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Awww...ferryman U is cruel..
That poor wittle wabbit!!
Na. sorry, he dun it didn't he, no sympathy at all, he deprived a citizen of their livelihood without due process, or even a valid reason that a certified ex WAAF baggage handler was qualified to assess, so wabbit stew sounds good. Word of advice from my old Gran...needs to be cooked very slowly or it becomes as tough as old boot leather.
The medical stuff??? well mate they only did what everyone else is doing, they went offshore!!
But with a diabolical twist.............instead of offshoring the outsource they bought the offshore here and onshored the outsource thus making it an onshored outsource..brilliant!! since Australian doctors are all criminals they haven't caught yet, bringing the offshore here converting them to onshore completely bypasses having Australian doctors anywhere near what they were trying to offshore thus leaving them in a position to do whatever they like!!!..........Oh... yeah...sorry they can already do that cant they!!
That poor wittle wabbit!!
Na. sorry, he dun it didn't he, no sympathy at all, he deprived a citizen of their livelihood without due process, or even a valid reason that a certified ex WAAF baggage handler was qualified to assess, so wabbit stew sounds good. Word of advice from my old Gran...needs to be cooked very slowly or it becomes as tough as old boot leather.
The medical stuff??? well mate they only did what everyone else is doing, they went offshore!!
But with a diabolical twist.............instead of offshoring the outsource they bought the offshore here and onshored the outsource thus making it an onshored outsource..brilliant!! since Australian doctors are all criminals they haven't caught yet, bringing the offshore here converting them to onshore completely bypasses having Australian doctors anywhere near what they were trying to offshore thus leaving them in a position to do whatever they like!!!..........Oh... yeah...sorry they can already do that cant they!!
Last edited by thorn bird; 3rd May 2014 at 08:49.
Why are CASA so a-feared of prosecuting? Is it that the presenting of facts and circumstances, to a court of law and having to prove a case is just too hard? Or is just the potential humiliation of having your collective arses trounced on a trumped up brief too scary for the amassed ego's. Perjury and accountability do not make for easy minds, one element has to go.
Actually, there is a reasonably simple answer, provided by a former Director of Aviation Safety/CEO of CASA direct to his then Minister, who asked a question, substantially similar (in meaning, if not wording) to the above.
The occasion was a meeting in the Minister's office, subsequent to said DAS/CEO making a rather controversial appearance at the National Press Club, where, amongst other interesting statements, the said Director "complained" that "Courts got it wrong". We can't have the guilty bastards found innocent, can we.
Anyway, back to the Minister's office, and the answer to the Minister's question about the need for facts: "But, Minister, if we had to have facts, I would need another 100 investigators".
Administrative actions, and a naive/ compliant AAT are so much neater and tidier that courts, rules of evidence and other inconvenient restrictions on CASA.
Tootle pip!!
PS: Before any of you claim this is a second hand account, and not accurate, not so!
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if you set off from oodnadatta to maree by heading north it doesn't matter how well you drive or how much justification you have for each of the turns you take you are still heading in totally the wrong direction.
(maree is south south east of oodnadatta)
australian aviation law is just so like that drive it isn't funny.
you can call in all the experts you like to drive the system further but it is still headed in the wrong direction.
we've paid the DAS 3 million dollars over his tenure and all he has achieved will have to be thrown out and a start in the correct direction made.
the kiwi regs would be a good start.
(maree is south south east of oodnadatta)
australian aviation law is just so like that drive it isn't funny.
you can call in all the experts you like to drive the system further but it is still headed in the wrong direction.
we've paid the DAS 3 million dollars over his tenure and all he has achieved will have to be thrown out and a start in the correct direction made.
the kiwi regs would be a good start.
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Geez Leadie,
every now and then a Pearler!!!
Now someone out there in TV land just has to see
"Truth" mimicking "Art" and a perfect script for an OZ version of
"Yes Minister"....Hey boatman how about a chockie frog for the most
original title!!
every now and then a Pearler!!!
Now someone out there in TV land just has to see
"Truth" mimicking "Art" and a perfect script for an OZ version of
"Yes Minister"....Hey boatman how about a chockie frog for the most
original title!!
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A bucket a day keeps the Doctor away!
Thanks Sarcs, nice line of questioning by Xenophon and Fawcett 
The endorsement - So CAsA, in regards to the A380 endo's, is it one or is it two people that are endorsed? John you seemed so confused? Well let me help you with the answer - I believe it is two. I know one of the endorsed individuals is a FOI based in BNE and he just so happens to be one of the few remaining good guys left, and he is more than capable of holding such an endorsement. The other A380 endo allegedly is held by Mr Farquharson. I believe that is what is of interest to the Senators as they examine exactly what the Australian taxpayers money is being spent on, the reasons behind the money being spent and whether there is any 'bang for the taxpayer buck', or whether it is being spent frivolously and fruitlessly.
Buckets of money - Another interesting point was when the bloated CFO explained that there is more than one bucket of 'training' money? So $2.3 million is used for things like endo's, currency etc for the Inspectorate, but am I correct in believing there is another bucket of moolah for the executives and/or other employees? If so, how much green is kept in that bucket? And are CAsA trying to be tricky with their answers to questions by giving the impression that only one Inspector has an A380 endo when in fact two individuals do? CAsA are cleverly playing on words and only mentioning who has a 380 endo from the inspectorates bucket of training money while they don't mention Terry's endo paid for by the 'mystery' bucket of dosh?? Makes me wonder which bucket Sky Sentinel came out of???
It may just happen to be that some of CAsA's financial wizards have been trained at "Beakers School of Finances" where buckets of taxpayer money really does make dreams come true
Message to Slugger - Dear Tony, being a budget conscious bureaucrat and a happy go lucky type razor wielder perhaps Fort Fumble could do with some form of financial 'readjustment'?
TICK TOCK
The endorsement - So CAsA, in regards to the A380 endo's, is it one or is it two people that are endorsed? John you seemed so confused? Well let me help you with the answer - I believe it is two. I know one of the endorsed individuals is a FOI based in BNE and he just so happens to be one of the few remaining good guys left, and he is more than capable of holding such an endorsement. The other A380 endo allegedly is held by Mr Farquharson. I believe that is what is of interest to the Senators as they examine exactly what the Australian taxpayers money is being spent on, the reasons behind the money being spent and whether there is any 'bang for the taxpayer buck', or whether it is being spent frivolously and fruitlessly.
Buckets of money - Another interesting point was when the bloated CFO explained that there is more than one bucket of 'training' money? So $2.3 million is used for things like endo's, currency etc for the Inspectorate, but am I correct in believing there is another bucket of moolah for the executives and/or other employees? If so, how much green is kept in that bucket? And are CAsA trying to be tricky with their answers to questions by giving the impression that only one Inspector has an A380 endo when in fact two individuals do? CAsA are cleverly playing on words and only mentioning who has a 380 endo from the inspectorates bucket of training money while they don't mention Terry's endo paid for by the 'mystery' bucket of dosh?? Makes me wonder which bucket Sky Sentinel came out of???
It may just happen to be that some of CAsA's financial wizards have been trained at "Beakers School of Finances" where buckets of taxpayer money really does make dreams come true
Message to Slugger - Dear Tony, being a budget conscious bureaucrat and a happy go lucky type razor wielder perhaps Fort Fumble could do with some form of financial 'readjustment'?
TICK TOCK
Gosh, 004wercras, you are obviously a CASA insider or very close to someone who is. Best you/your friend use the PID scheme to disclose this kind of information, unless you/your friend is ready to lose his/her job.
The current government isn't big on talkative drones.
The current government isn't big on talkative drones.
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Gosh, 004wercras, you are obviously a CASA insider or very close to someone who is. Best you/your friend use the PID scheme to disclose this kind of information, unless you/your friend is ready to lose his/her job.
