View Poll Results: Would you willingly submit to full body scanning, should it be introduced?
Yes
82
10.12%
No
685
84.57%
Undecided
43
5.31%
Voters: 810. This poll is closed
Body Scanners: Will you go for the genital feel up or the nude photos and a cancer?
Bottums Up
I think, as a blue blooded bloke, one would need a Bex & a good sit (lie) down after the pat down prior to performing any safety related duties. Might easily miss something important if one's blood pressure's through the roof after being groped by some security nazi! 
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Screening procedures are dictated by the government and its legislation, not the carriers.
No way will i undergo radiation therapy. They can play with my balls all day long.
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As usual, there are often other ways of doing things. Please read the following.
The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother
Published On Wed Dec 30 2009Cathal Kelly Staff Reporter
While North America's airports groan under the weight of another sea-change in security protocols, one word keeps popping out of the mouths of experts: Israelification.
That is, how can we make our airports more like Israel's, which deal with far greater terror threat with far less inconvenience.
"It is mindboggling for us Israelis to look at what happens in North America, because we went through this 50 years ago," said Rafi Sela, the president of AR Challenges, a global transportation security consultancy. He's worked with the RCMP, the U.S. Navy Seals and airports around the world.
"Israelis, unlike Canadians and Americans, don't take s--- from anybody. When the security agency in Israel (the ISA) started to tighten security and we had to wait in line for — not for hours — but 30 or 40 minutes, all hell broke loose here. We said, 'We're not going to do this. You're going to find a way that will take care of security without touching the efficiency of the airport."
That, in a nutshell is "Israelification" - a system that protects life and limb without annoying you to death.
Fliers urged to opt out of airport security en masse
Despite facing dozens of potential threats each day, the security set-up at Israel's largest hub, Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight. How do they manage that?
"The first thing you do is to look at who is coming into your airport," said Sela.
The first layer of actual security that greets travellers at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport is a roadside check. All drivers are stopped and asked two questions: How are you? Where are you coming from?
"Two benign questions. The questions aren't important. The way people act when they answer them is," Sela said.
Officers are looking for nervousness or other signs of "distress" — behavioural profiling. Sela rejects the argument that profiling is discriminatory.
"The word 'profiling' is a political invention by people who don't want to do security," he said. "To us, it doesn't matter if he's black, white, young or old. It's just his behaviour. So what kind of privacy am I really stepping on when I'm doing this?"
Once you've parked your car or gotten off your bus, you pass through the second and third security perimeters.
Armed guards outside the terminal are trained to observe passengers as they move toward the doors, again looking for odd behaviour. At Ben Gurion's half-dozen entrances, another layer of security are watching. At this point, some travellers will be randomly taken aside, and their person and their luggage run through a magnometer.
"This is to see that you don't have heavy metals on you or something that looks suspicious," said Sela.
You are now in the terminal. As you approach your airline check-in desk, a trained interviewer takes your passport and ticket. They ask a series of questions: Who packed your luggage? Has it left your side?
"The whole time, they are looking into your eyes — which is very embarrassing. But this is one of the ways they figure out if you are suspicious or not. It takes 20, 25 seconds," said Sela.
Lines are staggered. People are not allowed to bunch up into inviting targets for a bomber who has gotten this far.
At the check-in desk, your luggage is scanned immediately in a purpose-built area. Sela plays devil's advocate — what if you have escaped the attention of the first four layers of security, and now try to pass a bag with a bomb in it?
"I once put this question to Jacques Duchesneau (the former head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority): say there is a bag with play-doh in it and two pens stuck in the play-doh. That is 'Bombs 101' to a screener. I asked Ducheneau, 'What would you do?' And he said, 'Evacuate the terminal.' And I said, 'Oh. My. God.'
"Take Pearson. Do you know how many people are in the terminal at all times? Many thousands. Let's say I'm (doing an evacuation) without panic — which will never happen. But let's say this is the case. How long will it take? Nobody thought about it. I said, 'Two days.'"
