"SW, it would appear that having aired the situation, a fix is on the way."
Are you taking credit for shaming the politicians into fixing this, then, Nige?
SW,
The difference between the C-130 fuel tanks and the HC3 software is surely that:
The C-130 risk was obvious and demonstrable, the TPs and operators were unhappy with the unmodified aircraft, and the lead customer was unhappy enough with the situation that it modified its own aircraft years ago. Any operator would regard the lack of inerting/foam as putting aircraft at unacceptable risk.
Whereas
The Chinook software risk is hypothetical, the TPs were happy with the aircraft, and the lead customer for the type almost bought back these airframes.
And there is the suggestion that the problem that led to these aircraft being grounded (impossible to validate software to standard required>'unacceptable' recommendation from Boscombe>refusal to sign MAR) would not have happened under previous clearance standards (eg before the current Class 1 safety critical software assessment requirements WHEN WERE THESE INTRODUCED?), and would not be viewed as a problem by other operators.