Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011
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Diversion, obfuscation, delay
so once again the opportunity to ask some penetrating questions is lost through side issues and diversion, obfuscation, delay. 
The real questions that should have been asked but never would are:
Apart from appalling leadership as the nation's First Law Officer, did the A-G actually break any law?
Is a PA delivered by video or by cabin crew the legal equivalent of an instruction issued by the Captain?
If a law had been broken, is the operator guilty of an offence by choosing not to report the circumstances?
If a law had been broken, is any employee of the operator who was witness to the breach guilty of an offence by choosing not to report the circumstances?
If a law had been broken, does CASA have to justify exercising a discretion not to proceed with enforcement?
The really hard part is working out who could be asked who is accountable and further is likely to answer fully and accurately. Maybe that's the real problem!
The real questions that should have been asked but never would are:
Apart from appalling leadership as the nation's First Law Officer, did the A-G actually break any law?
Is a PA delivered by video or by cabin crew the legal equivalent of an instruction issued by the Captain?
If a law had been broken, is the operator guilty of an offence by choosing not to report the circumstances?
If a law had been broken, is any employee of the operator who was witness to the breach guilty of an offence by choosing not to report the circumstances?
If a law had been broken, does CASA have to justify exercising a discretion not to proceed with enforcement?
The really hard part is working out who could be asked who is accountable and further is likely to answer fully and accurately. Maybe that's the real problem!
Do I dare to ask what “flight” means in the phrase “during the flight”, for the purposes of those draft regulations? (I’ve given up wasting time reading stuff that is unlikely to become law.)
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Sunfish
What concerns me is that there may be an issue that ATSB should have finished investigating and hasn't. That should have resulted in CASA beiNg alerted to something, but wasn't, that results in an operator doing something they shouldn't ....... And that results in a smoking hole.
To put it another way, we may be overtaken by events while these clever dicks in Canberra are arguing among themselves. Be vigilant. We have to try and make what we have got to work, even with the limited trust and cooperation that is currently on display.
What concerns me is that there may be an issue that ATSB should have finished investigating and hasn't. That should have resulted in CASA beiNg alerted to something, but wasn't, that results in an operator doing something they shouldn't ....... And that results in a smoking hole.
To put it another way, we may be overtaken by events while these clever dicks in Canberra are arguing among themselves. Be vigilant. We have to try and make what we have got to work, even with the limited trust and cooperation that is currently on display.
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"engaged in a flight"
Creamie,
I think you know the answer and are just being a little coy. 
That same draft uses the phrase "engaged in a flight" repetitively, which also escapes definition. I presume that the drafters are relying on the definition of "flight" in the Act which, as we know is a little problematic in that it means operation during flight time and thus excludes pushback and any time after stopping at the bay. So, I'll take the bait and suggest "during the flight" is not as difficult a legal question as "engaged in a flight", given the absence of parallels in the Act, CARs or CASRs.
The precise cut-over points in the authority timeline continue to be avoided - who has the overriding authority when, working backwards:
+ the aircraft is pushing back,
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate but the doors are closed, and
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate, the doors are open and there are some passengers on board?
Apologies for continuing the thread drift...
Stay Alive,
Do I dare to ask what “flight” means in the phrase “during the flight”, for the purposes of those draft regulations?
That same draft uses the phrase "engaged in a flight" repetitively, which also escapes definition. I presume that the drafters are relying on the definition of "flight" in the Act which, as we know is a little problematic in that it means operation during flight time and thus excludes pushback and any time after stopping at the bay. So, I'll take the bait and suggest "during the flight" is not as difficult a legal question as "engaged in a flight", given the absence of parallels in the Act, CARs or CASRs.
The precise cut-over points in the authority timeline continue to be avoided - who has the overriding authority when, working backwards:
+ the aircraft is pushing back,
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate but the doors are closed, and
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate, the doors are open and there are some passengers on board?
Apologies for continuing the thread drift...
Stay Alive,
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No drift called.
The preceding excellent posts cannot be called 'drift' when they identify some of why we are all here.
The above all identify legal, operational and systematic risk areas within a narrow band of the operational spectrum. Without getting into a semantic 'situational' analysis (puleese) it can be easily seen that where a matter goes from routine to incident, how the legal wheels come off. The above posts all highlight the flawed approach to 'industry' regulation where the regulations, regulator, operator, operations, flight and ground crew interface (as it does).
This is why I believe outcome based regulation wins hands down, when an unfortunate event occurs and it winds up in a court (or Senate). Properly done, operator, pilots and regulator may be excused from the worst of fierce scrums created by the 'blame game'.. For us 'in the weeds' if everyone followed the script and there is a mess; then, the script is wrong or the one who dropped ball may be clearly identified. In either event the fix can be identified and effected. Getting the script right in the first place is the trick, which means a solid start point i.e. based on the Act and Regulation, then operational know how etc. etc...It's a complex enough equation without hidden 'legal' nooses dangling at every turn.
There is far too much scope in the current Act and regulation for the shifting of blame and abrogation of responsibility by unscrupulous people (from both teams) and nowhere near enough acceptance that a regulator approved, company produced 'system' despatches a flight, not just an individual. Norfolk is a classic. Should an operation not be able to clearly, in a legally safe manner define through the regulations the operational control boundaries and responsibilities? The need for simple, clear, concise regulation becomes more apparent as operations become more complex.
