Merged: APNG Twin Otter Missing
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Usually Oz
Posts: 732
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I was surprised to find how stressed a young bloke was after landing at a strip in Arnhem Land in podded C206. He said that he'd never done it with a full load into a limiting strip length. He was also slightly upset at my lack of awe at the situation.
My reply was "I don't know what your problem is; you could always go-around!" Ahh...Wonenara.......what a spot......
G'day
My reply was "I don't know what your problem is; you could always go-around!" Ahh...Wonenara.......what a spot......
G'day
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: South Pacific
Posts: 862
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lucille and Greenslopes (and Tailwheel)
If Obie is a journo, his research has been supplied and he SHOULD be able to provide a realistic article now. Nothing else counts like local experience.
If Obie is a journo, his research has been supplied and he SHOULD be able to provide a realistic article now. Nothing else counts like local experience.
Last edited by frigatebird; 12th Aug 2009 at 23:14.
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: Wanna Be Up There...
Age: 53
Posts: 279
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Latest media beat up coming out this morning is that the female pilot was "only" 26 years old and had less than 6 months experience flying twin engine aircraft.
Last night on the 7pm Project they had a pilot on (who probably posts here, CC?) setting out the requirements for being certified to fly into those strips which would make the latest media story a non issue.
I suppose they are just desperate to pin the blame on someone... B@st@rds.
Last night on the 7pm Project they had a pilot on (who probably posts here, CC?) setting out the requirements for being certified to fly into those strips which would make the latest media story a non issue.
I suppose they are just desperate to pin the blame on someone... B@st@rds.
Chimbu chukles, regarding:
"...In the mountains GPS is of very limited value (in fact it is near useless) and I point blank, absolutely refuse to believe this crew was fcking around with TAWs/EGPWS..."
Can I be brave enough to suggest otherwise?
I think they must have been, and if they weren't they should have been, and here's why. If I recall correctly, and from the outset I stand to be corrected here, the accident aircraft was fitted with a Garmin GNS530 equipped with the TAWS option. [If eyewitness accounts as reported by the Australian media are correct] the aircraft was in cloud when it hit the mountain, or at least until moments before it hit the mountain at which point impact was unavoidable. If you find yourself inadvertently in cloud in the mountains, or even if visual but with deteriorating weather and IMC is likely, I am quite sure any crew who had TAWS available would be keeping an eagle eye on its indications. Quite possibly TAWS is the best, maybe only, thing going for you in this situation once the opportunity to turn around has passed.
The crew knew the mountain was where it was because, [according to the operator], they had flown the route many times before. This leads to the obvious conclusion that they were not exactly sure where they were in relation to the mountain [because they flew into it]. We [might assume] they couldn't determine their position visually because they were in cloud. This means they must have been entirely reliant on GPS indications to determine where they were and what was around them. In other words, in this case the GPS information was extremely valuable because that's all that had, but was it reliable? (I think at the time of the accident RAIM was available in the area, however in very heavy rain and moutainous terrain I have seen degraded GPS position information). So the GPS and the crews interpretation of the GPS information will be absolutely critical to the investigation.
There's no "fcking around" as such with operating TAWS and the GNS530, it takes only a few seconds to call up the TAWS page from whatever page you might be on at the time. And in any event, even if you don't have the TAWS page up you still get the TAWS pop-up and aural alerts whatever other page you have displayed.
(For those who are unfamiliar with Terrain Avoidance Warning System, the TAWS page provides a graphical presentation on the GPS display of the terrain around you relative to your present height. Simply: black being space where there is no danger of impact, yellow being space where you might hit something, and red being space you will hit something).
TAWS can be disabled on the GNS530, but not completely disabled (the Premature Descent Alert and Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance alerts can be disabled, but not the Excessive Descent Rate Alert). However EDR alert only triggers if the closure rate with terrain is determined about 1000 fpm or more, meaning you could be climbing, but not out climbing rising terrain, and if the closure rate was less than 1000 fpm, theoretically you might not get a TAWS aural warning before impacting terrain. Again, I stand to be corrected here.
