Atsocas
Agree entirely with the previous four posts. It seems that the proposals are entirely driven by the users' demands without consideration of the practicalities.
When pilots under a Basic Service realise its inadequacy, they will be requesting an upgrade, and when VFR pilots realise that they can request Deconfliction Service, standby for rapid increase in workload - or the latter being refused and the pilots stuck with an inadequate level of service in which the passing of traffic information is actively discouraged.
There seems to be little consideration of how all this sits in the context of a Class G approach radar unit.
When pilots under a Basic Service realise its inadequacy, they will be requesting an upgrade, and when VFR pilots realise that they can request Deconfliction Service, standby for rapid increase in workload - or the latter being refused and the pilots stuck with an inadequate level of service in which the passing of traffic information is actively discouraged.
There seems to be little consideration of how all this sits in the context of a Class G approach radar unit.
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"in which the passing of traffic information is actively discouraged."
unless there’s a risk of collision , so all tracks will need to be monitored
to ensure no risk exists
Super, Giant leap forward
unless there’s a risk of collision , so all tracks will need to be monitored
to ensure no risk exists
Super, Giant leap forward
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presumably it follows logically that no service at all is even less appropriate for flight in IMC...
Since FIS and RIS (or Basic and Traffic Services) rely on the pilot using visual separation, I would think it was blindingly obvious that these services are not appropriate for flight in IMC. It worries me that people seem to think this statement is a surprise.
What this statement does now make clear is; if a pilot gets airborne into Class G airspce knowing (or having a very good idea) that he will be flying in IMC, he really needs to consider the implications of the controller being unable to offer a RAS (or Deconfliction service).
I think this is a great step forward for controllers as it makes clear that the risk assessment of flying in class G and IMC lies firmly with the pilot (or airline operator). I think it will lead to more formal agreements between operators and ANSPs so that either airlines stop trying to take advantage of higher risk OCAS routings or that 'agreed routes' will be used, where higher levels of service are likely. It follows that the military are likely to be key players in these discussions.
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""in which the passing of traffic information is actively discouraged."
unless there’s a risk of collision , so all tracks will need to be monitored
to ensure no risk exists
Super, Giant leap forward "
A pertinent warning is only going to be passed if the controller/FISO identifies there is a definite risk of collision; however, the pilot remains wholly responsible whether a warning has been passed or not. There is nothing in the document that implies tracks will have to be monitored under Basic Service, so please try to avoid adding clauses that dont exist. What this does do is attempt to clarify the difference that should exist between the lowest level of service and the next one up that includes specific traffic information and hopefully moves away from the FRISing that we get today that was identified as one of the main issues in the phase one report. This is also adequately explained in the RIA document available as part of the consultation pack.
unless there’s a risk of collision , so all tracks will need to be monitored
to ensure no risk exists
Super, Giant leap forward "
A pertinent warning is only going to be passed if the controller/FISO identifies there is a definite risk of collision; however, the pilot remains wholly responsible whether a warning has been passed or not. There is nothing in the document that implies tracks will have to be monitored under Basic Service, so please try to avoid adding clauses that dont exist. What this does do is attempt to clarify the difference that should exist between the lowest level of service and the next one up that includes specific traffic information and hopefully moves away from the FRISing that we get today that was identified as one of the main issues in the phase one report. This is also adequately explained in the RIA document available as part of the consultation pack.
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[A pertinent warning is only going to be passed if the controller/FISO identifies there is a definite risk of collision
That's ok then if I get really busy ,I'll just ask the cleaner
" Be a love and keep an eye on that one for me "
That's ok then if I get really busy ,I'll just ask the cleaner
" Be a love and keep an eye on that one for me "
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@Vick11
How would you know if a collision risk exists if the tracks are not monitored
im not saying this is a bad thing , just its what we do already
DTUP
How would you know if a collision risk exists if the tracks are not monitored
im not saying this is a bad thing , just its what we do already
DTUP
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DTUP:
That's what strikes me most about the proposals. The main difference between FIS and Basic, as I see it, is that while FIS only provides traffic info when there's a self-evident collision risk, Basic also provides "generic traffic information". But this is exactly what controllers at many radar-equipped units already do - e.g. "multiple contacts observed in the xxxx area, believed to be gliders, keep a good lokout". Backing this shift is the move from FIS being officially non-radar ("pilots must be left in no doubt that they are not receiving a radar service"), to Basic using whatever info the controller has access to, including radar. Some units deliberately don't provide even generic traffic info under a FIS - they take a literal view of MATS Part 1. But the shift to provision of generic traffic info under a Basic Service will surely lead to an increased workload for controllers because pilots will now expect radar-based generic traffic info.