To return briefly to 4 Dogs clever example; where company policy and procedures need to be concise with everyone involved full bottle on 'their bit' of a coordinated safety effort, then if the tanker butts the aircraft in the arse, we can identify what went wrong and why – then, address the system and make sure that whatever happened, won't happen again. But lets try to get rid of the hair splitting, weasel words; leave that to compensation lawyers slugging out the 'blame game'.
After all -
Sorry, but as it's a lazy Sunday, I couldn't resist two more apropos favourites, from a very funny play:-
Happily stolen from – The importance of being Earnest. Oscar Wilde.....
PNM 1981 -"The really hard part is working out who could be asked who is accountable and further is likely to answer fully and accurately. Maybe that's the real problem!"
HMHB# 1983 –"The issue comes down to risk. Those of us that see the safety risk where others appear more concerned with potential political risks.
4 Dogs # 1984-"The precise cut-over points in the authority timeline continue to be avoided – etc."
This is why I believe outcome based regulation wins hands down, when an unfortunate event occurs and it winds up in a court (or Senate). Properly done, operator, pilots and regulator may be excused from the worst of fierce scrums created by the 'blame game'.. For us 'in the weeds' if everyone followed the script and there is a mess; then, the script is wrong or the one who dropped ball may be clearly identified. In either event the fix can be identified and effected. Getting the script right in the first place is the trick, which means a solid start point i.e. based on the Act and Regulation, then operational know how etc. etc...It's a complex enough equation without hidden 'legal' nooses dangling at every turn.
There is far too much scope in the current Act and regulation for the shifting of blame and abrogation of responsibility by unscrupulous people (from both teams) and nowhere near enough acceptance that a regulator approved, company produced 'system' despatches a flight, not just an individual. Norfolk is a classic. Should an operation not be able to clearly, in a legally safe manner define through the regulations the operational control boundaries and responsibilities? The need for simple, clear, concise regulation becomes more apparent as operations become more complex.
To return briefly to 4 Dogs clever example; where company policy and procedures need to be concise with everyone involved full bottle on 'their bit' of a coordinated safety effort, then if the tanker butts the aircraft in the arse, we can identify what went wrong and why – then, address the system and make sure that whatever happened, won't happen again. But lets try to get rid of the hair splitting, weasel words; leave that to compensation lawyers slugging out the 'blame game'.
After all -
Lady Bracknell: To lose one parent, Mr. Worthing, may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose both looks like carelessness.
Lady Bracknell: Mr. Worthing. I must confess that I feel somewhat bewildered by what you have just told me. To be born, or at any rate bred in a handbag, whether it have handles or not, seems to me to display a contempt for the ordinary decencies of family life which reminds one of the worst excesses of the French revolution, and I presume you know what that unfortunate movement led to?
Lady Bracknell: I am pleased to hear it. I do not approve of anything that tampers with natural ignorance. Ignorance is like a very delicate exotic fruit. Touch it and the bloom is gone. The whole theory of modern education is radically unsound. Fortunately, in England at any rate, education produces no effect whatsoever. If it did, it would prove a serious danger to the upper classes, and probably lead to acts of violence in Grosvenor's Square.
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Some days your'e a pigeon, other days a statue.
Beaker - always a statue, never a pigeon. Just coated in more stool!
Skull - used to being a pigeon, now a permanent statue!
Skull - used to being a pigeon, now a permanent statue!
My profound apologies for also continuing the thread drift, but will copy the issue to the regulatory reform thread.
I’d suggest there is some precision, at least about when persons are obliged to comply with directions under 309A or the prohibition in the ‘new’ PED regulation.
Persons are not obliged to comply during any of the circumstances you’ve listed, because none of those circumstances occurs during flight/flight time as defined.
Decades of regulatory reform and this kind of silliness will remain.
The precise cut-over points in the authority timeline continue to be avoided - who has the overriding authority when, working backwards:
+ the aircraft is pushing back,
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate but the doors are closed, and
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate, the doors are open and there are some passengers on board?
+ the aircraft is pushing back,
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate but the doors are closed, and
+ the aircraft is stationary at the gate, the doors are open and there are some passengers on board?
Persons are not obliged to comply during any of the circumstances you’ve listed, because none of those circumstances occurs during flight/flight time as defined.
Decades of regulatory reform and this kind of silliness will remain.
PEDs drift and 'disallowance motion'?
Some top posts recently and not that I want to continue to promote a thread drift, especially on the rather contentious issue of PEDs in flight, on ground or whatever… but here is a copy of a post from a UK forum (2011):
Although the ATSB report is inconclusive in regards to PEDs and in reality the Dash 8 incident probably has more to do with a dodgy GPS unit, it is an example for the DAS to reference for ‘previous incidents’ along with this NASA report.
However the bigger issue here (as other posters point out) is the fact that we have another perfect example (to add to the considerable list) of where the RRP leaves a safety risk matter outstanding for the best part of a decade. As Creamy points out ‘ad nauseum’ the re-writing of the regs will drift forever and real safety issues that should have been addressed a long, long, long time ago remain as latent safety risks to aviation.
So back to the Hansard and there was another interesting comment made by Senator X in regards to the recent release of the FRMS regs:
Being an ignorant knuckledragger I decided to look up ‘disallowance motion’??
"Notices of motion for disallowance
Many Acts of Parliament delegate to the executive government the power to make detailed rules and regulations (legislative instruments). Instruments made in this way are subject to the power of either House to veto or disallow them.
