Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC

[barit1]

Re: post #1745

Thanks, Brian. A lot of us were "right there" with Sully while reading that outstanding story. Whether or not the word "Hero" applies, he and Jeff Skiles were using all their experience to make the best of the situation.

There comes a time you have to forget everything else, and just fly the damn airplane. :ok:

[misd-agin]

re: post #1745

Folks were trumpeting CA Sullenberger's glider epxerience. He, in his own words, states that he doesn't think the flying experience transfers and it was a long time ago.

Every well planned descent is an idle power glide to a given point(ie, stablized approach criteria, etc).

In the right airspace, it's possible to get idle power descents over 120 n.m., and as high as 135 n.m. (+/-).

Having a slight dogleg to final allows the best profile -

Low on energy turn towards a closer in final.

High on energy, turn slightly away(using speedbrakes is cheating). :=

[bubbers44]

I think the sailplane experience of landing would give you confidence in a powered airplane that lost all power being able to land it. It probably didn't have a lot to do with his success in the Hudson but it couldn't hurt. He did a great job and all of his prior experience obviously helped.

[4PW's]

You're right, sailplane (?) experience probably didn't hurt.

And if Sullly had salmon and scrambled eggs for breakfast, that probably would have helped, too.

What do you think, Bubbers?

[Airfix1]

Take a look at the photos, #2 engine appears to be in surprisingly good condition.
Pay attention to the nose cowl and fan blades, I have been invloved in the aftermath of several bird strikes from a maintenance perspective, quite common to replace nose cowls and fan blades, and this on engines that continued to run quite nicely.
I find it hard to believe that this engine had an encounter with Canada geese.

[lomapaseo]

Airfix1

I find it hard to believe that this engine had an encounter with Canada geese

We've been through this long ago in this thread i.e. barit1 etc. and myself.

Yes it is true that large birds mangle fan blades. However that is dependent on the bird entering the engine as a whole bird and not just broken up into small bits by the inlet cowl.

I expect that when the public hearing starts that additional data will come out clarifying what damage many pounds of the bird guts did cause behind the fan (I'm still hoping for a beer bet with barit1 :)

[barit1]

You're on, dude.

A case of Christian Moerlein (http://christianmoerlein.com/site.php) says the primary damage will be corncobbed HP compressors, rendering the beasts inoperable above some subidle cycle.

And no, I still have no inside dope. Just a lunchbunch of old-time hammer-and-tongs engineers with a century or two of field experience. :cool:

[SeenItAll]

See this news article about longer piece written by aviation writer William Langewiesche suggesting that flight control laws written into A320 software were more responsible for the successful result than the pilot.

Vanity Fair: Did Sully Sullenberger Land in the Hudson? Or Did the Plane Land Itself? - The Middle Seat Terminal - WSJ (http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2009/05/07/did-sully-sullenberger-land-in-the-hudson-or-did-the-plane-land-itself/)

Do the pilots out there think that if Sully had kept his hands completely off the controls, the result would be the same?

[Final 3 Greens]

Whether the aircraft landed itself or was hand flown seems to me, as a PPL, to be missing the point.

What resulted in a happy outcome was first class decision making.

if the automatics can do a better job, then let them do it, it does not denigrate the skill of the PIC one iota, IMHO.

Listen to the ATC tapes, Sullenberger is decisive and clear - I take my hat off to his ability to analyse the situation and make the right calls.

[bubbers44]

Can you imagine that magic A320 computer slowing to best L/D and just setting up a sink rate until impact. Depending what power was being generated the sink rate would have probably been 1500 fpm or more. Sully was able to manage his energy and flaps to touch down with practically no sink rate allowing everyone to survive. He would have been just as successful in a Boeing 737 without all the magic.

[FrequentSLF]

Taken from the same article of Vanity fair

In the cabin were three female flight attendants who were quintessential also, and not in the Singapore Airlines style.

I found also this statement a bit overboard...it suggesting that Singapore Airlines FA are not up to the task? There has been reports of a crew member to loose her life trying to help passengers. Whether that is truth or not I found that such comment is really insulting the "Singapore Girls".

FSLF

[daikilo]

Bubbers44,

For yr first sentence, probably yes.
For the second and third, I await the outcome of the investigations, but it is not clear to me that water contact was at 25 ft/s.
Your fourth sentence raises an interesting question.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

I have avoided all the usual attempts at humour.

In general my experience with SIN girls is that they like EK Girls are highly professional, and perhaps not had 35 years experience, are up to any task.

Currently operating with two X EK, and one X SIN, and would not swop them for any or their US carriers compatriots.

Now for the funnies.......................ok perhaps later.

[misd-agin]

1500' FPM sink? I doubt it's that high. Clean, 250KIAS idle descent is typically around 1300' FPM. Coming down the glide slope, at 180 KIAS (+/-), Flaps 5, is under 1000' FPM.

Granted, both examples are with idle power and no drag from damaged or windmilling engines, but IMO it's probably less than 1500' FPM.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

Jesus Christ - I Captain this aircraft type and if I did as good a job as Sully I'd be pretty happy.

Quit second guessing. Quit the hindsight.

Good job. Good crew. Good airline.


WWW

[Latearrival]

Geese....what geese? It's clear that Sully staged the whole thing so he could write a bestseller. He wasn't worried because he knew the airplane could fly itself under all circumstances. I'm especially impressed at the way it was programmed to choose the river, miss that bridge and pick such a great location for rescue.

Well put WWW:ok:

[olaolu Jacob]

Thats a great job the PF did out there, which not everyone can do.:ok:

[Mmmayday38]

Quote from Jacob Olaolu:

"Thats a great job the PF did out there, which not everyone can do."


Yes; but 'not everyone' Jacob, has 3 hijackers on the flight forcing the issue?

[Cosmo Beauregard]

I apologize first place in case someone else has covered this issue, as I have just come across this forum. I also would like to state for the record The Flight Crew performed an amazing feat in this scenario. All of that being said, here's my comment:
I'm curious as to why some of the Fuel Savings Initives have not been called into question. Specifically in this instance, if the APU was allowed to remain operating until reaching altitude would the outcome have been different? I know MEL procedures allow APU use in flight in cases where either a generator or pnuematic supply issue arise. My understanding of the events had the F/O attempting a restart of the APU when this incredibly heavy Glider simply ran out of time and altitude. I'm interested in any comments.

[Lost in Saigon]

I don't see how the APU would have made any difference. They would still be in the river. Can you please explain?

edit: (I guess they would have a few more lights on in the cabin)

[lomapaseo]

My understanding of the events had the F/O attempting a restart of the APU when this incredibly heavy Glider simply ran out of time and altitude. I'm interested in any comments.

I have no idea what your understanding of the events are that cause you to question the APU. :confused:

[BOAC]

Well, let's all trash Cosmo for a sensible question eh?

Yes, Cosmo (and welcome here, by the way), I'm not sure of the exact attempts made by the crew (if any) to try a relight, but at the speed they were at they would have needed an APU to do it, and it is a slow thing to start when you REALLY need it. I actually think it could make a lot of sense to keep the APU running a bit longer after departure. Who knows whether a shutdown and relight MIGHT just clear an engine that has choked and spluttered to an early grave with bird debris? We are only talking around 30-50kg of fuel I guess. It is certainly the correct procedure for flameout due to Volcanic Ash ingestion. Certainly something worth bearing in mind and, as they say - 'Captain's discretion' rules the day.

Now we can both be ridiculed :)

[lomapaseo]

Now we can both be ridiculed

apparently you thought that you understood the suppositions in his question. :)

[BOAC]

Actually I just know that I understood the question and the invitation for comments - you have no other?:)

[barit1]

BOAC opines I actually think it could make a lot of sense to keep the APU running a bit longer after departure. Who knows whether a shutdown and relight MIGHT just clear an engine that has choked and spluttered to an early grave with bird debris? We are only talking around 30-50kg of fuel I guess. It is certainly the correct procedure for flameout due to Volcanic Ash ingestion.

Very true re volcanic ash, and there's a unique reason:

The ash tends to melt and "Plate" the HPT nozzle vanes with a glass-like coating. A little buildup tends to close down the flow area of the nozzle, increasing the back pressure on the compressor(s). Compressor stall (surge) is the likely result.

Shutting down the engine for a few seconds causes shock cooling, which may fracture the unwanted glass into fine particles, possibly (partially) ridding the nozzle of the problem, and permitting an airstart.

[JW411]

Well, I'm not quite sure how much volcanic ash was emanating from the nuclear power station just up the Hudson river from Manhattan, but we always kept the APU running until about 7-8,000 ft after take-off and started it up again at the same height on the way down.

It was always a comfort to know that it was already running in the background if the sh*t should hit the fan at low level.

[lomapaseo]

It was always a comfort to know that it was already running in the background if the sh*t should hit the fan at low level

Give a thought to what it really protects :confused:

Sure it's nice to have for a warm feeling, but how many actual engine flameouts occur at these low levels?

At high power including climbouts it's engine stall that spools down the engine. Stall recovery and continous ignition is the quick way to go. Shutting down an engine and then restarting it takes a long time.

I'm still patiently waiting for more data from the NTSB hearing defining exactly what happened (I can almost taste that beer bet right now :)

and barit1 I do agree with you about the volcanic ash scenario it's just that you can't always count on the flaking to work

[barit1]

BTW I have heard of the same phenomenon (a la volcanic ash) during extended running in the sandy Santa Ana winds of the So Cal bowl.

[Cosmo Beauregard]

Gentlemen, sorry for not being clear enough for all to understand. This aircraft had a history of single engine flame out on climb. It stands to reason that the crew reviewed the maintenance logs as part of their preflight procedures. I've worked Line Maintenance for 27 years. Part of my job was expanding those sometimes cryptic maintenance write ups and going through the mental exercise of playing out each one in various phases of flight to decide what critical systems are in use as well as and attitude of of the aircraft at that time.
My experience with Geese are they fly in a V formation ergo flaming out two engines by ingestion, though not impossible, is very very slim. Add to that the appearance of one engine obviously damaged by ingestion yet the other not showing the same damage in spite of high speed water landing. I won't even bring up the fact that it's kind of late in the migration window for a large concentration of "Canadian Geese" to be hanging out in NYC. (Shopping maybe?)
Once again, not taking anything from the performance of the flight crew, if the APU was left running and if the remaining engine simply flamed out, the F/O would be able to attempt a re-light of that engine. My point was simply, Were they setup for this Miracle Landing purely by a company directed Fuel Saving Program. Much can happen in aircraft attitude changes especially in first and second segment climb operations.
Just throwing it out there to satisfy my own curiosity. Nothing more.-- Cosmo.....................

[lomapaseo]

Cosmo

Now I see what was on your mind.

The issue seems to be the presumption of "flame-out".

Let's be careful about this. A true flame-out implies the burner going unlit and the engines spooling down to windmill. It is extremely rare except in cases of fuel starvation. Yes if so it does require a time consuming restart procedure.

Birds are not likely to cause such a flame out. In most cases it is the pilots decision to turn off the flame to secure a misbehaving engine.

While I'm not a 100% sure yet in the Hudson accident it doesn't seem to me that they ever shut down the engines.

[BOAC]

Like JW, I would prefer the comfort of an APU running. If I had both engines in a sub-idle condition AND height available, I would most certainly consider closing one down and attempting an APU restart.

[Cosmo Beauregard]

I understand your point regarding the term Flame Out. My understanding of this term is its a situation where a Turbine Engine fails to continue operation due to inability to maintain flame propagation through any of a number of extinguishing events. Off the top of my head these would include: Compressor Stalls, Insufficient Airflow, Mass Water Ingestion and or Contaminated Fuel Supply. Basically anything other than a mechanical failure of the Power Plant; which would be classified as an Engine Failure.

Notice I have avoided the use of the term Engine Shutdown which would include Flight Crew operation of normal Fuel Shutoff procedures, Fire T-Handle applications and arguably Running Out of Fuel. I have never stated that the Flight Crew of U.S. Airways Flight 1549 Shutdown the Engines. Once again, my point was simply if the Flight Crew had the APU fully available at the time both engines ceased operations, would that possibly have had an impact on the situation? Specifically, provide instant Pneumatic resources to attempt a restart?

I raise this question because I feel it could have been a factor in this event. Pre-fuel conservation flight ops would not have the APU shutdown before Take off. This current procedure of shutting off the APU after Engine(s) start & restarting upon taxi-in are typical of most Operator's Fuel Saving Programs.

[lomapaseo]

Cosmo

.. (if) APU fully available at the time both engines ceased operations, would that possibly have had an impact on the situation? Specifically, provide instant Pneumatic resources to attempt a restart?


This is a time dependent judgement. If the engines have gone sub-idle and then the action might have been to turn off the fuel (crew shutdown) and start the restart procedure immediately following the ingestion. Whether you need an APU is subjective to how much altitude and airspeed can you maintain before you hit the ground.

However if the engines are still at or above idle it's a judgement call whether you try and work with a running engine or shut it down and start all over. With lots of altitude you can try several things out. At low altitude you quickly pick whatever is in your experience bank.

Maybe somebody at the NTSB hearing will ask Sully if he had an APU running or not would he have acted differently at the time (hindsight not allowed) :)

[DownIn3Green]

2 engine a/c, below 10,000 feet, he had the APU running...Unless Airbus deathcruisers are different from Boeings in this respect...

[Cosmo Beauregard]

Sub idle?, with the Power Levers near T/O Power Settings?..Problem??. ARRGHH!!! Take Airspeed and therfore Altitude out of the equation by utilizing APU supplied pneumatics while it's still spooling down.... (My only point thus far.....)
Ignition A&B.... On
Start Intiated...... Boom, (don't even look at the temps, who cares?)
Hang on......
I can only hope some in here are Twin Otter Pilots given the amount of time it takes them in Grasping (or in this case not grasping) a concept.
Adiós All!
Cosmo the Weary-Headed

[BOAC]

2 engine a/c, below 10,000 feet, he had the APU running...Unless Airbus deathcruisers are different from Boeings in this respect... - a bit of thread drift here, but can you elaborate on that? There is no Boeing procedure (737) I know of to regularly leave the APU running for take-off whereas I understand the 320 normally USES the APU for bleeds. Can a 320 driver tell me at what height it is normally shut down?

