Mid Air collision over S Germany
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News also said tonight "this could never happen in UK airspace as there are always two controllers controling each aircraft".
Maybe at NERC (or maybe not) where there is the whole planner tactical thing going on, but what about other units where its just the guy (or gal) on the tube?
Maybe at NERC (or maybe not) where there is the whole planner tactical thing going on, but what about other units where its just the guy (or gal) on the tube?
Beady Eye
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Uuuummm, STCA is not a safety tool, just a nice to have (although it saved my bacon a couple of times when I was an ATC!). Hence it can be off for Bypass mode at LATCC, DD&C etc. at LACC and so on.
Had a bit of a ruckus when I discovered this from the engineers! Seems that if it was safety then it would be a cat 2 tool with multi redundancy etc etc. Cost a fortune. As it is its a cat 5 (might have the numbers wrong, Engineers correct me please!) and costs a LOT less!!
Had a bit of a ruckus when I discovered this from the engineers! Seems that if it was safety then it would be a cat 2 tool with multi redundancy etc etc. Cost a fortune. As it is its a cat 5 (might have the numbers wrong, Engineers correct me please!) and costs a LOT less!!
Pegase Driver
Saddest day in European ATC for decades.
Our thoughts should be for the poor guy that was alone on that frequency that night, (his life as he knew it is gone, we all know this), and for the parents of those that perished , mostly children whose lives were taken by a sequence or errors.
Warning my friends, do not jump to conclusions on the Russians.
from my info, the TU154 crew spoke very good english ( confirmed by the previous controllers in EDDM )was RVSM ( confirmed by the overfly over Linz HMU an hour before ) and according to Eurocontrol database was one of the few TU154s equipped with TCAS.
The poor guy in LSZH was alone and the main system was in maintenance, therefore probably no OLDI as well as no STCA, verbal coordinations / estimates etc.. you get the picture.
The " unhautorised break " of the second guy is bull**** . Everyone that makes night shifts knows what Imean.
Now the rest below is speculation from my part :
For me this could be another TCAS induced error, where one pilot got an RA, the other got an opposite RA but which was conflicting with the (possibly emphatic )ATC clearance received.If traffic info was passed ( looks like it ) the russian pilot might have diregarded the Climb coordinated RA he probably received.
If you were in the TU 154 captain seat and had made visual with the 757, and got an ATC clearance to descent immediately, would you be 100% sure you would have reversed the manoeuvre on account of a TCAS RA ?
Anyway the main result of this is that in a few months or years a young guy will find himself in front of a judge , with 70 families of those who died in the room, and he likely will go down , failed by a system and his bosses. That makes me feel extremely bad.
The one that has never sat alone on a postion a night can throw the first stone....
Our thoughts should be for the poor guy that was alone on that frequency that night, (his life as he knew it is gone, we all know this), and for the parents of those that perished , mostly children whose lives were taken by a sequence or errors.
Warning my friends, do not jump to conclusions on the Russians.
from my info, the TU154 crew spoke very good english ( confirmed by the previous controllers in EDDM )was RVSM ( confirmed by the overfly over Linz HMU an hour before ) and according to Eurocontrol database was one of the few TU154s equipped with TCAS.
The poor guy in LSZH was alone and the main system was in maintenance, therefore probably no OLDI as well as no STCA, verbal coordinations / estimates etc.. you get the picture.
The " unhautorised break " of the second guy is bull**** . Everyone that makes night shifts knows what Imean.
Now the rest below is speculation from my part :
For me this could be another TCAS induced error, where one pilot got an RA, the other got an opposite RA but which was conflicting with the (possibly emphatic )ATC clearance received.If traffic info was passed ( looks like it ) the russian pilot might have diregarded the Climb coordinated RA he probably received.
If you were in the TU 154 captain seat and had made visual with the 757, and got an ATC clearance to descent immediately, would you be 100% sure you would have reversed the manoeuvre on account of a TCAS RA ?
Anyway the main result of this is that in a few months or years a young guy will find himself in front of a judge , with 70 families of those who died in the room, and he likely will go down , failed by a system and his bosses. That makes me feel extremely bad.
