Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC

[DC-ATE]

I recall him saying, "MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY". In other words, three times.....by the book.

[BreezyDC]

Not quite a transcript, but full report with just about all quotes of the interviewees at Flight 1549: A Routine Takeoff Turns Ugly, Captain Sullenberger Recalls The Bird Strike And The Tense And Crucial Minutes That Followed - CBS News (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/08/60minutes/main4783580.shtml)

[JohnnyRocket]

I thought that this was a very interesting program to watch.

Of course, we all know what happened whether from the cockpit voice recorded or various "experts" but it was nice to hear from Captain Sully first-hand.

He is a very composed man it seems.

Katy Couric (who I really cannot stand), asked him if he prayed during the time that was left as he glided towards the water.

"No", Sully replied. "There were people at the back of the plane who were doing that for me!"

Great response.

Again, she asked him another "tabloidy-shock-horror-type" question...

"Did you think to yourself how are we going to get ourselves out of this?"

"No," Sully replied firmly. "My initial reaction was one of disbelief. How can this be happening?"

What a wonderful answer.

The most comic insight of the night was when Sully turned to his Co-pilot Jeff Skiles after landing on the water and said, "That wasn't as bad as I thought!"

The most moving part of the program was when the crew of 1549 met up with the 155 passengers and family in CLT.

"Thank you for saving my life... "

"Thank you so much from bringing my husband home to me..."

"Thank you for not making me a widow ...for allowing my 3 year old son to have a father."

"Thank you for keeping our family altogether."

A gem - every one.

You can watch the videos from the program here:
60 Minutes - Video, Reports, Profiles, Interviews - CBSNews.com (http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/60minutes/main3415.shtml)

[protectthehornet]

to me, the person I am really impressed with is DOREEN the "B" flight attendant.

[speedbirdconcorde]

In fact, MAYDAY-MAYDAY-MAYDAY !

So how many pages have been written on this particular thread regarding the use ( or not ) of this call ????

See...Sully said it himself ! Watch the interview. Oh how quickly folk jump to conclusions...

Not sure if Captain Sullenberger will decide to keep on flying...his life certainly wont be same from this moment on.. but one thing is for certain... many many people owe their lives to the man...

:ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

Not sure if Captain Sullenberger will decide to keep on flying...

You serious?

I thought there was a surgical operation to remove a pilot's hands from the control column :)

[Interflug]

In this interview, he is sitting in a chair in a studio, but his right hand is briefly shown and it looks like it sits right on the throttles. It's the hard wired default position for a Captain's right hand I guess. :)

[finncapt]

I listened to the interview and what struck me most was the lack of we.

It gives the impression that whilst he (the captain) was flying the a/c he was starting the apu and he was trying to restore power etc.

I hope if ever I was in a similar situation I would say we were (the first officer was) trying.....

[bubbers44]

The captain probably had more time to deal with helping the situation than the FO already overloaded with restart checklists, etc so I can see why he was turning ignition switches on, starting the APU and other things that might help the situation. Survival was what was their concern, not who's job it was.

[Southernboy]

Yes I was surprised at that & wondered if the radio transmissions were made by FO Skiles but it appears not, so he did the radio too.

also the cabin crew didn't know they were going into water, I guess the FD crew simply didn't have time.

[finncapt]

I was trying to imply that he could have mentioned in the interview that the first officer was working like a one armed paperhanger as well.

Instead, I think, he didn't mention him once.

[Madbob]

To AMF and PTH I would say this as both a former RAF-trained pilot, and subsequently as an ATCO. Very few ATCO's nowadays both in the civil and military have any actual flying experience other than perhaps in a single piston ac.

I can remember when aircrew on ground tours often serverd at ATCO's and their experience was very useful on many occasions. Having had in my flying training experience of such things as a QGH, (flame out descent through cloud to those not familiar with the Q-code), 1:1's (Hunter/Hawk) and icing let-downs for the Canberra, which required special care, this immediately makes you appreciate just how little time there is in such a situation as faced by Sully and his crew.

Runway 13 at La Guardia seems as though it "might" have been an option with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight....this would only have worked if it had been offered by ATC straightaway and this assumes that ATC fully understood just how dire was the emergency and knew that from 3,000 ft (agl) the Airbus would fly roughly 9 track miles. As most of us know, this gliding range is longest in a straight line and if required to turn the distance one can fly is reduced. It also assumes that it was clear and available without delay....no vehicles, no work-in-progress, no crossing traffic, ac under tow etc. etc.

One also has to consider obstacles on approach and the absence of an acceptable under-shoot. Going for a ditching in the Hudson removed much of the guesswork of whether you are going to "make it" or not and the risk of "collateral" damage if it all went to cock was minimised - Sully didn't want to repeat 9/11.....

What this shows to me is that Sully acted decicively, showed captaincy of the highest order, outstanding airmanship and knew how best to use the energy he had left to manoevre the ac to a survivable crash/landing. He continued to "fly the aircraft" and did not allow external distractions to spoil the outcome. This requires total situational awareness.

The final factor was that he was "lucky" that it was day and VMC but when the chips are down its is amazing how exceptional pilots somehow make their own luck in situations like these. I am in no doubt that Sully's military background helped him no end.......

MB

[barit1]

I listened to the interview and what struck me most was the lack of we.

I'll give Sullenberger the benefit of the doubt, and chalk this up to the cutting-room floor. The media are all about hero-worship (the soloist gets all the adulation, the techie roadies who provide first-class support are 'way in the background), and 60 Minutes is an example of this.

Don't forget, what you saw and heard was a piece of bigtime entertainment media. Any resemblance to reality is purely coincidental. :(

[wings folded]

I am only a lapsed PPL and frequent SLF, so you professionals can shoot me down if you want, but whether he did or did not call three times "Mayday" can and will be established in due course, but is it so important?

I would rather have the successful outcome we all know about, than to hear "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday.... Bang....." on the recordings.

I was taught as a PPL to "aviate, navigate, communicate" in that order.

He "rivered" (can't call it "landed") because he successfully aviated.

He missed some rather densely populated buildings in the vicinity because he navigated.

He let ATC know he had a problem succintly, even if his terminology may in the future be judged to be not quite textbook. ATC seemed to grasp it pretty quickly. Is it not that which counts?

And of course when I say "he", I really mean "they" because he was not alone at the front.

Indeed, the whole team in the aircraft seem to have been pretty good at their jobs.

Heros? No. Just extremely skilled and dedicated and worthy of respect

[choxon]

I agree, from everything I have seen and heard on the ditching you would think that US Air have a dispensation to fly the 320 with single pilot. Without being 100% sure I dont think "Sully" EVER mentioned let alone praised his cockpit companion. I thought those types were long dead.....I wonder what the press would have said if God forbid, 100 or so pax drowned?????

[Graybeard]

Captured 60' on tivo/dvr, but haven't watched it yet. Probably won't now if there was no WE in the program, whether due to editing or ego.

Even if F/O Skiles had turned into a blathering idiot, which I highly doubt, it would be right for the Capt. to praise him in public.

GB

[OFBSLF]

TV interviews like the one on 60 Minutes involve hours of taping, which is then heavily edited into just a few minutes that is shown on TV. What you are seeing is what CBS chose out of that footage, and is not necessarily representative of the bulk of what the Capt. Sullenberger said. He may well have spent quite a bit of time praising his co-pilot, all of which wound up on the figurative cutting room floor. Don't blame the Captain for the network's editing.

[dazdaz]

Earlier posts suggest 'the first successful ditching on water' that may be true. But let us not forget, the Hudson river was like a mill pond, calm. I doubt very much that taking this event to the open sea (3ft) swells would have had the same outcome.

[lomapaseo]

TV interviews like the one on 60 Minutes involve hours of taping, which is then heavily edited into just a few minutes that is shown on TV. What you are seeing is what CBS chose out of that footage, and is not necessarily representative of the bulk of what the Capt. Sullenberger said. He may well have spent quite a bit of time praising his co-pilot, all of which wound up on the figurative cutting room floor. Don't blame the Captain for the network's editing.

I agree and would add another view as well. One takes some risk when facing cameras of foot & mouth disease or more delicately a mis-speak. Your company, your union and indeed your fellow workers may not want to have to defend this and thus unrehearsed statements are more easily stated as the singular "I"

[Um... lifting...]

Some of you really need to get lives and stop parsing every second of a television interview to determine what the man thought or may have said.

Sullenberger told reporters the rescue wouldn't have been possible without the rest of his crew.
"Much of this in the least three weeks has been about one person and I want to correct the record — this was a crew effort," said Sullenberger. "Our crew of five and the first responders as well as the cooperation of the passengers made this possible."
Bloomberg said the incident reminded passengers that flight crews "are true professionals and not just there to serve drinks and snacks — they are there to keep us safe."
The crew was also given dinner and tickets to the Broadway show Chicago.
Earlier, Sullenberger made the rounds of morning television news shows.
He told the "Early Show" on CBS that he felt there was too much attention on him, and "not enough on the team."

[CAPTDOUG]

Part 1 "I was sure I could do it"
"I Was Sure I Could Do It" Video - CBSNews.com (http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4784012n)

Part 2 Saving 155 lives
Saving 155 Lives Video - CBSNews.com (http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4784010n)

Part 3 The Reunion
An Emotional Reunion Video - CBSNews.com (http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4783966n)

[cap10lobo]

"I listened to the interview and what struck me most was the lack of we".

This was my thought too. But most of this is probably rehearsed by US-Air PR department..
We´ll see!

[alph2z]

I hope this hasn't been posted before.

AWE1549 US AIRWAYS RADIUS OF "GLIDE" WITHIN LAGUARDIA AND TETERBORO. "Glide" down to 300 ft ASL from 2000 ft ASL turn point. 17.77km "glide".

Airports near markers 3 and 5.

http://lh6.ggpht.com/_peTNxy6Ebzk/SZCDOSmwqeI/AAAAAAAACFU/PfMXfFb3vls/s800/awe1549.jpg
.

[Mark in CA]

The crew of 1549 received keys to New York City today.

According to reports, "During the event with the mayor, Sullenberger emphasized that while he's gotten a lot of the credit for the emergency landing, it was a team effort, and he praised the crew, passengers and first responders."

[misd-agin]

alph2z - From your point showing 1200' and 194 kts 4.5 n.m. to RWY 13 at LGA.

Airbus supposedly states you can glide 2.5-2.7 n.m. per thousand feet. Boeing gives about 3 n.m. per thousand.

Using that as an example you could go 3.6 n.m.'s, no wind, from the 1200'/194 kts position. Unfortunately the runway's 4.5 nm away.

It's interesting to see if they could have made it, but even if they'd started at the 2000'/202 kts position it's exactly 6 n.m. to RWY 13, which given the glide information provided would be the exact distance required to make the runway.

That's not considering wind or the loss in distance made good due to the 90 degrees of heading change needed to make LGA Rwy 13.

[protectthehornet]

the gliding distance chart above is fascinating...from the 1600' spot, it would seem that a modified straight in to runway 24 at TEB might have been possible...one could follow interstate 80 (freeway) and land there if miscalculations...cutting short the half circle on I80.

one must always ask of the sure thing...hudson was the sure thing...this chart/diagram may be wrong...funny how after the 1200 foot mark, it goes up to 1300 feet!!!!!!!!!

oh well

[Bigdave599]

Since we appear to be about to get into another "could they have made it to a runway" discussion, has anyone else noticed that the radar-reported positions of the aircraft are wrong? The video of the splashdown from the camera on the west bank clearly shows them coming down upstream of the Intrepid, which comes into view some seconds later as they drift down the current. But at this point the radar plot shows them somewhere between 400 and 300 ft up, suggesting a touchdown about a mile further on.

My point is that the achievable glide range was less than the radar plot suggests.

Superb job by all involved!

[patrickal]

From his 1300 ft position, there is no way he makes TEB without some really serious turns, which will cost altitude. Maybe he could make LGA IF he has RWY 13, which he did not. They had shut down departures on RWY 4, but I did not hear any request from ATC to stop arrivals, so RWY 31 was still being used. Even if they gave him RWY 13, he still has to make another 90 degree turn, fly over some of the highest terrain in Manhattan, the Tri Borough Bridge, the Northeast Rail Corridor bridge, drop his gear, and hit a 7,000' runway dead on. If he comes up short and lands in the East River, the currents at that point of the river are some of the worst you can encounter. And there are no ferries in the area. His decision was by far the smartest and lowest risk possible. 2nd guessing what he did makes no sense at all, because all of the other choices were much higher risk.

[protectthehornet]

I've seen too many posts about atc giving someone a runway...clearing someone for that runway

I remind you all that the FAR's say that an aircraft in distress has the right of way over all other aircraft.

YOU take the runway YOU need when YOU are in trouble...letting ATC know your choice makes it easier for them to send others around or delay takeoff

[protectthehornet]

airnav.com has a method of getting approach plates for TEB...there is a VOR24 apch and an ILS 6 apch that might prove interesting...of course the ILS is for runway 6, but it shows obstacles along the centerline of 6/24...so too the VOR apch

now, some clever guy might superimpose it on the above glide chart for some interesting results.

[pattern_is_full]

Bottom line on glide: Making either LGA or TEB would have been an "experiment" with no bailout option if things began to look bad at 500 feet and at least 155 lives at stake, not counting unfortunate souls beneath the glide path (or lack thereof).

And would have ended in a touchdown with zero reverse thrust available (and maybe no spoilers/speedbrakes) on not especially long runways with perhaps more than normal speed and less than normal flaps. (Someone will haul out the book here and 'prove' that a 320 can stop in x-many feet with no reverse. Fine. Willing to bet your life?)

Bottom line on "heroes": The crew were simply doing their jobs, competently.

But after a decade of extremely public incompetence in many walks of life, people simply doing their jobs competently looks pretty heroic.

[CHfour]

alph2z - From your point showing 1200' and 194 kts 4.5 n.m. to RWY 13 at LGA.

Airbus supposedly states you can glide 2.5-2.7 n.m. per thousand feet. Boeing gives about 3 n.m. per thousand.

Using that as an example you could go 3.6 n.m.'s, no wind, from the 1200'/194 kts position. Unfortunately the runway's 4.5 nm away.

It's interesting to see if they could have made it, but even if they'd started at the 2000'/202 kts position it's exactly 6 n.m. to RWY 13, which given the glide information provided would be the exact distance required to make the runway.

That's not considering wind or the loss in distance made good due to the 90 degrees of heading change needed to make LGA Rwy 13.


The manufacturer's gliding distances vs hight are probably correct but if I had a double flameout I'd use about 1.5 x hight at most to allow for the much steeper glide in landing configuration and also the need to aim to land deep, rather than in the usual area. At 1200ft AGL I wouldn't count on getting more than 2 miles.

[NigelOnDraft]

I hope this hasn't been posted before
AWE1549 US AIRWAYS RADIUS OF "GLIDE" WITHIN LAGUARDIA AND TETERBOROAnybody who has paid more than a passing interest in this accident knows 1549 could have quite easily made it to, and crashed at / near / beyond, TET and LGA.

Nobody has yet ventured to suggest quite "how" the crew could have made a successful landing there, "what training / procedures / drills" they had to do so, or "why" they would have seriously considered it :ok:

NoD

[Intruder]

Not only that, but it appears few (if any) of the "go to Teterboro" advocates seem to have factored landing gear drag into their "could have made it" equations...