However, if I were an insider I certainly wouldn't be asking the multitude of questions that I did in my previous post. I also scoped some of my questions based upon the wee video that Mr Sarcs posted, and the very words expressed by the DAS, CFO, Senators etc. No 'secrets' or 'insider trading' involved in that, nup, as any good government t agency would say - "I/we are being transparent, open and honest". Yes a number of questions were based on that. But you already knew that you naughty boy
Safe flying Creamy
Last edited by 004wercras; 4th May 2014 at 12:20.
REPCON & Fort Fumble 'weasel words'!
From the thread...Stress caused by the handling by management of major changes within The thread primarily focuses on the one de-identified REPCON and inevitably drifts to Sky God (Red Rat) issues but there are some underlying, seemingly cynical, issues that Fedsec Steve & Kharon picked up on that needs further exploration. So reproducing the "K" post #15 ....
Here is the link for the bureau listed REPCONs. This initiative by the bureau, appears to have been brought in at the start of 2013, & should be applauded, but I wonder if it is doing anything to dispel the severe distrust the industry now has with both the regulator and the supposed safety watchdog...
Steve in his post #5 gives some examples of FF responses to various REPCONs and in a further post #27 makes the comment...
"...From reading the REPCON outcomes, one could easily come to the conclusion that submitting a report is pointless because there is never any resulting fix to identified problems. I think someone needs to talk to the good Senator before he goes into the next estimates hearings..."
So to add some more fuel to the fire...
...and to focus more on GA issues generally, here is a couple more examples of REPCONs followed by properly spun bureaucratic FF, weasel worded non-reponses...
This one is interesting in light of a current active bureau accident investigation:
Shades of Barrier perhaps??
And finally going back to one Steve quoted from (my bold):
Last para..."in other words if you continue to have a whinge then come to us so we can single you out for a selected tea & bikkies (pineappling) session "...yeah right like that's going to happen...
IMO the word REPCON should be replaced with WOFTAM...
All this system is achieving is further discouraging (muzzling) potential (genuine) whistleblowers from coming forward when concerned with safety related matters....TICK TOCK...miniscule!
Quote: ALAEA #5 –"Just reading through the REPCONs generally. What concerns me is the way CASA seem to just fob everything off and the ATSB accept that".
If you go the Repcon link on post #1 in the left hand panel there's a black rectangle, marked Repcon, this will take you to three pages, containing 45 Repcon; most of which are aviation related. As Steve says, the responses are well rehearsed, smoothly executed excuses which make it look, through the smoke and mirrors, as though something is actually be done (disgusting).
If you can find the time have a look at the responses from the 'other' domestic transport agencies and compare them; then, if you want to get serious, have a look at the Canadian or USA authorities responses to similar 'safety reports'. I found an hour last evening to do this, not to make it a project, but to 'test' differences. I'm still shaking my head, well at least we can still drink most of the water in Australia.
If the Repcon in #1 achieves nothing else it has served well to highlight the appalling, self evident condition to which the official attitude on safety concerns has degenerated.
Quote: ALAEA "They simply never do anything".
Wrong Steve, they spend the entire day and budget making sure they cannot be held responsible or accountable for anything, while ensuring maximum control and kudos. It's an art form; deeply entrenched, fully supported and set to endure. The really 'nasty' part is they steal all the accolades for 'safe transport' from those who are at the coal face, keeping the public safe even while under the incredible pressure of work place uncertainty, mismanagement and not too much protection.
If you go the Repcon link on post #1 in the left hand panel there's a black rectangle, marked Repcon, this will take you to three pages, containing 45 Repcon; most of which are aviation related. As Steve says, the responses are well rehearsed, smoothly executed excuses which make it look, through the smoke and mirrors, as though something is actually be done (disgusting).
If you can find the time have a look at the responses from the 'other' domestic transport agencies and compare them; then, if you want to get serious, have a look at the Canadian or USA authorities responses to similar 'safety reports'. I found an hour last evening to do this, not to make it a project, but to 'test' differences. I'm still shaking my head, well at least we can still drink most of the water in Australia.
If the Repcon in #1 achieves nothing else it has served well to highlight the appalling, self evident condition to which the official attitude on safety concerns has degenerated.
Quote: ALAEA "They simply never do anything".
Wrong Steve, they spend the entire day and budget making sure they cannot be held responsible or accountable for anything, while ensuring maximum control and kudos. It's an art form; deeply entrenched, fully supported and set to endure. The really 'nasty' part is they steal all the accolades for 'safe transport' from those who are at the coal face, keeping the public safe even while under the incredible pressure of work place uncertainty, mismanagement and not too much protection.
Steve in his post #5 gives some examples of FF responses to various REPCONs and in a further post #27 makes the comment...
"...From reading the REPCON outcomes, one could easily come to the conclusion that submitting a report is pointless because there is never any resulting fix to identified problems. I think someone needs to talk to the good Senator before he goes into the next estimates hearings..."
So to add some more fuel to the fire...
...and to focus more on GA issues generally, here is a couple more examples of REPCONs followed by properly spun bureaucratic FF, weasel worded non-reponses...This one is interesting in light of a current active bureau accident investigation:
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the continuation of cabin crew service in flight while the fasten seat belt (FSB) sign is illuminated during turbulent conditions.
The reporter is concerned that the serving of hot beverages during turbulence is unsafe for both passengers and cabin crew and may result in significant injuries. The reporter has witnessed first-hand hot drinks being poured and spilt while the FSB sign was on.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
In response to REPCON AR201300053, the severity of the turbulence determines the course of action. The turbulence matrix states that during all turbulent events Cabin Crew discontinue hot drink service; there is no requirement for the discontinuation of service or to be seated, unless instructed to do so by the Captain / Cabin Supervisor in a Light turbulent event. Cabin Crew are empowered to be seated at any time they feel their safety is at risk.
During a Moderate or Severe turbulent event the Matrix states that the Cabin Crew are to discontinue Cabin Service and re-stow carts, if it is safe to do so.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the content of this REPCON and advises the matter is being followed up with the operator and will take action as appropriate.
Love this bit...(my bold)
ATSB comment
REPCON received further comments from the reporter on this matter and the text below was sent to CASA for comment.
The 'matrix' seems to make a simple CAO into a complex issue.
The matrix suggests that it is safe in turbulence to have the cabin crew up and about with their trolleys, while the passengers are restrained and the Fasten Sear Belt Sign is on.
This is not applying the CAO correctly. Further, there are two potential "judgers" as to when cabin crew are to be seated. One is the Captain and the other is the cabin manager. Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated.
I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly.
Regulator's response (Regulator 2)
I am advised that CASA has quarterly Cabin Safety review meetings with the operator. At the next meeting CASA will review the Operator's Seat Belt procedure collaboratively to ensure it meets CASA's regulatory requirements to provide an effective safety outcome.
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the continuation of cabin crew service in flight while the fasten seat belt (FSB) sign is illuminated during turbulent conditions.
The reporter is concerned that the serving of hot beverages during turbulence is unsafe for both passengers and cabin crew and may result in significant injuries. The reporter has witnessed first-hand hot drinks being poured and spilt while the FSB sign was on.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
In response to REPCON AR201300053, the severity of the turbulence determines the course of action. The turbulence matrix states that during all turbulent events Cabin Crew discontinue hot drink service; there is no requirement for the discontinuation of service or to be seated, unless instructed to do so by the Captain / Cabin Supervisor in a Light turbulent event. Cabin Crew are empowered to be seated at any time they feel their safety is at risk.
During a Moderate or Severe turbulent event the Matrix states that the Cabin Crew are to discontinue Cabin Service and re-stow carts, if it is safe to do so.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the content of this REPCON and advises the matter is being followed up with the operator and will take action as appropriate.
Love this bit...(my bold)
ATSB comment
REPCON received further comments from the reporter on this matter and the text below was sent to CASA for comment.
The 'matrix' seems to make a simple CAO into a complex issue.
The matrix suggests that it is safe in turbulence to have the cabin crew up and about with their trolleys, while the passengers are restrained and the Fasten Sear Belt Sign is on.
This is not applying the CAO correctly. Further, there are two potential "judgers" as to when cabin crew are to be seated. One is the Captain and the other is the cabin manager. Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated.
