New ATC Documentary on BBC2
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BIK 116.8;
Hate to say it mate, but you are looking at some OLD data. The FAA doesn't have old computers anymore. We have gotten rid of most of the old stuff. We do indeed have some older software around in the host processing in the new hardware, but our computers don't fail very much anymore. We are also working with new displays and some of the enroute facilities are working with new data systems also. More are to come on line in the next 8 to 12 months.
We are also working on the new HOST replacement hardware and software. The design is being ironed out and the requirements are set in firm jello as of now. Hopefully we will see some good direction on this new program by next year (ERAM)....
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
116.8;
While I am at it <G>... The Boeing plan does look sexy doesn't it. The problem with it though is when you get into it, it lacks substance and the HOW they are going to do it. We have talked with them about the PLAN... They can never answer the questions of just how they are going to be able to do it, nor can they answer how much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it...
While working on projects ( I enjoy working out of the box ) we have asked the engineers to come up with some really neat stuff that we controllers would like to have to make our jobs eaiser so that we can move more aircraft. It is something that we like to do here if you aren't to familiar with the US ATC... The answer from the experts who are writing all this wonderful code ( Don't work for the FAA or any other part of the govt. they are private enterprise. ) is that we can't do that yet. Even the more or less minor things that we would like to do we are told that we can't afford it even if we can make it work. So, if it is unaffordable, then it is for now unobtainable.
There are indeed things that we can do better, and hopefully we can come up with an integrated solution for it that is not cost prohibitive. But many of the things that are going to be needed to improve the through put of aircraft is going to require equipment not just on the ground and in space, but in the cockpit, and as we have found out with datalink. The airlines are not in a position to desire to upgrade their fleets and spend the money. Nor are they in a position to upgrade the nav in the 70's and 80's era glass cockpit aircraft that use DME/DME for navigation. This is leaving them out of some of the leading edge nav stuff that we are trying to do to improve efficiencies of getting about in both the terminal and enroute airspace. So it isn't just the problem of the ATC provider.
While we are speaking of equippage. For us to do our jobs as controllers, we have to have everyone doing things about the same. When we start mixing navigation equipage which in the future may determine separation criteria it makes our jobs a LOT harder. If we want to increase our output, then we have to make the job easier and not harder...
Would like to go on, but my brain is mush right now after a nice evening shift with thunderstorms about...
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
Hate to say it mate, but you are looking at some OLD data. The FAA doesn't have old computers anymore. We have gotten rid of most of the old stuff. We do indeed have some older software around in the host processing in the new hardware, but our computers don't fail very much anymore. We are also working with new displays and some of the enroute facilities are working with new data systems also. More are to come on line in the next 8 to 12 months.
We are also working on the new HOST replacement hardware and software. The design is being ironed out and the requirements are set in firm jello as of now. Hopefully we will see some good direction on this new program by next year (ERAM)....
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
116.8;
While I am at it <G>... The Boeing plan does look sexy doesn't it. The problem with it though is when you get into it, it lacks substance and the HOW they are going to do it. We have talked with them about the PLAN... They can never answer the questions of just how they are going to be able to do it, nor can they answer how much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it...
While working on projects ( I enjoy working out of the box ) we have asked the engineers to come up with some really neat stuff that we controllers would like to have to make our jobs eaiser so that we can move more aircraft. It is something that we like to do here if you aren't to familiar with the US ATC... The answer from the experts who are writing all this wonderful code ( Don't work for the FAA or any other part of the govt. they are private enterprise. ) is that we can't do that yet. Even the more or less minor things that we would like to do we are told that we can't afford it even if we can make it work. So, if it is unaffordable, then it is for now unobtainable.
There are indeed things that we can do better, and hopefully we can come up with an integrated solution for it that is not cost prohibitive. But many of the things that are going to be needed to improve the through put of aircraft is going to require equipment not just on the ground and in space, but in the cockpit, and as we have found out with datalink. The airlines are not in a position to desire to upgrade their fleets and spend the money. Nor are they in a position to upgrade the nav in the 70's and 80's era glass cockpit aircraft that use DME/DME for navigation. This is leaving them out of some of the leading edge nav stuff that we are trying to do to improve efficiencies of getting about in both the terminal and enroute airspace. So it isn't just the problem of the ATC provider.
While we are speaking of equippage. For us to do our jobs as controllers, we have to have everyone doing things about the same. When we start mixing navigation equipage which in the future may determine separation criteria it makes our jobs a LOT harder. If we want to increase our output, then we have to make the job easier and not harder...
Would like to go on, but my brain is mush right now after a nice evening shift with thunderstorms about...
