Did You Fly The Vulcan?? (Merged)
I got talking to a chap yesterday and somehow the conversation ended up about his grandfather who was aircrew on Vulcans/Victors during the cold war years. So....The aircraft had been on QRA/standby with live atomic weapons onboard, when at nearly the end of the duty time a Mickey Finn was called and they departed eastwards. Somewhere over the North Sea a single engine had a problem/compressor stall and thence started a tense period of where to land (RAF Germany) was mentioned, though not where (rejected) and the aircraft finally recovered on 3 engines back to the UK direct. I would put the time frame as more 1960's to 1970's than later. Anyone remember such an incident ?
YS
Plausible except that he did not get airborne with a nuclear weapon on board; shape maybe, weapon no.
SHJ
Would that mean, in general terms that nuclear weapons were never flown by the RAF ?
YS
Thanks for the informative thread steer YS, as always so much to read and take in and learn 
The chap with whom I spoke to related that his grandfather was very stressed with the whole nursing the aircraft back home scenario, moreso due to the ordnance aboard. Might they have been carrying other non-nuclear devices, but stuff that could go off if a crash landing had taken place ? He mentioned that the grandfather started sweating as he recounted the episode many years later, and as an ex-WW2 pilot was not inclined to exaggerate and only recounted the tale when prompted by other family members. As to whether he was Vulcan or Victor I do not know.
SHJ
The chap with whom I spoke to related that his grandfather was very stressed with the whole nursing the aircraft back home scenario, moreso due to the ordnance aboard. Might they have been carrying other non-nuclear devices, but stuff that could go off if a crash landing had taken place ? He mentioned that the grandfather started sweating as he recounted the episode many years later, and as an ex-WW2 pilot was not inclined to exaggerate and only recounted the tale when prompted by other family members. As to whether he was Vulcan or Victor I do not know.SHJ
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
SHJ, the answer is still no.
As for sweating with a single engine failure, the answer would be 'no sweat'. We frequently shut engines down as a precaution. In the mid-60s the MTBF (Mean time between failures) was around 300 hours; this was a lot better than some other types where it was 25 hrs. A good reason why the RAF hung on to twin-engines when the USAF was happy with single-engine fast-jets.
Then a quick glance at the map would have shown that landing in Germany would have been a nonsense - his home base would have been nearer for much of the time with Denmark or Norway being more sensible on many routes.
Now he might have sweated had one engine blown up and its adjacent one been shut down as a precaution.
As for sweating with a single engine failure, the answer would be 'no sweat'. We frequently shut engines down as a precaution. In the mid-60s the MTBF (Mean time between failures) was around 300 hours; this was a lot better than some other types where it was 25 hrs. A good reason why the RAF hung on to twin-engines when the USAF was happy with single-engine fast-jets.
Then a quick glance at the map would have shown that landing in Germany would have been a nonsense - his home base would have been nearer for much of the time with Denmark or Norway being more sensible on many routes.
Now he might have sweated had one engine blown up and its adjacent one been shut down as a precaution.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 9th Jun 2012 at 20:36.
Now he might have sweated had one engine blown up and its adjacent one been shut down as a precaution
SHJ
SHJ - the answer to your question "who really knows?" is - any of the many ex V Force aircrew and groundcrew who are members of this forum. As Yellow Sun and P-N have stated quite unequivocally, "bombed-up" aircraft on QRA would only ever have got airborne in the event of an actual scramble - ie in the event of nuclear war. They would never had done this as part of an exercise - there would be no training value in so doing. I think I may be right in saying that the only time that V aircraft ever carried nuclear weapons in the air was during Operation Grapple when Valiants dropped live weapons after taking off from Christmas Island.
The situation was of course quite different with the US B52 force who routinely flew with weapons on board. The risks of this practice were brought home when a B52 carrying four nuclear bombs crashed in the vicinity of Palomares in Spain after a mid-air collision during refuelling (story here 1966 Palomares B-52 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
The situation was of course quite different with the US B52 force who routinely flew with weapons on board. The risks of this practice were brought home when a B52 carrying four nuclear bombs crashed in the vicinity of Palomares in Spain after a mid-air collision during refuelling (story here 1966 Palomares B-52 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
TTN, YS, Beagle and PN, and any other V Bomber crew watching in.
