Paul Holmes and Erebus

[prospector]

Reads like someone has been into the single malts.

Pompous Prat springs to mind for some reason.

[Brian Abraham]

Why persist in arguing a case with those whose prejudices, biases and ignorance lend absolutely nothing to reasoned debate.

Thanks Fantome for the sage advice, but some times I just can't help myself. Wish I had your facility with words. The thread is inhabited by those who have a particularly blinkered view, and leave no stone unturned to denigrate Captain Collins, or those who don't have the same blinkered view. Pompous prat indeed.

I did my first accident investigators course with the worlds largest operator and subsequently with the RAAF. Lead my first formal accident investigation in 1971 - loss of control on take off, crew survived but aircraft reduced to ashes. Had come to rest in the middle of a mine field, on fire and with ammunition cooking off, crew were obliged to beat a hasty retreat through said field, fortunately not stepping on any thing nasty.

[prospector]

Brian Abraham.

Have you read, or seen quoted passages that Paul Holmes wrote in his book Daughters of Erebus??

When he calls our ex Chief Air Accident Inspector, a minor public servant, who was a stranger to the truth, who had very little aeronautical experience to base his findings on, calls the whole Air New Zealand operational management liars, even after that infamous statement of Justice Mahon "Had to listen to an orchestrated litany of lies" was shot down in flames by both our Appeal Court, and the Privy Council and then has the audacity to call for an apology from our Parliamentarians and an exoneration of Capt Collins and crew from any responsibility in regards to Erebus, then one does tend to get a bit upset.

You have even stated on this thread that exoneration is not the right action.

We know all about "Swiss Cheeses and holes" but only one person made the decision to descend below MSA without any certain knowledge of their position, and he must bare a share of the responsibility.

It is accepted that he was a very astute pilot, he must have been to have accomplished what he had in his past, but even astute pilots have bad days and make decisions that are wrong. Otherwise there would be no need for Air Accident Inspectors.

[Fantome]

If the court pleases, I seek leave to submit that the credentials of Brian Abraham in the matters of aviation safety analysis and accident investigation
are of a calibre, significance and extent that in the light of these qualifications he be accorded due recognition and furthermore . .. . .

. .. . . . be spared further attack by weasels ferrets and snapping yapping little mongrel dogs.

[prospector]

That is a rather pathetic submission, surely a man of the calibre you describe does not need protection provided by sycophants?????

[Fantome]

COMING BACK TO . . .. the search for the truth . .. . the accident in question .. . . the causal factors.. . .. the aftermath . .. .what could be of real value and lasting interest is a completely new study.

A top flight investigative writer given free rein to research and analyse . .. . . . to explore afresh the whole complex web of fact, fiction and opinion. . . to come at it with an open mind . . .. . . to have no truck with the simplistic conclusions drawn by god knows how many over the last thirty three years.

It is not, as some do almost belligerently claim, something to consign to the archives.. . . to close the book on now and forever. And that is surely in part due to the extraordinary psychological interplay that occurred . .. . the characters of the people who played the key roles over the years are in themselves enormous grist for the mill of the hypothetical, impartial, aspiring author.

[baron_beeza]

Paul Holmes and Erebus.

The book is about Paul Holmes, anything else is not really relevant.

Paul is the stirrer, and wants to be the centre of attention. You guys have no right to intrude into his territory.
We can leave the nitpicking and name calling to him please.

Peter Dunne may be a politician but he is not so stupid. We will see him reversing out of this deal anytime soon.

Preconceived ideas or not, Paul was difficult to watch as a broadcaster...... I have no intention whatsoever of reading any of his books.
If you want to find anything factual then I am sure there will be other places to look.

Everyone here seems to have come to an agreement.
The crash was no accident. It became about due to a large number of errors with the final ones coming from the crew of the aircraft.
There would be no reason to request an exoneration based on the discussion on this thread. You guys have probably put more thought into it than a certain 'author".

[ampan]

After a few single malts, I am moved to comment:

First, putting one's real name and address on a thread of this nature should not occur.

Second, a review of Brian Abraham's posts discloses many words, with nothing much to say. It's all Swiss Cheese and Reason, with a bit more grated cheese on top- but when push comes to shove, he accepts that Captain Collins wasn't actually visual when he went below MSA.

Of the two military men, I prefer the opinions of Group Captain Chippindale - who, according to recent research, passed School C with flying colours.