A screener at Ben-Gurion has a pair of better options.
First, the screening area is surrounded by contoured, blast-proof glass that can contain the detonation of up to 100 kilos of plastic explosive. Only the few dozen people within the screening area need be removed, and only to a point a few metres away.
Second, all the screening areas contain 'bomb boxes'. If a screener spots a suspect bag, he/she is trained to pick it up and place it in the box, which is blast proof. A bomb squad arrives shortly and wheels the box away for further investigation.
"This is a very small simple example of how we can simply stop a problem that would cripple one of your airports," Sela said.
Five security layers down: you now finally arrive at the only one which Ben-Gurion Airport shares with Pearson — the body and hand-luggage check.
"But here it is done completely, absolutely 180 degrees differently than it is done in North America," Sela said.
"First, it's fast — there's almost no line. That's because they're not looking for liquids, they're not looking at your shoes. They're not looking for everything they look for in North America. They just look at you," said Sela. "Even today with the heightened security in North America, they will check your items to death. But they will never look at you, at how you behave. They will never look into your eyes ... and that's how you figure out the bad guys from the good guys."
That's the process — six layers, four hard, two soft. The goal at Ben-Gurion is to move fliers from the parking lot to the airport lounge in a maximum of 25 minutes.
This doesn't begin to cover the off-site security net that failed so spectacularly in targeting would-be Flight 253 bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab — intelligence. In Israel, Sela said, a coordinated intelligence gathering operation produces a constantly evolving series of threat analyses and vulnerability studies.
"There is absolutely no intelligence and threat analysis done in Canada or the United States," Sela said. "Absolutely none."
But even without the intelligence, Sela maintains, Abdulmutallab would not have gotten past Ben Gurion Airport's behavioural profilers.
So. Eight years after 9/11, why are we still so reactive, so un-Israelified?
Working hard to dampen his outrage, Sela first blames our leaders, and then ourselves.
"We have a saying in Hebrew that it's much easier to look for a lost key under the light, than to look for the key where you actually lost it, because it's dark over there. That's exactly how (North American airport security officials) act," Sela said. "You can easily do what we do. You don't have to replace anything. You have to add just a little bit — technology, training. But you have to completely change the way you go about doing airport security. And that is something that the bureaucrats have a problem with. They are very well enclosed in their own concept."
And rather than fear, he suggests that outrage would be a far more powerful spur to provoking that change.
"Do you know why Israelis are so calm? We have brutal terror attacks on our civilians and still, life in Israel is pretty good. The reason is that people trust their defence forces, their police, their response teams and the security agencies. They know they're doing a good job. You can't say the same thing about Americans and Canadians. They don't trust anybody," Sela said. "But they say, 'So far, so good'. Then if something happens, all hell breaks loose and you've spent eight hours in an airport. Which is ridiculous. Not justifiable
"But, what can you do? Americans and Canadians are nice people and they will do anything because they were told to do so and because they don't know any different."
The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother
Published On Wed Dec 30 2009Cathal Kelly Staff Reporter
While North America's airports groan under the weight of another sea-change in security protocols, one word keeps popping out of the mouths of experts: Israelification.
That is, how can we make our airports more like Israel's, which deal with far greater terror threat with far less inconvenience.
"It is mindboggling for us Israelis to look at what happens in North America, because we went through this 50 years ago," said Rafi Sela, the president of AR Challenges, a global transportation security consultancy. He's worked with the RCMP, the U.S. Navy Seals and airports around the world.
"Israelis, unlike Canadians and Americans, don't take s--- from anybody. When the security agency in Israel (the ISA) started to tighten security and we had to wait in line for — not for hours — but 30 or 40 minutes, all hell broke loose here. We said, 'We're not going to do this. You're going to find a way that will take care of security without touching the efficiency of the airport."
