Erebus 25 years on
Unethical behaviour should be viewed as such and condemned regardless
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Fully concur PH6
but you have to fight fire with fire.
As is, of course, an airline shredding documents pertaining to the Antarctic operation. To this day I find it astonishing that this wasn't breaking any law!
But it leaves me wondering to which side the orchestrated litany of lies was directed at, airline, union, both? Any idea?
Last edited by PapaHotel6; 29th Jun 2016 at 04:30.
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I've always wondered who the conductor of the orchestra was supposed to be. Rob Muldoon?
Apart from the union and its lawyers, the various authors who wrote books in support were nearly as slimey. Mahon’s book was pathetic. Paul Holme’s efforts did his case more harm than good. All Vette demonstrated was how highly he regarded himself. StuartMacFarlane’s mad ravings (described as “Editorial Comment”) should have been enough to persuade two doctors to sign the necessary committal papers – but in his more lucid moments, MacFarlane demonstrated that he too was capable of a dirty trick or two. At page 351 he gave the reader the following quote from First Officer Gabriel (who attended the same briefing as Captain Collins), to show that the waypoint conveyed at the briefing was not at McMurdo Station but was many miles out to the west:
“In relation to the McMurdo waypoint for your own flight down there, did you have any briefing as to where that was geographically priorto the flight?”
“Roughly I had a look at the topographical map we were given at the briefing - the inset to NZMS135. I just roughly established where we were going. I thought it would be near enough to … 50 miles to the [west] of McMurdoStation.”
“Did you do that by roughly plotting the co-ordinates on that topographical map?”
“Really just be establishing in my own mind where the position was. I can’t say I actually recorded the co-ordinate from the flightplan … but looking at the map and from what I could remember of the co-ordinates and looking at the topographical map I thought in a rough sort of way we were going to about that position there, so it wasn’t specifically plotted.”
The quote ends there. Page 1712 of the transcript shows the very next question – and answer:
“Are you speaking now of what you did and thought at the time of the briefing on 9 November?”
“No, It was after the briefing.”
Apart from the union and its lawyers, the various authors who wrote books in support were nearly as slimey. Mahon’s book was pathetic. Paul Holme’s efforts did his case more harm than good. All Vette demonstrated was how highly he regarded himself. StuartMacFarlane’s mad ravings (described as “Editorial Comment”) should have been enough to persuade two doctors to sign the necessary committal papers – but in his more lucid moments, MacFarlane demonstrated that he too was capable of a dirty trick or two. At page 351 he gave the reader the following quote from First Officer Gabriel (who attended the same briefing as Captain Collins), to show that the waypoint conveyed at the briefing was not at McMurdo Station but was many miles out to the west:
“In relation to the McMurdo waypoint for your own flight down there, did you have any briefing as to where that was geographically priorto the flight?”
“Roughly I had a look at the topographical map we were given at the briefing - the inset to NZMS135. I just roughly established where we were going. I thought it would be near enough to … 50 miles to the [west] of McMurdoStation.”
“Did you do that by roughly plotting the co-ordinates on that topographical map?”
“Really just be establishing in my own mind where the position was. I can’t say I actually recorded the co-ordinate from the flightplan … but looking at the map and from what I could remember of the co-ordinates and looking at the topographical map I thought in a rough sort of way we were going to about that position there, so it wasn’t specifically plotted.”
The quote ends there. Page 1712 of the transcript shows the very next question – and answer:
“Are you speaking now of what you did and thought at the time of the briefing on 9 November?”
“No, It was after the briefing.”
Whispering "T" Jet
It was a foolish comment to make, and it was this that the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council had the most issue with.
It was a legal loophole that allegedly didn't allow testimony by certain witnesses during the Mahon Inquiry that the Privy Council had issue with. I notice that none of those professed legal experts ever considered what Collins and his crew may have testified to. Posthumously, they were treated very badly. However, the public saw the Appeals Court/Privy Council finding for what it was and there was a big backlash.
There simply weren't sufficient grounds to allege that a co-ordinated cover-up had taken place.
