL either did not meet the performance requirement or was canned. All sorts of esoteric discussions trying to balance range of one variant against numbers of the other took place. All were irrelevant.
Neither the RN nor the RAF actually wanted to face the implications of what a CTOL force and the associated structure meant. The RAF feared (correctly) that to make a CTOL force work correctly, that a larger FAA would be necessary or the RAF would need to dedicate itself to going to sea on a more frequent basis. One meant giving up budget share, the other meant giving up OPCON of a sizeable chunk of it's force structure. Hence the rumour campaign typified by Wrathmonks comment above, suggesting that the RN just wanted a big ship - hinting that it was the size of the ship that was the problem, rather than the inferred change of role. "If only they'd stuck to smaller ships like CVS everything would have been alright", which conveniently ignores the fact that smaller ships would not have been substantially cheaper and would have been even more hostage to the aircraft choice.
The RN feared (also correctly) that it would have to fight an attritional battle to secure that budget change, which it didn't have the stomach for, leaving the possibility of having to fund a larger FAA from the same share of the pie. This at a time when most of the RN was in need of replacement (Astute, T26 and to a lesser extent T45), when the RAF already had it's primary programme (Typhoon) in place. It is also entirely fair to suggest that there was a lack of understanding of how all the capabilities fit together to make the whole at senior RN levels (see transmogrification of MASC to Crowsnest for details). The last 1SL did not help himself with the remarks attributed to him regarding who was to fly off the ship. Bizarrely enough he was trying to make the joint case, but showed complete lack of understanding of the organisational consequences for his own team and others.
It's not a conspiracy by RAF or RN. It is a simple failure to balance competing vested interests. When contracted for (2007) the army was screaming for helos on Herrick, could not get as much as it wanted due to both deficient budgets for operations and entire fleets (Merlin HC3, Puma, SK4) that were unable to help due to either commitment elsewhere or unsuitability. Unsurprisngly, they looked at the RAF/RN CDEL lines with some jealousy and demanded their share. It's a brave man (RN or RAF) who would have demanded cuts in the army budgets at the time to pay for CTOL carriers. Hence STOVL was the assumption, right up until the press regarding Dave B began to get cancellation-serious. Then the brainwave for going to C, which was fine right up until the same long-term organisational and budget implications came out again. Then back to B.
The upshot is this.
Two ships are in build and progressing well. They are certainly not massively expensive by carrier standards (the latest USN CVN is running at $11Bn), but people like their expensive white elephant myths.
They will cost more than they should have, but this is largely a result of failure to commit to contract earlier and the paralysis of the 2003-2007 period, coupled with the ludicrous ISD slippage of 2008 that cost the best part of £1Bn (20% of total) alone. By that measure the B-C-B reversion is chump change. If you knock off the billion incurred by the ISD slippage, were getting two very capable ships for about £5Bn the pair - about $7.5Bn or $3.8Bn each for those who struggle to convert £ to $. Their manning costs will be hugely less than anything else of comparable capability - largely due to the size of their flightdeck.
Those ships will remain capable of embarking the best part of 40 cabs each, plus r/w - a capability that exceeds that of CVS by some distance. Good thing too as these learned gentlemen suggest (well worth reading overall).
House of Commons - Uncorrected Evidence - HC 1090-i
They won't have E2 and won't immediately have Crowsnest. There remains uncertainty as to how many fast jets we will eventually buy. AAR remains a concern. Only one may be in service.
However, much as we might all like a full-up F35C, E2, S3, F14, A6 etc etc airwing and we are not getting one, that does not make the ships valueless or white elephants. There is a huge amount of myth and legend surrounding their supposed deficiencies (see bastardeux's comment for details) - the reality is somewhat different.
Most importantly - over a fifty year lifespan we will be able to change them and they won't suddenly become irrevocably incapable of operating aircraft.
Perfect? No.
White elephants? No.
Great capability? - Depends on our collective ability to stick the course, which is not helped by over-dramatic wailing over what might have been, by implication suggesting that what is coming is worthless.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 2nd May 2013 at 14:16.
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Excellent reply as usual but why oh why did the Royal Navy request\demand\stipulate STOVL carriers as being the carrier of choice?
These ships are by far the largest carriers that will ever fly the White Ensign, design them from the outset with cats and traps, would that have offered a more flexible option.
From what I am reading the 'B' when returning with ordinance will not be doing vertical landings which might suggest a design similar to that of the Russian carrier might have been a better choice and is that ship being converted to have catapults?
You speak wise words and I would never dream of disagreeing with any of your much appreciated observations.
I blame the Select Committee
These ships are by far the largest carriers that will ever fly the White Ensign, design them from the outset with cats and traps, would that have offered a more flexible option.
From what I am reading the 'B' when returning with ordinance will not be doing vertical landings which might suggest a design similar to that of the Russian carrier might have been a better choice and is that ship being converted to have catapults?
You speak wise words and I would never dream of disagreeing with any of your much appreciated observations.
I blame the Select Committee
Do a Hover - it avoids G
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Chichester West Sussex UK
Age: 91
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Wrathmonk
Congratulations on spelling out the facts.
Mind you no doubt some (many?) will dispute them but not I am not among them.
In one of those coincidences that crop up in this life it happens that last night I had dinner with a defence related minister of that period in time and I said much as you have here, together with a few more personal details of the individuals involved and their motivation.
I got no arguement but a lot of very thoughtful looks that were I suspect about me (and perhaps my sources) rather than the topic.
Congratulations on spelling out the facts.
Mind you no doubt some (many?) will dispute them but not I am not among them.
In one of those coincidences that crop up in this life it happens that last night I had dinner with a defence related minister of that period in time and I said much as you have here, together with a few more personal details of the individuals involved and their motivation.
I got no arguement but a lot of very thoughtful looks that were I suspect about me (and perhaps my sources) rather than the topic.