Airservices Australia ADS-B program - another Seasprite Fiasco?
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Hey, Binghi.
Dick is "FOR" ADSB above A010 and he has made it quiet clear that he is "OPPOSED" to low level ADSB. I could be wrong, but I'm sure james michael will correct me within the minute of my posting.
UAV's aside, a croppie generally gets nosebleed above 500ft, RFDS are within this arena for, what, 5 seconds? Most croppies have a very sophisticated GPS system, some are a bit lax with radio.
I have mentioned before that I had a near miss with a RFDS King Air in the Gulf, with many credible witnesses on the ground, and I was in a "BOAT". The boat had an ELT and a torch.
What was this ******** doing at this altitude, at night, which was below the sand cliff on approach? Would ADSB have prevented this pilot error?
I have the details stored.
ADSB is like security cameras, It will not prevent accidents or crime, and is not proactive.
It is reactive.
Unless of course some "controller" is watching their activities, which they don't do now, unless you are in the "system", which generally means you pay money.
Aerobatic Instructor in my log book, by the name of Endacott perished at Benalla in similar circumstances
Mode C and TCAS works OK, so how will ADSB correct this wothout cost?
Dick is "FOR" ADSB above A010 and he has made it quiet clear that he is "OPPOSED" to low level ADSB. I could be wrong, but I'm sure james michael will correct me within the minute of my posting.
UAV's aside, a croppie generally gets nosebleed above 500ft, RFDS are within this arena for, what, 5 seconds? Most croppies have a very sophisticated GPS system, some are a bit lax with radio.
I have mentioned before that I had a near miss with a RFDS King Air in the Gulf, with many credible witnesses on the ground, and I was in a "BOAT". The boat had an ELT and a torch.
What was this ******** doing at this altitude, at night, which was below the sand cliff on approach? Would ADSB have prevented this pilot error?
I have the details stored.
ADSB is like security cameras, It will not prevent accidents or crime, and is not proactive.
It is reactive.
Unless of course some "controller" is watching their activities, which they don't do now, unless you are in the "system", which generally means you pay money.
Aerobatic Instructor in my log book, by the name of Endacott perished at Benalla in similar circumstances
Mode C and TCAS works OK, so how will ADSB correct this wothout cost?
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flying binghi
True.... improbable, (as borne out by past experience with GPS uptime availabilty) but true. There are very few absolutes in this universe., almost everything has some degree of uncertainty attached.
Please please please comprehend that the JCP did not propose to make ATC totally reliant on ADSB. Will you at least please read the JCP. I can email you a .PDF copy if you wish
I have a concern that an ADS-B based ATC system, by relying on the GPS signals presents a danger to the future of Oz aviation, in that the GPS signal can be lost for any number of reasons.
Remove the GPS signal and we have NO ADS-B.
Remove the GPS signal and we have NO ADS-B.
Please please please comprehend that the JCP did not propose to make ATC totally reliant on ADSB. Will you at least please read the JCP. I can email you a .PDF copy if you wish
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Mode C and TCAS works OK
I see two options that would guarantee it won't happen again...
1. Mandating the installation and use of Mode C transponders in crop-dusters (if the pilot actually switches the thing on!)... RFDS issues with TCAS RA's aside. Note, there is no subsidy for installation.
2. Mandating the installation and use of a 1090ES ADS-B transponder which activates automatically at start-up and which would provide the RFDS aircraft with awareness of the fact that the aircraft is operating in the area before the RFDS aircraft departs. With a subsidy for installation.
As a friend suggested to me the other day... "it's a no-brainer".
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The most inexpensive alternative to give the RFDS "security" would be to mandate Mode C txp. However given the time spent below 500ft agl for RFDS, where most croppies operate, I can accept they would think it an impost.
Of course the other option is if operating VFR below 500ft,
IS TO LOOK OUT THE WINDOW.
Of course the other option is if operating VFR below 500ft,
IS TO LOOK OUT THE WINDOW.
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James Michael, 3kg a small amount, maybe but consider this a croppie doing say 20 loads a day =60Kg extra for the day say working 40 weeks a year =200 days thus the insignificant 3kg adds up to 12,000 kg a not insignificant sum.
so is 3kg material, I guess it depends where you come from, to the croppie I would say yes, to an avionics sales person, I would say no.
ADSB for croppies flying VFR, just a totally redundant concept methinks.
Numbers never lie.
so is 3kg material, I guess it depends where you come from, to the croppie I would say yes, to an avionics sales person, I would say no.
ADSB for croppies flying VFR, just a totally redundant concept methinks.
Numbers never lie.
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scraping the bottom o the barrel.
T28D
To save precious cumulative payload weight for your 'croppie' why not ;
(1) use a pilot who weighs less than the others,
(2) put the existing pilot on a diet,
(3) fly nude,
(4) remove the ELT,
(5) only fly with the absolute minimum of fuel required for a job,
(6) only fly when the air-density is favourable,
(7) make the pilot take a dump before flight. (there's at least a kilo saved)
(8) don't let the pilot drink a can of something before flight. (nearly 0.4kg there!)
(9) remove all the exterior paint,
(10) drill more holes in non-structural panels,
arggggghhh..... that has got to be the lamest excuse for not fitting ADSB to an aircraft that I have ever heard.
If the extra weight was to be 20 kg or more I would then actually start to have some concerns and/or sympathy., but for < 5kg ?
(with present-day electronics the replacement transponder could even turn out to be lighter in weight than the old mode-C unit)
To save precious cumulative payload weight for your 'croppie' why not ;
(1) use a pilot who weighs less than the others,
(2) put the existing pilot on a diet,
(3) fly nude,
(4) remove the ELT,
(5) only fly with the absolute minimum of fuel required for a job,
(6) only fly when the air-density is favourable,
(7) make the pilot take a dump before flight. (there's at least a kilo saved)
(8) don't let the pilot drink a can of something before flight. (nearly 0.4kg there!)
(9) remove all the exterior paint,
(10) drill more holes in non-structural panels,
arggggghhh..... that has got to be the lamest excuse for not fitting ADSB to an aircraft that I have ever heard.
