Did You Fly The Vulcan?? (Merged)
from allan907
I always thought that the canopy relied on fwd airspeed to rip the canopy upwards once the forward jettison cartridges had unlocked and lifted the front of the canopy. If the aircraft has zero airspeed then the canopy guns would lift the front edge of the canopy which would then fall back onto the aircraft under the effects of gravity.
With the Finningley crunch just think about it... of course the canopy was jettisoned before the crew exited. With the crew entrance door on the floor and unable to be opened how else do you think the crew got out? Photos appearing in Air Clues and the Accident Report clearly show the wreck minus canopy which is lying off to the side
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The intimation in ZH875's post is that the canopy gun just lifted the front of the canopy into the airflow, which then completed the task. Not so. The canopy gun was positioned immediately behing the pilots - it did 'lift the front of the canopy' but was big enough, with a substantial cartridge, to blow the canopy clear of the ac without airflow assistance. The action of the pilots, in pulling the jettison levers aft, unlocked the front canopy locks.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
I also understand that they all exited via the front seats because the nosewheel area was awash with fuel.
Kim Bunting, the staff plotter, was out first, he should have been last!. He trod on the co's hand as the co tried to switch off the fuel pumps, onto the co pilot's legs and out. No worries about the bang seat pins! I suspect the seats were live but cannot remember exactly when they would have been armed.
Kim Bunting, the staff plotter, was out first, he should have been last!. He trod on the co's hand as the co tried to switch off the fuel pumps, onto the co pilot's legs and out. No worries about the bang seat pins! I suspect the seats were live but cannot remember exactly when they would have been armed.
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Had the honour of being taught to fly by another fine V Force gentleman, by the name of Pete Armstrong. Don't know if any of you guys remember him but he told a fine tale of the 9 Sqn/617 Sqn Tirpitz bulkhead raid at Scampton a good few years ago. I've got his written version of it somewhere, with the attached letter from CO Wittering complaining of being used in 'High Jinks'.
I'll see if I can dig it out.
Watch this space.
RF
I'll see if I can dig it out.
Watch this space.
RF
Nixor ut Ledo
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Now this has got the grey cells stirring! Didn't the canopy fly straight up and come down on someone trying to exit injuring their back? Or perhaps that was the one that landed wheels up at Finningley in early 1965 (couldn't have happened, shouldn't have happened but it did). My best mate married the captain's daughter - lovely girl!
I also remember some safety lecture where they had a very gory photo of some engineer whose arm had been penetrated by the canopy release pins. The story went that he had been sitting in the LHS doing something with the instruments and had been resting his left arm on the sill (the canopy was off). The emergency canopy release had activated and the bolt entered his arm at the elbow and exited at the wrist!
There was a fair amount of force in the emergency release system!!
I also remember some safety lecture where they had a very gory photo of some engineer whose arm had been penetrated by the canopy release pins. The story went that he had been sitting in the LHS doing something with the instruments and had been resting his left arm on the sill (the canopy was off). The emergency canopy release had activated and the bolt entered his arm at the elbow and exited at the wrist!
There was a fair amount of force in the emergency release system!!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Allan907, don't remember anyone being hurt at Finningley. I seem to remember that the crew were in the coffee bar, drinking coffee (what else) before the fire crew got there.
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"V-force jamming achieved hard kills on some of the radars as they overcame the safety devices."
Hmm. Wonder if they'd work against speed camera radar...
(thumbs through Yellow Pages looking for surplus equip. dealers)
Mark.
Hmm. Wonder if they'd work against speed camera radar...
(thumbs through Yellow Pages looking for surplus equip. dealers)
Mark.
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RADAR JAMMING
Pontius N
Ref your did V-force jamming "achieve hard kills on some US radars as they overcame the safety devices" query, I fear we will need an AEO to answer that. Assuming we can find one who can write in plain English!
Ref your did V-force jamming "achieve hard kills on some US radars as they overcame the safety devices" query, I fear we will need an AEO to answer that. Assuming we can find one who can write in plain English!
