PPRuNe Radar

Posted on behalf of Dick Doleman and the Support Group.

As many Ppruners will be well aware, the legal proceedings following the F15 accident have now been ongoing, in one form or another, since 2001. The Ppruners response and support for Flt Lt 'Spot' Williams and his family, during the Court Martial, was absolutely fantastic; it was also a great tonic for all of us who were there with him and it helped to give us hope when things looked bleak. We all hoped that the just result of the 'not guilty' verdict would be the end of the matter for Spot and his family. Unfortunately, this doesn't appear to be the case. We feel this Board of Inquiry has come to the wrong conclusion on the cause of accident and has also unjustly apportioned blame to 'Spot'.

Please read the following report which focuses on 'cause'. If you would like to comment, please bear that in mind. Other threads have plenty of discussion on the semantics of RIS and RAS which are not central to our argument in trying to prove that Board of Inquiry has come to the wrong conclusion. Many thanks for your support.

Dick Doleman

Response to the Board of Inquiry Report. F15 Accident. Cairngorms. 26 March 2001

1. Introduction.

This report has been prepared by the support group that attended the entire Court Martial of the controller concerned in this incident. We speak from the knowledge of hearing all the evidence and we have the full findings of the USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Report dated 15 April 2003. Firstly, we wish to draw your attention to the RAF's decision to release this Board of Inquiry (BoI) report to the press and into the public domain before informing the Air Traffic Controller concerned of their intent; it is a most discourteous to treat an employee in this manner. Secondly, it should be appreciated that the Terms of Reference for a BoI are specific and clearly state that the process is not designed to apportion blame; it is designed to be a process from which lessons can be learnt.

We have now had a chance to read the BoI findings and the comments and recommendations made by higher authority. There can be no objection to the BoI making safety recommendations and we have no wish to demean their work in this regard, however, we take issue with them and the subsequent reporting chain over their conclusion on the likely cause of this tragic accident. We do not believe the cause of this accident was related to any advice passed by the air traffic controller at RAF Leuchars. We remain convinced that this accident was controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), in probable whiteout conditions, while BITE 21 flight (2 x F15 aircraft) was engaged in low flying in Low Flying Area 14 (LFA 14) and possibly trying to regain their pre planned route having been diverted by weather.

2. It is our belief that the BoI has stuck rigidly to the premise that this was a straight line 'Instrument Met Conditions' (IMC) descent into terrain. We dispute this finding. We note that the BoI also had access to the USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report dated 15 April 2003 and all other relevant documentation available to both the original BoI and the General Courts Martial (GCM). There are several areas in the BoI report which are either contradicted by the USAF report or differ from testimony given under oath at the GCM and we shall now cover these points in the order in which they occur in the BoI report.

3. At page 2-3, para 10, the Board states:

The USAF report ('Statement of Opinion' page 23) contradicts this statement. They interpreted Bite21 as saying;

This seemingly minor point is actually very important, as, at no time did BITE 21 flight ever report to ATC that they were IMC, or, request a change to Radar Advisory Service (RAS); a request that would have indicated a change of flight conditions. Why did the BoI choose to ignore the USAF interpretation of this transmission or not mention that there was another interpretation of what was said?

4. At page 2-5, para 16, the Board states:

This is not quite the story told to the GCM. Under oath, the member of AXIS formation told the court that the formation had flown in 'loose trail' along the Dee valley and had encountered severe whiteout conditions necessitating a turn-about just east of Braemar; they reported the visibility as good outside of isolated showers. A 1:50,000 ordnance survey map with their route drawn on it was presented to the GCM as an exhibit (we have a copy of that map). This map shows quite clearly that after the turn-about, the formation backtracked the Dee valley to a point where they then continued northward up the Lairig Ghru passing only some 2kms to the west of Ben MacDui and the crash site. There was no mention of further bad weather or deviations from the Dee valley on that leg of the flight. It seems very strange then that at page 2-6, para 22 of the report, the Board says:

We find this very strange, because AXIS formation had only just come from that direction. The leg between passing the turn towards the Lairig Ghru and Braemar would have taken just over a minute at 420kts. Surely the weather couldn't have changed significantly in that time and, if it was that bad, why turn back towards it? That the crew might have deviated from the Dee valley but couldn't recall how they then got back to the Lairig Ghru seems inconceivable, particularly as such an event wasn?t mentioned at the GCM. This amendment of east-to-west track conveniently places AXIS flight closer to where the eyewitness reported sightings the F15s but only by forgetting how they might have got there. However, the amended track would have meant AXIS formation turning north up Glen Quoich for some 6km before over-flying the first witness at Dubh Ghleann and then turning west and taking a contour-following route to regain the Lairig Ghru somewhere south of Ben McDui; all of this in weather reported by the BoI as very low cloud base and whiteout conditions. We think AXIS formation would have remembered that particular detour, when flying in loose trail ! It is very important to note that none of the eyewitnesses could have seen AXIS formation if they tracked their original route, following the Dee valley, just as the member of AXIS formation had informed the GCM under oath.

