Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
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Are passengers at risk?
Just in case some are wondering what I am on about:-my bolding.
It is CASA not the ATSB who approve the CAO 20.11 and the evacuation procedures. These could be considered 'ineffective'. World wide implications. Right here, 3 years late. Taxi Minister?, Oh, and take your rubbish with you; please.
Hansard – James: The relevant part of the submission says: 'Only three of us managed to fit life jackets before exiting the aircraft—the doctor, David; the nurse, Karen; and the patient's husband, Gary. Zoe and I were far too busy while flying the aircraft to undo our seatbelts and fit the life jackets.
The patient, Bernie, was not fitted with a life jacket as per Care Flight's procedures for someone on a stretcher. During the evacuation, there was also no chance to grab additional jackets to make up the shortfall.
The Pel-Air ditching preparation procedure called for the 25-kilo life raft to be placed next to the exit on the floor and left there. Unsurprisingly, during the impact, the life raft tumbled forward and was lost in the darkness. I do not know why someone at Pel-Air or CASA did not question the likelihood of a life raft remaining in place during the violent deceleration of an aircraft ditching and did not suggest an alternative procedure. The jackets themselves had issues. The lights were very dim and did not remain illuminated for very long. I understand they are supposed to be seen from some distance and remain on for eight hours or so.
The groin strap of David's life jacket was too long or not able to be tightened sufficiently and at times you needed to hold his jacket down with one hand so he could breathe without difficulty. David's ears were also covered up, making him effectively deaf while we were in the water. The lanyards on the signalling whistles were not long enough or were knotted. This meant that you could not use your own whistle and instead someone else was required to.'
Senator XENOPHON: So you have just ditched and the whistles were not operating and you had to blow someone else's whistle to make any noise?
Mr James: That is correct.
Senator XENOPHON: That is very serious, but it is also almost farcical.
Mr James: I agree. The submission continues: 'The manual inflation and deflation tubes were a similar size and shape to the whistles and a few times they were accidentally activated when they were mistaken for a whistle in the darkness and pulled towards the face of the person wearing the jacket, causing the jacket to deflate.'
Senator XENOPHON: That is not reflected at all in the ATSB final report?
Mr James: No.
Senator XENOPHON: No recommendations were made by the ATSB in relation to the life jackets?
Mr James: Not that I am aware of.
Senator XENOPHON: In hindsight, where else do you think the life raft should have been?
Mr James: There needed to be a procedure where the life raft was secured in a fashion which would ensure the raft remained in place during the impact—but allowing it to be recovered without difficulty and put through the exit and deployed on the surface. I understand that is not an easy undertaking, but the process in place at the time was inadequate.
The patient, Bernie, was not fitted with a life jacket as per Care Flight's procedures for someone on a stretcher. During the evacuation, there was also no chance to grab additional jackets to make up the shortfall.
The Pel-Air ditching preparation procedure called for the 25-kilo life raft to be placed next to the exit on the floor and left there. Unsurprisingly, during the impact, the life raft tumbled forward and was lost in the darkness. I do not know why someone at Pel-Air or CASA did not question the likelihood of a life raft remaining in place during the violent deceleration of an aircraft ditching and did not suggest an alternative procedure. The jackets themselves had issues. The lights were very dim and did not remain illuminated for very long. I understand they are supposed to be seen from some distance and remain on for eight hours or so.
The groin strap of David's life jacket was too long or not able to be tightened sufficiently and at times you needed to hold his jacket down with one hand so he could breathe without difficulty. David's ears were also covered up, making him effectively deaf while we were in the water. The lanyards on the signalling whistles were not long enough or were knotted. This meant that you could not use your own whistle and instead someone else was required to.'
Senator XENOPHON: So you have just ditched and the whistles were not operating and you had to blow someone else's whistle to make any noise?
Mr James: That is correct.
Senator XENOPHON: That is very serious, but it is also almost farcical.
Mr James: I agree. The submission continues: 'The manual inflation and deflation tubes were a similar size and shape to the whistles and a few times they were accidentally activated when they were mistaken for a whistle in the darkness and pulled towards the face of the person wearing the jacket, causing the jacket to deflate.'
Senator XENOPHON: That is not reflected at all in the ATSB final report?
Mr James: No.
Senator XENOPHON: No recommendations were made by the ATSB in relation to the life jackets?