[barit1]

per Cosmo B.
I understand your point regarding the term Flame Out. My understanding of this term is its a situation where a Turbine Engine fails to continue operation due to inability to maintain flame propagation through any of a number of extinguishing events. Off the top of my head these would include: Compressor Stalls, ...

I once worked a pilot writeup of "Flameout with increasing EGT..." which of course is an oxymoron. It was a compressor stall, period (caused by sand/dust erosion) with NO flameout, but RPM rollback.

The term "flameout" is, I'm afraid, still misused by some of the aviation community, and actual flameout (oxidation ceases in the burner) is quite rare, save for fuel starvation.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't believe Sully's CFM56's ever flamed out.

[Skydrol Leak]

I can't believe you're still talking about this matter....after all this time...
Get a life...

[Dream Land]

2 engine a/c, below 10,000 feet, he had the APU running...Unless Airbus deathcruisers are different from Boeings in this respect...For what reason would it be on?

[Sky Wave]

There is no Boeing procedure (737) I know of to regularly leave the APU running for take-off whereas I understand the 320 normally USES the APU for bleeds. Can a 320 driver tell me at what height it is normally shut down?

My company has both 737's and A320's and we do not leave the APU running on either type. The only exception was on the 737 if we needed to do a bleeds off take off for performance reasons. In that case the packs would be on the APU. On the Airbus we always take off with packs off so there is no need for the APU.

I can't understand DownIn3green's point.

[Brian Abraham]

Few moments ago saw an interview with a passenger who was sitting in an exit row (so he claimed). When he realised they were headed down said he scrambled to find the briefing card on how to open the exit as he had not a clue. So much for listening to the brief and understanding your responsibilities sitting in that particular window seat. Different circumstances (smoke filled cabin on the runway) may have seen far different result if relying on this individual. Interviewer never picked up on the point.

[Obie]

Cosmo is obviously a 'wannabe pilot'...

but he's an engineer with some good knowledge!...

but he's not a pilot!...

big difference there, which he doesn't quite get!!

[Obie]

...and the reason he doesn't get it is because he has no concept of 'real time' !

When a pilot writes up a defect in the part 2, that should take 1/2 an hour to fix, the engineers take the a/c off line for a couple of hours!!!

Sully and co had about 180 seconds to solve a major problem and they did that in exemplary fashion!

Poor old Cosmo would have crashed and burnt in that time and killed himself and a couple of hundred pax!

Better stick with engineering Cosmo, and leave the flying up to the Pros!!

[Cosmo Beauregard]

Obie,

I hereby equivically state: I am not a pilot! Also, I am not, have not or will not, fault this flight crew whatsoever! From my very first posts I have praised the flight crew for their performance in this situation. Bravo! great job!

All I was trying to point out was concerning how relatively recent fuel saving procedures may have played a factor in this incident. The operator (company; in this case US Airways) decides at what point in the checklist the APU gets shutdown. Most, until recent fuel price hikes, left the APU until generally second segment climb, or initial cruise settings for two reasons:
1) incase of failures where additional electrical and or pneumatics would be an advantgeous resource for flight crews.
2) to reduce flight crew workload during critical phases of flight or flight transition.

If you feel your checklist procedure is the only way your aircraft can be operated; I suggest you leaf through your MEL under sections 21 & 36 to observe situations where the APU is left running the entire flight. If you are to Pilot a flight on an aircraft with a history of Engine Compressor Stalls, Pressurization events, or any of a number of things where additional electrical or pneumatic sources would be to your advantage; please request some additional fuel to cover the minimal APU burn through to cruise flight just to CYA. I was only trying to offer an additional resource for you to draw from while you guys do that Pilot thing.

As far as your comment about taking too long to change a part... We do whatever we can to prevent similar incidents from occuring. ***My Opinion Only***I feel they blew it in this case and didn't consider everything that could possibly go wrong with a Compressor Stalling Engine. I'm sure the mechanic was only willing to let it go to a major maintenance base where this engine was to be changed (it was headed to a major maintenance hub on this flight). We can't predict everything possible in flight, but we can try to offer you to fly with the most resources available for possible instant fault resolution.

I didn't mean to step on anyone's toes. and Obie if you wish to ignore my advice, go right ahead. It wasn't made with you in mind. Only those willing to listen. Truth is Truth regardless of how insignificant you consider engineers to be, my friend. You are responsible for safe passage of your passengers from chock out until chocks in. I an responsible for every soul who flys in this aircraft from time of repair until it becomes recycled into a beer can. Thank your engineers for taking so long trying to decifer the illogical over simplified squiggles some pilot call write ups; and considering the ramifications of this write up in all phases of flight with regard to safety, chain linked operations and yes, your workload in critical flight phases. Just because a system can be MEL'd doesn't automatically mean it gets MEL'd.

[Obie]

Good reply Cosmo! :)

[Jetney]

While not wanting to fault Capt Sully and F/O or detracting from the praise heaped unto them for the heroics, don't A320/330/340 drivers have a rule of thumb thingy that if one need to ditch ASAP, hit the ditching switch? Well in some LCCs, we do have such " memory " or " recall " action just like if a thrust reverser is inadvertantly deployed after V1 or in takeoff climb ( the manufacturers will swear IT WILL NEVER HAPPEN ), :mad: he checklist but shutdown the offending engine pronto!!

[barit1]

I think Sully demonstrated the ditchswitch is simply dead weight. :ugh:

[Cosmo Beauregard]

It's also an option, not all Airlines opted for it, and I think not many more will after this event!
Once again,
To: Captain Sullenberger & his Crew, While I realize you feel as if you were just doing your job, I don't think the same outcome would have happened with many other Crews out there! Great Job Sir!
To: The normally indifferent NYC Ferry-Boat Crews, Thanks for helping out.
(A couple of more minutes though, I'm sure Sullenberger & Crew would have figured out a way to drop his Nose Gear and then he would have taxied it up to the Boat Ramp just so his passengers would have received their Frequent Flyer Miles. The man is amazing!)

[zone]

The main reason to use an APU for take off is to improve take off performance. APU Bleed can be selected on during the line up leaving more bleed air for the engines. You would only tend to do this when the perfromance was critical.

(The other option is the checklist is to go Packs off on line upwhich achieves the same performance improvement.)

Most operators have APU Off for take off.

[BOAC]

Zone -we all know that! You have missed the whole point of Cosmo's posts!

[Obie]

Oh! Please, Nigle...grow up!

Have a re read of the last paragraph of Cosmo's post, #1794!

Then, like me, you wont waste anymore time on this moron's views!!

[WhatsaLizad?]

Zone,

Same with our ops. Cosmo means well, but really doesn't know what he's talking about.

Leave the APU on for takeoff as SOP? Unless needed for MEL or performance issues, leave it off.

Want to leave it on Cosmo? Fine. In the future we could have a 45 page thread regarding an accident where the crew aborted and burned after getting a APU fault light before V1. Pick your favorite "can of worms" off the shelf for opening at anytime Cosmo :ugh:

[precept]

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
June 4, 2009
************************************************************
UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE US AIRWAYS A-320 HUDSON
RIVER DITCHING ACCIDENT
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board today released
additional information about the Board's scheduled public
hearing on the January 2009 ditching of the US Airways A-320
into the Hudson River.

The hearing, originally scheduled for two days, has been
expanded to three. It will convene at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday,
June 9, 2009, and is expected to conclude mid-day on
Thursday, June 11. It will be held at the NTSB's Board Room
and Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington,
D.C. The room is lighted for television and a mult box is
provided for sound.
On January 15, 2009, at approximately 3:27 p.m. EST, US
Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320 bound for
Charlotte, North Carolina, incurred multiple bird strikes
during its initial departure climb from New York's La
Guardia Airport (LGA). The airplane subsequently lost thrust
to its engines and ditched in the Hudson River approximately
three and a half minutes after striking the birds and about
five minutes after leaving LGA. To date, of the five
crewmembers and 150 passengers on board, five serious
injuries have been reported.
The Safety Board will also open the public docket at the
start of the hearing. The public may view and download the
docket contents on the web under the "FOIA Reading Room" at
http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm (http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm) at that time.
The information being released is factual in nature and does
not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident.
The docket will include investigative group factual reports,
interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other
documents from the investigation. In addition, docket items
that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will
be available on the website under "Public Hearings"
The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board's efforts to
develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will
cover a wide range of safety issues including:
* Pilot training regarding ditching and forced landings on
water.
* Bird detection and mitigation efforts.
* Certification standards regarding ditching and forced
landings on water for transport-category airplanes.
* Cabin safety training, emergency procedures and equipment.
* Certification standards for bird ingestion into transport-
category airplane engines.
An agenda is posted on the Board's website at
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/agenda.htm (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/agenda.htm). A live webcast
of the proceedings will be available on the Board's website
at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm). Technical
support details are available under "Board Meetings." To
report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for
Webcast Technical Support.
Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on
Lower 10th Street, directly below L'Enfant Plaza. From
Metro, exit L'Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets
escalator, walk through shopping mall, at the CVS store (on
the left), and take escalator (on the right) down one level.
The Board room will be to your left.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************

[DLH208]

The New York Times reports about the first day of the hearing of the NTSB about the ditching in the Hudson River.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/nyregion/10usair.html?hp

[eagle21]

The NTSB have released the cockpit voice recorder transcript and the flight data recorder analysis during the currently ongoing three days hearing into the accident.

At 15:25:09 TOGA (takeoff thrust) is set and a normal departure commenced for 2 minutes, then:

15:27:10.4 HOT-1: birds.
15:27:11.0 HOT-2: whoa.
15:27:11.4 CAM: [sound of thump/thud(s) followed by shuddering sound]
15:27:12.0 HOT-2: oh #.
15:27:13.0 HOT-1: oh yeah.
15:27:13.0 CAM: [sound similar to decrease in engine noise/frequency begins]
15:27:14.0 HOT-2: uh oh.
15:27:15.0 HOT-1: we got one rol- both of 'em rolling back.
15:27:18.0 CAM: [rumbling sound begins and continues until approximately 15:28:08]
15:27:18.5 HOT-1: ignition, start.
15:27:21.3 HOT-1: I'm starting the APU.
15:27:22.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:23.2 HOT-1: my aircraft.
15:27:24.0 HOT-2: your aircraft.
15:27:24.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:25.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:26.5 FWC: priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs when the sidestick priority button is activated on the Captain's sidestick]
15:27:26.5 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:28.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:27:28.0 HOT-1: get the QRH... [Quick Reference Handbook] loss of thrust on both engines.
15:27:30.0 FWC: [sound of single chime begins and repeats at approximately 5.7 second intervals until 15:27:59]
15:27:32.9 RDO-1: mayday mayday mayday. uh this is uh Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we've lost thrust (in/on) both engines we're turning back towards LaGuardia.
15:27:42.0 DEP: ok uh, you need to return to LaGuardia? turn left heading of uh two two zero.
15:27:43.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:44.0 FWC: [sound of single chime, between the single chimes at 5.7 second intervals]
15:27:46.0 RDO-1: two two zero.
15:27:50.0 HOT-2: if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition.* ignition.
15:27:54.0 HOT-1: ignition.
15:27:55.0 HOT-2: thrust levers confirm idle.
15:27:58.0 HOT-1: idle.
15:28:02.0 HOT-2: airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don't have that.
15:28:03.0 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:28:05.0 HOT-1: we don't.
15:28:05.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine, if we can get it for you do you want to try to land runway one three?
15:28:05.0 CAM-2: if three nineteen-
15:28:10.6 RDO-1: we're unable. we may end up in the Hudson.
15:28:14.0 HOT-2: emergency electrical power... emergency generator not online.
15:28:18.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:28:19.0 HOT-1: (it’s/is) online.
15:28:21.0 HOT-2: ATC notify. squawk seventy seven hundred.
15:28:25.0 HOT-1: yeah. the left one's coming back up a little bit.
15:28:30.0 HOT-2: distress message, transmit. we did.
15:28:31.0 DEP: arright Cactus fifteen forty nine its gonna be left traffic for runway three one.
15:28:35.0 RDO-1: unable.
15:28:36.0 TCAS: traffic traffic.
15:28:36.0 DEP: okay, what do you need to land?
15:28:37.0 HOT-2: (he wants us) to come in and land on one three...for whatever.
15:28:45.0 PWS: go around. windshear ahead.
15:28:45.0 HOT-2: FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] one off, then on.
15:28:46.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen (twenty) nine runway four's available if you wanna make left traffic to runway four.
15:28:49.9 RDO-1: I'm not sure we can make any runway. uh what's over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?
15:28:55.0 DEP: ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro airport.
15:28:59.0 TCAS: monitor vertical speed.
15:29:00.0 HOT-2: no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and two confirm-
15:29:02.0 DEP: you wanna try and go to Teterboro?
15:29:03.0 RDO-1: yes.
15:29:05.0 TCAS: clear of conflict.
15:29:07.0 HOT-2: -off.
15:29:07.0 HOT-1: off.
15:29:10.0 HOT-2: wait thirty seconds.
15:29:11.0 PA-1: this is the Captain brace for impact.
15:29:14.9 GPWS: one thousand.
15:29:16.0 HOT-2: engine master two, back on.
15:29:18.0 HOT-1: back on.
15:29:19.0 HOT-2: on.
15:29:21.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine turn right two eight zero, you can land runway one at Teterboro.
15:29:21.0 CAM-2: is that all the power you got? * (wanna) number one? or we got power on number one.
15:29:25.0 RDO-1: we can't do it.
15:29:26.0 HOT-1: go ahead, try number one.
15:29:27.0 DEP: kay which runway would you like at Teterboro?
15:29:27.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 9.6 seconds ]
15:29:28.0 RDO-1: we're gonna be in the Hudson.
15:29:33.0 DEP: I'm sorry say again Cactus?
15:29:36.0 HOT-2: I put it back on.
15:29:37.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 37.4 seconds ]
15:29:37.0 HOT-1: ok put it back on... put it back on.
15:29:37.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:41.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:43.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:44.0 HOT-2: no relight.
15:29:45.4 HOT-1: ok lets go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.
15:29:45.0 EGPWS: caution. terrain.
15:29:48.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:29:48.0 HOT-2: flaps out?
15:29:49.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up.
15:29:51.0 DEP: Cactus uh....
15:29:53.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen forty nine radar contact is lost you also got Newark airport off your two o'clock in about seven miles.
15:29:55.0 EGPWS: pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up.
15:30:01.0 HOT-2: got flaps out.
15:30:03.0 HOT-2: two hundred fifty feet in the air.
15:30:04.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:30:06.0 GPWS: too low. gear.
15:30:06.0 CAM-2: hundred and seventy knots.
15:30:09.0 CAM-2: got no power on either one? try the other one.
15:30:09.0 4718: two one zero uh forty seven eighteen. I think he said he's goin in the Hudson.
15:30:11.0 HOT-1: try the other one.
15:30:13.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:14.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine uh, you still on?
15:30:15.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime begins and continues to end of recording]
15:30:15.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:16.0 HOT-2: hundred and fifty knots.
15:30:17.0 HOT-2: got flaps two, you want more?
15:30:19.0 HOT-1: no lets stay at two.
15:30:21.0 HOT-1: got any ideas?15:30:22.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine if you can uh....you got uh runway uh two nine available at Newark it'll be two o'clock and seven miles.
15:30:23.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:23.0 CAM-2: actually not.
15:30:24.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up. ["pull up" repeats until the end of the recording]
15:30:38.0 HOT-1: we're gonna brace.
15:30:38.0 HOT-2: * * switch?
15:30:40.0 HOT-1: yes.
15:30:41.1 GPWS: (fifty or thirty)
15:30:42.0 FWC: retard.
15:30:43.7 [End of Recording]
15:30:43.7 [End of Transcript]

:D To both of them

HOT-1: Hot microphone 1 (captain)
HOT-2: Hot microphone 2 (first officer)
RDO: radio transmissions from US1549
DEP: radio transmissions from La Guardia Departure Control
CAM: cockpit area microphones
4718: radio transmission from flight Eagle 4718
FWC: flight warning computer
TCAS: traffic and collision avoidance system
PWS: predicitive windshear system
GPWS: ground proximity warning system
EGPWS: enhanced ground proximity warning system

[reverserunlocked]

Good work, men. Didn't know they'd had a TCAS warning as well.