TAWS warnings and graphical presentations vary depending on the phase of flight, whether enroute, terminal, approach or departure. We don't know what the TAWS Phase of Flight was just prior to impact, it was most likely to be in enroute phase because the required criteria for the other phases was likely not present. In enroute phase the minimum clearance value for alerts is higher, meaning for a giving situation, you could get a TAWS alert if you were in enroute phase, but not in terminal or the other phases. (The TAWS logic and when warnings do and don't get triggered is really only fully understood by those people who wrote the algorithms, it's not something a pilot could ever hope to fully understand).
My experince with the GNS530 is you can get lots of eronious terrain warnings with TAWS either on or off, and very very rarely you don't get any warning when there is a clear collision risk ahead.
It is quite likely the crew had TAWS disabled whilst in the mountains to minimize annoying false warnings, but the TAWS page still shows surrounding terrain, and you still get EDR alerts if you're not on the TAWS page. So fair chance if the crew didn't have the TAWS page up they were getting aural and visual terrain warnings even if TAWS was disabled. However, if TAWS was disabled and they were on the TAWS page, as far as I know (perhaps??) you don't get the aural warning.
I think the key to finding out what went wrong here is in the GPS, and understanding the human/GPS interface factors. Another possibility is of course they were in cloud trying to get up the valley towards Kokoda gap [we now know they weren't, they were to the north of Kokoda slightly right of the extended runway centreline], relying on the TAWS graphical presentation for terrain avoidance, but they had an engine failure and from which point their fate was unavoidable (not being able to turn around in the space available, and not being able to out climb the rising terrain). The other possibility is degraded GPS position information due to the heavy rain, and they were half a mile away from where the GPS said they were.
In summary, TAWS is great. If you've left the decision to turn around too late or you find yourself in cloud in mountains, only TAWS, and luck, is all you have going for you to save your life. What is not great about TAWS is some might rely on it to do stuff they wouldn't be doing without it. Don't lose sight of the caveat that TAWS should only be used as an aid to visual acquisition - do not use terrain information to navigate or maneuver to avoid terrain. Unless you are inadvertently in cloud in mountains then you have no other choice.
Let's hope the GPS data can be recovered. Also, the CVR is going to be helpful to unravel what the crew intentions were [if it had one installed, not that a CVR was required for the class of operation]. Whatever happened, and why, whatever the investigation finds, nothing will change the fact this is a very tragic event.
"...In the mountains GPS is of very limited value (in fact it is near useless) and I point blank, absolutely refuse to believe this crew was fcking around with TAWs/EGPWS..."
Can I be brave enough to suggest otherwise?
I think they must have been, and if they weren't they should have been, and here's why. If I recall correctly, and from the outset I stand to be corrected here, the accident aircraft was fitted with a Garmin GNS530 equipped with the TAWS option. [If eyewitness accounts as reported by the Australian media are correct] the aircraft was in cloud when it hit the mountain, or at least until moments before it hit the mountain at which point impact was unavoidable. If you find yourself inadvertently in cloud in the mountains, or even if visual but with deteriorating weather and IMC is likely, I am quite sure any crew who had TAWS available would be keeping an eagle eye on its indications. Quite possibly TAWS is the best, maybe only, thing going for you in this situation once the opportunity to turn around has passed.
The crew knew the mountain was where it was because, [according to the operator], they had flown the route many times before. This leads to the obvious conclusion that they were not exactly sure where they were in relation to the mountain [because they flew into it]. We [might assume] they couldn't determine their position visually because they were in cloud. This means they must have been entirely reliant on GPS indications to determine where they were and what was around them. In other words, in this case the GPS information was extremely valuable because that's all that had, but was it reliable? (I think at the time of the accident RAIM was available in the area, however in very heavy rain and moutainous terrain I have seen degraded GPS position information). So the GPS and the crews interpretation of the GPS information will be absolutely critical to the investigation.
There's no "fcking around" as such with operating TAWS and the GNS530, it takes only a few seconds to call up the TAWS page from whatever page you might be on at the time. And in any event, even if you don't have the TAWS page up you still get the TAWS pop-up and aural alerts whatever other page you have displayed.
(For those who are unfamiliar with Terrain Avoidance Warning System, the TAWS page provides a graphical presentation on the GPS display of the terrain around you relative to your present height. Simply: black being space where there is no danger of impact, yellow being space where you might hit something, and red being space you will hit something).