The other area I can see causing difficulties is the notion that a Deconfliction Service can be provided to departing aircraft climbing to MSA and approaching aircraft descending below MSA. To be fair, this was already a grey area - an aircraft on an instrument approach in Class G which has been transferred to tower is still formally being monitored by approach - but the proposals don't, it seems to me, clarify things. If an aircraft is on a Deconfliction Service and has established on the ILS and been transferred to Tower, then pop-up conflicting traffic appears, the terms of the Deconfliction Service suggest that pilots will expect to be separated from that conflict. The draft CAP 774 proposes that there will then be an RT exchange including asking if they're happy to continue, then if not, warnings about terrain. Sounds messy. And if they've already transferred to Tower will they be sent back to approach, or is the reality that all they can do is tell Tower to tell them to go around?
NS
its what we do already
The other area I can see causing difficulties is the notion that a Deconfliction Service can be provided to departing aircraft climbing to MSA and approaching aircraft descending below MSA. To be fair, this was already a grey area - an aircraft on an instrument approach in Class G which has been transferred to tower is still formally being monitored by approach - but the proposals don't, it seems to me, clarify things. If an aircraft is on a Deconfliction Service and has established on the ILS and been transferred to Tower, then pop-up conflicting traffic appears, the terms of the Deconfliction Service suggest that pilots will expect to be separated from that conflict. The draft CAP 774 proposes that there will then be an RT exchange including asking if they're happy to continue, then if not, warnings about terrain. Sounds messy. And if they've already transferred to Tower will they be sent back to approach, or is the reality that all they can do is tell Tower to tell them to go around?
NS
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“What this statement does now make clear is; if a pilot gets airborne into Class G airspace knowing (or having a very good idea) that he will be flying in IMC, he really needs to consider the implications of the controller being unable to offer a RAS (or Deconfliction service).
I think this is a great step forward for controllers as it makes clear that the risk assessment of flying in class G and IMC lies firmly with the pilot (or airline operator).”
With due respect GW you sound like a policy man, not an active controller. Have you provided ATSOCAS recently? In the civil world it is mostly provided to GA, not airlines though your comments appear to confirm that this process is designed as if airlines are the focus. The reality is that the majority of pilots out there jump into their aircraft and hope for the best. Does anyone really believe most of the pilots who avail themselves of these services understand exactly what’s going on, let alone will do any kind of risk assessment? The odd airline might but mostly we provide this to GA, who will be as confused as ever. Great step forward, I think not.
I think this is a great step forward for controllers as it makes clear that the risk assessment of flying in class G and IMC lies firmly with the pilot (or airline operator).”
With due respect GW you sound like a policy man, not an active controller. Have you provided ATSOCAS recently? In the civil world it is mostly provided to GA, not airlines though your comments appear to confirm that this process is designed as if airlines are the focus. The reality is that the majority of pilots out there jump into their aircraft and hope for the best. Does anyone really believe most of the pilots who avail themselves of these services understand exactly what’s going on, let alone will do any kind of risk assessment? The odd airline might but mostly we provide this to GA, who will be as confused as ever. Great step forward, I think not.
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Grumpy, I don't know what I did you gain your respect, but thanks! I am indeed an active controller. I work at an en-route centre, but not on a sector that provides a great deal of ATSOCAS. Although I have provided both RIS and RAS in the past month (not because I accidently vectored someone OCAS before you start!).
The number of commercial flights prepared to operate OCAS is certainly on the increase - BAW operate a Shuttle to St. Mawgan!