5. The next statement made by the BoI is of equal concern. At page 2-6, para 23, they say:

We have read this statement many times. It first struck us that the BoI had invented new eyewitnesses but now we believe this to be a very obscure way of trying to say that the eyewitnesses never saw the F15s. The BoI seem to be following their theory that the F15s never deviated from the track recorded by the radar until impact in IMC. In their view, the only place an eyewitness could have seen F15s would have been close to the last radar contact. That theory being correct, then the aircraft would have suddenly become 'Visual Met Conditions' (VMC) beneath cloud, in close proximity to these (hypothetical) eyewitnesses, and then be seen 'in an extreme manoeuvre' to avoid hitting the ground that they (hypothetically) suddenly saw ahead of them; ergo (in the BoI's view), the eyewitnesses never saw F15s. This seems to be a most unusual way of trying to discount 4 eyewitness and their reported positions (which were not disputed) between 5km and 8km to the south east of the crash site.

At page 2-7, para 23, the Board go on to say:

This is a very strange conclusion to make, bearing in mind that the F15s were in close formation, while the member of AXIS formation (Tornado aircraft) reported to the GCM that they were flying in 'loose trail'. There is no mention of the important fact that the Tornados landed some 30 minutes prior to the assumed time of crash. While it is conceded that the time of sighting by all the witnesses were approximations, the margin of estimate of time between all the 4 witness groups was small. It should be appreciated that seeing low flying aircraft flying in 'loose trail' would appear to a casual observer as though he were seeing 2, possibly unrelated, aircraft . None of the eyewitnesses reported such a sighting. Concerning the BoI's inference that eyewitnesses were mistaken in their recognition of twin-tailed aircraft, one eyewitness stated under oath at the GCM that he was adamant that the aircraft he had seen were not Tornados; he had seen many of these in his hill walking experience. Moreover, two of the eyewitnesses were directly over-flown, by their estimate of 40yds; even if this was at 250ft, it was a an extremely close sighting of 2 large aircraft in close formation and could hardly be confused with the sighting of a single Tornado (as it would be seen in 'loose trail'). It is very important to understand that these particular eyewitnesses, standing at a spot height position on the eastern side of Dubh Ghleann, first saw the aircraft as they approached them head-on from the south and their first comment to each other, on seeing the aircraft, was about the twin tails. The aircraft then banked over them, turning from a northerly to a westerly heading, presenting the witnesses with a tail-view aspect. Within a matter of seconds the formation over-flew a solo skier from behind, presenting him, also, with a tail-view aspect.

As a result of the BoI report, the Station Commander, RAF Leuchars
comments at Part 3, page2, para4:

We note the Station Commander has used the phrase 'high probability' in referring to the type of aircraft seen; this seems to suggest that there was also a probability that the eyewitnesses had, indeed, seen the F15s as there were no other aircraft in the area that day.

6. Weather Factors and Situational Awareness.

The USAF report (page 14 Summary of Weather sub para C(1) ) states:

At the GCM, the crew-member from AXIS formation reported much the same, with scattered showers moving through the area and localised severe whiteout conditions; he reported that visibility was good outside of the showers. In our recollection, there was no mention at the GCM of a very low cloud base that the BoI says AXIS reported to them in para 4 above. The USAF summary was in accord with the information given to the GCM and it was conceded by the USAF aircrew-witness that at Flight Level 80 , BITE 21 flight would have had unlimited visibility and would likely see up to 5/8th of the surface. The BoIs view is somewhat different and neatly fits their theory of straight line descent into terrain.

The BoI state at page 2 '23 , para 46:

In their summary, the BoI state on page 2-23, para 46 :

We are very surprised by this statement, the BoI seem to question the navigational skills of the leader of BITE 21 formation . The BoI acknowledge that they were in possession of the same documentation and evidence that was presented at the GCM.

