I think there are some other messages that management need to take on board while they frantically try to find a controller or dead flight crew to pin the blame on.
Spotting conflicts and acting in good time is 'bread-and-butter' controlling (although I don't know what conditions were affecting the controller in charge when it happened). Yet a lot is being spoken about the Medium-term conflict detection being off. Don't Skyguide use strips or some sort of electronic data presentation? In which case couldn't the controller spot to a/c at 360?
Have the Skyguide management procured a system that ultimately de-skills the controller? Has use of the system left the controller without his/her bread-and-butter skills? Maybe management should be prepared to hold up their hand and share responsibility for decisions made a long-time ago, probably on the basis of financial (i.e. staffing) grounds, that may have contributed to this terrible tragedy.
NATS is looking at a variety of controller aides that will ultimately relegate the controller to the role of monitor. These may make us more efficient and safe, but without a fall-back mode. Let's hope management stop chasing the profit motive and consider the implications for controller skill.
If they don't, let's hope they start to take responsibility for their roles in any future incident.