Mr James: Not that I am aware of.
Senator XENOPHON: In hindsight, where else do you think the life raft should have been?
Mr James: There needed to be a procedure where the life raft was secured in a fashion which would ensure the raft remained in place during the impact—but allowing it to be recovered without difficulty and put through the exit and deployed on the surface. I understand that is not an easy undertaking, but the process in place at the time was inadequate.
Last edited by Kharon; 23rd Oct 2012 at 20:21.
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Kharon, without detracting from the seriousness of the Hearing.
The Chair seems to have had too many G&Ts for lunch - his comments in the afternoon session are interesting to say the least.
I was impressed with JM taking it up to them, Dolan needs to harden up a bit.
The senators' implication that there is a conspiracy about the CP being recruited by CASA to protect the Operator is spurious to say the least, wonder if they would be willing to repeat without parliamentary privilige.
Mr Jame's evidence/submission was self serving in the extreme, to the extent that his lack of preparation for ditching was caused by the company - can you bear it.
All in all seems to be same old same old.
The Chair seems to have had too many G&Ts for lunch - his comments in the afternoon session are interesting to say the least.
I was impressed with JM taking it up to them, Dolan needs to harden up a bit.
The senators' implication that there is a conspiracy about the CP being recruited by CASA to protect the Operator is spurious to say the least, wonder if they would be willing to repeat without parliamentary privilige.
Mr Jame's evidence/submission was self serving in the extreme, to the extent that his lack of preparation for ditching was caused by the company - can you bear it.
All in all seems to be same old same old.
Last edited by blackhand; 23rd Oct 2012 at 20:44.
Hey Blackie glad your there mate as I have a quick question...in regards to the matter of the lifejackets. Isn't the lifejackets now considered a part of the aircraft (under the old Class A) and therefore any serviceability issues should be considered as maintenance issues?
If that is the case it would make a furphy of this statement in the 'hidden' CASA report:
Just a query from an un-informed knuckledragger! Thanks in advance!
If that is the case it would make a furphy of this statement in the 'hidden' CASA report:
The aircraft was subject to regular maintenance and had a maintenance check on 6 November 2009 at 21,516 airframe hours. A Maintenance Release Certificate was issued at that time and was valid at the time of the accident. The total hours for the aircraft at the time of the accident were approximately 21,528 and maintenance was not considered to be an issue in the accident.
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Sarcs, the life jackets are lifed and subject to inspection and release to service.
The line inspection is to ensure that they are within serviceable date and no obvious damage
The jackets are in a "sealed" package so cannot be inspected further.
They are sent to an Approved Org for 5 yearly servicing..
Mr Jame's comment on the life jacket inflation tube and whistle does not stand up to close analysis. Neither does the reasons for incorrect use and non use of life jackets ring true.
The line inspection is to ensure that they are within serviceable date and no obvious damage
The jackets are in a "sealed" package so cannot be inspected further.
They are sent to an Approved Org for 5 yearly servicing..
Mr Jame's comment on the life jacket inflation tube and whistle does not stand up to close analysis. Neither does the reasons for incorrect use and non use of life jackets ring true.
Last edited by blackhand; 23rd Oct 2012 at 21:17.
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BH - The senators' implication that there is a conspiracy about the CP being recruited by CASA to protect the Operator is spurious to say the least, wonder if they would be willing to repeat without parliamentary privilege.
BH - to the extent that his lack of preparation for ditching was caused by the company - can you bear it.
But for weel or woe there it is. The bit I don't like is the unsecured life raft and the lack of crew 'reflex' assistance to evacuate. The company procedure taught by TC at CAO 20.11 training is brought into question, the CASA approved system is the root cause. Even if James had NFI about using the auto pilot and sending the FO out of harms way to assist, the FO should have done it, as a matter of 'trained' to do so. They will only do what they have trained to do as per the CASA approved system of training.
No mate, as said before, there is plenty of it to go around, but CASA and the ATSB have to carry their share. Resignations all around I reckon until the truth is established. If the Senate need to use privilege and confidential reports to get to the truth, so be it. But please just lets draw the very real 'safety' issues from the mess and make sure that next time, this whole farce can be avoided.
From the immortal Légion étrangère, It seems that this quote is attributed to a soldier named John Corry.
"We the willing, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much for so long with so little that we are now qualified to do everything with nothing."