Yes, Him
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Not a hard kill, but someone (alleged to be a Vulcan) accidentally dumped a load of chaff over Norfolk one evening in about 1976 or 77. Saw it on Honington's AR1, it took hours to dissapate.
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Had a similar problem at Finningley in the mid 60s. I was a lowly SAC working on BCDU and was tasked with burning some unused bundles of chaff which had been used on some trial or other. Had to be burnt because it was Secret.
The incinerator was near the sewage farm near the end of the runway and there was some other documents to be destroyed as well. As the fire gained in intesity we chucked on the packets of chaff and as the packets burnt away the chaff gaily floated up the chimney! Caused absolute panic in ATC - particularly as a 230 OCU Vulcan was on short finals at the time!!
The incinerator was near the sewage farm near the end of the runway and there was some other documents to be destroyed as well. As the fire gained in intesity we chucked on the packets of chaff and as the packets burnt away the chaff gaily floated up the chimney! Caused absolute panic in ATC - particularly as a 230 OCU Vulcan was on short finals at the time!!
Thread Starter
Indeed - and rumour seems to indicate that it'll soon be even smaller if the Jags are flogged off and the GR9s go.....
It's almost impossible for people who've been in for less than 13 years to begin to understand what it was like in the '60s, '70s or'80s..... Lots of ac types, plenty of bases, overseas tours on proper RAF bases, not tents in abandoned car parks. Even when I was on the V-force we had 7 squadrons of Vulcans with 50 aircrew on each in Lincolnshire. If you drove across the UK England, you'd always see someone at low-level.
I think that it's around 40 places where once we flew which have closed since I joined. But noe there's H&S, IiP and all those other wonderful 'management initiatives'.
Adedicated group at Bruntingthorpe is doing its best to get just one Vulcan back into the sky. Having played such a key part in defending our heritage, the aircraft surely deserves to demonstrate how it was when we had an air force.
It's almost impossible for people who've been in for less than 13 years to begin to understand what it was like in the '60s, '70s or'80s..... Lots of ac types, plenty of bases, overseas tours on proper RAF bases, not tents in abandoned car parks. Even when I was on the V-force we had 7 squadrons of Vulcans with 50 aircrew on each in Lincolnshire. If you drove across the UK England, you'd always see someone at low-level.
I think that it's around 40 places where once we flew which have closed since I joined. But noe there's H&S, IiP and all those other wonderful 'management initiatives'.
Adedicated group at Bruntingthorpe is doing its best to get just one Vulcan back into the sky. Having played such a key part in defending our heritage, the aircraft surely deserves to demonstrate how it was when we had an air force.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Another ECM nearly a hard kill was on Red Flag. As the F16 swept in for a Fox Two the AEO duly activated the I-band chaff, probably the book 5 bundles per second for 2 seconds and 5 second intervals, is about 15 bundles in 20 seconds of so.
Unfortunately they had a stripper runaway. The stripper broke the cardboard wrapper as the bundle was dispensed. All 1,000 bundles went out and the F16 ingested the lot.
Apparently the yanks were not amused with the shiny aluminium plated engine. He recovered Ok and broke off so it was certainly a kill.
A Vulcan also got a near miss with a Sea Vixen. The Sea Vixen was chosen as the nearest equivalent to the best Russian fighter, the Firebar. Also becaue it could be jammed, just like the Firebar.
The SV closed in at low level, below and behind the Vulcan which was at 500 feet. As soon as it was detected the Vulcan fired chaff and decoys, initiated a rapid climb, roll, and pushover, not above 1000 feet, and then sidestepped a mile of so. Meanwhile, the SV was inverted and descending!
It recovered, called knock it off and recovered to Yeovilton. The trial was abandoned forthwith and another successful tactic was written into the manual <g>.
Unfortunately they had a stripper runaway. The stripper broke the cardboard wrapper as the bundle was dispensed. All 1,000 bundles went out and the F16 ingested the lot.
Apparently the yanks were not amused with the shiny aluminium plated engine. He recovered Ok and broke off so it was certainly a kill.
A Vulcan also got a near miss with a Sea Vixen. The Sea Vixen was chosen as the nearest equivalent to the best Russian fighter, the Firebar. Also becaue it could be jammed, just like the Firebar.