[canyonblue737]

Beautiful. :D

[Dani]

Amazing - shiver runs down my spine when I read it. Again, congratulation to the crew.

And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. In cases like these, if you make it 2 engines up to this point, you always can make it back if you lost them! Just turn immediatly back to your runway. If you are in doubt, tune your ILS and you see if you are above or below the 3 degrees. All engine out would be about 4-5 degrees depending on your configuration. You might want to have a small margin.

Dani

[lomapaseo]

Dani

Could have would have:confused: Is that an expected response from a pilot? or is aviate-navigate-communicate (which takes more time) a more likely response?

[barit1]

You might want to have a small margin.

Bull****.

With several hundred lives potentially at stake, both on board and on the ground, a small margin ain't good enough.

Besides, the GS check would only be valid AFTER you've lost a significant amount of energy doing a 180. By that time, you've run out of options.
:ugh:

[Marsh Hawk]

It's confirmed they would have made it back to LaGuardia? I haven't seen any quotes from the captain or co-pilot of that flight that says anything of the sort.

The only reference I can find is in the NY Times link posted above by DLH208 about the touchdown point being further away than the runway, evident in hindsight. Sully commented "I couldn't afford to be wrong" about returning to the airport.

I'm not sure how this translates to a confirmation that they would have made it, unless somebody's run a few simulator re-enactments on this particular flight?

[flyboymurphy]

It has been reported that the NTSB has conducted sim tests with pilots to see could they have made it back to LGA ,with a success rate of around 50%
And these pilots may probably have expected the failure or at least were aware that they were in a sim with no pressure as to the outcome. !

So , in my humble opinion, the crew here made the absolute best decision in short time with immense pressure. 50 % isnt good enough !

[Dani]

Don't get me wrong. I admire the Cactus crew and said that they did a perfect job.

The decision to ditch was only the second best though.

The only error was that they accepted the HDG 220.

My decision at this very moment would have been: "negative, turning back to La Guardia immediatly." ATC would have needed to clear the way.

The thinking of Sully (“I couldn’t afford to be wrong.”) is absolutely correct. No human being can calculate in a split second if it is enough or not. But if you did your thinking ahead (we call it anticipated decisionmaking), you don't have to do the decision when you need it. The decision is: if you can make it out on two engines, you can always make it back without. Try it out in the sim. It always works!

My "small margin" was ment for the descent planning, not for the safety thinking. It means: plan that you have a little more altitude than you might want to have. But not too much, because if you are too high it's as dangerous as too low. If it still doesn't work: Turn away and make your ditching parallel to La Guardia.

I also don't think that the ditching-decision was more than a small safety margin, because history has shown that a succesful ditching was very unlikely. They only ditched because they had no other option at that later stage. We don't know how the chances where for ditching, probably far less than 50%.

Finally I repeat that I don't want to blame anyone and mostly not the US1539 crew. I just want to share my experience to others who might once need it. The ditching worked this time. Maybe next time not.

Dani

[flyboymurphy]

good points Dani.

[barit1]

Dani, I have little doubt that a modern twin operating at low TOW and TOGA (rated) thrust will perform as you describe. But that's not how modern airliners are operated; running out of EGT margin prematurely gets pretty expensive.

Have you tried this 180 stunt on a long runway using all available Tflex (Tass, etc)? Might discover a pucker factor there. :ooh:

[Graybeard]

"And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. In cases like these, if you make it 2 engines up to this point, you always can make it back if you lost them! Just turn immediatly back to your runway. If you are in doubt, tune your ILS and you see if you are above or below the 3 degrees. All engine out would be about 4-5 degrees depending on your configuration. You might want to have a small margin.Dani"

Tune your ILS??? The ILS for the runway you just departed has the GS beam pointed behind you, not at you! Quick, what's the ILS freq for the opposite runway? Oh, if it exists, it almost assuredly turned off. Do you even know Glidleslope beam width to know how high you are? Didn't think so.

GB
Sorry, folks, for the rant.

[p51guy]

If you are not sure, don't try. Sully did it right. He knew it was an option but it could have been a disaster. Results count.

[BOAC]

I'd prefer that we drew a line under all this 'perfect hindsight' guff and moved on. Much as I dislike the release of CVRs, now that it is 'out', may I with huge respect for C Sully and his crew suggest it be kept for posterity and used as an example of 'how to do it'? I am enormously impressed.

[olster]

Sully and his crew pulled off the most amazing aeronautical feat for many a year.Any 20/20 hindsight commentary such as 'they could have made it back to LGA' highlights some of the utter,ill-informed,anonymous garbage that passes for expert opinion on pprune.

[stormin norman]

Well said BOAC.

Until it happens to you you don't know how you will react.

They did a great a great job,they all walked away and they can always get a new aircraft !

I guess Dani you have never had a total engine failure at low level for real,try it, it may just change your view on things.

[Dani]

Barit1, I agree that if you are very close to the runway you wont make it.

But still if you are max flexed, your climb gradient is higher than your gliding angle. Check your books. Most modern airliners have more than the needed 4-5°.

For a turn you need 2 minutes that means 1-2000 feets. You still have a little excess speed from climb out speed to best gliding speed. You also want to bank a little more than 30°, the faster you turn the faster you are on a inbound heading.

Checking the ILS: Means tune on your ILS (opposite direction) when climbing out. You will see if you are above a 3°. Do it every day and you get a feeling of how good you climb is on a average day.

Sorry, my thinking is not hindsight. I have tried this a few times and we have done it in the simulator (before the Hudson accident). If you don't like my reasoning, then ok. I just want to give you a set of tools. I'll promise you: The next similar accident will not turn out as well as this one, because ditching is a very dangerous thing, and they will not make it successfully. Everyone today thinks that ditching is the first option. It is not! It's the last.

Dani

[Obie]

Dani is obviously way ahead of the professional pilots who frequent this forum.

[BOAC]

Dani - I'm not really sure WHY I'm bothering to reply to you, but here goes, and statements likeAnd it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. lead me to to seriously question your claimed profile.

However, what is the point of that statement? It may well be true. So? I'm pretty sure the crew would have been mentally reviewing the progress as it went along. Looking at the timeline I cannot believe you would have committed to La G, not being 100% sure

a) what had actually happened
b) what else might fall off
c) what the implications would be if it went wrong on finals

and

d) did the trial allow for a reduced power takeoff?
f) did it assume 'normal' climb profile to 3000'?
f) has it been 'confirmed' with 2 stopped front fans?

On that last topic I can assure you that your descent profile is NOT what you think it is. I discovered that in a Harrier. I suggest you leave this topic alone?

[olster]

Obie:nice irony.BOAC:absolutely correct.Also,'increase bank angle to turn back'.Increased bank angle equates to increased drag equals higher rate of descent.It's all in 'aerodynamics for toddlers'.Sully:you and your crew did a fantastic job under extraordinarily demanding conditions.

[p51guy]

Being above a 3 degree glideslope on the opposite runway would happen on almost every takeoff but needing to make a steep 180 degree turn makes it meaningless. Also if they aren't using that runway for arrivals that day it is probably not turned on. Sully did the only thing he could to make the best of a very bad situation without making a high risk 180 to see if he could make it back to the runway.

[punkalouver]

You also want to bank a little more than 30°, the faster you turn the faster you are on a inbound heading.

Checking the ILS: Means tune on your ILS (opposite direction) when climbing out. You will see if you are above a 3°. Do it every day and you get a feeling of how good you climb is on a average day.



So on departure you are fumbling around with the ILS frequency back at the airport instead of being set up for your departure? Do you actually do this kind of stuff instead of concentrating on your departure?

And then are you supposed to land downwind on the relatively short runway?
How about some realistic statements?

[fauxpaw]

There are a lot of interesting documents on the NTSB hearing site in addition to the CVR transcript. In particular I found the flight crew interviews to be a very interesting read. A couple of examples:

from First Officer Skiles -

When asked how he liked working for the company, he said “no one likes working with the company”. He said given the alternatives it was “not so bad”.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked to compare the captain’s proficiency to other pilots he had flown with, he said it was extremely high. He said the captain’s greatest strength was that he was still “blown away” by his professionalism. He could not think of an area in which the captain could improve. When asked if he heard anyone ever complain about flying with the captain, he said he never read the captain’s name on the “bathroom wall”.

from Captain Sullenberger -

In the previous interview with Captain Sullenberger, he stated that what helped him during this situation was that he “understood the concept of management of energy”. He was asked to further explain what he meant. He said he was not specifically referring to ditching but about the entire incident. He said since the situation was so time critical, at such a low speed and altitude over populated area, with so few options, he was able to fairly quickly consider all of the alternatives he was aware of and pick the one that would lead to the best outcome. There was not a lot of time to review the options. Asked where he learned about energy management, he stated the difference between flying a smaller and larger airplane is the energy involved and the total energy was the sum of two terms – height, which represents potential energy, and kinetic energy. He said raising the nose would decrease kinetic and increase potential, and vice versa. He said it was those sorts of things that were required to successfully fly a jet because there are higher speeds and altitudes involved. He thought it was something that was gained through experience.

Playing the real time animation also reinforces how very little time was available for decisions and actions.

[Dani]

I'm really sorry I have to insist. I agree with all professionals above, that the performance of crew 1539 was outstanding. I bow myself to Sully and lift my hat. Really. I just want to share some important information about this accident or similar ones. I talked to too many pilots who think that ditching is a sure thing now and that they would act from now on like Sully did. There will be a terrible accident soon, because those kind of all engine failures happen. I know that some members in this forum don't like somebody critizising a magnificent job of a fellow professional - the same mechanism that happens when a physician experience an incident in the emergency room, or another highly qualified professional gets under fire. This is poor CRM, because we all learn from experience from others, and we shouldn't close our eyes to important facts. Even when all turned out to be good.

BOAC, I highly respect you and your contributions. But you could bring on an endless lists of if's and when's. Of course he didn't know the state of his aircraft, of the path to go, of how much time left. That's why you have to stick to rules of thumbs and schematic thinking. You are looking in hindsight (not me) if you say that the ditching was succesful, that's why it was the best solution. What would you have said when something would have turned out slightly worse? What would happen if he wouldn't have made it over George Washington Bridge? Would he have flown under? Over and stalled? What if a ship would have blocked his touchdown area? At the moment he turned on HDG 220, he didn't know where he would land, and ditching was his last option (first was Teterboro).

HDG 220 was an instruction from a ATC controller who had no idea what happened. Taking on the initiative is the most important thing in a case where time factor is critical (something Captain Sullenberger did). He could never know if he would make it to Teterboro. But he knew exactly how far away he was from LGA.

As I said, if it still wouldn't have worked out back to the TO RWY, he could have ditched in the East River (the piece of water that surrounds LGA). At the time of the birds' impact, East River was closer than Hudson River (where he ditched finally). There is also better rescue service close to an airport.

From a real professional, I would expect that you can at least accept some points of my reasoning, and don't dismiss it in globo as some weird idea. It is assured that they would have made it back. So it cannot be weird. So please, all pilots in the world: Consider at least for a short moment that it is possible for some aircraft types to return to the starting point from a certain height (e.g. above thrust reduction altitude). And, please, consider ditching always as your last option. It has worked this time. Nearly never before. Never try this in the open sea (unless you have to). Try to have a plan you sit in your cockpit at all times, try to find out what you would do at a certain time at a certain point (when you don't need it yet). Ask your friendly sim instructor for a try if session time permits.

Thanks for sacrificing your valuable time to read this post,
Dani

[BOAC]

OK, Dani, I'll bite one more time. Yes, you have a theoretical point - you are probably right that there is a very good chance of getting back to the departure end of your runway in ideal circumstances. It is the stark presentation of your 'theory' that has caused all the turmoil here. Statements like the 'second best choice', 'they could have made it back', 'not the best choice' and so on.

I think you should make a big effort to meet the good Captain. Ask him what went through his mind when he came around the corner and (luckily) had a good view of the metropolis spread out around all the option airfields.

Perhaps, as you have done now, if you had tempered your initial post considerably the reaction may have been better.

[brak]

Disclaimer: I am not a pilot (clearly), I am not even a real SLF :)

That said, I think part of the decision making process and something that is not being discussed now, may have been mitigation of negative outcome. LaGuardia airport is located in a densely populated area. An unsuccessful return would have been a disaster not only for the passengers but potentially for a large amount of people on the ground. Going into the river avoids at least significant collateral damage, if things go badly.