[Brian Abraham]

he accepts that Captain Collins wasn't actually visual when he went below MSA.

No where do I say that. In fact, to be quite explicit, he was in VMC, as laid down by the regulators regulations. That's if we put to one side for the moment the 6,000 foot requirement. There is absolutely no evidence that he was not in VMC right up to impact, and photographic evidence shows that.

putting one's real name and address on a thread of this nature should not occur.

For heavens sake, pray tell why not? You may wish to hide behind your anonymity to have a spray, but I won't be saying anything here that I wouldn't say to your face, in real live actual personage.

Busy with other issues at the moment, more to follow.

[prospector]

No where do I say that. In fact, to be quite explicit, he was in VMC, as laid down by the regulators regulations

He may have been VMC, but it is irrelevant, the only VMC descent procedure that could be carried out was in the area stated, specifically to avoid Mt Erebus. That descent procedure was the regulators regulations.

If he took it upon himself not to comply then when it turned to custard it was his major error.

Please read the descent requirements, there is no disputing they were aware of them, a copy was found in the cockpit after the prang. It had been practiced in the simulator, but once again totally irrelevant, the reported weather at McMurdo was well below the requirements even for the approved descent.

What is it that is so hard to understand about the word "Only".

[Brian Abraham]

What is it that is so hard to understand about the word "Only"

Absolutely nothing, what is hard to understand is the word "never", as in, no one ever did it.

Chippendale comments,

As a result of questions put to some of the pilots of earlier Antarctic flights and from comments on the CVR record recovered from this flight, it was obvious that misconceptions were held about the minimum altitude to which the aircraft was permitted to descend in VMC and the actual topography below the flight planned track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.

If confusion existed why did not crews raise the issue on return so that clarification could be made at the brief? Obviously a major issue was to hand. Chippendale unfortunately does not expand on the exact nature of the confusion, nor why it may have existed. Though I have my suspicion.

Whiteout conditions can exist within the normal VMC minima and even in the conditions defined by Air New Zealand as the minima for VMC descents to 6,000 feet.

There was no explanation of the horizon and surface definition terms in the operators’ route qualification or pre-flight dispatch planning, and only a passing reference to whiteout conditions.

The previous two quotes from Chippendale underlie the complete failure of both the regulator and airline to appreciate what they were asking the crews to under take. Neither they, nor the operating crews, know what they didn't know.

Not since the Battle of Britain have crews been thrust into an operational theatre so totally unprepared.

[ampan]

This whole VMC argument is becoming farcical. The principles of instrument flying are a bit complicated, but those of visual flying are not, and they are known to everyone with driver’s license, because no-one drives on instruments. If someone is driving down an unlit rural road at night and the headlights fail, what should the driver do? The answer is obvious: Stop the car. If a dimwit pilot is flying above the cloud and is considering going below it on the basis that he is visual, when he knows that it will be very difficult to distinguish the cloud from the terrain, what should the dimwit pilot do? The answer is equally obvious: Don’t do it.

Prospector and Brian Abraham refer the altitude of 6000 feet as having some sort of relevance. Why? What does 6000 feet have to do with anything when the aircraft hit a 13000 foot mountain at an altitude of 1500 feet? That's almost as irrelevant as the Swiss cheese, blah, blah, blah

[prospector]

Absolutely nothing, what is hard to understand is the word "never", as in, no one ever did it.

What anyone else did is completely irrelevant. Those requirements were laid down by the company for this flight, and with the wx conditions they encountered, and the end result, it is easy to see why.

Whiteout conditions can exist within the normal VMC minima and even in the conditions defined by Air New Zealand as the minima for VMC descents to 6,000 feet

.

Perhaps so, but if the descent was carried out in the approved area, where there was no high ground, surely by the time they had descended to 6,000ft, and not seen anything, like Ross Is, or the huts at McMurdo, or anything they would know they were in whiteout conditions and climb back to MSA in the same approved area.

Even Gordon Vette acknowledges that the prior flights were lucky not to have been caught the same way.
.

There was no explanation of the horizon and surface definition terms in the operators’ route qualification or pre-flight dispatch planning, and only a passing reference to whiteout conditions

Holmes apparently states in his book that Collins and Lucas both attended a briefing session conducted by RNZAF on Antarctic flight which no doubt would have covered white out conditions. If one was rostered to conduct one of these flights then surely one would conduct one's own research on likely problems to be encountered?? Or does airline flying demand everything be laid out on a plate, even for senior captains???