That, in a nutshell is "Israelification" - a system that protects life and limb without annoying you to death.
Fliers urged to opt out of airport security en masse
Despite facing dozens of potential threats each day, the security set-up at Israel's largest hub, Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight. How do they manage that?
"The first thing you do is to look at who is coming into your airport," said Sela.
The first layer of actual security that greets travellers at Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport is a roadside check. All drivers are stopped and asked two questions: How are you? Where are you coming from?
"Two benign questions. The questions aren't important. The way people act when they answer them is," Sela said.
Officers are looking for nervousness or other signs of "distress" — behavioural profiling. Sela rejects the argument that profiling is discriminatory.
"The word 'profiling' is a political invention by people who don't want to do security," he said. "To us, it doesn't matter if he's black, white, young or old. It's just his behaviour. So what kind of privacy am I really stepping on when I'm doing this?"
Once you've parked your car or gotten off your bus, you pass through the second and third security perimeters.
Armed guards outside the terminal are trained to observe passengers as they move toward the doors, again looking for odd behaviour. At Ben Gurion's half-dozen entrances, another layer of security are watching. At this point, some travellers will be randomly taken aside, and their person and their luggage run through a magnometer.
"This is to see that you don't have heavy metals on you or something that looks suspicious," said Sela.
You are now in the terminal. As you approach your airline check-in desk, a trained interviewer takes your passport and ticket. They ask a series of questions: Who packed your luggage? Has it left your side?
"The whole time, they are looking into your eyes — which is very embarrassing. But this is one of the ways they figure out if you are suspicious or not. It takes 20, 25 seconds," said Sela.
Lines are staggered. People are not allowed to bunch up into inviting targets for a bomber who has gotten this far.
At the check-in desk, your luggage is scanned immediately in a purpose-built area. Sela plays devil's advocate — what if you have escaped the attention of the first four layers of security, and now try to pass a bag with a bomb in it?
"I once put this question to Jacques Duchesneau (the former head of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority): say there is a bag with play-doh in it and two pens stuck in the play-doh. That is 'Bombs 101' to a screener. I asked Ducheneau, 'What would you do?' And he said, 'Evacuate the terminal.' And I said, 'Oh. My. God.'
"Take Pearson. Do you know how many people are in the terminal at all times? Many thousands. Let's say I'm (doing an evacuation) without panic — which will never happen. But let's say this is the case. How long will it take? Nobody thought about it. I said, 'Two days.'"
A screener at Ben-Gurion has a pair of better options.
First, the screening area is surrounded by contoured, blast-proof glass that can contain the detonation of up to 100 kilos of plastic explosive. Only the few dozen people within the screening area need be removed, and only to a point a few metres away.
Second, all the screening areas contain 'bomb boxes'. If a screener spots a suspect bag, he/she is trained to pick it up and place it in the box, which is blast proof. A bomb squad arrives shortly and wheels the box away for further investigation.
"This is a very small simple example of how we can simply stop a problem that would cripple one of your airports," Sela said.
Five security layers down: you now finally arrive at the only one which Ben-Gurion Airport shares with Pearson — the body and hand-luggage check.
"But here it is done completely, absolutely 180 degrees differently than it is done in North America," Sela said.
"First, it's fast — there's almost no line. That's because they're not looking for liquids, they're not looking at your shoes. They're not looking for everything they look for in North America. They just look at you," said Sela. "Even today with the heightened security in North America, they will check your items to death. But they will never look at you, at how you behave. They will never look into your eyes ... and that's how you figure out the bad guys from the good guys."
That's the process — six layers, four hard, two soft. The goal at Ben-Gurion is to move fliers from the parking lot to the airport lounge in a maximum of 25 minutes.
This doesn't begin to cover the off-site security net that failed so spectacularly in targeting would-be Flight 253 bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab — intelligence. In Israel, Sela said, a coordinated intelligence gathering operation produces a constantly evolving series of threat analyses and vulnerability studies.