In most cases, within 15 sitting days after tabling a senator may give notice of a motion to disallow the legislative instrument. If the motion is agreed to, the instrument is disallowed and ceases to have effect. If a notice of motion to disallow a legislative instrument has not been resolved or withdrawn within 15 sitting days after having been given, the instrument is deemed to have been disallowed and automatically ceases to have effect."
No. 1 - Disallowance
Hmm interesting….I wonder if Senator X will follow through with that threat?
Doin a Sundy Kelpie…!
I have just been doing some digging around to see what I can find on the Internet about the issue.
While the following document from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is completely inconclusive, it may give you some "what ifs" to think about in relation to mobile phone and flight (note that it does not deal with the issue of mobile phone on the ground - my feeling/guess is that the issues with the ground is more 'nuisance' and the potential distraction and the resultant loss of situational awareness should interferences occur, e.g. on the radio).
WARNING: the following link will open a 112 page PDF file, close to 4MB in size: www.atsb.gov.au/media/24535/AO200402797.pdf
Specifically, 1.18.2 Other Occurrences which states:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Other occurrences
A search of occurrence data bases held by the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch and the US National Transportation Safety Board did not find any similar occurrences. There were numerous reports by crews experiencing GPS problems where receivers had stopped navigating for a period of time. Failure of the GPS receiver was reported to have been coincident with the discovery of mobile telephones or other personal electronic devices (PED) operating in the aircraft at the time. However, electronic interference from those devices was not established. One accident, where a pilot had turned onto a heading that was different from the GPS approach procedure being flown, was attributed to the pilot’s loss of situational awareness.
There was only one occurrence in the ATSB data base that presented similar characteristics to the accident flight. On 9 February 2003 (Occurrence 200300587) a Bombardier Dash 8 was observed on radar to diverge 9 NM left of track during a flight from Emerald to Brisbane. The aircraft’s crew reported that the aircraft was navigated by GPS and that the autopilot was engaged. No GPS warnings or error indications were observed and it was not determined if the receiver was navigating by DR. When the controller informed the crew of the track divergence, they reverted to ground-based navigation aids and continued to Brisbane. After landing, the GPS indicated a position 59 NM to the north of Brisbane.
The GPS receiver in the Dash 8 was a Trimble TNL 2101 I/O Approach receiver, similar to that installed in TNP. An examination of the receiver found no fault and after ground and air testing, the receiver was returned to service. The operator speculated that possible interference from a crew member’s active mobile phone may have caused the divergence. Subsequent testing in the same aircraft and with the same mobile phone, but using another identical GPS receiver, could not repeat the fault.
The operator advised that crews had reported numerous other GPS anomalies involving the Dash 8. Between February and September 2003, there were three occasions when the aircraft turned and tracked well left of the intended flight path while being navigated by GPS. In two of those occurrences, the cabin crew detected passengers using laptop computers and compact disc players. Following each of those events a functional test of the receiver was unable to detect any faults. The GPS receiver was replaced with a different unit each time, but the problems persisted until May 2005, when the operator replaced both the GPS receiver and the GPS antenna.
Subsequent testing, by the manufacturer of the receiver installed in the Dash 8 at the time of the first occurrence, was reported to have been unable to find any fault that would have affected the navigation resolution. No explanation was given for the receiver not displaying a warning during the event. The antenna was manufactured by a different manufacturer from that installed on TNP. It was tested and found to operate to its design specifications.
In other words, while they could not prove that the mobile phone caused any problems, it appears that they were not able to rule that out either.
Earlier in the same report, it also states:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Unintended signal interference from radio frequency transmissions emitted by personal electronic devices such as mobile phones, compact disc players or laptop computers can result in the loss of satellite signals and stop the GPS receiver from navigating.
The fact that an aviation safety investigation agency of reasonable repute has taken the trouble to look into the matter seriously is good enough for me to feel that it would be reasonable (whether that is technically correct or not) to request that the mobile telephones are turned off.
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/british-airways-executive-club/1289763-use-phones-ground-why-ba-so-agressively-rigid-11.html
While the following document from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau is completely inconclusive, it may give you some "what ifs" to think about in relation to mobile phone and flight (note that it does not deal with the issue of mobile phone on the ground - my feeling/guess is that the issues with the ground is more 'nuisance' and the potential distraction and the resultant loss of situational awareness should interferences occur, e.g. on the radio).
WARNING: the following link will open a 112 page PDF file, close to 4MB in size: www.atsb.gov.au/media/24535/AO200402797.pdf
Specifically, 1.18.2 Other Occurrences which states:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Other occurrences
A search of occurrence data bases held by the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch and the US National Transportation Safety Board did not find any similar occurrences. There were numerous reports by crews experiencing GPS problems where receivers had stopped navigating for a period of time. Failure of the GPS receiver was reported to have been coincident with the discovery of mobile telephones or other personal electronic devices (PED) operating in the aircraft at the time. However, electronic interference from those devices was not established. One accident, where a pilot had turned onto a heading that was different from the GPS approach procedure being flown, was attributed to the pilot’s loss of situational awareness.
