Atlas/AABO
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With regards to AMC, I had thought that a minimum of 5 years operating experience of specific type aircraft was also required. That requirement would have qualified Atlas at /about 1998.
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Depends on which part of AMC flying you are talking about. There are regulations from the CARB for AMC passenger carrying flights. Not sure what they are for pure cargo. When I worked pt 135 and AMC needed cargo hauled, they just called us. When it was for AMC or Government passengers they had a list of CARB qualified carriers they had to stick with.
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With regards to AMC, I had thought that a minimum of 5 years operating experience of specific type aircraft was also required. That requirement would have qualified Atlas at /about 1998.
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WhaleFr8 is probably right - different rules for pax and cargo. I recall flying Polar AMC before 1998, and pax AMC long before that with a different outfit. Maybe Atlas AMC was there, however don't recall seeing or competing with them prior to 9/11, however.
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He did obtain citizenship
Michael A. Chowdry (1955-2001) was a Pakistani American businessman who became the founder of American-based cargo carrier Atlas Air in 1992. He made the Forbes 400 list and with a net worth of $920 million, ranked among the richest American businessmen of Pakistani heritage before his death in a plane crash in 2001.
I knew he was a citizen, just wanted to find reference material.
I knew he was a citizen, just wanted to find reference material.
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A shrinking company dealing with a shrinking world economy. Asian lift is saturated, and AAWW capital stock is tanking again. The -800 delivery's are also delayed (probably a good thing). No Gov/ AMC rescue in sight (as with a breif bleak market just prior to 9/11 when cargo B-747's were parked everywhere at JFK).
What are the bare bones of this company?
What are the bare bones of this company?
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L-38 --
It's not saturation anymore. World cargo traffic down over 20% in December 2008 vs. 2007. Forecast for 2009 is yet another 6% decrease for the year. JAL reducing flights ( I think two per week) out of LAX.
Bottom line nobody is buying and nobody is shipping. Aircargoworld.com has the exact numbers if you subscribe.
On a side note, what did ground ops do and where were they located? I take it Purchase?
It's not saturation anymore. World cargo traffic down over 20% in December 2008 vs. 2007. Forecast for 2009 is yet another 6% decrease for the year. JAL reducing flights ( I think two per week) out of LAX.
Bottom line nobody is buying and nobody is shipping. Aircargoworld.com has the exact numbers if you subscribe.
On a side note, what did ground ops do and where were they located? I take it Purchase?
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Musical Chairs Over Pacific
Oz Starts As Kiwi Stops
For a sector that long seemed a haven of stability and strong yields, the US-Australia/New Zealand market is uncharacteristically lively at the moment.
On the heels of one freighter operator joining the game, one of the incumbents is scrapping its freighter lease, only for another player to field a freighter on the suspended route.
Air New Zealand is going to return a B747-400F aircraft leased from Atlas Air, a step that marks the end of the airline's round-the-world freighter operation from its home base via Europe to the U.S. and back to New Zealand. This eliminates two B747-400F flights a week from the U.S. to the South Pacific.
According to some observers, the carrier had tried unsuccessfully to obtain more advantageous leasing rates in light of a weakening market and decided to pull the plug on the operation when Atlas stood firm. Air New Zealand confirmed that the lease would be terminated at the end of March, leading to the suspension of the transpacific freighter service, but declined to discuss any details. It indicated that management is looking for alternative options for a U.S.-New Zealand freighter.
The gap left by the Kiwi carrier's withdrawal will be short-lived. "We are about to commence a twice weekly B747-400F freighter service between the U.S. and New Zealand. This new service will provide mid-week and weekend capacity from the U.S. to New Zealand and from New Zealand into Australia," announced Stephen Cleary, group general manager of Qantas Freight.
So far, Qantas has supplemented its 43 weekly passenger flights between the U.S. and its home market with three weekly 747 freighters to Sydney and one to Melbourne. Those freighters reach the U.S. market via Shanghai, where Qantas has built up a hub operation for both passenger and cargo flights. On the transpacific sector the airline's bellyhold capacity changed slightly in the fourth quarter, when it introduced A380 aircraft.
Air New Zealand's decision to suspend the U.S.-New Zealand freighter run reflects the recent deterioration of the U.S.-South Pacific market, which had long seemed impervious to chronic weakness of U.S. exports.
Oz Starts As Kiwi Stops
For a sector that long seemed a haven of stability and strong yields, the US-Australia/New Zealand market is uncharacteristically lively at the moment.