I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly.
Regulator's response (Regulator 2)
I am advised that CASA has quarterly Cabin Safety review meetings with the operator. At the next meeting CASA will review the Operator's Seat Belt procedure collaboratively to ensure it meets CASA's regulatory requirements to provide an effective safety outcome.
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the maintenance of the two Cessna 182s operated by the operator. The reporter stated that when they were rostered to fly for the organisation, they were asked to falsify the maintenance release by significantly under-recording the hours they were actually flying.
The reporter is also concerned that the aircraft are not being maintained to the appropriate standard.
The reporter stated that the following concerns were observed:
We only employ Commercial Pilots to fly these aircraft and have concerns that this pilot has breached their obligations to report safety concerns to me and to act appropriately to ensure the safety of other pilots and passengers. I have investigated the claims made by this pilot and have concluded that they are baseless.
We have contacted our mechanic to investigate any oil leaks in theses aeroplanes. It was concluded that there was no evidence of any oil leaks. We have asked other pilots if there have been any issues with the seat, all of whom stated that they have had no problems locking the seat in.
The door can be difficult to use by pilots who have done limited hours on the craft, though no concerns have been voiced by my experienced pilots. We will endeavour to do more training on this aircraft for anyone that feels they need it. Also, as these aircraft are flown in controlled air space, the altimeter is checked on each flight. I believe that if the altimeter was incorrect or malfunctioning, this would be identified as we enter controlled air space. There have been no complaints by other pilot voicing concerns about the accuracy of the tacho.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the matters raised in the REPCON and advises that surveillance was conducted at the airport which identified an aircraft as undergoing maintenance. The defects reported on the REPCON were not evident on that aircraft as they had been rectified during the maintenance.
CASA notes that the reporter refers to two aircraft, however only one aircraft is identified in the report.
ATSB comment
After REPCON questioned CASA as to whether they had discussed the falsification of the maintenance records with the operator, CASA conducted further enquires. They formed the preliminary view that the defects had not been endorsed on the maintenance release when they should have been and these matters were going to be examined further.
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the maintenance of the two Cessna 182s operated by the operator. The reporter stated that when they were rostered to fly for the organisation, they were asked to falsify the maintenance release by significantly under-recording the hours they were actually flying.
The reporter is also concerned that the aircraft are not being maintained to the appropriate standard.
The reporter stated that the following concerns were observed:
- The engine leaks an abnormal amount of oil
- The pilot seat is difficult to lock in place after adjusting
- The altimeter and tacho are often erroneous
- The upward opening door for parachutists to exit is difficult to secure closed using the locking pin.
We only employ Commercial Pilots to fly these aircraft and have concerns that this pilot has breached their obligations to report safety concerns to me and to act appropriately to ensure the safety of other pilots and passengers. I have investigated the claims made by this pilot and have concluded that they are baseless.
We have contacted our mechanic to investigate any oil leaks in theses aeroplanes. It was concluded that there was no evidence of any oil leaks. We have asked other pilots if there have been any issues with the seat, all of whom stated that they have had no problems locking the seat in.
The door can be difficult to use by pilots who have done limited hours on the craft, though no concerns have been voiced by my experienced pilots. We will endeavour to do more training on this aircraft for anyone that feels they need it. Also, as these aircraft are flown in controlled air space, the altimeter is checked on each flight. I believe that if the altimeter was incorrect or malfunctioning, this would be identified as we enter controlled air space. There have been no complaints by other pilot voicing concerns about the accuracy of the tacho.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the matters raised in the REPCON and advises that surveillance was conducted at the airport which identified an aircraft as undergoing maintenance. The defects reported on the REPCON were not evident on that aircraft as they had been rectified during the maintenance.
CASA notes that the reporter refers to two aircraft, however only one aircraft is identified in the report.
ATSB comment
After REPCON questioned CASA as to whether they had discussed the falsification of the maintenance records with the operator, CASA conducted further enquires. They formed the preliminary view that the defects had not been endorsed on the maintenance release when they should have been and these matters were going to be examined further.
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the fatigue experienced when flying either of two long distance return flights which are both back of clock duties. This fatigue is even worse on the second night if the crew is rostered on consecutive duties.
The flight time is eight hours and forty five minutes on the first return flight and nine hours and fifteen minutes for the second return flight and if the flight is diverted this generally occurs when the crew is already in a fatigued state and likely to make fatigue induced errors.
While most crews attempt to get enough sleep between consecutive duties, as they are driving home in peak hour traffic, arriving as their family is starting the day, and with body clock issues it is difficult to get more than three hours sleep during the day. This is inadequate for another back of clock duty.
While the duties may be considered below the threshold using the FAID fatigue management system, the reporter advised that they feel extremely fatigued during the latter part of the flight.
The reporter has stated that if the operator had a 'Just Culture', they may receive more reports of fatigue from flight crews rather than crews reporting unfit for duty.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
The airline takes fatigue management seriously and has a system for monitoring fatigue risk in our operations. Rosters are built to provide appropriate preparation and recovery time, meeting and often exceeding regulatory requirements. The number and frequency of consecutive back of flying operations for individuals are minimised and crew can express preferences for particular duties. The airline provides a just culture where crew can declare themselves unfit for duty if fatigued, consistent with crew individual responsibilities for fatigue management.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA is aware of the operator's fatigue risk management policy and monitors the system in respect of fatigue risk management objectives.
Risk mitigators observed include regular monitoring of roster pattern performance by the airline, adjustment of rostering rules, the ability for a crew member to opt out of a duty when fatigue is anticipated or experienced and the provision of company transport or accommodation in order to limit the fatigue effects following duty.
Under the proposed flight and duty rules which are expected to be in force from this year, it will still be up to the individual to determine fitness for duty and to make a report via the safety management system (SMS) where this is indicated under company procedures. CASA strongly recommends airline employees report potential fatigue events through the SMS, in order to identify areas where the company should focus resources to reduce operational risk, including fatigue risk. Comment: Isn't that what the Reporter indicated was a problem i.e. lack of true "Just Culture".
If the reporter has evidence of the reporting culture being compromised by management actions they are invited to make a report to CASA detailing any concerns.
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the fatigue experienced when flying either of two long distance return flights which are both back of clock duties. This fatigue is even worse on the second night if the crew is rostered on consecutive duties.
The flight time is eight hours and forty five minutes on the first return flight and nine hours and fifteen minutes for the second return flight and if the flight is diverted this generally occurs when the crew is already in a fatigued state and likely to make fatigue induced errors.
While most crews attempt to get enough sleep between consecutive duties, as they are driving home in peak hour traffic, arriving as their family is starting the day, and with body clock issues it is difficult to get more than three hours sleep during the day. This is inadequate for another back of clock duty.
While the duties may be considered below the threshold using the FAID fatigue management system, the reporter advised that they feel extremely fatigued during the latter part of the flight.
The reporter has stated that if the operator had a 'Just Culture', they may receive more reports of fatigue from flight crews rather than crews reporting unfit for duty.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
The airline takes fatigue management seriously and has a system for monitoring fatigue risk in our operations. Rosters are built to provide appropriate preparation and recovery time, meeting and often exceeding regulatory requirements. The number and frequency of consecutive back of flying operations for individuals are minimised and crew can express preferences for particular duties. The airline provides a just culture where crew can declare themselves unfit for duty if fatigued, consistent with crew individual responsibilities for fatigue management.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA is aware of the operator's fatigue risk management policy and monitors the system in respect of fatigue risk management objectives.
Risk mitigators observed include regular monitoring of roster pattern performance by the airline, adjustment of rostering rules, the ability for a crew member to opt out of a duty when fatigue is anticipated or experienced and the provision of company transport or accommodation in order to limit the fatigue effects following duty.
Under the proposed flight and duty rules which are expected to be in force from this year, it will still be up to the individual to determine fitness for duty and to make a report via the safety management system (SMS) where this is indicated under company procedures. CASA strongly recommends airline employees report potential fatigue events through the SMS, in order to identify areas where the company should focus resources to reduce operational risk, including fatigue risk. Comment: Isn't that what the Reporter indicated was a problem i.e. lack of true "Just Culture".