The BoI state at page 2-19, para 45b :

At page 2-21, para 45f they state:

At page 2-27, para 47 sub para c(2) they state:

We are not sure what the BoI actually mean in the last sentence of the above para but they do seem to be contradicting themselves before that in their other statements. They are completely intent on discounting the evidence from weather forecasts and R/T tape transcripts that BITE 21 flight were descending in VMC, in order to satisfy their view of the cause of the accident; this is hardly a balanced view. Let us not forget that the lead pilot was very experienced on the F15, with 1,700 hrs on type, and had previously been an Instructor Pilot and Evaluator Pilot on the same type; he would have had immense experience in determining situational awareness from the navigational aids available.

His sortie was correctly planned, he was weather briefed, he was carrying a Low Level map on which he had marked his RAA of 5700ft (the annotation was made close to Ben MacDui). Additionally, he was on his own navigation following his pre-planned route using INS to his next waypoint (Aviemore. W/P 10) which took the flight very close to Ben MacDui. We suggest that the leader of BITE 21 flight knew exactly where he was and that he was flying in the weather conditions he would have expected from his pre-flight brief. During the stage of flight from top of descent, the flight leader should not have been under a particularly heavy workload and we can see no reason why he should have lost 'situational awareness'. Furthermore, there is no evidence for the BoI to conclude that he lost situational awareness. They simply refuse to accept the possibility that, this immensely experienced pilot, passed his RAA of 5700ft because he was in sight of the surface. The theory put before the GCM by the defence QC was, that as the flight approached the Ben MacDui area, their descent into low level on their pre-planned route using INS was blocked by visible cloud. We see no evidence to contradict this theory. This is completely in accord with the USAF Report page 14, para
7,sub para c (1) which we re-state:

We believe that leader then elected to continue descent avoiding this cloud and entered low level and went below radar cover and out of R/T contact. Whilst in low level flight, the leader was attempting to regain his pre-planned route when BITE 21 impacted terrain in probable whiteout conditions that were prevalent throughout the area. It was while trying to reposition to the planned route that the flight was seen by several very credible eyewitnesses. This theory was put forward by a very experienced Test Pilot who had much low level experience, was current on the Typhoon and had completed an exchange tour on the F15.

PPRuNe Radar

7. Board of Inquiry Procedures.

The terms of reference for a BoI state that the process is not to apportion blame. We assume that the Station Commander Leuchars, AOC 3Gp and the CinC are considered to be part of this process. If that is the case, then they we believe they may have exceeded their remit by making the following comments which we construe as apportioning 'blame'. The controller concerned is mentioned by name in parts of both the Station Commander's and CinC.

Station Commander on Cause:

Comments by the Air Officer Commanding:

and later,

Comments by Commander in Chief

8. BoI Conclusions.

We are of the opinion that the BoI conclusion was formed very early on in the process and that a disproportionate credence was afforded to the favourable evidence. Evidence contrary to their conclusion was either discredited or discarded. Their report lacks the balance that would suggest a fair investigation. We cannot understand how the BoI can come to a conclusion as to the most likely cause of this accident without proving the balance of probability. As an example of their approach, they say in their Summary of Causes and Factors at page 2-31 para 49c that one of the contributory factors was:

This is an assumption, not a fact. Where is the proof to warrant this statement ? It is not in this report.

9. Summary.

We can find no evidence to support the BoI's conclusion that:

Although we can see the BoI's line of enquiry linking the crash site and a very close last radar sighting, it is inexcusable, without an established time of impact, to discount very credible eyewitness reports that demonstrated a very definite flight path and formation flown by the F15s that could not be associated with the Tornados in the area earlier and which had landed some 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of the crash. The compelling evidence, from known weather conditions and tape transcript information suggests that the aircraft descended in VMC conditions; they never reported that they were IMC. In support of their theory, the Board insinuates a lack of professional navigational skills by the flight leader that does not accord with his proven experience and ability. The subsequent eyewitness statements indicate that BITE 21 flight had made a successful transition into LFA 14 before crashing, in probable whiteout conditions, close to Ben MacDui, possibly while trying to regain their pre-planned route. The report by this BoI was sometimes factually incorrect and contrary to evidence in the USAF report or to that given under oath at the GCM. Their investigation lacked balance and failed to provide a satisfactory balance of probability to support their theory as to the cause of the crash. Furthermore, we believe that the higher authority has exceeded the remit given to the BoI procedure, by apportioning blame. This occurred when the actions of the Air Traffic Controller were highlighted as a contributory cause. We shall be lodging an appeal against these findings.