The one that has never sat alone on a postion a night can throw the first stone....
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I was unfortunate enough to have a close, opposite direction same level (FL330) airmiss about seven years ago. We had TCAS on the a/c but it was u/s at the time and not mandatory in Europe. Luckily we were VMC and I saw the guy coming.
The only point I would like to make is that it is very difficult to visually judge the relative level of other traffic, especially now with RVSM and 1000'separation. It is even harder at night and sometimes cloud layers can add confusing optical inputs.
My condolences to all affected.
The only point I would like to make is that it is very difficult to visually judge the relative level of other traffic, especially now with RVSM and 1000'separation. It is even harder at night and sometimes cloud layers can add confusing optical inputs.
My condolences to all affected.
More than just an ATCO
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Conjecture - If the STCA was on maintenance, how much more of the system was compromised? That is, as Watcher pointed out, OLDI, EPCM/strip printing, track labels etc. It's possible that the controller only had c/s and Mode C displayed.
I heard that the system at Maastricht went down this morning as a result of on-line testing during the night and the Code Assignment Tables being full???
I heard that the system at Maastricht went down this morning as a result of on-line testing during the night and the Code Assignment Tables being full???
Pegase Driver
Thanks G spot ( I like your name )
While browsing through the skyguide web site I found this ( unfortunaley only in French :
Zurich, le 3 juillet 2002, 14:30 heures
Dans une interview qui a malheureusement déjà été publiée, M. Maag, responsable du centre de contrôle aérien (ACC) de Zurich, s´est exprimé de façon peu claire au sujet d´une consigne de service selon laquelle le travail de contrôle est effectué par un homme seul. Le fait que l´un des deux contrôleurs aériens en service prenne sa pause après en avoir convenu avec son collègue correspond aux consignes de service officielles. En effet les - Single Manned Operation Procedures - pour le service de nuit prévoient cette manière de faire qui ne porte donc nullement atteinte aux prescriptions en vigueur.
skyguide, swiss air navigation services ltd
Media Relations
Renseignements état-major de crise:
+41 1 816 62 05
+41 1 816 62 06
+41 1 816 62 07
( It basically says that the Head of Zurich ACC screwed up in an interview to the media and that single manned operations during night is not only legal but part of the regulations in use in Zurich ! )
Management at his best once more.
While browsing through the skyguide web site I found this ( unfortunaley only in French :
Zurich, le 3 juillet 2002, 14:30 heures
Dans une interview qui a malheureusement déjà été publiée, M. Maag, responsable du centre de contrôle aérien (ACC) de Zurich, s´est exprimé de façon peu claire au sujet d´une consigne de service selon laquelle le travail de contrôle est effectué par un homme seul. Le fait que l´un des deux contrôleurs aériens en service prenne sa pause après en avoir convenu avec son collègue correspond aux consignes de service officielles. En effet les - Single Manned Operation Procedures - pour le service de nuit prévoient cette manière de faire qui ne porte donc nullement atteinte aux prescriptions en vigueur.
skyguide, swiss air navigation services ltd
Media Relations
Renseignements état-major de crise:
+41 1 816 62 05
+41 1 816 62 06
+41 1 816 62 07
( It basically says that the Head of Zurich ACC screwed up in an interview to the media and that single manned operations during night is not only legal but part of the regulations in use in Zurich ! )
Management at his best once more.
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Come the midnight shift over here we are ALWAYS with just one person on the radar. In our areas we have three people on duty with two radar positions open. One on each radar and one delivering flight strips while it is busy and then as break relief when things slow down...
regards
regards
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This is a truely tragic event and my thoughts go out to the bereaved and the ATC on duty that night.
To correct a few inaccuracies that have appeared on this thread regarding STCA at LACC
1) T3C5 - The ALP servers (These provide the STCA warnings) are a dual redunant pair. If the PAS (Primary Address Space) fails then the SAS (Secondary Address Space ) will take over.
Although not considered a safety system the coding and testing of the application is the same as any other system. I was also surprised to find this out, but as someone explained you don't use STCA to control aircraft. Given recent events that thinking may change.
