From the thread...
Stress caused by the handling by management of major changes within The thread primarily focuses on the one de-identified REPCON and inevitably drifts to Sky God (Red Rat) issues but there are some underlying, seemingly cynical, issues that Fedsec Steve & Kharon picked up on that needs further exploration. So reproducing the "K"
post #15 ....
Quote: ALAEA #5 –"Just reading through the REPCONs generally. What concerns me is the way CASA seem to just fob everything off and the ATSB accept that".
If you go the Repcon link on post #1 in the left hand panel there's a black rectangle, marked Repcon, this will take you to three pages, containing 45 Repcon; most of which are aviation related. As Steve says, the responses are well rehearsed, smoothly executed excuses which make it look, through the smoke and mirrors, as though something is actually be done (disgusting).
If you can find the time have a look at the responses from the 'other' domestic transport agencies and compare them; then, if you want to get serious, have a look at the Canadian or USA authorities responses to similar 'safety reports'. I found an hour last evening to do this, not to make it a project, but to 'test' differences. I'm still shaking my head, well at least we can still drink most of the water in Australia.
If the Repcon in #1 achieves nothing else it has served well to highlight the appalling, self evident condition to which the official attitude on safety concerns has degenerated.
Quote: ALAEA "They simply never do anything".
Wrong Steve, they spend the entire day and budget making sure they cannot be held responsible or accountable for anything, while ensuring maximum control and kudos. It's an art form; deeply entrenched, fully supported and set to endure. The really 'nasty' part is they steal all the accolades for 'safe transport' from those who are at the coal face, keeping the public safe even while under the incredible pressure of work place uncertainty, mismanagement and not too much protection.
Here is the
link for the bureau listed REPCONs. This initiative by the bureau, appears to have been brought in at the start of 2013, & should be applauded, but I wonder if it is doing anything to dispel the severe distrust the industry now has with both the regulator and the supposed safety watchdog...
Steve in his
post #5 gives some examples of FF responses to various REPCONs and in a further post #27 makes the comment...
"...From reading the REPCON outcomes, one could easily come to the conclusion that submitting a report is pointless because there is never any resulting fix to identified problems. I think someone needs to talk to the good Senator before he goes into the next estimates hearings..."
So to add some more fuel to the fire...
...and to focus more on GA issues generally, here is a couple more examples of REPCONs followed by properly spun bureaucratic FF, weasel worded non-reponses...
This one is interesting in light of a current active bureau accident investigation:
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the continuation of cabin crew service in flight while the fasten seat belt (FSB) sign is illuminated during turbulent conditions.
The reporter is concerned that the serving of hot beverages during turbulence is unsafe for both passengers and cabin crew and may result in significant injuries. The reporter has witnessed first-hand hot drinks being poured and spilt while the FSB sign was on.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
In response to REPCON AR201300053, the severity of the turbulence determines the course of action. The turbulence matrix states that during all turbulent events Cabin Crew discontinue hot drink service; there is no requirement for the discontinuation of service or to be seated, unless instructed to do so by the Captain / Cabin Supervisor in a Light turbulent event. Cabin Crew are empowered to be seated at any time they feel their safety is at risk.
During a Moderate or Severe turbulent event the Matrix states that the Cabin Crew are to discontinue Cabin Service and re-stow carts, if it is safe to do so.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the content of this REPCON and advises the matter is being followed up with the operator and will take action as appropriate.
Love this bit...(my bold)
ATSB comment
REPCON received further comments from the reporter on this matter and the text below was sent to CASA for comment.
The 'matrix' seems to make a simple CAO into a complex issue.
The matrix suggests that it is safe in turbulence to have the cabin crew up and about with their trolleys, while the passengers are restrained and the Fasten Sear Belt Sign is on.
This is not applying the CAO correctly. Further, there are two potential "judgers" as to when cabin crew are to be seated. One is the Captain and the other is the cabin manager. Both will have different perceptions of when flight attendants are to be seated.
I do not believe the CAO in question is being applied correctly.
Regulator's response (Regulator 2)
I am advised that CASA has quarterly Cabin Safety review meetings with the operator. At the next meeting CASA will review the Operator's Seat Belt procedure collaboratively to ensure it meets CASA's regulatory requirements to provide an effective safety outcome.
Shades of Barrier perhaps??
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the maintenance of the two Cessna 182s operated by the operator. The reporter stated that when they were rostered to fly for the organisation, they were asked to falsify the maintenance release by significantly under-recording the hours they were actually flying.