As far as East River goes, if you know New York, you would notice that East River is less than half the width of Hudson, is crossed by no less than 5 bridges and has a big island in the middle (so really there are two rivers right at the same lattitude where the plane eventually landed). The portion of East River near LGA that turns to the east (Hells Gate really) is even smaller and completely unsuitable for landing (barely suitable for navigation, which I know having sailed there a time or two :) ). So, East River would have been a terrible choice for ditching and almost guaranteed failure.

[Marsh Hawk]

Here is Sully's own response taken directly from the NTSB flight crew interviews (links posted on previous page just before the CVR transcript).

Asked why he felt that the river was a superior landing choice, Captain Sullenberger stated that choosing to return to LGA was an irrevocable choice, and if he had made a turn toward LGA then realized he could not make it, he would have had no other options or enough altitude to return to the river. He was told that he cleared the George Washington Bridge by 900 feet. He stated before he would make the decision to land on a runway, he would need to be sure that he could make it without landing short or long, he could line up the flight path with the runway, he could stay on the runway, and that he would have a sink rate that was survivable and would not collapse the landing gear and create a post crash fire. He thought that being a little short could have been catastrophic for those on the airplane or those on the ground. He could not afford to make the wrong decision and he was confident that he could make a successful water landing.

Thoughts on choosing river or LGA into the context of Threat and Error Management: it was clear to me based on our position, altitude and airspeed and heading away from airport and time it required me to maintain control of airplane and analyze situation that a return to LGA was not possible. We were too far away, too low and too slow for TEB. Only other option that was long enough, smooth enough, wide enough was the river.

[Will Fraser]

Sully obviously subscribes to the airman's code, 'A bird in the hand is worth two in Flatbush'

[punkalouver]

I would think full flap with no power available would lead to a high sink rate and much harder landing. Partial flap is the way to go.

[Marsh Hawk]

RazorFoundation, the Captain's reasons for choosing the flaps setting can be found in the pages of the NTSB flight crew interviews. It's the one that is seventh down from the top on this main page (the 33 page document). I just spent an engaging hour reading it myself.

CD List Of Contents (http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/default.htm)

[Will Fraser]

Complete guess, but it's possible that Sully figured some portion of the tail would contact the water first, and a shallow AoA might risk the nacelles biting first,, so the angle presented to the surface at touchdown allowed for more aluminum to hit and slow the a/c before the nose dropped. Look at the upturn of the hull at the aft break upward toward the tailcone, see if you get my 'drift'.

Will

[Marsh Hawk]

Okay, I went and found the section(on page 29) where Sully discusses why he chose the flaps setting, for those who don't feel like checking out the entire interview. I assure you though, it's worth reading in its entirety.

Asked about the flap setting selected prior to landing, Captain Sullenberger said that he called for flaps 2 and believed that they achieved that because he saw FO Skiles move the flap handle, felt the flap extension begin and the aircraft made the movement and sound that the flap extension usually made, and he observed on his PFD on the speed tape that a lower speed was possible. Asked why he made the decision to continue the landing with Flaps 2, Captain Sullenberger stated that there were operational advantages to using Flaps 2 that became obvious to him. He knew that going to Flaps 3 would not give him much more of an advantage in terms of lowering the stall speed and drag would have increased. He said he was concerned about having enough energy remaining to successfully flare the airplane and reduce the rate of descent sufficiently for landing. From his experience, Flaps 2 would give him a slightly higher nose attitude when landing. He said he felt that in the accident situation, Flaps 2 was the optimum setting.

[Diamond Bob]

East River was closer than Hudson River (where he ditched finally). There is also better rescue service close to an airport.

I doubt very much that any "rescue service" at LGA would have been any match for Vince Lombardi and his fellow skippers at NY Waterway.

Also, Dani, you seem so sure he could have made it back to the runway, yet just a few posts previous someone was saying that sim tests showed pilots making it back 50% of the time.

[Intruder]

Maybe because with the more stabilized approach he accomplished, he already had as close to a "zero flight path angle" as was required!

When was the last time you leveled off from an idle descent at Flaps 2 (or 20) and decelerated?

When was the last time you tried to level off as you threw out all your flaps, and did not descend even 1" below the target altitude?

[Intruder]

I talked to too many pilots who think that ditching is a sure thing now and that they would act from now on like Sully did. There will be a terrible accident soon, because those kind of all engine failures happen.
How many pilots? How many experienced airline pilots?

It's one thing to try to land a light twin with 1 or 2 people in the water, but a whole different ball game with a fast, heavy airplane with a couple hundred!

Any pilot with any sense would realize that the environment in the Hudson River that day was as benign as could ever happen -- no waves, current with the airplane... To expect such a benign environment as a "sure thing" is total insanity!

[muduckace]

Forgive me if this has not come up before but the threads are allmost in the thouands.

I had allways thought the ideal water ditch to be high AOA allowing the aircraft to slow gradually. The hudson river experience gave me a visual of a low AOA thus allowing the wings (especially engines) to provide the most stable encounter with terra agua. (most past have been a nasty snap and roll)

Being the first water sucessfull ditching soo well doccumented by video... Question?? Have any of of you pilots here been taught to water ditch at a low AOA or has this sucessfull procedure created a new standard for water ditching?

[BOAC]

As with everything it is down to 'taste'. I have not yet seen any comment from the crew on the nature of the ditching in terms of what actually happened to the fuselage and that would be of interest. It is a 'toss-up' between high AoA to minimise speed and a lower one to reduce the 'pitchdown' and probable front-end 'smack' and 'dive' that tail impact would trigger - I guess, having never done it..................... Too flat and you could be a 'skipping stone' with bits falling off at each bounce. I had always 'assumed' that if I were to ditch I would rapidly have found myself drinking the whole ocean as it smashed through the windscreens. I have not checked the crash pics, but I think the screens were intact on this one? Interesting question, mud, and I would be interested to hear from the Hudson crew. Anyone seen any comments?

[edga23]

From what I read in the NTSB documents, the procedure from Airbus calls for a +11° pitch when ditching. Capt Sullenberg declared that he tried to maintain +10°

[africangenesis]

Someone deleted my post of the Smithsonian results analyzing the remains of the ingested birds. The results were recent and had not been posted before, and included a link reference to a scienceNOW article. DNA and isotopic analysis showed they were Canadian geese from Labrador. NY is their normal winter grounds, but the scientists hypothesized that a recent snow storm had caused them to move again. I don't have the original link now. I am surprised that relevant results with important safety implications are being casually deleted by "moderators". Pilots, airport opertors and the public need to know of the increased risk in the aftermath of snowstorms that may mobilize migratory birds again.

I searched the thread for both "labrador" and "geese" in the thread and this recently published result hadn't been reported before.

[CR2]

Your posts (as mine and anyone else's for that matter) are subject to editorial control. Remember what you signed up for. Now, quit bleeting. :rolleyes:

[beamender99]

BBC NEWS | Programmes | World News America | Hudson co-pilot on airline issues (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/world_news_america/8044028.stm)

3min 29 secs on various issues.

Sorry if this has already been posted ( if so Mods please delete )

[Smilin_Ed]

This FO is every bit as good in front of the camera as is his boss. Impressive. :D

[ExSp33db1rd]

From what I read in the NTSB documents, the procedure from Airbus calls for a +11° pitch when ditching. Capt Sullenberg declared that he tried to maintain +10°


Oh! Forgive me, in the stress of the moment I failed to fly to 1 deg. accuracy. Smack my wrist.

[edga23]

It is not that simple := . The point stating the 11° was very far down on their check-list, and they never arrived at that point (performed only the first page of the 4 pages long procedure). So the 10° was what the Capt decided to hold as the best option from his experience (vast :ok:) as given him the best compromise between sufficient speed for not stalling and sufficiently low speed for not breaking-up when hitting the water.

[B-Mod]

I hadn't seen that particular Skiles' interview- he does indeed join Captain Sullenberger as an eloquent spokesman for the profession.

[protectthehornet]

I read that sully just held the ''stick'' full aft and the computer gave the right pitch attitude due to combo of airspeed etc.

indeed, there wasn't much left for the flare.

[p51guy]

The stick full back was obviously not done until just before touchdown. My pilot friend who flies the airplane says you can pull full back on the stick at any altitude and it won't stall. I said yes but what will your sink rate be when you hit the water if you bring it all the way back at a significant altitude or balloon the aircraft? They were running slightly above idle thrust.

[Finn47]

The airline´s insurance company, AIG, now denies liability regarding payment of compensation to the passengers "because the airline wasn´t negligent" :hmm:

That seems to mean the captain should have made a mistake or two instead of saving the day so the passengers would receive what´s due to them. Amazing.

AIG denies liability in Hudson River plane crash | InjuryBoard Greensboro (http://greensboro.injuryboard.com/mass-transit-accidents/aig-denies-liability-in-hudson-river-plane-crash.aspx?googleid=267418)

[FrequentSLF]

That seems to mean the captain should have made a mistake or two instead of saving the day so the passengers would receive what´s due to them. Amazing.

What is due to them? The airline should refund the cost of any lost item, and than claim to the insurance. If the insurance does not pay is a problem of the airline. However I do not see any big money on this, other than the value of the plane.
Why the passengers shall claim more?

FSLF

[Lightning6]

Captain Sullenberger pulled off a perfect ditching IMO, saving all souls on board, end of story.

[Graybeard]

Regardless of actual liability, or what is obvious to an outsider, it's only prudent for all parties to deny culpability, and let the courts sort it out.

AIG, American Insurance G...s, are just doing their job, minimizing liability. We have Billions of tax dollars invested in them, so they had better perform this one time, at least.

[singpilot]

By the time they reached the water, in fact, well before that, one engine had gone to zero thrust (right), and the left had slowly died from idle thrust to zero by 1000'. Sully set mid-range flaps (15 degrees if I remember right), and never got around to the 'infamous' 'ditch switch'.

Would have been moot, as the water contact ripped open the fuselage aft anyway.

Not a source I usually trust, but Vanity Fair magazine had a first person interview and his recollection of the events. He also praised all of his crew, especially the F/O for professionalism under fire.

[poina]

Hell of a job by all involved! Lotta people rip New York but the port authority guys are top notch. Remember the TWA Tritanic with the stall warning that aborted, fire and rescue saved that day.
Not to dis the crew, they were superb, but there was no decision to be made, no power, water ahead, thank God.

[Chronistin]

...and one of the nominees as "aviator of the year" by flightglobal.

voting page (http://www.creativesql.co.uk/flight/achievement_awards09/awards_form.htm)

[stepwilk]

Singpilot, Vanity Fair may be a source you don't normally trust, but the VF writer who deals with aviation subjects is William Langeweische, son of the much admired Wolfgang Langeweische ("Stick and Rudder") and an ATP with considerable experience. Trust him.

[robertbartsch]

NY Post is reporting today Sully will return to flight deck soon.

[barit1]

NYC media (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/01/national/main5355793.shtml)are all over this story - Sully's first line flight since Jan. Rush reassures us no birds in sight.

(Ooops - someone missed his requal trip on 11 Sept.)

[visibility3miles]

Sully is supposed to be on this call-in radio talk show tomorrow, but don't have a link yet on their website. It should be available via the web live or as a rebroadcast.

WAMU 88.5 FM American University Radio - About The Diane Rehm Show (http://wamu.org/programs/dr/about/)

[poorjohn]

Touring for his new book, so you'll see/hear a lot of him in the near term. Daily Show yesterday. Didn't hear much about the book, unfortunately.

[Machaca]

You may watch Sully on The Daily Show here (http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-october-13-2009/chesley-sullenberger).

[Shore Guy]

What a tremendous emissary for the profession.

Thirty minute interview at:

WNYC media player (http://www.wnyc.org/flashplayer/player.html#/play/%2Fstream%2Fxspf%2F142617)

[broadreach]

Thanks, Shore Guy, definitely the best interview of Captain Sullenberger I've heard and unencumbered by applause and glitz.

[Out Of Trim]

Can't see the interview as requires Flash 9 and current software is Adobe flash 10 - so would need to downgrade to view it! :ugh:

[Shore Guy]

Try this link.....

WNYC media player (http://www.wnyc.org/flashplayer/player.html#/play/%2Fstream%2Fxspf%2F142617)

[FlyingVisit]

What an amazing guy! A truly gifted pilot..............brave, clever, cool........he will go down in history - that's for sure. His nerve, steel and experience is something to be admired, and he doesn't brag or boast about his skills and heroism - he plays it all down!

How proud we would all be to have done what he managed to do against all the odds!

[lighttwin]

Since it is a radio interview, I fear any version of flash will not be able to let you see the interview..

[SDFlyer]

Sorry for the slightly off-topic post but he just did a TV spot this evening with his family for the Saint Jude (Cancer Center for children) and used the "hero" word somewhat self-deprecatingly (and ironically). Now that was brilliant, and it was using his new-found fame in just the right sort of way.

Maybe the guy really IS a hero of sorts, more for his behavior after the fact. An everyday sort of flying one, but one all the same. He really is the best thing for aviation since the Fowler flap or something ......

[mustafagander]

To me the thing is that he did everything that all pilots truly hope that they will do if God forbid happens.

A giant among aviators! :ok:

[Out Of Trim]

Since it is a radio interview, I fear any version of flash will not be able to let you see the interview..


Thanks for that info.. If the linked worked for me I would have found that out!

All I get is this:-

WNYC media player requires Flash player 9.

[vaneyck]

You can get the interview in a different format at http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/episodes/2009/10/15 or download the podcast of Leonard Lopate's show (Sully's interlocutor, and a very good interviewer) from iTunes.

[fireflybob]

So so refreshing to hear an experienced and mature aviator speaking in such an informed and eloquent way about the state of the airline industry. An outstanding ambassador for the airline pilot profession.

If ever there's a role model to follow it has to be Sully.

[Heliport]

The Times
"This week Captain Sullenberger landed in London to receive the “Master’s Medal” from the Guild of Air Pilots & Air Navigators (http://www.gapan.org)on behalf the crew of US Airways Airbus A320 ....... "
Hudson hero Chesley Sullenberger says cost-cutting airlines are risking lives - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6896184.ece)

Daily Telegraph
"Capt Sullenberger was speaking in London during a visit to receive the Master's Medal from the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators."
Hudson River pilot Chesley Sullenberger claims cost-cutting airlines risk lives - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6467421/Hudson-River-pilot-Chesley-Sullenberger-claims-cost-cutting-airlines-risk-lives.html)

[Microburst2002]

I am glad that it was him, out of the many who would have managed the situation as well as he did (or even better, if that is possible), who was that day the pilot in command.
He is brilliant speaker and the best ambassador we could have.