As is, of course, an airline shredding documents pertaining to the Antarctic operation. To this day I find it astonishing that this wasn't breaking any law!
Last edited by 3 Holer; 30th Jun 2016 at 02:28. Reason: Clarity
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Mahon’s book was pathetic.
But common sense also tells us that the sun travels around the earth every day. Common sense can be wrong.
Paul Holmes’s efforts did his case more harm than good
Last edited by PapaHotel6; 29th Jun 2016 at 23:49.
Whispering "T" Jet
ampan
The above selection of books you have read, appear to have given you a great deal of stress. Not sure if it was a result of the authors or their content.
May I recommend the book, "Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents" (1997) by James Reason. The author is neither a journalist, part time commentator or a High Court Judge.
I guarantee after reading this book, you will re-enter this debate with a more positive outlook on people. You may like to invite PapaHotel6 to join you - sort of a book club thing?
Apart from the union and its lawyers, the various authors who wrote books in support were nearly as slimey. Mahon’s book was pathetic. Paul Holme’s efforts did his case more harm than good. All Vette demonstrated was how highly he regarded himself. StuartMacFarlane’s mad ravings (described as “Editorial Comment”) should have been enough to persuade two doctors to sign the necessary committal papers – but in his more lucid moments, MacFarlane demonstrated that he too was capable of a dirty trick or two.
May I recommend the book, "Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents" (1997) by James Reason. The author is neither a journalist, part time commentator or a High Court Judge.
I guarantee after reading this book, you will re-enter this debate with a more positive outlook on people. You may like to invite PapaHotel6 to join you - sort of a book club thing?
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pompous Australian tosser
I don't know if Brian still posts these days.
While respecting your right to an opinion, I really need to leap to Brian's defence. He is quite a reasonable chap and I can't recall any post (or, indeed, social situation) comment which would warrant such an inimical observation ... just a balancing thought, if I may.
I don't know if Brian still posts these days.
While respecting your right to an opinion, I really need to leap to Brian's defence. He is quite a reasonable chap and I can't recall any post (or, indeed, social situation) comment which would warrant such an inimical observation ... just a balancing thought, if I may.
Whispering "T" Jet
Allow me to return the gesture by also recommending a book "Biggles..............
prospector, I know from your many, many posts on the cloudbreak procedure you have a great interest. In his book Vette spells out the procedure in some detail, and it takes no great leap of imagination to see the problems inherent. Should you be seeking information might I suggest you ask a specific question, or questions, to which an answer might be provided.
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megan,
Yes I do have a great interest in the cloudbreak procedure.
I would have thought, given the wording, and I will print it again to save interested parties having to dredge back through the many pages, states nothing about home made descents, it states THE ONLY, let down procedure available. It was issued after the briefings.
Delete all reference to briefing dated 23/10/79.
1. Vis 20km plus.
2. No snow showers in area
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through
360G to 270G from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
This was a mandatory company requirement.
.Which one of these requirements was complied with?
.
Yes I do have a great interest in the cloudbreak procedure.
I would have thought, given the wording, and I will print it again to save interested parties having to dredge back through the many pages, states nothing about home made descents, it states THE ONLY, let down procedure available. It was issued after the briefings.
Delete all reference to briefing dated 23/10/79.
1. Vis 20km plus.
2. No snow showers in area
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 Grid through
360G to 270G from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
This was a mandatory company requirement.
.Which one of these requirements was complied with?
.
Last edited by prospector; 30th Jun 2016 at 21:55.
Whispering "T" Jet
We know that #3 wasn't , compliments of the Air New Zealand navigation department.
The descent was co-ordinated with local radar, as confirmed by the CVR.
Requirements 1 and 2 could only be verified with the crew.
So, in answer to your question prospector, only one out of three. Although forecast indicated no snow showers and visibility > 20kms.
What's your point?
The descent was co-ordinated with local radar, as confirmed by the CVR.
Requirements 1 and 2 could only be verified with the crew.
So, in answer to your question prospector, only one out of three. Although forecast indicated no snow showers and visibility > 20kms.