And that is why this review is much needed.
Private pilots regularly make go/no go decisions on their flights, but commercial pilots flying into or out of bases OCAS don't get that choice unless it's a tech issue - they've got to fly the schedule. That's why I said it should make operators think a bit more about what they are sending their pilots into.
I believe that one airline is already thinking about changing some planned routes, following recent discussions about the level of ATSOCAS that can be offered to them on the south coast.
In the civil world it is mostly provided to GA, not airlines
The reality is that the majority of pilots out there jump into their aircraft and hope for the best. Does anyone really believe most of the pilots who avail themselves of these services understand exactly what’s going on, let alone will do any kind of risk assessment?
Private pilots regularly make go/no go decisions on their flights, but commercial pilots flying into or out of bases OCAS don't get that choice unless it's a tech issue - they've got to fly the schedule. That's why I said it should make operators think a bit more about what they are sending their pilots into.
I believe that one airline is already thinking about changing some planned routes, following recent discussions about the level of ATSOCAS that can be offered to them on the south coast.
Last edited by Goldfish Watcher; 20th Sep 2007 at 19:44.
The reality is that the majority of pilots out there jump into their aircraft and hope for the best. Does anyone really believe most of the pilots who avail themselves of these services understand exactly what’s going on, let alone will do any kind of risk assessment?
As a grossly unfair generalisation, I think ATCOs tend to overestimate the reliability of visual avoidance in good VMC, and overestimate the likelihood of collision between random tracks in IMC (loss of standard separation may mean Game Over on your tube but it doesn't necessarily spill any blood). Hence it might seem "obvious" to ATCOs that a service less than Deconfliction is unsuitable for flight in IMC, but I think the reality is a little different.
I've spent many hours flying on solidly IMC days in class G with a RIS -- it's delightfully peaceful, and in the unlikely event that traffic is called, I can usually make a small adjustment to mitigate any risk of collision.
Unfortunately, I've spent many more hours flying on beautifully VMC days in class G with a RIS and/or RAS. The workload, from time to time, is through the roof. I'm lucky if I sight 50% of the contacts called, even when they get quite close, and there are plenty of aircraft that aren't called at all, perhaps without a transponder? These are the days when I really need your help to work out what to do to manage the risk with turns or level changes, because there's no way that I can guarantee that I'll see the one that's going to hit me in time to do anything about it.
The traffic-density factor outweighs any met-condition factor in determining the real risk.
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@dont tell em pike
I would say the point is you might not notice a risk of collision because there is no requirement for anyone to monitor the flight of an aircraft under Basic Service and the pilot must not expect any traffic information, generic or pertinent warning. What this does do though is answer a Duty of Care issue whereby the controller/FISO has some information that he has the capacity to associate with a definite risk of collision and has the time and priority level to be able to pass a pertinent warning. The only alternative is to say you should not pass a warning and sit and watch a merge at the same height and say nothing. I cannot believe there is a controller alive who would advocate that stance. However, what it also attempts to do is answer some of the conundrum whereby controllers feel they are currently obliged to tell FIS tracks of everything else in the sky - 'just in case'. That has led to the the position where some units pretty much provide a RIS when the pilot asks for a FIS and some units where FIS is provided in accordance with current regulations whereby only definite risks are passed. That is confusing for the customer and I believe is what these proposals are trying to address.
Lets all do the same thing has got to be good?
I would say the point is you might not notice a risk of collision because there is no requirement for anyone to monitor the flight of an aircraft under Basic Service and the pilot must not expect any traffic information, generic or pertinent warning. What this does do though is answer a Duty of Care issue whereby the controller/FISO has some information that he has the capacity to associate with a definite risk of collision and has the time and priority level to be able to pass a pertinent warning. The only alternative is to say you should not pass a warning and sit and watch a merge at the same height and say nothing. I cannot believe there is a controller alive who would advocate that stance. However, what it also attempts to do is answer some of the conundrum whereby controllers feel they are currently obliged to tell FIS tracks of everything else in the sky - 'just in case'. That has led to the the position where some units pretty much provide a RIS when the pilot asks for a FIS and some units where FIS is provided in accordance with current regulations whereby only definite risks are passed. That is confusing for the customer and I believe is what these proposals are trying to address.