On the heels of one freighter operator joining the game, one of the incumbents is scrapping its freighter lease, only for another player to field a freighter on the suspended route.
Air New Zealand is going to return a B747-400F aircraft leased from Atlas Air, a step that marks the end of the airline's round-the-world freighter operation from its home base via Europe to the U.S. and back to New Zealand. This eliminates two B747-400F flights a week from the U.S. to the South Pacific.
According to some observers, the carrier had tried unsuccessfully to obtain more advantageous leasing rates in light of a weakening market and decided to pull the plug on the operation when Atlas stood firm. Air New Zealand confirmed that the lease would be terminated at the end of March, leading to the suspension of the transpacific freighter service, but declined to discuss any details. It indicated that management is looking for alternative options for a U.S.-New Zealand freighter.
The gap left by the Kiwi carrier's withdrawal will be short-lived. "We are about to commence a twice weekly B747-400F freighter service between the U.S. and New Zealand. This new service will provide mid-week and weekend capacity from the U.S. to New Zealand and from New Zealand into Australia," announced Stephen Cleary, group general manager of Qantas Freight.
So far, Qantas has supplemented its 43 weekly passenger flights between the U.S. and its home market with three weekly 747 freighters to Sydney and one to Melbourne. Those freighters reach the U.S. market via Shanghai, where Qantas has built up a hub operation for both passenger and cargo flights. On the transpacific sector the airline's bellyhold capacity changed slightly in the fourth quarter, when it introduced A380 aircraft.
Air New Zealand's decision to suspend the U.S.-New Zealand freighter run reflects the recent deterioration of the U.S.-South Pacific market, which had long seemed impervious to chronic weakness of U.S. exports.
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It appears that the management of Atlas has made a business decision to operate aircraft at a profit and not to cut a contract to the bone just to ensure an airplane flies. While that may seem odd at first blush; it is clear that should they have renegotiated at a lower rate, every other Atlas customer would have demanded the same. You simply cannot operate a business and charge less for a service than it costs to provide.
No doubt other operators will be jumping at the chance to fly cheap and hope to make it up with the profits or cash flow from other customers. Soon more will follow suit and eventually they will all end up cutting wages and benefits. Job losses will follow. We've seen this model repeat itself since the Deregulation Act of 1978, when the government refused to keep up the oversight required.
Atlas' most important move may well have been going outside the revolving door of airline management to find someone who is not steeped in the old airline operations theories.
No doubt other operators will be jumping at the chance to fly cheap and hope to make it up with the profits or cash flow from other customers. Soon more will follow suit and eventually they will all end up cutting wages and benefits. Job losses will follow. We've seen this model repeat itself since the Deregulation Act of 1978, when the government refused to keep up the oversight required.
Atlas' most important move may well have been going outside the revolving door of airline management to find someone who is not steeped in the old airline operations theories.
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Regarding Air New Zealand . . . you better keep an eye on Titan Leasing. Seems as though you could get more bang for your buck as AAWW to lease a plane and let them deal with everything else. PLEASE stand strong on scope dealing with the negotiations . . . we need to stand strong on scope. Just in case you didn't get it stand strong on scope.
Remember the old saying of keep your friends close and your enemies closer!
Remember the old saying of keep your friends close and your enemies closer!
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You need to look no further than Polar than to see what this company thinks of scope. The FE's won the arbitration, now the company want to arbitrate the arbitration. Bottom line, there is no scope strong enough when the company is as dishonest as AAWWH
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You might want to correct that to "CBA strong enough" vs "scope strong enough". We on the labor side have always had an uphill battle with federal labor laws and companies complying with collective bargaining agreements made under them. Polar is no exception to it.
Written Law has always favored management in the past leaving little for labor. Arbitration just adds one more layer to the smoke an mirrors.
Written Law has always favored management in the past leaving little for labor. Arbitration just adds one more layer to the smoke an mirrors.
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I absolutely agree with you nitty, but evidently this scope was strong enough to win the arbitration. AAWWH just doesn't want to abide by it. How the IBT is going to handle it is another question for another day but it doesn't look good.
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. . . but evidently this scope was strong enough to win the arbitration
If referring to Arbitrator Bloch's 11/08 decision, it was actually won on black and white CBA language (furlough out of seniority). This verbage clearly could not be interpreted in any other way. The FE's award was not given for violating scope. Regardless, the company is coming up way short on Bloch's carelessly worded but intended remedy, so we must again wrestle some more with AAWW management.