I am extremely interested in the operations of the V force during the Cold War, and have a specific question regarding the response of the V force to heightened international tensions, for want of a better description.
My understanding (from many fine tomes including Wynn and Hennesey) is that at Alert Condition 2, the V force would disperse to their dispersal bases ARMED with their weapon (be it Blue Steel, Yellow Sun. or perhaps post 1969 WE177?) I remember reading/hearing somewhere that MacMillan REFUSED to order Alert Condition 2 during the Cuban Crisis, because he thought that would give an unequivocal sign to the Russians that the UK/NATO were primed to attack, thus escalating the already heightened tensions maybe to the point of no return and potentially illiciting a Soviet first strike.
In that case, I was wondering if Alert Condition 2 was either seen as or even briefed as 'the point of no return' in the V-force, and in effect, was just a re-posioning prelude to the inevitable Alert Condition 3 (i.e. to attack your pre-prepared targets in Eastern Europe), to prevent the V force being wiped out by a first strike at their home bases?
I would appreciate your thoughts and comments, if I'm not asking and questions that you feel you can't answer.
Best regards
TO
I am extremely interested in the operations of the V force during the Cold War, and have a specific question regarding the response of the V force to heightened international tensions, for want of a better description.
My understanding (from many fine tomes including Wynn and Hennesey) is that at Alert Condition 2, the V force would disperse to their dispersal bases ARMED with their weapon (be it Blue Steel, Yellow Sun. or perhaps post 1969 WE177?) I remember reading/hearing somewhere that MacMillan REFUSED to order Alert Condition 2 during the Cuban Crisis, because he thought that would give an unequivocal sign to the Russians that the UK/NATO were primed to attack, thus escalating the already heightened tensions maybe to the point of no return and potentially illiciting a Soviet first strike.
In that case, I was wondering if Alert Condition 2 was either seen as or even briefed as 'the point of no return' in the V-force, and in effect, was just a re-posioning prelude to the inevitable Alert Condition 3 (i.e. to attack your pre-prepared targets in Eastern Europe), to prevent the V force being wiped out by a first strike at their home bases?
I would appreciate your thoughts and comments, if I'm not asking and questions that you feel you can't answer.
Best regards
TO
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Alert Condition One
Alert Condition 3 was indeed a main base generation with all aircraft armed and fully fuelled. Alert Condition 2 was the point of great weakness in the process.
Aircraft were loaded but the weapons were unarmed and aircraft was only fuelled for transit to dispersal. The exception would be the additional main base aircraft. On the Vulcan bases this would make 4 total and and other 4 at Finningley. Vulcan-wise available aircraft would increase from 9 to 16.
When Alert Condition 1 was declared then aircraft would disperse with the first aircraft having to get airborne in 15 minutes. On one exercise at Waddo we got about 17 off in 33 minutes. One had not even been declared loaded, it simply finished loading and departed. A Hastings also had to get airborne as he was in the way.
Operationally, en route to dispersal aircraft would be RT silent and land on a green. We were briefed not to switch ON any radios in case we received any confusing messages.
It wasn't stated but it was clearly in case we heard a scramble message; we would have been wholly impotent so the period between Alert Condition 1 and coming on state at dispersal was a critical time.
The other weak points were with a Scramble Cancellation with the whole force possibly airborne and having to return and turnround.
So Alert Condition 3 was seen as less provocative than Alert Condition 1 and the force was more vulnerable to missile strike. OTOH is was on state and inside the ring of steel and avoided that vital vulnerability period between generation and Alert Condition 1.
Aircraft were loaded but the weapons were unarmed and aircraft was only fuelled for transit to dispersal. The exception would be the additional main base aircraft. On the Vulcan bases this would make 4 total and and other 4 at Finningley. Vulcan-wise available aircraft would increase from 9 to 16.