[protectthehornet]

reverse thrust would not be needed for a landing at either TEB or LGA...indeed, the great majority of stopping power on a dry runway is wheel brakes.

I recall doing power off glides in simulator training and landing on runway 33 at DCA.

As far as bailout options for going to TEB, interstate 80 approximates a left base all the way to the runway and could be used for landing.

This all doesn't mean that the hudson wasn't a good option...but it should make us all aware that we may have to make a tough decision and not to sit to dumb fat and happy all the time.

By the way, one could land gear up at TEB if the glide didn't permit gear extension.

[killerseb]

I was happy to watch 60 minutes but to a certain extent I felt the personal stories (passengers, flight attendents) were more interesting than the 'technical account' of the landing. I think that the only two things that are now confirmed from the pilot from his account is that he turned on the APU (I remember a little debate on this in earlier parts of this thread) and that he did say the mayday mayday mayday. The rest was the usual heroic accounts that TV programs love to make for us. I really disliked the woman doing the interview and as others have said earlier, who knows how this thing was edited !
I think the next valuable step would be a "technical" interview of Sully and his copilot in a serious aviation mag, with real questions... Could that happen soon ? Even not being a pro, I would love to read it.

KS

[barit1]

Sullenberger, Skiles, & crew were on NBC Nightly News tonight; and Sully was explicitly crediting the whole crew with the success of the mission. No absence of "we" in this interview.

And while I have no great love affair with NBC, I thought they handled the story much more credibly than did Katie and the CBS "60 Minutes" gang. :rolleyes:

[bubbers44]

I have no belief Sully didn't look at landing downwind at LGA but from his view it was too risky so took the Hudon river. He saved himself and 154 other people by doing what he did. Plan 2 may have cost them their lives.

[misd-agin]

NigelOnDraft - Nobody has yet ventured to suggest quite "how" the crew could have made a successful landing there, "what training / procedures / drills" they had to do so, or "why" they would have seriously considered it.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

How? Exactly how they reached the runway, fly/glide there. In this case they could have extended the gear on short final if they had enough energy.

What training/procedures/drills they had to do? Same as on every other landing - aimpoint, airspeed, drag management. Dead stick landings have gotten so routinue, and boring, that it's been a long time since anyone's been interested in doing one with leftover simulator time.

Why? Walk away vs. relying on ferry boats.

Unfortunately at 1530 the highways were starting to fill with afternoon traffic. It will be interesting to see if CA Sullenberger mentions traffic on the highways reducing that as an option.

[None]

60 Minutes: The aft F/As statement that a Pax opened one of the aft doors (even though she said not to) was interesting. The pax did not assess the exit, yet just opened the door. Water then started into the aft cabin, and they could not shut the door (no surprise there). This is another item for me to think about.

Teterboro: I operated out of TEB for 3 years before going to an airline. A small error in glidepath while gliding into TEB would be...well...not good at all.

Geese: I see Geese in a formation of 30+ often during the flyway months (fall and spring). I would not be surprised to learn that the formation that day had 50+ Geese. If I see this while flying, I will more than likely make a PIREP...something I might not have done previously.

[llondel]

By the way, one could land gear up at TEB if the glide didn't permit gear extension.

Plenty of fuel still on board, could have made it very interesting. The game of determining whether it was possible to land at LGA or TEB is fun for the simulator where you can hit the reset button and try again, but when you only get one go and you haven't had plenty of practice, you wouldn't want to do it. Just like the BA038 incident where it was later shown that with prior knowledge and exactly the correct configuration, they could have made the runway. You don't get chance to go around in a glider.

[DingerX]

Bigdave's right (welcome, by the way). Those who are relying on the "map plot" have some very obvious bad data. According to witnesses and the video recordings posted here, the plane hit the water just past the "400 foot" mark. If you're going to use obviously garbage data, you'll need to make some adjustments for the "Harlem Thermal"

[cap10lobo]

There is a minimum speed for the RAT to give enough press for L/G operation. So how late can you actually lower it on final? What it is for the A320, I dont know.
Anyway, NOBODY can say how a person reacts or what/why they decided on exactly that, untill faced with the situation.
Training, experince, CRM and well rested will certainly help though..

[runawayedge]

As a non professional pilot I find some of the recent posts by 'professional' pilots astounding for the following reasons;

1. The captain found himself in a situation, made a decision and STUCK to that decision.

2. Yes there may have been another option and yes it MAY have worked, but why introduce problems, turns, ATC, landing gear and drag, flying a crippled airliner over high terrain and densley populated areas, with pitch (flap and speedbrake) the only method of controlling airspeed, get it wrong and your short or long. The crew followed basic airmanship aviate, navigate, communicate.

3. The Hudson river is a long clear relatively unobstructed area (yes water) but with skill as was the case you have lots of time to judge the rate of descent, airspeed etc. to have a reasonable chance of pulling it off, without worrying about additional ground casualties.

4. It may not have been a factor in the cockpit thought process, but they turned the fuel to their advantage, instead of worrying about crashing on terra firma, the fuel assisted in keeping the aircraft afloat.

5. Lastly, some posters pointing to the fact that they were not heroes, and that they were merely doing their job. How much time is spent on SEPs in the sim practicing complete power failure with little height or airspeed?

My points may not be valid, but hopefully worthy of discussion!

[FrequentSLF]

4. It may not have been a factor in the cockpit thought process, but they turned the fuel to their advantage, instead of worrying about crashing on terra firma, the fuel assisted in keeping the aircraft afloat.

I cannot understand how the fuel assisted in keeping the aircraft afloat...fuel specific weight is higher than air...less fuel higher buoyancy

[barit1]

4. It may not have been a factor in the cockpit thought process, but they turned the fuel to their advantage, instead of worrying about crashing on terra firma, the fuel assisted in keeping the aircraft afloat.

The crew had no option here; and in any event, IF GIVEN A CHOICE, empty tanks (i.e. full of air) would have been a better flotation medium.

But there's an interesting side issue - I don't hear any mention of fuel spillage, so the A320 tank integrity seems pretty robust. :ok:

[runawayedge]

Thank you for pointing out the relative specific gravities, point 4 was incidental. Fuel yes is heavier than air, but is lighter than water. However, the main points I was making were 1-3 and the comment re training, funny at times how the main points are overlooked. Regarding the integrity of the tanks, I don't think it came into question as the wings remained intact!

[Super VC-10]

Fuel may be heavier than air, but it is lighter than water, which is why the "excess" fuel assisted in providing buoyancy.

[dvv]

barit1 (http://www.pprune.org/members/107138-barit1), a minor fuel leak was reported around the time the aircraft was being fished out of the Hudson.

[FCeng84]

One fact about this incident that I learned from the 60 Minutes report this past Sunday is that they got the APU running. Sully mentioned starting the APU as one of the first steps he took following loss of power. The RAT may have deployed, but they also had APU power so continued flight control was possible and gear extension would have been possible if they had tried for a dry landing.

As to the discussion of empty vs. full tanks one related factor is touchdown speed. Sully mentioned that he was trying to manage speed for the slowest possible touchdown without excessive pitch attitude. It is of course an academic discussion, but if the fuel load were less, the overall gross weight would have been less and he could have further reduced speed prior to touchdown. The aft cabin crew member reported a rather violent touchdown during which she was injured. Had the airplane been lighter weight, landed slower, and thus landed softer she might have been better able to prevent a passenger from opening one of the rear doors. Although she tried to close it that proved impossible with water pouring in. That door being open caused the airplane to sink much faster than it would have otherwise. Fortunately it stayed afloat long enough.

[thx1169]

Interesting Slide Show of the recovery of the US Airways Airbus . Nice closeups of the fuselage and other aircraft parts. The interior shots are surreal, looks like there are still a few items in the over head bins!

The salvage of flight 1549 | stephen mallon's industrial photography (http://www.stephenmallon.com/gallery.html?gallery=The%20salvage%20of%20flight%201549)

cheers,
thx1169

[Pax Vobiscum]

Nevertheless, halfway through the piece, I began to wonder if Sullenberger had said too much. “The first few nights [after the accident] were the worst,” he told us. “When the what-ifs started.”

This made me - and presumably everyone else sitting at home - think, what if what?

“Do you regret anything that you did?” asked Couric, also clearly intrigued.

“No,” Sullenberger replied. “Not now.”

Not now?

She didn't push him any farther. But now I can't stop thinking: what exactly does he think he didn't do right, given that he successfully landed an aircraft with no functioning engines on the Hudson River, with all 155 passengers surviving? Did he forget to activate some kind of built-in goose cannon? Did he throw down birdseed before taking off? Sadly, hundreds of lawyers across America will no doubt be thinking exactly the same thing.

Chris Ayres - LA Notebook (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/chris_ayres/article5697001.ece)

[Stearperson]

BARNSTORMERS.COM eFLYER - Flat Water is Useful (http://www.barnstormers.com/eFLYER/2009/053-eFLYER-FA01-FlatWater.html)

[Lost in Saigon]

Nevertheless, halfway through the piece, I began to wonder if Sullenberger had said too much. “The first few nights [after the accident] were the worst,” he told us. “When the what-ifs started.”

This made me - and presumably everyone else sitting at home - think, what if what?

“Do you regret anything that you did?” asked Couric, also clearly intrigued.

“No,” Sullenberger replied. “Not now.”

Not now?

She didn't push him any farther. But now I can't stop thinking: what exactly does he think he didn't do right, given that he successfully landed an aircraft with no functioning engines on the Hudson River, with all 155 passengers surviving? Did he forget to activate some kind of built-in goose cannon? Did he throw down birdseed before taking off? Sadly, hundreds of lawyers across America will no doubt be thinking exactly the same thing.

The only thing he could have, or should have, done is to tell the the crew and passengers that he was planning on ditching the aircraft on the water. Even 1 minute notice could have been enough time for most to don their life jackets. It is very lucky that no one drown after slipping off the wing into the freezing water.

That being said, I doubt I would have thought of it, or had the time to do it either. (20/20 hindsight)

[snowfalcon2]

To continue the 20/20 hindsight comments...

I've been playing with the idea that maybe a touchdown closer to either shore would have been beneficial.
The thought behind this idea is that the most likely outcome of the ditching would have been that many passengers would have had to swim ashore. So it would pay off to minimize the swimming distance.
In the event the ferry boats were there almost instantly, which surely saved a great many lives.

On the other hand, aiming for a touchdown close to the riverbank creates a new set of significant risks. So I guess Sully's decision was the right one also in this matter.

[lomapaseo]

I've been playing with the idea that maybe a touchdown closer to either shore would have been beneficial.


I'm not sure that I would even want to navigate a boat parallel and near the shore of a large river in the US. They seem to be a constant cluster of rotting pier pilings just below the water surface capable of ripping a boat apart moving in the direction of the river.

[protectthehornet]

I've piloted LGA-CLT often. And while turning over the GW Bridge looked south upon the river and thought what a nice place to land...if I had to.

The actual skill set in a water touchdown is practiced on every normal landing. Nose up, wings level...touchdown above stall while plane is fully controlable.

I would like to think that every ATP in the country would have had as good a result as flt 1549.

Ditching closer to the shore was a thought I am sure...but a ditching near the boats was vital. Sailors are trained for ''man overboard'' drills all the time.

I really think that all pilots should be warned that they must always look for a place to land...no matter how many engines their plane has. Instead of sitting there complaining about something...start the process of always looking for a place to land.

One that you are over right now, one within gliding distance for your altitude ahead of you along your course. In this way, there are at least 2 in mind. Airports of course are high on the list, open field, and contrary to one thought above, FREEWAYS. Every 50 miles on the interstate highway system in the USA, there is at least 5000' of straight road that might be useful for a landing.

When I drove along I80, just west of the GW bridge (after/west of the huge half circle) the area struck me as a perfect place to land...of course traffic would complicate that. So, dive down low with speed and hopefully drivers would see you and stop, giving you a fighting chance.

Fields directly below you might be reached by that old standby, the steep spiral into a traffic pattern.

So many of the skills that you learned , or should have learned, as a private pilot, or commercial pilot do come in handy...but you must practice them , IF ONLY IN YOUR MIND.

I also frequently flew out of DCA and knew that I might have to put my two engine jet right down into the Potomac river.

Now is the time for you to consider your options around the routes you fly. I hope it never happens, but if YOU, the PILOT isn't ready...who will be?

And so what if your simulator time isn't used for power off landings...use your mind...act like a pilot.

AND READ THE DAMN SECTION IN THE AIM about ditching!

[jugofpropwash]

I would assume that if Capt. Sully was second-guessing himself, he was simply wondering if he COULD have made it to an airport and landed safely - the folks HERE certainly seem to be doing a lot of that.

[protectthehornet]

Home »*CBS*Evening*News

Capt. Sully Worried About Airline Industry

CBS Evening News: Flight 1549 Pilot Exclusively Tells Katie Couric His Fear About Future Pilots

Feb. 10, 2009 | by Katie Couric

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During Katie Couric's exclusive interview with Capt. Chesley Sullenberger, the hero of U.S. Airways Flight 1549 expressed concern over the airline industry's ability to attract experienced pilots. | Share/Embed


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Honoring Heroes (1:35)
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Sully's Personal Side (3:28)
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Behind The Scenes

See some candid snapshots of Katie Couric's interview with Capt. Sullenberger and his crew.

Interactive

Miracle On The Hudson

All survive as commercial airliner makes emergency landing in Hudson River in New York.

Timeline:


Takes off from LaGuardia at 3:24pm
Pilot reports "double bird strike" at 3:28
The plane hits the water at 3:31

Stories:

A Routine Takeoff Turns Ugly
Saving 155 Souls In Minutes
An Emotional Reunion
Friends For Life
Six Secrets Of Surviving A Plane Crash

Interactive & Photos:

Flight 1549 Interacive
Behind The Scenes Photos

(CBS)*The amazing story of US Airways Flight 1549 might have frequent fliers thinking more about something often taken for granted: the experience of the pilot. The captain of Flight 1549 told CBS News anchor Katie Couric that he's concerned the industry will soon have trouble attracting experienced pilots. The reason? Money.

"One way of looking at this might be that, for 42 years, I've been making small regular deposits in this bank of experience: education and training," said US Airways Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger. "And on January 15, the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very large withdrawal."

Sullenberger is uncharacteristically worried. He's worried that when it comes to the bank of experience for airline pilots, there may someday be a significant shortage.

"I don't know a single professional pilot who would recommend that their children follow in their footsteps," he said.

There was a time when airline pilot was a coveted job - glamorous, respected, with plenty of benefits.

But now: "The airline employees have been hit by an economic tsunami. Pay cuts, loss of pensions, increased hours every day, days per week, days per month," Sullenberger said. "It's a heavy burden."

Last year alone, more than 6,000 commercial pilots were either furloughed or permanently laid off.

Couricsaid: "What effect do you think that is having on the industry itself and on the people's it's attracting?"

"I know some of our pilots, who have been laid off, have chosen not to return," Sullenberger said. "I can speak personally, for me and my family, that my decision to remain in this profession that I love has come at a cost to me and my family."

Sully says five years ago he and the rest of his fellow pilots at US Airways gave back almost $6.8 billion in pension, wages and other concessions, to keep the airline flying.

