Lon More, you say that TCAS not being fitted to the Russian a/c is irrelevent in this case. If it had a functioning TCAS, then it would have co-ordinated an RA with the DHL, and had both RAs been obeyed, then it would have prevented this accident. TCAS RAs should always be obeyed, even if contrary to an ATC demand.
Two questions : can anyone confirm whether the Russian a/c was TCAS equipped? It may have been inoperative.
Also, whilst it is not mandatory for RVSM, I thought TCAS was mandatory in European airspace - is there a 'lead in' time to allow operators to modify there a/c, or should they all have it by now. Perhaps it ought to become a requirement in RVSM.
Seems a bit worrying if there was only 50 secs or so allowed to resolve the known conflict. We all know that blocked frequencies, pilots dialling the wrong frequency up, or pilots not hearing instructions happen every day - and can easily take minutes to resolve.
I hope we can all (pilots and controllers) learn lessons from this
and make sure it doesn't happen again - next time it could be over Manchester etc with even worse consequences. I hope this will change the way that controllers and the infratructure are being treated and run right now, and should be a wake up call for all.