If the reporter has evidence of the reporting culture being compromised by management actions they are invited to make a report to CASA detailing any concerns.
IMO the word REPCON should be replaced with WOFTAM...
All this system is achieving is further discouraging (muzzling) potential (genuine) whistleblowers from coming forward when concerned with safety related matters....TICK TOCK...miniscule!
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Nanny state – out of control.
Aaaand - Steam on.
Just reading through the Repcon, reporting the high drama of cabin service being continued during 'turbulence'. Everyone having a free whack at the safety Piñata.
The reporters version is subjective, emotive and fails to define the level of turbulence experienced at the time. It also fails to provide an accurate picture of the event; did the CA just finish dispensing the "hot drink" when the SBS came on, before docking the trolley and strapping in; or, did the CA blithely continue service during 'moderate' turbulence; or, is it that in some way the CA was 'forced' to continue in the face of 'grave and imminent danger? We are not advised, just left with a feeling that this all 'could be dangerous'. It neatly attacks the 'company' and also questions the competence of the flight crew, the CM and the CA, without a shred of evidence – other than opinionated hearsay. Bollocks.
The company comes close to reality, they define it quite clearly: passengers strapped down in 'light'; CA strapped in during moderate. Furry muff, even to the extent that the trolley must first be secured (probably why the CA seats are next to the trolley stow dock). Last thing you would want is the CA secured and the trolley floating about the cabin.
The 'regulator' has had a cuppa with the operator and maybe had a review of the COM procedures - which are probably as reasonable as could be expected without the PIC and CM being given training in the use of crystal balls. The 'regulator' quite properly agreed with the company practice, the proof being that not too many passengers, CA and most importantly 'trolleys' seldom end up damaged. QED. Regulator job done and seen to be done proper.
The 'Safety Watchdog' bit, as Sarcs points out is either loveable or risible. It's almost as hysterical as the original complaint. Of course it's complex, you bloody Muppet. (i) That turbulence can be 'predicted' with any certainty is really quite wonderful, but not an exact science; (ii) that aircrew are trained to recognise the 'potential' for turbulence and have a vague idea of where the switch for SBS is located and how to use it is a given fact; (iii) that cabin service trolleys need time to be stowed. So, here we are heading for some bumps, OK sign on, that secures the passengers, CM informed it's going to get worse, the trolleys go away and the CA are strapped in. FFS it happens 100,000 times, every day of the week. But the SWD wants to make it 'an issue', perhaps attempting to score a point over the regulator. Only a bleeding heart, rabid, pedantic OH&S guru could come up with this pathetic response.
"Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated". Bollocks.
"I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly". Bollocks.
FCOL – what more is the regulator supposed to do?. They have been given supposition and fresh air to work with and must rely on an 'opinion'. The 'regulator' (bless 'em) have again, patiently trotted off for more tea, quite rightfully taking refuge behind the bit 'they' are responsible for – do the company procedures "comply"? – Of course they do.
This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity.
- Steam off. There, I feel better now.
Just reading through the Repcon, reporting the high drama of cabin service being continued during 'turbulence'. Everyone having a free whack at the safety Piñata.
The reporters version is subjective, emotive and fails to define the level of turbulence experienced at the time. It also fails to provide an accurate picture of the event; did the CA just finish dispensing the "hot drink" when the SBS came on, before docking the trolley and strapping in; or, did the CA blithely continue service during 'moderate' turbulence; or, is it that in some way the CA was 'forced' to continue in the face of 'grave and imminent danger? We are not advised, just left with a feeling that this all 'could be dangerous'. It neatly attacks the 'company' and also questions the competence of the flight crew, the CM and the CA, without a shred of evidence – other than opinionated hearsay. Bollocks.
The company comes close to reality, they define it quite clearly: passengers strapped down in 'light'; CA strapped in during moderate. Furry muff, even to the extent that the trolley must first be secured (probably why the CA seats are next to the trolley stow dock). Last thing you would want is the CA secured and the trolley floating about the cabin.
The 'regulator' has had a cuppa with the operator and maybe had a review of the COM procedures - which are probably as reasonable as could be expected without the PIC and CM being given training in the use of crystal balls. The 'regulator' quite properly agreed with the company practice, the proof being that not too many passengers, CA and most importantly 'trolleys' seldom end up damaged. QED. Regulator job done and seen to be done proper.
The 'Safety Watchdog' bit, as Sarcs points out is either loveable or risible. It's almost as hysterical as the original complaint. Of course it's complex, you bloody Muppet. (i) That turbulence can be 'predicted' with any certainty is really quite wonderful, but not an exact science; (ii) that aircrew are trained to recognise the 'potential' for turbulence and have a vague idea of where the switch for SBS is located and how to use it is a given fact; (iii) that cabin service trolleys need time to be stowed. So, here we are heading for some bumps, OK sign on, that secures the passengers, CM informed it's going to get worse, the trolleys go away and the CA are strapped in. FFS it happens 100,000 times, every day of the week. But the SWD wants to make it 'an issue', perhaps attempting to score a point over the regulator. Only a bleeding heart, rabid, pedantic OH&S guru could come up with this pathetic response.
"Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated". Bollocks.
"I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly". Bollocks.
FCOL – what more is the regulator supposed to do?. They have been given supposition and fresh air to work with and must rely on an 'opinion'. The 'regulator' (bless 'em) have again, patiently trotted off for more tea, quite rightfully taking refuge behind the bit 'they' are responsible for – do the company procedures "comply"? – Of course they do.
This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity.
- Steam off. There, I feel better now.
Beaker's REPCON scoping matrix may need reviewing??
The ATsBeaker initiative to publish REPCONs was justified with this preamble..
"....New confidential reporting web page
A new web page featuring de-identified confidential reports on aviation, maritime and rail safety concerns is now available on the ATSB website.
The ATSB’s confidential reporting scheme, REPCON, allows people with safety concerns to report them confidentially to the ATSB without fear of being identified. These confidential reports often contain valuable information that can help industry address unsafe procedures, practices or conditions.
Because many important safety concerns are reported to the ATSB through REPCON, it is vital that all of industry is aware of, and can learn from, the reported concerns. To enhance awareness of these safety issues, the ATSB will make this information available through the publication of de-identified confidential reports on its website.
The published information will include details about safety concerns, as well as responses and safety actions taken by relevant organisations or government agencies about the concern.
It’s important to remember that the information published on the new web page is de-identified to protect the identity of the reporter or any third party individual. REPCON serves to collect information about safety concerns in the aviation, marine and rail industries, to help facilitate safety action and, ultimately, improve transport safety. REPCON is not used to apportion blame or liability—the underpinning legislation specifically precludes information in a report being used for disciplinary purposes. As well, REPCON reports are inadmissible in evidence in a court, except where a person has committed an offence under the Criminal Code (False or misleading information) in making the report..."
Not one to normally question the efficacy (or veracity) of such a statement (I'll leave that to the Ferryman...) but going through the ICASS list of Annex 13 signatory states (duly provided here by ATsBeaker), I am yet to find any other State that has taken a similar initiative in publishing confidential reports on their websites. Perhaps the Kharon post highlights why this may be so...
"...This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity..."
If Beaker is to continue with this, yet another apparently unique Oz initiative, could I suggest they may like to revisit their current REPCON scoping matrix...
Sense & Sensibility??
Moving on but sticking with the theme of the FSB REPCON, I noted the following Paul B (Avweb) article...Sit the ^%$* Down! ...that provides a serious but somewhat amusing reminder on the dangers of unpredicted CAT...