And while annual salaries can average anywhere from $37,000 for a first officer and well into the six figures for a captain, the shrinking workforce means pilots are often spread very thin.

As Capt. James Ray of the U.S. Airline Pilots Association said: "Twenty years ago, the average airline pilot would maybe work, oh, 70 to 80 hours, about three times a month. Now, that pilot's working 70 to 80 hours every week," he said.

"It started with deregulation in 1978. The onset of low-cost carriers really started to put stress on the system," said Peter Goelz, the former managing director of the National Transportation Safety Board. "Then you couple that with 9/11, the spike in fuel costs, you've reallygot the prescription for a very challenged industry."

The majority of pilots hired today are civilians coming out of flight school, who began their career at smaller airlines. And few have the military background Sullenberger had flying for the Air Force.

In 1992, roughly 90 percent of those hired by major carriers had flown for the military. By last year, fewer than 30 percent had.

"I think that there will always be people who want to do this," Sullenberger said. "It just may not be the same people who are doing it now."

"Are you concerned that that means if another situation like this one comes up in the future, you won't have as qualified a pilot flying the plane?" Couricasked.

"That just follows doesn't it?" Sullenberger said.

But despite the harsh economic realities, for the first time in jet aviation history, U.S. commercial carriers have gone two consecutive years without a crash fatality.

When contracted about Sullenberger's concerns, the Air Transport Association, which represents the principle U.S. carriers, had no comment.

The story of Flight 1549 has been a boost to the country. But it's also given those who work in the struggling industry a shot in the arm.

"Probably the most important words I've heard have been from my peers. That I have made them proud," Sullenberger said. "That they feel pride in themselves - a pride in their profession they hadn't felt for years. Sometimes decades. And they also tell me, especially ones at my airline who know me, that they were glad that I was the one flying that flight that day."

"Why does that make you feel so good?" Couricsaid.

"Their praise isn't given easily or readily," Sullenberger said.

But this pilot hopes his moment in the spotlight will remind the airlines - and those who fly - that attracting those with the right stuff may make all the difference.

© MMIX, CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.

[Mark in CA]

Jeffrey Skiles is scheduled tonight (Feb 10) on the U.S. public broadcasting TV program, Charlie Rose, an in-depth interview format program, definitely several cuts above the commercial networks. You can view the interview within the next day or so here:

Charlie Rose - Home (http://www.charlierose.com/)

[speedbirdconcorde]

"One way of looking at this might be that, for 42 years, I've been making small regular deposits in this bank of experience: education and training," said US Airways Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger. "And on January 15, the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very large withdrawal."

Indeed...flying an aircraft is one thing....dealing with an immediate emergency on a level such as Sullys ( with no option to dwell on the moment for a few weeks ! ) is something else. Text books and sims only provide part of the solution...experience ( and a little luck ) is a big player in such an outcome but unfortunately these two variables are not available to everyone.

This time it all worked out for the best.....

[alph2z]

You're assuming that the airplane had no thrust at all. I did wrap the word glide with quotes. All I did was take the available data, right or wrong, and extrapolate it to produce a radius around the 2000 ft ASL point. I make no assumptions regarding, or lack there-of, his options.

Remember, the plane still had some thrust. I used the flightaware data of the actual flight and not from a handbook, for better or for worst. If you have better data pls do post it. One suggestion is to try to figure out the error in the radar data pts; filter/process them. Maybe some of the radar data points are from far away radars and some are from close by. Maybe consider radar beam tilt and angular errors in your calcs. Maybe, use data from one radar only.

I'm happy they ditched in the water. Future flights now know that a proper ditching is possible.

It's too bad that the crew didn't mention, to my knowledge, that it was great that the plane didn't break up, and congratulate the A320 plane, it's designers, and government specs.

Apparently the back door was opened by a hysterical female passenger, in front of the stewardess*, which allowed the quick flooding of the tail.

* The "blonde" one that now refuses to wear her uniform to interviews.

see cbs 60 minutes interviews (5 parts) YouTube - nypdcar1's Channel (http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=nypdcar1&view=videos)

misd-agin: .....Airbus supposedly states you can glide 2.5-2.7 n.m. per thousand feet. Boeing gives about 3 n.m. per thousand.

Using that as an example you could go 3.6 n.m.'s, no wind, from the 1200'/194 kts position. Unfortunately the runway's 4.5 nm away.

It's interesting to see if they could have made it, but even if they'd started at the 2000'/202 kts position it's exactly 6 n.m. to RWY 13, which given the glide information provided would be the exact distance required to make the runway......

[AAKEE]

I can se an idea of calculating if it would have been theoretically possible to reach an airport, just for 'fun'.

IRL, when all both engines quit you have to make a rather quick desition that you believe will make you stay alive. @ low altitude there´s usually not so many options to choose from, and if you did make the choise and then another option comes visible you would have to have good reason to change the landing spot.
I´d say the crew did a perfect job, and I dont think that Sully wonder if (or should wonder about) he could have reached an airport safe. Remember that 'almost reaching' an airport probably would give a very tragic outcome. Even reaching an airport but not lined up with the runway could be bad.

I fly both fixed wing and helis, I work as a military heli pilot. @ flight school and for annual training a common way of learning the pilot a lesson is to cut the helis engines close enough for a place not perfect but survivable and then there would be a decoy (the perfect field for an autorotation) but that place is just beyond reachable range. If you swallow the bait you find yourself short of altitude over a big forrest or so about 2-300m short of the decoy. Lesson learned is to choose a spot 'good enough' and stick with the plan.

Anyone remember the SAS 'gottröra' MD81 accident/emergeny landing the 27th december 1991 ? Ice on both wing came loose and qiut both eninges at low altitide (about 4000ft if my memory still works). They where IMC and I think cloudbase was between 1000-2000 feet or so.
The captain got some kind of 'incapatity' and didnt do the work 100%, but another off duty MD81 captain rushed forward and helped the crew with the emergency prodedures.

[golfyankeesierra]

The captain got some kind of 'incapatity' and didnt do the work 100%, but another off duty MD81 captain rushed forward and helped the crew with the emergency prodedures.
Wait a minute, that's some accusation! You might be confused with SAS' improper training.
Contributory causes were: The pilots were not trained to identify and eliminate engine surging; ATR-which was unknown within SAS - was activated and increased the engine power without the pilot's knowledge. (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19911227-0&lang=de)

[protectthehornet]

Yes, the crew was great on letterman. Skiles was very funny and it comes out that HE HAS MORE FLYING TIME than Sully does.

Again, in my view, the real hero is the aft flight attendant...doreen. 38 years with USAIR/allegeny. IF the back doors had been opened by the passengers, I am sure the outcome would have had at least a dozen drowned in the tail.

Oddly enough, the crew was also on Larry King at the same time due to repeats...I was switching back and forth between the two.

Doreen, on letterman, reminded me of Teri Garr in the good old days.

I truly hope the whole crew does not go back to line flying and is given a nice training gig or full pay forever doing nothing. Sully, if you read this, quit while you are ahead.(this is not meant as anything in a negative way...one only gets so much luck, even with experience and skill)

[idle bystander]

Look, this is not a criticism, but I'm interested that the cabin crew in the interviews all say they didn't know until they were down that this was to be a "landing on water" (ha, ha). Is this SOP (don't frighten the SLF, who most of them, like me before this, probably think that that's a euphemism for "crash in water")? Or were the guys at the pointy end just too busy?

[wiggy]

Probably depends on different airlines procedures. In our outfit if time is available the process is known as a "planned emergency" and we would try to carry out a some sort of Cabin crew briefing ...I guess a double engine failure at 30 West at Flight Level 380 might just fall into that category.........:ooh:

However if time is limited ( certainly the case here!) it becomes an "Unplanned Emergency" :eek: All the Cabin Crew really needed to know is that there's going to be some form of hard landing very soon and therefore they and the passengers need to be braced for impact....so all they'll get in that case is a "brace, brace" call.....IMHO in that case ( short time frame) you don't want to mention a landing on water - you want the crew and pax braced for impact, not trying to don lifejackets at the moment of touchdown.

[Super VC-10]

Alph2z, the "blonde" flight attendant (as you put it) did not refuse to wear her uniform.

If you watched the programme, she said that she didn't feel ready to wear it yet. Doreen Welsh was the most seriously injured on that aircraft, she, (and the 154 others) has been through a traumatic experience. I for one don't blame her one bit for saying that she doesn't feel ready to wear her uniform yet.

I suppose a comparison can be made to having a car crash. Some people can get straight into another car and drive again. Others have to steel themselves before getting back behind the wheel, some may take a while before they can do it, and there are some who may feel that they can never drive again.

Cut the lady some slack and let her recover in her own time and in her own way. :ok:

[chuks]

It isn't a "resource" if it isn't available, is it? As in, no time to use the cabin crew in any way except to tell them to brace for impact. I am sure the flight crew would have done more if they had more time available but what they did obviously sufficed.

This second-guessing seems to be function of time. Right after the ditching in the river everyone was just amazed and full of admiration. Now, with plenty of time some folks have come up with such good ideas! Of course I would love to have seen them come up with something right then and there, when most people in the general population would have reacted with simple, stunned disbelief if they even noticed that there was some sort of problem at all while there was still time to sort out a solution.

Even many pilots would probably not have come up with such a happy outcome, I bet, first figuring out a ditching and then doing one so well.

If the cabin crew had not been informed it was a ditching, well, looking out the windows probably told them that anyway so that they, too, performed very well.

Really, what is there in this to carp about?

By the way, that Pan Am ditching was prefaced with plenty of time to prepare where this crew had almost no time at all. I don't think you can compare the two except that they were both successful ditchings.

Here's a New York joke for you:

A Jewish mother is at the beach on Coney Island with her five year-old all togged out in his sailor suit. The little boy is playing at the water's edge. Suddenly a huge wave washes the tyke out into deep water, when the desperate mother utters a frantic prayer to God to save her poor child.

In the very next second another huge wave deposits the bedraggled child back on the beach somewhat the worse for wear but alive!

The mother rushes to pick up her child but then stops, looks up and says, "He had a HAT!"

Has anyone asked Captain Sully about their lost luggage yet? If not then they will, they will...

[Alanwsg]

Just seen a trailer for a Channel 4 (UK) documentary on this,

Thursday 19 February, Channel 4, 22:00
MIRACLE OF THE HUDSON PLANE CRASH
70 MINS

"Minutes into US Airways flight 1549 from New York, a flock of birds strikes the plane, taking out both engines. With no power, the captain must attempt the impossible: to land in the Hudson River."

"Last month Captain Sullenberger and US Airways flight 1549 made history by crash-landing on the Hudson River in New York city. Everyone on board survived. This is their story."

Enjoy ....

[OFBSLF]

Has anyone asked Captain Sully about their lost luggage yet? If not then they will, they will...
They've already received $5000 USD each as partial payment. US Airways has retained Douglass Air Disaster Funeral Coordinators to clean, salvage, and return the personal effects. I'm sure that the passengers have already been notified of that.

US Airways passengers hopeful about luggage after Hudson landing | News for Dallas, Texas | Dallas Morning News | Headline | National News (http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/nation/stories/DN-luggage_10nat.ART.State.Edition1.4c2dffa.html)

[Mark in CA]

Not the full video, but some "highlight" clips, about 2 minutes worth, here:

CBS | Late Show with David Letterman : (http://lateshow.cbs.com/latenight/lateshow/)

It's item 1 in the upper right hand corner of the web page. Funny stuff.

[alph2z]

Skiles on Charlie Rose said that a senior training pilot at the airline simulated the flight and failed 25 times to reach LaGuardia. No mention at what point along the "glide" they tried to turn back to LaGuardia.

Charlie Rose - A conversation with Jeffrey Skiles Co-pilot US Airways Flight 1549 (http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10069)
.

[protectthehornet]

I only have one uniform...you have to realize that this lady has been with the airline for 38 years and the most recent merger has a new uniform...she probably has the first one she bought 38 years ago, but it isn't the right one for now.

OH, and here is the new SULLY COCKTAIL...2 shots of gray goose and a splash of water.

[lomapaseo]

Lots of photos surfacing all over the net mostly of the aircraft from a distance. But here's one of one of the engines.

Not much visible damage for a canada goose, but then again nobody in authority has said that they were large geese have they?

I now understand that the Italian investigating agency has decided that it would be a good time to restart their investigation of the Rome starling ingestion that disabled both similar model engines leading to a forced landing of a Boeing.

So now both accident investigation teams will teardown both accident's engines to determine just what goes wrong in this model engine to leave the fan blades looking so good but resulting in a near total thrust loss nevertheless.



http://fromtheflightdeck.com/MEL/USAIR-01.jpg

[OFBSLF]

but then again nobody in authority has said that they were large geese have they?
The bird strike evidence has reportedly been sent to the Smithsonian for identification.

WASHINGTON — Clues from the wreckage from US Airways Flight 1549, which crashed in the Hudson River, are going to the best investigators in the world: the black boxes to the National Transportation Safety Board, the engines to the manufacturer’s experts and a bird feather to a Smithsonian museum.

The National Museum of Natural History in Washington may not leap to mind when both engines on a high-tech plane quit at 3,200 feet. But around the corner from the stuffed African elephant that greets the visiting hordes of schoolchildren, down a back hall from the employee bike rack, a staff of four in the Feather Identification Lab took in samples from 4,600 bird-plane collisions, or bird strikes, last year. Arriving mostly in sealed plastic bags, these included birds’ feet, whole feathers or tiny bits of down, and pulverized bird guts, known as snarge.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/science/25birds.html?hp

[mono]

So now both accident investigation teams will teardown both accident's engines to determine just what goes wrong in this model engine to leave the fan blades looking so good but resulting in a near total thrust loss nevertheless.


I know for a fact that these engines have a very sharpe leading edge to the fan-blades ( I have cut my hand carrying out an inspection of them) Unlike for example the RB 211 fan. I would suspect therefore that a large quantity of diced bird remains doesn't do the core airflow characteristics much good.

[Haaatschi]

I must say I am very impressed with the Letterman interview. He asked a couple of very interesting questions that had been asked in this forum before. Much more about aviation, how the airplane works (thinks like glide ratio, etc.). What does it say about the state of American news journalism if a comedian asks the most interesting questions in a media tour that included Larry King, 60 minutes, etc.?

Sully uttered the words "I's a Fly-by-Wire airplane" on Letterman. Did not hear him say such things on the other shows.

[AviatorAtHeart]

Skiles on Charlie Rose said that a senior training pilot at the airline simulated the flight and failed 25 times to reach LaGuardia. No mention at what point along the "glide" they tried to turn back to LaGuardia.

I really wonder what would happen if the senior training pilot managed to land the plane at LaGuardia say 20 out of 25 times while re-creating this event. Would someone (management) condemn the crew's decision for landing in the Hudson ? I am not a pilot and rarely participate in discussions but I thought I'd throw this questions to the guys / gals who fly for a living and see what they think. To me, the shear number of variables involved at the time of the bird strike would render any simulator flight useless but I guess there was a reason they tried it. Anyways, what do you guys think ?

[Pontius Navigator]

Four out of five is not good odds. What was the simulated outcome on the 5th?

OK, I know you posed a theoretical question. Now how about a hypothcial answer to the 5th?