When Alert Condition 1 was declared then aircraft would disperse with the first aircraft having to get airborne in 15 minutes. On one exercise at Waddo we got about 17 off in 33 minutes. One had not even been declared loaded, it simply finished loading and departed. A Hastings also had to get airborne as he was in the way.
Operationally, en route to dispersal aircraft would be RT silent and land on a green. We were briefed not to switch ON any radios in case we received any confusing messages.
It wasn't stated but it was clearly in case we heard a scramble message; we would have been wholly impotent so the period between Alert Condition 1 and coming on state at dispersal was a critical time.
The other weak points were with a Scramble Cancellation with the whole force possibly airborne and having to return and turnround.
So Alert Condition 3 was seen as less provocative than Alert Condition 1 and the force was more vulnerable to missile strike. OTOH is was on state and inside the ring of steel and avoided that vital vulnerability period between generation and Alert Condition 1.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Prometheus
Alert Condition One was signalled with the codeword Prometheus.
Now I had read the book The Penetrators
And Gray used the same codeword. Later in the book he used Apocalypse.
Now although Prometheus as the Alert Condition 1 codeword was an open Secret the codewords for Scramble and Positive Release were not. Was Apocalypse one of these codewords?
I reported this 'breach' and it was investigated. It turns out that Bomber Command had only picked Prometheus after Gray had written his book. It was a complete coincidence.
Now I had read the book The Penetrators
Set in the corridors of power of the USAF's Strategic Air Command, the 1965 novel The Penetrators is the story of a maverick Royal Air Force exchange officer who leads a mock Avro Vulcan bomber attack on the USA. Replete with quotes from Curtis LeMay, Robert S McNamara and other key figures of the Cold War era, The Penetrators foreshadowed the kind of richly detailed, political-military thriller . . . The book also strongly argued the case for the US's manned long-range bomber force, which was then in danger of being phased out in favour of ICBMs.
Now although Prometheus as the Alert Condition 1 codeword was an open Secret the codewords for Scramble and Positive Release were not. Was Apocalypse one of these codewords?
I reported this 'breach' and it was investigated. It turns out that Bomber Command had only picked Prometheus after Gray had written his book. It was a complete coincidence.
PN thanks for your posts and the information.
I was mistakenly under the impression that dispersal of the V force under Alert condition 2 took place with loaded and ARMED weapons, so that after arrival at the dispersal sites, only re-fuelling would be required before the aircraft could be scrambled on AC3 to bomb their targets.
This seems like a weak point in the deterrent? The weapon would have to be armed at the dispersal base which would leave the force open to Soviet attack during this arming phase. To a interested observer, surely it would have been better to have the weapons armed during generation and at AC1 and transit with armed weapons, to enhance the credibility of the deterrent?
I mean, what would have happened if there had been a Russian first strike during transit to the dispersal bases? You would have a lot of smoking holes in the ground, and a lot of unarmed bombers with few places to land. Again excuse my ignorance, unless it was possible to arm a weapon in transit? (you may not be able to answer that PN).
I accept that there is a significantly greater risk of transiting with armed aircraft, (and the potential for catastrophic accident), but given the serious circumstances which would preceed the generation of a loaded and armed bomber force, and the increased credibility to the deterrent it would give, surely the risk would have been justified in the circumstances.
Thanks for taking the time to answer. Its good to talk to someone who was at the sharp end during the Cold War.
I was mistakenly under the impression that dispersal of the V force under Alert condition 2 took place with loaded and ARMED weapons, so that after arrival at the dispersal sites, only re-fuelling would be required before the aircraft could be scrambled on AC3 to bomb their targets.
This seems like a weak point in the deterrent? The weapon would have to be armed at the dispersal base which would leave the force open to Soviet attack during this arming phase. To a interested observer, surely it would have been better to have the weapons armed during generation and at AC1 and transit with armed weapons, to enhance the credibility of the deterrent?
I mean, what would have happened if there had been a Russian first strike during transit to the dispersal bases? You would have a lot of smoking holes in the ground, and a lot of unarmed bombers with few places to land. Again excuse my ignorance, unless it was possible to arm a weapon in transit? (you may not be able to answer that PN).
