gumbyswa

Thanks for the info, i find it interesting you use the word "term", as in it was a defined procedure. The only place I could find it written down was in a USAF document, and then it was not defined.

Any more out there???

Argus

'Cloudbreak' was a term in common RN ATC usage at Lossiemouth in the 1960s. Not sure if it was ever defined with precision in any publication, but it was certainly well understood by both aircrew and air traffickers.

It was used to describe a procedure for decent by RN, RAF and USAF (F4s and FIIIs) aircraft into LFAs 14, 15 and, for 2TAF Canberras, TainRange.

If memory serves me correctly, after a positive radar ident (turn or IFF), ATC issued a decent 'clearance' to a minimum safe quadrantal level based on the safety altitude within 100nm of Lossie and the RPS. I'm fairly certain that the term 'clearance' was used as part of the procedure.

In those days, RAF Canberras based in Germany flew direct to Tain Range, descended either VMC or under limited radar control or advisory service provided by both ‘Highland Radar’ (the GCI radar at RAF Buchan with a chinagraph GEOREF overlay) and ‘Moray Radar’ at Lossiemouth (with an electronically generated one), dropped the ordinance, enjoyed lunch at Lossie and returned to Germany in the afternoon.

In early January 1966, a 2TAF Canberra crashed into mountains west of Inverness whilst on a radar controlled descent into Tain during a ‘white out’ blizzard. Both the pilot and navigator were killed. Because of the weather, the wreckage wasn’t found for three days – and only then by a ground party. Aerial searches were impossible.

I recall that there was always a problem with visiting aircraft descending directly into TainRange or the then Low Flying Areas 14 and 15 because of the adjoining high terrain. The RN had installed 1960s state of the art radar at Lossie (I think it was the Marconi S264). My recollection is that the radar was as good as it got at that time. On the day of the accident, the Canberra was descending in IMC towards high ground west of Inverness under 'limited radar control' from Moray Radar. The decent clearance was, I think to an altitude below the minimum safe in a perceived expectation that the pilot would report VMC below and proceed VFR to the range. But on the day in question, there were snow blizzards and low cloud. In the prevailing 'white out' conditions (that were known to ATC), VMC below eluded the crew with fatal consequences.

Sounds familiar?

After the accident and subsequent CM of the RN air trafficker, the let down procedure for 2TAF aircraft into Tain was changed to a radar controlled decent for a GCA pickup to Lossie, preferably to runway 23 so that aircraft could let down over the North Sea, overshoot and then proceed VMC across the Moray Firth to the Range.

And a revised procedure was introduced for aircraft working Moray Radar, Moray Approach or Moray Director descending either into the LFAs or recovery to Lossie or Kinloss (including descents into Tain), that without exception, pilots were to be told that if not under positive radar control, they were responsible for terrain clearance, that they were descending towards high ground, that the minimum safe altitude/level was ....ft, and if they were IMC approaching that height/level, they were to climb immediately to the next higher quadrantal level and contact Moray Radar/Approach/Director on .....freq.

I'm not sure what happened to this procedure but it seems to have not survived the passage of time. And neither it seems have the dedicated landlines that in my day used to exist between Lossie, Leuchars and Buchan for handovers etc. Elgin Trunk Sub 4 rings a memory bell, as does the telephone network that each station was connected to via Prestwick.

It might be worth making some enquiries as to why the above process was discontinued; as this might go towards an argument that the Crown had constructive knowledge, and thus a duty of care which it then breached by not maintaining the above arrangements.

nigegilb

I used the word "term" to describe cloudbreak because that is exactly what USAF used to ask for. This was in the days of Mildenhall, Lakenheath and Upper Heyford sending hoards of jets to low fly in Scottish LFA's, on hi-lo- hi profiles. I worked at Scottish between 1985-88. We used to limit radar service as they got close to radar heads or close to radar coverage.

DICK DOLEMAN

I have gradually been working my way through the various annexes to the main BOI report which we have obtained through the FOI Act.

What I quote now, I find very disturbing. The following are extracts from Annex F to Part 2A (dated 30 APR 04) headed Board's Detailed Response to XXXX (name blanked) QR 1269 (7) Comments.

A question is raised by Spot and his solicitor on BOI findings as to the change of the AXIS formation route given to the Court Martial:


[/QUOTE]


The Response by the BOI was:

Extraordinary !! I was at the Court Martial. The evidence given under oath by the leader of AXIS formation followed the introduction of a pre-prepared map of their route given as an exhibit. There is absolutely no question that this was drawn under the "stress of cross-examination"

It is now suggested by the re-formed BOI, that a route was produced and signed by the all members of the formation, shortly after the accident, that was totally different to that produced at the Court Martial.