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
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I found Bik's post so impressive that as an amateur I am wary of dissenting, but two points seemed to be a generalisation a little too far:
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"By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G."
-------------------
Perfect safety is unattainable - if the Government/CAA/NATS or whoever has a tacit position, it is that there is an acceptable level of risk, which is around 10 to the -8 or so per flight. If you look at what actually kills people in UK airliners, collisions with military (or anything else) in class G is historically less than dropping Tridents onto Staines, fires at Manchester, hitting motorway embankments after shutting down the wrong engine, and taking your chances with various foreign places. Including risks to third parties, there is also the issue of getting lumps of blue ice, inter alia, or even whole Korean airliners, fall out of the sky.
------------------------
"Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not. "
------------------------------------------------
There is more to it than that. I fly a non-transponder glider and weigh 205 pounds including parachute, with a max cockpit weight allowed of 208. I use up the last three with water, food, and a logger (a black box recording my flight).
There is no £150 solution for me. What would be the price, even if I could accommodate the weight including another battery, the size in my already crowded cockpit, and whatever on my already full panel, for a transponder, + alt encoder, + fitting, + certification, for a non-standard installation?
I would guess that gliders comprise more of the UK traffic on good summer days than all the rest put together (an educated guess, based on extrapolation from the last published survey of UK airspace utilisation). Hardly any have, or could at present have, transponders. Ditto for many permit PFA-type aircraft.
I have no more wish to have a collison than anyone else, but what kills UK glider pilots historically is mostly self-inflicted - other forms of bad airmanship; then collision with other gliders; then collisions with GA traffic; and not yet with heavy stuff. Of course, the first time the latter happens it may swing the figures if the airliner is also mortally afflicted, and of course we don't want any of these things to happen, but the solutions have to practicable and affordable.
On a more general note, I am on the side of those who see airliners leaving controlled airspace by choice and mixing it with the military, me, and everyone else, to save fuel and/or keep routes "viable", as compromising their attitude to safety. It is an arguable position where there is no linking airspace, but questionable, showing profit triumphing over safety, where there is a protected but longer route available.
Where I found the BBC programs disturbing was the apparent continuing lack of willingness by the big professional outfits to invest in safety until forced to do so. E.g. Milan and ground radar. Or even Leeds. It just confirmed what I have seen over three decades - the big boys want safety when somebody else pays for it, e.g. by more controlled airspace which takes from me at no expense to them, but not in equally urgent and probably more life-saving potential but costly measures such as rear-facing seats, ways of getting passengers out of burning aircraft (a la Manchester), this new data link, video cameras to show which engine is really on fire (Kegworth), etc.
Chris N.
---------------------
"By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G."
-------------------
Perfect safety is unattainable - if the Government/CAA/NATS or whoever has a tacit position, it is that there is an acceptable level of risk, which is around 10 to the -8 or so per flight. If you look at what actually kills people in UK airliners, collisions with military (or anything else) in class G is historically less than dropping Tridents onto Staines, fires at Manchester, hitting motorway embankments after shutting down the wrong engine, and taking your chances with various foreign places. Including risks to third parties, there is also the issue of getting lumps of blue ice, inter alia, or even whole Korean airliners, fall out of the sky.
------------------------
"Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not. "
------------------------------------------------
There is more to it than that. I fly a non-transponder glider and weigh 205 pounds including parachute, with a max cockpit weight allowed of 208. I use up the last three with water, food, and a logger (a black box recording my flight).
There is no £150 solution for me. What would be the price, even if I could accommodate the weight including another battery, the size in my already crowded cockpit, and whatever on my already full panel, for a transponder, + alt encoder, + fitting, + certification, for a non-standard installation?
I would guess that gliders comprise more of the UK traffic on good summer days than all the rest put together (an educated guess, based on extrapolation from the last published survey of UK airspace utilisation). Hardly any have, or could at present have, transponders. Ditto for many permit PFA-type aircraft.
I have no more wish to have a collison than anyone else, but what kills UK glider pilots historically is mostly self-inflicted - other forms of bad airmanship; then collision with other gliders; then collisions with GA traffic; and not yet with heavy stuff. Of course, the first time the latter happens it may swing the figures if the airliner is also mortally afflicted, and of course we don't want any of these things to happen, but the solutions have to practicable and affordable.
On a more general note, I am on the side of those who see airliners leaving controlled airspace by choice and mixing it with the military, me, and everyone else, to save fuel and/or keep routes "viable", as compromising their attitude to safety. It is an arguable position where there is no linking airspace, but questionable, showing profit triumphing over safety, where there is a protected but longer route available.