Last edited by Kharon; 24th Oct 2012 at 19:33.
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Kharon, the "Jame's Speak" is what has a hollow ring to it.
Once was involved in preparation to ditch, didn't eventuate. The Pilot briefed everyone on what he was going to do and what each individual was to do. I was given the task of taking the liferaft with me - from that moment I had the life raft rope looped around my wrist. And we all fitted lifejackets.
Once was involved in preparation to ditch, didn't eventuate. The Pilot briefed everyone on what he was going to do and what each individual was to do. I was given the task of taking the liferaft with me - from that moment I had the life raft rope looped around my wrist. And we all fitted lifejackets.
Blackhand:
..Mr Jame's comment on the life jacket inflation tube and whistle does not stand up to close analysis. Neither does the reasons for incorrect use and non use of life jackets ring true.
Kharon, the "Jame's Speak" is what has a hollow ring to it.
Once was involved in preparation to ditch, didn't eventuate. The Pilot briefed everyone on what he was going to do and what each individual was to do. I was given the task of taking the liferaft with me - from that moment I had the life raft rope looped around my wrist. And we all fitted lifejackets.
My description of you and your so called "experience" is unprintable, as is my opinion of your character because you consistently, in any number of threads, defend the indefensible: the current system and anything associated with it, without making the slightest criticism or suggestion for improvement,
I think I've read a post by you to the effect that you make your living from a detailed knowledge and ability to interpret these regulations - so your reverence for them is entirely understandable.
However this time you have strayed way, way, too far from your supposed level of expertise.
To put it bluntly, unless you have particiated in an actual full blown ditching you are not qualified to comment on James observations which are entirely credible to me, having been involved one way and another with the sea since age Nine.
For the record, Six people died in the 1998 Sydney Hobart race. The proximate cause, among things including faulty weather reporting was the failure of safety equipment, most especially life rafts and the inability of the crews to make correct use of what they had - and these were experienced racing yachtsmen with the best equipment money could buy, not some cheap-arse airline inflatables designed to survive five years in a seat pocket or gathering dust on a shelf in the back of a hangar.
The outcome of that was mandatory completion of a sea survival course which requires, actual practice of, among other things; abandonment of the vessel fully clothed into the water and manual inflation of the lifejacket, deplyment of a raft, followed by getting into it from the surface of the water (no mean feat) and the righting of a capsized raft (do not try it from opposite the gas bottle or you will be knocked unconscious by it if you succeed).
The general response from people who have undergone the course, which must be repeated every Two years, is that they were surprised by the effort, shock and disorientation of being immersed, and that is in daylight with full knowledge of what is about to happen, not after an event as traumatic as a ditching. James comments about confusion between whistle and inflation tube are perfectly understandable and consideration should be given to them by sea safety professionals.
It is a bloody miracle that anyone survived. We put personal strobes on our lifejackets. Hydrostatic release and quick release harnesses for life rafts, as is a dedicated knife, are mandatory depending on the vessel. So are PLB's. The latest lifejacket incarnations have an automaticly deploying spray hood since it is swallowed spray that drowns most people.
Your comments are entirely unhelpful, irrelevant and simply wrong. As usual.
By the way, if you had a "life raft rope around your wrist" in an actual ditching you would have either amputated your hand or inflated the raft in the aircraft.
..Mr Jame's comment on the life jacket inflation tube and whistle does not stand up to close analysis. Neither does the reasons for incorrect use and non use of life jackets ring true.
Kharon, the "Jame's Speak" is what has a hollow ring to it.
Once was involved in preparation to ditch, didn't eventuate. The Pilot briefed everyone on what he was going to do and what each individual was to do. I was given the task of taking the liferaft with me - from that moment I had the life raft rope looped around my wrist. And we all fitted lifejackets.
I think I've read a post by you to the effect that you make your living from a detailed knowledge and ability to interpret these regulations - so your reverence for them is entirely understandable.
However this time you have strayed way, way, too far from your supposed level of expertise.
To put it bluntly, unless you have particiated in an actual full blown ditching you are not qualified to comment on James observations which are entirely credible to me, having been involved one way and another with the sea since age Nine.
