CNS 33 HENDO Mess
Originally Posted by Morno
But a simple thing such as inputting or selecting data from an FMS, shouldn’t be an approach specific thing, so why do we need to practice them. An internal memo saying “hey dickheads, do it properly and then check the data” should be sufficient for this. And if events continue to occur, maybe then look at the systems (including procedures) or the design (approach, FMS entry process). But wasting time flying an approach in the sim, when the process could be the problem, is not the answer.
However:
Originally Posted by Mach E Avelli
and reduced the amount of time spent on things we should be able to handle (rejected take-offs or engine failures)
It’s the continuity of knowledge that needs to be passed on.Some pilots employed by the airlines have never been to Cairns before they joined,so they have no knowledge of the terrain,let alone the 32 approach.Then you have the 35 CBR terrain.Remember the QF terrain incident a few years ago?The DME arrival into LST from SYD is another example.There would be other examples and they need to be part of a cyclical program,not practiced EVERY sim.There are too many “children of the magenta” out there.The FMC is only as good as it is fed and CHECKED.
It’s the continuity of knowledge that needs to be passed on.Some pilots employed by the airlines have never been to Cairns before they joined,so they have no knowledge of the terrain,let alone the 32 approach.Then you have the 35 CBR terrain.Remember the QF terrain incident a few years ago?The DME arrival into LST from SYD is another example.There would be other examples and they need to be part of a cyclical program,not practiced EVERY sim.There are too many “children of the magenta” out there.The FMC is only as good as it is fed and CHECKED.
Originally Posted by mates rates
It’s the continuity of knowledge that needs to be passed on.Some pilots employed by the airlines have never been to Cairns before they joined,so they have no knowledge of the terrain,let alone the 32 approach.Then you have the 35 CBR terrain.Remember the QF terrain incident a few years ago?The DME arrival into LST from SYD is another example.There would be other examples and they need to be part of a cyclical program,not practiced EVERY sim.There are too many “children of the magenta” out there.The FMC is only as good as it is fed and CHECKED.
I have actually seen pilots program the FMS to fly a visual circuit on a clear day. It's not surprising that situational awareness is disappearing.
But surely these kinds of risks are identified and dealt with in each operator’s SMS and resulting procedures. Is it really the case that a pilot without any first-hand experience of these kinds of - I’ll use the word ‘quirky’ - approaches is ‘let loose’ on them without specific briefing/training on those ‘quirks’? How can that happen in 21st century in country with the number of rules Australia has?
Decent companies have a decent route manual that describes all these little gotchas; a quick read before you go (route qualification) is all that should be necessary. Modern aviation shouldn't rely on "the continuity of knowledge that needs to be passed on".
Decent companies have a decent route manual that describes all these little gotchas; a quick read before you go (route qualification) is all that should be necessary. Modern aviation shouldn't rely on "the continuity of knowledge that needs to be passed on".
In the absence of that knowledge then this statement is even more important "The FMC is only as good as it is fed and CHECKED". If the crews did not put in the transition on an RNP approach then where is the cockpit discipline?
The 33 RNP should be coded much earlier than it is but doing a selected or managed descent to that point and actively monitoring the approach should keep you out of trouble. There is a reason that RNP approaches has a requirement for all those cross checks before the approach and during the approach. Unfortunately it is often treated like an ILS and once on a vertical profile it is almost considered to be set and forget. As has been mentioned, an incorrect QNH puts you on a highway to the danger zone. Personally I would rather do an ILS than an RNP. Townsville 01 is a case in point.
The first rule of FMC usage is GIGO.
In the olden days, after the Earth had cooled but before the introduction of something which chipped away a little more at the need to think and which is called a "STAR", we would at some point prior to TopD examine the charts and determine the most limiting of the CTA steps (which protect against terrain) and plan a descent accordingly based on a 3X + [factor] angle to the limiting step. This was simple to do and kept us all out of trouble. The people who taught these techniques to the newer pilots had been doing the job for years and worked their way up through the airline. Pilots I fly with today look at this sort of thing the same way my dog looks at the TV. They used to call that concept "Experience" and in the olden days it was considered valuable, if intangible, by CEOs and managers who could see the wood for the trees but this is no longer so and we've watched certain airlines emerge staffed by inexperienced pilots eager to climb the scrotem pole and CEOs focused on share prices and dividends and woke agendas and gender quotas and so now with STARs and magenta lines to follow people scratch their heads and wonder how this sort of terrain event can happen.
In the olden days, after the Earth had cooled but before the introduction of something which chipped away a little more at the need to think and which is called a "STAR", we would at some point prior to TopD examine the charts and determine the most limiting of the CTA steps (which protect against terrain) and plan a descent accordingly based on a 3X + [factor] angle to the limiting step. This was simple to do and kept us all out of trouble. The people who taught these techniques to the newer pilots had been doing the job for years and worked their way up through the airline. Pilots I fly with today look at this sort of thing the same way my dog looks at the TV. They used to call that concept "Experience" and in the olden days it was considered valuable, if intangible, by CEOs and managers who could see the wood for the trees but this is no longer so and we've watched certain airlines emerge staffed by inexperienced pilots eager to climb the scrotem pole and CEOs focused on share prices and dividends and woke agendas and gender quotas and so now with STARs and magenta lines to follow people scratch their heads and wonder how this sort of terrain event can happen.