Dick Doleman
GCM Defence Support Group
12 Feb 2006

SID East

Well done that man. You have summarized all the points and questions that sprung to mind when I took the time to read the BOI report in full last week. Having followed the CM in detail also.
I do believe that the Board have made the evidence fit the crime – by ignoring the vital evidence by eye witnesses they have made a mockery of their process and report. How the hell can they just do that on the basis of nothing more than it fits their theory?

The whole process stinks, this farcical BOI report is a joke (ignoring the few sound recommendations that were made). As if the "blame-throwing" was not bad enough:

“On 26 Mar 01 2 USAF F-15C ac………”

The day of the crash

"Capt K T Jones USAF, the wingman………. He had qualified as a 2-ship flight lead in Dec 01” 9 months later!

This is the opening section of the report and they didn’t even notice that they were crediting the man with achieving a qualification 9 months after his death! This to me sets the whole basis on which I read the rest of the contents.

I fully support the appeal.

SID

air pig

Do I detect another BoI scandel on this as happened with the Chinook crash. Do we see a pattern emerging or am I just being paranoid ????

Johnwil

I was an eye witness at the Court Martial. I fully support Dick Doleman in his rejection of parts of the BoI report. I agree with him that the crash scenario put forward by the Board is wrong.

The Board accepts that the eye witnesses were out walking in the southern Cairngorms that day. It accepts that they were where they claimed to be to the south east of Ben MacDui. It accepts that they saw two jet aircraft. The Board does not accept that the jets seen by the eye witnesses were the F-15s that crashed on the east side of Ben MacDui's summit. The Board maintains that the two jets seen by the witnesses were Tornados.

There were three sets of eye witnesses at the GCM. They had no knowledge of each other until reading press reports of the trial. Some of the witnesses made statements to the police before the jets were found. These statements were considered by the GCM and deemed to be compatible with the evidence they had given to the court.

There are several pieces of hard evidence in relation to the eye witness accounts which are at variance with the Board's view that the witnesses did not see the F-15s.

* All of the witnesses stated they had seen two jets flying close to each other. The Tornados were not in close formation but flying in 'loose trail'. I take that to mean there would have been at least 100 yards separating them - much more probably. There is no opitcal illusion that could transform a low level loose trail so that it appeared to be close formation to ground observers.

* The Tornado pilots gave an account of their route from Braemar to the entrance to the Lairig Ghru at the GCM. The path described by the pilots did not go over or near the eye witness positions when they observed the jets. These positions are accepted by the Board.

* The times the three sets of witnesses stated that they saw the jets were all signifiicantly later than the time at which the Tornados were approaching the Lairig Ghru.

* Three eye witnesses were certain they saw twin-tailed jets.

Individually these pieces of evidence are sufficient to discount the Board's crash hypothesis. Taken together they make an overwhelming case against it.

Flap40

Has the FL43 been corrected for temperature? If not and the temp at 4000ft was around 0c the then a correction of 290ft is required.

I.e. Altimeter (or encoder in this case) says 4300 (on 1013) and OAT of 0c then actual altitude is 4010ft.

There may not have been any descent in the last 6 seconds.

DICK DOLEMAN

Flap40's comments refer to an earlier post by me that has been removed. We now have all the data required from the particular question posed. Many thanks to Flaps40 and all FJ input on the other thread (now closed).

DD

mike rondot

You know this, but for others it might be worth restating the obvious:
Re: Altimetry.
I have not read the BOI. I don't know what the temperature was at the time of the crash but I have read SAR reports of temperatures at the crash site being as low as -18ºC, which is ISA -25ºC at 4000ft. Altimeter temperature error is 4ft/1000ft/ºC difference from ISA. This could cause an altimeter set to Regional QNH to overread by 400ft at an indicated 4000ft. I gather the prosecution produced an "expert" to explain the "complicated" altimetry but he overlooked temperature error among other factors and got himself in somthing of a muddle.
Re: Terrain avoidance and ATC "Instructions".
This is very simple. The pilot is always responsible for terrain clearance under RAS or RIS.
ATC is only responsible for terrain clearance when the aircraft is under radar control. This has always been the case as far as I know.

1in1

It seems that the eyewitnesses are crucial to the Support Group’s theory as to ‘cause of accident’. It is also very apparent that the BoI has realised this and their findings indicate an unhealthy bias in the use of available information towards their own, seemingly, pre-determined conclusions.