I can't wait to read his "Highest Duty" and I hope I will attend one of his speeches one day and shake his hand.

Hail to you, Captain!:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

[The Real Slim Shady]

I was with him until he used that cheesy managerial bullsh1t line " going forward".

[Flying Lawyer]

What a tremendous emissary for the profession.I agree.
I have enormous respect for the way in which Captain Sullenberger has taken the opportunity provided by his unexpected and unwanted fame to speak up for all airline pilots.
Apparently he's always been known as a man of few words but, having by chance become a public figure, he has proved to be an excellent ambassador for all airline pilots - not only reminding the public of the responsibility airline pilots bear but IMHO increasing the respect which the public has for the profession.

Evidence to Congress. (9 mins, worth listening to the end.)
CRvy2o-hV-Y

I've been very impressed by the way he's come across, and by the dignified way in which both he and, to her credit, his wife have dealt with the inevitable press interest. (No tacky tabloid articles.)

I’m part way through his recently published book Highest Duty. He relates in an under-stated way what happened on the 15th January (less than 15% of the book), but also comments upon the current state of the airline industry with particular emphasis on safety (a subject about which he's written and lectured for many years) and what he regards as the sometimes conflicting interests of safety v costcutting.

I met Capt Sullenberger at the Guild of Air Pilots (http://www.gapan.org/) annual Trophies & Awards Banquet at the London Guildhall on Thursday evening when the entire crew of Flight 1549 was awarded the Master's Medal for their outstanding aviation achievement. They received a prolonged standing ovation from the 650+ people present.
He was everything he's been described as being - modest, understated, rather reserved and clearly putting the ‘celebrity’ status he neither sought nor wanted to good use. I considered it an honour to meet him.
Truly a superb ambassador for your profession. :ok:


.

[beamender99]

BBC - Today - What makes a hero? (http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8332000/8332183.stm)

5min + interview

[Heliport]

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v140/Rotorheads/Aviation/GAPANbanner_600.jpg



http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v140/Rotorheads/Flying%20Lawyer/Sully_cc1.jpg

F/A Sheila Dail, Captain Sullenberger and F/A Donna Dent with their Master's Medal certificates.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v140/Rotorheads/Flying%20Lawyer/Sully_RPE_CCP.jpg

Capt Sullenberger accepted the awards on behalf of F/O Jeffrey Skiles and F/A Doreen Welsh who were unable to attend.

[Brian Abraham]

Extraordinary graphical recreation of the accident sequence. Interesting crew dialogue descending through 300 feet.

http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pages/project_gallery/cactus_1549_hudson_river.html

[BOAC]

My admiration for Capt Sully and the crew has just leapt several thousand percent from an already 'high'! Awesome! ATC good stuff too.

The '300ft' conversation has to be the best I have heard!

[GearDown&Locked]

I suspect this 6min flight will be mandatory study for future pilots, atcos and airline management.

It has it all, from every angle you look at it.

[RAT 5]

I admire the way this event was handled. I respect the airmanship displayed by the crew. IMHO the hardest decision to make was to reject the extended glide option to a normal runway. That took great courage, and I'm sure Sully's experience weighed heavily in his favour. Would a 3000hr captain have had the same courage? The skill after that was for all to see.

I have no paticular affection for any particular airline, but I feel saddened that the courage and skill of the RYR captain at CIA has remained under the radar, both amongst ourselves and in the media. He had a split second to make a decision, realise that the a/c was under-powered, take control from PF and convert a G/A into a survival arrival on a shortish runway. Imagine if he'd delayed that decision a few seconds, and we might now be discussing why there is a large smoking hole in southern Rome, with 100's dead.
I take nothing away from Sully & crew, but why is it that this act of superb captaincy/piloting is so negelected. Compare it to the BA crew at LHR. They had no choice but to extend the glide. Hardly an einstein decision: Sully had many moments to consider the options and execute the plan: our colleague in CIA had the 'wink of an eye' to make a decision and execute it, and they all walked away from it. I don't know his name, but he deserves to be up there with them all.

[lomapaseo]

Brian

Extraordinary graphical recreation of the accident sequence. Interesting crew dialogue descending through 300 feet.

http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pa...son_river.html

Thanks for the reconstruction, great job and it makes it much easier to grasp the workload in the cockpit.

For anybody out there a couple of questions

1. Am I correct that only one engine (#2) was actually shutdown and that the FO was concentrating on restarting this one while #1 engine was only able to come up a little bit?

2. at time 2:30 in the link, the comment was:
FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] one off then on
What is happening here?

[kappa]

I have viewed over-and-over all of the amazing reenactment videos of the events connected with 1549, and I have read and re-read the accompanying text. Awesome!

But nowhere could I find an explanation of the significance of the final screen of Central Park and adjacent areas (http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/images/cactus_1549/renders/screen1.jpg). Being intimately familiar with the area, I first surmised that the greenish coloration totally covering the Park (and other areas I know to be open) represent trees and vegetation.

But when I drilled into the URL and expanded this screen, I saw the greenish areas are over what I perceive to be open water and isolated built-up areas.

And I cannot understand the differentiation in the areas colored in red, green and yellow and the dark spots where I know buildings exist. The tabs on the left and top give me no clue.

And finally, I fail to understand what this screen has to do with Flight 1549. What am I missing?

[twentygrand]

I expect that Capt Sully, being the professional that he is, had thought about what he would do if he had a power failure on take off from this particular airfield. His options, of course, were limited but I'm sure that had already thought through his course of action. He made his decision and stuck to it.

[cessnapuppy]

Extraordinary graphical recreation of the accident sequence. Interesting crew dialogue descending through 300 feet.

http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pa...son_river.html

Excellent find sir!

I was interested to hear that the birds were visible on radar.

(from the link)
Most people don't realize this, but the birds were visible on radar, before the event occured. After integrating the raw radar data into our 3D environment and creating motion targets representing those radar returns associated with the flock of birds, our timeline clearly depicts the intersection of Flight 1549 with birds at a time of around 1527:10 (HHMM:SS). This coincides well with the CVR transcript which indicates loud "thumps" at 1527:11.4 (HHMM:SS.0). The NTSB Wildlife Factors Report has identified the feathers in the aircraft as Branta Canadensis (Canada Goose) by means of visual, microscopic and DNA analysis. Identification of the feathers was conducted by the Smithsonian Institute Feather Identification Laboratory. Though the errors may be intolerable, it is possible to pursue an altitude calculation for the birds by triangulation, this due to the fact that there are two separate radar facilities that reported data. We know the altitude of the birds at the time of impact, but it may also be helpful to determine their flight profile to understand where they were going or where they departed.. We will attempt this analysis as our work continues on the accident.

The timelapse (10x) animation below presents a detailed view in the area of the bird strike and clearly shows motion, disorganization of the flock following the bird strike, and the subsequent re-organization of the flock(s) following the passage of a second aircraft, Eagle Flight 4718. Aircraft altitude is in 100's of feet. Eagle Flight 4718 actually came quite close to birds but luckily was not on an intersecting flightpath


Other than gassing thousands of birds and killing some eggs (after the fact) it seems that this could have been prevented, no?

[Oleo]

All due credit to the two pilots: a great job well done is an understatement.

A very surprising book on the subject was reviewed in the New York Times and the book gives a view I disagree with. (Sounds like the author might be an embittered would-be pilot IMHO)


http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/books/11book.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=pilot%20hudson%20river&st=cse

Books of The Times
A Cool Pilot, but the Plane Was Cooler

DWIGHT GARNER
Published: November 10, 2009
Uplift sells better than unpleasant facts, which is why, I suppose, William Langewiesche’s new book, “Fly by Wire,” has been published with an upbeat subtitle (“The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson”) rather than with the more cynical one its publisher initially intended to use. That original subtitle, “The Truth About the Miracle on the Hudson,” more accurately reflects this gripping book’s contents.

Clovis Franca
William Langewiesche

FLY BY WIRE

The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson

By William Langewiesche

193 pages. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. $24.

Related
Excerpt: ‘Fly By Wire’ (November 10, 2009)
Times Topics: Chesley B. Sullenberger III“Fly by Wire” isn’t muckraking, exactly. Mr. Langewiesche doesn’t dispute the events of Jan. 15, 2009, when US Airways Flight 1549 successfully ditched on the Hudson River after its engines were knocked out by geese strikes shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia. (All 155 passengers and crew members survived.) Nor does he dispute that the flight’s pilot, Chesley B. Sullenberger III, a k a Sully, is, as he puts it, “a brave and decent man” and a “superb pilot.”

But Mr. Langewiesche does bang a few light dents into Sully’s hero aura. What the public doesn’t understand, he writes in “Fly by Wire,” is the extent to which advances in aviation and digital technology have made pilots almost superfluous, perhaps even “the weak link in flight.” Mr. Sullenberger’s airplane, an Airbus A320, was nearly capable of guiding itself gently to the ground, even after losing both of its engines.

Mr. Sullenberger made a good choice to land on the Hudson. But his actual control of Flight 1549, Mr. Langewiesche writes, was “less reflective of unusual skill.” No knock against Sully, he suggests, but almost any decent pilot could have done it.

Mr. Langewiesche, the author of “American Ground” (2002) and “The Outlaw Sea” (2004) and a pilot himself, seems annoyed that Mr. Sullenberger has yet to praise publicly his Airbus plane and its sophisticated design. He seems annoyed, too, that Mr. Sullenberger has spoken of the problems of automation failure since his flight, while his own plane’s automation “had emphatically not failed.”

“He was no Charles Lindbergh, seeking to make history, no Chuck Yeager breaking the speed of sound,” Mr. Langewiesche writes. “The Übermensch era of aviation had long since faded. But he crashed during a slump in the American mood, and overnight he was transformed into a national hero, at a time when people were hungry for one.”

That may sound a bit snarky — and this slim book, at its worst, is. Written quickly, it lacks some of the eloquence and steely control of Mr. Langewiesche’s earlier books. (The author is the Steve McQueen of American journalism.) It’s looser, jokier and more digressive, and it contains pointlessly macho asides, like this one about Mr. Sullenberger:

“His performance was a work of extraordinary concentration, which the public misread as coolness under fire. Some soldiers will recognize the distinction.”

Based on an article Mr. Langewiesche published in Vanity Fair in June, “Fly by Wire” is not just about Chesley Sullenberger, however. Mr. Langewiesche uses Flight 1549 as the pretext for a smart, confident, wide-ranging discussion of commercial aviation.

He assesses the low morale at most major American airlines caused by bankruptcies, pay cuts, union strife and the decimation of retirement pensions. He refers to these things as “the insults of an airline career.”

He painstakingly reconstructs what happened that January day on Flight 1549, and spends a good deal of time talking about the damage birds can do to an aircraft. He writes about how the National Transportation Safety Board goes about its work, and about the physics of gliding. The book is also filled with hair-raising stories of other flights in peril, the kind of thing Mr. Langewiesche writes about as well as anyone alive.

He is so familiar with airplanes that his descriptions of how they work are simple and revelatory.

“Jet engines are air compressors,” he writes. “They gulp the outside air, compress it with fans and fire, and shove it out the back at high speed.”

This book’s true hero — this will be an additional insult to some of Sully’s admirers — is a Frenchman, a former test and fighter pilot named Bernard Ziegler, whom Mr. Langewiesche calls “one of the great engineers of our time.”

In the 1970s and ’80s, working for Airbus, Mr. Ziegler and his colleagues perfected a revolutionary system known as “fly-by-wire control,” marrying electrical circuits and digital computers to make almost perfect flying machines. “Within the limits of physics and structural science,” Mr. Langewiesche writes, “Ziegler and his colleagues identified the wrinkles of conventional handling and mostly ironed them out.”

The airplanes that resulted — including the Airbus A320 — are not only easy to fly and filled with redundancies that make mechanical backup systems unnecessary, but they will also not let pilots make certain mistakes. The airplane “will intervene to keep people alive,” Mr. Langewiesche writes.

Because these rare interventions cannot be overridden, they are not popular with all pilots. The fly-by-wire system wasn’t designed to protect passengers from people like Sully, Mr. Langewiesche writes, but from “people at the low end of the scale, who occasionally will be at the controls of any airplane that is widely sold and flown. Unsafe pilots? Sure, of course, there are quite a few, and testing can only go so far in weeding them out.”

This prickly and uneven but plainspoken book will not make Mr. Langewiesche many friends among commercial pilots, about whom, as a group, he is not admiring.

“If you had to pick the most desirable trait for airline pilots, it would probably be placidity,” he says. He adds that “with exceptions, the ‘best and the brightest’ have never chosen to become airplane pilots, at whatever salary, because of the terrible this-is-my-life monotony of the job.”

Mr. Sullenberger may not have needed the help — keeping the wings level, the nose up and the glide smooth — that his Airbus A320 automatically provided him during Flight 1549’s short time in the air. But he and his co-pilot, Jeffrey B. Skiles, did fly by wire during the glide.

“They had no choice,” Mr. Langewiesche writes. “Like it or not, Ziegler reached out across the years and cradled them all the way to the water.”

I don't think so........... Like someone else said, the early, best and gutsy decision to head for the river made the world of difference here

[Fantome]

Oleo - please don't attack before you have researched your target.

William Langewiesche is a 10,000 plus pilot of many types big and small. (Incidentally his father, as all real aerophiles know, was (?) Wolfgang Langewiesche, author of 'Stick and Rudder').

[protectthehornet]

you are right about the author...I spoke with him when we were both flight instructing at Palo Alto, CA airport almost 30 years ago.

This doesn't mean I agree with his ideas or the gist of the book.

and it doesn't mean that William is a bad guy.

I think the airbus is a POS. I think it is built to be sold to countries that don't have a rich pilot heritage, so that some 200 hour pilot can ''make it go''.

TWENTYGRAND...all takeoff briefings at usairways include how to handle an ENGINE failure...but not neccessarily an ''all engine failure''.

[Huck]

“If you had to pick the most desirable trait for airline pilots, it would probably be placidity,” he says. He adds that “with exceptions, the ‘best and the brightest’ have never chosen to become airplane pilots, at whatever salary, because of the terrible this-is-my-life monotony of the job.”