TAWS can be disabled on the GNS530, but not completely disabled (the Premature Descent Alert and Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance alerts can be disabled, but not the Excessive Descent Rate Alert). However EDR alert only triggers if the closure rate with terrain is determined about 1000 fpm or more, meaning you could be climbing, but not out climbing rising terrain, and if the closure rate was less than 1000 fpm, theoretically you might not get a TAWS aural warning before impacting terrain. Again, I stand to be corrected here.
TAWS warnings and graphical presentations vary depending on the phase of flight, whether enroute, terminal, approach or departure. We don't know what the TAWS Phase of Flight was just prior to impact, it was most likely to be in enroute phase because the required criteria for the other phases was likely not present. In enroute phase the minimum clearance value for alerts is higher, meaning for a giving situation, you could get a TAWS alert if you were in enroute phase, but not in terminal or the other phases. (The TAWS logic and when warnings do and don't get triggered is really only fully understood by those people who wrote the algorithms, it's not something a pilot could ever hope to fully understand).
My experince with the GNS530 is you can get lots of eronious terrain warnings with TAWS either on or off, and very very rarely you don't get any warning when there is a clear collision risk ahead.
It is quite likely the crew had TAWS disabled whilst in the mountains to minimize annoying false warnings, but the TAWS page still shows surrounding terrain, and you still get EDR alerts if you're not on the TAWS page. So fair chance if the crew didn't have the TAWS page up they were getting aural and visual terrain warnings even if TAWS was disabled. However, if TAWS was disabled and they were on the TAWS page, as far as I know (perhaps??) you don't get the aural warning.
I think the key to finding out what went wrong here is in the GPS, and understanding the human/GPS interface factors. Another possibility is of course they were in cloud trying to get up the valley towards Kokoda gap [we now know they weren't, they were to the north of Kokoda slightly right of the extended runway centreline], relying on the TAWS graphical presentation for terrain avoidance, but they had an engine failure and from which point their fate was unavoidable (not being able to turn around in the space available, and not being able to out climb the rising terrain). The other possibility is degraded GPS position information due to the heavy rain, and they were half a mile away from where the GPS said they were.
In summary, TAWS is great. If you've left the decision to turn around too late or you find yourself in cloud in mountains, only TAWS, and luck, is all you have going for you to save your life. What is not great about TAWS is some might rely on it to do stuff they wouldn't be doing without it. Don't lose sight of the caveat that TAWS should only be used as an aid to visual acquisition - do not use terrain information to navigate or maneuver to avoid terrain. Unless you are inadvertently in cloud in mountains then you have no other choice.
Let's hope the GPS data can be recovered. Also, the CVR is going to be helpful to unravel what the crew intentions were [if it had one installed, not that a CVR was required for the class of operation]. Whatever happened, and why, whatever the investigation finds, nothing will change the fact this is a very tragic event.
Last edited by gulliBell; 13th Aug 2009 at 08:42. Reason: changes [ ] on account of feedback
gulibell, having flown in PNG GPS/TAWS is unreliable for the simple fact that the maneuvers required and the terrain surrounding most strips denies the GPS aerial a constant signal. I had GPS but not TAWS and was trained to use the GPS as another tool in the kitbag not the only tool and certainly not to be relied upon IMC beLow LSALT. As for the pilot only being on type for six months. The hours flown in six months are usually greater than those flown by most pilots(elsewhere in the world) in a year. Also knowing the guys conducting the checking and training on the twotters, there is only one standard. 100% right is 100% right , and 99% right is 1oo% wrong. Very high standards are trained and no allowance is given for lack of ability.
We may never know the facts of the crash, PNG is an extremely demanding/unforgiving environment in which to operate. It takes a tremendous amount of skill combined with courage to operate in this harsh environment.
Instead of sniping at these professional pilots, wait for the facts and perhaps we may all learn from this and make PNG a safer place for lessons hard learned.
R.I.P to all those involved
We may never know the facts of the crash, PNG is an extremely demanding/unforgiving environment in which to operate. It takes a tremendous amount of skill combined with courage to operate in this harsh environment.
Instead of sniping at these professional pilots, wait for the facts and perhaps we may all learn from this and make PNG a safer place for lessons hard learned.
R.I.P to all those involved
Latest news is that PNG airstrips need white cone markers to assist pilots to find them in poor weather
Attributed to a tour operator on the Westnet news site.