Where I found the BBC programs disturbing was the apparent continuing lack of willingness by the big professional outfits to invest in safety until forced to do so. E.g. Milan and ground radar. Or even Leeds. It just confirmed what I have seen over three decades - the big boys want safety when somebody else pays for it, e.g. by more controlled airspace which takes from me at no expense to them, but not in equally urgent and probably more life-saving potential but costly measures such as rear-facing seats, ways of getting passengers out of burning aircraft (a la Manchester), this new data link, video cameras to show which engine is really on fire (Kegworth), etc.
Chris N.
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Bik_116.80
Well well, aint it amazing the responses you get when you turn to reasoned discussion rather than your previous method of debate. Having read your post I have reassessed my opinion of you. I may not agree with what you say a great deal, but thats the point of a discussion thread. At least now I can respect your viewpont as one coming from an intelligent human being.
To answer your question, a False RA, or at least my definition of it with regard to my post, is an RA given byTCAS when there was never any danger of an infringement of separation. In my case the action taken by the pilot, which was correct in accordance to airline policy, was to divert from my safe clearance, and climb into opposite traffic, which I had to turn away to avoid a loss of separation.
As you say, TCAS if left to its own devices will keep a/c apart, but we have separation minima to respect, TCAS will not adhere to that. If you are happy with that scenario then you're a braver man than me.
There are many quotes I could use from your post which show quite clearly to me that you do not understand fully the job of an ATCO in a busy radar environment. I do not pretend to be aware of the intricacies of piloting an aircraft even though I have many freinds, and indeed family who are pilots.
For example, you seem to think that TCAS gives enough situational awareness to know the controllers plan. Enough to question the plan. It doesn't matter how much traffic you can see on TCAS, until you know the flight plan data of every target you see you CANNOT have situational awareness. Doesn't matter how good the user is.
I could go on but my break is at an end, gotta go keep the skies safe again!!
Cheers Bik for a well reasoned post. Sure we will meet again.
To answer your question, a False RA, or at least my definition of it with regard to my post, is an RA given byTCAS when there was never any danger of an infringement of separation. In my case the action taken by the pilot, which was correct in accordance to airline policy, was to divert from my safe clearance, and climb into opposite traffic, which I had to turn away to avoid a loss of separation.
As you say, TCAS if left to its own devices will keep a/c apart, but we have separation minima to respect, TCAS will not adhere to that. If you are happy with that scenario then you're a braver man than me.
There are many quotes I could use from your post which show quite clearly to me that you do not understand fully the job of an ATCO in a busy radar environment. I do not pretend to be aware of the intricacies of piloting an aircraft even though I have many freinds, and indeed family who are pilots.
For example, you seem to think that TCAS gives enough situational awareness to know the controllers plan. Enough to question the plan. It doesn't matter how much traffic you can see on TCAS, until you know the flight plan data of every target you see you CANNOT have situational awareness. Doesn't matter how good the user is.
I could go on but my break is at an end, gotta go keep the skies safe again!!
Cheers Bik for a well reasoned post. Sure we will meet again.
Last edited by fourthreethree; 12th Aug 2003 at 02:43.
Thread Starter
Last Episode...
"Crowded Skies
Sun 17 Aug, 9:00 pm - 10:00 pm 60mins
Made by the company behind the 2001 Emmy-nominated 'Challenger: Go For Launch', this major documentary series looks at the most terrifying air collisions and near misses of the past - and explores how we can avoid these catastrophes in the future.
In the wake of the tragic mid-air collision over Switzerland last year, the series takes a detailed look at the world's air traffic control system, looking at the people and technology responsible for handling some 5 million air passengers every day.
Through detailed examination of disastrous air collisions, the series asks whether the lessons of the past have been learnt and how, with a system already running at full capacity, the industry will cope with the expected doubling of air traffic by 2020.
The Blame Game
Last summer the unthinkable happened when two modern airliners collided 35 thousand feet above Switzerland. This accident sent shock waves throughout the industry, not least because of the resulting 71 deaths - including a party of Russian schoolchildren making their first trip abroad having won an essay writing competition to win a holiday in Spain.
With moving testimony from the families who lost their children in the crash, along with accident investigators and colleagues of the Zurich air traffic controller who was blamed by many for the accident, this programme forensically examines exactly what happened that night. Mid air collisions are very rare, but near misses are not uncommon over British skies and the programme goes on to ask if a Lake Constance collision could happen over here.
Stereo Widescreen"
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings...0_4224_1228_60
LXGB
"Crowded Skies
Sun 17 Aug, 9:00 pm - 10:00 pm 60mins
Made by the company behind the 2001 Emmy-nominated 'Challenger: Go For Launch', this major documentary series looks at the most terrifying air collisions and near misses of the past - and explores how we can avoid these catastrophes in the future.