Wrong on both counts.

Spoken like someone who has never actually been there. Commuters, maybe, but he's never taken a swept-wing jet around the world. Monotony? Balls.

And placidity will get you fired, eventually. They pay us to make decisions, often.

Gimli said it best: "You speak evil of that which is fair beyond the reach of your thought, and only little wit can excuse you."

[SDFlyer]

Langewiesche: “His performance was a work of extraordinary concentration, which the public misread as coolness under fire."

This is largely a distinction without a difference, despite the author's protestation. Obviously, when something like this hapens you show coolness under fire by concentrating on a solution to the problem. If you don't show it, you will become seriously distracted and the risk of failure increases dramatically. I haven't read this hastily-written book but have read some of his other writings. He's an experienced and knowledgeable aviator but sometimes seems "intoxicated with the exuberance of his own verbosity". He also spends too much time attacking straw men. This is less of a problem for non-pilot readers I suppose, and those would often be his intended audience.

[twentygrand]

Fair point HORNET - all airlines have a similar T/O briefing. But I would not be surprised if Capt Sully, while he was relaxing in the bath one night thought "what the hell would I do if I hit a load of those geese on takeoff". That is how professionals behave and he certainly is one.

[Capt Kremin]

The A320 FBW system did not/could not;

a: turn the aircraft towards the Hudson,

b: Commence the checklists that may have restored thrust,

c: Instantly calculate the glide distances to La Guardia and Teterboro and conduct a risk assessment as to the probability of a successful landing at either.

d: alert the Cabin crew and passengers in a timely manner to prepare for the ditching.

e: flare the aircraft at to appropriate time to reduce the rate of descent; had the aircraft been flying itself it would have struck the water at over 1500 FPM, travelling another 50 knots faster with Flaps UP!

f: make sure that everyone was off before it evacuated.

Langweisches premise is thin, wrong and downright insulting. What some people will do for a buck! :mad:

[Oilhead]

November 15, 2009, 8:54 pm
Sullenberger Takes Issue With New Book
By CHRISTINE NEGRONI

A new book addressing the role of automation in US Airways Flight 1549 is wrong, according to the pilot who safely landed the plane on the Hudson River in January.

In an interview on Sunday, the pilot, Capt. Chesley B. Sullenberger III, said that the book, “Fly By Wire,” by William Langewiesche, “greatly overstates how much it mattered” that the plane he landed in the river, an Airbus A320, featured an automated cockpit. Mr. Sullenberger said the outcome of the emergency landing he made on Jan. 15, after the jet’s engines were knocked out by geese strikes shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia, would have been the same whether the plane was an electronically controlled Airbus or a more conventional Boeing.

In his book, subtitled “The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson,” Mr. Langewiesche praised the engineers behind the Airbus’s highly automated aircraft. He said that by creating an airplane that will not allow pilots to go outside certain flight parameters, they devised a craft that “will intervene to keep people alive.”

Since the day that he and his co-pilot, Jeffrey B. Skiles, landed the plane on the river, Mr. Sullenberger has tried to tone down a public perception that he is a hero. He says credit for the fact that all 155 passengers and crew members survived the ditching should be spread around. But when it comes to the role of the Airbus, Mr. Sullenberger said, its impact was minor.

“Others in the industry knowledgeable about these technical issues know there are misstatements of fact in ‘Fly by Wire,’ ” Mr. Sullenberger said. His own book about the event, “Highest Duty,” is largely a memoir, though he does devote several pages to the fly-by-wire technology.

“There are some situations where the automation will protect a pilot, but at the same time a highly automated airplane makes possible other types of errors * so it’s a mixed blessing,” he said in the interview. “And greater knowledge is required to fly a highly automated aircraft.”

Mr. Langewiesche said he was mystified by Mr. Sullenberger’s reaction to “Fly by Wire.” “There have been some characterizations of the book that are wrong,” he said, adding that he was neither a proponent nor opponent of fly by wire, but that it was important to examine its role in what happened to Flight 1549. “I don’t think its role is critical, but it was functioning, it’s part of the story.”

The National Transportation Safety Board has not issued a final report on the event, but when it does, it is likely to show that there were “flaws in this design,” said Dan Sicchio, a US Airways pilot who represented the pilots’ union in the investigation. “There are things that will come out that will show problems with the control system in this airplane. There were things that helped Sully and things that hurt him.”

[p51guy]

I am surprised the comments that are not favorable to Airbus are still not deleted by the monitors. They must have taken the weekend off. I started to copy and paste so obvious posts that could be retrieved could be seen and compared to what was still allowed to be left as a post.

[clivewatson]

Rat 5 - I am in complete agreement with you.

[protectthehornet]

I haven't taken a bath since I got my ATP over 27 years ago (I take showers). I have thought of losing all engines over every portion of the 48 contiguous United States...I fly domestic USA and haven't bothered with alaska or hawaii, or the myriad of other places on the earth.

Sully is not unique, except that his plane happened to need his skill on a particular day. I would like to think that all of Sully's comrades at USAIRways would have done as well.

I've often thought of what I would do with a 911 situation...but I won't tell you.

That's what good airline pilots do...they play: what if?

One critique of sully...why did he go back for the maintenance log book and not the portable PAsystem/bullhorn/powered megaphone?

[BOAC]

I guess he wanted to write up the snag?

[p51guy]

Using a bullhorn to tell the people to wait for the ferry might not have accomplished much. Maybe the logbook while he was waiting would verify the aircraft was legal for that departure. Once they are standing on the wing I don't know what the captain could do to help them before boarding the boats. Did Sully know at that time he was a hero, not someone who would have to defend himself?

[protectthehornet]

the bullhorn wouldhave been used to communicate and coordinate with the rescuers...indeed, sully stated he was trying to communicate with the boats to ''get the people on the wings first''.

the last thing I would worry about is whether the paperwork was right

[twentygrand]

I accept your superior personal hygiene routine! Professionals should think "what if" all the time. I've flown all over the world (including over 3 years based in the US) and I recognize Capt Sully as a true professional. I was merely observing that, from an airport with limited options he chose the right one, stuck to his decision and pulled off an amazing feat of airmanship. Perhaps he had considered his course of action in the shower!

[ExSp33db1rd]

I guess he wanted to write up the snag?


or more to the point, ensure that someone else didn't - with a different Agenda ?

Having left the aeroplane after a major event, the first question I was asked by management, was where was the Voyage Report - in the Medias' hands ?

Ye canna be too carrrreful.

Good thinking, Hoskins.

[Fantome]

and I recognize Capt Sully as a true professional

How chuffed will he be to know that!

[Sky Sports]

Just seen the flight sim reconstruction.......amazing. Shows the benefit of sticking to the plan.

[Runaway Gun]

Sully: 'Rock-star sex' life after Hudson landing - San Jose Mercury News (http://www.mercurynews.com/bay-area-news/ci_13850236?source=rss)

How to spice up your marriage....

[Graybeard]

Back in 1977 when a Southern Airways DC-9 had a dual flameout from hail and landed on a road - within gliding distance of at least one airport - glide ratios and best glide speeds of twinjets were never even discussed, as they were too improbable. Many pilots had no real idea of their mounts' glide potential. Some even became testy when I asked.

Further, Atlanta ATC assumed they had lost two of their three engines, and continued routine handling of their flight.

GB

[forget]

Back in 1977 when a Southern Airways DC-9 had a dual flameout from hail ............ Atlanta ATC assumed they had lost two of their three engines, and continued routine handling of their flight.

Was that an STC?

[Graybeard]

No STC; no third engine. That was back when Boeing Tri-Motors were more prevalent on domestic routes, and losing all thrust was unheard of.

GB

[lomapaseo]

Further, Atlanta ATC assumed they had lost two of their three engines, and continued routine handling of their flight.


Do you have a source for that?

The CVR does not confirm this and I don't recall this coming up in the Public hearing.

arguably the ATC handling sounded routine although helpful to all requests. "you've got our squawk on emergency?... I'm not receiving it but radar contact position is ..."

"allright listen we have lost both engines and I can't tell you the implications of this we've only got two engines and how far is Dobins ...."

[Graybeard]

Do you have a source for that?

Secondhand, 30 years ago.

Although engines are arguably more reliable now, total loss of thrust is more believable.

GB

[AirRabbit]

Back in 1977 when a Southern Airways DC-9 had a dual flameout from hail and landed on a road - within gliding distance of at least one airport - glide ratios and best glide speeds of twinjets were never even discussed, as they were too improbable. Many pilots had no real idea of their mounts' glide potential. Some even became testy when I asked.
Further, Atlanta ATC assumed they had lost two of their three engines, and continued routine handling of their flight.
I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that I just cannot imagine an air traffic controller, even in 1977, learning or hearing that a B-727 had just lost 2 of its 3 engines would continue "routine handling of the flight." I don't recall the specifics of that particular incident, but I would strongly suspect that if the controllers didn't "get exicited" it was because they weren't advised of anything over which they would get exicited. Being advised of one of the airplanes he was working that lost 2 of 3 engines would, I think, cause any controller to have to go change his shorts! In fact, losing 1 of 3 engines would have at least caused him to stand up and get some attention from others with whom he was working at the time!

[barit1]

If anyone has access to complete NTSB reports, the document for the Southern DC-9 (New Hope, GA, 1977) is DCA77AA015.

[jugofpropwash]

FYI, TLC (The Learning Channel) had a show on tonight (they'll probably run it again) called "Brace for Impact" talking about the crash - showed Sully looking at the remains of the plane wherever it is in storage. All things considered, the damage really doesn't appear that bad, especially considering some of that damage was probably done getting it out of the water and transporting it.

[bodypilot]

Quote "I guess he wanted to write up the snag?"

Now that's funny :-)

[albatross]

How would you write that up?

"Engines won't run- Maybe flooded"

[RobertS975]

The program is available online:

Brace for Impact: Brace For Impact : Video : TLC (http://tlc.discovery.com/videos/brace-for-impact-brace-for-impact.html)

It is one hour long, and most of it was fluff. Captain Sully says he made a "mayday" call in the program. Hard to remeber and I do not feel like pouring through this thread, but didn't we give a lot of discussion to the fact that there was no formal mayday call? (Maybe I have this wrong!?)

[pmemrick]

darn, was looking forward to watching it later too. (couldn't find it here in the hotel)

I'm so tired of these programs that dumb everything down like we're all a bunch of idiots. And then recap everything they just said previously after the last commercial break. No wonder I channel surf!

BTW, couldn't find anything but the trailer online.

Cheers

[Latearrival]

Brace for Impact was made for those without any knowledge of aviation--the general public.

Having been involved at the production level for smaller but similar projects, I was the one asking the pros for ‘dumbed-down' answers when I felt the language/explanation was over the heads of the viewers. I can assure you that’s what happened here.

At the end of the day, did the audience understand what happened? Were they left with a positive impression of the industry and those in it? IMHO they were. (My petty criticism is that I found the narration overly dramatic. The event itself and related interviews were dramatic enough and didn’t need any boost in that direction.)

[Machaca]

If anyone has access to complete NTSB reports, the document for the Southern DC-9 (New Hope, GA, 1977) is DCA77AA015.



Embry-Riddle's library has it here (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR78-03.pdf).

[lomapaseo]

Having been involved at the production level for smaller but similar projects, I was the one asking the pros for ‘dumbed-down' answers when I felt the language/explanation was over the heads of the viewers. I can assure you that’s what happened here.


It's quite difficult for an expert with knowlege to shift into a dumb down gear by themselves. It takes the talent of the interviewer (on or off camera) to prompt for an answer that the public can understand. Hence the re-shoots and sound bites edits. Most of the time when a microphone is simply shoved in a face, lots of edits to capture 5 secs of words is all that is captured. On the other hand studio shots are a lot less pressure ridden but hard to capture suspense and the hold on an audience without a background script lurking behind the editing scenes.

[N1EPR]

I have just watched the one hour Discovery Channel program about the USAir flight into the Hudson river. Apparently this flight was operated without cabin crew!! There is no mention of their contribution to saving the lives of the 150 passengers.

Does anyone know why they were omitted?? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gif

[jcjeant]

Hi,

I have just watched the one hour Discovery Channel program about the USAir flight into the Hudson river. Apparently this flight was operated without cabin crew!! There is no mention of their contribution to saving the lives of the 150 passengers.

Does anyone know why they were omitted?? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/censored.gifWonder what will be the comments by Discovery Channel program viewers about airliners accidents in 30 years from now .. when they will ear about the cabin crew and nothing about the flightdeck crew ? :)

[barit1]

The NTSB powerplant group report (http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/419254.pdf) is online. No surprises as far as I'm concerned.

[lomapaseo]

Barit1

The NTSB powerplant group report is online. No surprises as far as I'm concerned

Thanks

Good thorough report

Little hope for the pilots to restart these engines and get any power out of them ... too much internal damage

[YWG-JFK]

Perhaps I saw a different show, but I heard Sully talking about the cabin crew. He said BRACE... then said he could hear the cabin crew though the door shouting their commands... and later said something about what a good job they did getting the pax off. So yes, the cabin Crew were present!!!

[barit1]

lomapaseo

In post #1754 we had a beer bet. The photos substantiate my claim of HP system damage; the LP damage, of itself, would not have made the donks inop, but the shrapnel released caused much downstream distress.

I fully intend to collect next time I'm in chilly FL. Just leave the beer out on the porch -- that will be sufficiently cool.

(Thank you, global warming...)
:ok:

[lomapaseo]

Barit1

lomapaseo

In post #1754 we had a beer bet. The photos substantiate my claim of HP system damage; the LP damage, of itself, would not have made the donks inop, but the shrapnel released caused much downstream distress.

I fully intend to collect next time I'm in chilly FL. Just leave the beer out on the porch -- that will be sufficiently cool.

(Thank you, global warming...)


I certainly remember the beer bet and I do agree with you about the significance of the HPC damage as well as the insignificance of the booster-lpc damage (by-itself).

However. The fan blade rubstrip damage is significant by itself, but probably was significantly affected by the the HPC in the final outcome. At any rate I will buy the first round should you make it to Florida :ok:

[p51guy]

Robert, Mayday may be the official emergency call and works well throughout the world. In the US however it is a formality to be correct. Declaring an emergency does the same thing and I have heard it many times in my long career. Never mayday except at the Reno Air Races when they blow an engine. I only had two emergencies and never once have said mayday. 23,000 hrs and no maydays calls is pretty average in the US. ICAO is not so laid back.