The SV closed in at low level, below and behind the Vulcan which was at 500 feet. As soon as it was detected the Vulcan fired chaff and decoys, initiated a rapid climb, roll, and pushover, not above 1000 feet, and then sidestepped a mile of so. Meanwhile, the SV was inverted and descending!
It recovered, called knock it off and recovered to Yeovilton. The trial was abandoned forthwith and another successful tactic was written into the manual <g>.
Thread Starter
The old power, pitch, roll, sidestep trick also ruined the day of the poor IWI student who was attempting a stern firing against us one fine day at low level over the North Sea. 3500 sq ft of highly disturbed airflow in the face somehow upset his aim!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
There is a very good MA disertation in the latest edition of Air Power on the creation and effectiveness of the V-Force. The author has done an excellent job of trawling through archives and books and created a very credible essay. Her strength lies with her analysis of air ministry plans and documents; her weakness lies with less useage of primary sources from the V-force. She does however cite Alan Brookes on several occasions.
What the essay reveals is that documents at air staff level in the 50s and 60s actually avoided spelling out operational detail. For instance it was recognised that penetration of the central region was out of the question as the V-force would have to run the gamut of allied defences, tactical nuke contamination, and enemy bombers heading the other way. The option was the northern and southern routes. It was assummed that this was around North Cape and up through the Med. She was clearly not a navigator as a bit of map work would soon have shown up this fallacy.
The routes through Sweden and Switzerland gave the longest tracks through non-combat zones.
She then analysed the SAM effectiveness but ignored the possibilities of tactical deception and concentration of force.
A good article but earlier items in this thread will flesh out the detail. The Buccanneers were involved and not, as she said dismissed.
What the essay reveals is that documents at air staff level in the 50s and 60s actually avoided spelling out operational detail. For instance it was recognised that penetration of the central region was out of the question as the V-force would have to run the gamut of allied defences, tactical nuke contamination, and enemy bombers heading the other way. The option was the northern and southern routes. It was assummed that this was around North Cape and up through the Med. She was clearly not a navigator as a bit of map work would soon have shown up this fallacy.
The routes through Sweden and Switzerland gave the longest tracks through non-combat zones.
She then analysed the SAM effectiveness but ignored the possibilities of tactical deception and concentration of force.
A good article but earlier items in this thread will flesh out the detail. The Buccanneers were involved and not, as she said dismissed.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Some pages back I posted the types of attacks used by the Vulcan and other Vs. I suggested someone might have a go at the LPs or limited procedures. As no one has I shall have a go but in this respect I confess to failing memory as it was over 30 years ago.
LP1B - no ballistic computation from the Calc 3 so the attack was done using the HOME function on the CU585 and releasing when the distance to go on the Nav Panel matched the calculated forward throw. The release range was accurate down to +/- 200 yds. Offset attacks were still possible
LP2
LP3A - no navigation output from the Calc 1 and 2 so a fixed bearing marker and 15 mile range ring were set up. The aircraft was manouevred to bring the bearing marker through the target and the doppler distance gone counters started at 15 nm and the release initiated when the distance gone equalled 15 mile less the forward throw. Range accurate to about 200 yards and tracking depending on both the skill of the nav radar and the pilots and the visibility of the target as offset attacks were not possible.
LP4 - shiftless. The radar picture was usually slewed off centre by the nav rad using the CU626 and the range and bearing cross hairs would be scope centred. If the shift potentiometers, one or both, failed or some other malfunction, it was possible to drive them markers to the target position but not offset the radar picture. For a direct attack this limited the forward look to 15 miles or just one minute at high level. If there was an undershoot offset then you gained a bit of time. If there was an off track offset then you might not see it at all unless the aircraft flew closer to the offset. Full ballistic computation meant accuracies down to the 900 foot limit were possible.
LP5A - no height. I might have the wrong one here. The height carriage on the Calc 3 was not functioning so the Calc 3 height was set manually using the PC/Set H function. Using this the carriage height could be increased at 50 ft/sec. The pilots then had to fly at an accurately calculated height.