There was only one occurrence in the ATSB data base that presented similar characteristics to the accident flight. On 9 February 2003 (Occurrence 200300587) a Bombardier Dash 8 was observed on radar to diverge 9 NM left of track during a flight from Emerald to Brisbane. The aircraft’s crew reported that the aircraft was navigated by GPS and that the autopilot was engaged. No GPS warnings or error indications were observed and it was not determined if the receiver was navigating by DR. When the controller informed the crew of the track divergence, they reverted to ground-based navigation aids and continued to Brisbane. After landing, the GPS indicated a position 59 NM to the north of Brisbane.
The GPS receiver in the Dash 8 was a Trimble TNL 2101 I/O Approach receiver, similar to that installed in TNP. An examination of the receiver found no fault and after ground and air testing, the receiver was returned to service. The operator speculated that possible interference from a crew member’s active mobile phone may have caused the divergence. Subsequent testing in the same aircraft and with the same mobile phone, but using another identical GPS receiver, could not repeat the fault.
The operator advised that crews had reported numerous other GPS anomalies involving the Dash 8. Between February and September 2003, there were three occasions when the aircraft turned and tracked well left of the intended flight path while being navigated by GPS. In two of those occurrences, the cabin crew detected passengers using laptop computers and compact disc players. Following each of those events a functional test of the receiver was unable to detect any faults. The GPS receiver was replaced with a different unit each time, but the problems persisted until May 2005, when the operator replaced both the GPS receiver and the GPS antenna.
Subsequent testing, by the manufacturer of the receiver installed in the Dash 8 at the time of the first occurrence, was reported to have been unable to find any fault that would have affected the navigation resolution. No explanation was given for the receiver not displaying a warning during the event. The antenna was manufactured by a different manufacturer from that installed on TNP. It was tested and found to operate to its design specifications.
In other words, while they could not prove that the mobile phone caused any problems, it appears that they were not able to rule that out either.
Earlier in the same report, it also states:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Unintended signal interference from radio frequency transmissions emitted by personal electronic devices such as mobile phones, compact disc players or laptop computers can result in the loss of satellite signals and stop the GPS receiver from navigating.
The fact that an aviation safety investigation agency of reasonable repute has taken the trouble to look into the matter seriously is good enough for me to feel that it would be reasonable (whether that is technically correct or not) to request that the mobile telephones are turned off.
http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/british-airways-executive-club/1289763-use-phones-ground-why-ba-so-agressively-rigid-11.html
However the bigger issue here (as other posters point out) is the fact that we have another perfect example (to add to the considerable list) of where the RRP leaves a safety risk matter outstanding for the best part of a decade. As Creamy points out ‘ad nauseum’ the re-writing of the regs will drift forever and real safety issues that should have been addressed a long, long, long time ago remain as latent safety risks to aviation.
So back to the Hansard and there was another interesting comment made by Senator X in regards to the recent release of the FRMS regs:
Mr Boyd: As far as I am aware, the only feedback we have from pilots, for example, on the fatigue regulations is to do with the representation of the pilots' groups on the safety action groups that we have in the regulations for consultation around fatigue risk management systems.
Senator XENOPHON: Who represent thousands of pilots.
Mr Boyd: Indeed.
Senator XENOPHON: They are saying that these rules stink and that there is a real risk in terms of fatigue and with it aviation safety. So why would you not put a lot of weight on what the pilots are saying?
Mr Boyd: Senator, the feedback we are getting is not that the rules stink, as you put it.
Senator XENOPHON: But it is that they do pose a risk to aviation safety.
Mr Boyd: The only feedback we have from the pilots association is about that particular issue.
Senator XENOPHON: And will you be acting on that particular issue?
Mr Boyd: We have replied to the association to say that we are taking the ICAO approach, and that is what we have taken all the way through this development of the fatigue regulations.
Senator XENOPHON: Can you provide us with details of documents with respect to that?
Mr Boyd: Absolutely.
Senator XENOPHON: Can you provide those documents as a matter of urgency, because there may be a disallowance motion that might go down that path; I am not sure. Mr McCormick, I will put a number of questions on notice. In relation to the recent inquiry, I think you told the inquiry that you instigated the Chambers report. Is that right?
Senator XENOPHON: Who represent thousands of pilots.
Mr Boyd: Indeed.
Senator XENOPHON: They are saying that these rules stink and that there is a real risk in terms of fatigue and with it aviation safety. So why would you not put a lot of weight on what the pilots are saying?
Mr Boyd: Senator, the feedback we are getting is not that the rules stink, as you put it.
Senator XENOPHON: But it is that they do pose a risk to aviation safety.
Mr Boyd: The only feedback we have from the pilots association is about that particular issue.
Senator XENOPHON: And will you be acting on that particular issue?
Mr Boyd: We have replied to the association to say that we are taking the ICAO approach, and that is what we have taken all the way through this development of the fatigue regulations.
Senator XENOPHON: Can you provide us with details of documents with respect to that?
Mr Boyd: Absolutely.
Senator XENOPHON: Can you provide those documents as a matter of urgency, because there may be a disallowance motion that might go down that path; I am not sure. Mr McCormick, I will put a number of questions on notice. In relation to the recent inquiry, I think you told the inquiry that you instigated the Chambers report. Is that right?
"Notices of motion for disallowance
Many Acts of Parliament delegate to the executive government the power to make detailed rules and regulations (legislative instruments). Instruments made in this way are subject to the power of either House to veto or disallow them.
