[QUOTE=Johnwil]
" It was elicited
" Maj Chamberlain conceded that
/QUOTE]
No worries John, I didn't mean to make it sound like I was snapping back at you, stupid internent
, as for "elicited" and "conceded" I think you will note these were BASED on my answers to very direct questioning and I always said "improbable or unlikely" when answering these same questions. I am pretty sure I never said I concede nor you have elicited a change of heart from me
.
Interesting how years later through the fog of time that some still think I said "they probably were descending visually" when in reality the most I said is "they may have been", it was "a possibility that", but based on the evidence, they were not descending in VMC conditions (closing formation to close position, engine heat on, asking for descent to MVA, you don't do any of these things if your visual).
Now I guess I go into ramble mode,
The gas thing. At the CM, I had a rough compilation of fuel used with associated errors, which I presented and was shot down quickly, good. I had not finalized it and did not have the means to do so while in Scottland. Once I returned to home, it was easy through simulation to determine that the fuel quantities on the guages matched within %1/2 of what simulation showed as a straight line descent into the mountain, flying a low level, even a simple 360 at power would have used in excess about %10 more fuel than tolerances in the system could acount for, ie, they did not fly around low level.
Lastly, how did they (the mountain rescue guys) know where to look? They knew because someone in the USAF told someone in the RAF that an IR signature was created about 8 seconds after the last radar plot at the crash location. Not minutes later as if they would have been flying around, this also did not come out because we did not have this information at the CM.
Bottom line, the aircrew were flying under the impression they could ask for what they asked for, MVA clearance, they did not have this right. Why did they think this? Because they were taught it in training. The training was in error, the publications were in error. That has been fixed. I even believe some of the RAF controller rules were changed shortly after the crash, even before the CM. Why? They were in error??
Is the UK a signator of the ICAO rules/regulations? I think they are, then how come the RIS/RAS thing is not detailed, or at least at the time it was not detailed in the appendixes of the ICAO documents as required of ICAO? Anyone?
Ramble complete.
Spot is not to blame, now lets get him off the hot seat, please.