2) Ahh-40612 - STCA is unaffected during DD&C or NAS shutdown at LACC. The TDU has a complete set of Servers and these are running providing the same services as OPS (including STCA). STCA also works purely on Radar and therefore has no need for flight plan data.
To correct a few inaccuracies that have appeared on this thread regarding STCA at LACC
1) T3C5 - The ALP servers (These provide the STCA warnings) are a dual redunant pair. If the PAS (Primary Address Space) fails then the SAS (Secondary Address Space ) will take over.
Although not considered a safety system the coding and testing of the application is the same as any other system. I was also surprised to find this out, but as someone explained you don't use STCA to control aircraft. Given recent events that thinking may change.
2) Ahh-40612 - STCA is unaffected during DD&C or NAS shutdown at LACC. The TDU has a complete set of Servers and these are running providing the same services as OPS (including STCA). STCA also works purely on Radar and therefore has no need for flight plan data.
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What a truly awful thing to happen. I can not express in words how I feel for those affected.
Can we please learn from this (bean counters take note) THIS IS REAL AND REAL PEOPLE GET HURT!!!!!
Safety IS the only consideration - not how cheaply you can provide a service.......one little mistake and.....there but for the grace of God etc etc.
What a pittance is a few more salaries against the deaths of children going on holiday....
God sometimes I wish I was not in this line.
Can we please learn from this (bean counters take note) THIS IS REAL AND REAL PEOPLE GET HURT!!!!!
Safety IS the only consideration - not how cheaply you can provide a service.......one little mistake and.....there but for the grace of God etc etc.
What a pittance is a few more salaries against the deaths of children going on holiday....
God sometimes I wish I was not in this line.
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Lon More, you say that TCAS not being fitted to the Russian a/c is irrelevent in this case. If it had a functioning TCAS, then it would have co-ordinated an RA with the DHL, and had both RAs been obeyed, then it would have prevented this accident. TCAS RAs should always be obeyed, even if contrary to an ATC demand.
Two questions : can anyone confirm whether the Russian a/c was TCAS equipped? It may have been inoperative.
Also, whilst it is not mandatory for RVSM, I thought TCAS was mandatory in European airspace - is there a 'lead in' time to allow operators to modify there a/c, or should they all have it by now. Perhaps it ought to become a requirement in RVSM.
Seems a bit worrying if there was only 50 secs or so allowed to resolve the known conflict. We all know that blocked frequencies, pilots dialling the wrong frequency up, or pilots not hearing instructions happen every day - and can easily take minutes to resolve.
I hope we can all (pilots and controllers) learn lessons from this
and make sure it doesn't happen again - next time it could be over Manchester etc with even worse consequences. I hope this will change the way that controllers and the infratructure are being treated and run right now, and should be a wake up call for all.
Two questions : can anyone confirm whether the Russian a/c was TCAS equipped? It may have been inoperative.
Also, whilst it is not mandatory for RVSM, I thought TCAS was mandatory in European airspace - is there a 'lead in' time to allow operators to modify there a/c, or should they all have it by now. Perhaps it ought to become a requirement in RVSM.
Seems a bit worrying if there was only 50 secs or so allowed to resolve the known conflict. We all know that blocked frequencies, pilots dialling the wrong frequency up, or pilots not hearing instructions happen every day - and can easily take minutes to resolve.
I hope we can all (pilots and controllers) learn lessons from this
and make sure it doesn't happen again - next time it could be over Manchester etc with even worse consequences. I hope this will change the way that controllers and the infratructure are being treated and run right now, and should be a wake up call for all.
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Let's stop this rubbish about TCAS. If one aircraft is fitted, and the other has a functioning altitude reporting transponder, then they 'should not' hit.
If both have TCAS, the RAs will be co-ordinated, and they 'should not' hit.
If all pilots have always reacted correctly to TCAS RAs, then my name is Graham Norton. Too little training, and of the wrong type, has led to enormously widespread mis-understanding of TCAS by those involved in its use.
Now if the TCAS action was downlinked to ATC and linked into STCA, in order to allow controllers to back-up the TCAS RA guidance, THAT would be a step forward.