"There is absolutely no intelligence and threat analysis done in Canada or the United States," Sela said. "Absolutely none."
But even without the intelligence, Sela maintains, Abdulmutallab would not have gotten past Ben Gurion Airport's behavioural profilers.
So. Eight years after 9/11, why are we still so reactive, so un-Israelified?
Working hard to dampen his outrage, Sela first blames our leaders, and then ourselves.
"We have a saying in Hebrew that it's much easier to look for a lost key under the light, than to look for the key where you actually lost it, because it's dark over there. That's exactly how (North American airport security officials) act," Sela said. "You can easily do what we do. You don't have to replace anything. You have to add just a little bit — technology, training. But you have to completely change the way you go about doing airport security. And that is something that the bureaucrats have a problem with. They are very well enclosed in their own concept."
And rather than fear, he suggests that outrage would be a far more powerful spur to provoking that change.
"Do you know why Israelis are so calm? We have brutal terror attacks on our civilians and still, life in Israel is pretty good. The reason is that people trust their defence forces, their police, their response teams and the security agencies. They know they're doing a good job. You can't say the same thing about Americans and Canadians. They don't trust anybody," Sela said. "But they say, 'So far, so good'. Then if something happens, all hell breaks loose and you've spent eight hours in an airport. Which is ridiculous. Not justifiable
"But, what can you do? Americans and Canadians are nice people and they will do anything because they were told to do so and because they don't know any different."
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The 'Israelification' of airports: High security, little bother
What price Australia doing the same?
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Great article, thanks. However Pinky (g'day btw) has hit on the key word...price. The Austalian government won't pay for the number of trained officers it takes to run the Israeli rockshow. Hell, they don't even pay for the current setup but duckshove responsibility to private companies that pay the bare minimum, train to the bare minimum and for the most part, hire the bare minimum.
Good luck with Senator X, that's a great idea. People who work in oil refineries, fertilizer factories, DG transport companies and many other risky places can go to work with a bare minimum (if any) security, so why are aviation workers subjected to more intrusive and incovenient harassment every time we draw breath?
Good luck with Senator X, that's a great idea. People who work in oil refineries, fertilizer factories, DG transport companies and many other risky places can go to work with a bare minimum (if any) security, so why are aviation workers subjected to more intrusive and incovenient harassment every time we draw breath?
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Update on Plane Talking by Ben Sandilands:
Looks like the Moron Minister Albanese is determined to make his mark again. (failed dismally with jump seat policy!)
and
Damn right no scan no fly. You'll be missing 84% of the pilots on this forum. Then again he'll probably find a way to get some highschool students to sit in the right seat.
I love the references to "low level" radiation. Let me guess its all going to be fine because the government says so. Hmm I might go and get some insulation in my ceiling while I'm at it. People die prematurely when people with this IQ level are allowed to make decisions.
My question to the minister STILL is:
Why are cleaners, caterers, baggage handlers and refuellers and other staff allowed airside with no screening yet crews have to be screened? How is this system working to increase safety?
Plane Talking
November 19, 2010 – 5:52 pm, by Ben Sandilands
There will be no intimate, offensive or indecent physical examinations of air travellers using Australian airports when body scanners are introduced in the New Year.
A spokesperson for the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, Anthony Albanese, confirmed that Australia would not go down the same path as the US Transportation Security Administration, which has caused uproar at American airports by requiring physical genital area touching and feeling searches of those passengers and pilots who refuse to submit to revealing imaging X-ray scans before boarding aircraft.
The spokesperson said that a final decision on the technology to be used initially at a number of Australian international air terminals had not been made, but that the selection would seek out the devices that produced the least possible amount of radiation and coded the data so that the operators could only see stick figures on which suspicious objects would be identified by symbols.
The scanners would be used for secondary rather than primary screening.