[stepwilk]

"Perhaps I saw a different show..."

I believe you did. What was originally being discussed was a very recent--like last week--TLC (The Learning Channel) show about the ditching. You're referring to a Discovery Channel program that was broadcast some time ago.

What is it that the Brits say? Chimps and cheeps? Talk and wheeze? Chalk and cheese? Ah, that's the one...

[Landroger]

I was very interested to see the images of the torn down engines in the Engine Group Report. Clearly these donks had suffered tremendous insult and yet, though they collapsed into an 'idle but not' state where they were neither use nor ornament, they didn't, in fact, stop?

From the point of view of an engineer - non aero - I have always regarded modern high bypass fan jets as the most beautiful example of almost effortless power. At the same time they are - compared to the fabulously intricate and fragile, double row radials of the 'Connie', DC-6 and Stratocruiser - practically bomb proof.

Having said that, looking at three instances of multi engine failure - all of them 100% survived - what is striking is the extreme 'gradient' of what was necessary to stop both/all the engines. I suppose we could regard 'Sully's' engines as the far end of mechanical trauma; a number (more than one each?) quite large birds ingested while the engines were at high stress.

Somewhere midpoint is the fantastic amount of terminal damage suffered by the RB211s of the BA 747 over Jakarta, after swallowing a volcano. The even more striking thing about those engines was; the crew got them started again. I don't suppose for a second that they ever flew again?

Finally, there is the BA038 rollback. Although the final results are not yet in - as I understand it - all it took was a peculiar conjunction of circumstances and water, that prevented those engines responding to an urgent requirement for power.

Sorry for the diversion, but those photgraphs do give one furiously to think. By the way, I take it that the reason why both engines lost their AGBs and associated 'peripherals', is because that is right underneath the engine and likely to be the first thing to get swept away?

Roger.

[kaikohe76]

Hi Folks,

On a slightly different thread to the ditching it'self & the aftermath, I have just finished reading Chesley Sullenberger's biography `Highest Duty`. A number of you may have already read the book as well, but it has only just arrived in this part of the world.
I found the book First Class in all respects, it details the many personal & family difficulties that Sullenberger had to deal with long before the Hudson ditching. The book goes into just the right level of detail in all the issues covered, enough information for aviation & non aviation people.
For me the stand out point is, how all the way through the book, Sullenberger is at pains to stress, that the successful outcome of the ditching was a united Crew effort & that they not just him well deserve all the praise. He also goes to some length to thank & praise the ATC Officer & other personnel & the efforts of the rescue craft who lifted the pax & crew off.
For me, a great book, very well written with great sensitivity throughout, I would reccommend it to anyone.
A safe 2010 to us all.

[edmundronald]

SLF query: Is the ditched plane a hull loss, or will it fly again?

Edmund

[Pugilistic Animus]

SLF query: Is the ditched plane a hull loss, or will it fly again?

depends not necessarily it happened with a DC-8 that was returned to service,..there's already a link to that on this huge thread:)

PA

edit all SLF for true appreciation,..should also see Al Haynes:D

[lomapaseo]

SLF query: Is the ditched plane a hull loss, or will it fly again?

Edmund

short answer, I don' know and I don't want to know :)

Longer answer:

Depends on several factors.

Most operators would rather have the insurance value and invest the money in a newer or better product for their routes (like many of us would do with our cars after an accident).

The inusurance valuation considers repairability including costs.

Sometimes the above factors conflict ex: the operator doesn't want to keep a ghost ship in their fleet as it could put their passengers off from flyng it. It's like who won, the geese or the plane?

[barit1]

SLF query: Is the ditched plane a hull loss, or will it fly again?


If you've seen the photos of the pieces being carted through NJ streets you wouldn't be asking that question. My speculation a year ago was that the undercarriage potentially could be reused after a major shop visit, but that's about it.

[SeenItAll]

See this article Year after Hudson River jet landing, fear remains (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/14/AR2010011400897_pf.html) on the 1-year anniversary of the ditching. What is noted in this news article is:

"The group surprised some observers with what they have chosen not to do: No one on board the plane has sued the airline.

"Amazing," said Justin Green, an attorney with Kreindler & Kreindler, a law firm that specializes in air disasters. "

[Dont Hang Up]

"The group surprised some observers with what they have chosen not to do: No one on board the plane has sued the airline.



At that end of a long and dismal day that has cheered me up.:D

I'm sure the ambulance chasing attorneys must be furious with Sully and his crew. "Extreme competence in the face of adversity" is of no use to them whatsoever. How will they put th kids through school?

[RAT 5]

How is the airline to blame for conspiring to put some birds in the path of one of its aeroplanes? It was more an 'act of God', and I'm sure that even the most fervant of US lawyers would have difficulty getting success there. Considering their god-fearing society, they might think twice, otherwise they might have a direct hit from the next bolt of Bejamin Franklin. Surely the pax should be donating something to the airline cadet training scheme and thanking their lucky stars to have had more than 4000hrs total time at the sharp end.

[BOAC]

You should see the case against the Geese, though.

[jugofpropwash]

Quote:
SLF query: Is the ditched plane a hull loss, or will it fly again?

Edmund
short answer, I don' know and I don't want to know

Longer answer:

Depends on several factors.

Most operators would rather have the insurance value and invest the money in a newer or better product for their routes (like many of us would do with our cars after an accident).

The inusurance valuation considers repairability including costs.

Sometimes the above factors conflict ex: the operator doesn't want to keep a ghost ship in their fleet as it could put their passengers off from flyng it. It's like who won, the geese or the plane?

I'm thinking there are plenty of folks who would pay extra to fly on that particular plane.

IIRC, there was a case where various parts of a plane that went down in the Everglades were recovered and reused, and there were rumors of the recovered parts being haunted. Given the positive results and the hero status of all involved, I think this is a very different situation.

[grimmrad]

If you look at the CVR transcript a mayday call was made if I remember correct;y but was not transmitted, probably secondary to high work load button not pressed.

[Not Gulfair CEO]

Does any one have any info about the speed at the time of the impact and what flap setting was used?

[SouthpawSLF]

Gulfair - FDR airspeed around 120kt IAS; flaps position 2 (about 15 degrees)

[golfyankeesierra]

Does any one have any info about the speed at the time of the impact and what flap setting was used?

NTSB animation on Youtube including ATC tape and CVR transcript (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWpSAfF6elI)

[RobertS975]

It is appropriate that at the reunion ceremony on the one year anniversary, the toasts were made with Grey Goose vodka.

[Not Gulfair CEO]

thank you fellows

[sharksandwich]

New footage: Hudson plane crash - Comment Central - Times Online - WBLG (http://timesonline.typepad.com/comment/2010/01/new-footage-of-the-hudson-plane-crash.html)

[Capvermell]

Surely if there was to be any successful form of litigation in this case it ought to be by either the airline and/or some of the crew and/or passengers on the aircraft against the airport or its owners for failing to adequately address the longstanding bird control issues in the airspace immediately surrounding the airport and in particular on the approach and departure paths to the airport.

If there was any obvious area of clear cut negligence that led to this accident taking place then that was surely it.

I really don't see how either the airline or the aircraft manufacturers can be held to blame in any shape or form for this particular incident.

[SK8TRBOI]

Sunk in brackish water for days?!? No fixin' that - you'd have to replace, well, everything. It has indeed been officially Written-Off.
(Though it would have looked cool sitting in the old boneyard at MIA with the aging Connies, etc., back-in-the-day...gosh, I'm 'misting').

Great job Skully! Oh, and the most profound lesson he taught the general public, IMHO? - decisiveness in his decision making. Skill, experience, and Command Presence all rolled into one: "We'll be in the Hudson."
Bravo.

[CONF iture]

The NTSB powerplant group report (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ntsb.gov%2FDockets%2FAviation%2FDCA09MA 026%2F419254.pdf) is online. No surprises as far as I'm concerned.
Was it merely understandable confusion under such a tremendous amount of pressure that a relight attempt was performed on both engines … By continuously exploiting maximum of the still available thrust, would it have minimized enough the rate of descent for Captain Sullenberger to reconsider his ultimate decision making ?

[Cubs2jets]

Want to buy an A320?
AIG Aviation.com - International Information (http://www.aigaviation.com/aviationsalvage/salvagedetail.aspx?faano=N106US)

C2j

[Dani]

Was it merely understandable confusion under such a tremendous amount of pressure that a relight attempt was performed on both engines

The relight checklist on Airbusses is somewhat confusing, it says in the first part that you should try to relight one by one, then both together. The only difference in the checklist is one letter: first they talk about "Engine Master" then "Engine Masters". I had trouble to find the difference myself several times in a simulator.

I guess considering the time available Jeff Skiles had no choice than to try everything he could. I would have done the same.

There wasn't much thrust there anyway. The only thing the engine delivered was electricity and hydraulic pressure.

hth,
Dani

[bearfoil]

Well, Airbus Vertical Stabilizers are a dime a dozen, but the Fuselage would make a spiff diner here ont'a Interstate. I say give it to Sully for his new classroom.

[barit1]

CONF iture:

Was it merely understandable confusion under such a tremendous amount of pressure that a relight attempt was performed on both engines … By continuously exploiting maximum of the still available thrust, would it have minimized enough the rate of descent for Captain Sullenberger to reconsider his ultimate decision making ?

Looking at the "corncobbed" HP compressors, I am frankly amazed the engines ran at all. The first-stage blades are amputated at the mid-span shrouds, and virtually every airfoil has some damage.

Sully & Skiles were lucky to have what little they had by way of electrical and hydraulics.

[Pugilistic Animus]

I think the RAT/PTU was probably more helpful:)

[st7860]

Ok so now the aircraft is for auction but what would a company do with it? The cost of repairs could be more than the cost of a used A320 right?

[Microburst2002]

Was there ENG FAIL ecam warnings or there was just a loss of thrust?

Anyway, it's clear that not every specific case and its many ramifications is covered in the FCOMs. Pilots are still needed!

[OFBSLF]

The cost of repairs could be more than the cost of a used A320 right?
Actually, it would be relatively simple:

1) buy a used A320.
2) pay to have someone haul away the wreckage.

That wreck is a total loss.

[CONF iture]

Was there ENG FAIL ecam warnings or there was just a loss of thrust?

Not too much info on the ECAM they got, if they had any … but it probably felt like an obvious deficit of thrust, which made the PF call for the LOSS OF THRUST ON BOTH ENG procedure.
However both engines were still alive, one engine was very weak but the other one was still at 36% N1 and 2000pph FF up to the time both thrust levers were retarded, as per QRH.
That action may have reduced their options as Cpt Sullenberger was evaluating runway 01 in Teterboro … ?

But wait a minute ... Is it possible the QRH procedure has been renamed ALL ENG FLAMEOUT since ?

[barit1]

That wreck is a total loss.

Well, no. I have it on good authority that the Ditch Switch is still serviceable.

[FirstStep]

CONF iture's quote;
Not too much info on the ECAM they got, if they had any … but it probably felt like an obvious deficit of thrust, which made the PF call for the LOSS OF THRUST ON BOTH ENG procedure.
However both engines were still alive, one engine was very weak but the other one was still at 36% N1 and 2000pph FF up to the time both thrust levers were retarded, as per QRH.
That action may have reduced their options as Cpt Sullenberger was evaluating runway 01 in Teterboro … ?

But wait a minute ... Is it possible the QRH procedure has been renamed ALL ENG FLAMEOUT since ?

As a Boeing pilot, I know I'm out of my element in certain aspects here, regarding operating Airbus Aircraft, specifically, commanded thrust versus thrust-lever position. IF No1 were still producing some thrust ( which it was according to the Powerplant Group Report) why the shutdown?. I was tought, if one fails, and the other is on FIRE, let it burn ( as long as it is developing thrust ). Obviously, it appeared the engine failed, and a re-light was in order. But, it didn't fail, did it?. Are there times that the commanded thrust won't match thrust-lever position on Airbuses?. As in, you push throttle up ( or the throttle is already up ), but logic commands idle or reduced thrust?. I also don't know the company noise abatement procedures, ie, could the altitude they attained coincide with any programmed thrust-reduction altitudes?. Althought the report mentions N1 and N2 speeds at three distinct times, it fails to mention commanded thrust. ( report is weak on flight data information ). I only want to be educated on this topic by someone in the know (and hopefully not attacked for my ignorance).
BTW, I commend Sully for his judgement and flying skills. I hope he is enjoying being back on the line. :D

[Microburst2002]

Actually, the QRH procedure is ENG DUAL FAILURE (fuel remaining).
ENG FAIL WARNING is triggered if affected engine core goes below idle, only.

My conclusion, therefore, is that pilots are still needed in an airplane, no matter how modern and computerized it is. Because not every case has been studied and laid down in FCOMs or QRHs. Airmanship is still required. Experience is still a very valuable tool in a flight deck.

Maybe if they did a video of how to handle such a failure (like those videos of TAP, the portuguese airline, where the pilots look like robots but that it took hundreds of takes for each failure) maybe, I say, there would be a couple of things that could have been done better. But it is the overall performance and decision making of the crew that counts, in a totally unexpected scenario. They adapted quickly to it, to the dreadful reality, and ditched nicely on the Hudson, with no victims. And of course they had a little bit of luck.

A less experienced, robotic, "CRM-SOP fanatic" crew could have flown the airplane to the ground and crashed after saying a lot of call outs and a lot of "I have controls I have radio you have controls you have radio, get the QRH..." and trying to find what the hell to do because no ECAM nor QRH says what to do in that case, instead of quickly assessing the situation and coordinating with each other naturally, like Sully and Skyles, instead, did.

They acted like excellent human pilots and succeeded.

[clunckdriver]

Microburst, thank you for saying that! having flown the Bus and Boeing products and seen graduates of MPL couses and other "puppy farms" totally miss the point that gravity has taken over and all the "babblespeak" in the world wont change the situation, so just fly the bloody aircraft untill the crashing noise stops!

[lomapaseo]

I was tought, if one fails, and the other is on FIRE, let it burn ( as long as it is developing thrust ). Obviously, it appeared the engine failed, and a re-light was in order. But, it didn't fail, did it?. Are there times that the commanded thrust won't match thrust-lever position on Airbuses?.