In most cases, within 15 sitting days after tabling a senator may give notice of a motion to disallow the legislative instrument. If the motion is agreed to, the instrument is disallowed and ceases to have effect. If a notice of motion to disallow a legislative instrument has not been resolved or withdrawn within 15 sitting days after having been given, the instrument is deemed to have been disallowed and automatically ceases to have effect."
No. 1 - Disallowance
Hmm interesting….I wonder if Senator X will follow through with that threat?
Doin a Sundy Kelpie…!
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Cracks appearing ?
If any still wonder about the 'subterranean' effects of Senate Inquiry, look back to Hansard where the Information Commissioner was invited to answer some questions. A couple of interesting points from that part are (i) he came unattended by minions (ii) was able, without stumbling to respond intelligently, honestly and openly; (iii) in response to QON was prompt, circumspect, respectful, informative and well worth careful reading.
The latest –Paul Phelan- article relates to 'problems' acquiring documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI). While the piece is interesting on topic, it should wake up some departments in Sleepy Hollow by sounding several large warning bells.
The FOI Act is 'powerful' and when used correctly can, eventually strip away home spun policy restrictions and demonstrates that despite CASA firmly believing they are the only law in the land, they clearly are not. Once proof positive of 'slight of hand' is released to a (another) fictional complainant it must then become an easy matter to identify the alleged, often shocking breaches of law, protocol, procedure and even policy which may have been committed in the name of 'Safety'. The FOI Act served the Senate Inquiry and participants very well indeed, now it will serve again to right past wrongs.
The warning should be clear to whoever fills the position recently vacated by Greg Hood. It is to this desk the wrath of those who have, though the FOI Act established a case to prove 'administrative' sleight of hand, bastardry and criminal intent, will be addressed along with their requests for corrective action. The LSD will only serve and protect those who have complied with –'the system' and must swiftly abandon those who have not.
The ghosts of Lockhart have long called for justice and thanks to the FOI Act, CASA have just run into a real law with real teeth, which they did not write; a department they cannot manipulate, bully or subvert and a bunch of fictional complainants armed with fictional evidence seeking very real compensation.
Well done Senate, OAIC and Shane Urquhart. Brava.
Sponsored by the "Ills of Society" (support group) for the Deluded Minority.
The latest –Paul Phelan- article relates to 'problems' acquiring documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOI). While the piece is interesting on topic, it should wake up some departments in Sleepy Hollow by sounding several large warning bells.
The FOI Act is 'powerful' and when used correctly can, eventually strip away home spun policy restrictions and demonstrates that despite CASA firmly believing they are the only law in the land, they clearly are not. Once proof positive of 'slight of hand' is released to a (another) fictional complainant it must then become an easy matter to identify the alleged, often shocking breaches of law, protocol, procedure and even policy which may have been committed in the name of 'Safety'. The FOI Act served the Senate Inquiry and participants very well indeed, now it will serve again to right past wrongs.
The warning should be clear to whoever fills the position recently vacated by Greg Hood. It is to this desk the wrath of those who have, though the FOI Act established a case to prove 'administrative' sleight of hand, bastardry and criminal intent, will be addressed along with their requests for corrective action. The LSD will only serve and protect those who have complied with –'the system' and must swiftly abandon those who have not.
The ghosts of Lockhart have long called for justice and thanks to the FOI Act, CASA have just run into a real law with real teeth, which they did not write; a department they cannot manipulate, bully or subvert and a bunch of fictional complainants armed with fictional evidence seeking very real compensation.
Well done Senate, OAIC and Shane Urquhart. Brava.
Sponsored by the "Ills of Society" (support group) for the Deluded Minority.
Last edited by Kharon; 2nd Jun 2013 at 21:06. Reason: Taxi – anyone???. Keep your receipts.
Be aware that CASA and ATSB are playing for time.
Once the Government enters "caretaker mode" then everything must wait for the New Minister.
Once the New Government is appointed, then a whole lot of delightful documentation is locked up under the Thirty year rule.
The whole process resets and starts again from square One if the new Minister is successfully "captured" by his Department head.
My guess is that the public service will be lobbying Liberal party powerbrokers and anyone else who will listen that anyone but Sen. Fawcett should be the Minister.
The Department line will be that at all costs Senators Fawcett and Xenophon (assuming they are re elected) must be kept at arms length the Aviation portfolio or they will "make trouble" for the Abbott Government.
If I were Sir Humphrey, I would most probably phrase the matter of CASA and the ATSB as "an unneccessary diversion from the main game Prime Minister."
I dearly miss my spy in PM & C, I would love to know their opinion of Mr. Mrdak
Once the Government enters "caretaker mode" then everything must wait for the New Minister.
Once the New Government is appointed, then a whole lot of delightful documentation is locked up under the Thirty year rule.
The whole process resets and starts again from square One if the new Minister is successfully "captured" by his Department head.
My guess is that the public service will be lobbying Liberal party powerbrokers and anyone else who will listen that anyone but Sen. Fawcett should be the Minister.
The Department line will be that at all costs Senators Fawcett and Xenophon (assuming they are re elected) must be kept at arms length the Aviation portfolio or they will "make trouble" for the Abbott Government.
If I were Sir Humphrey, I would most probably phrase the matter of CASA and the ATSB as "an unneccessary diversion from the main game Prime Minister."