I don’t buy into this new evidence from Axis on the route they followed in the area of the crash site. The news of the crash would have been ‘hot poop’ in the crew-room not long after they had landed. Human nature says that the crews would have discussed how close they had been to the crash site ( it looks to be no more than 1nm!), the route they followed and the weather would have been principal points of discussion. If the weather had been as stated by the witness to the 2nd Board of Inquiry, then the route should have been clearly remembered, particularly if it caused the formation to take a significant re-route to get back to the Lairig Ghru. I would suggest that the bad weather and whiteout conditions mentioned by the crew to the 2nd Board of Inquiry were obviously not around Ben MacDui at the time that Axis flew by on their first account of the event.
I’m sure that such crew-room discussion formed the basis of the evidence that the Axis crewmember gave to the Court Martial; he would have also given the same evidence to the original Board of Inquiry shortly after the accident; no excuses about the Court Martial being a long time after the accident, please. Things now start to get more than a little ‘smelly’.

1) Was the Axis witness to the 2nd Board of Inquiry the same one as at the first Board ? If not, why not ? More than ‘dodgy’ if the 2nd Board has used another crewmember to refute the evidence of the original crewmember.

2) If it was the same witness, was his new evidence admissible? He has now given evidence that is inconsistent with what he said previously at the Court Martial.

3) If the same witness, was he reminded of his original evidence given under oath ?

4) Does ‘not remembering’ a route constitute evidence that should be used by a Board of Inquiry’ to contradict or refute eyewitness accounts given previously under oath at a Court Martial.

5) Was he coerced by the Board of Inquiry to change his statement?

6) Was a route suggested to him by the Board of Inquiry that might have tied in with eyewitness statements?

7) Has perjury been committed?

Personally, I think this Board of Inquiry and it’s findings are on very dodgy ground. Notwithstanding the above, it appears that they have ignored or disregarded relevant material and come to a conclusion that is not based on evidence. I have read the comments made by the Station Commnder, AOC 3gp and the CinC. I am in no doubt that they have apportioned blame, intentionally or otherwise. The controller has already been found not guilty by a Court Martial.

Yet another MOD conspired travesty of justice is in the making !

Could someone give the full sequence of events relating to the eyewitnesses please?

Pierre Argh

i'm getting confused (but maybe that's the intention?)... Absolutely, and that's still the case despite some tweaking of the regs after this accident... However, I still believe the descent instruction wasn't the wisest instruction a controller has ever given; and would go so far as to say I don't have a problem with it being thought unsafe.
But did that instruction kill the pilots... answer NO, which is why the Court Marshall found Not Guilty... and it is wrong for a BoI to try to blame the controller.

KENNYR

Thankyou Dick, a very concise and very welcome break down of the facts.
Perhaps it is time for the Air Force to take a look at how these BoI's are presided over and by whom. This incident and the Chinook incident are eerily alike in the way the board approached its decision.

In my humble opinion the ATC chap is totally blameless with regard to the cause of the accident. Keep up the fight and if there is anything I can do to help (writing to MP's etc) please let me know.

DICK DOLEMAN

I have no wish for this thread to be side-tracked into legal argument or the semantics of RIS/RAS but I think it might be time to remind folk of the actual charges levied against Spot at the Court Martial. As you know, he was found NOT GUILTY on all charges. I also enclose some notes taken from the Court Martial which relate both to eyewitnesses and causation.


Charge 1 & 3 (One for each pilot, Lt Col Hyvonen and Capt Jones): Causation
Charge 2; Negligence
The charges against Spot are based on Causation (the most serious) and Negligence. On the Causation Charge (under Section 49 of the RAF Act) Spot is charged on two counts (mirror charges relating to the two individual pilots) of committing an act summarised in the followng phrase from the charge sheet ‘which act caused the loss of life’. It appears that these charges could have included the underlined phrase ‘which act caused the loss of life or is likely to have caused the loss of life”. This was not the case in the charges made against Spot.

Extract from daily summary:
Extract from the daily summary:
Extract from daily summary:
I hope the above information will give you all a clearer picture as to why the Support Group take exception to both the latest Board of Inquiry findings and the finger of blame pointed by the senior officers in their comments on the findings.

drunkenwasp

Having been the officer that defended the Sgt in the Kosovo BOI, I know how utterly appalling RAF BOIs can be. I feel sometimes that I could write a book on what went on during that BOI. I never believed that I was naive - but I had no idea as to what lengths the Service would go to to apportion blame where they wanted, not where it should have been. The sheer mendacity was simply breathtaking.