For the record, Six people died in the 1998 Sydney Hobart race. The proximate cause, among things including faulty weather reporting was the failure of safety equipment, most especially life rafts and the inability of the crews to make correct use of what they had - and these were experienced racing yachtsmen with the best equipment money could buy, not some cheap-arse airline inflatables designed to survive five years in a seat pocket or gathering dust on a shelf in the back of a hangar.
The outcome of that was mandatory completion of a sea survival course which requires, actual practice of, among other things; abandonment of the vessel fully clothed into the water and manual inflation of the lifejacket, deplyment of a raft, followed by getting into it from the surface of the water (no mean feat) and the righting of a capsized raft (do not try it from opposite the gas bottle or you will be knocked unconscious by it if you succeed).
The general response from people who have undergone the course, which must be repeated every Two years, is that they were surprised by the effort, shock and disorientation of being immersed, and that is in daylight with full knowledge of what is about to happen, not after an event as traumatic as a ditching. James comments about confusion between whistle and inflation tube are perfectly understandable and consideration should be given to them by sea safety professionals.
It is a bloody miracle that anyone survived. We put personal strobes on our lifejackets. Hydrostatic release and quick release harnesses for life rafts, as is a dedicated knife, are mandatory depending on the vessel. So are PLB's. The latest lifejacket incarnations have an automaticly deploying spray hood since it is swallowed spray that drowns most people.
Your comments are entirely unhelpful, irrelevant and simply wrong. As usual.
By the way, if you had a "life raft rope around your wrist" in an actual ditching you would have either amputated your hand or inflated the raft in the aircraft.
Last edited by Sunfish; 23rd Oct 2012 at 23:30.
I'm not sure I want a 25kg raft cord wrapped around my wrist prior to a unknown deceleration, day or night
edit Sunfish has similiar thinking
edit Sunfish has similiar thinking
Last edited by megle2; 23rd Oct 2012 at 22:28.
If I was a CASA or ATSB manager, I would want to be looking for a new job right now.
THe only cure I can see for this mess is Three smoking holes followed by dismemembering the whole system and implementing the FAA rules with FAA people.
Its a pity that people are going to pay with their lives for this on going farce. Even if CASA wanted to change, it has no hope of doing so.
THe only cure I can see for this mess is Three smoking holes followed by dismemembering the whole system and implementing the FAA rules with FAA people.
Its a pity that people are going to pay with their lives for this on going farce. Even if CASA wanted to change, it has no hope of doing so.
Thanks for that Blackie!
No Blackie as has been mentioned before the PIC was done over and pineappled back in Act 1 Scene 1..
I still find it very 'odd' that the regulator wouldn't have devoted a paragraph or two about the functionality etc of several of the safety systems, procedures, factors, after all this was a ditching carried out at night where everyone survived.
Like "K" says above I also question that the CASA investigation/Final report, which was supposedly run in parallel as per the MOU, could be completed over 2 years before the ATSB. Then to top it all off the ATSB report almost exactly mirrors the CASA report...hmm that's very suss!
I also agree with "K" on the other pilot issue i.e. there was no issue. Last time I looked this was a multi-crew operation which should mean there are COMs including FCOMs, Part A references, approved Multi-crew checklists, QRH, TCS multi-crew references etc..etc. The fact that a supposedly competent FO could sit there fat, dumb and happy blindly accepting the PIC blatant deficiencies is simply staggering!
PS Sorry Sunny missed your post something about always looking fwd...anyway congrats on an absolutely spot on post!
No Blackie as has been mentioned before the PIC was done over and pineappled back in Act 1 Scene 1..
I still find it very 'odd' that the regulator wouldn't have devoted a paragraph or two about the functionality etc of several of the safety systems, procedures, factors, after all this was a ditching carried out at night where everyone survived.
Like "K" says above I also question that the CASA investigation/Final report, which was supposedly run in parallel as per the MOU, could be completed over 2 years before the ATSB. Then to top it all off the ATSB report almost exactly mirrors the CASA report...hmm that's very suss!
I also agree with "K" on the other pilot issue i.e. there was no issue. Last time I looked this was a multi-crew operation which should mean there are COMs including FCOMs, Part A references, approved Multi-crew checklists, QRH, TCS multi-crew references etc..etc. The fact that a supposedly competent FO could sit there fat, dumb and happy blindly accepting the PIC blatant deficiencies is simply staggering!
PS Sorry Sunny missed your post something about always looking fwd...anyway congrats on an absolutely spot on post!