It would seem blindingly obvious that the RAF Prosecutor would have been aware of such vital contadictory evidence, so why was it never challenged at the Court Martial ?

I remain convinced by the eye-witness statements and less convinced by every effort to undermine them. Please bear in mind that Route 2 (above) now conveniently aligns with the previously ignored eye-witnesses.

green granite

Did it also say that they were in close formation, and not the trail that was
stated at the court marshall?

DICK DOLEMAN

For some reason, the different formations flown by the F15s and the Tornados does not feature at all in the BOI report. Why not ? This is highly significant in both what was seen by eye-witnesses and how the aircraft impacted (very Close formation). The thrust of the entire BOI report (including all annexes) is that there was only one way that this accident occurred.

I can not stand up and categoriacally say exactly what happened in this tragic accident (unlike the BOI). I would guess that the accident occurred in 'whiteout' conditions.....not necessarily in strict IMC as it is an optical illusion. Please read the BOI report in detail and you will find that they often present assumptions as fact in how the F15 crew flew and conducted their descent profile to a straight line impact in IMC despite contrary Met information both from ground and airborne observation.

Without the vital timeline to associate the accident, we will never know what occurred. So where does that leave us ? In my very humble position.... where we should not be pointing the finger of blame........ on either side. Major Scott Chamberlain (USAF Ret'd) is absolutely right.

How strange that the USAF has never done this but the RAF hiearchy continues to do so (please read the comments written by the Air Ranking officers as part of this BOI procedure). I read these comments as attaching blame to the controller involved and being contrary to BOI procedure.

The fact that this very tragic accident occurred very closely after a similar accident in Pristina leads me to assume that certain pressures were applied.......hence the Court Martial that almost everyone seems to concede was completely unjustified. Will the guilty man stand up ??

green granite

Dick
It is interesting that the formation flown by the tornados is'nt mentioned,
? deliberately? after all, its one thing to say there was confusion over the
route at the CM, but to say he was confused as to the formation flown
as well would rather stretch credibility I think.

I have indeed read all the higher ups comments and I also waded through
the CM daily reports.

I felt in the published BOI summary, they spent a lot of time, and gave a
very high profile to the fact that the controller had been off sick for 2
weeks, had not been interviewed on his return to check he was ok to work,
plus one or two other minor issues, to what end? I can only assume to
give the reader a certain 'mind set'.

As I said in an earlier post I can only assume that the BOI findings had to
justify the bringing of the CM in the first place. If true that would be a
terrible state of affairs, but that is how it seems to me.

I'm probably totally out of order saying that if you think I am let me know
and I'll edit it out

gumbyswa

I still sit here years later and think of how in awe I am for the men and women who were up on that mountain searching in whiteout conditions in the faint hope of finding survivors. I thanked them then, I would like to do it again.

So how did they know were to look, who told them to start looking on that peak?

gumbyswa

Did anyone ask why a CM was started before a BOI?? I know of no pressure to get either one completed. Can BOI info be used in a CM?

green granite

The first BOI was stoped when it was decided to start Court Marshall
proceedings, and then reconvened afterwards.

Can BOI info be used in a CM? I'm not certain about the rules of evidence
but I would imagine not directly but I stand to be corrected on that

gumbyswa

But why??

//////

DICK DOLEMAN

Scott,

See Ginsengs explanation at the bottom of page 2.

DD

Johnwil

I apologise if I misrepresented your expert testimony to the GCM. My source of information is the daily report written by Dick Doleman et al for the PPRuNe forum. I have not read a transcript of the GCM and only attended the trial when I was appearing before the court as a defence eye-witness.

One extract from this report states in relation to evidence given by you :

" It was elicited from the witness that the descent profile prior to impact indicated the likelihood of a descent in VMC". ( Post for Day 9 ).

I understand this to mean, in layman's terms, that the pilots probably had some visual contact with the ground through broken cloud.

In recording Michael Jones's concluding summary the report states :

" Maj Chamberlain conceded that the rate of descent towards Ben Mc Dui (as put forward by the prosecution ) did not support the prosecution case of a formation descent in IMC straight to the point of impact ". ( Post 9 )

Clearly these extracts are relevant to the argument I put forward in Post 73 on the forum - that Craig Penrice's hypothesis is the only tenable one. I would be grateful if you would correct any factual errors in the extracts I have quoted.

