18 Injured CX880 after RTO.
Rubbish……
He did his job and the company and the insurers and the investigators won’t have an issue with the CN’s decision ( yes after they analyze everything, and so they should ) . The Cabin crews decision to evac without direction from the flight deck WILL be scrutinized and examined.
This actual scenario was discussed in the last round of Sims in my company and the CC examiner and all of us agreed it’s better to reject with an IAS disagree below say 100-120 knots on the 737 ( V1 around 140 ) than take the problem into the air at night possible ****ty wx and fly around for 1 hour sorting it out opening yourself up to larger threats…….because there’d be a few.
1/ they were at night
2/ they were heavy
3/ they most certainly weren’t going to continue to LAX with an IAS disagree and would be returning to VHHH in any event.
4/ they would then need to dump fuel for about 1 hour to come back below MLW.
5/ they didn’t damage the 777, the fuse plugs letting go and deflating the wheels is not damage, they are designed to do that!! The wheels and slides can and will be replaced easily.
He, IMHO with only a split second to decide did the right thing and based on what I’ve read I don’t think I would have done any different to him.
He did his job and the company and the insurers and the investigators won’t have an issue with the CN’s decision ( yes after they analyze everything, and so they should ) . The Cabin crews decision to evac without direction from the flight deck WILL be scrutinized and examined.
This actual scenario was discussed in the last round of Sims in my company and the CC examiner and all of us agreed it’s better to reject with an IAS disagree below say 100-120 knots on the 737 ( V1 around 140 ) than take the problem into the air at night possible ****ty wx and fly around for 1 hour sorting it out opening yourself up to larger threats…….because there’d be a few.
1/ they were at night
2/ they were heavy
3/ they most certainly weren’t going to continue to LAX with an IAS disagree and would be returning to VHHH in any event.
4/ they would then need to dump fuel for about 1 hour to come back below MLW.
5/ they didn’t damage the 777, the fuse plugs letting go and deflating the wheels is not damage, they are designed to do that!! The wheels and slides can and will be replaced easily.
He, IMHO with only a split second to decide did the right thing and based on what I’ve read I don’t think I would have done any different to him.
Last edited by ACMS; 30th Jun 2023 at 03:18.
They say the Airbus is designed to be flown by monkeys, but I really admire the KISS principle used in their FCTM:
It then goes on to list 5 of the 'very few' situations...
Does the 777 books give any such similar guidance?
To assist in the decision making process, the takeoff is divided into low and high speeds regimes, with 100 kt being chosen as the dividing line.
Above 100 kt, and below V1: Rejecting the takeoff at these speeds is a more serious matter, particularly on slippery runways. It could lead to a hazardous situation, if the speed is approaching V1. At these speeds, the Captain should be "go-minded" and very few situations should lead to the decision to reject the takeoff:
Does the 777 books give any such similar guidance?
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I'll be very honest here..
Whenever I read the sentence 'unsafe or unable to fly' in the checklist as the reason for aborting over 80kts, I always thought they meant some structural failure that they just didn't want quantify simply because they couldn't. Something so bad, but indescribable, meaning lots of possible things, that are obvious.
When I read about the abort here, initially I thought, 'that's not one of the reasons to abort above 80kts!", but I was wrong, this was exactly the right call. And there's a good chance I would have taken off that night, to sort it out in the air, and I would have been wrong for doing so.
Whenever I read the sentence 'unsafe or unable to fly' in the checklist as the reason for aborting over 80kts, I always thought they meant some structural failure that they just didn't want quantify simply because they couldn't. Something so bad, but indescribable, meaning lots of possible things, that are obvious.
When I read about the abort here, initially I thought, 'that's not one of the reasons to abort above 80kts!", but I was wrong, this was exactly the right call. And there's a good chance I would have taken off that night, to sort it out in the air, and I would have been wrong for doing so.
Yes, although Boeing uses 80 knots as the cut off. Above 80 knots and before V1, Boeing says the take-off should be rejected for any of the following:
- fire or fire warning
- engine failure
- predictive windshear warning
- if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly
The CN involved may well be a great guy but that does not render the decision beyond analysis.
17 people claiming injuries, a CAD investigation initiated and the aircraft damaged as a result, all for 1 failed airspeed indicator(alleged) which does not render the aircraft unsafe for flight.
I doubt the insurer will take such a benevolent approach.
17 people claiming injuries, a CAD investigation initiated and the aircraft damaged as a result, all for 1 failed airspeed indicator(alleged) which does not render the aircraft unsafe for flight.
I doubt the insurer will take such a benevolent approach.
If they haven't by now and use the MOR as the excuse to avoid an investigation that is by definition an accident (injuries) and not a serious incident there is a cover up going on.
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They should have pushed on. GMA forced POS18 onto us. These guys lost approx HKD100,00 by not completing the pattern + $ for lost patterns as they are stood down. Safety is a long way down the list for the GMA and her lap bitch Jack Bastard.