[precept]

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
February 12, 2009
************************************************************
FOURTH UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION INTO DITCHING OF US AIRWAYS
JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
The following is an update on the National Transportation
Safety Board's investigation of US Airways flight 1549,
which ditched into the Hudson River on January 15, 2009.
The bird remains found in both engines of US Airways flight
1549 have been identified by the Smithsonian Institution's
Feather Identification Laboratory as Canada Goose (Branta
canadensis).
The lab made the identification for the NTSB through DNA
analysis as well as through morphological comparisons in
which feather fragments were compared with Canada Goose
specimens in the museum's collections; the microscopic
feather samples were compared with reference microslide
collections.
A total of 25 samples of bird remains have been examined as
of today. Additional analysis will be conducted on samples
received from the NTSB to attempt to determine if the Canada
Geese were resident or migratory. While no determination has
been made about how many birds the aircraft struck or how
many were ingested into the engines, an adult Canada Goose
typically ranges in size from 5.8 to 10.7 pounds, however
larger individual resident birds can exceed published
records.
The accident aircraft was powered by two CFM56-5B/P turbofan
engines. The bird ingestion standard in effect when this
engine type was certified in 1996 included the requirement
that the engine must withstand the ingestion of a four-pound
bird without catching fire, without releasing hazardous
fragments through the engine case, without generating loads
high enough to potentially compromise aircraft structural
components, or without losing the capability of being shut
down. The certification standard does not require that the
engine be able to continue to generate thrust after
ingesting a bird four pounds or larger.
NTSB investigators worked closely with wildlife biologists
from the United States Department of Agriculture, both at
the scene of the accident in New York City and during the
engine teardowns at the manufacturer's facility in
Cincinnati, to extract all of the organic material that was
identified today.
###
NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]

[Brian McGrath]

Heads up guys for people on the forum who have access to Channel 4

Next Thursday 19th Feb 10pm to 11.15pm "The Miracle of the Hudson Plane Crash"

The story of the US Airways flight forced to make a landing on the Hudson River should be interesting.

[Meek]

It also saves on fuel.

Dispatch deviation list quotes 3% increase if stuck in the open position.

I am not sure that they actually scare birds away so the fuel saving is a relevant reason to retract landing lights below 10,000.

10kg each sector for 7 sectors each day for 29 aircraft flying 330 days each year.

do the maths.

[Super VC-10]

Can I just point out that this in Channel 4 in the UK, other countries may have a Channel 4 too.

[bobusse]

Next Thursday 19th Feb 10pm to 11.15pm "The Miracle of the Hudson Plane Crash"

I'm not living in UK,could you give time in UTC,(though I may have an idea).
Thanks

[Super VC-10]

The programme on Channel 4 may be available for viewing online after it has been broadcast in the UK.

Link to C4 webpage about the prog. Miracle of the Hudson Plane Crash - Channel 4 (http://www.channel4.com/programmes/miracle-of-the-hudson-plane-crash)

[Kanoknuahaha]

I don't know if this info is already here..there are too many pages to browse.. In the interview i've seen 2 pilots and 3 cabin crew, shouldn't 4 cabin crew be the minimum crew for A320? This minimum crew requirment, is it set by Airbus or the relevant autority..
Thank you.

K.

[Super VC-10]

Suggest you start at page 1 and read on, it was covered quite early in the thread as to why they only needed three flight attendants.

:ugh:

[kappa]

Q. minimum crew requirment, is it set by Airbus or the relevant autority?
A. Relevant authority

[TonyWilliams]

US FAA part 121.391

For airplanes having a seating capacity of more than 100 passengers—two flight attendants plus one additional flight attendant for each unit (or part of a unit) of 50 passenger seats above a seating capacity of 100 passengers.

(b) If, in conducting the emergency evacuation demonstration required under §121.291 (a) or (b), the certificate holder used more flight attendants than is required under paragraph (a) of this section for the maximum seating capacity of the airplane used in the demonstration, he may not, thereafter, take off that airplane—

(1) In its maximum seating capacity configuration with fewer flight attendants than the number used during the emergency evacuation demonstration; or

(2) In any reduced seating capacity configuration with fewer flight attendants than the number required by paragraph (a) of this section for that seating capacity plus the number of flight attendants used during the emergency evacuation demonstration that were in excess of those required under paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) The number of flight attendants approved under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section are set forth in the certificate holder's operations specifications.

(d) During takeoff and landing, flight attendants required by this section shall be located as near as practicable to required floor level exists and shall be uniformly distributed throughout the airplane in order to provide the most effective egress of passengers in event of an emergency evacuation. During taxi, flight attendants required by this section must remain at their duty stations with safety belts and shoulder harnesses fastened except to perform duties related to the safety of the airplane and its occupants.

[News Shooter]

I know this is a dumb question, but can someone tell me why USAir is designated "Cactus?"

Thanks

[galaxy flyer]

It was the callsign of America West, which bought US Air. AW is based in Phoenix, hence "Cactus".

GF

[News Shooter]

Ah ha..thank you..makes complete sense

[RobertS975]

And even though America West was the "surviving" corporate entity, having purchased the stock of US Air, they decided that US Air was a better name for the merged carrier to have going forward, both domestic and international.

[lomapaseo]

And even though America West was the "surviving" corporate entity, having purchased the stock of US Air, they decided that US Air was a better name for the merged carrier to have going forward, both domestic and international.

Yes they also have to consider the negativity factor of public memory names like America Worst and US Scare

[ExSp33db1rd]

or Better On A Camel.

[eaglespar]

http://img26.imageshack.us/img26/6122/firstclassud4.jpg

[precept]

************************************************************
NTSB PRESS RELEASE
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 19, 2009
SB-09-07
************************************************************
NTSB TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARING ON US AIRWAYS DITCHING ACCIDENT
IN HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
Washington, D.C. - The National Transportation Safety Board
will hold a two-day public hearing as part of its ongoing
investigation into the ditching of a US Airways Airbus A-320
into the Hudson River in New York City in January.
The hearing, which will be held at the NTSB's Board Room and
Conference Center in Washington, D.C., is expected to be
scheduled for late spring or early summer; the exact dates
will be announced within the next few weeks.
"Based on what we have learned so far about this accident,
we know that many things went right," said NTSB Acting
Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "But no matter how many things
go right, we've found that each accident presents safety
issues that we can learn from - both to further our
investigation, and ultimately, to make the skies even safer.
This hearing will move us closer toward those goals."
At about 3:30 p.m. EST on January 15, 2009, an Airbus A-320
operated as US Airways flight 1549 on a scheduled flight
from New York's LaGuardia Airport to Charlotte, North
Carolina, ditched into the Hudson River shortly after the
aircraft struck Canada geese, resulting in an immediate loss
of thrust in both engines. While there were no fatalities
among the 155 passengers and crew, two individuals were
seriously injured.
The public hearing will focus on the following issues:
- Training of crew members on emergency procedures
- Certification requirements for the Airbus A-320 related to
the structural integrity of the airframe during ditching
- Bird ingestion certification standards for transport-
category turbofan engines
- New and developing technologies for detection of large
groups of birds and procedures to avoid conflicts with birds
in the general vicinity of airports
A list of those expected to testify will be released closer
to the date of the hearing.
###
NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson (202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************

[autothrottle]

Yes , its quite interesting. Not a bad program by todays standards of journalism.

[Gingerbread Man]

Yep. Wish they'd got someone who was awake to narrate the program, but parts of the second half are interesting. I wish they had more from the crew though. The majority of it seems to be regurgitated news bulletins and stating the bleeding obvious.

[Acklington]

Pity the pilot didn't hit the "ditch switch", := must have been doing something else like making a perfect ditch landing.:D

[jonathan3141]

Agree that the rescue part of the C4 programme was interesting, but the flight bit itself was repetitive and superficial. The FO and rest of the crew were nameless and appeared to have little part in the proceedings. Disappointing programme for me anyway.

[X13CDX]

I have to say I thought it was well documented and presented, made me very emotional.. although I was hoping it would be a documentary focused on the crew and their testimony, of which there was little to none! aside what has already been repeated many times in all the news bulletins about this incident.. I also want to point out that I agree with another comment from earlier.. they did seem to emphasise the fact that the "crew did not activate the ditch switch" in a negative way, and I do not think that should have been included.

[mickjoebill]

Has anyone received an answer as to why the cabin crew and passengers were not informed that they were ditching and so did not have a chance to don life jackets before impact?


Would it have been a good idea for cabin crew (not knowing rescuers were so close) to advise passengers to grab their life vest from under the seat on the way out?

Given a member of crew walked the plane checking for disabled passengers, could/should they have grabbed life vests and distributed them to those on the wing?


Mickjoebill

[Mark in CA]

Interesting film of the successful ditching of PanAm 943 in the Pacific Ocean on Oct 16, 1956 after losing two (of four) engines en route HNL-SFO. All passengers and crew, including two infants, rescued by Coast Guard cutter Pontchartrain stationed in the area:

<object width="445" height="364"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/fkR4F3_fEUQ&hl=en&fs=1&border=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/fkR4F3_fEUQ&hl=en&fs=1&border=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="445" height="364"></embed></object>


http://blogs.abcnews.com/photos/uncategorized/2009/02/19/ht_561016panamditches3_090219_main.jpg

[galaxy flyer]

I suspect the front end crew were too busy landing the plane. I am sure that Sully lost sleep over that one. He did direct the F/O to distribute life vests from the forward seats to those outside.

GF

[Jofm5]

Having just watched the u-tube documentory about the ditching of pan am 943 and also having watched the C4 documentry tonight they could not contrast more in style.

The PAN AM 943 documentry was factual, a little up-beat an congratulatory in places but did not seem to place any spin on the matter.

In contrast the documentry was full of drama, the father & son "Who had to face death as sitting at opposite ends of the plane" blah blah.

I wish we could go back to the old style of reporting - it was way more interesting and factual.

One question that did arise in the 943 video is why if the plane could maintain altitude did it not turn back and land - was this a fuel issue? Sorry for the off the cuff question now going to go see if I can find out.

[Rhino1]

From what I understand the 943 issue was that due to the engine that quit and it's propeller not feathering. Due to the increased drag, they would not have had enough fuel to make landfall. They were near to the Coast Guard vessel, and so it made sense to stay nearby so they could be picked up.

[Mark in CA]

One question that did arise in the 943 video is why if the plane could maintain altitude did it not turn back and land - was this a fuel issue? Sorry for the off the cuff question now going to go see if I can find out.
They had had apparently just passed the point of no return, and so were unable to reach a suitable landing strip in either direction.

[Jofm5]

They had had apparently just passed the point of no return, and so were unable to reach a suitable landing strip in either direction


Oh - I thought it said as they approached... But then I agree that could be as they approached the engines failed and then they went past.

[Island Jockey]

When the B767 ditched many of the passengers who inflated their life vests while still in their seats were trapped in the aircraft.

In the Hudson incident this was not the case.

If 155 passengers had time to put on life vests a percentage may have inflated them when seeing the aircraft was in water.

This would have slowed the evacuation of the aircraft.

[Super VC-10]

More info on Pan Am Flight 943 :-

Pan Am Flight 943 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_943)

[Super VC-10]

I watched the progarmme on C4 last night. Agree that they could have said more about the crew, but found the previously unseen footage interesting.

[malaysiacadet]

hello,

a little off topic here,
I've been listening to the ATC recording of the USAirways A320 incident,

I just want to ask, is it the norm in the US for ATC to read out :

Cactus Fiftheen Fourthy Nine

Instead of:

Cactus One Five Four Niner

Please pardon me for my ignorance, i've only been flying in Malaysia, and the standard RT here is
"Cactus One Five Four Niner"
" Malaysian Seven One One"
"Asian Express Six Two Niner Two"
"Firefly Three Zero Five Zero"

so i really would like to find out.

I am asking because there's a Boeing Plane... Callsign Boeing 37NY .
The pilot said "Boeing Three Seven November Yankee" i was expecting Boeing Thirthy Seven November Yankee


Thank You.

[Jofm5]

Thanks for the link super vc10

My intentions were to look it up and got distracted - so you saved me some effort.

I have some questions... but not to divert topic on this thread will take to jet blast.

[NigelOnDraft]

Repeated comments about I wish they had more from the crew though Whilst the USA is more "publicity" orientated than the UK, I really cannot see the crew being allowed to comment fully until all investigations are complete... probably as per NTSB and Employer rules.

It was a "very early" documentary (1 month post incident), and Pan Am has had over 50 years to get the facts established ;)
Has anyone received an answer as to why the cabin crew and passengers were not informed that they were ditching and so did not have a chance to don life jackets before impact?Maybe watch the program again :ooh: Ditching procedures are designed from Cruise, with appropriate decisions and briefings. Certainly my airline has no "short notice" FD calls for an unexpected ditching. As stated above, if there had been such a call, no doubt the majority of Pax would have known where their LJ was, and in the event they did find it, would then have inflated it := Which in some circumstances could have caused significant loss of life...

You might ask "would it have been better if the crew had made an ad-hoc PA". I would suggest not - again, the program seems to indicate that the response to the one FD PA by the CC was text book with the "Brace Brace" calls. Lessons will be learned from this accident, but until then... ;)

NoD

[Dream Buster]

I was sickened (but not surprised) by the human angle too, so much so that I fell :zzz:.........Now how close did the ferry get again? - Boring.

Couldn't they have at least mentioned the only other successful airline ditching in history? Here (http://www.check-six.com/Crash_Sites/Shiga-SFBay.htm) and reproduced below.

How do these weak aviation documentaries 'FXXX up' like Capt Asoh, but without the excuses?

DB :yuk:



Splashdown of the "Shiga"…

In San Francisco Bay, California

November 22, 1968

Landing Before Takeoff...

Kohei Asoh, a 15 year veteran with Japan Air Lines, had served as a flight instructor for the Japanese military in World War II, and had nearly 10,000 hours of flight time - well deserving of his title of "Captain." He was experienced enough to be given the assignment of flying one of JAL's newest acquisitions - a Douglas DC-8, registered as JA8032, which had rolled off the Douglas assembly line in May of 1968, and had been in service with JAL for only six months.

The DC-8, named "Shiga" by the airline, took off from Tokyo at 5:36 on the afternoon of November 22nd, 1968, bound non-stop for San Francisco (SFO). Powered by four Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B, the eight hour flight would cross the International Date Line, so accounting for time zones and flight time, the flight was scheduled to land nearly seven hours before it took off.

As Captain Asoh, and his flight crew, first officer Joseph Hazen, flight Engineer Richard Fahning, and navigator Ichiryo Suzuki, were approaching SFO at approximately 9 AM, where the weather was reported to be "ceiling indefinite, 300 feet overcast, sky partially obscured, 3/4 mile visibility with fog". The airport's minimums at the time were, 200 feet ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility. Normal communications were established, and the crew was radar vectored to the Woodside VOR and thence to intercept the ILS for Runway 28L at San Francisco.

The cabin crew, consisting of a purser, two stewards, and four stewardesses, prepared the passengers for landing as the plane crossed the Woodside VOR at 9:16 AM at approximately 4,000 feet and, at 9:18 AM, was cleared to descend to 2,000 feet . The flight then descended at a constant, uninterrupted rate towards the airport, lined up on the localizer approach course.

On Final...

The landing gear was lowered and flaps fully extended. When they broke out below the fog, the first officer called, "Breaking out of the overcast, I cannot see the runway light ." He then called out, 'We are too low - Pull up, pull up!"