LP6 - markerless. In this case the full ballistic computation was possible but the markers from the Wave Form Generator (I think) were not displayed. Pre-flight the nav rad would have calibrated the scope electrnic centre for the attack track and release range and marked this with a chinagraph mark. Remarkably accurate as a full computed attack was possible.
Then we have a Basic attack. In this case the entire NBC (nav bombing computer) was U/s and the attack would be performed using a plastic gizmo called a bombing protractor. This had a moving arm calibrated in nautical miles at quarter mil scale and a drift scale. The drift was set and the protractor aligned with the headng marker on the picture. The aircraft was manouevred to fly down the plastic track and release at the calculated range mark. The target had to be discrete. In theory 1000 yards was a good bomb. In practice errors of 600 feet were not unheard of and that from 40,000 feet.
Then the piece de resistance, a pictureless. This was the opposite of the basic with the H2S 9 u/s. Release was accomlished from best navigation inputs and full comutation. Now we started to approach WWII accuracies <g>.
If we set these against a modern mission we can glimse an entirely different ethos. Today, any degradation would risk both the loss of the aircraft for an almost certain ineffective attack and high risk of collateral damage. With the V-force you never planned to abort a nucler mission.
LP1B - no ballistic computation from the Calc 3 so the attack was done using the HOME function on the CU585 and releasing when the distance to go on the Nav Panel matched the calculated forward throw. The release range was accurate down to +/- 200 yds. Offset attacks were still possible
LP2
LP3A - no navigation output from the Calc 1 and 2 so a fixed bearing marker and 15 mile range ring were set up. The aircraft was manouevred to bring the bearing marker through the target and the doppler distance gone counters started at 15 nm and the release initiated when the distance gone equalled 15 mile less the forward throw. Range accurate to about 200 yards and tracking depending on both the skill of the nav radar and the pilots and the visibility of the target as offset attacks were not possible.
LP4 - shiftless. The radar picture was usually slewed off centre by the nav rad using the CU626 and the range and bearing cross hairs would be scope centred. If the shift potentiometers, one or both, failed or some other malfunction, it was possible to drive them markers to the target position but not offset the radar picture. For a direct attack this limited the forward look to 15 miles or just one minute at high level. If there was an undershoot offset then you gained a bit of time. If there was an off track offset then you might not see it at all unless the aircraft flew closer to the offset. Full ballistic computation meant accuracies down to the 900 foot limit were possible.
LP5A - no height. I might have the wrong one here. The height carriage on the Calc 3 was not functioning so the Calc 3 height was set manually using the PC/Set H function. Using this the carriage height could be increased at 50 ft/sec. The pilots then had to fly at an accurately calculated height.
LP6 - markerless. In this case the full ballistic computation was possible but the markers from the Wave Form Generator (I think) were not displayed. Pre-flight the nav rad would have calibrated the scope electrnic centre for the attack track and release range and marked this with a chinagraph mark. Remarkably accurate as a full computed attack was possible.
Then we have a Basic attack. In this case the entire NBC (nav bombing computer) was U/s and the attack would be performed using a plastic gizmo called a bombing protractor. This had a moving arm calibrated in nautical miles at quarter mil scale and a drift scale. The drift was set and the protractor aligned with the headng marker on the picture. The aircraft was manouevred to fly down the plastic track and release at the calculated range mark. The target had to be discrete. In theory 1000 yards was a good bomb. In practice errors of 600 feet were not unheard of and that from 40,000 feet.
Then the piece de resistance, a pictureless. This was the opposite of the basic with the H2S 9 u/s. Release was accomlished from best navigation inputs and full comutation. Now we started to approach WWII accuracies <g>.
If we set these against a modern mission we can glimse an entirely different ethos. Today, any degradation would risk both the loss of the aircraft for an almost certain ineffective attack and high risk of collateral damage. With the V-force you never planned to abort a nucler mission.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
If you thought the mark 2 could power off the ground you should have seen the Mark 1 land.
Without the sting in the bum it could pull up a prodigious angle during aerodynamic braking.
Without the sting in the bum it could pull up a prodigious angle during aerodynamic braking.