If the extra weight was to be 20 kg or more I would then actually start to have some concerns and/or sympathy., but for < 5kg ?
(with present-day electronics the replacement transponder could even turn out to be lighter in weight than the old mode-C unit)
Hmmm... looks like I have let myself be stirred up a bit when I would of been better off ignoreing it 
..... any way, back to the thread.
====================================================
Bob Murphie, thanks for that, I have ammended my previous post.
=====================================================
Biggles_in_Oz, I have serious concerns that if we allow ADS-B to be 'the' ATC system, that we will not be able to easily go back to our current robust ATC system if the need arises - we may not have the back-up there when we need it, JCP not-withstanding.
I would argue that since ADS-B needs much off the current system as a back-up - why not just keep the current system - maintain it, employ more ATC, and pay them properly
=========================================================
Quokka, I'm wondering what the RFD pilot was doing if He carnt see a large, slow moving Ag plane - was He looking out the window ? There are other things a pilot needs to be looking for when flying at the level of Ag aircraft - flocks of birds for example.
..... any way, back to the thread.
====================================================
Dick is "FOR" ADSB above A010 and he has made it quiet clear that he is "OPPOSED" to low level ADSB
=====================================================
Please please please comprehend that the JCP did not propose to make ATC totally reliant on ADSB. Will you at least please read the JCP.
I would argue that since ADS-B needs much off the current system as a back-up - why not just keep the current system - maintain it, employ more ATC, and pay them properly
=========================================================
In this particular situation, between the RFDS aircraft and the crop-duster... it didn't.
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Bob Murphie
As has been suggested by others to others on here, please have a read of the JCP with an open mind looking for cheese not holes and gain an understanding of the total project.
The JCP is also firmly based on TSO146 Navigators with approach capability for IFR aircraft. In fact, the proposed JCP savings are based as much around navaid maintenance as radar.
ADS-B would not have prevented the pilot error - but a highly accurate TSO146 Navigator (which as your research has no doubt told you provides FDE and SA), coupled with an increase in certified GPS approaches due to the fleet fitment, would have given him a 'railroad line' approach well clear of your boat and with he/her and his pax safe.
Dick can see no safety benefits for ADS-B below 10,000'? He is correct to divorce the benefits of ADS-B from those of GPS NAV, but the JCP is premised on both taking place.
From memory Dick mentioned talking to or being aware of the RFDS situation in WA. My understanding is that their greatest concern is below 10,000' as above that the big sky theory of randomness separation ensues.
The alternative is perhaps for CASA to declare the Gulf a "Sea TAF R" and to require all tinnies within the vicinity of the aerodrome (10 Nm a la CAR 166) to have radio and transponder, certified lifejackets, two yearly RADs .......
I have mentioned before that I had a near miss with a RFDS King Air in the Gulf, with many credible witnesses on the ground, and I was in a "BOAT". The boat had an ELT and a torch.
What was this ******** doing at this altitude, at night, which was below the sand cliff on approach? Would ADSB have prevented this pilot error?
What was this ******** doing at this altitude, at night, which was below the sand cliff on approach? Would ADSB have prevented this pilot error?
The JCP is also firmly based on TSO146 Navigators with approach capability for IFR aircraft. In fact, the proposed JCP savings are based as much around navaid maintenance as radar.
ADS-B would not have prevented the pilot error - but a highly accurate TSO146 Navigator (which as your research has no doubt told you provides FDE and SA), coupled with an increase in certified GPS approaches due to the fleet fitment, would have given him a 'railroad line' approach well clear of your boat and with he/her and his pax safe.
Dick can see no safety benefits for ADS-B below 10,000'? He is correct to divorce the benefits of ADS-B from those of GPS NAV, but the JCP is premised on both taking place.
From memory Dick mentioned talking to or being aware of the RFDS situation in WA. My understanding is that their greatest concern is below 10,000' as above that the big sky theory of randomness separation ensues.
The alternative is perhaps for CASA to declare the Gulf a "Sea TAF R" and to require all tinnies within the vicinity of the aerodrome (10 Nm a la CAR 166) to have radio and transponder, certified lifejackets, two yearly RADs .......
Thread Starter
Ozbusdriver, I’m only pushing for approach radar if we have Class C airspace. That is because there is no way an air traffic controller knows where a VFR aircraft is in the Class C unless the air traffic controller has both primary and secondary radar. You don’t seem to understand this.
In relation to the ADS-B, you obviously haven’t read my posts – or you cannot understand what I’m actually writing. Can I suggest that you give me a phone call on 0408 640 221 or 02 9450 0600 so we can discuss it?
Seeing that James Michael won’t do this, you may. I will go through the details again.
By the way, you may have noticed that I have been reasonably astute in my lifetime in relation to business decisions. That astuteness is simply being reflected at the moment in relation to ADS-B. I have had lots of boffins working for me over the years who would have sent me into bankruptcy by going ahead with something like the low level ADS-B subsidy – although on a smaller scale.
Ozbusdriver, give me a ring and I think you will understand my position a lot better.
In relation to the ADS-B, you obviously haven’t read my posts – or you cannot understand what I’m actually writing. Can I suggest that you give me a phone call on 0408 640 221 or 02 9450 0600 so we can discuss it?
Seeing that James Michael won’t do this, you may. I will go through the details again.
By the way, you may have noticed that I have been reasonably astute in my lifetime in relation to business decisions. That astuteness is simply being reflected at the moment in relation to ADS-B. I have had lots of boffins working for me over the years who would have sent me into bankruptcy by going ahead with something like the low level ADS-B subsidy – although on a smaller scale.
Ozbusdriver, give me a ring and I think you will understand my position a lot better.
Thread Starter
By the way, I support ADS-B everywhere (both above and below 10,000 feet), as long as it meets proper cost benefit criteria so we are not misallocating our safety dollars. In my belief, it is wrong to spend $100 million of our industry’s money in reducing risk that is so minimal it is almost immeasurable.