Asoh applied power to the engines, and started to rotate the aircraft when water contact was made. At a speed of 137 knots, the right main gear hit the water first, followed immediately by the left gear striking. Then, the airplane reportedly made a slow turn to the left, and settled in the shallow waters two and a half miles short of runway 28L, at 9:24 in the morning.

County Park Ranger Doug Lakey was in the Coyote Point parking lot when the plane splashed into the bay. He heard it and immediately notified Harbormaster Art O'Leary who hurried three boats to the plane within minutes. Fire tugs also rushed to the scene to help prevent fire in case jet fuel ignited from a spark.

Wet Feet...

Amazingly, there were no injuries to any of the 96 passengers or 11 crew during the accident and ensuing evacuation.

Two days after the crash, crews from Bigge Drayage Co. and Air International Recovery hoisted the plane out of the water with large floating cranes and placed the plane on a large barge. As soon as the plane was out of the brackish water of San Francisco Bay, some 55 hours after splashdown, salvage crews started washing down the plane with fresh water to help prevent corrosion. The plane was then taken by barge to United Airline's maintenance base at SFO.



The passengers of Japan Air Lines flight #2 raft to shore. Note the plane in the background


"Shiga" being lifted out of the waters of San Francisco Bay.

"Shiga" arriving at SFO via barge

According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the captain said he was making a coupled approach, but because of problems with his pressure altimeter, he was relying on the more accurate radio altimeter for verification of altitude. The captain looked up expecting to be 200 feet above the water but instead was nearly in the water. He applied power but it was too late. The captain did not cross-check the raw data glide-slope signals and did not realize the ILS on-course position was far above where he was.

As a result, Japan Air Lines changed their training procedures to stress command responsibilities, crew coordination and transition time for new type of aircraft. Asoh was assigned to ground operations in Tokyo as a routine retraining measure, and demoted to co-pilot.

The "Asoh Defense"...

The person ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight, Kohei Asoh, said later that he thought he was landing at San Francisco International; instead, the plane belly-flopped into the bay several hundred yards from the runway. But he took full responsibility for the accident and refused to blame anyone else or any other circumstances.

At the NTSB hearing, Captain Asoh took the stand as first witness and supposedly said, in answer to why he had landed in the bay, "As you Americans say, I ****** up."

Such a frank acceptance of blame and responsibility has come to be known as the "Asoh Defense". It has been discussed in various books such "The Abilene Paradox" by Professor Jerry Harvey, publications and in company training films.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the crash was, "the improper application of the prescribed procedures to execute an automatic-coupled ILS approach. This deviation from the prescribed procedures was, in part, due to a lack of familiarization and infrequent operation of the installed flight director and autopilot system."

She Flys Again...

Repairs were carried out by United Air Lines on the "Shiga", and it was returned to JAL on March 31, 1969, and along with a $4 million invoice for over 52,000 man-hours of labor. JAL changed the name of the aircraft from 'Shiga' to 'Hidaka', and after a successful test flight on April 11, 1969, from San Francisco to Honolulu, the plane went back into regular service with JAL.

The plane continued to fly for Japan Airlines for 14 more years until it was sold in March 1983 to Air ABC and reregistered as TF-BBF. In May of 1983 the plane was leased to Hamzair until December 1983 when it was returned to Air ABC. In July of 1984 it was sold to Okada Air of Nigeria and reregistered as 5N-AON.

A few years later, in April of 1987 the plane was purchased by Airborne Express and reregistered as N808AX. After a second career as a express freighter for Airborne Express, years of fatigue crack caught up with the veteran DC-8, and in December of 2001, it met its demise on the ramp at Wilmington International Airport (ILN) in North Carolina, at the mercy of the salvage crews' hydraulic claws.

A Repeatable Feat...

On the afternoon of January 15th, 2009, an Airbus 320, registered as N106US and flown by USAir captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, ditched in the waters of New York's Hudson River shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, bound for Charlotte, North Carolina. After power loss of both of the plane's engines, the flight crew of USAir Flight 1549 landed the commercial jetliner with almost no serious injuries to the 155 aboard.

[Um... lifting...]

I just want to ask, is it the norm in the US for ATC to read out :

Cactus Fiftheen Fourthy Nine

Instead of:

Cactus One Five Four Niner

Yes, it is. On the initial call to ATC, the aircraft gives the full callsign, as you do. ATC will also give the full callsign if they make the first call to the aircraft. ATC has the latitude to shorten call signs depending upon workload and who else is on the frequency.
Why exactly, I don't know, but it does seem to work in the U.S. For a non-native speaker, it might be harder to do, but ATC is usually reasonably sensitive to that.
American pilots can (and I am one) be sloppy with R/T, so you need to listen not only for what you expect to hear, but variations upon it as well. Unfortunate, but true.

Dream Buster-
I'm not sure I'd call the Shiga a ditching. I'd call it a lucky instance of CFIT. Curious how I'd never even heard of it until today. I have, however, been using the Asoh defense for years... I just didn't know it was called that.:O
Now, PanAm 943... that's a ditching.

[Dream Buster]

Um lifting,

I found it fascinating that the DC 8 flew again - I can't see the Airbus doing the same...maybe bits of it.

To me it's definitely a ditching (with a twist). CFI T = Terrain....

I wonder if Capt Asoh is still around? Anybody?

Isn't it refreshing to see somebody take total responsibility - but I thought that's what every pilot signs up to.

DB :ok:

[Um... lifting...]

From what little I can find (and it's awfully little), apparently Captain Asoh committed suicide soon after the incident.

[JW411]

malaysiacadet:

It is FAA policy to use this style of using your callsign on the radio. The reason is to avoid callsigns being confused with headings or flight levels.

So, "XYZ 240" would be spoken as "XYZ Two Forty" to avoid any confusion with Heading Two Four Zero or Flight Level Two Four Zero.

So when you hear an American crew using this style on the radio, they are not being sloppy but actually doing what they have been taught.

Personally I think it is a good idea.

[Um... lifting...]

So when you hear an American crew using this style on the radio, they are not being sloppy but actually doing what they have been taught.

True... we're sloppy in other ways!;)

Altitudes are generally given as: "Two-thousand five-hundred feet" or "Flight Level two-five-zero".

Headings are always "Turn left to three-six-zero"

Squawks can be given as "Squawk twelve-hundred" or "Squawk VFR", but IFR squawks are given as individual digits.

Callsigns are contracted numbers... depending upon the radio strength, they may be given as single digits for clarity until there's a positive ID. Sometimes an aircraft will roger as "Cactus 49", but only after established with the controller.

[Captain Airclues]

The double digit method is only used by air carriers and commuter airlines using FAA approved callsigns, for example "United thirty one, sixty". All other aircraft should use single digits for example "Cessna three one six zero.

See Section 2, 2-4-2 (5)

Section 2. Radio Communications Phraseology and Techniques (http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/Chap4/aim0402.html)

Dave

[barit1]

Once upon a time in the air racing world there was a ban on race numbers ending in zero (30, 40, 50, etc.) because a pylon judge might call a pylon cut on "number 30", and it might be heard as "number 13". (see note)

To avoid this ambiguity the above rule was applied. It sounds to me like ATC communications might be equally vulnerable.

Note: This rule was not in force in the 1930s; Mister Mulligan was race no. 40.

[Rainboe]

Dreambuster, where ever did you get this gem:
Couldn't they have at least mentioned the only other successful airline ditching in history?
Airliners have quite regularly ditched. The vast majority have seen the structure successfully absorb the impact and remain intact. People regard the Ethiopian crash ditching as tyhe norm for some reason. It dug a wingtip in causing the crash- the Captain being beaten up whilst trying to ditch being the cause of why it happened. Your statement was quite incorrect.

[mickjoebill]

If 155 passengers had time to put on life vests a percentage may have inflated them when seeing the aircraft was in water.

This would have slowed the evacuation of the aircraft.

I agree that no doubt some passengers would inflate life jackets inside the plane.
However a number of passengers in the Hudson ditching are seen clutching seat cushions which also slows down ones exit, especially using the over wing doors where use of both arms is an advantage.

Had rescuers not been so close, had the plane broken up or sunk it is highly likely some would have drowned due to inability to stay afloat caused by just the onset of early stages of hypothermia.
So the judgement not to tell passengers or cabin crew to done life vests is a very risky one in my opinion.
Mitigating the decision perhaps the pilot thought that their was a risk of passengers being out of their seats on impact?
Or was he and copilot simply too busy?

Having watched three people fall out of a small boat into very cold water (with life vests) it was shocking to see who quickly they were imobilised and how long it took for boats yards away to pull them aboard.


Mickjoebill

[Graybeard]

"Headings are always "Turn left to three-six-zero""

Has nobody else seen the fault with that? I have heard pilots confuse ".. Left (to) Three-sixty" between heading to fly, and doing a circle.

Further, I have never seen a compass or heading indicator with 360 on it: just N or 0. Why shouldn't ATC say, "Turn left to Zero"?

GB

[Dream Buster]

Rainboe,

I bow to your superior knowledge - have you had a bad trip?

Could you please list the jet ditchings which have been successful over the past 50 years?

Could I remind you this is a forum and we can't wait for your next helpful contribution.....

DB :ouch:

[Um... lifting...]

Further, I have never seen a compass or heading indicator with 360 on it: just N or 0. Why shouldn't ATC say, "Turn left to Zero"?

But that is what they'll say. I didn't deliberately choose that controversial heading in this post, just happened to be the first that came to mind. Long ago, one was something of a mariner. Mariners use 0-0-0 for North, at least as I was taught, "nor' by nor'west me foine bucko" having gone out of vogue some time previous.

While being instructed to become a pilot, what I had known as 0-0-0 had become 3-6-0. I recall asking (knowing there must be a good reason) about it. Don't ever recall getting an answer.

[Cubs2jets]

NTSB report on Flight 1549

US Airways violated Federal migratory bird regulations by hunting geese with an A320 Airbus jetliner, claim anonymous government sources. The pilot of flight 1549, Air Force veteran and avid hunter Chesley B. Sullenberger, tried combining both of his interests by bagging a brace of geese over the wetlands near New York's LaGuardia airport after takeoff, on his way to Charlotte, North Carolina. The imported European $77 million A320 airliner is not certified for either waterfowl or upland bird hunting, so it was not surprising that the aircraft malfunctioned. When he realized that both New York and New Jersey State Game and Fish enforcement officers would soon be approaching, Captain Sullenberger unsuccessfully attempted to hide the plane in the Hudson River. The crew and 150 passengers were chilled and shaken but unhurt. Most were simply grateful to avoid spending the weekend in Charlotte.

National Transportation Safety Board inspectors rushed to the scene, and reportedly found no Duck Stamps on the downed aircraft's fuselage. Captain Sullenberger has not been charged but is being held incommunicado at an undisclosed location. PETA is urging the government to prosecute the pilot for double honkercide and poaching, and the animal rights group is expected to file a civil suit on behalf of the flock. The two victims were undocumented aliens, according to sources close to the investigation, Canada geese who had over-stayed their visas. Their goose gang scandalized their quiet Queens community by squatting in local cemeteries and golf courses, parking on the grass, cooking strange-smelling food and throwing wild parties late into the night. Neighbors say police dogs were called out on several occasions.

Such incidents have triggered a wave of anti-Canada goose sentiment, but at this time revenge or hate crime motives are not suspected in the US Airways bird bashings. Forensic examination of the avian corpses continues, and technicians are analyzing the two cadavers under heat with chestnuts, prunes, and Armagnac. NTSB inspectors have contributed a supply of testing fluid, a 2005 Zind-Humbrecht Riesling from Alsace. We will update this story as entrees details become available.

C2j

[Mark in CA]

A more personal, non-technical interview with Captain Sullenberger and his wife in their home by one of the local news broadcasters, Dan Ashley. Focuses mostly on how this has changed their lives since. Kind of lightweight, but it has its moments.

You can download the Flash video here:

http://dig.abclocal.go.com/kgo/video/2009/02/kgo-022109-jl-430pm-special-sully.flv

If this link doesn't work, or if you can't directly play a flash video, try the one below and look for the video segment entitled "Face to Face: Dan Ashley and the Sullenbergers."

San Francisco Bay Area Breaking News Video from KGO (http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/video)

[ZQA297/30]

Cubs2jets
Au contrair, monsieur, := this was a cowardly unprovoked suicide attack by an avian terrorist organization called World Integrated League Defending Feathered Or Webfooted Life (W.I.L.D.F.O.W.L).

They are known to exist in pockets in most countries of the world, and they promise their suicide attackers unlimited access to 66 golf courses, cemeteries, or wetlands of their choice in the afterlife.

A spokesman for W.I.L.D.F.O.W.L, who claimed responsibility for the attack, announced that John Honk led the squad, which successfully downed one of the all singing, all dancing, high-tech modern technology marvels, with good old fashioned feather power.

W.I.L.D.F.O.W.L is committed to returning control of the air to those who have owned it for eons and will fight to the last one flying if necessary.

[RobertS975]

Does anyone else wonder why the plane floated so symmetrically for so many minutes when one of the engines was missing from the airframe? I was wondering why that didn't cause the intact engine side to ride lower in the water

[ZQA297/30]

Dont forget Archimedes principle.
You have to subtract the "weight" of the water displaced by the remaining engine, so that the net effect is probably not that much, and is relatively close to the centre of displacement.
End result, not much roll moment.

[Cubs2jets]

Geese do float. The presence of goose in the engine provided additional bouyancy on that side to make up for the weight of the engine? :rolleyes:

C2j

[paulg]

Do cooked geese still float?:confused:

[barit1]

Dont forget Archimedes principle.
You have to subtract the "weight" of the water displaced by the remaining engine, so that the net effect is probably not that much, and is relatively close to the centre of displacement.
End result, not much roll moment.

I'd discount this for the engines. After all, the detached #1 engine sank immediately - thus no appreciable bouyancy. The main airflow path for the fan and core flood immediately; other odd cavities such as rotor interiors take longer. And the turbine disks are nickel-rich alloys - denser than steel.

Immediately after ditching, the ship remained nearly wings level for most of the evacuation, but slowly rolled toward the #2 engine as odd cavities in the right wing slowly flooded. The left wing was thus elevated above the waterline, and never flooded.

By the time it was towed to the Manhattan side, the roll was 45 degrees or so, and remained so until it was slowly hoisted clear of the water.

[lomapaseo]

Some period of time has now passed so I wonder if Airbus has said anything to its other operators about the reason for the frozen engines at or near idle condition.

Damaged engines just don't pick an idle condition to reside by themselves. Something has to command them there and then latch them at that condition.

[RatherBeFlying]

Damaged engines just don't pick an idle condition to reside by themselves. Something has to command them there and then latch them at that condition.Goose bits clogging the air passages reduces the airflow. It doesn't matter how much fuel is going into the cans as no more fuel will be consumed than there is O2 to support the combustion thereof. The analogous piston engine case would be carb ice instead of goose bits.

The compressor blades likely do a decent job of cuisinarting, but the stators get in the way while the passage shrinks 30:1. Remember that air is compressible while solid bits and liquids are not.

[barit1]

In defining the acceleration performance of an engine, the designer looks primarily at a couple curves:

1) the steady-state line - what fuel flow will cause the engine to stabilize at a given speed?