Plane Talking understands that instead of ordering persons who refused body scanning to submit to a hands on experience, the Australian way will be to deny boarding to the passenger, who will be told to leave the terminal.
No scan, no fly. Simple. (Maybe). Certainly different to the inane situation in San Diego in which John Tyner, a software engineer, who refused to have ‘my junk’ touched by a TSA official, was then threatened with a $10,000 fine if he left the terminal, even though he had cancelled his flight, received a refund for the fare, and no longer had any reason to be at the airport.
The public anger over the new TSA get-naked-scanned or get-physically-examined procedure continues to grow in the US. The media is full of stories questioning government mandated molestation as a prerequisite for boarding an airliner, and social media videos of passengers being ordered to submit to manual checks that would in criminal law be a sexual or indecent assault.
These incidents have also involved children and elderly passengers.
In the past week an Opt-Out protest movement has begun to grow through social and public media in the US, with calls for mass refusals to submit to physical checks or electronic strip searches next Wednesday, the day before Thanksgiving, and one of the busiest days for domestic air travel in the US. However there are some doubts that many travellers would give up their turkey and family reunion feasts on that day, even if they start to cut back on air travel at other times.
In Australia, part of the emphasis of the evaluation process for secondary scanning machines has been on the potentially harmful cumulative effects of low levels of radiation on those who operate the machines or who as other airport workers or pilots have to cross the landside/airside security divide many times a day.
In the US however the TSA prohibited the wearing of radiation dosimeters by its airport workers, thus removing the risk of employees being able to prove excessive exposure to the scanners.
It could be that the theatrical and often hysterical political investment in security paranoia in the US has finally outreached itself. Literally.
November 19, 2010 – 5:52 pm, by Ben Sandilands
There will be no intimate, offensive or indecent physical examinations of air travellers using Australian airports when body scanners are introduced in the New Year.
A spokesperson for the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, Anthony Albanese, confirmed that Australia would not go down the same path as the US Transportation Security Administration, which has caused uproar at American airports by requiring physical genital area touching and feeling searches of those passengers and pilots who refuse to submit to revealing imaging X-ray scans before boarding aircraft.
The spokesperson said that a final decision on the technology to be used initially at a number of Australian international air terminals had not been made, but that the selection would seek out the devices that produced the least possible amount of radiation and coded the data so that the operators could only see stick figures on which suspicious objects would be identified by symbols.
The scanners would be used for secondary rather than primary screening.
Plane Talking understands that instead of ordering persons who refused body scanning to submit to a hands on experience, the Australian way will be to deny boarding to the passenger, who will be told to leave the terminal.
No scan, no fly. Simple. (Maybe). Certainly different to the inane situation in San Diego in which John Tyner, a software engineer, who refused to have ‘my junk’ touched by a TSA official, was then threatened with a $10,000 fine if he left the terminal, even though he had cancelled his flight, received a refund for the fare, and no longer had any reason to be at the airport.
The public anger over the new TSA get-naked-scanned or get-physically-examined procedure continues to grow in the US. The media is full of stories questioning government mandated molestation as a prerequisite for boarding an airliner, and social media videos of passengers being ordered to submit to manual checks that would in criminal law be a sexual or indecent assault.
These incidents have also involved children and elderly passengers.
In the past week an Opt-Out protest movement has begun to grow through social and public media in the US, with calls for mass refusals to submit to physical checks or electronic strip searches next Wednesday, the day before Thanksgiving, and one of the busiest days for domestic air travel in the US. However there are some doubts that many travellers would give up their turkey and family reunion feasts on that day, even if they start to cut back on air travel at other times.
In Australia, part of the emphasis of the evaluation process for secondary scanning machines has been on the potentially harmful cumulative effects of low levels of radiation on those who operate the machines or who as other airport workers or pilots have to cross the landside/airside security divide many times a day.