Last edited by L-38; 5th Feb 2009 at 18:08.
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L-38 is correct. The scope part of the arbitration was found in AAWH's favor. The IBT is considering taking this Bloc finding to another arbitrator to get a solution. This would only be to solve how the FE's are to be made whole.
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I guess I don't understand. If the company (Polar) has nothing that you could fly as a PFE (ie. no Classics) but you are senior to pilots who are needed to fly the -400, what do you expect the company to do?
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They (Polar) signed the contract knowing this. They can try to buy the FE's out with a severance package, offer those interested some training, or just keep paying them to sit at home. Another option, furlough everyone, pilots included, then recall only those qualified. That would lead to a grounding of the fleet for at least two weeks.
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I don't understand. If the company (Polar) has nothing that you could fly as a PFE
That's the rub. Polar management agreed to this by signing it, and AAWW thus inherited it.
Actually, back in 1998 when Polar's CBA was authored, Polar's FE's and pilots were put on the same seniority list for reasons of job protection. In those days, everyone knew that the expensive -400's were coming, however they were considered to be at least 10 years out for Polar's use.
Also at that time, ICAO standards had not been established for "cruise pilots" on the ultra long range -400. Some airlines (Lufty and Qantas included) re-assigned their FE's as cruise pilots to save their jobs. This was the intention of Polar's labor, however today, ICAO cruise pilot standards have been established and the FE's as cruise pilot concept is now obsolete.
Polar, when they received their first -400 much earlier than forecasted, had this option but did not run with it. It was also very ironic at the time that after crying poor for months, management reversed, and orderd their first -400. All within a few weeks of it's contested first CBA becoming ratified.
Poor Jim Cato and company. They overlooked and/or did not realize the implication's of Polar's little CBA clause. They were by then stuck with it . . . oh well.
Last edited by L-38; 5th Feb 2009 at 18:14.
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So do you honestly think that PFEs could possibly just be "qualified" to be a cruise pilot?
Seems to me that if a PFE wanted to protect his job he would go out and get a rating (which I am sure many of them did - many at Atlas certainly did) and then actually fly an airplane - not a pen - to get the 1000 or 1500 hours required for an ATP. I wonder how many PFEs, high on the seniority list, simply sat back and waited, putting their faith in a scope clause that no arbitrator in the land would honor if there were no airplanes for the PFEs to fly.
Even to fly as a cruise captain (assuming the insurance companies and the FAA would buy off on the program) you need a commercial license as well as an instrument and multiengine rating. Did the PFEs that were not rated expect the company to pay for that also?
Most rated pilots either gave up their lives for 12 years to get military training or they paid tens of thousands of dollars for the training and then gave up their lives to crappy little commuters or air taxi flying to gain the experience needed to get a job at Polar or Atlas.
Granted the PFEs gained their FE experience through much the same amount of hard knocks - but now they expect to lateral over to a much different path with no experience or training? Flying a multi million dollar asset through thunderstorms, CAT, with company managers watching fuel burns to the teaspoon, and crappy HF comms with foreign controllers who are at best garbled and stupid?
Seems like a chance for another "San Bruno Mountain" and that guy was a rated pilot.
Seems to me that if a PFE wanted to protect his job he would go out and get a rating (which I am sure many of them did - many at Atlas certainly did) and then actually fly an airplane - not a pen - to get the 1000 or 1500 hours required for an ATP. I wonder how many PFEs, high on the seniority list, simply sat back and waited, putting their faith in a scope clause that no arbitrator in the land would honor if there were no airplanes for the PFEs to fly.
Even to fly as a cruise captain (assuming the insurance companies and the FAA would buy off on the program) you need a commercial license as well as an instrument and multiengine rating. Did the PFEs that were not rated expect the company to pay for that also?
Most rated pilots either gave up their lives for 12 years to get military training or they paid tens of thousands of dollars for the training and then gave up their lives to crappy little commuters or air taxi flying to gain the experience needed to get a job at Polar or Atlas.
Granted the PFEs gained their FE experience through much the same amount of hard knocks - but now they expect to lateral over to a much different path with no experience or training? Flying a multi million dollar asset through thunderstorms, CAT, with company managers watching fuel burns to the teaspoon, and crappy HF comms with foreign controllers who are at best garbled and stupid?
Seems like a chance for another "San Bruno Mountain" and that guy was a rated pilot.