Dick, whilst it was a while ago that I was involved in BOIs, let me know if I can be of help.

KENNYR

Perhaps BoI's should become the responsibility of an independant review board consisting of Officers and Civilians from all walks of military life, people who can DISPASSIONATELY look at evidence and come to an UNBIASED opinion of events based on testimony of eye witnesses and experts in the field.

For this BoI and the other one involving the Chinook, how could the presiding members reach the decisions that they did? How could they totally ignore, discount and forge the evidence of eye witnesses and radar traces in the way they did, AND GET AWAY WITH IT.

AAAAAAGGGGHHHHH...........The mind boggles and reels with revulsion.

Sorry, got carried away, but I feel so passionately about these particular injustices.

Lima Juliet

My two-penneth? Yes, the pilots should've known better that 6500ft is a good safety alt in the Grampians. Yes, they should've known that RIS does not offer them any terrain clearance. Yes, they should've known that Min Vectoring Altitude (MVA) is not available in the UK (even though it was mentioned in the FIH (yellow book) at the time).
However, giving out information of "Bite 21 descend 4000ft on the Portree" is unsafe even if it is not a mandatory instruction. Look at the catchall at the front of the then extant JSP318A inferring that a controller has a responsibility to pass safe information. Also, not replying for a request for MVA left the contract requested between the controller and the pilots horribly open.
Who is to blame for all this? Too many to list to single out any individual.
Also, I seriously question the eyewitness business. I have taken a long time to positively VID a Tornado instead of an F15 (well inside 3000ft); I've even watched a wingman shoot an F3 because he thought it was an F15 and he had 3000hrs+ on Lightning, F4 and F3.
So all in all, what's my point? Stop turning this sorry catalogue of errors into some crusade to defend a controller that was having as bad a day as anyone else involved. It won't bring back the pilots and it won't do anything to patch up a deepening distrust (IMHO) that appears to be prevalent between aircrew and ATCOs.
Rant over and out...
LJ

DICK DOLEMAN

I'm sorry you see it that way. The "crusade",as you call it, started when the original charge contained the word 'wilfully'. In my interpretation, that is with 'intent'. I am not defending a controller that was having a "bad day"; I am attacking a system that refuses to acknowledge that there is another view as to how this accident might have occurred and has always seemed hell bent on having a scapegoat. I have no wish to demean the loss of life and all those involved acknowledge that this is the greatest tragedy in this sorry saga.

I hope that your final comment on a "deepening distrust" isn't well founded from the aircrew perspective; I haven't had any evidence of that from my controlling experience; the system relies very heavily on mutual trust for it to work.

Say Again

I have been following this case for over four years and have never heard anyone make such a comment. I cannot speak for everyone but most of the comments I have seen or heard from those that have followed this case (some from around the world) seem to concur with the view that what the ATCO did, or did not say, is a red herring, as the aircraft at the time of the crash were established at low level. Therefore it is only right and just to defend him from wrongly apportioned blame.

Methinks you have come to an instant conclusion without fully looking at the facts.

As to your comment on the deepening distrust between pilots and ATCOs, I have done a staw poll of current RAF ATCOs and they are mystified as to your comment. I personally find it very sad.

Ginseng

If I may give a personal point of view, based on nearly 25 years of flying experience including many an IMC letdown, both with and without the aid of TFR:

We as aircrew are wholey responsible for our own safety in the first instance. We may seek help from controllers where approriate, but we are under no compulsion to accept blindly any instruction they may give if we consider it to be unsafe. The safety altitude procedures are there for a good reason - the ground nearly always has a Pk of 1. It is not good enough to shift the blame elsewhere when things go wrong.

Ginseng

Mmmmnice

The various responsibilities of aviators and ATCOs notwithstanding; the responsibility for keeping track of whether the ground is becoming a bigger threat than everything else, ultimately rests with the Aircraft Captain. You only get older, and perhaps bolder, if the hairs on the back of your neck start to twitch when you are pushing your luck. Personally I find it easier to fly something that can go lower and slower when it starts to get gloopy - unfortunately many do not have that option (but they can usually climb in a quite spectacular fashion) Sorry if I've strayed rather a long way off the thread. but I thought a break from the mud-slinging was in order.

southside

This ATCer gets my full support. We all know the rules and fly by the rules. When a CFIT is conducted it is the responsibility of the aircrew. Not the ATCO. If you are flying in cloud and you hit a piece of Scotland then you and only you are responsible. They should have known where they were with regard to the piece of rock and they should have avoided it.