In the wake of the tragic mid-air collision over Switzerland last year, the series takes a detailed look at the world's air traffic control system, looking at the people and technology responsible for handling some 5 million air passengers every day.
Through detailed examination of disastrous air collisions, the series asks whether the lessons of the past have been learnt and how, with a system already running at full capacity, the industry will cope with the expected doubling of air traffic by 2020.
The Blame Game
Last summer the unthinkable happened when two modern airliners collided 35 thousand feet above Switzerland. This accident sent shock waves throughout the industry, not least because of the resulting 71 deaths - including a party of Russian schoolchildren making their first trip abroad having won an essay writing competition to win a holiday in Spain.
With moving testimony from the families who lost their children in the crash, along with accident investigators and colleagues of the Zurich air traffic controller who was blamed by many for the accident, this programme forensically examines exactly what happened that night. Mid air collisions are very rare, but near misses are not uncommon over British skies and the programme goes on to ask if a Lake Constance collision could happen over here.
Stereo Widescreen"
http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings...0_4224_1228_60
LXGB
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BIK116.8
Well, what a marathon. I'm sure you'll get more respect shown to you after that civil and well-thought out post.
As I said, I agree totally that we, like just about everyone, is facing automation. It won't necessarily do it better, but if the bosses could shift the traffic at a cheaper price, they will. When my son is asked "what do you want to do when you grow up?", his answer is "not ATC". "Why?". "Because my dad says there wont be any in the future". Like everything else that is automated, it will be less flexible, more specialised and be a painful transition. Hopefully I'll be old enough to accept my redundancy with good grace.
A couple of points. You misunderstood my position about CPDLC and HF. I was making the point that (in the oz experience), CPDLC was better than HF voice communication. You know, over the ocean and in the boonies where pilots have to use HF. CPDLC is a marked improvement. But where VHF voice comms are available, they are far superior (if both pilots and ATC speak the same language). I estimate I could do 10 times the amount of ATC with VHF voice, than with CPDLC. You certainly couldn't attempt to use CPDLC in high traffic environments. Until you take the pilots out of the loop. I'm pretty sure it's developers were fully aware of this, but had the 'big picture' in mind. All the elements are already there. The TAAATS platform, the 'maestro' flow control program, CPDLC. It's not a huge step to have it all talking together to the avionics controls on a/c. Of course, all the individual elements would need to work significantly better
but you get the idea.
Secondly, your faith in TCAS is a worry. You mention the idea that pilots can have sit. awareness if they use it correctly. Absolute crap. Whether it's the tech aspects, or the human side, it isn't happening. TCAS has limited ability to process targets, and if it gets too many (more than 25??), it just drops them off. Even engineers can't explain to me how or which targets it drops. Frequently, the threat a/c is merging/same direction, and TCAS seems particularly poor at identifying said threats (something to do with rate of change of threat). Planning in ATC frequently requires more than 9000' forward. eg. last week I had an arrival stopped at FL200 vs a departure on a different freq (at that time) climbing to FL180 (note to pilot- 2000' sep to stop false RAs - efficient?). The descender thru FL240 queried where his traffic was (it was climbing thru FL110 and crossing) as he couldn't see it on TCAS. That wastes my time when I could be doing something else. It never used to happen. It is becoming more and more common (see other thread this forum), and I could go on and on, but I won't.
At the end of the day, capacity enhancements are governed more by available airports and runways than anything to do with ATC.
Happy holding.
As I said, I agree totally that we, like just about everyone, is facing automation. It won't necessarily do it better, but if the bosses could shift the traffic at a cheaper price, they will. When my son is asked "what do you want to do when you grow up?", his answer is "not ATC". "Why?". "Because my dad says there wont be any in the future". Like everything else that is automated, it will be less flexible, more specialised and be a painful transition. Hopefully I'll be old enough to accept my redundancy with good grace.