The following article (also from the US), rather more satirically, reinforces the "K" 'Nanny State' post...:
Love it.. {Comment: Hmm...maybe that's our problem we've got Skippy and a flightless bird on our national coat of arms??}
MTF Sarcs
{ps Does Beaker seriously think that his REPCON examples will remain confidential & de-identified. How hard is it, for the average punter, to work out who the reporter possibly is and who the operator is in some of those published REPCONs...FFS!}
"....New confidential reporting web page
A new web page featuring de-identified confidential reports on aviation, maritime and rail safety concerns is now available on the ATSB website.
The ATSB’s confidential reporting scheme, REPCON, allows people with safety concerns to report them confidentially to the ATSB without fear of being identified. These confidential reports often contain valuable information that can help industry address unsafe procedures, practices or conditions.
Because many important safety concerns are reported to the ATSB through REPCON, it is vital that all of industry is aware of, and can learn from, the reported concerns. To enhance awareness of these safety issues, the ATSB will make this information available through the publication of de-identified confidential reports on its website.
The published information will include details about safety concerns, as well as responses and safety actions taken by relevant organisations or government agencies about the concern.
It’s important to remember that the information published on the new web page is de-identified to protect the identity of the reporter or any third party individual. REPCON serves to collect information about safety concerns in the aviation, marine and rail industries, to help facilitate safety action and, ultimately, improve transport safety. REPCON is not used to apportion blame or liability—the underpinning legislation specifically precludes information in a report being used for disciplinary purposes. As well, REPCON reports are inadmissible in evidence in a court, except where a person has committed an offence under the Criminal Code (False or misleading information) in making the report..."
Not one to normally question the efficacy (or veracity) of such a statement (I'll leave that to the Ferryman...
) but going through the ICASS list of Annex 13 signatory states (duly provided here by ATsBeaker), I am yet to find any other State that has taken a similar initiative in publishing confidential reports on their websites. Perhaps the Kharon post highlights why this may be so..."...This pitiful, un detailed, puling little complaint serves to show why the OH&S industry is loosing credibility; everyone is becoming a slightly hysterical, self appointed 'expert'. No wonder there is an element of cynicism when the Repcon system is used as an agenda tool, rather than part of a serious support structure for examining and improving 'real' safety issues. OBR?– "Oh, we don't do them". Silly half assed, subjective complaints from SLF – "Oh yes we do them, have expert opinion for those and everything; no, we never question motive". Spare me and bring back sanity..."
If Beaker is to continue with this, yet another apparently unique Oz initiative, could I suggest they may like to revisit their current REPCON scoping matrix...
Sense & Sensibility??
Moving on but sticking with the theme of the FSB REPCON, I noted the following Paul B (Avweb) article...Sit the ^%$* Down! ...that provides a serious but somewhat amusing reminder on the dangers of unpredicted CAT...
The good thing is that the vast majority of passengers will never see this kind of turbulence. But the bad thing is not having seen how bad bad can be, they traipse around the cabin unsecured as if on the way from the couch to the refrigerator. Frankly, this makes me nervous as hell. When the flight attendants push the drink trolly up the aisle, that makes me nervous as hell, too. I’ve seen those things come off the deck even in mild bumps. And when I go to the lav, I use one hand for business and the other to maintain a death grip on the helper handle and I jam my head against the ceiling. Then I rush back to my seat and strap in, all the while nervous as hell. I’m not worried about crashing; I’m worried about a broken arm or a concussion.
:
Right to Bear Wings
Is confrontation the key to success?
"Aviation" rhymes with "American." Well, even if it's not that close a rhyme, you get the idea. Aviation in many ways represents what it is to live in a free land with free skies. The same, it goes without saying, is or should be true for many of our friends worldwide. Aviation, metaphorically and literally, is a magic activity, one that takes a mere ground-bound mortal and through the power of will, ingenuity and the elegant abuse of raw physics, places us high above the world.
This might sound overly romantic; trust me, I know there's the cost of fuel and insurance, Class A-F airspace, a thousand pages of regs (okay, lots more than that) and that darned FAA medical to contend with, but the basis of it all, the reason we go to all of the other trouble is because flying is special. Apologies to kayakers, cross-stitchers, Sudoku-maniacs and Civil War re-enactors, but there's nothing remotely like flying. Even sky diving gets it wrong. Staying aloft is the point of the whole thing.
My point is simply this: I'm tired of apologizing for flying. I'm tired of telling the "not-in-my-backyard" types that we're very sorry and next time we'll try to climb on thermal energy alone so as to keep the faint and passing noise of GA down while trucks and road crews blare away unabated with hardly any notice taken. I'm tired of apologizing for our use of land, our negligible impact on the environment and our lording it up over the common folk for flying around in our airplanes as we do personal or business travel or just take in the beauty of the day. I'm tired of it.
This is not to say we shouldn't be good neighbors and try to minimize our impact, like any responsible citizen should do, but not because we're begging to stay on people's good side but instead because we choose to do it.
We need to make our message clear. You mess with aviation, you mess with freedom. You try to limit my right to fly, you're messing with not just me but with more than a half a million of my good friends, many of whom feel even more strongly than I do about the issue.
My plane is no threat to you. My plane is an emblem of the freedom to fly, a freedom that generations before us have fought valiantly to protect and one that we take the utmost pride in, for their sake, for ours and for our children.
There might not be a constitutional right directly associated with travel, let alone travel by air — the forefathers were only so prescient — but that right has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to be so fundamental that its very omission from the Constitution is proof of its unassailably fundamental importance.
And when you travel in a plane, it is, in my non-judicial opinion, even more fundamental and more central our rights as citizens.
Think about it. Our national symbol isn't a trout. It's an eagle. Fly on.
Is confrontation the key to success?
"Aviation" rhymes with "American." Well, even if it's not that close a rhyme, you get the idea. Aviation in many ways represents what it is to live in a free land with free skies. The same, it goes without saying, is or should be true for many of our friends worldwide. Aviation, metaphorically and literally, is a magic activity, one that takes a mere ground-bound mortal and through the power of will, ingenuity and the elegant abuse of raw physics, places us high above the world.
This might sound overly romantic; trust me, I know there's the cost of fuel and insurance, Class A-F airspace, a thousand pages of regs (okay, lots more than that) and that darned FAA medical to contend with, but the basis of it all, the reason we go to all of the other trouble is because flying is special. Apologies to kayakers, cross-stitchers, Sudoku-maniacs and Civil War re-enactors, but there's nothing remotely like flying. Even sky diving gets it wrong. Staying aloft is the point of the whole thing.
My point is simply this: I'm tired of apologizing for flying. I'm tired of telling the "not-in-my-backyard" types that we're very sorry and next time we'll try to climb on thermal energy alone so as to keep the faint and passing noise of GA down while trucks and road crews blare away unabated with hardly any notice taken. I'm tired of apologizing for our use of land, our negligible impact on the environment and our lording it up over the common folk for flying around in our airplanes as we do personal or business travel or just take in the beauty of the day. I'm tired of it.
This is not to say we shouldn't be good neighbors and try to minimize our impact, like any responsible citizen should do, but not because we're begging to stay on people's good side but instead because we choose to do it.
We need to make our message clear. You mess with aviation, you mess with freedom. You try to limit my right to fly, you're messing with not just me but with more than a half a million of my good friends, many of whom feel even more strongly than I do about the issue.
My plane is no threat to you. My plane is an emblem of the freedom to fly, a freedom that generations before us have fought valiantly to protect and one that we take the utmost pride in, for their sake, for ours and for our children.
There might not be a constitutional right directly associated with travel, let alone travel by air — the forefathers were only so prescient — but that right has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to be so fundamental that its very omission from the Constitution is proof of its unassailably fundamental importance.
And when you travel in a plane, it is, in my non-judicial opinion, even more fundamental and more central our rights as citizens.
Think about it. Our national symbol isn't a trout. It's an eagle. Fly on.
{Comment: Hmm...maybe that's our problem we've got Skippy and a flightless bird on our national coat of arms??}MTF Sarcs
{ps Does Beaker seriously think that his REPCON examples will remain confidential & de-identified. How hard is it, for the average punter, to work out who the reporter possibly is and who the operator is in some of those published REPCONs...FFS!