2) the stall or surge line - how much instantaneous increase in fuel can the engine tolerate before the compressor goes non-linear?

He then creates an acceleration fuel schedule that is close to, BUT NOT ABOVE, the stall line. That way, when the pilot calls for acceleration, the control can predictably deliver that acceleration without stalling. Whether a mechanical or electronic control, it makes no difference; the principles are the same.

But what happens when the engine aerodynamics are degraded (FOD, sand erosion, avian attack...)?

First of all, the steady-state line moves UP. More fuel is needed to hold a given RPM. This is the natural result of poorer component efficiency.

And the steady-state and accel schedule lines may not be parallel. The steady-state line may intersect the accel schedule - who knows at what speed? It may be 70%, it may be 35% - the fuel control still is programmed to avoid compressor stall, and that's the limiting speed for the engine in that degraded state.

So the engines (as I see it) WERE NOT at a governed, stabilized idle, even though the gages might have suggested that. They were trapped by their degraded steady-state line intersecting the accel schedule.

[lomapaseo]

So the engines (as I see it) WERE NOT at a governed, stabilized idle, even though the gages might have suggested that. They were trapped by their degraded steady-state line intersecting the accel schedule

So equal damage then? Wow and little fan damage evident.

So where's the damage? Low compressor or high compressor? and what is the EGT?

If the EGT is high than I agree it's damage, but if the EGT is low than it probably is a governed limit.

[dvv]

Dream Buster (http://www.pprune.org/members/110973-dream-buster), have a look: Tupolev 124 ditching in Neva River - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_124_ditching_in_Neva_River)

[barit1]

So where's the damage? Low compressor or high compressor? and what is the EGT?

There are a few sturdy low compressor stages bolted to the fan rotor, and they may be in fairly good shape - so I'm betting on:

1) primarily high compressor damage; and as a result,

2) high EGT - significantly higher than idle, anyway.

[billy34-kit]

rumour around Airbus, the front crew ''MAY'' haved **** up with one engine identification... time to put the hole hero thing on the hold!!

[barit1]

I'll believe it when I see the FDR traces.

[VFD]

So the engines (as I see it) WERE NOT at a governed, stabilized idle, even though the gages might have suggested that. They were trapped by their degraded steady-state line intersecting the accel schedule.

Sounds good to me. Let me point out the turbines involved were not out of the can engines. FAA has been pretty much accepting engine manufacturers recommendations on leaving high time engines on frame.

I do not think the NTSB is going to let this accident slide through the cracks without testing injestion abilities on turbines that are long in the tooth compared to a fresh engine. Especially in light of a "pressure sensor" failure on one of the turbines just days before causing a surge.

VFD

[lomapaseo]

I do not think the NTSB is going to let this accident slide through the cracks without testing injestion abilities on turbines that are long in the tooth compared to a fresh engine

Well this can open up a can of worms. It is a known fact that the engines are at least as good as the test engine when they come out of the shop. After that it's a case of how much wear. Nobody can dial in all the variables involved with an ingestion so the idea is to make the single demonstration test strong enough to get you through what mother nature deals up most of the time.

You can draw lines in the sand all you want but in the end they will be blown away by the next day when you leave them out in the open.

About all the NTSB can do as an investigating agency (not a regulator) is ask questions about the specific engines installed vs their maintenance history and manufacturers recommendations. They can have an analysis performed to show just how much operating margin was available at the time of the incident and then review this against published standards, AD's etc.

It there is a question about ingestion adequacy it needs to be asked against the acceptable regulatory standard at the time or against service history over time.

[lomapaseo]

barit1

There are a few sturdy low compressor stages bolted to the fan rotor, and they may be in fairly good shape - so I'm betting on:

1) primarily high compressor damage; and as a result,

2) high EGT - significantly higher than idle, anyway.

agree in principal

but I heard from day one that as both engines came out of the water there was notable damage to the front vanes on the LPC. I haven't seen any pics of this yet and it may be unique. I'm sure the investigators have already scoured the total fleet wide service history for any similarities

[barit1]

Allow me to point out that ingestion testing is usually NOT carried out using brand new, "out of the can engines". That's a needless expense; generally an engine to be used in a destructive test has as much tired, disposable hardware as can be scraped up. It's less expensive, and probably meets VFD's objective better too. :}

[News Shooter]

Sully answers the ditch switch question

Sully?s Tale | Flight Today | Air & Space Magazine (http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/Sullys-Tale.html)

[Southernboy]

I notice he twice refers to "Annual recurrent training," is that only one sim ride a year & if so is that the norm in the US?

[DC-ATE]

Don't know what it is these days, but when I was flying we had two sim sessions six months apart. One was a PT (Proficiency training) and the other, a PC (Proficiency Check).

[MES Drvr]

Do not forget about the B-727 that landed in the water on approach to Ft. Walton Beach -I think- near Pensacola, FL. I cannot remember the details or if any body was killed. The flight was operated by National Airlines. The year was either 1976 or 78.

[Um... lifting...]

National Airlines Flight 193 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Airlines_Flight_193)

Fort Walton didn't make sense to me, as that airport is co-located with Eglin AFB, has precision radar and isn't particularly close to the water... about a mile from the water to the threshold IIRC.
Pensacola was where it occurred... which is also about a mile from the water to the threshold of Rwy 25... they were 1,000' lower than they thought they were, evidently. Three drownings... airplane sunk in 12 feet of water. The field is about 100' MSL and there are bluffs of about that height coming out of the bay... they're lucky the aircraft wasn't a little higher or the airport a bit farther inland or they would have been a smoking hole.

[mickjoebill]

It may be 70%, it may be 35% - the fuel control still is programmed to avoid compressor stall, and that's the limiting speed for the engine in that degraded state.
So the engines (as I see it) WERE NOT at a governed, stabilized idle, even though the gages might have suggested that. They were trapped by their degraded steady-state line intersecting the accel schedule.

As a layman when it comes to turbines, is this aspect of the event a control system design failure (under extreme circumstances) to command delivery of fuel?
If so, would a "bird strike" button that is programmed to deliver appropriate amount of fuel regardless of any other sensor inputs be a good idea?



mickjoebill

[barit1]

No - I wrote this paragraph to specifically address that:

He then creates an acceleration fuel schedule that is close to, BUT NOT ABOVE, the stall line. That way, when the pilot calls for acceleration, the control can predictably deliver that acceleration without stalling. Whether a mechanical or electronic control, it makes no difference; the principles are the same.

The acceleration fuel schedule is there for a very good reason, and trying to override this (i.e. pump more fuel) will do you NO GOOD WHATSOEVER. :ugh:

[HotDog]

Recurrent training.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I notice he twice refers to "Annual recurrent training," is that only one sim ride a year & if so is that the norm in the US?

I think the reference is to the annual emergency procedures training that may include ditching and live raft drills in a pool.

[forget]

Testimony
February 24, 2009

Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on US Airways Flight 1549


Testimony (http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news_story.cfm?newsId=10413)

[ATCNetwork]

Controller Patrick Harten talks about flight 1549 - ATC Network - News Item (http://www.atc-network.com/NewsItem-29122-Controller-Patrick-Harten-talks-about-flight-1549.aspx)

[kwh]

...and with reference to Capt. Sullenberger's lament about the state of the piloting profession in the US, is that the two pilots at the sharp end of Flight 1549 were both hugely experienced people possibly at the chronological tail end of their careers. Ditto the cabin crew, I notice, probably (I speculate) for very similar reasons. Most people seem to regard this as a good thing, and for everybody else on board 1549 it obviously had no downside at all, but more holistically I wonder....

Clearly it was a bit of a result that Capt. Sullenberger was there to do the driving, but in ten years time he won't be. The co-pilot was another hugely experienced bloke, in fact more experienced than Capt. Sullenberger, with plenty of command experience of his own. Surely in a perfect world, you'd have a Captain Sullenberger on the flight deck, with somebody along side him of more tender years and with less experience learning his trade from one of the best. If this incident had happened in ten or fifteen years time, that's the guy who you'd (well, I'd) want to be taking over the driving when the excrement hit the air-conditioner. One wonders who, in fifteen years time, will be flying US domestic planes. Presumably not people who have had fifteen years and thousands of hours flying alongside people like Capt. Sullenberger or his co-pilot...

[corsair]

You'll have a crew who came through new MPL system. You can rest assured!:eek:

[FrequentSLF]

One wonders who, in fifteen years time, will be flying US domestic planes. Presumably not people who have had fifteen years and thousands of hours flying alongside people like Capt. Sullenberger or his co-pilot...
Their name will not be Capt. Sullenberger... but their qualification will be the same...as SLF i must believe that the aviation industry will keep going on

[SASless]

Ran across this news video about Bird Warning Radar systems.

WBZ-TV Video Archive - wbztv.com (http://wbztv.com/video/[email protected])

[NG_Kaptain]

Perhaps the captain of this flight could post about his experiences about ten or more years ago when a BW MD83 took of from Tobago at night and experienced multiple bird strikes. One engine ingested seven North American migratory ducks and the other five. They were able to keep one engine running (barely) and make an immediate return to the island. Both engines were totally ruined and it was by extreme good fortune they did not have to do a power off night ditching in the Caribbean Sea.
ZQA was it you?

[Christodoulidesd]

The Aviation Herald Last Update: Tuesday, Mar 3rd 2009 10:48Z
3296 Articles available

Events from Apr 20th 2004 to Mar 2nd 2009

Accident: US Airways A320 at New York on Jan 15th 2009, ditched in Hudson River

By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Mar 3rd 2009 10:48Z, last updated
Tuesday, Mar 3rd 2009 10:48Z

Bill Nix was passenger on the flight, which began perfectly normal, the usual routine briefing occured, and the departure went normal. Bill was seated in 25B next to the last seat row and chatted with a fellow passenger seated in 25A during the departure, when he heard a noise that he thought was an explosion in the belly of the plane.

The aisle became hazy with smoke, smell of fuel developed. "There was the most unnatural silence at this time and it all seems unreal." The engine sounds had stopped, the noise from the air conditioning ceased. "I looked at the guy next to me in 25A and he at me but we did not say a word, just a look of disbelief." Bill realized they had lost power and the airplane had started to descend. Bill thought for the first time they were going to die. The silence was interrupted by a passenger a few rows forward, who stated one of the engines was on fire. Then it got silent again. Bill feared the aircraft might explode with one engine on fire and the tanks full of fuel. They were over New York City with nothing but buildings below and they were descending fast. The thought they were going to die crossed his mind a second time.

When Bill looked out of the window, they were below the tops of the buildings already and he realized, they were heading for the river. "At the time that seemed to be a good thing, we may survive after all. I heard nothing, not even the wind, until the pilot said brace for impact, then a small child started crying." The "brace for impact" brought it all home, that they were in big trouble. "We had a very rough landing, almost as soon as we hit the water we felt water splashing into our faces and by the time we stopped it was about ankle deep." The water had been spraying through the floor though no cracks were visible. The touchdown and slow down felt like a long hard vibration, as only the tail hit water at first then the rest of the airplane came down about a second or two later. No jolts were felt during the slow down.

"A lot of people rushed to the back of the plane and tried to exit the rear door, the flight attendant shouted 'no the door is under water go out the front'. That was the third time I thought I may die, this time from drowning." Still, a number of folks tried to open the rear doors, one person forced the way to the door and opened the door a little. Flight attendant Doreen Welsh physically stopped the door from opening all the way preventing the airplane from completely filling with water. Bill was in water up to waist level within a few seconds. Bill was sure, that had the door been fully opened, the people near the rear of the airplane would have all drowned as they were packed together trying to get out, so that they could not have turned around quickly enough.

Bill headed forwards, a big bottleneck formed at the overwing exits, the entire front of the airplane was empty. FA Welsh shouted that people should go to the forward doors, but people still wanted to get out through the wing exits. She shouted, that people should climb over the seats to reach the forward doors, some of the passengers actually crawled over the seats. Bill got past the middle doors and went out the left passenger door into the raft. He immediately called his wife via mobile phone telling her he was okay.

Around 70% of the people were already outside of the airplane either on the wings or in the rafts, when the first boat arrived, then a second joined and many more arrived. "I began to feel pretty good. All we had to do was deal with the frigid water and cold air a few more minutes." The plane was sinking and drifting, the raft was still attached to the aircraft and the sinking plane threatened to take the raft with it. "The pilot asked someone on the boat to throw us a knife which they did and he cut us away from the plane, so I guess there was actually four times that day I thought I was gone."

"I was picked up by, I believe a tour boat, the Athena. A great place to be, on a warm boat headed to land. We were taken to the NY side and pier 78. Soon we had a lot of support from the Red Cross, fire department, police etc, we got warm and partially dry. Buses were provided to take us to a hotel, I went to the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza at LGA. They had a room set up for us to check in and food. They had assigned me a room for the night and I had a key in about three minutes. Everyone through out the whole process was wonderful. I slept very little that night, got up at 5:00 the next morning and was met by a USAIR representative who had arranged a car for the airport and had our tickets. She walked us through check in and security, got us boarded about 45 minutes before the boarding process, also introduced us the the pilot who promised us a smooth flight, and it was."

"We were fortunate to have Captain Sullenberger as our pilot but I don't think most people realize that flight attendant Welsh may have saved dozens of lives by stopping someone from opening the back door and letting the river rush in. She was very active from the time of the bird hit until everyone was out of the plane, even with her injuries she did a great job."

Being back on dry ground passengers started to chat to each other. "Most talk was about the frigid water and everyone wanted to say thank you to the pilot, even then we realized we were lucky to have him. Most could not believe it happened so quickly and we were ok and on land. The one thing I heard the most and I thought of the most was how could this happen and everyone on board lived. With something of this magnitude you almost expect disaster."

"I talked to and heard recounts of the landing from people up front and it was like talking to someone in a different plane. I think the back of the plane absorbed most of the impact. Some people up front told me it was almost like a normal landing. It was a different story in the back."

"So far I have not been in another plane, but I'm sure I will soon. I am having some good days and some bad days and a few sleepless nights, but it will get better with time. For now it's just good to be here", Bill Nix closed his account.


Original link here, at the avherald.com (http://avherald.com/h?article=41370ebc/0028&opt=0)

[HarryMann]

So a less 'strong' & assertive FA than Ms Walsh might have resulted in a tragic outcome... she deserves a special award IMHO!
Up to her shoulders at times in freezing water and with an injury, she kept her head and did her job. Probably the real hero?

[Canuckbirdstrike]

Their are several bird detection radar systems either in production or under development. Some outstanding work has been done with the hardware and software to provide bird species identification, flock number estimates and future flight path predictions.

What has not been developed yet is how the aviation industry will use this information. How will airports use it for strategic and tactical wildlife management? How will ATS providers use the information? How will pilots use the information?

Much like GPWS/EGPWS and windshear detection the challenge is figuring out how to practically and effectively integrate the available tools into the system.

In essence we are at the "proof of concept" and field trial stage in development. Our industry will need to devote resources to developing the processes to use the product output.

[TeachMe]

Interesting comment about the flight attendant.

As SLF in Asia, I felt very uncomfortable on Korean Airlines as the FAs were too young and more eye candy than someone I could trust in an emergency. Yes I know they are well trained, but still...