What's your point?
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The descent was co-ordinated with local radar, as confirmed by the CVR.
Please quote any contact with McMurdo radar on the CVR?
What's your point?
Nowhere does it state that if you feel like it, and the weather is below our requirements, and the local wx people advise no good for sightseeing, then you can dream up your own descent procedure, using a Nav Aid not cleared for ops below MSA, never having sighted a 12,000ft odd mountain that you know is very close, and crash into that mountain, then, according to Mahon's interpretation of the facts you "have committed no error".
states nothing about home made descents, it states THE ONLY, let down procedure available
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Look at the date of that directive, it was issued well after all the other flights and just prior to the flight under discussion. This crew knew about it, what the other flights had done is not relevant. And even if it was does that mean that this crew could deliberately ignore their written instructions re let down procedure?
The other flights all made it home again, if this flight had of made it home again then would "Normalisation of Deviance" been applicable?
The other flights all made it home again, if this flight had of made it home again then would "Normalisation of Deviance" been applicable?
what the other flights had done is not relevant
Flight in the McMurdo area below flight level 160 will be restricted to an arc corresponding to a bearing of 120° Grid through 360° G to 270G from the NDB within 20 nm in order to keep well clear of Erebus.
The original requirement for radar monitoring of any VMC letdown was deleted by the letter of amendment detailing the conditions for VMC letdowns which were to apply following the withdrawal of the NDB letdown procedure. The revised version only called for the descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control.
this crew could deliberately ignore their written instructions re let down procedure?
Briefly, Professor Diane Vaughan developed the “Normalisation of Deviance” theory in order to explain the Shuttle Challenger accident. As a result of her analysis of the Challenger accident, she was asked to testify before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in 2003, then became part of the Board's research staff, working with the Board to analyze and write the chapters of the Report identifying the social causes of the Columbia accident. She states, "I find that in common, routine nonconformity, mistake, misconduct, and disaster are systematically produced by the interconnection between environment, organizations, cognition, and choice. These patterns amplify what is known about social structure and have implications for theory, research, and policy". One of Vaughan's theories regarding misconduct within large organizations is the normalization of deviance. "Social normalization of deviance means that people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behavior that they don't consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules for the elementary safety". People grow more accustomed to the deviant behavior the more it occurs. To people outside of the organization, the activities seem deviant; however, people within the organization do not recognize the deviance because it is seen as a normal occurrence. In hindsight, people within the organization realize that their seemingly normal behavior was deviant.
It explains the inner workings of the airline at the time to a T, as it did the two Shuttle accidents.
at no time was a DME lockon achieved
Whispering "T" Jet
Please quote any contact with McMurdo radar on the CVR?
At 12.32 p.m. the crew reported they were 43 miles from McMurdo Station and asked for approval to descend further in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Mac Centre approved this and asked to be kept advised of their altitude. At 12.35 (NZST) the crew reported they were at 13,000 ft and advised they were descending to 10,000 ft (3050 m) VMC. Mac Centre asked whether they required a radar controlled let down through the cloud at this level and this was accepted. But at 12.42 (NZST) the crew advised that they were flying VMC and would now proceed visually to McMurdo Station. Mac Centre requested that the aircraft maintain VMC and keep them advised of their altitude.
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We have been down this road before, and your statement is to be polite wrong.
.
He was offered a radar monitored let down, he was never identified by the radar, what radar operator would authorise a let down if he did not know where the aircraft was???
He elected a VMC descent, and that was approved. It was approved because by so doing he was taking on his own responsibility for terrain and traffic separation.
There was no clearance issued, it was an approval and it was approved as stated above, VMC by definition is to maintain own terrain clearance and traffic separation.
megan,
How was this established?
.
There was obvious communication between Mac Centre and local radar control for the approval for the radar controlled let down
He elected a VMC descent, and that was approved. It was approved because by so doing he was taking on his own responsibility for terrain and traffic separation.
hence the clearance to descend maintaining VMC and keep them advised of their altitude
megan,
It did, but only very briefly.