}
Last edited by Sarcs; 8th May 2014 at 03:51.
Addendum to last...
This is even better.....from the same journo:
Yep says it all really...
...from the same journo: FAA: Stop That, It's Legal!
When feds bow to public opinion over the regs, something's wrong.
By Robert Goyer / Published: Apr 22, 2014
Enlarge Photo
It must seem that I'm always complaining about the FAA, but the truth be told, the vast majority of our employees there (that's right; they're our employees) are fantastic. From controllers who bend over backwards to get us routings away from the storms to inspectors who go the extra mile to make sure we give it our best shot on our checkrides to directors who are working to bring the agency into the new millennium, there's a lot to like about the FAA.
Then there's this.
I had a photo shoot all set in South Florida with the great folks from Daher Socata to photograph one of their lovely new TBM 900s. Gorgeous plane, different story.
We did the shoot — two of them in fact. One was in the afternoon over the Everglades and the second one was the following morning over the Atlantic Coast near South Beach. Our flight consisted of my photo ship pilot, consummate pro Bruce Moore, our safety pilot, Cesar Eugenio, with photo subject pilot Wayman Luy, a Daher Socata Pilot, and subject plane safety pilot (and Chipmunk owner operator) Michel De Villiers, also of Daher Socata.
The shoots went off great, though we did have to hunt hard for sunlight on a few occasions. Luckily, Bruce has a great nose for good light.
The highlight of the shoots was our circuits of South Beach. We steered well clear of restricted airspace and conducted the mission within full compliance of the FARs.
Which is why what happened the next morning surprised me.
Wayman emailed me the next day saying that an FAA inspector had called him asking about the shoot. The FAA guy, Wayman said, informed him that the FAA's office had gotten phone calls about two airplanes flying close together over the beach.
Now, I am tempted to discuss how desperate for attention or ignorant of the sky above them someone who made such a call has to be. I mean, were they afraid that the two planes didn't see each other as they made turns and remained in perfect formation? Or that the formation was part of a two-light-plane leading edge of a wave of invading Pipers and Cessnas planning to descend upon South Florida? Who knows, maybe they were worried we were snowbirds coming down at exactly the wrong time of year and they wanted to warn us. In any case, every one of those calls was a call that never should have been made.
No, the thing that really got me mad was what the FAA guy asked Wayman to do next. According to Wayman, the inspector said he was fully aware that our flight was perfectly legal, but he asked us that we not do it anyways. Well, at least not over populated areas, which is also perfectly legal as long as you maintain legal altitude, which we did, and then some.
The message I got was, the FAA wanted us not just to obey the FARs but to give up some of our precious airspace and flying freedoms so they wouldn't get any more phone calls from confused citizens.
Um, sorry, but no.
Read more at FAA: Stop That, It's Legal! | Flying Magazine
When feds bow to public opinion over the regs, something's wrong.
By Robert Goyer / Published: Apr 22, 2014
Enlarge Photo
It must seem that I'm always complaining about the FAA, but the truth be told, the vast majority of our employees there (that's right; they're our employees) are fantastic. From controllers who bend over backwards to get us routings away from the storms to inspectors who go the extra mile to make sure we give it our best shot on our checkrides to directors who are working to bring the agency into the new millennium, there's a lot to like about the FAA.
Then there's this.
I had a photo shoot all set in South Florida with the great folks from Daher Socata to photograph one of their lovely new TBM 900s. Gorgeous plane, different story.
We did the shoot — two of them in fact. One was in the afternoon over the Everglades and the second one was the following morning over the Atlantic Coast near South Beach. Our flight consisted of my photo ship pilot, consummate pro Bruce Moore, our safety pilot, Cesar Eugenio, with photo subject pilot Wayman Luy, a Daher Socata Pilot, and subject plane safety pilot (and Chipmunk owner operator) Michel De Villiers, also of Daher Socata.
The shoots went off great, though we did have to hunt hard for sunlight on a few occasions. Luckily, Bruce has a great nose for good light.
The highlight of the shoots was our circuits of South Beach. We steered well clear of restricted airspace and conducted the mission within full compliance of the FARs.
Which is why what happened the next morning surprised me.
Wayman emailed me the next day saying that an FAA inspector had called him asking about the shoot. The FAA guy, Wayman said, informed him that the FAA's office had gotten phone calls about two airplanes flying close together over the beach.
Now, I am tempted to discuss how desperate for attention or ignorant of the sky above them someone who made such a call has to be. I mean, were they afraid that the two planes didn't see each other as they made turns and remained in perfect formation? Or that the formation was part of a two-light-plane leading edge of a wave of invading Pipers and Cessnas planning to descend upon South Florida? Who knows, maybe they were worried we were snowbirds coming down at exactly the wrong time of year and they wanted to warn us. In any case, every one of those calls was a call that never should have been made.
No, the thing that really got me mad was what the FAA guy asked Wayman to do next. According to Wayman, the inspector said he was fully aware that our flight was perfectly legal, but he asked us that we not do it anyways. Well, at least not over populated areas, which is also perfectly legal as long as you maintain legal altitude, which we did, and then some.
The message I got was, the FAA wanted us not just to obey the FARs but to give up some of our precious airspace and flying freedoms so they wouldn't get any more phone calls from confused citizens.
Um, sorry, but no.
Read more at FAA: Stop That, It's Legal! | Flying Magazine
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It's the dizzy limit – that's what...
Because many important safety concerns are reported to the ATSB through REPCON, it is vital that all of industry is aware of, and can learn from, the reported concerns.
See here, this is what we mean by cop out.
The published information will include details about safety concerns, as well as responses and safety actions taken by relevant organisations or government agencies about the concern.
REPCON serves to collect information about safety concerns in the aviation, marine and rail industries, to help facilitate safety action and, ultimately, improve transport safety.
What's wrong with this bloke, he has a good budget, good people, plenty of muscular law to support anything reasonable; so why all the Uriah Heep like hand wringing, obfuscation, humble PC crap and why, in the name of all the hells are CASA dictating the conclusions. The technical parts of the few reports we see are acceptable, definitely not stellar; but, the back few pages are completely beyond the pale. Bloody useless is how most describe them.
Fetch a bucket Minnie, a big one.
Last edited by Kharon; 8th May 2014 at 09:03. Reason: Suddenly, I'm very, very thirsty.
Kharon...
Did you forget that the fact that life vests did or didn't work properly may not even be considered IAW the differences filed with respect to Annex 13, because, according to the ATSB under Dolan's (mis)management:
Refer AIP Appendix 2 to SUP H18/14.
So, Kharon, if your scenario involved GA, then it looks as though you may as well assume that an investigation of the life vests probably WASN'T included, because it would have involved a cost.
FFS.
Who cares if life vests don't work properly, it's a unique domestic issue and anyway, we have registered our differences with ICAO. FFS.
Decisions on whether a particular domestic accident will be investigated depend on resources, and the likely benefit to future safety, particularly in the general aviation sector.
So, Kharon, if your scenario involved GA, then it looks as though you may as well assume that an investigation of the life vests probably WASN'T included, because it would have involved a cost.
FFS.
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Safety statistics.
There are a couple on 'new' threads which raise some interesting questions about the new look ATSB web site and search 'philosophy'. I can't find the Sarcs post which first mentioned the 'new' system, bemoaning the loss of weekly summaries and noting how difficult it was to 'mine' the data required. I did have a whack at trying to 'navigate' through the wretched thing, only to give it up feeling slightly nauseous.
Trusting the Creampuff cock up over conspiracy system after reading the Ramble and Framer posts, I have spent some little time trying to research similar events and to generally make a honest attempt to find some 'useful' information. It's bloody hopeless – I am not one of those who can claim expertise at data mining, but can, normally, with patience (and tender words) extract the information needed; eventually. But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course).
Ramble On.
The thing which prompts this post is 'Framer' doing a bit of research into the frequency with which runways are made unavailable (sudden like); probably break the data down into single runway and multiple runway airports and intersection events. It's worthwhile, even if it proves that 'statistically' the risks are low; there are those who would promote carrying an alternate and those who say it's a waste. It's tough enough to have a sensible discussion with facts, let alone without. The information sought should be readily available; it's not as though the data is not there.