What does 6000 feet have to do with anything when the aircraft hit a 13000 foot mountain at an altitude of 1500 feet? That's almost as irrelevant as the Swiss cheese, blah, blah, blah

There were a number of reasons why 6,000ft was selected as the MDA for these flights. One of the more important being to minimize the risk of bird strike. The damage a flock of skua gulls could inflict at 260kts plus would be considerable. But as you say, relevant to hitting the mountain at 1500ft 6.000ft is not really relevant.

[Brian Abraham]

What anyone else did is completely irrelevant. Those requirements were laid down by the company for this flight, and with the wx conditions they encountered

So please explain why the level of confusion.

As a result of questions put to some of the pilots of earlier Antarctic flights and from comments on the CVR record recovered from this flight, it was obvious that misconceptions were held about the minimum altitude to which the aircraft was permitted to descend in VMC and the actual topography below the flight planned track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.

This whole VMC argument is becoming farcical. The principles of instrument flying are a bit complicated, but those of visual flying are not, and they are known to everyone with driver’s license

Apparently not. A flight may descend below the MSA if in VMC. The person responsible for determining if VMC exists is the PIC. (Australian regs, and I doubt NZ would be any different.

[prospector]

The person responsible for determining if VMC exists is the PIC. (Australian regs, and I doubt NZ would be any different.

The previous two quotes from Chippendale underlie the complete failure of both the regulator and airline to appreciate what they were asking the crews to under take. Neither they, nor the operating crews, know what they didn't know.

It is a well known fact that Captain Gemmel (Chief Pilot ANZ) was one of the ANZ people that went to the American Deefreeze Operations people to pick their brains on any suggestions they had relative to ANZ Antarctic operations. They were well aware if white out and visibility vagaries in the Antarctic. That was why the descent requirements were so restrictive. By bypassing the requirement for the captain to have been down to the ice as an observer or FO, therefor possibily not realizing if they were in whiteout conditions or not, as Capt Vette states, they lost the right to decide if they were VMC. The descent was to be carried out as laid down to avoid high ground whether VMC or not.

[Brian Abraham]

It is a well known fact that Captain Gemmel (Chief Pilot ANZ) was one of the ANZ people that went to the American Deefreeze Operations people to pick their brains on any suggestions they had relative to ANZ Antarctic operations. They were well aware if white out and visibility vagaries in the Antarctic. That was why the descent requirements were so restrictive. By bypassing the requirement for the captain to have been down to the ice as an observer or FO, therefor possibily not realizing if they were in whiteout conditions or not, as Capt Vette states, they lost the right to decide if they were VMC. The descent was to be carried out as laid down to avoid high ground whether VMC or not.

What a load of cods wallop. You're clutching at straws prospector. The airline itself decided that pilots didn't need to take a trip as an observer. The CAA wasn't even aware the airline had bypassed the CAA requirement for the Captains to make a trip as an observer. Anything Captain Gemmel says is immediately suspect, he wouldn't know the truth if it smacked him in the balls.

They were well aware if white out and visibility vagaries in the Antarctic

If that be the case they did a **** house job of passing that knowledge onto the crews.

What anyone else did is completely irrelevant.

I blanch at your sang-froid.

One of the more important being to minimize the risk of bird strike. The damage a flock of skua gulls could inflict at 260kts plus would be considerable

I call bull**** on this, and would love to know where you availed yourself of this information. As far as I'm aware Skuas are solitary birds and do not fly around in flocks, and nor do they fly at any considerable altitude. Never the less, I've messaged a nephew who is a glaciological scientist down on the ice to put me in touch with an individual who can answer the question. I'll let you know.

The descent was to be carried out as laid down to avoid high ground whether VMC or not

So how did the flight that that diverted to the west manage to get down to 1,000 feet agl over the glaciers.

Just had a call from my nephew who confirmed you are very lucky to see a Skua flying at anything greater than head height, and nor do they fly in flocks. So it would seem your source of information regarding Skuas and their habits is full of bollox.

[prospector]

I think Ornis put it very well, post 570, so even non aviators could understand, but apparently not. Here it is again, fits this Erebus event very well.

