Rumour: Sunstate Engineers suspended over aircraft sabotage?

[airsupport]

They were signed out by Managers.

Okay, that was why I asked earlier IF this guy causing all the trouble was an LAME, and I was told he is NOT.

So there are other Managers, who ARE actually also qualified LAMEs, clearing these defects.

[ALAEA Fed Sec]

That is correct. The LAMEs finish just before midnight and then 2 or 3 Managers who used to work as LAMEs come in and pen off the defects left by the crew.

[airsupport]

That is correct. The LAMEs finish just before midnight and then 2 or 3 Managers who used to work as LAMEs come in and pen off the defects left by the crew.

Okay, so as long as the Managers are qualified on the aircraft and their Licences are current, I guess it is not illegal, highly immoral, but not illegal.

So do these Managers also release the aircraft to service in the morning?

Also doesn't any other LAME have to certify for each aircraft during the day?

IF you are who you say you are, surely there is something you can do to stop this horrid situation?

This is one of the most disturbing things I have ever heard of after more than 40 years in the Industry.

[LAME2]

I'm at a loss to think why this would have happened other than to say it was to give the Association a blackeye and achieve cancellation of the PIA. If we assume they are intelligent, seems to me they have opened up a pandoras box and are hoping the Association mishandles the response.

Is there not an part of the Act or Regs that makes it illegal to coerce or influence a person to contravene the Act or Regs? Would being stood down not influence your decision? Seems the certifying managers have been influenced by those above them.

[airsupport]

The post I came to respond to appears to have been removed, or deleted.

This is the standard that Australian Engineers set when they maintain aircraft. This is the normal custom and practice.......... That is not the fault of the engineers that report and rectify defects.

I agree, that is why I am so annoyed and disgusted by this goings on.

[DasTrash]

The LAMEs finish just before midnight and then 2 or 3 Managers who used to work as LAMEs come in and pen off the defects left by the crew.

That would explain why the same defect often appears in the defect book multiple times. The crew notice the fault and write it up, the LAMEs don't get a chance to fix the fault but it gets signed of anyway, the next day the crew notice the fault and write it up....

[601]

Managers who used to work as LAMEs come in and pen off the defects left by the crew

Is there an entry in the log book ( or whatever Qantaslink use) to detail what maintenance was done to clear the defect before it is signed off?

If so what does it read?

[airsupport]

2 or 3 Managers who used to work as LAMEs come in and pen off the defects left by the crew

I take it these Managers are NOT current members of the ALAEA?

Otherwise surely the Association could do something about this horrid situation?

I know it is considered un Australian, but this is ridiculous, have these Managers been reported to CASA?

Something NEEDS to be done...............

[ALAEA Fed Sec]

Is there an entry in the log book ( or whatever Qantaslink use) to detail what maintenance was done to clear the defect before it is signed off?

The night that 7 aircraft were grounded, the Managers got them all out in the morning after changing the latches. The new latches had exactly the same defect.

I know it is considered un Australian, but this is ridiculous, have these Managers been reported to CASA?

Yes. for a few similar matters like this for the after midnight maintenance such as signing out of category and ignoring cracks in strut components. Casa have not got back to us and the managers are still on the loose.

In this instance (the doors) we went to Aviation Security as they own the legislation that is being breached here.

The govt departments haven't been very helpful in fact the head of Aviation Security threatened me with jail if I went public with this stuff. Nothing got fixed so we went public.

[airsupport]

Yes. for a few similar matters like this for the after midnight maintenance such as signing out of category and ignoring cracks in strut components. Casa have not got back to us and the managers are still on the loose.

This is just SO wrong.

I can see why the Company would be trying to keep it quiet, but CASA have a responsibilty to keep up the standards and ensure everything is being done properly.

What about the Pilots, are they scared of the Company? IF they know about this I am surprised none of them have bought into it. A lot of Captains I have known over the years would have just refused to take these aircraft.

[BrissySparkyCoit]

By the way the Maintenance Manager that doesn't want people to look outside of the narrow description on a job card - wouldn't look like an American talk show doctor would he?

Take one step down the ladder and you are there.

The issue of the guys being stood down for doing their job LEGALLY and simply following what they are OBLIGED to do in the terms of their licence, smacks of bullying by management. This is perhaps one of the lowest acts I have seen so far.

[gobbledock]

Joke Of The Day

I can see why the Company would be trying to keep it quiet, but CASA have a responsibilty to keep up the standards and ensure everything is being done properly.

Now that is fuuny !

[LAME2]

FEDSEC please

Steve, how do the Managers know to come into work (due to uncleared defects)? Do they only do this if there is an AOG and they do not want to pay the overtime for a LAME to stay back or start early? Do they come in early each mornig to check what's outstanding, then rectify and certify for those items before the dayshift appears? What is the timeframe between when the guys wrote the defects up and they were stood down? I'm guessing this only occured due to the PIA? Normally the Engineers would stay behind to rectify?

Thanks.

[Sweet Surrender]

If the engineers truly believe that a person will subdue the flight attendants and break into the flight deck with their rolled up boarding pass then full marks to them for writing up the problem. If they are writing up a bogus defect to further their industrial claims then shame on them.

[LAME2]

Sweet Surrender, I think you are way off the mark with your comments. I think it is pretty clear, the affected employees were doing their job as detailed in the applicable CAR.

[Skydrol_ise]

It seems A380 Engine MELs are more of a worry presently than DHC8 doors

But I still have a techo question, DHC8s I remember had cockpit door
(non cascade) with a plate on the back (cabin side) covering the gap where the lock operates. so paddlepop stick, or screwdriver or anything else wouldnt be able to be poked through the gap to unlock it. Cascade doors had the electrical release and a button in cockpit from memory, not sure if they had the cover plate on the back.

[Going Nowhere]

Word is that Alliance to do 3 BNE-ROK-BNE flights a day until Jan due to lack of crew/engineers.

Let's see how the spreadsheets and powerpoint presentations explain this one!

[airsupport]

I am surprised they have anyone working for them, especially Engineers.

Have the LAMEs been reinstated yet?

[scumbag]

4.68
Other security measures Part 4 On-board security Division 4.4
Regulation 4.68
Additional requirements for security of flight crew compartment — aircraft with seating capacity 30 or more
This regulation applies in relation to an aircraft operated for the purposes of a regular public transport operation or an open charter operation (in each case, whether a domestic or an international air service).
The operator of an aircraft that has a certificated maximum passenger seating capacity of 30 to 59 must not operate the aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with a cockpit door that is:
(a) designed to resist forcible intrusion by unauthorised persons; and
(b) capable of withstanding impacts of at least 300 joules at critical locations; and
(c) capable of withstanding at least 1113 newtons constant tensile load on the knob or handle; and
(d) designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and fragementation devices to a level equivalent to level IIIa of the United States National Institute of Justice Standard (NIJ) 0101.04 Revision A, as in force on 15 January 2002.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
The operator of an aircraft that has a certificated maximum passenger seating capacity of 60 or more must not operate the aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with a cockpit door that complies with section 13.2.2 of Annex 6, Operation of Aircraft, to the Chicago Convention, as in force on 28 November 2002.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Note The section is as follows:
‘13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to resist penetration by small-arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot’s station.’.
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 179



So how did these doors comply with 4.68(a)?

[Skynews]

how do these doors comply with 4.68.(a)?

I suspect they hide behind the word "designed". The doors were designed and approved in accordance with 4.68(a) i am guessing, however as happens the design has not lived up to it's promise.