Just as importantly, we should be very careful when we move to ADS-B that we do not move to an “orphan.” There is no hurry at the moment to mandate ADS-B. At the present time Airservices is installing ADS-B stations across Australia, and more and more aircraft are being fitted with ADS-B. That is what we should keep doing with a parallel system.
Airservices should not push us to make a decision within 2 months that could affect our industry, and if the decision was wrong it could basically destroy general aviation.
Airservices should enter into a contract to replace or refurbish their secondary surveillance radars, continue to encourage aircraft owners to fit ADS-B, and also tell us the cost and advantages of the multilateration system in Tasmania.
Only when we have all the facts can the industry make the correct decision.
Just as importantly, we should be very careful when we move to ADS-B that we do not move to an “orphan.” There is no hurry at the moment to mandate ADS-B. At the present time Airservices is installing ADS-B stations across Australia, and more and more aircraft are being fitted with ADS-B. That is what we should keep doing with a parallel system.
Airservices should not push us to make a decision within 2 months that could affect our industry, and if the decision was wrong it could basically destroy general aviation.
Airservices should enter into a contract to replace or refurbish their secondary surveillance radars, continue to encourage aircraft owners to fit ADS-B, and also tell us the cost and advantages of the multilateration system in Tasmania.
Only when we have all the facts can the industry make the correct decision.
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That is because there is no way an air traffic controller knows where a VFR aircraft is in the Class C unless the air traffic controller has both primary and secondary radar. You don’t seem to understand this.
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Airservices should not push us to make a decision within 2 months that could affect our industry, and if the decision was wrong it could basically destroy general aviation.
That is because there is no way an air traffic controller knows where a VFR aircraft is in the Class C unless the air traffic controller has both primary and secondary radar.
Primary radar also mandated? Last I looked Class C was transponder airspace (MSSR). Didn't realise ATC were focussed on primary paints in C.
Any ATC able to advise re this dual procedure.
Still, until ADS-B arrives, a good reason for Avalon to be Class C not D.
Only when we have all the facts can the industry make the correct decision
All this talk about RFD ops in W.A. made me have a closer look at some of the problems that may be encounted in those remote areas.
Came across some comments about the difficultys of maintaining transponders via these minutes of the ASTRA ADS-B Implementation Team (ABIT)
(Please note I have edited parts for brevity)
Certification of Large Aircraft for ADS-B operations
• Greg Dunstone presented IP002 and sought input from avionics experts.
Discussion
•
• Steve Lansell - ... pointed out that if the ADS-B equipment was made subject to a testing regime similar to that applied for transponders, it would become unworkable in WA, due to lack of avionic LAMEs outside the Perth area (there are no radio lames north of Jandakot in WA). This problem was so acute that many operators have already or were currently removing transponders due to the difficulties faced having them tested. Therefore, Stephen asked if we could we adopt a maintenance system based on condition as a part of the overall ADS-B implementation program.
• Brian Hannan – AOPA would support this RFDS view.
• Peter Flanagan felt this was an overly simplistic view and there is perhaps insufficient experience with the equipment
• Jason Burzacott advised in his experience, 20% of transponders which checked, require adjustments – in both newer solid state and older valve transponders. Adding an ADS-B check when carrying out the standard transponder check should keep the cost relatively low.
•
• Peter Flanagan – suggested that geostatic equipment is poorly maintained.
•
• Eugene Reid – noted that many sports aircraft are unable to get to LAME’s as they can’t fly into airports where LAME’s are located due to licensing and security clearances etc.
• Patrick O’Brien – said that since many aircraft operate outside of radar coverage, where there is no potential for an ATC “reality” check of their transponders, the industry needs to (ref) ...think very carefully about relaxing any current requirements.
•
My Bolding and the full view of this, is page five at -
http://www.astra.aero/downloads/ABIT...ar_06_V1.1.pdf
Came across some comments about the difficultys of maintaining transponders via these minutes of the ASTRA ADS-B Implementation Team (ABIT)
(Please note I have edited parts for brevity)
Certification of Large Aircraft for ADS-B operations
• Greg Dunstone presented IP002 and sought input from avionics experts.
Discussion
•
• Steve Lansell - ... pointed out that if the ADS-B equipment was made subject to a testing regime similar to that applied for transponders, it would become unworkable in WA, due to lack of avionic LAMEs outside the Perth area (there are no radio lames north of Jandakot in WA). This problem was so acute that many operators have already or were currently removing transponders due to the difficulties faced having them tested. Therefore, Stephen asked if we could we adopt a maintenance system based on condition as a part of the overall ADS-B implementation program.
• Brian Hannan – AOPA would support this RFDS view.
• Peter Flanagan felt this was an overly simplistic view and there is perhaps insufficient experience with the equipment
• Jason Burzacott advised in his experience, 20% of transponders which checked, require adjustments – in both newer solid state and older valve transponders. Adding an ADS-B check when carrying out the standard transponder check should keep the cost relatively low.
•
• Peter Flanagan – suggested that geostatic equipment is poorly maintained.
•
• Eugene Reid – noted that many sports aircraft are unable to get to LAME’s as they can’t fly into airports where LAME’s are located due to licensing and security clearances etc.
• Patrick O’Brien – said that since many aircraft operate outside of radar coverage, where there is no potential for an ATC “reality” check of their transponders, the industry needs to (ref) ...think very carefully about relaxing any current requirements.
•
My Bolding and the full view of this, is page five at -
http://www.astra.aero/downloads/ABIT...ar_06_V1.1.pdf
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Bing
An excellent point and my congratulations on your move from the UAV Platform to such in depth research on ADS-B.
Another here posted recently about business decisions and safety decisions. How pertinent.
One notes two conclusions from your research.
1. Currently the RFDS must meet the transponder RAD requirements, therefore providing the RAD requirements are not changed the situation remains unchanged (in your research into the last ABIT you will undoubtedly note the availability of the test equipment already).
2. Obviously, for the RFDS to NOW be such an enthusiastic supporter / proponent of ADS-B, they are convinced that the RAD matter is a mere bagatelle in comparison to the safety benefits they are gaining from ADS-B.
I also note the organisation I joined has pushed the view of extending the RAD periodicity due to the more stable and reliable operation of the new full IC equipment and RS232 encoders.
