There is a very good MA disertation in the latest edition of Air Power on the creation and effectiveness of the V-Force. The author has done an excellent job of trawling through archives and books and created a very credible essay. Her strength lies with her analysis of air ministry plans and documents; her weakness lies with less useage of primary sources from the V-force. She does however cite Alan Brookes on several occasions.
What the essay reveals is that documents at air staff level in the 50s and 60s actually avoided spelling out operational detail. For instance it was recognised that penetration of the central region was out of the question as the V-force would have to run the gamut of allied defences, tactical nuke contamination, and enemy bombers heading the other way. The option was the northern and southern routes. It was assummed that this was around North Cape and up through the Med. She was clearly not a navigator as a bit of map work would soon have shown up this fallacy.
The routes through Sweden and Switzerland gave the longest tracks through non-combat zones.
She then analysed the SAM effectiveness but ignored the possibilities of tactical deception and concentration of force.
A good article but earlier items in this thread will flesh out the detail. The Buccanneers were involved and not, as she said dismissed.