Mind you that's like saying that TCAS shouldn't be necessary. It wasn't, until recently. Now, it's preventing collisions every day. Just not on July 1st.
All this analysis aside, let's not forget the families who are left behind. They don't know enough about this business to achieve a change. We do, and if we can bear their loss in mind, we can take steps in the right direction.
If both have TCAS, the RAs will be co-ordinated, and they 'should not' hit.
If all pilots have always reacted correctly to TCAS RAs, then my name is Graham Norton. Too little training, and of the wrong type, has led to enormously widespread mis-understanding of TCAS by those involved in its use.
Now if the TCAS action was downlinked to ATC and linked into STCA, in order to allow controllers to back-up the TCAS RA guidance, THAT would be a step forward.
Mind you that's like saying that TCAS shouldn't be necessary. It wasn't, until recently. Now, it's preventing collisions every day. Just not on July 1st.
All this analysis aside, let's not forget the families who are left behind. They don't know enough about this business to achieve a change. We do, and if we can bear their loss in mind, we can take steps in the right direction.
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more bad news
Evening
Newsnight has just quoted Russia as saying they had
the TCAS turned off for maintanance
and swiss still saying they had an unauthorisied break
Yet we all breathe a sigh of relief
Thank God this wasn't here here in the UK
(sorry condolences to all the families)
MM
Newsnight has just quoted Russia as saying they had
the TCAS turned off for maintanance
and swiss still saying they had an unauthorisied break
Yet we all breathe a sigh of relief
Thank God this wasn't here here in the UK
(sorry condolences to all the families)
MM
More than just an ATCO
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BmPilot Read the much more comprehensive posts in the Reporting Points Forum. Both aircraft were TCAS/RVSM compliant.
I was merely pointing out that the statement made was irrelevant when the biggest "offenders" are also the lawmakers.
I was merely pointing out that the statement made was irrelevant when the biggest "offenders" are also the lawmakers.
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Terrifying for the controller who had to watch it unfold, terrifying for the pilots scrambling for an adequate resolution which was never forthcoming. We all know controllers make mistakes. We all know pilots make mistakes. We all know TCAS makes mistakes. When all facts are brought forth the correct action must be taken. There is no room for complacency from controllers, pilots, engineers, management...we are a team...we protect lives...priority number 1.
My thoughts and prayers go out to all involved...
My thoughts and prayers go out to all involved...
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I think there are some other messages that management need to take on board while they frantically try to find a controller or dead flight crew to pin the blame on.
Spotting conflicts and acting in good time is 'bread-and-butter' controlling (although I don't know what conditions were affecting the controller in charge when it happened). Yet a lot is being spoken about the Medium-term conflict detection being off. Don't Skyguide use strips or some sort of electronic data presentation? In which case couldn't the controller spot to a/c at 360?
Have the Skyguide management procured a system that ultimately de-skills the controller? Has use of the system left the controller without his/her bread-and-butter skills? Maybe management should be prepared to hold up their hand and share responsibility for decisions made a long-time ago, probably on the basis of financial (i.e. staffing) grounds, that may have contributed to this terrible tragedy.
NATS is looking at a variety of controller aides that will ultimately relegate the controller to the role of monitor. These may make us more efficient and safe, but without a fall-back mode. Let's hope management stop chasing the profit motive and consider the implications for controller skill.
If they don't, let's hope they start to take responsibility for their roles in any future incident.
Spotting conflicts and acting in good time is 'bread-and-butter' controlling (although I don't know what conditions were affecting the controller in charge when it happened). Yet a lot is being spoken about the Medium-term conflict detection being off. Don't Skyguide use strips or some sort of electronic data presentation? In which case couldn't the controller spot to a/c at 360?
Have the Skyguide management procured a system that ultimately de-skills the controller? Has use of the system left the controller without his/her bread-and-butter skills? Maybe management should be prepared to hold up their hand and share responsibility for decisions made a long-time ago, probably on the basis of financial (i.e. staffing) grounds, that may have contributed to this terrible tragedy.