Well done on flagging this, as an aside - given the speed of technology push and change - do you have a date for when those comments were made?
An excellent point and my congratulations on your move from the UAV Platform to such in depth research on ADS-B.
Another here posted recently about business decisions and safety decisions. How pertinent.
One notes two conclusions from your research.
1. Currently the RFDS must meet the transponder RAD requirements, therefore providing the RAD requirements are not changed the situation remains unchanged (in your research into the last ABIT you will undoubtedly note the availability of the test equipment already).
2. Obviously, for the RFDS to NOW be such an enthusiastic supporter / proponent of ADS-B, they are convinced that the RAD matter is a mere bagatelle in comparison to the safety benefits they are gaining from ADS-B.
I also note the organisation I joined has pushed the view of extending the RAD periodicity due to the more stable and reliable operation of the new full IC equipment and RS232 encoders.
Well done on flagging this, as an aside - given the speed of technology push and change - do you have a date for when those comments were made?
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Dick you state
"In my belief, it is wrong to spend $100 million of our industry’s money in reducing risk that is so minimal it is almost immeasurable."
That $100 million you talk about has not come from GA, that money has come from the airlines, GA navcharges are miniscule against airline charges.
The airlines would seek an immediate reduction in charges if this money did not go towards ADS-B. They are willing to see this $100 million go towards a subsidy of fitment of ADS-B into GA, for safety. The non-installation and associated running costs of SSR is the long term saving envisaged, and susequent reduction in charges in the future.
You need to stop making it sound as if this money is just sitting in a bank somewhere waiting to be spent on 'something'. The airlines are allowing this money to be cached for ADS-B. If ADS-B doesn't get up it will have to be spent on the installation and/or replacement of expensive to run and maintain SSRs.
The airlines will have to indirectly pay for the upkeep of SSRs. Do you seriously think that the airlines haven't researched this and are willing to blow a $100 million dollars of their money.
As for a 2 month decision. The planning and consultation go back years.
In six weeks time will you be complaining that they expect you to make a decision with two weeks notice?
Bob,
As for complaining about ADS-B below A100, it works and is accurate, why wouldn't you want it used where you could be seen. You guys complain that Launy tower can 'see' you on radar but can't use it for separation (due training) and on the other hand complain that if we can see you and are trained to use the equipment that you don't want it to apply.
What do you want? Or have you taken a stance, and thats it. I am not changing my mind. Your arguments and FBs are becoming more and more frivolous, buzz bombs, sunspots, and some guy in a digger cut the Optus line.
I'm not sure if you guys have had any exposure to safety risk management, here is the five dollar version.
When a safety case is done events such as these are given a value e.g. low ,medium, high impact and a likelihood of happening e.g. weekly , monthly , yearly, once in a hundred years etc.
Then risk mitigators are applied i.e a way of doing things to overcome the severity and timing of the occurence.
If something is high impact (e.g. buzzbombs) and will happen frequently e.g. yearly, and would see the GPS signal turned off and no back up separation available, this would kill a project stone dead.
If the buzzbombs are however seen as a once in a hundred years event and a form of separation available in a safe timeframe this would not kill the project.
Nothing in this world, besides death and taxes, is a given. All we can do is try and mitigate as much as we can.
Procedural separation (i.e. outside surveillance range) is based on mathematical probability. A 10 minute longitidunal standard (along track) is not because we want the aircraft 10 minutes apart for controller amusement, it is based on all the variable factors of aircraft navigation. The lead aircraft may lose 2 minutes and the following aircraft may gain 2 minutes (they are only required to update estimates if they change by MORE than 2 minutes.)
There maybe inaccuracies in the aircrafts nav equipment, it may have been hours since they were last over land for a definite fix etc, etc
All these factors are thrown into the mix, and the standard is increased until the mathematical probability of two aircraft sharing the same piece of airspace, if all the holes line up, is so outrageously large that it would be like winning Lotto two weeks running. This also keeps the insurers happy, they like numbers.
Please don't be thinking that $100 million dollars is being thrown at ADS-B on a " Geez that seems a good idea, we'll give that a whirl".
This thread has been linked to the SeaSprite unfairly, I am sure everyone is aware of the politicking that goes on when defence spending happens (not inferring anything with SeaSprite), build a piece in my electorate, cosy job afterwards with defence contractors, general stupidity, etc.
I really don't see the parallels here, you attack JMs argument by inferring he has a vested interest, he denies this, but you won't leave off. What of the others who have made good points?
"In my belief, it is wrong to spend $100 million of our industry’s money in reducing risk that is so minimal it is almost immeasurable."
That $100 million you talk about has not come from GA, that money has come from the airlines, GA navcharges are miniscule against airline charges.
The airlines would seek an immediate reduction in charges if this money did not go towards ADS-B. They are willing to see this $100 million go towards a subsidy of fitment of ADS-B into GA, for safety. The non-installation and associated running costs of SSR is the long term saving envisaged, and susequent reduction in charges in the future.
You need to stop making it sound as if this money is just sitting in a bank somewhere waiting to be spent on 'something'. The airlines are allowing this money to be cached for ADS-B. If ADS-B doesn't get up it will have to be spent on the installation and/or replacement of expensive to run and maintain SSRs.
The airlines will have to indirectly pay for the upkeep of SSRs. Do you seriously think that the airlines haven't researched this and are willing to blow a $100 million dollars of their money.
As for a 2 month decision. The planning and consultation go back years.
In six weeks time will you be complaining that they expect you to make a decision with two weeks notice?
Bob,
As for complaining about ADS-B below A100, it works and is accurate, why wouldn't you want it used where you could be seen. You guys complain that Launy tower can 'see' you on radar but can't use it for separation (due training) and on the other hand complain that if we can see you and are trained to use the equipment that you don't want it to apply.
What do you want? Or have you taken a stance, and thats it. I am not changing my mind. Your arguments and FBs are becoming more and more frivolous, buzz bombs, sunspots, and some guy in a digger cut the Optus line.