I dearly miss my spy in PM & C, I would love to know their opinion of Mr. Mrdak
Sunny- nice paraphrase of this post:
Be careful though with such thoughts lest someone:
Just sayin'
Yep great report with some very relevant recommendations. ATSB
and to a lessor extent CASA come out looking dodgy. Do you know what happens now? The government has 3 months to reply. That reply is drafted by the same agencies that the report critisizes, three months from now the current government is in caretaker mode then there is an election. Assuming a new government they take a few months to get into the groove of being in power, then its Christmas the summer holidays and now its February
2014.
and to a lessor extent CASA come out looking dodgy. Do you know what happens now? The government has 3 months to reply. That reply is drafted by the same agencies that the report critisizes, three months from now the current government is in caretaker mode then there is an election. Assuming a new government they take a few months to get into the groove of being in power, then its Christmas the summer holidays and now its February
2014.
Be careful though with such thoughts lest someone:
reveals himself as a troll by dissimulation about the impact of the report
Just sayin'
Robo outstanding safety issues (Part I)??
Important note: Please don't read this post as a helicopter accident investigation, it's not. Read it as continuing on from the Senator X and Fawcett probes into the quality of service, grudgingly spared to similar accidents such as Canely Vale and the Air North Brasília. It also highlights the ineffectiveness of bureau highlighted ‘Safety Issues’in reports vs the direct effect of bureau issued ‘Safety Recommendations’ (may they RIP). The lack of a 'closed loop' system for ensuring preventable accidents are not repeated is easily determined from the long-term history of repetitive incidents/accidents, which have resulted in fatalities.
From Hansard 29/05/13:
Here are the links for the 2003, 2006, 2008 R44 accidents that involved post impact fires:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1533519/ao2008062.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1361537/aair200600979_001.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24556/aair200304546_001.pdf
With the possible exception of the 2003 accident there would appear to be general debate on whether these accidents could be classified as high-energy impact as Beaker generalises them to be.
Its kind of academic really and maybe it’s just another Beaker throw away line but what is the definition of a high-energy impact?
From the Bungles report on page 7 here is a couple of excerpts:
Then there is this:
And there is also further mention on page 10 under (the very brief) ‘Medical and pathological information’… “ The post-mortem examinations for all occupants of the helicopter described varying degrees of injuries consistent with the high vertical velocity impact. All sustained extensive thermal injury.”
There is also this interesting observation… “The pilot’s post-mortem report indicated that he was found ‘...a slight distance from the damaged aircraft’…. ”
So there was high vertical velocity but little or no fwd velocity, however there is also possible evidence (not conclusive I know) that the pilot (at least) survived the initial impact but may have received fatal injuries from the post impact fire!
Yet there is nowhere in that report, or indeed the 2006 and 2003 reports, that the post impact fire survivability issues were ever explored in the context of the ATSB investigations.
So Beaker’s generalised comment…. “There were, as you say, a number of high-energy collisions that would have led to a ruptured fuel tank in any helicopter and therefore a great likelihood of a post-crash fire….” in my personal opinion definitely needs exploring and the Senators need applauding for exploring these still outstanding safety issue??
Kind of cold comfort for the victims families like the Cousin’s in the Bungle Bungle’s accident.
Note: I have made this “Robo outstanding safety issues (Part I)” because there is more, much more ‘not satisfactorily addressed’ safety issues that have been brought to my attention in reviewing the R44 accidents…..
Hint: Look at the safety issues/actions sections of the three linked reports and also refer to Robo’s Safety Notices SN-10, SN-24 and SN-34; here is the ‘link’. Also refer to 'FAA SFAR 73-2'.
There is also this ATSB report for an 'R22 fatal crash' on the Gold Coast, which is also relevant.
To borrow from the ‘Kelpie’ (I see he is back: ‘Jetstar Pilot Cadet Program!’) …..more to follow!
From Hansard 29/05/13:
Senator XENOPHON: But weren't there several earlier accidents involving post-crash fires with R44s before the manufacturer issued their service bulletin in 2003, 2006 and 2008?
Mr Dolan: There had been a number of post-crash fires associated with R44 helicopters. In the vast majority of those cases they represented high-energy impacts, which is to say accidents that were unlikely to have been survivable and which would have led to a post-crash fire in almost any helicopter.
Senator XENOPHON: So you are saying that the retrofitting would not have made any difference?
Mr Dolan: That would be our general assessment.
Senator XENOPHON: Take it on notice, because I have a few other matters to raise. You are saying that, from a causation point of view, even retrofitting the helicopters with that protective bladder, it still would have been a fatal accident?
Mr Dolan: On the facts that were available to us. We are not aware of any previous to Cessnock. I do not think we are aware of any of the low-energy collisions leading to that sort of thing. There were, as you say, a number of high-energy collisions that would have led to a ruptured fuel tank in any helicopter and therefore a great likelihood of a post-crash fire. Those are the sorts of accidents that generally are not survivable.
Senator XENOPHON: If you would not mind taking that on notice, even if it is just referring us to what you consider relevant, that would be very helpful.
Mr Dolan: There had been a number of post-crash fires associated with R44 helicopters. In the vast majority of those cases they represented high-energy impacts, which is to say accidents that were unlikely to have been survivable and which would have led to a post-crash fire in almost any helicopter.
Senator XENOPHON: So you are saying that the retrofitting would not have made any difference?
Mr Dolan: That would be our general assessment.
Senator XENOPHON: Take it on notice, because I have a few other matters to raise. You are saying that, from a causation point of view, even retrofitting the helicopters with that protective bladder, it still would have been a fatal accident?