NATS is looking at a variety of controller aides that will ultimately relegate the controller to the role of monitor. These may make us more efficient and safe, but without a fall-back mode. Let's hope management stop chasing the profit motive and consider the implications for controller skill.
If they don't, let's hope they start to take responsibility for their roles in any future incident.
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Re TCAS
NorthernSky
BMPilot21
I am not a pilot, therefore the basics of TCAS aside, I will not pretend to understand company requirements etc. However, TCAS is not infallible and it may be worth looking at the thread on this Forum titled nasty incident and in particular the posts by Capt Pit Bull.
It shows how easily these perfect sytems can be fooled!!
BMPilot21
I am not a pilot, therefore the basics of TCAS aside, I will not pretend to understand company requirements etc. However, TCAS is not infallible and it may be worth looking at the thread on this Forum titled nasty incident and in particular the posts by Capt Pit Bull.
It shows how easily these perfect sytems can be fooled!!
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G45G3
Careful - CPB's very informative post speaks nothing of anything being fooled. The TCAS, within its operational constraints, is determining/negotiating a course of action to achieve minimum separation based on information continuously available to it and can, if calculated necessary, reverse it's decision - one possible reason why... one or both crews didn't follow (or were slow to follow) an issued RA. Hesitation because of momentary confusion serves only to reduce the margin of separation. In fact ARINC pointed out at NBAA last year that operational data indicates that typical RA response is slower and weaker than that assumed by TCAS resulting in less than desired separation being achieved.
An update on TCAS v7 - ARINC
TCAS may be your last resort when the system and "see and avoid" aren't working for you - like in the middle of the night over Lake Constance (God rest their souls in peace).
Careful - CPB's very informative post speaks nothing of anything being fooled. The TCAS, within its operational constraints, is determining/negotiating a course of action to achieve minimum separation based on information continuously available to it and can, if calculated necessary, reverse it's decision - one possible reason why... one or both crews didn't follow (or were slow to follow) an issued RA. Hesitation because of momentary confusion serves only to reduce the margin of separation. In fact ARINC pointed out at NBAA last year that operational data indicates that typical RA response is slower and weaker than that assumed by TCAS resulting in less than desired separation being achieved.
Improper response, lack of responses or slow response to RAs continue to result in aircraft getting closer than desired.
TCAS may be your last resort when the system and "see and avoid" aren't working for you - like in the middle of the night over Lake Constance (God rest their souls in peace).
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information please
Hello,
I am new here. A very close family friend was on board one of the aircraft that went down in Germany on July 1rst and I am trying to get a few answers. I have asked this question in other forum's but have yet to get an answer that makes any sense so I am trying here.
I used to be a very frequent flyer on business and on many occasions (pre 9/11) was invited to the flight deck on many aircraft, on many airlines, and even had an opportunity to observe landings and take-offs.
On these occasions I learned a little bit, and one thing that made me feel very safe was what a little screen that showed other aircraft in the vicinity. You folks have an acronym for it but I can't remeber what it is called. I remember one Captain telling me that it was adjustable, and could be tuned for various distances from the aircraft. You used a longer range when at altitude, and a closer range on approach.
If the two aircraft had this gizmo set to maximum range - how much notice (in distance or time) would they have received from this on-board anti-collision equipment.
Thanks for your help.
I am new here. A very close family friend was on board one of the aircraft that went down in Germany on July 1rst and I am trying to get a few answers. I have asked this question in other forum's but have yet to get an answer that makes any sense so I am trying here.
I used to be a very frequent flyer on business and on many occasions (pre 9/11) was invited to the flight deck on many aircraft, on many airlines, and even had an opportunity to observe landings and take-offs.
On these occasions I learned a little bit, and one thing that made me feel very safe was what a little screen that showed other aircraft in the vicinity. You folks have an acronym for it but I can't remeber what it is called. I remember one Captain telling me that it was adjustable, and could be tuned for various distances from the aircraft. You used a longer range when at altitude, and a closer range on approach.
If the two aircraft had this gizmo set to maximum range - how much notice (in distance or time) would they have received from this on-board anti-collision equipment.
Thanks for your help.