I'm not sure if you guys have had any exposure to safety risk management, here is the five dollar version.
When a safety case is done events such as these are given a value e.g. low ,medium, high impact and a likelihood of happening e.g. weekly , monthly , yearly, once in a hundred years etc.
Then risk mitigators are applied i.e a way of doing things to overcome the severity and timing of the occurence.
If something is high impact (e.g. buzzbombs) and will happen frequently e.g. yearly, and would see the GPS signal turned off and no back up separation available, this would kill a project stone dead.
If the buzzbombs are however seen as a once in a hundred years event and a form of separation available in a safe timeframe this would not kill the project.
Nothing in this world, besides death and taxes, is a given. All we can do is try and mitigate as much as we can.
Procedural separation (i.e. outside surveillance range) is based on mathematical probability. A 10 minute longitidunal standard (along track) is not because we want the aircraft 10 minutes apart for controller amusement, it is based on all the variable factors of aircraft navigation. The lead aircraft may lose 2 minutes and the following aircraft may gain 2 minutes (they are only required to update estimates if they change by MORE than 2 minutes.)
There maybe inaccuracies in the aircrafts nav equipment, it may have been hours since they were last over land for a definite fix etc, etc
All these factors are thrown into the mix, and the standard is increased until the mathematical probability of two aircraft sharing the same piece of airspace, if all the holes line up, is so outrageously large that it would be like winning Lotto two weeks running. This also keeps the insurers happy, they like numbers.
Please don't be thinking that $100 million dollars is being thrown at ADS-B on a " Geez that seems a good idea, we'll give that a whirl".
This thread has been linked to the SeaSprite unfairly, I am sure everyone is aware of the politicking that goes on when defence spending happens (not inferring anything with SeaSprite), build a piece in my electorate, cosy job afterwards with defence contractors, general stupidity, etc.
I really don't see the parallels here, you attack JMs argument by inferring he has a vested interest, he denies this, but you won't leave off. What of the others who have made good points?
Dick,
Yes he does. Procedural C works well at ASP and has done for years. ATC do need some sort of low-level surveillance there (ADSB is the obvious candidate) but until then, procedural C works OK. Your long-held view about the connection between C and radar is a furphy, as you have been told many times before. Just because your beloved Septic Tanks don't have procedural C, why can't we, especially given all the fluffing around going on about implementation of ADSB?
That is because there is no way an air traffic controller knows where a VFR aircraft is in the Class C unless the air traffic controller has both primary and secondary radar.
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A little more research on top of Bing's.
That ABIT Meeting was March 2006 - over 2 years ago.
Interesting, even then, RFDS WA was concerned about safety and pushing for MORE sites for ADS-B. Extract below:
"Steve Lansell – RFDS list provided 8 WA sites – not sure why they weren’t assessed. Traffic provides a risk to RFDS (tourist flights etc.) and requested that Kununurra, Tarren Rock and Fitzroy Crossing be reconsidered. Albany could be swapped for Meriden (location of the China Southern Flying School)."
We have been told by others no safety benefit exists below 10,000' - one can only assume these tourist flights abovementioned are on oxygen
Now to maintenance and the RAD 43/47 scenario.
RFDS WA operate 6 x PC12, 5 x B200 = 11 aircraft.
This from the RFDS WA website:
"All aircraft maintenance is managed from our maintenance facility at Jandakot Airport. The facility is able to carry out all airframe, engine, avionics, electrical and instrument maintenance activities in support of our fleet other than major engine overhauls and some specialist equipment repairs.
Our PC12 and B200 aircraft require scheduled maintenance inspections each 200 flying hours. The inspections typically take between one and three days depending on the aircraft type and spares availability. Based on our current flying activity, approximately 75 such inspections are carried out each year."
It would seem our concerns of 2006 are now unfounded as even if the RFDS did not equip to undertake ADS-B RAD, the location at Jandakot makes such work quite simple coincident with routine maintenance that - dividing 75 by 11 equals each aircraft in for maintenance at least every two months.
Another obstacle removed from the ADS-B path
That ABIT Meeting was March 2006 - over 2 years ago.
Interesting, even then, RFDS WA was concerned about safety and pushing for MORE sites for ADS-B. Extract below:
"Steve Lansell – RFDS list provided 8 WA sites – not sure why they weren’t assessed. Traffic provides a risk to RFDS (tourist flights etc.) and requested that Kununurra, Tarren Rock and Fitzroy Crossing be reconsidered. Albany could be swapped for Meriden (location of the China Southern Flying School)."
We have been told by others no safety benefit exists below 10,000' - one can only assume these tourist flights abovementioned are on oxygen
Now to maintenance and the RAD 43/47 scenario.
RFDS WA operate 6 x PC12, 5 x B200 = 11 aircraft.
This from the RFDS WA website:
"All aircraft maintenance is managed from our maintenance facility at Jandakot Airport. The facility is able to carry out all airframe, engine, avionics, electrical and instrument maintenance activities in support of our fleet other than major engine overhauls and some specialist equipment repairs.
Our PC12 and B200 aircraft require scheduled maintenance inspections each 200 flying hours. The inspections typically take between one and three days depending on the aircraft type and spares availability. Based on our current flying activity, approximately 75 such inspections are carried out each year."
It would seem our concerns of 2006 are now unfounded as even if the RFDS did not equip to undertake ADS-B RAD, the location at Jandakot makes such work quite simple coincident with routine maintenance that - dividing 75 by 11 equals each aircraft in for maintenance at least every two months.
Another obstacle removed from the ADS-B path
I'm in one of those moods
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Wheat from Chaff
An Orphan or not?
Creampuff has raised this issue for discussion, and although it has been raised and discussed previously, and in this thread, it is worthwhile summarising the points made
Delivery Frequency - 1090ES world standard
1. 1090ES has been selected as the worldwide standard for ADS-B in the flight levels (lets call it for arguments sake the Pressurised Aircraft standard)
2. High-Cap manufacturers have been and will continue to equip their aircraft with 1090ES TXPDR’s (Boeing, Airbus et al)
3. A large proportion of the High-Cap fleet are already fitted.
4. Universal (turbo prop type avionics) and others have 1090ES equipment ready to go
5. ACAS systems will be provided far more accurate and predictive data on which to display targets and calculate resolutions.