Attributed to a tour operator on the Westnet news site.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Posts: 1,451
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think there'd be few who've "been there and done that" in the Highlands of PNG, particularly in an underpowered civil single or twin, who'd disagree that if getting a PPL could be likened to passing Kindergarten and an ATPL to graduating from High School, a couple of years flying around the PNG Highlands is the equivalent of a post graduate university degree.
The fact that so many of the pilots who do this flying have relatively low hours makes the fact that there are so few serious accidents even more impressive.
It's a long time since I've operated in the Highlnds, and I now navaids, particularly GPS, have made life considerably easier for a pilot in knowing exactly where he/she is, but I'm still gob-smacked to learn from earlier posts here that it now seems to be SOP to fly IMC below LSALT in the Highlands.
The only time I ever went IMC in the Highlands was when I was caught out by rapidly changing weather - and my one and only ambition when that happened was to get clear of cloud or above LSALT (if that was possible - it wasn't always an option!) ASAP.
The fact that so many of the pilots who do this flying have relatively low hours makes the fact that there are so few serious accidents even more impressive.
It's a long time since I've operated in the Highlnds, and I now navaids, particularly GPS, have made life considerably easier for a pilot in knowing exactly where he/she is, but I'm still gob-smacked to learn from earlier posts here that it now seems to be SOP to fly IMC below LSALT in the Highlands.
The only time I ever went IMC in the Highlands was when I was caught out by rapidly changing weather - and my one and only ambition when that happened was to get clear of cloud or above LSALT (if that was possible - it wasn't always an option!) ASAP.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: S.H.
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Also, the CVR is going to be helpful to unravel what the crew intentions were.
DHC-300 MTOW is 5,670 kgs from the Transport Canada Type Certificate Data Sheet. Minimum crew = 1 pilot
PNG CAR 125:
125.367 Cockpit-voice recorder
A certificate holder shall ensure each of its multi-engined turbine powered aeroplanes with a MCTOW of greater than 5700 kg is equipped with a cockpit voice recorder if that aeroplane’s flight manual requires two or more flight crew members.
Last edited by chainsaw; 13th Aug 2009 at 00:27. Reason: A bit more info.
Retired Tiger pilot
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Club Morocco. Subic Bay. Philippines
Posts: 460
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
notmy150/obie
NMC150: APNG home page states that both pilots have some 5 years experience on DHC6 aircraft, so I'd guess they had accumulated around 3,000 hours on type. Not an inconsiderable amount in such a hostile environment.
Not too sure about Obie though, apart from suggesting that he take a trip to Port Moresby and fly as pax on a few Goilala trips, as well as to/from Kokoda via the Kokoda Gap. He then may have a better appreciation of what PNG flying is all about.
I back-up Chimbu Chuckles comments as after 37 years in the country operating various aircraft from C206/185/402/336/B55/P166B/PA31/SC7 and DC3 over the hills and into Kokoda, I have a suble appreciation of what PNG ops are all about.
RIP.
Not too sure about Obie though, apart from suggesting that he take a trip to Port Moresby and fly as pax on a few Goilala trips, as well as to/from Kokoda via the Kokoda Gap. He then may have a better appreciation of what PNG flying is all about.
I back-up Chimbu Chuckles comments as after 37 years in the country operating various aircraft from C206/185/402/336/B55/P166B/PA31/SC7 and DC3 over the hills and into Kokoda, I have a suble appreciation of what PNG ops are all about.
RIP.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: ground bound looking up
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
this might help a bit more understanding
YouTube - extreme flying
Hope this works ...... I found this a while back and showed the kids what their dad use to do .... exhilirating, challenging and unforgiving. Its all been said before.
Hope this works ...... I found this a while back and showed the kids what their dad use to do .... exhilirating, challenging and unforgiving. Its all been said before.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: OCTA
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
gulliBell, I am sure that by saying he 'refused to believe the crew were fcking around with the EGPWS' Chuckles meant that he refused to believe the crew were attempting an approach in IMC up the valley. I agree with Chuckles, that would be madness. You are saying that if it all turned to crap and they went IMC the crew should then use the EGPWS as a tool to get themselves out of that situation. I agree with you, use whatever you can.
Maybe you and Chuckles are talking about different things? BB
Maybe you and Chuckles are talking about different things? BB
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 26
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
At the end of the day even experience can kill.