Framer.
.
Perhaps a Repcon; Oi, ya website is crap; howz about making it useful.
Trusting the Creampuff cock up over conspiracy system after reading the Ramble and Framer posts, I have spent some little time trying to research similar events and to generally make a honest attempt to find some 'useful' information. It's bloody hopeless – I am not one of those who can claim expertise at data mining, but can, normally, with patience (and tender words) extract the information needed; eventually. But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course).
Ramble On.
It appears that the ATSB have just recently removed Aviation Weekly Summaries from their website.
Their new system is not fit for any practical purpose other than statistics.
The ATSB should take a leaf from the NTSB and list occurrences on a daily basis.
Its a valuable tool to see the nature of occurrences and what incidents are trending and at what locations.
Whomever introduced this new ATSB system demonstrates little practical knowledge of aviation operations.
Their new system is not fit for any practical purpose other than statistics.
The ATSB should take a leaf from the NTSB and list occurrences on a daily basis.
Its a valuable tool to see the nature of occurrences and what incidents are trending and at what locations.
Whomever introduced this new ATSB system demonstrates little practical knowledge of aviation operations.
Framer.
I would like to compile a list of unforecast airfield closures in Australia since the NZAA lights went out a few years back
Perhaps a Repcon; Oi, ya website is crap; howz about making it useful.
Last edited by Kharon; 9th May 2014 at 20:56.
Cause & effect and the four year cycle
While the miniscule & his team of dept crats are otherwise distracted with balancing the books for 2014-15, the Ferryman’s last perhaps provides a welcome diversion from the future ‘doom & gloom’ of TA’s budgetary crisis..
Kharon: "..But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course)..."
Beaker & Co should have nothing to hide so why the seemingly impenetrable website?? The ATsB’s primary function is to promote open & free dissemination of vital safety findings, lessons, research and recommendations to further enhance safety risk mitigation for the greater worldwide aviation industry. Beaker should be promoting the good work his investigators, researchers & data entry folk are doing on the coalface. So why is the ATsB (in its current form) so obtuse (almost retrograde) in how they go about their primary function??
The four year cycle
As long as we can all remember the, once beloved, bureau (BASI/ATSB) had always been the cash strapped poor cousins to the FF behemoth. Yet with limited resources they still punched above their weight and in accordance with Annex 13 were lorded as setting a benchmark for a small but effective State AAI.
It wasn’t till 2000 with the Whyalla accident investigation that the wheels started to fall off and for the first time the bureau started to cop independent, external & international flak.
Then we had the 2004 ICAO audit of the ATsB which came up with the following finding and recommendation in regards to compliance with Annex 13:
FINDING:
The ATSB’s policy is to place the primary focus on fare-paying passengers and to investigate all fatal accidents (unless they involve sport aviation). However, accidents that are considered to have little potential benefit for prevention may not be investigated in detail. In such cases, the ATSB would not necessarily attend the scene,conduct an in-depth investigation or produce an extensive report.
RECOMMENDATION:
The ATSB should investigate all accidents as defined by Annex 13. The depth of such investigations should be at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved.
To which the ATSB responded with this:
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:
This recommendation is related to the earlier recommendation at Appendix 2-2 and the ATSB response at 2-2 is also relevant. The ICAO audit recommendation that all accidents should be investigated at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved has significant budgetary implications that are outside of the control of the ATSB. While many accidents are essentially repetitive and involve little new safety learning and diminishing returns in their investigation, it is rarely possible to be so absolute as to assess that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved by further investigation.
The ATSB will, before the end of August 2004, advise the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Departmental Secretary and the Department of Finance and Administration of the audit recommendation and its budgetary implications.
Which led to a rather prolonged action response:
ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:
The ATSB formally briefed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services on the final ICAO Audit and its recommendations by Minute dated 22 October 2004. This Minute was also the formal mechanism for briefing the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) Secretary and Deputy Secretaries. The ATSB briefed the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA) at Division Head level on the ICAO Audit with a focus on recommendations CE-3/02 and CE-5/03 on 23 November 2004 via the Department of Transport and Regional Services’s Chief Financial Officer. On 21 December 2004 the Department of Finance and Administration responded that any additional funding was a matter in the first instance for the Minister's consideration against other priorities in his portfolio. DOFA stated also that only proposals with specific authority from the Cabinet or the Prime Minister were eligible for budget consideration.
In 2007-08 the ATSB was funded to undertake approximately 80 new aviation safety investigations of which about 30 are of the more comprehensive variety. Choice of the 80 from approximately 8000 accidents and incidents reported was based on published selection criteria. In addition, for the financial years 2007-08 to 2009-10 the ATSB was provided with additional budget funding to assist Indonesia with its transport safety improvement program.
But despite these initiatives, on the next four year cycle the bureau copped this finding & recommendation, again from ICAO {It is worth noting that 2008 was when Beaker first started his tenure and there was an underspend in the fiscal year 2008-09}:
AUDIT FINDING AIG/01
Funding for aviation accident investigations is provided by the Federal Government of Australia through the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.
To make the most of the funding allocated to it, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has established guidelines to determine whether to investigate an occurrence with the level of response to a notification determined by resource availability and such factors as:
1. existence of fatalities;
2. anticipated safety value of an investigation;
3. extent of public, media or political interest;
4. timeliness of notification;
5. training benefit for ATSB investigators;
6. likely possibility of safety action arising from the investigation or the existence of supporting
evidence or requirements to conduct a special investigation based on trends;
7. safety analysis or an identified targeted programme; and
8. scope or impact of any system failures.
Under the ATSB guidelines, occurrences that may fit the ICAO Annex 13’s definition of an aircraft accident or incident may not be investigated. Although the ATSB submits a notification of these occurrences to ICAO in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 provisions, the ATSB does not submit a preliminary report and/or an accident data report identifying contributing safety factors or probable cause.
And the response & action plan:
STATE’S COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS*
Australia has considered this finding and the related recommendations from the audit team.
Australia meets its Article 26 obligations. However, Australia has also lodged a difference with ICAO in relation to standard 5.1 and recommended practice 5.1.1 of Annex 13 as Australia considers it impractical to investigate all accidents and serious incidents within resources available. In addition to targeting those accidents and incidents that are likely to yield the greatest safety value in accordance with the guidelines quoted above, Australia normally gives priority to investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving regular public transport aircraft (especially with fare-paying passengers) and accidents involving fatalities other than those involving ultralights and sport aviation.
Australia notes that the investigation of accidents and serious incidents has been included for
discussion at the ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional meeting in October 2008. ATSB will participate in this discussion as it relates to upgrading recommendation 5.1.1 to a standard and allocating resources to those investigations that will yield the greatest safety value.
Australia may review its investigation policy following the AIG meeting.
Which led to the notified differences (highlighted by SIUYA) recorded in the ASA AIP SUP H12/11 in 2011 {Note: More on the notified differences later because there is some rather disturbing additions in the latest H18/14 SUP}.
Then we fast forward a further 4 years to the PelAir inquiry where we had another independent external body (i.e. the Senate Committee) which was heavily critical of the ATsB using lack of resources as an excuse to not thoroughly investigate (as per Annex 13) the Norfolk VH-NGA ditching. The Committee also made this recommendation:
Recommendation 9
4.103 The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.
More to follow on bean counter Beaker’s fiscal discipline, his new notified differences to Annex 13 & the history of REPCON (WOFTAM)…
Kharon: "..But I get the feeling that the ATSB site almost deliberately sets out to confound, the NTSB and other agencies all seem to have open, easy to navigate sites (by comparison). Some even offer to facilitate 'your research' if it's abstruse, for a modest fee (of course)..."