6. ANSP’s around the world are/will install 1090ES ground stations for the high level en-route, regional and Surface (airport) traffic surveillance requirements
7. Most every country with the exception of the US and Sweden will utilise this 1090ES infrastructure to accommodate their low level GA surveillance requirements (although their maybe a shift in thinking in the US and Sweden)
8. All countries will have 1090ES surveillance infrastructure to accommodate the ‘pressurised aircraft standard’ 1090ES equipped aircraft
Bottom line, 1090ES will be utilised worldwide in all countries for the Pressurised RPT fleet, from the enroute high all the way down to and including the future advanced surface surveillance and anti-collision/incursion protections that are required to address the identified, and ever growing risks apparent with manoeuvring area (runways, taxiways and vehicles) operations! In other words, 1090ES ADS-B will be around ‘globally’ for many many years to come!
…. No Orphan there!
The compatibility, safety and efficiencies grown from this global standard are recognised and are unprecedented, initiatives such as:-
a. ADS-B in-trail autonomous operations (where ATS surveillance does not exist)
b. Enabling ATC to utilise vastly improved surveillance to apply 5nm standards rather than far more restrictive time, distance or Mach no techniques where surveillance currently does not exist
c. Enabling reduced separation standards where ground based navigation systems are not available (Oceanic)
d. Enabling a quantum shift in pilot, ATC and vehicle operator situational hazard awareness on the surface, the list of advances in this area is almost limitless
Interfacing with the rest of the Aviation industry – GA 1090ES or other?
1. 1090ES ground infrastructure will be wide spread
2. 1090ES will be carried by the aircraft (Pressurised RPT) that the regulators will seek to protect through airspace classification and/or mandated carriage of collision mitigation equipment
Outside Capital City PRIM, SSR, WAMLAt ADS-B veils – Regional and Remote areas with ADS-B only surveillance, or no surveillance
a. Unless the (Pressurised) RPT can ‘see’ (ACAS) and/or hear ALL the target aircraft, then restriction/exclusion is possible/probable
b. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is not present, then all aircraft operating in the circling and climb and descent areas must logically be utilising the same ADS-B delivery frequency for aircraft to aircraft ACAS identification
c. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is not present and all aircraft operating in the circling and climb and descent areas are not utilising the same ADS-B delivery frequency RPT’s will not ‘see’ GA and vice versa
d. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is present, with all aircraft 1090ES equipped, the infrastructure is simple and single band passive
e. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is present, with RPT utilising 1090ES, and GA utilising another delivery frequency (UAT), the infrastructure will need to be complex dual transmit and receive, the 1090ES targets received will need to be re-broadcast on UAT, and the UAT targets received will need to be re-broadcast on 1090ES
f. The cost and complexity of dual band ADS-B ground stations (US UAT) V’s single band passive (1090ES) would logically be far greater
g. Dual band infrastructure could have the effect of ‘flooding’ the 1090ES and UAT bandwidth/s with the re-broadcast information (TBA)
h. The possibility for fail-unsafe is heightened with dual band ground stations. If a dual band ground station fails OCTA, the separate groups of pilots (1090ES RPT and UAT GA pilots) would be unaware of the missing target data on the other.
i. VHF radio provides no fail safe as VFR are not active in classifications such as ICAO E
Interoperability guaranteeing continued access during contingency – Fail Safe
Single Band 1090ES and Dual band ADS-B (UAT)
1. Single band ADS-B permits contingency planning with less restriction (access to CTA and Airport environs)
2. Dual band failure results in contingency restrictions i.e. UAT GA could likely be restricted from high volume airspace and airports resulting from a failure of the dual band infrastructure (UAT aircraft would be invisible to ATC and other Pilots and vehicles)
3. UAT Aircraft are totally reliant on UAT ADS-B interaction within the system, including within surveillance redundant airspace that retains SSR and WAMLat as neither of these systems will ‘see’ UAT aircraft
Capital City – PRIM, MSSR, WAMLat A,C,S, 1090ES ADS-B system redundancy
1. 1090ES GA aircraft will retain the ability during contingency operations of ADS-B failure to access capital city veils
2. UAT GA are reliant on functioning UAT ground infrastructure. Access to capital city becomes problematic during failure redundancies UAT GA would likely need to retain Mode A,C or S capability (two boxes)
GA ADS-B Avionics – What we know
1. 1090ES GA avionics is ready today
2. Many (read most) countries with a small to medium density of GA aircraft will adopt 1090ES for GA for all of the compatibility, safety, cost and interoperability reasons listed above
3. GA aircraft equipped with 1090ES avionics will be compatible in dual band countries. The same does not apply in the reverse
4. The true costs, functionality and reliability of Dual Band ADS-B are yet to be seen.
5. Dual band ground and airborne based equipment is more complex, less redundancy safe, and likely to be limited to one country of origin with possible pricing effects for international sales
It is the opinion of this writer that 1090ES for GA cannot become an ‘orphan’ based purely on the realities of 100% adoption and ratification of the 1090ES platform for the ‘pressurised’ commercial sector Worldwide.