Regarding pay, If this crew did not complete their full rostered duty, i.e. fly to LAX, layover, fly home; Would they really expect to be paid the entire pay and allowances for that trip - even though they did not get off the ground in the first place ?
Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?
Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?
Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?
Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?
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Can’t believe there’s people saying it would have been better to takeoff.
Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?
I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!
Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?
I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!
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You also have to consider that a load of fuel Would be required to be dumped had they become airborne , so although some tyres deflated and the brakes probably needed to be replaced the slides repacked all of that has to be balanced against the fuel that would have been dumped .
I cannot fault the CN decision to abort I wasn’t there , but I don’t think I would have taxied back to a bay bearing in mind the possibility of a brake fire 🔥 just my 10 cents worth
I cannot fault the CN decision to abort I wasn’t there , but I don’t think I would have taxied back to a bay bearing in mind the possibility of a brake fire 🔥 just my 10 cents worth
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Mind you that from the video, there was no smoke or fire coming from the brakes. So it's possible the brakes were fine by the time they arrived at the gate.
Perhaps they waited a while to cool before there approached the gate, someone with a flight radar 24 account can see if they waited.
I feel bad for the crew involved saying this, how would you like to have every moment following a high speed reject be scrutinized by a bunch of keyboard warriors. Something was messed up with the communication though, much to be learned from this.
Perhaps they waited a while to cool before there approached the gate, someone with a flight radar 24 account can see if they waited.
I feel bad for the crew involved saying this, how would you like to have every moment following a high speed reject be scrutinized by a bunch of keyboard warriors. Something was messed up with the communication though, much to be learned from this.
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Regarding pay, If this crew did not complete their full rostered duty, i.e. fly to LAX, layover, fly home; Would they really expect to be paid the entire pay and allowances for that trip - even though they did not get off the ground in the first place ?
Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?
Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?
Having had an evacuation - for whatever reason - I think the crew would be paid for the duty they performed, and then be excused duty for at least 24 hrs ?
Could this be the reason for the "crew not paid" suggestion ?
Can’t believe there’s people saying it would have been better to takeoff.
Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?
I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!
Let’s say they did the RTO, taxied back and everyone did a normal disembarkation like it sounds like the CN wanted? Would you then be saying he should have taken off at night, very heavy, with unreliable instruments?
I was always told the 80kt/100kt check was to check the other guy is still alive and to check the speeds are the same. Stop if it’s no to either of those!
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I can believe it…as any experienced pilot knows a high speed RTO comes with its risks, as demonstrated in this event resulting in 17 injuries. This risk has to be weighed up almost instantly amongst taking off with one air airspeed indication faulty (assuming the other two were valid and giving reasonable information), but this is why guidance has been published by the manufacturer to help us make such decisions during takeoff. What you may ‘have always been told’ could be just technique and if un-published, should always be taken with a grain of salt.
There’s absolutely no way in the world it would have been a better decision to continue the takeoff if you really did spot unreliable speed before V1.
Theres a difference between unreliable speed and a single ASI discrepancy with 2 x additional ASI giving valid data (cross-checked with a GS readout). I don’t know the specifics of this incident, but no-one can categorically say at this stage if one decision was better then the other.
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An evacuation occurred because of a high speed RTO, hence why I say a high speed RTO will always carry some risks, ie an evacuation is one of them along with the resultant injuries.
Theres a difference between unreliable speed and a single ASI discrepancy with 2 x additional ASI giving valid data (cross-checked with a GS readout). I don’t know the specifics of this incident, but no-one can categorically say at this stage if one decision was better then the other.
Theres a difference between unreliable speed and a single ASI discrepancy with 2 x additional ASI giving valid data (cross-checked with a GS readout). I don’t know the specifics of this incident, but no-one can categorically say at this stage if one decision was better then the other.
Taking the problem into the air and dealing with everything that goes with that would have been much, much more risky.
If one of the passengers broke their leg walking through the terminal after returning to the bay would the injury have “occurred because of a high speed RTO”? Absolutely not. The RTO had been successfully carried out. People got injured going down the slides with their luggage that they were supposed to leave behind.
Taking the problem into the air and dealing with everything that goes with that would have been much, much more risky.
Taking the problem into the air and dealing with everything that goes with that would have been much, much more risky.
Can’t speak for the 777, but taking the problem of a single ADR / IAS fault on the Airbus into the air is not as risky as a high speed RTO. My opinion, so take it with a grain of salt. But Airbus thinks so also, hence why the ECAM for IAS discrepancy, single ADR FAULT, and even ADR disagree are inhibited above 80 knots…
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So “100kts”
”not checked, speed is different”
”well the pax might get injured going down the slides when we taxi back to the gate if we stop now…CONTINUE”
Then it’s straight into unreliable speed memory items for the climb out into the night.
”not checked, speed is different”
”well the pax might get injured going down the slides when we taxi back to the gate if we stop now…CONTINUE”
Then it’s straight into unreliable speed memory items for the climb out into the night.