One of the few things I like about Air Canada and Air India the times I flew them was that the FAs were older, mature and seemed mostly to have had their families, thus giving me the feeling that if an emergency occured, they would more likly have the ability to deal with it (basically the ability to take charge and do an effective job with the 200 odd babies on board).

[lomapaseo]

I felt very uncomfortable on Korean Airlines as the FAs were too young and more eye candy than someone I could trust in an emergency. Yes I know they are well trained, but still...


Wow, such a perceptive comment, if only I could relate to that.

Now you're going to get me to look at the next FA on a US long haul and wonder if they could fit through the overwing exit door.:}

[airfoilmod]

At 24, Holly could speak 4 languages plus English, had a degree in Nursing and was a IIIBravo in Karate. 110 pounds, 5 foot 2, made Eva Green look skanky. She worked for PanAm until the Shah hired her away.

FA's are the most under appreciated professionals in the mix.

AF

[Dysag]

If you live in Seoul you'll have realised by now that an Asian girl at 35 looks the same age as an American at 20.

And if you'd ever been involved in cabin crew training at Cathay Pacific or Singapore Airlines, you'd know that it means TRAINING. i.e. you learn to perform or you're OUT.

P.S. some Air-India ladies are best said to waddle, not walk. Certainly not glide!

[ankh]

Ask E.T.: Geese taking flight (at 300 frames per second) (http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0003ES&topic_id=1)

[PJ2]

airfoilmod;
FA's are the most under appreciated professionals in the mix.
Absolutely the truth. Without the false flattery about "award-winning F/A's crap one hears every so often, in my welcome-on-board PAs I always told my passengers that the F/A's were on board primarily for their safety and that as captain, the F/A's had my full support in all their duties and I thanked them for giving the same (support). As a passenger I have heard other captains say roughly the same thing - it pleasantly but clearly lets everyone on board know where the buck stops. It sets a professional tone and expectations and lets them know they're valued so they (the passengers) should do the same. We were requested by the company that when deadheading or even riding on a pass, that when the emergency briefings were played, we were to stop what we were doing, put down our newspapers/books/headsets and pay attention, simply to set an example.

I still see passengers with thongs (the foot variety) or shoes kicked off for takeoff/landing. The situational awareness isn't very good.

[Rananim]

FA Walsh should get an award and I hope that Sully pushes for this.

[reventor]

Award? Hero? Under appreciated? I realize it's natural to celebrate a fortunate outcome and thereby the people who did a fine job in ensuring that outcome, but let's not lose all perspective. Just looking at the facts, as objectively as I can (considering my complete lack of credenditials in aviation), it seems to me that things were far from perfect in this incident.
* The FAs appeared not to be aware that they were landing on the Hudson, situational awareness at least not on super-hero level.
* Lots of passengers evacuated without any floatation device, had the ferries not arrived quickly, one would expect quite a few casualties. It turned out also there was no particular urgency in evacuating, the plane floated just fine, although this is easy to state in retrospect. But the ideal handling of the situation would include more pax with vests/floatation, taking slightly longer to get out.
* In the channel 4 documentary, I belive one of the passengers were instructed by a FA to jump out into the water, without floatation device. There were better options available, to put it mildly.
* The aft door, yes a FA "heroically" managed to close it partly, but it's clearly a failure that it was opened in the first place. Perhaps it was unavoidable or close to it, but until that's established I tend to think a stronger and more assertive FA could have prevented the opening in the first place. Ironically, he/she probably wouldn't be pegged a hero in that case.

Regardless of my nitpicking (which I hope is appropriate and not complete off, despite not being celebratory in its nature), this incident certainly stands out as a prime example of how intelligent decision making and good craftmanship can avert a potential disaster. Hope you professionals can use this newfound respect and karma for something more innovative than the mind-numbing nagging about the safety briefing. :ok:

[rcallahan]

I agree with the above post. I'm glad that there were no fatalities. But, I've heard that one engine was at 35% N1 all the way to the water. The crew did not select TOGA. I'll let the Airbus experts here opine what this means.

Bob

[misd-agin]

rcallahan - wtr to one engine being at 35% N1...my a/c engines idle at approx. 25-30% N1 at low altitude/airspeed. Different engines on the A320 so 31% N1 might be a reasonable estimate for an idling engine.

Based on that observation I wouldn't be surprised if one engine was stuck at idle and the other engine(12-15% N1?) was still running but obvious N1 damage was preventing the fan from spinning at the typical idle RPM.

[barit1]

misd-agin:

I addressed the 35% N1 observation, with my own conjecture, in post 1641 (http://www.pprune.org/4738608-post1641.html).

I have 33+ years in the turbine engine business, and I've been known to be wrong, but I believe the engines were barely self-sustaining. Time will tell in this case.

[misd-agin]

barit - the term I've heard as a pilot is 'low idle stall'. The engine is running but will not accelerate. That's what I meant by "stuck at idle".

I think we're saying the same thing.

[barit1]

Another term for the same thing: "Off-idle hangup" or "Off-idle stumble". At one time on a well-known engine, it could occur on a bleed-off takeoff. N2 would hang, but EGT slowly rose. It could be overcome simply by turning bleeds on.

Sully's bird already had bleeds on.

[BOAC]

Toulouse reported working on 'Drive-by-Wire' technology.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v293/boacphotos/cid_05EA0E989106438FA6D9146FAE03040.jpg

[DC-ATE]

And just HOW are they gonna turn the corner with that thing?!

[BOAC]

...maybe C Sully said something similar?:)

[ACMS]

ok I'll bite

Where is it and where's it going?

[Wee Jock McPlop]

The new A320 undercarraige is going to require an interesting landing technique:}:E

[barit1]

Where is it and where's it going?

My sources say: When they took the plane out of the Hudson they ended up having to detour through East Rutherford NJ.

It's at a warehouse somewhere near there now.

[DC-ATE]

How 'bout the gear doors and hydraulic system to handle that gear!

[rcallahan]

The crew never selected TOGA! One engine may have been OK to be able to allow the aircraft to actually land on a regular hard surface airport.

[John Farley]

Some posters here seem to think that if a jet engine is running at some low power (not flamed out) then increasing the fuel supply by opening the throttle will necessarily give you more thrust.

Sadly that is not how engine fuel systems work. Whether they be earlier generation hydro-mechanical engine fuel systems or modern FADEC (full authority digital engine control) fuel systems their job is to meter the increase in fuel flow asked for by throttle positions (NB whether the throttles are operated by the pilot or the autopilot makes no difference).

This careful metering has to take into account the pressures at the different stages of the fan and compressor combination, especially the compressor.

The probes and ports for measuring these pressures can easily become contaminated by bird remains so sending incorrect information to the fuel scheduling systems.

Therefore a bird strike can cause an engine run down to a low RPM (not a flameout) without any mechanical damage being present to the compressor blades themselves.

[barit1]

The probes and ports for measuring these pressures can easily become contaminated by bird remains so sending incorrect information to the fuel scheduling systems.

The esteemed Mr. Farley makes an excellent point, although I think the only sensor actually in the CFM56 flowpath is the T25 temperature (between the low & high compressors), and the FADEC is undoubtedly programmed with a fail-safe schedule to permit partial power recovery if T25 is lost.

The significant damage in this case is likely in the HP compressor airfoils - bent, twisted, broken, "corncobbed" in airline slang. They were simply unable to pump any significant airflow through the burner and turbines - and it's airflow that makes it go.

A modern high-bypass engine's core is smaller than older donks, and it's coupled to a bigger fan. This means two things:

1) the inlet area of the core is smaller, so it's a smaller target for a bird to attack :)

2) if a bird successfully attacks the core, it does proportionately more damage! :eek:

[galaxy flyer]

Thanks, Mr Barit 1 and Mr Farley :ok:

You will make my safety briefing a bit better!

GF

[lomapaseo]

Barit1

I agree with much but not all subject to some more data.

Again I suspect that the only mechanical damage is in the Low pressure compressor. However I'm afraid that we may have to wait for the public hearing to release the powerplant report unless somebody has some inside knowledge.

At any rate since little fan damage was seen, I'm beginning to wonder how they got through the certification test if they indeed ingested a bird into the core.

I'm equally keen to hear what happened to the same engines in the Rome starling encounter.

[barit1]

I have no inside information re 1549. However, my contacts with former colleagues have a unanimous agreement re the likely state of the core compressors.

And I don't know the details of a certification test for birds. BUT-- I seem to recall for a single large bird, it is aimed at a point deemed most critical re: fan blade breakage. That point is probably NOT the fan blade root, where a large amount of debris might enter the core. The objective of that test is more likely to determine if multiple fan blades will break, which could be REALLY bad.

But again, no inside knowledge.

[lomapaseo]

barit1

agree about the large bird but it was the run-on medium bird test I was interested in.

[ACMS]

rcallahan The crew never selected TOGA

I don't fly Airbus but I do know that until you enter a "detent" the throttles work like any jet. Push them forward and they give you more thrust.

So how do you know the crew didn't slowly move the thrust levers forward to see what happened? They don't need to go all the way to TOGA, in fact that sudden burst of fuel as TOGA was selected could have made the stall worse.

I know that in my 777 I'm not going to push TOGA to try and get the engines running again after an event like this. Easy does it until the engine stabilizes. ( if it ever will )

[broadreach]

DC-ATE
You'd be amazed. Usually done at three on a Monday morning*, a big tractor in front and one guy with two fistfuls of levers on a console clipped onto the last bogie, walking behind, steering the beast, all the steering on the double sets of tyres synchronised. The route's measured out beforehand in 3D but, of course, occasional mistakes do happen as do hydraulic leaks. Usually at seven-thirty in the morning.

*the preference for Monday morning is simply due to the fact that the guy on the levers is not as likely to be obliterated by a Jersey (or Staten Island) driver as he might be on a Saturday night. But that's just hearsay:)

Edit: in fact, looking at that pic,and having an approximate idea of the several hundred tonnes that assemblage of bogies could handle, I do suspect there might have been a bit of overkill.

[DC-ATE]

Well, it's quite a rig no matter what time they move it. Just doesn't look like there's much room for the boggies to move. Guess I don't have to worry about tho, ay?!

[airfoilmod]

Weighs twice as much as that TP tube, gents.

[Dysag]

Is your bulldozer one of those with sidesticks and computers?

[airfoilmod]

D8-K, very old-fashioned, just like me. Very little wire, and it would most certainly not float. Actually, it does have a side stick, but only one. I have had six people in the cab, and I have dug more than one goose pond with it.

[News Shooter]

Captain Chesley 'Sully' Sullenberger: Traitor (http://gawker.com/5165072/captain-chesley-sully-sullenberger-traitor)

[Bondgirl78]

Newsshooter Go Shoot In Your Ass!

:*

[airfoilmod]

Methinks that piece was satire.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Bondgirl --- definitely a joke/satire:ooh: --- like AFM says

the worst is that Sully conspired with those geese and staged that ditching so that he could get the royal treatment And drag poor Jeff down wit'im

Dat Bum:}

PA

[FrequentSLF]

Such comments can only be made in USA :ugh::ugh:

[Starbear]

If you look closely at rear bogie wheels versus front ones, you will have your answer I hope. Clever isn't it?

http://i317.photobucket.com/albums/mm382/bairbus/howtoturn.jpg

[CONF iture]

But, I've heard that one engine was at 35% N1 all the way to the water. The crew did not select TOGA

At the time of the bird strike both thrust levers were probably in the climb detent still looking for the computed target climb EPR but N1 decreased abruptly to 35% and 15% on engines 1 & 2 respectively … I don’t see how TOGA selection would have delivered anything more ?

[rcallahan]

It depends on what speed he selected, ie. "green dot"

[CONF iture]

It depends on what speed he selected, ie. "green dot"
No it does not.
Selecting a specific speed when in the climb mode only affects the speed you want to use for your climb. The target EPR remains the same : climb thrust !

Do you have more data than we have ?
It takes more than a mere speed selection to command the engines towards idle thrust.


What I notice is that one month after the event, the US1549 crew still did not have a chance to have a look at the data, their data from what happened on their own desk ...

[chris weston]

Starbear sir,

Excellent pic well done, very clear.

But ........ I thought that most aircraft rear steered most of the time!

I know, off thread, I'll go now, sorry all.

CW

[lomapaseo]

CONF iture

What I notice is that one month after the event, the US1549 crew still did not have a chance to have a look at the data, their data from what happened on their own desk ...

:confused:

What is this about? Are you talking about Sully having a peek into the investigation?

I'm sure that he will be interviewed publicly at the hearing and before that be given access to the various reports (FDR, CVR, Engines, ATC, etc.)

[rcallahan]

If, during the climb, (with the throttles in the climb detent)the pilot selects a slower speed ie. green dot, then the engines will go to idle until the selected speed is reached. If that selected speed is never reached, the engine power will remain at idle until splash down. EPR or N1 has nothing to do with the engine speed in the "climb detent"

[CONF iture]

If, during the climb, (with the throttles in the climb detent)the pilot selects a slower speed ie. green dot, then the engines will go to idle until the selected speed is reached. If that selected speed is never reached, the engine power will remain at idle until splash down. EPR or N1 has nothing to do with the engine speed in the "climb detent"
I'm sorry rcallahan, but you have a biased understanding how the system works. My precedent answer still applies.

In the same time I find it odd you keep mentioning that point :
Are you pretending at least one of the engines was involuntary kept to idle by the crew but would have been perfectly able, maybe, to deliver full thrust ???

Where are your data please ?

[bubbers44]

On any Boeing if a controller asks you to increase your climb rate for traffic you simply select a lower climb speed. I do not believe the Airbus A320 would go to idle power.

[rcallahan]

First, let me start at the firewall. That detent is TOGA. It is FIXED thrust. It's all the engine can deliver. Period.

Second, if you pull the thrust levers back to the next detent, you will be in the FLEX/MCT detent. The way this detent works is as follows: If, before takeoff, an ASSUMED temperature is entered in the FLEX prompt of the PERF page, the thrust levers will deliver a reduced takeoff thrust that will be at least EQUAL, but never LESS than climb thrust. The fadec takes into account the OAT when it AUTOMATICALLY adusts EPR or N1 (depending on the mode of the IAE engine or if you happen to have the CFM engine) because it has an AIR DATA input through the ADR. Now, if you have performed a takeoff, and you move the thrust levers to any other detent and then move them back to the FLEX/MCT detent, the fadec will command, and you will get MCT and nothing else because it is a FIXED thrust. If you are using the MCT for some reason, and you select a faster or slower speed while climbing, the elevator will pitch the airplane to make good that speed. If you are in level flight, the airplane will keep accelerating and selecting a speed will have no effect. Thrust is FIXED. Period.