I accept that there is a significantly greater risk of transiting with armed aircraft, (and the potential for catastrophic accident), but given the serious circumstances which would preceed the generation of a loaded and armed bomber force, and the increased credibility to the deterrent it would give, surely the risk would have been justified in the circumstances.
Thanks for taking the time to answer. Its good to talk to someone who was at the sharp end during the Cold War.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
PN thanks for your posts and the information.
I was mistakenly under the impression that dispersal of the V force under Alert condition 2 took place with loaded and ARMED weapons, so that after arrival at the dispersal sites, only re-fuelling would be required before the aircraft could be scrambled on AC3 to bomb their targets.
I was mistakenly under the impression that dispersal of the V force under Alert condition 2 took place with loaded and ARMED weapons, so that after arrival at the dispersal sites, only re-fuelling would be required before the aircraft could be scrambled on AC3 to bomb their targets.
Aircraft on dispersal carried only sufficient fuel so that they would be below normal landing weight at dispersal.
The Yellow Sun would have been flown fully armed as it had no on-weapon safety devices. The WE177 would be flown with a safety pin in the carrier and the strike/enable facility would be set at Safe. To set it live and remove the pin would take only a minute and be insignificant compared with the turn-round servicing and refuelling.
This seems like a weak point in the deterrent? The weapon would have to be armed at the dispersal base which would leave the force open to Soviet attack during this arming phase.
I mean, what would have happened if there had been a Russian first strike during transit to the dispersal bases? You would have a lot of smoking holes in the ground, and a lot of unarmed bombers with few places to land. Again excuse my ignorance, unless it was possible to arm a weapon in transit? (you may not be able to answer that PN).
That MacMillan chose to hold the force at Alert Condition 3 - main base generation - would exchange the dispersal vulnerability phase for the concentration of all the assets on the 7 or 8 main bases.
I accept that there is a significantly greater risk of transiting with armed aircraft, (and the potential for catastrophic accident.
PN-another question from me, again if you can't feel you can answer this one I will understand.
Reading Hennesey, he gives an example of a Scramble order for the V Force giving the Scramble command, a 'bomb list' and a Zulu time (presumably the execution time). I had the pleasure of volunteering at a well known aviation museum with an ex V bomber (Victor) pilot, and we discussed at some length his previous operations on the V force.
I was under the impression that each individual crew had their own target which didn't change (unless the target no longer became worth of a strike of course), in fact I understood that this was one of the pillars of V force operations. As this was the case, I asked him about the QRA aircraft, as it would seem that the Q targets would have to vary depending on which crews were manning QRA, which seemed a bit odd. Of course, he explained that the QRA targets were fixed so all V Bomber crews had detailed flight plans/routes to these as well.
However, I am slightly confused as if there MAY be apparently different 'bomb lists' on the scramble order, how did this fit in with the one target for each crew scenario? Or was this bomb list merely an order of strike, which may change depending on the individual targeting priorites?
Once again, apologies if I'm asking too much or being a bit naive, but this is a very interesting subject to me, and who better to ask than someone who actually was on the V force?
Best regards
TO
Reading Hennesey, he gives an example of a Scramble order for the V Force giving the Scramble command, a 'bomb list' and a Zulu time (presumably the execution time). I had the pleasure of volunteering at a well known aviation museum with an ex V bomber (Victor) pilot, and we discussed at some length his previous operations on the V force.
I was under the impression that each individual crew had their own target which didn't change (unless the target no longer became worth of a strike of course), in fact I understood that this was one of the pillars of V force operations. As this was the case, I asked him about the QRA aircraft, as it would seem that the Q targets would have to vary depending on which crews were manning QRA, which seemed a bit odd. Of course, he explained that the QRA targets were fixed so all V Bomber crews had detailed flight plans/routes to these as well.
However, I am slightly confused as if there MAY be apparently different 'bomb lists' on the scramble order, how did this fit in with the one target for each crew scenario? Or was this bomb list merely an order of strike, which may change depending on the individual targeting priorites?
