Bamboo Airlines crew configuration
Thread Starter
Bamboo Airlines crew configuration
Had a look at the preliminary report into the MAS and Bamboo airlines runway excursions taking off from Melbourne during the reduced runway length operations. I saw that the Bamboo Airlines flight had the PIC sitting in the jump seat for take-off:
Is this just the ATSB not understanding that a Check Captain sitting in the jump seat is not the PIC or is this an alarming trend in crew configurations for departure? I am hoping its the former. There is also the twin problems of not understanding NOTAMS and the volume of NOTAMS that are issued for Australian airports.
On 18 September 2023 at 2230, a Bamboo Airways Boeing 787-9 aircraft, registered VN-A819, was being prepared to depart Melbourne Airport for scheduled passenger transport flight QH83 to Hanoi, Vietnam. There were 3 flight crew, who were assigned the roles (according to the operator’s terminology) of pilot in command (PIC), PM, and PF.[15] For this flight, the PIC sat in the jump seat behind the pilots at the controls, the PM sat in the left pilot’s seat and the PF sat on the right.
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I hear what you are saying but to play the Devils advocate for a second, is it not better to have the PinC sitting in the jump seat with a clear head ? The PinC is often not the most skilled stick and rudder pilot on the flight deck so is there possibly a safety benefit to having them sitting and observing and relaying the odd instruction when necessary?
I hear what you are saying but to play the Devils advocate for a second, is it not better to have the PinC sitting in the jump seat with a clear head ? The PinC is often not the most skilled stick and rudder pilot on the flight deck so is there possibly a safety benefit to having them sitting and observing and relaying the odd instruction when necessary?
Unlike boating flying can unravel in seconds and the last thing you want is the guy who is in charge not in a position to do anything about it.
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AF447 would suggest otherwise but it does feed into the narrative that pilots are just systems monitors. AFAIK the PIC is responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft. In the event of an RTO he/she/they can't do it from the jump seat.
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PIC is ultimately responsible. You can't be ultimately responsible sitting in the jumpseat
Most airlines employing this type of line check scenario denote the command candidate the PIC for that particular flight with a 'real' FO. The initial part of the line check (generally done prior to this event) would have the Check Captain in a control seat.
A NOTAM for runway works should provide a decent diagram. An airspace NOTAM should do the same. A picture speaks a thousand words. Why are we still using hieroglyphics to transmit important safety information?
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
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Surprised there were no overruns in Darwin with the nearly two months long runway works. Half the day it was down to 1400m. To paraphrase a prominent Australian legal expert "Stage three? What the **** is stage three?!?"
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A NOTAM for runway works should provide a decent diagram. An airspace NOTAM should do the same. A picture speaks a thousand words. Why are we still using hieroglyphics to transmit important safety information?
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
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Reminds me of a wonderful story I heard many years ago.
A crusty old ships Captain was invited into a jumpseat for landing (like you could do pre 9/11!!)
After watching the procedure the pilots turned and asked him what he thought.
He said "I just have one question-why was the Captain helming?"
A crusty old ships Captain was invited into a jumpseat for landing (like you could do pre 9/11!!)
After watching the procedure the pilots turned and asked him what he thought.
He said "I just have one question-why was the Captain helming?"
A NOTAM for runway works should provide a decent diagram. An airspace NOTAM should do the same. A picture speaks a thousand words. Why are we still using hieroglyphics to transmit important safety information?
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
One NOTAM no problem, ten NOTAMs annoying, 25+ NOTAMS asking for trouble. Not saying airmen aren’t responsible for checking them but after thousands of pages of NOTAMs about unlit obstacles and bird types flying across the airfield, pilots could be forgiven for suffering from NOTAM overload thereby missing the one really, really important bit of information.
I was interested to read the following on page 7 of the ATSB preliminary report:
and, on page 14:
(my bolding).
