Erebus 25 years on
Whispering "T" Jet
That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.
Pathetic.
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Yes, all pro Air New Zealand and NZ government and their petty,futile attempts to lay the blame on Captain Collins. What would you expect?
Pathetic.
Pathetic.
I do not think any more needs to be said.
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chris2303 asks what the other first officer seated with the passengers would have that thought. The answer is in the CVR transcript. The captain announced to the passengers that the would be making a radar-assisted descent to McMurdo Station - so when the aircraft descended through the hole in the cloud, First Officer Lucas would have assumed that the aircraft's position had been confirmed by the radar controller and would not have been concerned.
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Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue? Surely any union, ALPA included, should have no place in an accident investigation and Mahon was clearly manipulated by them. Victory for the union perhaps, but the casualty was truth.
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Perhaps the union became involved because they pushed for the flights to be shared amongst their senior captains. This was against all the accumulated wisdom of all the operators who have been operating down to the ice for many years. The experience requirements for operating in Antarctic regions was completely disregarded.
This from 'A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand" by Maurice McGreal.
This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
This from 'A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand" by Maurice McGreal.
The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"
Last edited by prospector; 10th Jun 2016 at 10:44.
Whispering "T" Jet
the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"
I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised. His relentless energy and enthusiasm to seek factual evidence of the causal factor(s) of this accident was testament to his ethos of respect and common decency to all parties touched by this tragedy. Unlike Air NZ management and the NZ government, Mahon never pointed the finger at any one person who caused the accident. He stated it was “......the incompetent, administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.” Mahon and Vette were well ahead of their time when it came to the correct protocol and understanding of Human Factors in this accident.
Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality. The findings were well respected and unbiased. However, they were never going to sit well with Morrie Davis and Robert Muldoon, so they set out to discredit them and Peter Mahon. The Erebus Inquiry had to absolve Air New Zealand and the NZ Government of any blame in the accident no matter what it took.
Enter the Privy Council of the U.K. – the self appointed custodian of Royal Commissions in the colonies. The appeal to have Mahon’s finding overturned was farcical but predictable. It wasn’t sufficient just to declare the findings, not politically correct and overturn them within, they had to try and discredit Justice Mahon as well. Those who don’t believe that, may also believe, that one can pick up a piece of sh!t by the clean end.
There was a huge backlash and it took 21 years, but, in 2004, appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in NZ. Now the only avenue for appealing decisions/findings for Commission Inquiries is the Supreme Court of NZ.
You have just beautifully demonstrated what I said in an earlier post.
I wouldn't disagree with you when you say
if you added "and completely devoid of any understanding of the purpose,role, and responsibilities of an Airline Captain."
Are you suggesting that if any of the other Air NZ Captains had been called out to operate that duty the crash would still have occurred?
If so I believe you are wrong.
But, as always with this subject the actions/ behaviours of one party often affect how we judge the actions/ behaviours of another.
That AirNZ and the government behaved poorly does not change the fact that Collins was in command of an aircraft, flying in a clean configuration, at 1500ft, below MSA, not in the vicinity of an airport, with crew members saying things like " I'm just wondering where Erebus is" .
The fact that one party behaved poorly does not mean that another party was making good decisions.
That AirNZ and the government behaved poorly does not change the fact that Collins was in command of an aircraft, flying in a clean configuration, at 1500ft, below MSA, not in the vicinity of an airport, with crew members saying things like " I'm just wondering where Erebus is" .
The fact that one party behaved poorly does not mean that another party was making good decisions.
Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality.
only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.
If so I believe you are wrong.
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The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight
This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
Quote:
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"
This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
Quote:
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"
It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.
I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised.
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PapaHotel6,
I fail to see how your comment .
Can be reconciled with the written comment of Maurice McGreal. To my mind that statement covers the Erebus situation very well.
How do you come to that conclusion??
To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight
ctually, such statements really irritate me. They reek of pompous sanctimony and imply that once in the air, a competent captain should gain some sort of overriding omnipresence that protects the flight from all outside influence
It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.
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How do you come to that conclusion??
Mahon - with a level of arrogance that beggars belief - thought his own level of insight was superior to that of Chippindale, who he wrote off as an uneducated, concrete thinking militaristic individual with no insight into the intricacies and infrastructure of "computerised" navigation. Nothing could have been further from the truth. But making generalised statements like "the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
Am I making any sense??
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Am I making any sense??
Because nebulous statements like "the Captain must have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight" implying therefore, that this was pilot error, are facile in the extreme
Now, the Erebus crash *was* due to pilot error, but for very specific reasons - not because the Captain failed in some ill-defined ultimate responsibility.
"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
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Quote:
"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.
"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.
It's not a big deal in the overall context of the discussion. Cheers.
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Doesn't this following article explain the Erebus disaster fairly precisely? - and lay the blame where it is rightfully due? The article is written by a professional pilot.
Is it not a commercial pilots responsibility to know where he is at all times, in relation to that nasty cloud type, "cumulus granitus? I always thought it was - am I wrong in this belief?
Derek Ellis: Erebus - why the pilot was at fault - National - NZ Herald News
Is it not a commercial pilots responsibility to know where he is at all times, in relation to that nasty cloud type, "cumulus granitus? I always thought it was - am I wrong in this belief?
Derek Ellis: Erebus - why the pilot was at fault - National - NZ Herald News
I initiated the Antarctic flights and went on the 9 Qantas ones I chartered.
I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.
One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.
It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.
I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.
One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.
It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 12th Jun 2016 at 20:04.
Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue?
I am not passing comment on the rights or wrongs of the crew in this accident, just highlighting reasons why the likes of ALPA become involved, to ensure the crew get a fair hearing.
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In the early hours of 28 November a navigational coordinate in the flight plan presented at the briefing was changed. The airline’s navigation section believed it was making a minor adjustment to the flight’s longstanding destination point, but a typing error some 14 months earlier meant it had actually shifted this point some 27 nautical miles to the east. Instead of the IFR route taking Flight TE901 over flat sea ice, as Collins and Cassin had been briefed, it would take them directly over Mt Erebus, a 3794-metre-high active volcano. The flight crew were not alerted to the change. On the morning of 28 November they received the adjusted 'correct' flight plan and entered these coordinates into the on board computer.
Good point Dick,in retrospect, it would have been a good idea to have plotted the course on a visual chart. In retrospect, there were many things that could have been done differently and may have prevented this tragic accident. Many were raised and considered in Justice Mahon's inquiry. Unfortunately, these findings were not in the best interest of Air NZ and Robert Muldoon's government at the time.
Good point Dick,in retrospect, it would have been a good idea to have plotted the course on a visual chart. In retrospect, there were many things that could have been done differently and may have prevented this tragic accident. Many were raised and considered in Justice Mahon's inquiry. Unfortunately, these findings were not in the best interest of Air NZ and Robert Muldoon's government at the time.
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nz 901
I was nearly on stand by as a lowley First Officer for that particular flight.
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
I am like most aviators, I suffer from 20-20 hind sight.
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit. Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.” ― Omar Khayyám.
It had a very sad ending.
GLGR
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
I am like most aviators, I suffer from 20-20 hind sight.
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit. Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.” ― Omar Khayyám.
It had a very sad ending.
GLGR
Last edited by gulfairs; 13th Jun 2016 at 02:35.
Yes. Agree the waypoint was moved without the crew being informed.
That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.
That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.
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That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.
1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
You will note that this is the ONLY let down procedure approved by the Company and the CAA. The crew was aware of this requirement as a copy of the memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.