A couple of points. You misunderstood my position about CPDLC and HF. I was making the point that (in the oz experience), CPDLC was better than HF voice communication. You know, over the ocean and in the boonies where pilots have to use HF. CPDLC is a marked improvement. But where VHF voice comms are available, they are far superior (if both pilots and ATC speak the same language). I estimate I could do 10 times the amount of ATC with VHF voice, than with CPDLC. You certainly couldn't attempt to use CPDLC in high traffic environments. Until you take the pilots out of the loop. I'm pretty sure it's developers were fully aware of this, but had the 'big picture' in mind. All the elements are already there. The TAAATS platform, the 'maestro' flow control program, CPDLC. It's not a huge step to have it all talking together to the avionics controls on a/c. Of course, all the individual elements would need to work significantly better
but you get the idea.Secondly, your faith in TCAS is a worry. You mention the idea that pilots can have sit. awareness if they use it correctly. Absolute crap. Whether it's the tech aspects, or the human side, it isn't happening. TCAS has limited ability to process targets, and if it gets too many (more than 25??), it just drops them off. Even engineers can't explain to me how or which targets it drops. Frequently, the threat a/c is merging/same direction, and TCAS seems particularly poor at identifying said threats (something to do with rate of change of threat). Planning in ATC frequently requires more than 9000' forward. eg. last week I had an arrival stopped at FL200 vs a departure on a different freq (at that time) climbing to FL180 (note to pilot- 2000' sep to stop false RAs - efficient?). The descender thru FL240 queried where his traffic was (it was climbing thru FL110 and crossing) as he couldn't see it on TCAS. That wastes my time when I could be doing something else. It never used to happen. It is becoming more and more common (see other thread this forum), and I could go on and on, but I won't.
At the end of the day, capacity enhancements are governed more by available airports and runways than anything to do with ATC.
Happy holding.
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433...
I am intrigued by your definition of a "False RA". I would define a "False RA" as one that was given, when if no further action was taken by the one/both aricraft, no risk of collision would occur.
You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...
What to do about this? It comes down to the airmanship of the pilots - we need to avoid high rates of climb / descent, particularly close to the assigned FL / Altitude. In the USA they brought in a rule something like >1000'/m until ~1000' to go, then 500'/m. This would avoid most of these RAs. In addition, most RAs are preceded by a TA, and if that is not a clue to reduce the RoC/D, then I do not know what is.
Please remember (both pilots and controllers) what TCAS is for - it is the backup system for when the ATC system fails - which may be for all sorts of reasons (aircraft or ground induced). There seem a few posts here a bit "anti TCAS" - having flown with it for some years now, I had an aircraft the other day without it, and felt very vulnerable.
However, as has been stated, it is not an alternative to ATC. Quite often it does not "display" proximate aircraft we are visual with. Anyone who decides they can propose an alternative course of action based on TCAS is being unfair to the ATCO. On the other hand, ATC should not mind an instruction being queried if TCAS shows the instruction may be hazardous - that's the value of a backup system...
All IMHO of course!
NoD
I am intrigued by your definition of a "False RA". I would define a "False RA" as one that was given, when if no further action was taken by the one/both aricraft, no risk of collision would occur.
You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...
What to do about this? It comes down to the airmanship of the pilots - we need to avoid high rates of climb / descent, particularly close to the assigned FL / Altitude. In the USA they brought in a rule something like >1000'/m until ~1000' to go, then 500'/m. This would avoid most of these RAs. In addition, most RAs are preceded by a TA, and if that is not a clue to reduce the RoC/D, then I do not know what is.
Please remember (both pilots and controllers) what TCAS is for - it is the backup system for when the ATC system fails - which may be for all sorts of reasons (aircraft or ground induced). There seem a few posts here a bit "anti TCAS" - having flown with it for some years now, I had an aircraft the other day without it, and felt very vulnerable.
However, as has been stated, it is not an alternative to ATC. Quite often it does not "display" proximate aircraft we are visual with. Anyone who decides they can propose an alternative course of action based on TCAS is being unfair to the ATCO. On the other hand, ATC should not mind an instruction being queried if TCAS shows the instruction may be hazardous - that's the value of a backup system...
All IMHO of course!
NoD
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NigelonDraft
True, but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions. I would not consider it to be a "false RA" if separation were infringed when the RA was issued. My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation, and it is suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation, forcing me to turn traffic away which was previously not traffic. Its a frightening feeling sitting behind the radar and not being in control of the picture, watching aircraft getting closer and not being allowed to do anything about it because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA.
For the record I am NOT anti TCAS, I can see the benefits of such a system, but I do believe the criteria for an RA should be changed, and controllers able to override an RA. Not the generally held view I know, but there ya go!
You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...
For the record I am NOT anti TCAS, I can see the benefits of such a system, but I do believe the criteria for an RA should be changed, and controllers able to override an RA. Not the generally held view I know, but there ya go!
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There has been a lot of talk about types of service in this thread, a couple questioning why we give avoiding action against unknown traffic in class G airspace, instead of trying to explain, the follwing are the rules for RAS wich we are BOUND by, so if you ask for RAS these are the rules which will guide you to your destination.
A RAS.