There are always going to be differences of opinion depending on how you weight outcomes. If you drive through a red light you might get a warning, you might get a fine. If you drive through a red light and kill someone you will be done for dangerous driving causing death. Why? What changed?

Police and ambulances drive through red lights because they need to. Collins did not need to "drive through a red light", but did so; the consequences were catastrophic.

When you printed the following one thought perhaps you were correct, but now I believe yours takes the prize.

Foregive me, that is the most stupid post I've ever seen posted on

PPRuNe.

. Anything Captain Gemmel says is immediately suspect, he wouldn't know the truth if it smacked him in the balls

I was wrong on the point that Gemmell was Chief Pilot, he was in fact Manager Flight Operations at the relevant time.

On what do you base such a statement, not anything Justice Mahon said I would hope, Justice Mahon's handling of witness statements was well and truly shot down by both the NZ Appeal Court, and the Privy Council

Skua Gulls, from John King publication.

Scavenging Skua Gulls were kept at bay with flares and frequent gunshot blasts

Presumably all the recovery teams kept their heads down, below head height, and the gulls were not getting hypoxic at 1.500ft.

[Ornis]

Brian Abraham, you ignore all my arguments but pick up "went looking for trouble", which everybody knows is just an expression, normally to give an admonition. You then appear to address another's comments. Having a bit of trouble with the old memory?

Despite inadequacies in planning, training, briefing, regulatory oversight; the change in waypoint; the weather and sector whiteout: the accident was not inevitable. Or, if it was, it was only because Collins had a mindset, which NZALPA quaintly call "situational awareness". And here's me, an unpretentious recreational pilot, thinking SA was knowing where you were and where you were going, not deciding thousands of miles away you were going to look at a mountain come hell or high water.

The cause of the crash was Collins flying visual when he couldn't see Erebus, where he thought it was or anywhere, despite descending in an unapproved manner, when he knew it was close and the visibility was putatively 40nm, then, instead of climbing out over the sea which every pilot knows is safe, electing to fly south over the coast where he could not tell the difference between the ice and the cloud.

As a matter of fact I have studied psychology at university, and some psychiatry for that matter, but as good an explanation as any is my late mother's: Collins had a brainstorm. Man is descended from bacteria, fish and "crocodiles". He is inherently irrational and erratic and there is a wide range in ability to observe and think.

You seemed reluctant to hold pilots responsible for piloting. Certainly airlines know to mandate autopilot and keep aircraft out of trouble above MSA. Airbus try desperately to make their aircraft idiot-proof, but even Airbus could not stop pilots taking an A320 down to 99kts on an approach to Perpignan, contrary to the Airbus manual and good airmanship.

You can beat around the bush all you like, nothing new has emerged. Your arguments hardly get off the ground and your ammunition is all blank. Collins was given a task he was perfectly well qualified to do, but he decided to do it his way. No wonder Air NZ, for all its faults, responded negatively. Had I lost my children, I would shoot Poor Gnomes in the knees. All the better for crawling to the Collins women.

[framer]

As a matter of fact I have studied psychology at university, and some psychiatry for that matter, but as good an explanation as any is my late mother's: Collins had a brainstorm. Man is descended from bacteria, fish and "crocodiles". He is inherently irrational and erratic and there is a wide range in ability to observe and think.

I´ve thought about the psychology of it a bit over the years. It´s well established that humans tend to choose the ´sure thing´when faced between two attractive options and to gamble when faced with two unattractive options. In this case, Collins was faced with two unattractive options,

1/ Descending below MSA trying to maintain separation visually and
2/ remaining at MSA and potentially not achieving the goal of showing his passengers what they came to see.

It seems to be a fairly natural human trait to take the risky option when both choices are unattractive. I wonder if being an airline Captain requires a certain ability to overcome that natural tendency. I think it probably does.

As for determining which side you come down on when discussing the event decades later. That too is interesting from a psychological perspective.
My feeling is that people immediately recognise their own ´moral intuition´about Erebus, and then look for supporting evidence to construct their argument. With Erebus there is very powerful emotion involved (particularly surrounding Air NZ´s behaviour after the event) as well as a complex case so it is easy to find evidence supporting an argument either supporting Collins or against him.
My opinion is that accurate descriptions of the responsibilities only occur when those emotions and ´moral intuitions´are removed from the process.

[Aimpoint]

600 posts and we're still going around in circles about this...