Renamed & Merged: Qantas Severe Engine Damage Over Indonesia

[Capt Kremin]

But don't the SIA Trent 900's operate at 2000lbs less thrust?

I am the last person to defend QF but this at last puts paid to the notion that this anything other than a Rolls Royce problem.

It also begs a few questions of Singapore Airlines and their much vaunted (on this thread anyway) maintenance.

Question 1. Why did it take you a week to discover the problem when QF knew about their problems within 2 days?

Question 2. Does this mean that suspect engines have been flying paying passengers around for almost a week?

[aveng]

You've hit the nail squarely on the head Capt Kremin. How could SQ clear their entire fleet for flight in just 1 night when the problem first occurred? 11 A380's = 44 engines - I find it unbelievable that they could boroscope that many engines in such a short timeframe. Perception of ideals me thinks.

[peuce]

NOIP,

Although I might have put my case forward in a slightly flippant manner, as I am often want to do, I think you have missed my serious point.

To spell it out more succinctly, the punters are sick of hearing the "safety was never compromised" spin from QANTAS ... and many other Airlines.

When, obviously, safety was at risk.

You even state:

Whilst this scenario had the potential to have a significantly different outcome, it didn't.

Hindsight is a very useful tool, but, at the time ... there was the potential for things to go extremely pear shaped. And in my book, that is a safety issue.

And although wrestling a fully laden, structurally damaged, power deprived, fuel spewing monster back onto the ground is "just his job"... it doesn't make it any safer.

All I ask is that the Airlines acknowledge these situations.

[hotnhigh]

Any one with any news on how the rest of the airframe is looking?

[DrPepz]

In an email from SQ, they said that they found the oil stains last week but Rolls Royce deemed them not a problem. However RR subsequently changed their mind and told them to change the engines.

[rmcdonal]

When, obviously, safety was at risk.

What do you call safe? Flying is inherently dangerous. Travelling at .8 the speed of sound at 10K is not a natural state for anything let alone humans, and the number of things that can go wrong are huge.
However at what point do you stop and say "it is not safe?" Dick posted a bit about this a few years ago with NAS, "Affordable safety" was the term used.
What the passengers and the public need to know is that yes flying has risks, these risks are managed (hence having 4 engines). Flying is certainly safer now then it was 30 years ago, the growing split between aircraft movements and aircraft crashes demonstrates this (Flight Safety Nov-Dec 2010, p10).

As to the Qantas remark safety was never compromised it depends upon how you view safety. Is flying an A380 on 3 engines not a managed risk that is trained for in a simulator? Sure it may have a higher chance (risk) of ending badly then say flying on all 4 engines but it is still above the acceptable safety standard. In fact if the Qantas sims are anything like mine then an engine failure should fairly standard to deal with, with multiple failures and instrument approaches being the norm.

[struggling]

Here's an Idea!

Bonuses will depend upon safety, says BP boss

Bob Dudley, the recently appointed CEO of BP, sent an email to all employees stating that staff bonuses would depend solely on safety.

The energy company has been concentrating on a new management system for operational safety over the last four to five years, affecting all sites and employees across the organisation. Dudley’s initiative of safety-dependant bonuses are the next stage of this, and all 80,000 employees have been told they won’t receive a bonus for the fourth quarter of 2010 if they don’t meet the set requirements.

A BP spokesperson said that the new rewards structure was “a direct result of the [oil] spill” that occurred earlier this year, in the Gulf of Mexico.

[Capt Kremin]

I was told by a reliable source that at one stage, roll control was briefly lost.

This crew has earned it pay for the rest of their lives.

[HotDog]

QF32

Some inside information from a Qantas friend.



Earned at least a year's salary in an hour or so.
Everyone gave the pilots a glowing commendation for their professionalism & they deserved it.



Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in Singapore last week aboard
QF32.... I won't bother mentioning the engine explosion!.... oops...
mentioned the engine explosion, sorry.....