As a pilot not trained or based in Australia, but who operates there regularly, I found it incomprehensible that Airservices Australia declined to amend their take off phraseology! This should be a standard practice in Australia, as it is in the rest of the world. Skybrary have a good article with links to the appropriate ICAO and FAA documents. Why can the phraseology not be amended during reduced length operations to add one word? "Malaysian 128, Runway 34 Shortened, Cleared for Take-off"
The crews indicated that
there would likely have been some benefit in additional cues to highlight the shortened runway
length, including:
• Auditory cues, such as having their attention drawn specifically to the shortened runway when
given various clearances.
there would likely have been some benefit in additional cues to highlight the shortened runway
length, including:
• Auditory cues, such as having their attention drawn specifically to the shortened runway when
given various clearances.
APAM had requested for ASA [Airservices Australia] (Melbourne Tower) to amend take off
phraseology to include that the runway was shortened, however this was declined as it was non-
standard and too prescriptive
phraseology to include that the runway was shortened, however this was declined as it was non-
standard and too prescriptive
As a pilot not trained or based in Australia, but who operates there regularly, I found it incomprehensible that Airservices Australia declined to amend their take off phraseology! This should be a standard practice in Australia, as it is in the rest of the world. Skybrary have a good article with links to the appropriate ICAO and FAA documents. Why can the phraseology not be amended during reduced length operations to add one word? "Malaysian 128, Runway 34 Shortened, Cleared for Take-off"
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It was, in both instances.
Initial report refers.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ao-2023-043
Initial report refers.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...rt/ao-2023-043
All good.
Couple of things of note - frequently I taxi out to find the ATIS has changed a couple of times since I did my performance calculations, with no notification from ATC. Frequently I listen to aircraft give the previous ATIS on ground or approach and aren’t advised by the controller that it has changed.
In this instance, however, ATC confirmed with Bamboo the change of ATIS which Bamboo hadn’t actually listened to, in spite of stating that they had. 🤯
The crew stated in their interview that usually it would just be a change of wind or QNH - and “important” changes would be communicated by ATC rather than the ATIS.
That implies a level of complacency on behalf of the crew, but also that the critical information contained within the change of ATIS from O to P, ie. shortening the runway by 1500m or so, wasn’t communicated directly to the crew to confirm understanding.
ATC should be able to assume crews are competent and diligent, but as a systemic defence, communicating and confirming that change to crew taxiing for departure may have been wise.
Lots to pick through in this one.
Couple of things of note - frequently I taxi out to find the ATIS has changed a couple of times since I did my performance calculations, with no notification from ATC. Frequently I listen to aircraft give the previous ATIS on ground or approach and aren’t advised by the controller that it has changed.
In this instance, however, ATC confirmed with Bamboo the change of ATIS which Bamboo hadn’t actually listened to, in spite of stating that they had. 🤯
The crew stated in their interview that usually it would just be a change of wind or QNH - and “important” changes would be communicated by ATC rather than the ATIS.
That implies a level of complacency on behalf of the crew, but also that the critical information contained within the change of ATIS from O to P, ie. shortening the runway by 1500m or so, wasn’t communicated directly to the crew to confirm understanding.
ATC should be able to assume crews are competent and diligent, but as a systemic defence, communicating and confirming that change to crew taxiing for departure may have been wise.
Lots to pick through in this one.
Last edited by DirectAnywhere; 3rd Dec 2023 at 05:19.
I always find it a bit strange when I’ve done data for a shortened runway either for landing or takeoff and the ATC communications don’t highlight it. It always makes me wonder if I’ve been correct with my interpretation of the timings for runway shortening. On the flip side I always appreciate it when overseas and the clearance is along the lines of “ runway 24 reduced length, cleared to land”.
I always find it a bit strange when I’ve done data for a shortened runway either for landing or takeoff and the ATC communications don’t highlight it. It always makes me wonder if I’ve been correct with my interpretation of the timings for runway shortening. On the flip side I always appreciate it when overseas and the clearance is along the lines of “ runway 24 reduced length, cleared to land”.
Not sure why MEL ATC don't do the same (or maybe they do for arrivals?).