Mr Dolan: On the facts that were available to us. We are not aware of any previous to Cessnock. I do not think we are aware of any of the low-energy collisions leading to that sort of thing. There were, as you say, a number of high-energy collisions that would have led to a ruptured fuel tank in any helicopter and therefore a great likelihood of a post-crash fire. Those are the sorts of accidents that generally are not survivable.
Senator XENOPHON: If you would not mind taking that on notice, even if it is just referring us to what you consider relevant, that would be very helpful.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1533519/ao2008062.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1361537/aair200600979_001.pdf
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24556/aair200304546_001.pdf
With the possible exception of the 2003 accident there would appear to be general debate on whether these accidents could be classified as high-energy impact as Beaker generalises them to be.
Its kind of academic really and maybe it’s just another Beaker throw away line but what is the definition of a high-energy impact?
From the Bungles report on page 7 here is a couple of excerpts:
Damage to the engine firewall and skids showed that the helicopter impacted the
ground generally upright, in a right skid-low attitude and with high vertical
velocity.
ground generally upright, in a right skid-low attitude and with high vertical
velocity.
The absence of surface or vegetation disturbance in the vicinity of the wreckage indicated little or no forward speed at impact. Fire damage allowed the helicopter to subside onto its right side.
There is also this interesting observation… “The pilot’s post-mortem report indicated that he was found ‘...a slight distance from the damaged aircraft’…. ”
So there was high vertical velocity but little or no fwd velocity, however there is also possible evidence (not conclusive I know) that the pilot (at least) survived the initial impact but may have received fatal injuries from the post impact fire!
Yet there is nowhere in that report, or indeed the 2006 and 2003 reports, that the post impact fire survivability issues were ever explored in the context of the ATSB investigations.
So Beaker’s generalised comment…. “There were, as you say, a number of high-energy collisions that would have led to a ruptured fuel tank in any helicopter and therefore a great likelihood of a post-crash fire….” in my personal opinion definitely needs exploring and the Senators need applauding for exploring these still outstanding safety issue??
Kind of cold comfort for the victims families like the Cousin’s in the Bungle Bungle’s accident.
Well we had our inquest which was an absolute joke and embarrassment for the fact that so many documents were not produced / lost / created etc and no one did a thing about it. Our Coroner Ms Fricker left a lot to be desired and the fact that in the 2 years 7 months not one person in the court room excluding us had even visited the accident site or gone out to witness just what happens out there. We came away just blown away with the fact that so many things were dismissed/ allowed/undisclosed and were allowed to be.
That smell of money I think well and truly came into play!!!
I personally lost all respect for our government representatives, law, safety authorities after sitting in that court room for 5 days and listened to excuses on their behalf...instead of reasons to rectify and was horrified after the evidence given that it was declared and accident.
As I said in court this was an Accident waiting to happen and will occur again!! The coroner in her report even noted the number of helicopter accidents just since the inquest - approx 4 month....and not one recommendation was handed down. She used the words like Breached and Failed to comply in her report and yet not one recommendation.”
Carolyn Cousins. (mother of Jessica Cousins) Slingair Robinson 44 Bungle Bungles 14 September 2008 4 fatalities
That smell of money I think well and truly came into play!!!
I personally lost all respect for our government representatives, law, safety authorities after sitting in that court room for 5 days and listened to excuses on their behalf...instead of reasons to rectify and was horrified after the evidence given that it was declared and accident.
As I said in court this was an Accident waiting to happen and will occur again!! The coroner in her report even noted the number of helicopter accidents just since the inquest - approx 4 month....and not one recommendation was handed down. She used the words like Breached and Failed to comply in her report and yet not one recommendation.”
Carolyn Cousins. (mother of Jessica Cousins) Slingair Robinson 44 Bungle Bungles 14 September 2008 4 fatalities
Hint: Look at the safety issues/actions sections of the three linked reports and also refer to Robo’s Safety Notices SN-10, SN-24 and SN-34; here is the ‘link’. Also refer to 'FAA SFAR 73-2'.
There is also this ATSB report for an 'R22 fatal crash' on the Gold Coast, which is also relevant.
To borrow from the ‘Kelpie’ (I see he is back: ‘Jetstar Pilot Cadet Program!’) …..more to follow!
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Caretaker mode
sunfish, Be aware that CASA and ATSB are playing for time.
I think Dolan stated in estimates 24 July was when re opening the inquiry was to be reviewed. Couple of delays for further info and into caretaker mode.
It is very clear they do not want the inquiry re opened.
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ICAO Approach indeed
QUOTE "Mr Boyd: We have replied to the association to say that we are taking the ICAO approach, and that is what we have taken all the way through this development of the fatigue regulations."
WHAT AN ABSOLUTE LOAD OF CODSWALLOP. I WAS INVOLVED IN THE VERY EARLY DAYS OF AN FM PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR A LARGE CHARTER COMPANY. ICAO NEVER CAME INTO THE EQUATION, EITHER THEN, OR LATER.
I IMAGINE THE SLEEP / FATIGUE CENTRE AT THE UNI OF SA WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THAT.
AGAIN, IT WAS APPROVED/DISAPPROVED AT THE WHIM OR WHATEVER SIDE OF THE BED THE FOI GOT OUT OF..
WHAT AN ABSOLUTE LOAD OF CODSWALLOP. I WAS INVOLVED IN THE VERY EARLY DAYS OF AN FM PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR A LARGE CHARTER COMPANY. ICAO NEVER CAME INTO THE EQUATION, EITHER THEN, OR LATER.