I don't have the actual facts here, but from a discussion standpoint consider that the engine damage was severe enough to result in an engine stall/surge condition resulting in the EGT going through the roof. It's entirely possible that the rotors still spooling developed some thrust, but with so little air the EGT was probably setting off warning signals and thus being addressed by the crew.

I would expect that the only rule based intuition here was not to take action on both engines simultaneously, but that some action would be part of the intuition (happy to be corrected on this by what the procedures actually state)

[Microburst2002]

Thanks to you

In Airbus, because of its "special features", they put the stress on things that are not so difficult to understand for young low houred pilots. They assume that the pilots are real pilots already, who have to get used to a totally new technology with new interfaces with the airplane.

However, what the young low houred pilots need to learn is more airmanship, they need to learn to fly a jet, first, and then deal with the complex integrated automation systems of a modern airliner with FBW which is not the difficulty. Young people have been born in a computerized world already! What they need is to learn how to fly a jet. Pushing buttons and dealing with a computer... they do that better than anybody. I am in my mid thirties and I started playing with the Sinclair Spectrum (48k) when I was 10 years old.

Airbus treat old pilots like a child explaining his grandpa how to use the DVD player. And they forget that the Airbus is being flown by many young unexperienced pilots as the first airplane. They don't need to know the difference between airbus and conventional airplanes. For them, the airbus is already the conventional airplane. What they lack is flight instruction.

To sum up:

Learn the proffession first
then follow with automation, CRM, SOPs, etc.

Pilots are needed, not flight deck operators

[edmundronald]

as an SLF I suggest hack off the front part, mount it on hydraulics, and set it up at Disneyworld as a flight game for toddlers called " Ditchin' "


Edmund

[CONF iture]

Are there times that the commanded thrust won't match thrust-lever position on Airbuses?
Yes, but I don’t see it at being an issue in this case. After takeoff checklist was completed, thrust reduction altitude was passed, thrust levers were most probably in the climb detent commanding thrust climb, the target altitude was 15000 feet.

tE_5eiYn0D0

I believe the situation brought some precipitation in the urgency to do something, 3000 feet is really nothing, A checklist was called and the FO had a lot of reading to do in that checklist, there was not much time to calmly analyse the engine parameters, so, as incongruous it may appear, they end up applying a procedure to restart engines that were actually running.
The Captain had already so much to do with the aviate navigate communicate, which he did fantastically under tremendous pressure. The decision to go for the ditching was anything but simple to take especially for the period of the year.
It is possible that exploiting the maximum of what was still available in those engines, the rate of descent would have been somehow reduced and Captain Sullenberger could have been tempted to have a go to Teterboro … But then it is a very risky situation as well, he succeeds and every body leaves by the stairs, he fails and it is catastrophic.

Overall, I think they did so well the way they did.

[Alanwsg]

Dilbert.com - The Official Dilbert Website with Scott Adams' color strips, Dilbert animation, mashups and more! (http://www.dilbert.com/fast/2010-02-10/)

[barit1]

Brilliant as usual! :ok:

[st7860]

Hudson Hero Sullenberger Hangs Up Wings - News Story - KTVU San Francisco (http://www.ktvu.com/news/22727433/detail.html?hpt=T2)
Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, the Danville native who piloted Flight 1549 during its emergency water landing on the Hudson River in January 2009, announced his retirement from U.S. Airways on Wednesday, according to an airline spokesman.

Fittingly, Flight Attendant Doreen Welsh, who helped guide 150 passengers to safety on the same flight, also announced her retirement on the same day.

[Nom De Guerre]

Yep, national news last night. Sully parked the aircraft at CLT for the last time.

[st7860]

i wonder if he got the fire truck treatment as some Captains do on their final flight.(taxing through an arch of water)

[MathFox]

A four-truck salute: Sully lands final flight in Charlotte | Charlotte News, Weather, Traffic, Sports WCNC.com | Slideshows (http://www.wcnc.com/news/slideshows/Sully-lands-final-flight-in-Charlotte-86257522.html?gallery=y&c=y&ref=%2F&img=0)

[barit1]

So what will Capt. Sullenberger's legacy be in the front office of his younger colleagues?

I hope it will be first-class airmanship, situational awareness, and choosing a reasonable plan and sticking with it. (At least, stick with it until a CLEARLY superior option shows up!)

[jugofpropwash]

I would not be shocked to see Sully run for public office.

[OVERTALK]

When the A320 went into the Hudson River, the Captain deviated from the checklist cadence and quite appropriately fired up the APU, more or less immediately after the birds hit.

This action kept electricals (and hydraulics?) and retained(?) the FBW mode as NORMAL Law (????).

What if he hadn't started the APU? Would sufficient busses have been powered and would battery power for the 5 min flight have been enough? Would the crew have had their full FBW or have been reverted to a lesser law?

The inference, albeit a weak allusion, from the NTSB's Report was that it may well have been a completely different outcome if Capt Sully hadn't promptly kick-started the APU. As it was, he had significant problems maintaining the desired/appropriate glide speed and the flaring attitude was non-optimal. Why was that?

If the APU hadn't been started, the degree of controllability that led to a "sufficient" flare (although not optimal - NTSB Report) and subsequent benign ditching might well have been characterised as a crash.... with a significant loss of life due to a greater loss of airframe integrity.

Your thoughts?

[p51guy]

The NTSB report said they touched down in the Hudson at over 700 FPM. Looking at the video it looked like picture perfect normal flare onto a runway at less than 50 FPM. They must have been measuring the descent before flare.

[barit1]

Agreed. Sully made a typical taildragger short/soft field touchdown - just as you'd expect a pilot with his background to do. His instincts were on the money. :ok:

[protectthehornet]

I think along time ago in this thread, I mentioned the concept of flare reserve.

I don't think he had much left in that area and that a higher glide speed would have resulted in an additional flare reserve to cushion the touchdown.

oh well. what is done is done and everything worked out ok for most of the people.

[OVERTALK]

........4 posts above
.
"This action kept electricals (and hydraulics?) and retained(?) the FBW mode as NORMAL Law (????).

What if he hadn't started the APU? Would sufficient busses have been powered and would battery power for the 5 min flight have been enough? Would the crew have had their full FBW or have been reverted to a lesser law? "

[PJ2]

OVERTALK:
If the APU hadn't been started, the degree of controllability that led to a "sufficient" flare (although not optimal - NTSB Report) and subsequent benign ditching might well have been characterised as a crash.... with a significant loss of life due to a greater loss of airframe integrity.
The APU supplies only pneumatics and electrical power generation on ground and in the air. (On heavy takeoffs, one can run the packs off the APU to reduce engine bleed and slightly increase power while keeping temperatures slightly lower.) Starting the APU is a standard procedure when an engine is lost so the reaction was a good one given the circumstances.

Here, the engines were still rotating slightly - 35% and 17% if I recall from earlier in the thread but I may be wrong on the numbers - the point is, both hydraulic and electrical power generation can occur at these N2 speeds.

The RAT would not deploy under these conditions as at least one if not both of the two AC buses was powered.

The RAT only powers the "Blue" hydraulic system which would power only the slats. The minimum RAT operating speed is 140kts, so there is another consideration in terms of control and available hydraulic power; they got Flaps to Config 2 so there had to be "Green" and/or "Yellow", (vice 1, 2 or3, or left/center/right), hydraulic system power.

With the RAT extended, an emergency generator driven by a hydraulic motor powered by the blue system can supply limited electrical power. The airplane would be in Alternate Law and there would be limited instrumentation. The possibility of it dropping to Direct Law exists as speed is reduced and hydraulic power lost. At this point it gets a bit messy.

Under the circumstances experienced by this flight, with electrical power the flight control system would have remained in Normal Law and the APU would be providing backup "just in case", rather than powering the aircraft electrical system but in the time available and priorities considered, the crew would almost certainly not make a decision to rely upon windmilling engines.

If the engine(s) had not been supplying electrical power and the emergency generator was unable to supply electrical power, the batteries would supply sufficient power to support the flight control system. The RAT would power sufficient hydraulics to move the necessary surfaces but the flaps could not be extended, only the slats, as described above. It might have turned out slightly differently - bit faster; I believe touchdown was around 107kts, but again that's just from recollection - someone else will surely know and help out.

Further info: On battery-only flight, the battery is certified for 30 minutes but I would not trust that length of time. On an A320 series aircraft, if the APU or the APU generator is u/s and one loses an engine or engine generator in my opinion as a captain that is an emergency and a landing at the nearest suitable airport. The ECAM - LAND ASAP would be an amber, not red message.

The A320 is emminently flyable in Alternate or Direct Law. It becomes a "WYSIWYG" airplane without any of the autoflight system protections. It is not a problem to land in either mode.

[BOAC]

Way back in 'history'- around #1768 - Cosmo, I, JW and downin3 took a fair bit of flak ('not SOP' etc etc) for suggesting that it might be a good idea to keep it running for a while after take-off. I still think so. I reckon 3000'/after take-off checks would do me nicely. Stuff the fuel burn!

[golfyankeesierra]

When the A320 went into the Hudson River, the Captain deviated from the checklist cadence and quite appropriately fired up the APU, more or less immediately after the birds hit.

This action kept electricals (and hydraulics?) and retained(?) the FBW mode as NORMAL Law (????)
Nonsense,
all aircraft I flew have enough hydraulic output from a windmilling engine at clean speeds. Below speeds of typically 160-180 hydraulics are lost. You notice every time with an engine out that once reducing below those speeds, the hyd "low press" lights (Boeing) or secondary HYD/FCTL failures (Airbus) will kick in. Also battery power is sufficient for flight controls and primary instruments.
APU start is still important, especially to keep your position awareness as navigation displays (moving map) remain displayed

BTW Airbus goes to alternate law as a result of the "both engines out" condition, regardless of whether hydraulics and electrics are retained.
Not relevant here as flare mode is the same for alternate laws 1 or 2 or normal law.

[p51guy]

The term "flair reserve" would be what I would use to make a gentle touchdown as Sully did. Airliners are not designed to land in rivers so obviously the aft fuselage had damage but was minor. He did a great job and whoever said he hit the Hudson at over 700 FPM was wrong. We would all try to touch down with a negligable descent rate and it was obvious he did. We all know we would have to maintain over 700 FPM to do what he did to have the energy to flair and stop the descent. Why couldn't the NTSB? If I wasn't so old I would like to work for them but the fun stuff is probably done by the senior guys. I would be pulling up their last physical dates.

[Tipsy Barossa]

Sully did a good job under the circumstances but he had to thank his lucky stars that he had heroes/heroines on the Hudson coming over to effect a quick rescue. Had this been in a remote airport or open seas without the ferries and boats nearby, then any lost of lives or injuries would have caused a VERY DIFFERENT outcome. Then the very difficult questions would have come about the " ditching " switch. The insurance lawyers would be asking very very difficult questions.

The whole episode was caught on camera and the media had made Sully a hero...........Americans love heroes and I am sure this has made the FAA and NTSB shy away from very difficult questions. Make no mistake, Sully's navigational situation awareness was superb and he deserve the accolades for his piloting skills BUT THERE ARE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS!

In other countries the nit pickers in the regulatory and safety bodies may not be so kind.

[Jetjock330]

The underneath was ripped open by the water, therefore the ditching switch means nothing by closing the outflow valves, when water pours in through the damage.

[kinteafrokunta]

I guess the " scooping " motion ad the bottom of the aft empennage contacted water can cause the fuselage to rip apart. Had the outflow valve been close, it would have sealed off the hole and reduced resistance which cause the bottom aft fuselage to rip. Also the ditching switch closes other apertures as well. I must agree, the Americans love heroes and are definitely not going to take this one down like BA did to Captain Burkill. Remember, they also manufacture heroes and heroines out of Iraq and Afghanistan.

With the incident caught on tape and no loss of life, Sully is indeed the perfect poster boy! And deservedly so!

[Diamond Bob]

Airbus goes to alternate law as a result of the "both engines out" condition, regardless of whether hydraulics and electrics are retained.
Not relevant here as flare mode is the same for alternate laws 1 or 2 or normal law.

I believe it was posted in this thread that Airbus announced the plane was in normal law for the entire flight.

the aft fuselage had damage but was minor P51 guy -- The photos I saw showed significant damage in that the the skin was ripped off the bottom of the fuselage for about one quarter the length of the aircraft.

[PJ2]

Diamond Bob;
I believe it was posted in this thread that Airbus announced the plane was in normal law for the entire flight.
That is correct. The engines never actually failed, they just couldn't accelerate due to blade damage. Full hydraulics and electrical power were available until splashdown at about 130kts.

The NTSB Docket of all available materials associated with the investigation can be found here (http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/default.htm). Detailed photographs of the fuselage damage are available here (http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation/DCA09MA026/419640.pdf). I understand the NTSB will release the full report on May 10th.

PJ2

[misd-agin]

Tipsy Barosa (post 1990) -

What difficult questions are not being asked?

[woodyspooney]

Wrt the post that had the ditching switch been activated, it would have sealed of the outflow valves, ram inlets etc to prevent water ingestion. Does the switch really do all that ( sorry, not A320 rated )? If it does, I would agree with the poster that sealing off the orifices will help prevent drag forces from ripping open the bottom aft fuselage.

[bubbers44]

What drag forces? The last three pages of this thread are not readable. I don't think hitting that switch would have made any difference. They did the part of the ditching checklist they had time for and they ditched. Perfect.

[MATELO]

Had this been in a remote airport or open seas without the ferries and boats nearby....then probably the canadian geese wouldnt be there either, so there would not have been any problems at all.

[MATELO]

In other countries the nit pickers in the regulatory and safety bodies may not be so kind.

Which countries would that be?? And ask the passengers on Sullys flight if they can "nit pick", as those are the people that really count.

[bubbers44]

The descent angle at 700 FPM had to be reduced to almost zero at touchdown and they did an excellent job. The flare in the video looked perfect for a ditching. Read his book.

[AvMed.IN]

I suppose it all boils down to Situational Awareness (http://www.avmed.in/2011/03/lost-it-situational-awareness/) and Decision Making (http://www.avmed.in/2011/03/decision-making-in-aviation-classical-versus-naturalistic/) - a classic example of excellent airmanship!

[Flying Lawyer]

Tipsy The insurance lawyers would be asking very very difficult questions.
Which competent aviation lawyers on the other side would have had no difficulty answering.

Captain Sullenberger's book is worth reading.

FL