Whatever happened to the Chinook HC 3s?
We were going to strip the avionics bay and flight deck, re-wire them and install new avionics. They would have been brought by road.
As they are in good nick there was very little else to do apart from some special forces mods.
It would have been nice to do as well but you can't win them all
As they are in good nick there was very little else to do apart from some special forces mods.
It would have been nice to do as well but you can't win them all
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Nige,
Are you inferring that is what should happen?
sw
Certainly the word that I had heard was that the Chinners could be signed off tomorrow, someone with large cojones required.
sw
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SW, I am just trying to make sense of this whole thing. No 1 equipment shortage in UK Armed Forces right now is helicopters. We are at war, these Chinooks were flown regularly, why not use them? I suspect that they are not in a position to be flown at the moment but what sense is there in leaving them to rust? As far as I understand they were delivered to spec, so why can't they be signed off? If simply airing this absurd situation acts as a catalyst to finally sorting this procurement out, then, that in itself is a good thing.
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Nige,
The problem I see is that, having previously decided that these ac were not fit to have an RTS for safety reasons, is it not reasonable for Joe Public (and Jack Pilot) to say "These ac were previously considered unsafe, what has changed?" Is your statement of "We are at war, these Chinooks were flown regularly, why not use them?" good enough.
Or put it another way, in your dealings with the big wheels, if they said "We are at war, these Hercules were flown regularly, why not use them?" would you lessen your campaign to have ESF fitted?
Or do you think it is one rule for SH and another rule for AT?
I thought that you of all people would have learned that something delivered to spec isn't necessarily safe. 
sw
The problem I see is that, having previously decided that these ac were not fit to have an RTS for safety reasons, is it not reasonable for Joe Public (and Jack Pilot) to say "These ac were previously considered unsafe, what has changed?" Is your statement of "We are at war, these Chinooks were flown regularly, why not use them?" good enough.
Or put it another way, in your dealings with the big wheels, if they said "We are at war, these Hercules were flown regularly, why not use them?" would you lessen your campaign to have ESF fitted?
Or do you think it is one rule for SH and another rule for AT?
As far as I understand they were delivered to spec, so why can't they be signed off?
sw
As you need to log in to the MoD site with your service/staff number, I won’t reveal all the details, but the Chinook Mk3 “Fix to Field” team is actively recruiting. The bulletins state the proposed In Service Dates (plural). Not 2007.
Safeware - Fully agree.
Safeware - Fully agree.
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SW, it would appear that having aired the situation, a fix is on the way.
I never expected the HC3s to get signed off, but File on 4 gave me a tinkle a few weeks ago and I suggested they take a look at the procurement of the Chinooks. Smart move? If they were delivered to spec at a cost of £246m and they were not safe why has nobody taken responsibility for an outrageous waste of taxpayers money? Or do you think that is OK? I am still not clear as to why these ac cannot be signed off which is why I ask the question. Accountability is something dear to my heart. There is precious little accountability here is there?
Oh, C4 News covered it on Saturday as well. (it was only a suggestion). Sometimes you have to think like politicians!
I never expected the HC3s to get signed off, but File on 4 gave me a tinkle a few weeks ago and I suggested they take a look at the procurement of the Chinooks. Smart move? If they were delivered to spec at a cost of £246m and they were not safe why has nobody taken responsibility for an outrageous waste of taxpayers money? Or do you think that is OK? I am still not clear as to why these ac cannot be signed off which is why I ask the question. Accountability is something dear to my heart. There is precious little accountability here is there?
Oh, C4 News covered it on Saturday as well. (it was only a suggestion). Sometimes you have to think like politicians!
Last edited by nigegilb; 13th Oct 2006 at 08:14.
Thread Starter
"SW, it would appear that having aired the situation, a fix is on the way."
Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige?
SW,
The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable, the TPs and operators were unhappy with the unmodified aircraft, and the lead customer was unhappy enough with the situation that it modified its own aircraft years ago. Any operator would regard the lack of inerting/foam as putting aircraft at unacceptable risk.
Whereas
The Chinook software risk is hypothetical, the TPs were happy with the aircraft, and the lead customer for the type almost bought back these airframes.
And there is the suggestion that the problem that led to these aircraft being grounded (impossible to validate software to standard required>'unacceptable' recommendation from Boscombe>refusal to sign MAR) would not have happened under previous clearance standards (eg before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements WHEN WERE THESE INTRODUCED?), and would not be viewed as a problem by other operators.
Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige?
SW,
The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable, the TPs and operators were unhappy with the unmodified aircraft, and the lead customer was unhappy enough with the situation that it modified its own aircraft years ago. Any operator would regard the lack of inerting/foam as putting aircraft at unacceptable risk.
Whereas
The Chinook software risk is hypothetical, the TPs were happy with the aircraft, and the lead customer for the type almost bought back these airframes.
And there is the suggestion that the problem that led to these aircraft being grounded (impossible to validate software to standard required>'unacceptable' recommendation from Boscombe>refusal to sign MAR) would not have happened under previous clearance standards (eg before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements WHEN WERE THESE INTRODUCED?), and would not be viewed as a problem by other operators.
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Plus the fact that there is a precedent for overruling BD RE: Typhoon. Surely the roots of this debacle lie in the Chinook that crashed on the Mull.
JN, not claiming credit. Drayson hinted that a Boeing fix should be on offer soon and that other ways to achieve more rotary lift in theater were being looked at. It can only assist the situation if the media are adding extra scrutiny.
JN, not claiming credit. Drayson hinted that a Boeing fix should be on offer soon and that other ways to achieve more rotary lift in theater were being looked at. It can only assist the situation if the media are adding extra scrutiny.
Last edited by nigegilb; 13th Oct 2006 at 12:03.
“Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige?”
The “fix-to-field” initiative has been known for some time, at least since the demise of SABR. The recruiting is probably due to a combination of people coming to an end of their tours and in anticipation of approvals.
“The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable”
From previous posts I understood this also applied to Chinook and advance warning was given to the project office. The recent File On 4 programme included an interview on the subject. A retired Sqn Ldr. Also that the problem was more than just software. I concede I know little about helicopters, but Racal made it known around 1995 that some of their kit had been selected “off-the-shelf” for new Chinooks when in fact it was widely known to be so immature that years of development were still required. If the kit was immature, then the risk would be obvious and demonstrable surely?
The “fix-to-field” initiative has been known for some time, at least since the demise of SABR. The recruiting is probably due to a combination of people coming to an end of their tours and in anticipation of approvals.
“The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable”
From previous posts I understood this also applied to Chinook and advance warning was given to the project office. The recent File On 4 programme included an interview on the subject. A retired Sqn Ldr. Also that the problem was more than just software. I concede I know little about helicopters, but Racal made it known around 1995 that some of their kit had been selected “off-the-shelf” for new Chinooks when in fact it was widely known to be so immature that years of development were still required. If the kit was immature, then the risk would be obvious and demonstrable surely?
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Nige,
Boscombe RECOMMENDS it does not authorise etc any MAR or RTS; hence, the views expressed are not overruled, just ignored!. That has always been the case all the way back to when the organisation was formed - MOD in the shape of ACAS heads-up RTS content and approval.
In this case the Boscombe view has not been ignored. Considering the desperate need for these platforms one concludes there is a genuine problem. The question to pose is why is it taking MOD so long to sort it out - one way or the other?
lm
Boscombe RECOMMENDS it does not authorise etc any MAR or RTS; hence, the views expressed are not overruled, just ignored!. That has always been the case all the way back to when the organisation was formed - MOD in the shape of ACAS heads-up RTS content and approval.
In this case the Boscombe view has not been ignored. Considering the desperate need for these platforms one concludes there is a genuine problem. The question to pose is why is it taking MOD so long to sort it out - one way or the other?
lm
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LM, point taken and I am definitely not laying the blame with BD. Now this subject has been given the oxygen of publicity I would hope that there is added impetus to getting it fixed sharpish. Surely we should not go down the road of hiring private helicopters to ferry our troops around? SW mentioned the safety angle, can you imagine the arguments if a private helo went down with British troops on board? The solution to the current problem lies at BD. PM has stated that UK Armed Forces will get anything their commanders ask for. Well they are asking for more Chinners. Get it sorted.
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Nige,
The solution does not rest at Boscombe, a little further east methinks.
Whilst I am not wholly familiar with the problem identified, I understand it relates to systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions. Hardly, the sort of concern you need for a SF capability platform.