Last edited by Sarcs; 24th Oct 2012 at 09:14.
Ditching... what happens.
I have done it in a fixed wing, unplanned, no life jackets or raft, full daylight.
About 1 minute from engine stop to water impact. Time for a mayday and an approx position and thats about it while trying to find the best place to put it down.
Personally, having operated jets for some time the PIC should have had more time to prepare. I concur with this comment
For the record.
Upon impact everything goes into slow motion, you remember things happening that look slow but are real fast.
The next thing you know your world is dark green and chocolate brown and you have no idea about where you are. I could not see my hand in front of me. I put my hands out to where the windscreen was and there was no feel.
There was a glow in my 4 o'clock on the cabin floor..... it turned out to be the sun as by this time I was 12 ft underwater and upside down.
Animal instinct takes over and I released my belt buckle and swam to the light.
I swam past the guy sitting in the right front seat and did not know he was there, (still joke about boot marks in the back of his head).
The next thing you know is you are treading water and gasping.
Now lets look at this, a ditching that everyone agrees could have been handled better. At night and open water with poor weather. The holes in the swiss cheese may have lined up to get them into the water but the exact same thing from the good luck gods happened that they all survived.
Yes there were procedural and oversight failings, yes there was equipment failings. What we have here is a sheer luck event that nobody died.
The regulator needs to be responsible for its oversight and regulatory failings.... full stop. It may not matter who was in command of SS CASA at the time but someone needs to take responsibility of failings and that is what this is all about.
CASA & ATSB are so good at finger pointing and buckpassing and masters of spin. However the reality is the whole place is a cluster, no one will make a firm decision and then they send everything off to the AG Dept and we get back a ream of legalese that my need a degree to interpret.
Let the inquiry, inquire and hopefully it will lead to the forcing the minister into action and put a broom through the place.
About 1 minute from engine stop to water impact. Time for a mayday and an approx position and thats about it while trying to find the best place to put it down.
Personally, having operated jets for some time the PIC should have had more time to prepare. I concur with this comment
unless you have particiated in an actual full blown ditching you are not qualified to comment on James observations
Upon impact everything goes into slow motion, you remember things happening that look slow but are real fast.
The next thing you know your world is dark green and chocolate brown and you have no idea about where you are. I could not see my hand in front of me. I put my hands out to where the windscreen was and there was no feel.
There was a glow in my 4 o'clock on the cabin floor..... it turned out to be the sun as by this time I was 12 ft underwater and upside down.
Animal instinct takes over and I released my belt buckle and swam to the light.
I swam past the guy sitting in the right front seat and did not know he was there, (still joke about boot marks in the back of his head).
The next thing you know is you are treading water and gasping.
Now lets look at this, a ditching that everyone agrees could have been handled better. At night and open water with poor weather. The holes in the swiss cheese may have lined up to get them into the water but the exact same thing from the good luck gods happened that they all survived.
Yes there were procedural and oversight failings, yes there was equipment failings. What we have here is a sheer luck event that nobody died.
The regulator needs to be responsible for its oversight and regulatory failings.... full stop. It may not matter who was in command of SS CASA at the time but someone needs to take responsibility of failings and that is what this is all about.
CASA & ATSB are so good at finger pointing and buckpassing and masters of spin. However the reality is the whole place is a cluster, no one will make a firm decision and then they send everything off to the AG Dept and we get back a ream of legalese that my need a degree to interpret.
Let the inquiry, inquire and hopefully it will lead to the forcing the minister into action and put a broom through the place.
Last edited by TWOTBAGS; 23rd Oct 2012 at 23:18.
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The salient point is lack of briefing by pilot flying as well as his other "embelishments"
BTW I have been involved in a few sh1tfights with CASA and have no delusions to some of their antics and dubious decisions. This senate hearing is a separate issue and is turning out to be the same farce as all senate hearings.
As for the various comments about handling of the liferaft, not all ditchings are by fixed wing.
Twobags, that wasn't a ditching you had, it was a crash
BTW I have been involved in a few sh1tfights with CASA and have no delusions to some of their antics and dubious decisions. This senate hearing is a separate issue and is turning out to be the same farce as all senate hearings.
As for the various comments about handling of the liferaft, not all ditchings are by fixed wing.