I have not heard mention of the aviation fuel evidence before. If you have any details of the calculations with respect to this matter I would be interested to read them.

I agree totally with your observation that the blame for the crash should not be attributed to pilot or controller error. I have no first hand knowledge of piloting an aircraft or of air traffic control. I can only compare the risks of low level flying at high speed with those that go with mountaineering. Both are activities sometimes carried out at the limits of what is humanly possible. Just occasionally tragic accidents happen to even the most experienced of practitioners. A rock hold may suddenly break or a section of snow unexpectedly give way. Unless all the details of an accident are known with near certainty then facile judgements, such as pinning the blame on pilot or controller error, should never be made.

gumbyswa

[QUOTE=Johnwil]
" It was elicited

" Maj Chamberlain conceded that


/QUOTE]

No worries John, I didn't mean to make it sound like I was snapping back at you, stupid internent , as for "elicited" and "conceded" I think you will note these were BASED on my answers to very direct questioning and I always said "improbable or unlikely" when answering these same questions. I am pretty sure I never said I concede nor you have elicited a change of heart from me.

Interesting how years later through the fog of time that some still think I said "they probably were descending visually" when in reality the most I said is "they may have been", it was "a possibility that", but based on the evidence, they were not descending in VMC conditions (closing formation to close position, engine heat on, asking for descent to MVA, you don't do any of these things if your visual).

Now I guess I go into ramble mode,

The gas thing. At the CM, I had a rough compilation of fuel used with associated errors, which I presented and was shot down quickly, good. I had not finalized it and did not have the means to do so while in Scottland. Once I returned to home, it was easy through simulation to determine that the fuel quantities on the guages matched within %1/2 of what simulation showed as a straight line descent into the mountain, flying a low level, even a simple 360 at power would have used in excess about %10 more fuel than tolerances in the system could acount for, ie, they did not fly around low level.

Lastly, how did they (the mountain rescue guys) know where to look? They knew because someone in the USAF told someone in the RAF that an IR signature was created about 8 seconds after the last radar plot at the crash location. Not minutes later as if they would have been flying around, this also did not come out because we did not have this information at the CM.

Bottom line, the aircrew were flying under the impression they could ask for what they asked for, MVA clearance, they did not have this right. Why did they think this? Because they were taught it in training. The training was in error, the publications were in error. That has been fixed. I even believe some of the RAF controller rules were changed shortly after the crash, even before the CM. Why? They were in error??

Is the UK a signator of the ICAO rules/regulations? I think they are, then how come the RIS/RAS thing is not detailed, or at least at the time it was not detailed in the appendixes of the ICAO documents as required of ICAO? Anyone?

Ramble complete.

Spot is not to blame, now lets get him off the hot seat, please.

DICK DOLEMAN

I am totally blown away by this statement:

I have read both the USAF and RAF BOI reports on this accident. There is absolutely no mention of the IR signature to which you refer. The RAF BOI goes into some detail on how they researched for seismological and AWACs evidence to establish a timeline for the accident (with no result). Please bear in mind that the RAF BOI was reconvened after the Court Martial and the IR signature data to which you refer would then have been available to them.

If what you say is true, I would have thought that any report would have simply stated that the Search and Rescue teams were directed to the precise scene of the crash by satellite(?) information revealing an IR signature shortly after loss of radar contact.

I respectfully request that you provide the proof to substantiate your statement. If you cannot do so, I think it must be withdrawn.

DICK DOLEMAN

Further to my last post. I have re-read Annex L to the BOI Report, titled 'Search and Rescue Report on the 2 X F15c Accident' and dated 25 Jun 03.

It is a very detailed summary of events and makes no mention of the USAF passing on information about an IR signature. Furthermore, the report makes it very clear that there was considerable confusion as to where the aircraft might have crashed and that the search area was only refined after a replay of the radar data.

Johnwil

Thanks for responding quickly to my last post and for the new information concerning fuel calculations and the time at which IF signals from the crash site were detected. More on this later.

I would like to recap the situation as I and others in the Support Group see it. My interpretation of the BOI conclusion in relation to the cause of the crash is this. Irrespective of whether the F15 crew were following correct procedure in descending below their predetermnied safe height the crash would not have happened if the pilots had not received advice from Leuchars ATC to descend to 4,000 feet. It seems probable that had the jury at the CM reached a similar conclusion Spot would have been found guilty on all charges. I consider this conclusion to be wrong. It is unjust that Spot, his family, friends and many well wishers should have to live with this conclusion on the public record. The aim of the Support Group is to correct this injustice.