Don't know how others think about it, but my first though of Cairns is problematic terrain everywhere. So that sets my train of thoughts as to cross checking descent steps and procedures. Same as Canberra, Albury or Launy, and a few other places with unusual terrain and steps. It's nice to rely on ATC to give you descent altitudes (in this case ATC only cleared them to 6800 and then via the RNP so had no adverse affect), but I'm always conscious of the spot heights and such into these areas and have a floor in my mind where I will question a cleared alt if it seems too low. It doesn't help that MVAs are not published, so hard to gather what the minimum vector altitude is, but I reckon it won't be anywhere near 500 ft agl of terrain.
PS just listened to the radio of the VA incident, well done to that controller, spotted alerted and hurried them up back to altitude all well communicated. Probably avoided GPWS getting involved.
It's times like these I get reminded why we readback inane things like "descend via star". Oops, forgot to read the STAR/Approach chart properly and identify the limitations, ATC forgot to tell me to!
PS just listened to the radio of the VA incident, well done to that controller, spotted alerted and hurried them up back to altitude all well communicated. Probably avoided GPWS getting involved.
It's times like these I get reminded why we readback inane things like "descend via star". Oops, forgot to read the STAR/Approach chart properly and identify the limitations, ATC forgot to tell me to!
Last edited by 43Inches; 16th Nov 2022 at 01:31.
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Originally Posted by Mr_App
Starts at 10.00. Not pretty.
https://archive.liveatc.net/ybcs/YBC...2022-1000Z.mp3
https://archive.liveatc.net/ybcs/YBC...2022-1000Z.mp3
In that 30 min clip there are three aircraft struggle with the approach.
Rex sound like they go through the centreline and do some manoeuvring to get back to it,
The VA go-around,
and then Border Force have some difficulty also with a "FMS issue"
Sounds like that controller earned his keep that shift.
What ever happened to reading and following the approach chart? When you went somewhere for the first time, that’s all you had.
Maybe this was a case of familiarity. Been here before, load the FMS and watch it happen.
If this was done as a raw data approach, it would be done perfectly.
Maybe this was a case of familiarity. Been here before, load the FMS and watch it happen.
If this was done as a raw data approach, it would be done perfectly.
Originally Posted by Capt Fathom
What ever happened to reading and following the approach chart? When you went somewhere for the first time, that’s all you had.
Maybe this was a case of familiarity. Been here before, load the FMS and watch it happen.
If this was done as a raw data approach, it would be done perfectly.
Maybe this was a case of familiarity. Been here before, load the FMS and watch it happen.
If this was done as a raw data approach, it would be done perfectly.
If you select the approach without the transition then the crew are not doing their job properly. Both pilots not cross checking the STAR in the FMC then briefing it correctly is not a trap, its poor flying.
This thread started off well by not pointing fingers at crew but rather discussing the threats around Cairns and approach transitions. But as usual, the armchair experts chime in beating their chests proclaiming how they are superior because they would not let it happen to them. What is it with you types? Just can’t keep it in your pants huh?
No one is pointing the finger at anyone idiot. Just a response to the statement that not putting the transition in on an RNP approach into Cairns is a trap. Its not a trap just poor airmanship. As yet we don't know what the 2 crews did. It could actually be a problem with the 737 database. Given your lack of any constructive discussion then I can imagine you sitting in your armchair yelling at the keyboard.
No one is pointing the finger at anyone idiot. Just a response to the statement that not putting the transition in on an RNP approach into Cairns is a trap. Its not a trap just poor airmanship. As yet we don't know what the 2 crews did. It could actually be a problem with the 737 database.
Originally Posted by Lookleft
No one is pointing the finger at anyone idiot. Just a response to the statement that not putting the transition in on an RNP approach into Cairns is a trap. Its not a trap just poor airmanship. As yet we don't know what the 2 crews did. It could actually be a problem with the 737 database. Given your lack of any constructive discussion then I can imagine you sitting in your armchair yelling at the keyboard.
As for the idiot comment and accusing me of yelling at keyboard…pot…kettle…black…
I fly the type so am fully aware of the aforementioned failure to select both transitions on the STAR and Approach.
and charted differently/poorly to elsewhere we fly them
just another hole in the cheese that you never have I guess lookleft.
just another hole in the cheese that you never have I guess lookleft.
The answer seems pretty obvious to me, they made an error, hopefully one we can all learn off. Internal comms were sent re this incident to ensure no one else falls into the same trap (of failing to select both the STAR and approach transitions).
It’s great to see that you hold your airmanship in such high regard. For the rest of us mere mortals, we like to learn from other’s mistakes so that we don’t make them ourselves.
It’s great to see that you hold your airmanship in such high regard. For the rest of us mere mortals, we like to learn from other’s mistakes so that we don’t make them ourselves.