I IMAGINE THE SLEEP / FATIGUE CENTRE AT THE UNI OF SA WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THAT.
AGAIN, IT WAS APPROVED/DISAPPROVED AT THE WHIM OR WHATEVER SIDE OF THE BED THE FOI GOT OUT OF..
Last edited by kimwestt; 4th Jun 2013 at 07:24.
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He who hesitates. etc.
Again, just thinking out loud here; but caretaker mode or not I wonder if Dolan is not taking an unacceptable risk, prevaricating over the matter. IF the other team win the election and someone like Fawcett gets hold of matters aeronautical, will the fall out be worse?. Should Dolan grasp the nettle now, while he retains some control of the process by 'voluntarily reopening the 'investigation'. Then he can truthfully say to whomever is his new master, "we have progressed, here is a revised interim report and a modified version of our investigating protocol". He has all the toys to do the job, so why bugger about delaying. This is not going to just disappear on some arbitrary date. If he sits on his hands the new master may just call in a professional outfit and bring on an independent audit of the whole shemozzle. Which would be no fun for anyone.
Common sense says get on with it, but sadly, having watched and listened to this man in the committee room, I doubt he has the humility or honesty required to complete the task.
Shame really, all things considered.
Common sense says get on with it, but sadly, having watched and listened to this man in the committee room, I doubt he has the humility or honesty required to complete the task.
Shame really, all things considered.
Last edited by Kharon; 3rd Jun 2013 at 20:31.
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The fall of Rome
Caretaker government, no government, 100 governments, it doesn't really matter as Beakers days are numbered (don't tell lord Beaker that though). He has lost the confidence of industry in Australia, many members of government, and not to mention the confidence of some sections of the public, media and concerning many international stakeholders at high levels. He is effectively 'soiled goods'. To persist with this gentleman as Commissioner will only result in more damaged goods being offered up, more ridiculous investigation reports, more scrutiny under the very bright international spotlight, and inevitably more stuff ups tabled publicly for all the world to see.
Beaker is a liability, and a potentially expensive one at that. Give it time, he will go.....
Beaker is a liability, and a potentially expensive one at that. Give it time, he will go.....
Kharon...
Fair comment, but I think it's safe to say that Dolan is no longer effectively in control, and is simply doing as he's being told. Which is, as you describe, to buggerise around and prevaricate about the matter until it's too late to do anything effective before caretaker mode sets in and shuts down everything.
I reckon Cactusjack is correct, and that Dolan's days are numbered. He's 'damned if he does and damned if he doesn't', so he's really got nothing more to lose by continuing with the idiotic delay tactics that he's now engaging in.
We can only hope that the new government will ensure that as one of its first acts, it makes sure that there is a clean sweep of the management 'clowns' presently in position at the ATSB so that it has a chance to regain its former (BASI) reputation.
Should Dolan grasp the nettle now, while he retains some control of the process...
I reckon Cactusjack is correct, and that Dolan's days are numbered. He's 'damned if he does and damned if he doesn't', so he's really got nothing more to lose by continuing with the idiotic delay tactics that he's now engaging in.
We can only hope that the new government will ensure that as one of its first acts, it makes sure that there is a clean sweep of the management 'clowns' presently in position at the ATSB so that it has a chance to regain its former (BASI) reputation.
Last edited by SIUYA; 3rd Jun 2013 at 21:42.
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Whoops;
Sorry boys, I flubbed it a bit saying Dolan. I what I really meant was the "ATSB" (woolly thinking). I just meant to say that the 'problem' exists and must be dealt with. Much as in any operation where a 'real' live safety issue presents, you can't just sit on your arse and wait for a 'change' of whatever. I guess with 20/20 what I was getting at is should another event, such as the Brasilia, Canley Vale, Norfolk or any of the many other badly analysed events reoccur, "we" are going to be in a world of hurt. Have a look at the Robbo case history. The advice needed to prevent a reoccurrence still is not out there. Sure, we can try to sort it out, but without solid data, we are just making it up; and, if push comes to shove, it's anyone's guess what would be the repercussions of an inquiry into a similar accident should the home made 'fix' be judged wrong.
For my two bob's worth, the industry and courts rely heavily on the probity and quality of an ATSB report. Reported issues, (such as life jacket questions) need, I believe, to addressed swiftly. Imagine the fuss if some unfortunate drowns in the same situation. To do a Sunny, and put it another way, the safety case will not improve with time like a good claret. We need reliable answers to questions now, not at some point in the future. 24/7 operations - there is no time to waste on rhetoric and certainly not for political tap dancing at glacial speed.
Aye well; Serves me right for thinking out loud, before second coffee. Mea culpa.
For my two bob's worth, the industry and courts rely heavily on the probity and quality of an ATSB report. Reported issues, (such as life jacket questions) need, I believe, to addressed swiftly. Imagine the fuss if some unfortunate drowns in the same situation. To do a Sunny, and put it another way, the safety case will not improve with time like a good claret. We need reliable answers to questions now, not at some point in the future. 24/7 operations - there is no time to waste on rhetoric and certainly not for political tap dancing at glacial speed.
Aye well; Serves me right for thinking out loud, before second coffee. Mea culpa.
Last edited by Kharon; 3rd Jun 2013 at 23:02.