RAS is an air traffic radar service in which the controller will provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between ac participating in the advisory service, and in which he will pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and if known, level of non-participating traffic, together with advice on the action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller will pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic.
"RAS will only be provided under IFR irrespective of met conditions.
The controller will expect pilots to accept radar vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Pilots not qualified to fly in IMC should accept RAS only where compliance with ATC advice permits the flight to be continued in VMC.
There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside CAS to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, a pilot who chooses not to comply with advisory avoiding action must inform the controller. the pilot will then become reponsible for initiating any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.
the pilot must inform the controller before changing heading or level.
The avoiding action instructions which a controller may pass to resolve a confliction with non-participating traffic will, where possible, be aimed at achieving separation which is not less than 5nm or 3000ft, except where specified otherwise by the regulating authority. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, abd when unknown a/c make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.
Information on conflicting traffic will be passed until the situation is resolved.
The pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, although ATSU,s providing a RAS will set a level or levels below which RAS will be refused or terminated. "
So, if you want RAS outside CAS, in s busy class G area, this is why you are given a turn or three!
A RAS.
RAS is an air traffic radar service in which the controller will provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between ac participating in the advisory service, and in which he will pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and if known, level of non-participating traffic, together with advice on the action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller will pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic.
"RAS will only be provided under IFR irrespective of met conditions.
The controller will expect pilots to accept radar vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Pilots not qualified to fly in IMC should accept RAS only where compliance with ATC advice permits the flight to be continued in VMC.
There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside CAS to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, a pilot who chooses not to comply with advisory avoiding action must inform the controller. the pilot will then become reponsible for initiating any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.
the pilot must inform the controller before changing heading or level.
The avoiding action instructions which a controller may pass to resolve a confliction with non-participating traffic will, where possible, be aimed at achieving separation which is not less than 5nm or 3000ft, except where specified otherwise by the regulating authority. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, abd when unknown a/c make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.
Information on conflicting traffic will be passed until the situation is resolved.
The pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, although ATSU,s providing a RAS will set a level or levels below which RAS will be refused or terminated. "
So, if you want RAS outside CAS, in s busy class G area, this is why you are given a turn or three!
More than just an ATCO
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Bik re "When ready, descend..., cross xxx at FL nnn" For more than 30 years that.s been my normal way of doing things. I've always tried to do it in such a way as to allow plenty of leeway for the pilot i.e. in such time that the average rate need not be more than 2000fpm, Unfortunately, as i stated, many pilots are now automaticallly questioning the clearance.
I agree entirely with the American method of reducing vertical rate within the last 1000ft - much more comfortable for the pax. We;re having some success in educating our military into doing ir when in proximity to civil traffic.
Perhaps classing them as False RAs is wrong, Nuisance RA is maybe better, but when a pilot follows a False/Nuisance RA it will, one day, lead to the mid air the system is supposed to help avoid.
Nothing,either on ths ground or in the air, is a substitute for good airmanship and "controllership"
edited for spelling
I agree entirely with the American method of reducing vertical rate within the last 1000ft - much more comfortable for the pax. We;re having some success in educating our military into doing ir when in proximity to civil traffic.
Perhaps classing them as False RAs is wrong, Nuisance RA is maybe better, but when a pilot follows a False/Nuisance RA it will, one day, lead to the mid air the system is supposed to help avoid.
Nothing,either on ths ground or in the air, is a substitute for good airmanship and "controllership"
edited for spelling
Last edited by Lon More; 21st Aug 2003 at 01:44.
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Agree entirely with Lon More.
The RAs are not 'false' since the TCAS is doing what it is designed to do ... predict the closest point of passage and issue a resolution to make sure that the pilot does something about it to prevent a collision.
They can of course be considered 'nuisance' RAs since they do not take account of the whole story (cleared levels) and may affect ATCs plan, however we have to understand that the pilot needs to heed the warnings which may save his and others lives.
And of course the PR which came with TCAS when introduced many years ago said that pilots will generally only deviate by about 400' before returning to their cleared level (hahahahaha
)
The RAs are not 'false' since the TCAS is doing what it is designed to do ... predict the closest point of passage and issue a resolution to make sure that the pilot does something about it to prevent a collision.
They can of course be considered 'nuisance' RAs since they do not take account of the whole story (cleared levels) and may affect ATCs plan, however we have to understand that the pilot needs to heed the warnings which may save his and others lives.
And of course the PR which came with TCAS when introduced many years ago said that pilots will generally only deviate by about 400' before returning to their cleared level (hahahahaha
)
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433
<< but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions>>
There is in fact - TCAS!