Twobags, that wasn't a ditching you had, it was a crash
Last edited by blackhand; 24th Oct 2012 at 00:13.
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I think that we can all agree that the crew and the PIC in particular made some errors before and during the flight. The big picture here though is that he did not make these on his lonesome but as part of an organisation that includes the company and the regulator.
If there were well written company procedures that the PIC had flagrantly disregarded then there would be a fair and reasonable case to be made that this accident was the result of poor performance by an individual. But on the basis of evidence available to both the public and the ATSB the company procedures were not perfect, in fact they were far from it.
The ATSB have found the first part of the puzzle, the decisions that were made on the day that led to the aircraft running out of fuel but they have totally missed the most important point, the why?
Why did he make the decisions he did? If the ATSB believe that it is reasonable for a pilot to be able to conduct accurate flight planning for this type of flight in the field with no computer aided flight planning and they have not investigated the organisational issues why on earth did it take three years to complete the report? If they seriously believe this planning can be completed in an hour or so then surely they could have knocked the report out in a couple of weeks.
If, however, this is not the only story then the report should state the facts and provide analysis on the organisational factors involved.
If there were well written company procedures that the PIC had flagrantly disregarded then there would be a fair and reasonable case to be made that this accident was the result of poor performance by an individual. But on the basis of evidence available to both the public and the ATSB the company procedures were not perfect, in fact they were far from it.
The ATSB have found the first part of the puzzle, the decisions that were made on the day that led to the aircraft running out of fuel but they have totally missed the most important point, the why?
Why did he make the decisions he did? If the ATSB believe that it is reasonable for a pilot to be able to conduct accurate flight planning for this type of flight in the field with no computer aided flight planning and they have not investigated the organisational issues why on earth did it take three years to complete the report? If they seriously believe this planning can be completed in an hour or so then surely they could have knocked the report out in a couple of weeks.
If, however, this is not the only story then the report should state the facts and provide analysis on the organisational factors involved.
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The big picture here though is that he did not make these on his lonesome but as part of an organisation that includes the company and the regulator.
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Hansard – James: Pel-Air was known to CASA for particular deficiencies in its operation, but that too was not acted upon. Then, after the accident, there was more inaction, this time in the form of the ATSB not disclosing in the accident report the findings of the Pel-Air special audit, amongst other things.
Hansard – James: I had available to me, it strikes me as astoundingly hypocritical of the ATSB to have made these criticisms when the ATSB has failed to do its job after nearly three years and with almost unlimited resources.
Hansard – James: I had available to me, it strikes me as astoundingly hypocritical of the ATSB to have made these criticisms when the ATSB has failed to do its job after nearly three years and with almost unlimited resources.
CASA approved the TC system which failed to pick up normalised deficiencies across the board, FCOL the bloody ex CP nearly ran out noise at Norfolk as did James. The TC may have abandoned the pilot, but so did the new CASA approved whiz bang CP, the one CASA are (sic) delighted with.
Where did the new and delightful CP say 'hey, these flights need a bit more thought; we can't land at Fiji (fuel account embarrassment) we can't land in Noumea (regulatory embarrassment) we can't operate at economical altitudes (RVSM embarrassment) there is a trend of running low on fuel developing and no one seems to be able to work out a simple radius of action fuel plan'. Time for changes ? you bet. Did they happen - No and yet this Muppet so 'delighted' CASA, they hired him to oversight more CASA approved operations. Spare me.
Did DJ stuff it up – Yup, but he had help; lots of it. Trouble is the 'help' was tucked in bed with Mum at the time or at the pub with the boys. CASA approved the systems, CASA approved the delightful CP.
Where is the CP statement, where is the rest of the flight crew statement and where the hell is the company response.
Sunny, thank you for the overboard briefing, saved me doing it, Oh, and by the way, "Looped around his wrist", should have wrapped it around his Willy, could have gone out with bang then.
Last edited by Kharon; 24th Oct 2012 at 01:50.
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casa and "No responsibility"
sarcs, the response from Senator Fawcett is just brilliant::
Amazing, what the venerable senator is alluding to of course, is that there is only one person from casa who has an alibi for "ducking" their responsibilities.
Of course there are responsibilities in this Mr. casa - take them, we are all sick of the "duck and weave"
And well said SunFish:
As for BlackHand.