My overriding reason for rejecting the straight line descent hypothesis is that my companion and I saw two low flying F15s within 200 feet of us. Our evidence to the CM was corroborated by a lone skier two Kms to the west of us and two hill walkers a mile or two west again. There were very few other people walking or skiing in the area on that day. We were the only people in upper Glen Quoich. As chance would have it we were standing on a rocky outcrop at 2,500 feet admiring the winter scene when the jets came into view. We watched them approach then bank to the left in front of us. Like many people I can recall exactly where I was and what I was doing when told of President Kennedy's asassination in 1963. The memory of seeing the F15s is etched on my memory with equal clarity.

It is my firm view that the F15 aircrew descended below their safe flying height because they had decided the conditions looked suitable to carry out the low flying component of their mission and that we saw the jets as they were flying towards the entrance to the Lairig Ghru. It is also my opinion that this view is supported by evidence from the CM. This evidence includes the jets rate of descent from FL80. I accept that you reject this.

As a consequence of holding this view I believe that any calculation which is claimed to rule out this scenario has to be wrong.

In relation to the moutain rescue and infra red data. I spoke to the coordinator of the mountain rescue on the phone on the evening of the crash. He asked to speak to me following a statement I had made to the police in Braemar. I suggested to him that the pilots may have been attempting a transit of the Cairngorms through a pass to the east of Ben MacDui ( Lairig an Laoigh ) and that a possible crash site was near the narrowest part of the pass. He told me there was a rescue team searching near that area. At the time he was coordinating several rescue teams who were located at various parts of the Cairngorm plateau area. At that time he most certainly did not have an exact location near Ben MacDui's summit on which to focus rescue efforts. If IR related location data was available to him it was far from precise. i.e. not accurate to within two miles.

In relation to the fuel calculation I assume it is based on measurements of fuel prior to take off and data of fuel levels recorded on instruments recovered from the crash. I am surprised that it is possible to estimate, from this data, the distance an aircraft has flown to plus or minus 2.5 miles in 500 miles. I am also surprised that the exact route flown by the jets from Lakenheath in Suffolk to Ben MacDui is known to this degree of accuracy. I estimate the Craig Penrice hypothesis involves a loop of between 25 and 30 miles.

John W.

gumbyswa

As I was, blown away. But it was told to me, by whom I cannot recall. I cannot retract, sorry. This info does in no way change the fact that Spot should not have been culpable.

Oh, and like I said before, the correct questions were apparently not asked.

gumbyswa

John, I am really here to help Spot. I do not mean to throw rocks into the support groups plans, if what i am saying does, i'll stop, but they are the facts as I know them. I am willing to ceed aspects and focus on the one area I know makes a difference, and that is the documentation of the rules as they were, I am now not constrained in arguement as I was while active duty.

That being said, I agree I have no right to say you did not see F-15's.

However, the corrected radar plots, the comm during descent, the formation at impact, the instruments at impact, including fuel level, lead me to only one conclusion, they hit shortly after leveling. As an asside, yes we can be that accurate on fuel, we knew thier starting fuel, taxi time, type of takeoff, climb rate, altitude, time of descent, speed etc. It's all on tape. taking all this into account inlcuiding tolerance of fuel sending units and guages, I have a quantity that exactly matches that found at the site. Adding a minimal low level jaunt adds about 1000 more lbs of fuel used, how do I account for that not being used?

As the defense laywer so deftly stated in question to me, "do you know what the scientific process is" of course, he stated that the hypothesis needed to be tested by trying every means to disprove. Well, the reverse is also true. Einstein still thought E=MC2 was pretty self explanatory, yet it has exceptions to it's rule

I would recommend we not get into further discussions of low level flying here, maybe offline. I am still willing to engage in other aspects.

Again, I'm here to help, to be truthful, if thats hurting the cause, please let me know.

Scott

DICK DOLEMAN

I think our recent posts seem to be pitting friend on friend and I am probably the most guilty party in taking an unecessarily aggressive stance.

Confusions can easily occur and I apologise to Scott if I have caused any offence in tackling the issues raised as I know he was a true gentleman during the CM and has continued to be so.

Naturally, we have differing opinions in some areas and that will probably continue to be the case.

We (the support group) can only try to fight our particular corner on the facts known (or made known) to us.