<<My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation>>
The solution here lies with the pilots, and them not using stupid RoD/C close to assigned Level off Altitudes. And if necessary, prescriptive maximum RoC/D need to be introduced as law i.e. as in the USA.
<<suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation>>
I can see it must be frightning for a controller - if both pilots follow their RA, it is actually "controlled", but by TCAS. And his separation criteria is tight - I have had an RA and with 500' of separation it was "Maintain Vertical Speed" throughout...
<<because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA>>
It is not, or at least should not be "company policy". It MUST be National / ICAO policy. TCAS will only work if we ALL ALWAYS follow its commands, or bin the whole thing...
<<and controllers able to override an RA>>
Disagree - this was what in effect led to the German / Swiss midair. TCAS is a very "close in" tool, and in "reversal" type scenarios it is quite hard work to react to it in its timescales in the FD - there is no time to check, or get overriddden from the ground. All we can do is follow it, as quickly and accurately as possible, and only then inform ATC.
I do come back to the original point. As an ATCO, and providing legal separation minima, aircraft under your control should hardly see a TA, and never an RA. If they do, it is either an error on your part, which is what TCAS is for, or (far more likely) one or both aircrew using inappropriate RoD/C. And as an aside, ATC clearances requiring high RoD/C e.g. outside the 3x table, are in turn more likely to generate TAs/RAs....
Good debate as ever!
NoD
<< but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions>>
There is in fact - TCAS!
<<My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation>>
The solution here lies with the pilots, and them not using stupid RoD/C close to assigned Level off Altitudes. And if necessary, prescriptive maximum RoC/D need to be introduced as law i.e. as in the USA.
<<suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation>>
I can see it must be frightning for a controller - if both pilots follow their RA, it is actually "controlled", but by TCAS. And his separation criteria is tight - I have had an RA and with 500' of separation it was "Maintain Vertical Speed" throughout...
<<because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA>>
It is not, or at least should not be "company policy". It MUST be National / ICAO policy. TCAS will only work if we ALL ALWAYS follow its commands, or bin the whole thing...
<<and controllers able to override an RA>>
Disagree - this was what in effect led to the German / Swiss midair. TCAS is a very "close in" tool, and in "reversal" type scenarios it is quite hard work to react to it in its timescales in the FD - there is no time to check, or get overriddden from the ground. All we can do is follow it, as quickly and accurately as possible, and only then inform ATC.
I do come back to the original point. As an ATCO, and providing legal separation minima, aircraft under your control should hardly see a TA, and never an RA. If they do, it is either an error on your part, which is what TCAS is for, or (far more likely) one or both aircrew using inappropriate RoD/C. And as an aside, ATC clearances requiring high RoD/C e.g. outside the 3x table, are in turn more likely to generate TAs/RAs....
Good debate as ever!
NoD
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Nigel
Couple of points, first, the Swiss tragedy was, in the beginning, a controller error, in that two aircraft were converging at the same level. In this case TCAS gave instructions which were tragically overridden by ATC, amongst much confusion. The scenario I am talking about is somewhat different, where there is no chance of loss of separation, I would like the chance to inform pilots of this fact so that when they recieve a nuisance RA (agreed, better terminology) they can choose to disregard it. I can give traffic info to pilots in such a case, indeed I often do, but it seems it is just a waste of time and breath. If I have screwed up and TCAS can save my butt (not to mention the lives of those on board) then naturally I will be glad to let that happen.
Now I don't know that much about the technical side of TCAS, but would I be correct in saying that different operators can calibrate theis TCAS differently? I only ask because there is one particular operator who, in my limited experience, have more RA's than others. A few weeks ago, I had two of their aircraft, one climbing, one descending, cleared levels separated by 1000 feet, opposite direction. Neither were high roc/d, both had traffic info. At 1800' separation, both had simultaneous RA's and both reacted. I have similar situations nearly every day, but never before with the same outcome. In this case it was not busy, and there was no other tfc to effect, but next time?
As I said, it is against the instinct of any controller to sit back and let a machine which is not aware of the traffic picture carry out your separation for you, but it is what we are legally obliged to do. Let me put it this way, if you were on the operating table for major heart surgery, what would you prefer, an experienced surgeon trained to deal with all scenarios, or a robot who knows only the programmed operation? Not a perfect analogy I know but you get the picture.
Couple of points, first, the Swiss tragedy was, in the beginning, a controller error, in that two aircraft were converging at the same level. In this case TCAS gave instructions which were tragically overridden by ATC, amongst much confusion. The scenario I am talking about is somewhat different, where there is no chance of loss of separation, I would like the chance to inform pilots of this fact so that when they recieve a nuisance RA (agreed, better terminology) they can choose to disregard it. I can give traffic info to pilots in such a case, indeed I often do, but it seems it is just a waste of time and breath. If I have screwed up and TCAS can save my butt (not to mention the lives of those on board) then naturally I will be glad to let that happen.