The reporter is also concerned that the aircraft are not being maintained to the appropriate standard.
The reporter stated that the following concerns were observed:
- The engine leaks an abnormal amount of oil
- The pilot seat is difficult to lock in place after adjusting
- The altimeter and tacho are often erroneous
- The upward opening door for parachutists to exit is difficult to secure closed using the locking pin.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
We only employ Commercial Pilots to fly these aircraft and have concerns that this pilot has breached their obligations to report safety concerns to me and to act appropriately to ensure the safety of other pilots and passengers. I have investigated the claims made by this pilot and have concluded that they are baseless.
We have contacted our mechanic to investigate any oil leaks in theses aeroplanes. It was concluded that there was no evidence of any oil leaks. We have asked other pilots if there have been any issues with the seat, all of whom stated that they have had no problems locking the seat in.
The door can be difficult to use by pilots who have done limited hours on the craft, though no concerns have been voiced by my experienced pilots. We will endeavour to do more training on this aircraft for anyone that feels they need it. Also, as these aircraft are flown in controlled air space, the altimeter is checked on each flight. I believe that if the altimeter was incorrect or malfunctioning, this would be identified as we enter controlled air space. There have been no complaints by other pilot voicing concerns about the accuracy of the tacho.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA has reviewed the matters raised in the REPCON and advises that surveillance was conducted at the airport which identified an aircraft as undergoing maintenance. The defects reported on the REPCON were not evident on that aircraft as they had been rectified during the maintenance.
CASA notes that the reporter refers to two aircraft, however only one aircraft is identified in the report.
ATSB comment
After REPCON questioned CASA as to whether they had discussed the falsification of the maintenance records with the operator, CASA conducted further enquires. They formed the preliminary view that the defects had not been endorsed on the maintenance release when they should have been and these matters were going to be examined further.
And finally going back to one Steve quoted from (my bold):
Reporter's concern
The reporter expressed a safety concern regarding the fatigue experienced when flying either of two long distance return flights which are both back of clock duties. This fatigue is even worse on the second night if the crew is rostered on consecutive duties.
The flight time is eight hours and forty five minutes on the first return flight and nine hours and fifteen minutes for the second return flight and if the flight is diverted this generally occurs when the crew is already in a fatigued state and likely to make fatigue induced errors.
While most crews attempt to get enough sleep between consecutive duties, as they are driving home in peak hour traffic, arriving as their family is starting the day, and with body clock issues it is difficult to get more than three hours sleep during the day. This is inadequate for another back of clock duty.
While the duties may be considered below the threshold using the FAID fatigue management system, the reporter advised that they feel extremely fatigued during the latter part of the flight.
The reporter has stated that if the operator had a 'Just Culture', they may receive more reports of fatigue from flight crews rather than crews reporting unfit for duty.
Operator's response (Operator 1)
The airline takes fatigue management seriously and has a system for monitoring fatigue risk in our operations. Rosters are built to provide appropriate preparation and recovery time, meeting and often exceeding regulatory requirements. The number and frequency of consecutive back of flying operations for individuals are minimised and crew can express preferences for particular duties. The airline provides a just culture where crew can declare themselves unfit for duty if fatigued, consistent with crew individual responsibilities for fatigue management.
Regulator's response (Regulator 1)
CASA is aware of the operator's fatigue risk management policy and monitors the system in respect of fatigue risk management objectives.
Risk mitigators observed include regular monitoring of roster pattern performance by the airline, adjustment of rostering rules, the ability for a crew member to opt out of a duty when fatigue is anticipated or experienced and the provision of company transport or accommodation in order to limit the fatigue effects following duty.
Under the proposed flight and duty rules which are expected to be in force from this year, it will still be up to the individual to determine fitness for duty and to make a report via the safety management system (SMS) where this is indicated under company procedures. CASA strongly recommends airline employees report potential fatigue events through the SMS, in order to identify areas where the company should focus resources to reduce operational risk, including fatigue risk. Comment: Isn't that what the Reporter indicated was a problem i.e. lack of true "Just Culture".
If the reporter has evidence of the reporting culture being compromised by management actions they are invited to make a report to CASA detailing any concerns.
Last para..."
in other words if you continue to have a whinge then come to us so we can single you out for a selected tea & bikkies (pineappling) session "...yeah right like that's going to happen...
IMO the word REPCON should be replaced with WOFTAM...
All this system is achieving is further discouraging (muzzling) potential (genuine) whistleblowers from coming forward when concerned with safety related matters....TICK TOCK...miniscule!