* massive fuel leak in the left mid fuel tank (the beast has 11 tanks,
including in the horizontal stabiliser on the tail)
* massive fuel leak in the left inner fuel tank
* a hole on the flap canoe/fairing that you could fit your upper body
through
* the aft gallery in the fuel system failed, preventing many fuel transfer
functions
* fuel jettison had problems due to the previous problem above
* bloody great hole in the upper wing surface
* partial failure of leading edge slats
* partial failure of speed brakes/ground spoilers
* shrapnel damage to the flaps
* TOTAL loss of all hydraulic fluid in the Green System (beast has 2 x
5,000 PSI systems, Green and Yellow)
* manual extension of landing gear
* loss of 1 generator and associated systems
* loss of brake anti-skid system
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using normal method after landing
due to major damage to systems
* unable to shutdown adjacent #1 engine using using the fire switch!!!!!!!!
Therefore, no fire protection was available for that engine after the
explosion in #2
* ECAM warnings about major fuel imbalance because of fuel leaks on left
side, that were UNABLE to be fixed with cross-feeding
* fuel trapped in Trim Tank (in the tail). Therefore, possible major CofG
out-of-balance condition for landing. Yikes!
* and much more to come..........

[stubby jumbo]

Strewth

To quote a PR Pro -far more literate than moi.

"Its all happening"

[Sunfish]

HotDog:
Hotdog:

Here are just SOME of the problems Richard had in Singapore last week aboard
QF32.... I won't bother mentioning the engine explosion!.... oops...
mentioned the engine explosion, sorry...

Not bad work for an overpaid under worked pilot of a "Legacy" airline to fix was it?

..I wonder how the young kids in Jetstar would have coped?

Pilots are just Bus drivers aren't they?

Mr. Joyce, care to think where the company and its much vaunted reputation would be today if Richard hadn't coped? Guess who has more immediate impact on your profitability? You, or the Airline staff?

What was that famous line by Chairman Jackson? Something about how the Board and senior management are solely responsible for Qantas prosperity?


You all have just experienced a demonstration of who has the real power in any organisation. The Board and Senior management makes decisions once in a blue moon that affect the organisation over decades. The people at the coal face have the company's future in the their hands every day.

[Neptunus Rex]

Hot Dog

Not even the Sim Instructor from Hell could have dreamed up that little lot. Hats off to Captain de Crespigny and his Crew.

[Feather #3]

Just to put some balance into Capt. Kremin's comment about thrust usage, the Trent 900 has a full rated thrust of, say, 72,000lb. LH and SQ buy their power at a rating well under this and QF a bit more than them. None of the A380's use the max rated thrust of the engine.

G'day

[Kangaroo Court]

The management types at any airline need to remember that this industry started with an aircraft and two prospective pilots who flipped a coin...everything else came later!

[HotDog]

Latest Emergency AD:

EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 1/3
EASA EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0236-E
Date: 10 November 2010
Note: This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its
Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of
EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may
operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by
the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article
14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holder’s Name :
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC
Type/Model designation(s) :
RB211 Trent 900 series engines
TCDS Number : EASA.E.012
Foreign AD : Not applicable
Supersedure : None
ATA 72 Engine – High Pressure / Intermediate Pressure (HP/IP)
Structure – Inspections
Manufacturer(s): Rolls-Royce plc
Applicability: RB211 Trent 900 series engines, variants RB211 Trent 970-84, RB211
Trent 970B-84, RB211 Trent 972-84, RB211 Trent 972B-84, RB211 Trent
977-84, RB211 Trent 977B-84 and RB211 Trent 980-84, all serial
numbers.
These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus
A380 series aeroplanes.
Reason: An uncontained engine failure has recently occurred on a Rolls-Royce
Trent 900 involving release of high energy debris and leading to damage
to the aeroplane.
Analysis of the preliminary elements from the incident investigation shows
that an oil fire in the HP/IP structure cavity may have caused the failure of
the Intermediate Pressure Turbine (IPT) Disc.
This condition, if not detected, could ultimately result in uncontained
engine failure potentially leading to damage to the aeroplane and hazards
to persons or property on the ground.
For the reasons described above and pending conclusion of the incident
investigation, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the Low Pressure
Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer
cavity and oil service tubes in order to detect any abnormal oil leakage,
and if any discrepancy is found, to prohibit further engine operation.
The requirements of this AD are considered as interim action. If, as a
EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 2/3
result of the on-going incident investigation, a terminating action is later
identified, further mandatory actions might be considered.
Effective Date: 10 November 2010
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:
(1) Within the compliance times indicated in Table 1 of this AD,
accomplish the following actions in accordance with Rolls-Royce
Non Modification Service Bulletin (NMSB) 72-AG590, Par 3.
Accomplishment Instructions, 3.A or 3.B as applicable to the engine
configuration:
(1.1) Carry out an extended ground idle run.
(1.2) Inspect the Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and
case drain.
(1.3) Inspect the HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service
tubes.
Table 1
Compliance time
Engine
Configuration
Initial Threshold Repetitive Interval
On-wing Within 10 Flight Cycles
(FC) after the effective
date of this AD.
At intervals not exceeding
20 FC.
In-shop After the engine test
procedure and before
next flight.
Not applicable (after
engine installation refer to
on-wing repetitive
inspection intervals).
(2) If any discrepancy is found during the inspections required by
paragraph (1) of this AD, any further engine operation is prohibited.
Within one day after the accomplishment of the inspection, report the
findings to Rolls-Royce.
(3) Inspections accomplished in accordance with the content of NMSB
72-AG590 before the effective date of this AD, are acceptable to
comply with the initial inspections required by this AD.
(4) After the effective date of this AD, do not operate an engine on an
aeroplane unless it has been inspected in accordance with the
requirements of this AD.
Ref. Publications: Rolls-Royce RB211-Trent 900 Alert Non Modification Service Bulletin
72-AG590 dated 10 November 2010.
The use of later approved updates of this document is acceptable for
compliance with the requirements of this AD.
Remarks : 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve
Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. The safety assessment has requested not to implement the full
consultation process and an immediate publication and notification.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness
Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification
Directorate, EASA. E-mail [email protected].
EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 3/3
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements
in this AD, please contact:
Your designated Rolls-Royce representative or download the
publication from your Aeromanager account at
Aeromanager by Rolls-Royce. If you do not have a designated
representative or Aeromanager account, please contact Corporate
Communications at Rolls-Royce plc. PO Box 31, Derby, DE24 8BJ,
United Kingdom. Phone: [phone], or e-mail from
Civil Aerospace - Rolls-Royce identifying the
correspondence as being related to Airworthiness Directives.

[ampclamp]

Thanks for that hotdog.
No wonder SIA jumped up and saluted.

Grounding by qf was easier with RR picking up the bills but kudos to them for making that decision.
Did I just give qf a rap? bugger. someone slap me.
After that list of defects posted by hotdog(thanks too) give those drivers a medal.Official pat on the back from those that make it happen, not the itinerants that think they run the show.

[hotnhigh]

Will the bird ever fly again?

[Eastwest Loco]

QF A380 Grounding extended.

Hi sportsfans.

Not sure if it has been released yet but just copped schedule changes for 20 November with QF93 MEL LAX reverting to a 744 and noted QF11 rescheduled out of SYD at 2230 on that day. It was a 744 in the first place.

This appears to extend through to 26 November with QF9 which is normally a 388 now showing a 744.

This all looks far from over.

Are we having fun yet?

Best regards

EWL

[ampclamp]

Rumours emerging of nasty spar damage that could be very serious indeed.Just rumours but it is the pprune.

[Bleve]

Yes, I've heard the same rumour (from a first-hand source) about significant damage to a wing spar. They expressed the opinion that IF it is repairable it will be very expensive. The aircraft will not be flying for quite some time (if at all).

They also expressed amazement that given the massive fuel leaks, the wing did not catch on fire.

They were very very lucky.