The flying carried out at Boscombe to keep the oil moving etc in the 'stored' aircraft has only taken place on nice clear days.
lm
The solution does not rest at Boscombe, a little further east methinks.
Whilst I am not wholly familiar with the problem identified, I understand it relates to systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions. Hardly, the sort of concern you need for a SF capability platform.
The flying carried out at Boscombe to keep the oil moving etc in the 'stored' aircraft has only taken place on nice clear days.
lm
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You can be sure that nobody will sign off the Chinooks if there are concerns about IMC flight. By stating the solution lies at BD, I implied that BD is the location for 8 (possibly 7) Chinooks that are sitting idle. I did not mean that this is a problem for BD to fix. The solution is a political one that will not wait much longer. Who knows, these helos might get scrapped, that is not what I am hearing though. I have a certain amount of respect for Lord Drayson, he strikes me as a problem solver. Drayson has stated he wants more rotary in Afg by next May. Could be there is a 2 stage solution to this need, certainly does not sound as though the Chinooks will be ready by then. This sorry episode in procurement has dragged on for too long, are we finally seeing light at the end of the tunnel?
Thread Starter
LM,
My understanding is that NO insoluble or ignorable problem has been identified or indicated with the systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions.
Rather the problem is that the software cannot be validated to a standard that would GUARANTEE that such problems cannot or could not occur.
However, it is believed that such a failure/problem would require all of the displays/feeds to the AFCS to suddenly, simultaneously be giving the same erroneous data to the displays (all at the same time and all agreeing with each other) - something that the TPs felt was improbable and no more that a hypothetical risk.
But because the source code can not be proven, you can't absolutely, unreservedly guarantee that it won't happen, leaving Boscombe with no choice but to give an "unacceptable" recommendation.
However, many systems have (quite rightly) been given a release despite such a judgement, after the risk has been properly evaluated. (Boscombe merely identify the risks - the IPT then assess them and get the MAR signed).
However, because these are Chinooks (a type involved in what is still being described as the RAF's worst post war accident) and because these particular aircraft have been labelled as having been judged unfit for release (in Parliament, in the Press, everywhere!), if they were now rushed into service, and one were then lost, the solids would really hit the rotating ventilator and the less supportive elements of the press and the lawyers would have a field day.
My understanding is that NO insoluble or ignorable problem has been identified or indicated with the systems critical to flying in IMC/poor WX conditions.
Rather the problem is that the software cannot be validated to a standard that would GUARANTEE that such problems cannot or could not occur.
However, it is believed that such a failure/problem would require all of the displays/feeds to the AFCS to suddenly, simultaneously be giving the same erroneous data to the displays (all at the same time and all agreeing with each other) - something that the TPs felt was improbable and no more that a hypothetical risk.
But because the source code can not be proven, you can't absolutely, unreservedly guarantee that it won't happen, leaving Boscombe with no choice but to give an "unacceptable" recommendation.
However, many systems have (quite rightly) been given a release despite such a judgement, after the risk has been properly evaluated. (Boscombe merely identify the risks - the IPT then assess them and get the MAR signed).
However, because these are Chinooks (a type involved in what is still being described as the RAF's worst post war accident) and because these particular aircraft have been labelled as having been judged unfit for release (in Parliament, in the Press, everywhere!), if they were now rushed into service, and one were then lost, the solids would really hit the rotating ventilator and the less supportive elements of the press and the lawyers would have a field day.
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Jacko,
Hear what you say and I recollect an earlier post noting an MOD Web Site as stating a solution was identified. I suspect it has been for some time but someone has to fund the solution.
However, as one who has more than once experienced in a military aircraft a happening that could not/should not happen, I tend to regard such statements with some scepticism, particularly when software is involved.
As to Risk Assessments - bit like statistics, you can prove anything.
lm
Hear what you say and I recollect an earlier post noting an MOD Web Site as stating a solution was identified. I suspect it has been for some time but someone has to fund the solution.
However, as one who has more than once experienced in a military aircraft a happening that could not/should not happen, I tend to regard such statements with some scepticism, particularly when software is involved.
As to Risk Assessments - bit like statistics, you can prove anything.
lm
Thread Starter
Perhaps a more realistic risk assessment would be possible if one of the Boscombe HC3s were to be flown really intensively, in simulated IMC, with a safety pilot and a handling pilot (only one of whom would necessarily need to be a TP, I guess?).