In the US however the TSA prohibited the wearing of radiation dosimeters by its airport workers, thus removing the risk of employees being able to prove excessive exposure to the scanners.
It could be that the theatrical and often hysterical political investment in security paranoia in the US has finally outreached itself. Literally.
the Australian way will be to deny boarding to the passenger, who will be told to leave the terminal.
No scan, no fly. Simple.
I love the references to "low level" radiation. Let me guess its all going to be fine because the government says so. Hmm I might go and get some insulation in my ceiling while I'm at it. People die prematurely when people with this IQ level are allowed to make decisions.
My question to the minister STILL is:
Why are cleaners, caterers, baggage handlers and refuellers and other staff allowed airside with no screening yet crews have to be screened? How is this system working to increase safety?
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Thanks to Sandilands for taking this into the public arena.
Not just no scan no fly, but no scan no CS counter, no boarding and aerobridge driving, no terminal operations, no cleaning, the list goes on. These employees are all easier to train/replace than pilots, but still integral to getting the punters airborne. When I worked in a terminal I would often pass through screening ten times a day.
A hell of a lot of people work in the air and on the ground to keep aviation happening. It would be awesome to see those thousands of people come together just once to defend their health and dignity, no matter what company they work for or their professional status.
Anyway, so what exactly is 'secondary screening'? Is it the same as the so called random explosives testing? Those of you with a swarthy appearance will know just how 'random' it really is, having been trace detected more often than a parcel from the Miami Gun Show.
I wonder if the sales people who work for the manufacturers of these infernal machines have been in the Land of Oz recently hawking their product to our esteemed leaders. It's happened with seach equipment before, where the Canberra-ites have gone 'wow, that's so cool we'll order 50 of them' only to find that the bloody things don't do anything the sales pitch promised (and sometimes a few undesirable things that it didn't 
).
Damn right no scan no fly. You'll be missing 84% of the pilots on this forum.
A hell of a lot of people work in the air and on the ground to keep aviation happening. It would be awesome to see those thousands of people come together just once to defend their health and dignity, no matter what company they work for or their professional status.
Anyway, so what exactly is 'secondary screening'? Is it the same as the so called random explosives testing? Those of you with a swarthy appearance will know just how 'random' it really is, having been trace detected more often than a parcel from the Miami Gun Show.
The spokesperson said that a final decision on the technology to be used initially at a number of Australian international air terminals had not been made, but that the selection would seek out the devices that produced the least possible amount of radiation and coded the data so that the operators could only see stick figures on which suspicious objects would be identified by symbols.
).
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BEN SANDILANDS, if you are reading, will you PLEASE, get it out into the media, what Mr Hat and the rest of us professional pilots have been saying for YEARS:
Why are cleaners, caterers, baggage handlers and refuellers and other staff allowed airside with no screening yet crews have to be screened? How is this system working to increase safety?
Why are cleaners, caterers, baggage handlers and refuellers and other staff allowed airside with no screening yet crews have to be screened? How is this system working to increase safety?
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Anyway, so what exactly is 'secondary screening'?
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TSA: Pilots to be exempt from some airport checks
TSA: Pilots to be exempt from some airport checks - BusinessWeek
TSA: Pilots to be exempt from some airport checks - BusinessWeek
Why are cleaners, caterers, baggage handlers and refuellers and other staff allowed airside with no screening yet crews have to be screened? How is this system working to increase safety?
More importantly, why are pilots not exempt as we once (not so long ago) were? Let's try to focus on getting back into this group of exempt employees !
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005
Part 4 Other security measures Division 4.1 Screening and clearing
Regulation 4.10
4.10
4.11
122
(1)
(b) may pass through a screening point under regulation 4.10.
Persons who may pass through screening point without being screened
For paragraph 41 (2) (b) of the Act, the following persons may pass through a screening point without being screened:
(a) a law enforcement officer who produces his or her identity card as a law enforcement officer;
(b) a screening officer who is engaged in the management of the screening point;
(c) an ambulance, rescue or fire service officer who is responding to an emergency on the landside of the airport;
(d) a member of the Defence Force who is responding to an event or threat of unlawful interference with aviation.