Remember the Chief Pilot (shiploads of experience in PNG) of a certain operator who, in '79, attemped a go-around at Manari, FROM THE GROUND, in a Gomad and ended up vertical amoungst the trees half way up the ridge immediately to the north of the strip, the result of being hot and high on approach with nowhere to go. 14 on board, all perished!
Just another one of those places where you're committed long before the threshold!
Remember the Chief Pilot (shiploads of experience in PNG) of a certain operator who, in '79, attemped a go-around at Manari, FROM THE GROUND, in a Gomad and ended up vertical amoungst the trees half way up the ridge immediately to the north of the strip, the result of being hot and high on approach with nowhere to go. 14 on board, all perished!
Just another one of those places where you're committed long before the threshold!
gulliBell,
I am afraid that the day after the accident is NOT the time to be stepping up on one's soap box and preaching how an accident occurred.
Your reply indicated what the crew did, what the crew knew, what the crew disabled, what the crew should have done, what the weather was like, what the GPS and TAWs/EGPWS were reporting.
Your insight into the accident is somewhat amazing.
You would be much better informed by listening to Chuck!
How about a little respect for both the passengers and crew
and keep the very subjective statements for another day.
I am afraid that the day after the accident is NOT the time to be stepping up on one's soap box and preaching how an accident occurred.
Your reply indicated what the crew did, what the crew knew, what the crew disabled, what the crew should have done, what the weather was like, what the GPS and TAWs/EGPWS were reporting.
Your insight into the accident is somewhat amazing.
You would be much better informed by listening to Chuck!
How about a little respect for both the passengers and crew
and keep the very subjective statements for another day.
Join Date: May 2004
Location: The center of the earths surface
Posts: 290
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
knocker:
Quote:
I was surprised to find how stressed a young bloke was after landing at a strip in Arnhem Land in podded C206. He said that he'd never done it with a full load into a limiting strip length. He was also slightly upset at my lack of awe at the situation.
My reply was "I don't know what your problem is; you could always go-around!" Ahh...Wonenara.......what a spot......
****e man. least we forget when we started out, you could have chosen to say:
Good on ya mate! I remember my first time, welcome to commercial aviation!
Its a good feeling isn't it mate:
Knock em down, club em to death, nah we never felt the same did we? OR DID WE?
Chrs
H/Snort
PS( I love KNOCKERS)
especially my wifes
I was surprised to find how stressed a young bloke was after landing at a strip in Arnhem Land in podded C206. He said that he'd never done it with a full load into a limiting strip length. He was also slightly upset at my lack of awe at the situation.
My reply was "I don't know what your problem is; you could always go-around!" Ahh...Wonenara.......what a spot......
****e man. least we forget when we started out, you could have chosen to say:
Good on ya mate! I remember my first time, welcome to commercial aviation!
Its a good feeling isn't it mate:
Knock em down, club em to death, nah we never felt the same did we? OR DID WE?
Chrs
H/Snort
PS( I love KNOCKERS)
especially my wifes
Last night on the 7pm Project they had a pilot on (who probably posts here, CC?)
Dr
AA. I'm on no soap box here, and quite frankly I can't see how you've read any disrespect towards the crew on my part in anything I said. Not even implied criticism, it's simply not there.
All I said was what might have happened; that is, they might have been using TAWS to navigate out of the valley, TAWS might have been the best choice left available to them, and that TAWS navigation data might have been subject to error for no fault of their own. Others here seem to be in agreeance with me, that GPS and TAWS has it limitations, but if you've got it, use it if you need it.
No one is saying the crew shouldn't have been using it, or even whether they were actually using it. I also said we don't know what mode the TAWS was in, or what it was reporting, and I gave a whole host of reasons why. For all we know the wing might have fallen off the plane and TAWS or navigation uncertainty had nothing to do with it. We just don't know.
I haven't said anywhere what caused the crash or who is at fault, that is left to the investigating authority. My "insight" as you say is based purely on my knowledge of the equipment fitted to the aircraft, having used this exact same equipment extensively throughout PNG for years. If I'm wrong in a technical sense about anything I have said about the equipment then so be it, I did qualify my comments that I was unsure about some aspects. My 7+ years of PNG insight also says there is an element of bad luck at play here, as is often the case. My insight also says the crew was doing the best they could with the equipment they had in the circumstances they faced.