Once again, apologies if I'm asking too much or being a bit naive, but this is a very interesting subject to me, and who better to ask than someone who actually was on the V force?
Best regards
TO
Last edited by Treble one; 15th Jun 2012 at 20:08.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Bomb List was short for Bomber List not target list.
IIRC Bomb List Delta referred to all aircraft at main bases and dispersals. I think Bomb List Charlie was main bases but that is a guess.
Zulu was not the execution time that was E-Hour. E-Hour was a time in Zulu ie GMT near the scramble time and the basis on which crews would calculate TOT or time on target.
The targets themselves were allocated a number - ALN - which simply meant Accounting Line Number. All crews on one Sqn studied the two QRA targets, one for Plan Alpha and one for Plan Bravo. Each crew also studied two other Plan Alpha targets and one Plan Bravo. Plan Alpha targets were updated annually. How they were allocated was up to the targetting officer. One, as you suggest, was to issue the same target to the same crews at each change. The alternative, which I used, was to allocate the same dispersal to crews rather than the target. If a target, say Kiev, was a Manston dispersal and in the next plan it became a Leconfield dispersal target then it would be allocated to a different crew. No crew knew which targets any other crews covered.
I recall one target pair. ALN 224 was allocated to the first aircraft and ALN 214, 10 minutes later, to a second. The routes were identical. I allocated the same crews to 214 and 224. If they noticed I allowed one hour's study to count for both targets; some crews never spotted this which suggests they didn't study the target properly.
The lower the ALN the higher the target priority. In the case outlined above the first aircraft might have been an effective decoy.
IIRC Bomb List Delta referred to all aircraft at main bases and dispersals. I think Bomb List Charlie was main bases but that is a guess.
Zulu was not the execution time that was E-Hour. E-Hour was a time in Zulu ie GMT near the scramble time and the basis on which crews would calculate TOT or time on target.
The targets themselves were allocated a number - ALN - which simply meant Accounting Line Number. All crews on one Sqn studied the two QRA targets, one for Plan Alpha and one for Plan Bravo. Each crew also studied two other Plan Alpha targets and one Plan Bravo. Plan Alpha targets were updated annually. How they were allocated was up to the targetting officer. One, as you suggest, was to issue the same target to the same crews at each change. The alternative, which I used, was to allocate the same dispersal to crews rather than the target. If a target, say Kiev, was a Manston dispersal and in the next plan it became a Leconfield dispersal target then it would be allocated to a different crew. No crew knew which targets any other crews covered.
I recall one target pair. ALN 224 was allocated to the first aircraft and ALN 214, 10 minutes later, to a second. The routes were identical. I allocated the same crews to 214 and 224. If they noticed I allowed one hour's study to count for both targets; some crews never spotted this which suggests they didn't study the target properly.
The lower the ALN the higher the target priority. In the case outlined above the first aircraft might have been an effective decoy.
PN, once again, thanks again this is very interesting and educational.
The V force, as I understand it, although the UK's independent nuclear deterrent, was very much part of an integrated operations plan (SIOP?) alongside SAC and SACEUR (I believe at one stage some of our Valiants carried US weapons, and were under SACEUR control?).
Reading in Wynn, this was obviously an extremely detailed targeting plan, with attacks on targets being highly co-ordinated to prevent, for example, one crew flying through the blast of another crews weapon.
Presumably in the event of an attack, there would have been (substantial?) losses in the V-force and SAC prior to weapons release due to Eastern Bloc air defences etc. In this case, was their any flexibility in the targeting plan to cover for these losses? Or was it simply a case of if a bomber was shot down or failed to reach its target, it just meant that no strike took place (I understand that some of the more valuable targets were often assigned several bombs).
And whilst I am asking about targeting, may I also ask if the V-force switching to low level had any impact on their targets, as presumably low level operations meant reduced range?
Many thanks
TO
The V force, as I understand it, although the UK's independent nuclear deterrent, was very much part of an integrated operations plan (SIOP?) alongside SAC and SACEUR (I believe at one stage some of our Valiants carried US weapons, and were under SACEUR control?).