Now I don't know that much about the technical side of TCAS, but would I be correct in saying that different operators can calibrate theis TCAS differently? I only ask because there is one particular operator who, in my limited experience, have more RA's than others. A few weeks ago, I had two of their aircraft, one climbing, one descending, cleared levels separated by 1000 feet, opposite direction. Neither were high roc/d, both had traffic info. At 1800' separation, both had simultaneous RA's and both reacted. I have similar situations nearly every day, but never before with the same outcome. In this case it was not busy, and there was no other tfc to effect, but next time?
As I said, it is against the instinct of any controller to sit back and let a machine which is not aware of the traffic picture carry out your separation for you, but it is what we are legally obliged to do. Let me put it this way, if you were on the operating table for major heart surgery, what would you prefer, an experienced surgeon trained to deal with all scenarios, or a robot who knows only the programmed operation? Not a perfect analogy I know but you get the picture.
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DoD;
Slowing climb or descent 1000 prior to level is not rule in the US. It is merely a suggested operating practice...
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
Slowing climb or descent 1000 prior to level is not rule in the US. It is merely a suggested operating practice...
regards
Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman
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REALITY CHECK
I have been reading with avid interest as these threads sway from one topic to the next some with heated exchanges. I am also fascinated by the space age technology purported to be just around the corner; changing all of our jobs to one of management rather than control (promotion at last). One question vexes me however, in the utopia that will obviously be all our futures, will aircraft transponders be able to select 8s and 9s and will ATC systems be able to read them? As this octal system has prevailed since the 1960s forgive me for being slightly cynical if I do not immediately sign up to, the dream of a worldwide-integrated ATC system watched over by big brother just yet.
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Jack-oh;
Actually with the advent of ADS-B or whatever comes after that <G>, there won't be a need for the old transponder as we know it in the future. The ADS-B will have it's own unique identifier which will tell you the aircraft identification as well as the type of aircraft...
regards
Scott
PS. It is just going to take a long while to mandate equippage so that everyone can use the newer systems. Costs money and that is hard to get mandated.
Actually with the advent of ADS-B or whatever comes after that <G>, there won't be a need for the old transponder as we know it in the future. The ADS-B will have it's own unique identifier which will tell you the aircraft identification as well as the type of aircraft...
regards
Scott
PS. It is just going to take a long while to mandate equippage so that everyone can use the newer systems. Costs money and that is hard to get mandated.
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Tonight's programme - Skyguide - Peter "X"
I am watching the latest in this series and am appalled that it would appear, at least from what I believe I just heard, that the Danish ATC who was working two screens, who had no working telephone service, whose screen was faulty therefore not showing a collision alert, is being blamed for what happened over Lake Constance??!! Surely this can't be true .. OK so maybe he could have called a colleague back from break to work the second station but neither of them would still have been able to telephone the airport control tower.
My heart goes out to him ...
It also appears that the Tupolev's pilots were (1) 8yrs experience (in command) and (2) airline chief pilot (second in command) and the second in command overruled TCAS and overruled the captain...
My heart goes out to him ...
It also appears that the Tupolev's pilots were (1) 8yrs experience (in command) and (2) airline chief pilot (second in command) and the second in command overruled TCAS and overruled the captain...
...the thin end thereof
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Agree Brocken -
This was a very good reconstruction, and there were all kinds of difficult and unusual circumstances that he was being asked to deal with. Including having to talk with telephone engineers asking him to take the primary phone system offline while dealing with two workstations - en route and approach control. He agreed and was left without a phone. Which would have averted the accident if it was online.
If he is being blamed for what happened, I'm appalled.
I wouldn't want to be a Controller if this is the environment they have to work in.
If anybody is going to stand trial for Manslaughter it should be his managers. To make a scapegoat of this controller for the gaping flaws in the system would be shameful.
This was a very good reconstruction, and there were all kinds of difficult and unusual circumstances that he was being asked to deal with. Including having to talk with telephone engineers asking him to take the primary phone system offline while dealing with two workstations - en route and approach control. He agreed and was left without a phone. Which would have averted the accident if it was online.
If he is being blamed for what happened, I'm appalled.
I wouldn't want to be a Controller if this is the environment they have to work in.
If anybody is going to stand trial for Manslaughter it should be his managers. To make a scapegoat of this controller for the gaping flaws in the system would be shameful.