Persons who may enter certain cleared areas other than through screening point
Sterile areas
For paragraph 41 (2) (c) of the Act, a person mentioned in subregulation (2) may enter an area that is a cleared area other than through a screening point if:
(a)
(b)
for a sterile area within the cleared area — either of the following apply:
(i) he or she is authorised to do so and properly displays a valid ASIC;
(ii) he or she is authorised to do so, properly displays a valid VIC and is supervised by somebody who may enter the sterile area other than through a screening point and properly displays a valid ASIC; and
for a LAGs cleared area within the cleared area — he or she does not have in his or her possession an impermissible LAG product.
Persons who may enter sterile area
(2) For subregulation (1), the persons are the following: (a) an aviation security inspector; (b) an officer of the Australian Customs Service; (c) a screening officer;
(d) an employee of the operator of the airport in which the sterile area is located;
(e) an employee of the operator of a screened air service aircraft;
(f) a contractor, and an employee of a contractor, to the operator of the airport in which the sterile area is located who is engaged in the loading of cargo, stores or checked baggage, or the boarding of passengers, onto a cleared aircraft that is operating a screened air service, or who is otherwise authorised for access to the aircraft;
(g) a contractor, and an employee of a contractor, to the operator of a screened air service aircraft who is engaged in the loading of cargo, stores or checked baggage, or the boarding of passengers, onto a cleared aircraft that is operating a screened air service, or who is otherwise authorised for access to the aircraft.
So as it stands, we are deemed a 'potential terrorist' (quoted straight from a screening officers mouth) until we have passed through the screening point then we are deemed as trusted aircrew once cleared.
Better make sure we check you for explosive traces too because you might just have EXPLOSIVES in your bag! Ok you're all cleared now and we deem you safe to fly your AEROPLANE....
What would it take for us to be exempt once again?
How could a unified professional pilot group once again arrive at work exempted from the absolutely ridiculous and laughable practice of screening us for things we have no need for? I'm sure it is possible if done correctly!
Some lobbying via AIPA and AFAP perhaps?
And Moderators, how about 2 polls...
First: 'Have you arrived at work overly stressed/anxious due to the screening process/attitudes of screening officers?'
Second:'If YES how often do you arrive at work in this stressed/anxious state?'
More importantly, why are pilots not exempt as we once (not so long ago) were? Let's try to focus on getting back into this group of exempt employees !
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005
Part 4 Other security measures Division 4.1 Screening and clearing
Regulation 4.10
4.10
4.11
122
(1)
(b) may pass through a screening point under regulation 4.10.
Persons who may pass through screening point without being screened
For paragraph 41 (2) (b) of the Act, the following persons may pass through a screening point without being screened:
(a) a law enforcement officer who produces his or her identity card as a law enforcement officer;
(b) a screening officer who is engaged in the management of the screening point;
(c) an ambulance, rescue or fire service officer who is responding to an emergency on the landside of the airport;
(d) a member of the Defence Force who is responding to an event or threat of unlawful interference with aviation.
Persons who may enter certain cleared areas other than through screening point
Sterile areas
For paragraph 41 (2) (c) of the Act, a person mentioned in subregulation (2) may enter an area that is a cleared area other than through a screening point if:
(a)
(b)
for a sterile area within the cleared area — either of the following apply:
(i) he or she is authorised to do so and properly displays a valid ASIC;
(ii) he or she is authorised to do so, properly displays a valid VIC and is supervised by somebody who may enter the sterile area other than through a screening point and properly displays a valid ASIC; and
for a LAGs cleared area within the cleared area — he or she does not have in his or her possession an impermissible LAG product.