Reading in Wynn, this was obviously an extremely detailed targeting plan, with attacks on targets being highly co-ordinated to prevent, for example, one crew flying through the blast of another crews weapon.
Presumably in the event of an attack, there would have been (substantial?) losses in the V-force and SAC prior to weapons release due to Eastern Bloc air defences etc. In this case, was their any flexibility in the targeting plan to cover for these losses? Or was it simply a case of if a bomber was shot down or failed to reach its target, it just meant that no strike took place (I understand that some of the more valuable targets were often assigned several bombs).
And whilst I am asking about targeting, may I also ask if the V-force switching to low level had any impact on their targets, as presumably low level operations meant reduced range?
Many thanks
TO
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
In this case, was their any flexibility in the targeting plan to cover for these losses? Or was it simply a case of if a bomber was shot down or failed to reach its target, it just meant that no strike took place (I understand that some of the more valuable targets were often assigned several bombs).
In many targets we were warned that an earlier missile strike had been programmed. Missiles would have had TOT up to around E-hour plus 75 and then there would have been a window for the first bomber wave up to around E-hour plus 240 then more missiles, then the SAC wave etc.
And whilst I am asking about targeting, may I also ask if the V-force switching to low level had any impact on their targets, as presumably low level operations meant reduced range?
The penetration routes also had to be switched from the French/Swiss corridor to Norway/Sweden. I am not sure but that may also have affected southern target sets. I do know one target was close to the Czech border and presumably would have been a much earlier strike on the old plans.
Once again, thanks for a very full answer PN. You have certainly helped to fill some blanks in my understanding of V-Force operations. I am most grateful.
Best regards
TO
Best regards
TO
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Just to put the V-Force in to context in the early '60s. There were 9 Vulcan sqns plus the OCU and 6 Victor Sqns plus OCU. In addtion there was the tactical bomber force of Valiants.
Assuming an 8 UE and 4 UE respectively that would give around 128 bombers. The USAF had in the region of 1600 B47 and approaching 600 B52.
While the B47/B52 would be able to engage target across the breadth of the Soviet Union and recover to treaty airfields in NATO, CENTO and SEATO the bulk of the high value targets were west of the Urals. The small, in comparison, UK Bomber Force would have been right behind the first missile strikes in the main target areas with the SAC Bombers digging more holes where there were bunkers or second tier targets.
The SIOP was fine tuned at SAC HQ with active participation by the Brisish and the French. When France withdrew from the NATO integrated command structure and went it alone under de Gaulle not a lot actually changed. The FAF staffs at Offutt were merely reassigned as liasion officers and I assume that the target allocation remained unchanged.
Assuming an 8 UE and 4 UE respectively that would give around 128 bombers. The USAF had in the region of 1600 B47 and approaching 600 B52.
While the B47/B52 would be able to engage target across the breadth of the Soviet Union and recover to treaty airfields in NATO, CENTO and SEATO the bulk of the high value targets were west of the Urals. The small, in comparison, UK Bomber Force would have been right behind the first missile strikes in the main target areas with the SAC Bombers digging more holes where there were bunkers or second tier targets.
The SIOP was fine tuned at SAC HQ with active participation by the Brisish and the French. When France withdrew from the NATO integrated command structure and went it alone under de Gaulle not a lot actually changed. The FAF staffs at Offutt were merely reassigned as liasion officers and I assume that the target allocation remained unchanged.
Interesting numbers for the V-force there PN. Just shows what a small force it was in comparison to the US strategic force. However, it seems fairly certain from your post that the V-force would have been in the first wave after initial missile strikes, right at the sharp end.
I see you mention the OCU's in your post. Did the OCU's have a war role, or were they just used as extra airframes for the V-force to maintain serviceable airframe strength?
Many thanks
TO
I see you mention the OCU's in your post. Did the OCU's have a war role, or were they just used as extra airframes for the V-force to maintain serviceable airframe strength?
Many thanks
TO