So you can hang onto a 25kg article with a rope around your wrist -
Simple maths says:
1G deceleration = 25kg
6G deceleration = 150kg
10G deceleration = 250kg
OK Blackie??
Senator NASH: Anybody else? Mr Farquharson? Dr Aleck?
Dr Aleck: I was in Montreal.
Senator FAWCETT: You've got an alibi!
Dr Aleck: I was in Montreal.
Senator FAWCETT: You've got an alibi!
Of course there are responsibilities in this Mr. casa - take them, we are all sick of the "duck and weave"
And well said SunFish:
The regulator needs to be responsible for its oversight and regulatory failings.... full stop. It may not matter who was in command of SS CASA at the time but someone needs to take responsibility of failings and that is what this is all about.
So you can hang onto a 25kg article with a rope around your wrist -
Simple maths says:
1G deceleration = 25kg
6G deceleration = 150kg
10G deceleration = 250kg
OK Blackie??
Last edited by Up-into-the-air; 24th Oct 2012 at 05:54. Reason: Just to have the details correct
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We do NOT take punitive action, but when we do!",
Mr McCormick: While there are undoubtedly violations of the regulations, we do not take punitive action against anybody and we would like to always think that when we do take punitive action there is a very strong reason for it. So we try and rehabilitate the person in this case.*
In my case you [casa] have even obstructed my "rehabilitation" or is this it.
CHAIR: That filing prompted the email that said, 'If we find ourselves in the AAT or a court, we'll look a bit foolish if we the regulator have to say that there are two conflicting views, one which has to be wrong, and we have done nothing to rectify that over the years, which is very untidy.' Without dobbing the poor bugger in who sent this, he is very close to you*
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The committee didn't really focus on this but I am interested in what people think about how not being RVSM compliant impacts on medevacs. For normal operations you just have to soak the extra fuel burn but in the case of a medevac can the pilot declare med 1 or med 2 to get an RVSM waiver? If not why not?
In this case being able to cruise in the RVSM airspace would have allowed the PIC to take full fuel.
In the long term though what oversight do CASA apply to regular EMS operators to ensure that they are not using med catagories to avoid capabilities, such as RVSM.
In this case being able to cruise in the RVSM airspace would have allowed the PIC to take full fuel.
In the long term though what oversight do CASA apply to regular EMS operators to ensure that they are not using med catagories to avoid capabilities, such as RVSM.
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What is the SGR for a Westwind at LRC at non RVSM levels as opposed to Normal Cruise at FL350?
Kharon; two flights a trend does not make. What evidence is there of a culture of running tight on fuel in these ops? One flight from the the Ex CP and then Fleet Manager (where he landed above the legal requirements but without alternate fuel) and the accident flight? Does that really make a trend? The audit itself couldn't find recurring instances so what insight do you use to identify a trend?
Anyone who knows the CP at the time of the accident would know that he was the last person that Pel-Air or Rex would want involved in a CASA investigation involving them. The idea that he is part of a consipracy to protect Pel-Air is hilarious. If he popped up involved in an investigation involving Rex the mountain of letters going to CASA from Baxter Road would require a B Double to deliver.
Kharon; two flights a trend does not make. What evidence is there of a culture of running tight on fuel in these ops? One flight from the the Ex CP and then Fleet Manager (where he landed above the legal requirements but without alternate fuel) and the accident flight? Does that really make a trend? The audit itself couldn't find recurring instances so what insight do you use to identify a trend?
Anyone who knows the CP at the time of the accident would know that he was the last person that Pel-Air or Rex would want involved in a CASA investigation involving them. The idea that he is part of a consipracy to protect Pel-Air is hilarious. If he popped up involved in an investigation involving Rex the mountain of letters going to CASA from Baxter Road would require a B Double to deliver.
Even if James had NFI about using the auto pilot and sending the FO out of harms way to assist, the FO should have done it, as a matter of 'trained' to do so. They will only do what they have trained to do as per the CASA approved system of training.
Even if James had not wanted to involve her (why I would not know) SHE should have taken the INITIATIVE and INSISTED on checking his figures.
She is not without blame and had a RESPONSIBILITY to check his figures.
Hell. In the past I've grabbed F/O's by the ear and ORDERED them to check my figures.
It is a CREWED aeroplane, is it not?
Last edited by dogcharlietree; 24th Oct 2012 at 07:38.