Beaker & Co should have nothing to hide so why the seemingly impenetrable website?? The ATsB’s primary function is to promote open & free dissemination of vital safety findings, lessons, research and recommendations to further enhance safety risk mitigation for the greater worldwide aviation industry. Beaker should be promoting the good work his investigators, researchers & data entry folk are doing on the coalface. So why is the ATsB (in its current form) so obtuse (almost retrograde) in how they go about their primary function??
The four year cycle
As long as we can all remember the, once beloved, bureau (BASI/ATSB) had always been the cash strapped poor cousins to the FF behemoth. Yet with limited resources they still punched above their weight and in accordance with Annex 13 were lorded as setting a benchmark for a small but effective State AAI.
It wasn’t till 2000 with the Whyalla accident investigation that the wheels started to fall off and for the first time the bureau started to cop independent, external & international flak.
Then we had the 2004 ICAO audit of the ATsB which came up with the following finding and recommendation in regards to compliance with Annex 13:
FINDING:
The ATSB’s policy is to place the primary focus on fare-paying passengers and to investigate all fatal accidents (unless they involve sport aviation). However, accidents that are considered to have little potential benefit for prevention may not be investigated in detail. In such cases, the ATSB would not necessarily attend the scene,conduct an in-depth investigation or produce an extensive report.
RECOMMENDATION:
The ATSB should investigate all accidents as defined by Annex 13. The depth of such investigations should be at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved.
To which the ATSB responded with this:
CORRECTIVE ACTION PROPOSED BY THE ATSB:
This recommendation is related to the earlier recommendation at Appendix 2-2 and the ATSB response at 2-2 is also relevant. The ICAO audit recommendation that all accidents should be investigated at least to a level where it is evident that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved has significant budgetary implications that are outside of the control of the ATSB. While many accidents are essentially repetitive and involve little new safety learning and diminishing returns in their investigation, it is rarely possible to be so absolute as to assess that no further enhancement of aviation safety can be achieved by further investigation.
The ATSB will, before the end of August 2004, advise the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Departmental Secretary and the Department of Finance and Administration of the audit recommendation and its budgetary implications.
Which led to a rather prolonged action response:
ACTION TAKEN BY THE ATSB:
The ATSB formally briefed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport and Regional Services on the final ICAO Audit and its recommendations by Minute dated 22 October 2004. This Minute was also the formal mechanism for briefing the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) Secretary and Deputy Secretaries. The ATSB briefed the Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA) at Division Head level on the ICAO Audit with a focus on recommendations CE-3/02 and CE-5/03 on 23 November 2004 via the Department of Transport and Regional Services’s Chief Financial Officer. On 21 December 2004 the Department of Finance and Administration responded that any additional funding was a matter in the first instance for the Minister's consideration against other priorities in his portfolio. DOFA stated also that only proposals with specific authority from the Cabinet or the Prime Minister were eligible for budget consideration.
In 2007-08 the ATSB was funded to undertake approximately 80 new aviation safety investigations of which about 30 are of the more comprehensive variety. Choice of the 80 from approximately 8000 accidents and incidents reported was based on published selection criteria. In addition, for the financial years 2007-08 to 2009-10 the ATSB was provided with additional budget funding to assist Indonesia with its transport safety improvement program.
But despite these initiatives, on the next four year cycle the bureau copped this finding & recommendation, again from ICAO {It is worth noting that 2008 was when Beaker first started his tenure and there was an underspend in the fiscal year 2008-09}:
AUDIT FINDING AIG/01
Funding for aviation accident investigations is provided by the Federal Government of Australia through the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.
To make the most of the funding allocated to it, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has established guidelines to determine whether to investigate an occurrence with the level of response to a notification determined by resource availability and such factors as:
1. existence of fatalities;
2. anticipated safety value of an investigation;
3. extent of public, media or political interest;
4. timeliness of notification;
5. training benefit for ATSB investigators;
6. likely possibility of safety action arising from the investigation or the existence of supporting
evidence or requirements to conduct a special investigation based on trends;
7. safety analysis or an identified targeted programme; and
8. scope or impact of any system failures.
Under the ATSB guidelines, occurrences that may fit the ICAO Annex 13’s definition of an aircraft accident or incident may not be investigated. Although the ATSB submits a notification of these occurrences to ICAO in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 provisions, the ATSB does not submit a preliminary report and/or an accident data report identifying contributing safety factors or probable cause.
And the response & action plan:
STATE’S COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS*
Australia has considered this finding and the related recommendations from the audit team.
Australia meets its Article 26 obligations. However, Australia has also lodged a difference with ICAO in relation to standard 5.1 and recommended practice 5.1.1 of Annex 13 as Australia considers it impractical to investigate all accidents and serious incidents within resources available. In addition to targeting those accidents and incidents that are likely to yield the greatest safety value in accordance with the guidelines quoted above, Australia normally gives priority to investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving regular public transport aircraft (especially with fare-paying passengers) and accidents involving fatalities other than those involving ultralights and sport aviation.
Australia notes that the investigation of accidents and serious incidents has been included for
discussion at the ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional meeting in October 2008. ATSB will participate in this discussion as it relates to upgrading recommendation 5.1.1 to a standard and allocating resources to those investigations that will yield the greatest safety value.
Australia may review its investigation policy following the AIG meeting.
Which led to the notified differences (highlighted by SIUYA) recorded in the ASA AIP SUP H12/11 in 2011 {Note: More on the notified differences later because there is some rather disturbing additions in the latest H18/14 SUP}.
Then we fast forward a further 4 years to the PelAir inquiry where we had another independent external body (i.e. the Senate Committee) which was heavily critical of the ATsB using lack of resources as an excuse to not thoroughly investigate (as per Annex 13) the Norfolk VH-NGA ditching. The Committee also made this recommendation:
Recommendation 9
4.103 The committee recommends that the government develop a process by which the ATSB can request access to supplementary funding via the minister.
More to follow on bean counter Beaker’s fiscal discipline, his new notified differences to Annex 13 & the history of REPCON (WOFTAM)…
Sarcs...
According to the ATSB Annual Plan for 2013-2014, the 'weasel words' are still being used to evade the obligations under paragraph 5.1 of Annex 13 to investigate ....... accidents.
I find it hard to understand how the Commissioners believe that the ATSB is actually maximising its contribution to aviation safety if its priority is on the travelling public, because that inevitably will result in it not always focussing its efforts at every occasion where they will '...likely result in safety improvements.'
The PEL-AIR investigation demonstrated that quite clearly.
There is no hope for the ATSB under the current (mis)management.
According to the ATSB Annual Plan for 2013-2014, the 'weasel words' are still being used to evade the obligations under paragraph 5.1 of Annex 13 to investigate ....... accidents.
We will work to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness of investigations. The ATSB's highest priority is investigations of accidents and safety occurrences that deliver improved transport safety outcomes for the travelling public. We will also give priority to investigating serious incidents or patterns of incidents.
The PEL-AIR investigation demonstrated that quite clearly.
There is no hope for the ATSB under the current (mis)management.
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We'll there is a white wash being undertakeimg right at this present time with the m18 turbine dromadra. There are people in the back ground at present that are doing everything in the power to try and make this not to happen. Casa and Atsb have laid there cards on the table now. Still wiring for the final report from David's accident.
Let's hope that David's loss is not in vain and heads roll at casa and not the person they trying to pin it on now. They know for over 10 years about the proem and done nothing.
Cheers
Let's hope that David's loss is not in vain and heads roll at casa and not the person they trying to pin it on now. They know for over 10 years about the proem and done nothing.
Cheers
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Senate – in waiting?
Jinglie #1907 –"Get the facts on these guys and go to the Senate with solid evidence."
I believe Truss has been, once again, badly advised. His committee in the parliament Senate are cranky, they have had a glimpse of the truth; and, with a bit of luck after the budget brouhaha has calmed down; they will get back to work. Next estimates and probably the next few weeks will tell the tale; how much of that story will 'escape' into daylight is unknown. The hatch, match and dispatch list from Sleepy Hollow may give some clues.
As it stands, the neutered Senate committee represents a tragedy in a great waste of time, talent and money.