Lets all do the same thing has got to be good?
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No offence meant GW. The point you make about commercial flying outside CAS is a fair one but is it relevant? The issue of risk assessing commercial operations is a separate issue from a major change to ATSOCAS. Commercial operators should do it anyway and the CAA should insist on it. It is relatively easy for an operator to do that and then insist that appropriate operating procedures are adopted. That they do not is a disgrace. That failure, however, is not the reason for changing ATSOCAS (unless you know something we don’t). The reason for changing ATSOCAS is to remove confusion and errors of application.
My point is that the vast majority of ATSOCAS provided by civil controllers is down in the boondocks to thousands of light aircraft daily. Those pilots will not do risk assessments and will not change the way they operate. They will be even more confused than now. What is needed is education, the correct application of the present rules and the sort of clarification of responsibilities contained in CAP774. What we will get is a huge shuffling of deckchairs and even more confusion. If people are confused now, after 20 years, do we really believe this will change anything?
My point is that the vast majority of ATSOCAS provided by civil controllers is down in the boondocks to thousands of light aircraft daily. Those pilots will not do risk assessments and will not change the way they operate. They will be even more confused than now. What is needed is education, the correct application of the present rules and the sort of clarification of responsibilities contained in CAP774. What we will get is a huge shuffling of deckchairs and even more confusion. If people are confused now, after 20 years, do we really believe this will change anything?
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I think most pilots understand that different units will interpret things differently, and different controllers at the same unit will also have different approaches. I don't expect the new rules will change that. But for commercial flights outside CAS it's reasonable for them to expect some consistency and predictability. As part of the safety case approach now required by CAA it seems to me that at the very least the airline's Ops Manager or Chief Pilot should head along to the relevant Area Centre and LARS unit(s) with a copy of their Ops Manual under his arm, so both sides know what's going on. Again, this is irrespective of whether a new ATSOCAS system is introduced.
NS
NS
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Chevrons suggestion of only 2 services sounds quite a good place to be (I'm too young to have experienced it before). I wouldn't call both services RAS though, sounds a recipe for confusion.
Last edited by VectorLine; 22nd Sep 2007 at 17:07.
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"what it also attempts to do is answer some of the conundrum whereby controllers feel they are currently obliged to tell FIS tracks of everything else in the sky"
But does it ? if this really was the intention then "listening watch" or "alerting service" would have been more appropriate , the conflicting traffic issue is still mandated and will still need to be applied , in whatever form the controller thinks most appropriate in any given situation
That said i do like the bit about not vectoring a RIS (sorry the artist formerly known as RIS) towards an unknown contact , lovely idea , adopted by just about everybody some time ago
DTUP
But does it ? if this really was the intention then "listening watch" or "alerting service" would have been more appropriate , the conflicting traffic issue is still mandated and will still need to be applied , in whatever form the controller thinks most appropriate in any given situation
That said i do like the bit about not vectoring a RIS (sorry the artist formerly known as RIS) towards an unknown contact , lovely idea , adopted by just about everybody some time ago
DTUP
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The problem with "Listening Watch" is it might imply the controller/FISO will "Watch" the aircraft and this takes us further down that monitoring line. Another one is Flight Following, but again it has potential implicated service.
As for Alerting Service that is provided throughout the FIR irrespective of any air traffic service that is provided in accordance with ICAO procedures. The proposals do make that clear.
As for Alerting Service that is provided throughout the FIR irrespective of any air traffic service that is provided in accordance with ICAO procedures. The proposals do make that clear.
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@Vick11
you've missed my point , i don't care what its called. Its the content i'm interested in and from what i've seen so far this review raises as many questions as it answers (see previous 3 pages).
DTUP
you've missed my point , i don't care what its called. Its the content i'm interested in and from what i've seen so far this review raises as many questions as it answers (see previous 3 pages).
DTUP