Persons who may enter sterile area
(2) For subregulation (1), the persons are the following: (a) an aviation security inspector; (b) an officer of the Australian Customs Service; (c) a screening officer;
(d) an employee of the operator of the airport in which the sterile area is located;
(e) an employee of the operator of a screened air service aircraft;
(f) a contractor, and an employee of a contractor, to the operator of the airport in which the sterile area is located who is engaged in the loading of cargo, stores or checked baggage, or the boarding of passengers, onto a cleared aircraft that is operating a screened air service, or who is otherwise authorised for access to the aircraft;
(g) a contractor, and an employee of a contractor, to the operator of a screened air service aircraft who is engaged in the loading of cargo, stores or checked baggage, or the boarding of passengers, onto a cleared aircraft that is operating a screened air service, or who is otherwise authorised for access to the aircraft.
So as it stands, we are deemed a 'potential terrorist' (quoted straight from a screening officers mouth) until we have passed through the screening point then we are deemed as trusted aircrew once cleared.
Better make sure we check you for explosive traces too because you might just have EXPLOSIVES in your bag! Ok you're all cleared now and we deem you safe to fly your AEROPLANE....
What would it take for us to be exempt once again?
How could a unified professional pilot group once again arrive at work exempted from the absolutely ridiculous and laughable practice of screening us for things we have no need for? I'm sure it is possible if done correctly!
Some lobbying via AIPA and AFAP perhaps?
And Moderators, how about 2 polls...
First: 'Have you arrived at work overly stressed/anxious due to the screening process/attitudes of screening officers?'
Second:'If YES how often do you arrive at work in this stressed/anxious state?'
Last edited by scumbag; 20th Nov 2010 at 08:52.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: in the classroom of life
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Veteran FA gets abused
Enough is Enough..........I think the war on stupidity is ramping up a little.This is an example of disgusting 
Pat-down woman forced to show fake breast
More and more folk will start coming forward and hopefully this garbage will get turned around
Pat-down woman forced to show fake breast
More and more folk will start coming forward and hopefully this garbage will get turned around
The OTS needs to be reined in also and be required to serously consult with industry. Holding a few seminars and meetings to tick off the consultation requirement before going to the minister doesn't cut it.
Join Date: Jan 2001
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For me, I will be diplomatic, and say,,,...
GET F^&$%(#ED - you M%*%(%$ERS!
You can scan me a mullion times, strip me, and I will walk to the aeroplane naked. I will still have the most dangerous weapon on the planet - the grey crap between my ears - of which will be strapped to a 300 ton missile filled with jet fuel - but hey you can have my tiny can of deoderant if it makes your day.
The reality is we subjected to the most ongoing set of checks annually than most other industries, and have been working at it for alot of years, - would we do this just to sneak something aboard an aircraft we have control of anyway???
We should be more worried about the blokes who seem to have an all acess - back stage pass to all areas nooquestions asked, without the groping and "it's your shoes".
Reality check Mr Albanese and co!!
GET F^&$%(#ED - you M%*%(%$ERS!
You can scan me a mullion times, strip me, and I will walk to the aeroplane naked. I will still have the most dangerous weapon on the planet - the grey crap between my ears - of which will be strapped to a 300 ton missile filled with jet fuel - but hey you can have my tiny can of deoderant if it makes your day.
The reality is we subjected to the most ongoing set of checks annually than most other industries, and have been working at it for alot of years, - would we do this just to sneak something aboard an aircraft we have control of anyway???
We should be more worried about the blokes who seem to have an all acess - back stage pass to all areas nooquestions asked, without the groping and "it's your shoes".
Reality check Mr Albanese and co!!
Last edited by rho; 20th Nov 2010 at 09:25.
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I dunno. I'm an old bloke and the thought of a bit of a feel-up is giving me a semi. It's free, too. You don't have to buy the groper a drink or dinner.Seriously, though, it is time to throw out the toys and say f*** this.