As Bush Boss says, if faced with a situation you use whatever tools you have available to you. If that means using TAWS to navigate out of a valley, lucky you for having it. Much better than not. If the engine stopped or the wing fell off, or if the GPS was degraded, that's just the worst luck.
I welcome further criticism of anything I have said here. That's what the forum is for.
All I said was what might have happened; that is, they might have been using TAWS to navigate out of the valley, TAWS might have been the best choice left available to them, and that TAWS navigation data might have been subject to error for no fault of their own. Others here seem to be in agreeance with me, that GPS and TAWS has it limitations, but if you've got it, use it if you need it.
No one is saying the crew shouldn't have been using it, or even whether they were actually using it. I also said we don't know what mode the TAWS was in, or what it was reporting, and I gave a whole host of reasons why. For all we know the wing might have fallen off the plane and TAWS or navigation uncertainty had nothing to do with it. We just don't know.
I haven't said anywhere what caused the crash or who is at fault, that is left to the investigating authority. My "insight" as you say is based purely on my knowledge of the equipment fitted to the aircraft, having used this exact same equipment extensively throughout PNG for years. If I'm wrong in a technical sense about anything I have said about the equipment then so be it, I did qualify my comments that I was unsure about some aspects. My 7+ years of PNG insight also says there is an element of bad luck at play here, as is often the case. My insight also says the crew was doing the best they could with the equipment they had in the circumstances they faced.
As Bush Boss says, if faced with a situation you use whatever tools you have available to you. If that means using TAWS to navigate out of a valley, lucky you for having it. Much better than not. If the engine stopped or the wing fell off, or if the GPS was degraded, that's just the worst luck.
I welcome further criticism of anything I have said here. That's what the forum is for.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Enroute from Dagobah to Tatooine...!
Posts: 791
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
mattyj, because without aviation PNG stops... For a relatively small country there is a lot of flying due to the lack of alternatives. What makes every crash more poignant is the fact that there are practically no PPL cowboys flying around up there - they are all professional pilots who generally know what they are doing and are good pilots because they have to be! I don't know if the place claims more lives proportionate to other places - these days I reckon probably less. Air Niugini is one of the few National Carries that has NEVER had a fatal crash, and that is really saying something! Having said that, they don't have to fly into the 'bush' strips...
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: The cloud
Posts: 409
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
gullibell...
you have amazing insight are you sure you werent onboard or the pilot?
How could the search have taken so long when with all your knowledge you could clearly show them where and what happened...
sorry for the condescending remarks, but please dont jump to conclusions...
I still remember my check flight... with a distinctive pappa smurf looking fellow, who with 20,000hrs+ in country and getting late in his years had me continue well past my comfort zone in IMC... "its ok look i know this area well, this rock here is at 10,200 so just sit at 10,500 she'll be right..."
I climbed to 11,000 just to be safe and skirted wider than he appreciated...
on later inspection of the map the actual spot height was 10,700...
*what we think we know can sometimes get us in the most trouble...
the only time we used gps was using the nearest feature and definately not the "direct to mt" button... as in a valley in imc is defintely a place avoided at all costs...
the report could be very interesting.. hope it does some good for sop's and limits future occurances... interesting to note how many fligths are canned straight away due to ash, and understood by management as a significant issue but not so for weather...
you have amazing insight are you sure you werent onboard or the pilot?
How could the search have taken so long when with all your knowledge you could clearly show them where and what happened...
sorry for the condescending remarks, but please dont jump to conclusions...
I still remember my check flight... with a distinctive pappa smurf looking fellow, who with 20,000hrs+ in country and getting late in his years had me continue well past my comfort zone in IMC... "its ok look i know this area well, this rock here is at 10,200 so just sit at 10,500 she'll be right..."
I climbed to 11,000 just to be safe and skirted wider than he appreciated...
on later inspection of the map the actual spot height was 10,700...
*what we think we know can sometimes get us in the most trouble...
the only time we used gps was using the nearest feature and definately not the "direct to mt" button... as in a valley in imc is defintely a place avoided at all costs...
the report could be very interesting.. hope it does some good for sop's and limits future occurances... interesting to note how many fligths are canned straight away due to ash, and understood by management as a significant issue but not so for weather...