Whilst 1090ES for GA remains fully compatible from a functional, safety, and redundancy/contingency point of view, it is inconceivable that it could become the ‘DME A’ of the 21st Century. The same cannot be said for GA ADS-B delivered on a different and GA unique incompatible platform
Australian Specifics
ATS System Contingencies in a GPS Nav, ADS-B equipped era
The ‘Big Bing’ scenario
The ATS system will retain critical redundancies in the event of a catastrophic failure of GPS and/or ADS-B (even though the risk is vanishingly small – I knew I would find an appropriate use for that term one day Bill and Bob)
1. Capital City operations retain:-
Surveillance
a. Primary Radar
b. MSSR Radar
c. WAMlat A/C/S (Precision approach monitor for PROPS etc)
d. All TXPDR’s will continue to operate in A/C/S mode
Navigation
a. ILS
b. VOR
c. DME (I)
Failure safe procedures and alerts
a. GPS system alerts (loss of data alerts)
b. Break-off procedures, separation standards unaffected (3nm and 5nm surveillance standards still apply)
c. Alternative approach and navigation options as above
2. Enroute, Regional and Remote area operations
Surveillance and ATS Services
a. CTA ADS-B Based ATC
b. OCTA ADS-B FISS (Flight Information Surveillance Service) – Flight Service with ‘eyes’ …. eh griffo
c. Enroute MSSR Radar (that would be replaced with ADS-B) has varied amounts of coverage full to limited to no reach into regional terminal area environs today
d. Most OCTA areas that will benefit greatly from ADS-B have no, or no useful (reliable) MSSR Radar coverage today
e. Areas not currently afforded MSSR, would likely never receive surveillance as MSSR is prohibitively expensive in a Regional sense
Navigation (the back-up network of ground based navaids)
a. ILS (where equipped)
b. VOR
c. DME (I) (where co-located with VOR, and equipped)
Failure safe procedures and alerts
a. GPS system alerts (loss of ADS-B data alerts)
b. Alternative approach and navigation options as above
c. In OCTA areas, the contingency is as it is now i.e. IFR procedural DTI
d. In CTA/R areas, the contingency is as it is now, procedural, visual separation.
In other words, the contingency (however ridiculously unlikely, and likely only ever for very short duration in a specific location/s) would return the ATS system to basically what we have today, not bad as a ‘contingency’ fallback only!
Why you would want the ATS system to stay as it is (and cost no less, arguably more)?? … particularly when the players involved clearly recognise the efficiency, safety and cost benefit to all, and are therefore happy to provide a subsidy to GA to realise these benefits for all?
.
GA will receive Accurate Nav, No cost access to compatible airspace, anti-collision protection, future cost savings TO ALL USERS. There are no additional costs or restrictions to VFR in this, in fact quite the opposite!
In closing, I must comment on this erroneous view that ADS-B Below A100 does not address any ‘measurable safety issue’. The number of mid-air’s and Airprox’s here and abroad in OCTA G, CTAF and E, this year alone, the warning signs are clearly there, they have been for some time …. I ask this:-
Without any ‘real’ accurate data on which to assess ‘real’ collision pair opportunities, in many OCTA locations, do we need to wait for the big accident to occur?
…particularly where there is an unprecedented opportunity NOW to provide no-cost mitgators BEFORE the FACT?
To do otherwise is just plain daft, short sighted, bloody minded and old school!
Cheers
P.S. Eh Bob ... your last post is a pearla ... an insight if ever there was one
Creampuff has raised this issue for discussion, and although it has been raised and discussed previously, and in this thread, it is worthwhile summarising the points made
Delivery Frequency - 1090ES world standard
1. 1090ES has been selected as the worldwide standard for ADS-B in the flight levels (lets call it for arguments sake the Pressurised Aircraft standard)
2. High-Cap manufacturers have been and will continue to equip their aircraft with 1090ES TXPDR’s (Boeing, Airbus et al)
3. A large proportion of the High-Cap fleet are already fitted.
4. Universal (turbo prop type avionics) and others have 1090ES equipment ready to go
5. ACAS systems will be provided far more accurate and predictive data on which to display targets and calculate resolutions.
6. ANSP’s around the world are/will install 1090ES ground stations for the high level en-route, regional and Surface (airport) traffic surveillance requirements
7. Most every country with the exception of the US and Sweden will utilise this 1090ES infrastructure to accommodate their low level GA surveillance requirements (although their maybe a shift in thinking in the US and Sweden)
8. All countries will have 1090ES surveillance infrastructure to accommodate the ‘pressurised aircraft standard’ 1090ES equipped aircraft
Bottom line, 1090ES will be utilised worldwide in all countries for the Pressurised RPT fleet, from the enroute high all the way down to and including the future advanced surface surveillance and anti-collision/incursion protections that are required to address the identified, and ever growing risks apparent with manoeuvring area (runways, taxiways and vehicles) operations! In other words, 1090ES ADS-B will be around ‘globally’ for many many years to come!
…. No Orphan there!
The compatibility, safety and efficiencies grown from this global standard are recognised and are unprecedented, initiatives such as:-
a. ADS-B in-trail autonomous operations (where ATS surveillance does not exist)
b. Enabling ATC to utilise vastly improved surveillance to apply 5nm standards rather than far more restrictive time, distance or Mach no techniques where surveillance currently does not exist
c. Enabling reduced separation standards where ground based navigation systems are not available (Oceanic)
d. Enabling a quantum shift in pilot, ATC and vehicle operator situational hazard awareness on the surface, the list of advances in this area is almost limitless
Interfacing with the rest of the Aviation industry – GA 1090ES or other?
1. 1090ES ground infrastructure will be wide spread
2. 1090ES will be carried by the aircraft (Pressurised RPT) that the regulators will seek to protect through airspace classification and/or mandated carriage of collision mitigation equipment
Outside Capital City PRIM, SSR, WAMLAt ADS-B veils – Regional and Remote areas with ADS-B only surveillance, or no surveillance
a. Unless the (Pressurised) RPT can ‘see’ (ACAS) and/or hear ALL the target aircraft, then restriction/exclusion is possible/probable
b. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is not present, then all aircraft operating in the circling and climb and descent areas must logically be utilising the same ADS-B delivery frequency for aircraft to aircraft ACAS identification
c. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is not present and all aircraft operating in the circling and climb and descent areas are not utilising the same ADS-B delivery frequency RPT’s will not ‘see’ GA and vice versa
d. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is present, with all aircraft 1090ES equipped, the infrastructure is simple and single band passive
e. If ADS-B ground infrastructure is present, with RPT utilising 1090ES, and GA utilising another delivery frequency (UAT), the infrastructure will need to be complex dual transmit and receive, the 1090ES targets received will need to be re-broadcast on UAT, and the UAT targets received will need to be re-broadcast on 1090ES
f. The cost and complexity of dual band ADS-B ground stations (US UAT) V’s single band passive (1090ES) would logically be far greater
g. Dual band infrastructure could have the effect of ‘flooding’ the 1090ES and UAT bandwidth/s with the re-broadcast information (TBA)
h. The possibility for fail-unsafe is heightened with dual band ground stations. If a dual band ground station fails OCTA, the separate groups of pilots (1090ES RPT and UAT GA pilots) would be unaware of the missing target data on the other.
i. VHF radio provides no fail safe as VFR are not active in classifications such as ICAO E
Interoperability guaranteeing continued access during contingency – Fail Safe
Single Band 1090ES and Dual band ADS-B (UAT)
1. Single band ADS-B permits contingency planning with less restriction (access to CTA and Airport environs)
2. Dual band failure results in contingency restrictions i.e. UAT GA could likely be restricted from high volume airspace and airports resulting from a failure of the dual band infrastructure (UAT aircraft would be invisible to ATC and other Pilots and vehicles)
3. UAT Aircraft are totally reliant on UAT ADS-B interaction within the system, including within surveillance redundant airspace that retains SSR and WAMLat as neither of these systems will ‘see’ UAT aircraft
Capital City – PRIM, MSSR, WAMLat A,C,S, 1090ES ADS-B system redundancy
1. 1090ES GA aircraft will retain the ability during contingency operations of ADS-B failure to access capital city veils
2. UAT GA are reliant on functioning UAT ground infrastructure. Access to capital city becomes problematic during failure redundancies UAT GA would likely need to retain Mode A,C or S capability (two boxes)
GA ADS-B Avionics – What we know
1. 1090ES GA avionics is ready today
2. Many (read most) countries with a small to medium density of GA aircraft will adopt 1090ES for GA for all of the compatibility, safety, cost and interoperability reasons listed above
3. GA aircraft equipped with 1090ES avionics will be compatible in dual band countries. The same does not apply in the reverse
4. The true costs, functionality and reliability of Dual Band ADS-B are yet to be seen.
5. Dual band ground and airborne based equipment is more complex, less redundancy safe, and likely to be limited to one country of origin with possible pricing effects for international sales
It is the opinion of this writer that 1090ES for GA cannot become an ‘orphan’ based purely on the realities of 100% adoption and ratification of the 1090ES platform for the ‘pressurised’ commercial sector Worldwide.
Whilst 1090ES for GA remains fully compatible from a functional, safety, and redundancy/contingency point of view, it is inconceivable that it could become the ‘DME A’ of the 21st Century. The same cannot be said for GA ADS-B delivered on a different and GA unique incompatible platform
Australian Specifics
ATS System Contingencies in a GPS Nav, ADS-B equipped era
The ‘Big Bing’ scenario
The ATS system will retain critical redundancies in the event of a catastrophic failure of GPS and/or ADS-B (even though the risk is vanishingly small – I knew I would find an appropriate use for that term one day Bill and Bob)
1. Capital City operations retain:-
Surveillance
a. Primary Radar
b. MSSR Radar
c. WAMlat A/C/S (Precision approach monitor for PROPS etc)
d. All TXPDR’s will continue to operate in A/C/S mode
Navigation
a. ILS
b. VOR
c. DME (I)
Failure safe procedures and alerts
a. GPS system alerts (loss of data alerts)
b. Break-off procedures, separation standards unaffected (3nm and 5nm surveillance standards still apply)
c. Alternative approach and navigation options as above
2. Enroute, Regional and Remote area operations
Surveillance and ATS Services
a. CTA ADS-B Based ATC
b. OCTA ADS-B FISS (Flight Information Surveillance Service) – Flight Service with ‘eyes’ …. eh griffo
c. Enroute MSSR Radar (that would be replaced with ADS-B) has varied amounts of coverage full to limited to no reach into regional terminal area environs today
d. Most OCTA areas that will benefit greatly from ADS-B have no, or no useful (reliable) MSSR Radar coverage today
e. Areas not currently afforded MSSR, would likely never receive surveillance as MSSR is prohibitively expensive in a Regional sense
Navigation (the back-up network of ground based navaids)
a. ILS (where equipped)
b. VOR
c. DME (I) (where co-located with VOR, and equipped)
Failure safe procedures and alerts
a. GPS system alerts (loss of ADS-B data alerts)
b. Alternative approach and navigation options as above
c. In OCTA areas, the contingency is as it is now i.e. IFR procedural DTI
d. In CTA/R areas, the contingency is as it is now, procedural, visual separation.
In other words, the contingency (however ridiculously unlikely, and likely only ever for very short duration in a specific location/s) would return the ATS system to basically what we have today, not bad as a ‘contingency’ fallback only!
Why you would want the ATS system to stay as it is (and cost no less, arguably more)?? … particularly when the players involved clearly recognise the efficiency, safety and cost benefit to all, and are therefore happy to provide a subsidy to GA to realise these benefits for all?
.
GA will receive Accurate Nav, No cost access to compatible airspace, anti-collision protection, future cost savings TO ALL USERS. There are no additional costs or restrictions to VFR in this, in fact quite the opposite!
In closing, I must comment on this erroneous view that ADS-B Below A100 does not address any ‘measurable safety issue’. The number of mid-air’s and Airprox’s here and abroad in OCTA G, CTAF and E, this year alone, the warning signs are clearly there, they have been for some time …. I ask this:-
Without any ‘real’ accurate data on which to assess ‘real’ collision pair opportunities, in many OCTA locations, do we need to wait for the big accident to occur?
…particularly where there is an unprecedented opportunity NOW to provide no-cost mitgators BEFORE the FACT?
To do otherwise is just plain daft, short sighted, bloody minded and old school!
Cheers
P.S. Eh Bob ... your last post is a pearla
... an insight if ever there was one
In other words, the contingency (however ridiculously unlikely, and likely only ever for very short duration in a specific location/s) would return the ATS system to basically what we have today, not bad as a ‘contingency’ fallback only!
I take note that the current ASIC cards and security fenceing are NOT of "short duration"
I also note that Airservices are not even maintaining our current primary ATC system properly. With that track record, how then can we expect Airservices to even maintain a back-up system ?