Third, the climb detent. The climb detent is where you put the thrust levers when you transition to the climb phase immediately after 1000 feet AGL or whatever altitude you decide your transition to be (i.e. 1500 AGL for noise abatement). Once the thrust levers are placed in this detent, the AUTOTHRUST will command thrust anywhere from IDLE, to MAX CLIMB thrust depending on what speed you select on the FCU if you are using selected navigation (i.e. using the knobs on the FCU to select HDG and SPEED and ALTITUDE). It will use the same range from IDLE to MAX CLIMB if using the FMGC to MANAGE the airplane in CLIMB, CRUISE, DESCENT, and APPROACH phase of flight. So, if you are in LEVEL FLIGHT with the autopilot engaged or are hand flying, and you are going 250 knots and you select 200 knots let's say, then the autothrust will command IDLE until you reach 200 knots and then it will increase thrust to maintain 200 knots. If you are going 200 knots and select 250 knots, the autothrust will command MAX CLIMB thrust until reaching 250 knots and then back off to the point that it needs to in order to maintain 250 knots. Now, if you are descending and you have 200 knots SELECTED, yet you are hand flying and the speed is FASTER than what is SELECTED, the autothrust is going to command IDLE. Under this circumstance, if one were to select MCT or TOGA, the thrust would immediately go to that value and would be an excellent indication of whether the engine was A) RUNNING and B) whether it would be capable of producing more than IDLE. Unfortunately, going to a fixed thrust detent in order to assess whether the engine is running or not isn't anywhere in the Engine Dual Failure QRH checklist.

[CONF iture]

Once the thrust levers are placed in this detent, the AUTOTHRUST will command thrust anywhere from IDLE, to MAX CLIMB thrust depending on what speed you select on the FCU
Is it possible you miss the point the A/THR was very probably in THR CLB, the AP/FD VERTICAL MODE was in OPEN CLB and the FCU target altitude was 15000 feet ?
Whatever speed is selected at this time will not interfere in any way on the A/THR status which will still maintain THR CLB.

Selecting a different speed will only modify the pitch attitude.

Do you understand the A/THR is NOT in SPEED mode ?

Rcallahan, up to now you wrote only 5 posts on PPRuNe, but and all of them on that specific issue … you must have additional information we are not aware of ?
After the initial thrust reduction due to bird strikes, there are possibilities for the A/THR to command THR IDLE … but that would require additional action(s) from the crew …

Up to now, none such action(s) have been made avail to the public ... but I'm ready to hear ... ?

[lomapaseo]

After the initial thrust reduction due to bird strikes, there are possibilities for the A/THR to command THR IDLE … but that would require additional action(s) from the crew …

Up to now, none such action(s) have been made avail to the public ... but I'm ready to hear ... ?



Tell me the EGT and I'mj ready to guess :)

[bubbers44]

If the A320 goes to idle selecting a lower speed I hope they correct it soon.

[cactusbusdrvr]

I don't know any autothrottle system that will not go to idle if you command a slower speed. The Boeing operates the same as the Airbus in that respect. Also, if you turn the autothrust off on the Airbus you can see engine response. If I have a suspected engine problem on both engines I sure a heck am going to move the thrust levers around to see if I get something. I would definitely go to TOGA.

Just remember, Sully was flying the jet, talking on the radio, turning on the APU. The F/O had 35 hours on type and was fumbling with the QRH.

[Jetdoc]

Raise your hand if you think the crew tried to see if they could get any power out of the engines.
Given the fact that there was substantial damage to the core engine, I seriously doubt they could have gotten much thrust out of the engines. The airflow through the engine would have been very unstable and probably could not have supported high thrust settings.
Having at least one engine at 35% N1 was beneficial in that he had hydraulics and electrics.

[cactusbusdrvr]

Most of us would agree that we think the crew would have tried to do whatever they could to get the thrust restored. In the end we probably will find out that there was nothing more that could be done. There has been a lot of speculation on the position of the thrust levers but since sparky the wonderjet knows all and tells all we will find out in the final report.

[Flapwing]

There was a successfull ditching in 1956 with no fatalities... a Pan Am 377. I wish the media would do a bit more research before broadcasting!

Pan Am Flight 943 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_943)

http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_11602402

[CONF iture]

I don't know any autothrottle system that will not go to idle if you command a slower speed. The Boeing operates the same as the Airbus in that respect.
What is true in level flight is not in climb phase.
Did I miss an ATC request for 3000 feet level off ?
Your 757 works the same way in climb phase, reducing the speed will raise your nose but the thrust won't reduce the slightest.

[bubbers44]

In climb mode on any aircraft with an autothrottle system it would make no sense to reduce below climb power by reducing your climb speed. Name one that does. Non of the Boeings do anything but raise the nose to achieve the selected speed. I have flown most of them.

[YRP]

Flapwing, it would be nice if posters on pprune would do a bit more research - like reading the thread to see if their point has been posted a dozen times already or not :).

[ankh]

at the Mercury News site. Thanks for the link

[Fargoo]

A small amount of thread drift, heres an interesting little article on the fate of the aircraft.

One For The Breakers | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=mro&id=news/omUSAir309.xml)

[Bill Harris]

Thanks, folks, enjoyed this discussion.

--Bill

[feedback]

Bizarre further thread drift:

US Air's insurers, AIG, are seeking to suppress photos of the Airbus salvage, or so it says at The Online Photographer: AIG and US Airways Seek to Cover Up Flight 1549 Recovery Photos (http://theonlinephotographer.typepad.com/the_online_photographer/2009/03/aig-and-us-airways-seek-to-cover-up-flight-1549-recovery-photos.html)

Yes, that AIG.

But why? Is it just a marketing department's general allergy to photos of dented planes?

[Jofm5]

Dont think others have posted these two - may be interesting from a techincal aspect tho not sure how much damage was done to underside whilst dismantling the plane:-

http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~jof/side.jpg

http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~jof/rear.jpg

[protectthehornet]

I don't know if you have seen this or not, but sully got a 3 million US dollar advance for two books.

I hope he shares it with his crew.

[bubbers44]

Good for him. He got his retirement package plus some that USAir took from him. If just cost a few geese and one A320. Hope he enjoys his soon to come retirement.

[Ralph Cramden]

PTH

Why should he share his book advance with the crew? Wasn't saving their lives enough?

They can write their own books.

Ralph

[protectthehornet]

why should he share the money with the crew?

Well, for starters, if the aft FA hadn't kept the passengers from opening the rear doors, at least a dozen people would have died. the ditching wouldn't have been a success then now would it?

the crew worked together to save everyone, sully was just the most visible on TV.

Remember, the captain is responsible for everything, including running into a flock of geese.

[kappa]

Well, for starters, if the aft FA hadn't kept the passengers from opening the rear doors, at least a dozen people would have died. the ditching wouldn't have been a success then now would it? Scott McCartney, aviation writer for the Wall Street Journal attended the U S Airways Media Day last week and reported in his WSJ blog (http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2009/03/25/sully-dont-hang-up/) on “a panel discussion with behind-the-scenes officials involved in the Flight 1549 accident, which all aboard survived. Among the new information revealed: The impact with the water ripped open a hole in the underside of the airplane and twisting of the fuselage caused cargo doors to pop open, so the plane would have filled with water from the rear regardless of whether a passenger opened an escape door in the back of the cabin.”

[Graybeard]

Makes you wonder why all the aft belly damage. From the distant video, I could not detect any flare. Was there no energy left to flare? I've never seen near so much damage after a gear-up landing on a runway. There have been a number of dead stick landings of Boeings and Douglas that did no damage at all: witness the new TACA 737-300 on the dike in New Orleans.

Did the Indonesia 737 that landed in the water suffer as much damage?

[stator vane]

from what i have seen and heard of him in the various interviews, i am confident that he'll do the right thing by the rest of the crew.

it is not for us to decide what that might be.

[bsieker]

Well, for starters, if the aft FA hadn't kept the passengers from opening the rear doors, at least a dozen people would have died. the ditching wouldn't have been a success then now would it?


This always struck me as odd. In the copy of the FCOM that I have seen (which may have been revised since), it says in the ditching emergency procedure:


- EVACUATION
After impact the lowest point of the passenger exits (aft door) remains above the waterline for more than 7 minutes.


In my understanding this implies that all exits can be used for an evacuation after a ditching.

Maybe someone knows if that procedure has changed for A320? (I have heard that Boeing 737 does not allow the aft exits to be used after ditching.)


Bernd

[captplaystation]

Don't think he owes anyone a penny. If he had cocked it up I don't suppose anyone of them would have been helping him financially in "retirement".
Finally, his contribution was his contribution, & his lucidity and foresight has got him the publishing deal , nobody else.
Nothing to stop the others doing the same if they feel able, and think they have a different/more interesting take on things.
Think the cash should stay in HIS account, but then I am a Scottish Skinflint, so what do you expect :rolleyes:

[CargoMatatu]

So how many members of the crew are writing the book?

The fee goes to the author, no? :rolleyes:

[HarryMann]

There have been a number of dead stick landings of Boeings and Douglas that did no damage at all:

NO damage, right!

[precept]

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 8, 2009
************************************************************
NTSB ANNOUNCES DATE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON US AIRWAYS DITCHING
ACCIDENT IN HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public
hearing on June 9-10, 2009, as part of its ongoing
investigation into the ditching of a US Airways Airbus A-320
into the Hudson River in New York City in January. The
hearing will be held at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference
Center in Washington, D.C.
The purpose of the hearing will be to gather additional
factual information for the investigation. It will be
chaired by Member Robert M. Sumwalt who, along with Safety
Board investigators, will hear from those the Board calls to
testify on the following issues:
- Training of crew members on emergency procedures

- Certification requirements for the Airbus A-320
related to the structural integrity of the airframe
during ditching

- Bird ingestion certification standards for transport-
category turbofan engines

- New and developing technologies for detection of large
groups of birds and procedures to avoid conflicts with
birds in the general vicinity of airports
A list of the individuals expected to testify will be
released closer to the date of the hearing.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************

[broadreach]

I'm intrigued by this - post 1728 refers - as I suspect the salvage operation could have been performed with far less collateral damage. The impression one gets is of a hurried job with inadequate gear; a conspiracy theorist, which I'm not, might venture that it's almost as if further damage was being deliberately inflicted to ensure as little as possible was recoverable.

Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.

[protectthehornet]

you said that the author should get the pay...I'll bet a penny that there will be a ghost writer involved.

[llondel]

Regarding post 1728,

stephen mallon's industrial photography (http://www.stephenmallon.com/index-slides.html?gallery=BACK%20ONLINE!%20THE%20SALVAGE%20OF%20FL IGHT%201549)

He's got his pictures back on-line.

[Brian Abraham]

An interview with Sully from Sully?s Tale | Flight Today | Air & Space Magazine (http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/Sullys-Tale.html)

Long before he won instant celebrity for his cool handling of the ditching of US Airways flight 1549 in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009, Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger had thought a lot about airline safety procedures. But when it came time to apply those lessons, he and his crew relied as much on instinct as on the playbook. Sullenberger spoke with Air & Space editor Linda Shiner on February 16, almost a month to the day after the dramatic events that earned him worldwide acclaim from fellow pilots and the public alike.

Air & Space: I heard you say in one of your interviews that it was comforting to you to hear the flight attendants, after you announced “Brace for impact,” also directing the passengers to brace and put their heads down. Why was that a source of comfort?

Sullenberger: I felt they were assisting me in that moment. Even though we were intensely focused and very busy, I remember thinking that as soon as I made the public address announcement in the cabin, within a second or two, I heard even through the hardened cockpit door the flight attendants in unison shouting their commands. “Heads down. Stay down.” And it was comforting to me to know that they were on the same page, that we were all acting in concert. It made me feel that my hope and my confidence in completing this plan was reasonable and that they knew what needed to be done and were doing their part.

Air & Space: Is it standard procedure for the captain to go back through the cabin after an emergency like yours?

Sullenberger: I felt that as more of a personal responsibility than a procedural responsibility—which it may be. But I had the time, the aircraft was stable, and I was not concerned that it would suddenly sink. And so I could leave absolutely no possibility of anyone being left behind. I made a thorough search, calling out, “Is anyone there?” to make sure the evacuation was complete, and it was.

Air & Space: You made the decision to ditch within one minute of losing power in the engines. Is that correct?

Sullenberger: You may know better than I. I have not seen an official timeline, or official data of any kind from the investigators. All I have seen is what’s been reported in the press—based upon the daily press briefings given by the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] during the initial phase. I knew it had to be done quickly.

Air & Space: Before you made that decision, you’d briefly considered returning to LaGuardia. You’d considered diverting to Teterboro [New Jersey]. Was there a discussion between you and your first officer about the distances you could glide or the amount of energy you might sacrifice if you had to head to either of those airports?

Sullenberger: I haven’t listened to the cockpit voice recorder yet. At some point before the NTSB public hearing in a few months, I will have to do that. Until then, I’m not sure. I would characterize the cockpit as being busy, businesslike, and our cooperation was done largely by observing the other and not communicating directly because of the extreme time pressure. [First officer] Jeff [Skiles] and I worked together seamlessly and very efficiently, very quickly, without directly verbalizing a lot of issues. We were observing the same things, we had the same perceptions, and it was clear to me that he was hearing what I was saying to Air Traffic Control on the radio. He was observing my actions, and I was observing his, and it was immediately obvious to me that his understanding of the situation was the same as mine, and that he was quickly and efficiently taking the steps to do his part.

Air & Space: What is the role of the first officer in that situation?

Sullenberger: This was not a typical case. Because of the extraordinarily difficult nature of the situation and because of the extreme time pressure, we both had to take on different roles than what typically would be done according to protocol. Most of the training that we get is for a situation where you have more time to deal with things. You have time to be more thoughtful, to analyze the situation. Typically what’s done these days is for the first officer to be the pilot flying and for the captain to be the pilot monitoring, analyzing and managing the situation. There wasn’t time for that.

I felt that even though Jeff was very experienced—he turns out to have had as much total flying experience as I do—and even though he’d been a captain before on another airplane at my airline and had been at the company 23 years, he was relatively new on this particular aircraft type [Airbus A320]. In fact, this was his first trip after having completed training on it. He’d been through the simulator and the ground school and had been on a four-day trip with an instructor, but this was his first trip to fly. So I decided early on that we were best served by me using my greater experience in the [A320] to fly the airplane.

Additionally, I felt like I had a clear view out the left-hand and forward windows of all the important landmarks that I needed to consider. They were on my side. They would be easier for me to see. And ultimately the choice of where we would go and what flight path we would take would be mine.

I also thought that since it had been almost a year since I had been through our annual pilot recurrent training, and Jeff had just completed it—he had just been in the simulator using all the emergency checklists—he was probably better suited to quickly knowing exactly which checklist would be most appropriate, and quickly finding it in this big mutlipage quick reference handbook that we carry in the cockpit. So I felt it was like the best of both worlds. I could use my experience, I could look out the window and make a decision about where we were going to go, while he was continuing his effort to restart the engines and hoping that we wouldn’t have to land some place other than a runway. He was valiantly trying until the last moment to get the engines started again.

Air & Space: Were you calculating the distance you could glide?

Sullenberger: It wasn’t so much calculating as it was being acutely aware, based upon our energy state and by visually assessing the situation, of what was and what was not possible. There are several ways I used my experience to do that. I knew the altitude and airspeed were relatively low, so our total energy available was not great. I also knew we were headed away from LaGuardia, and I knew that to return to LaGuardia I would have to take into account the distance and the altitude necessary to make the turn back.

In the case of Teterboro, I knew that was even farther away, even though we were headed in that direction. The short answer is, based on my experience and looking out the window, I could tell by the altitude and the descent rate that neither [airport] was a viable option. I also thought that I could not afford to choose wrongly. I could not afford to attempt to make it to a runway that in fact I could not make. Landing short, even by a little bit, can have catastrophic consequences not only for everybody on the airplane but for people on the ground.

Air & Space: What was your speed when you lost the engines?

Sullenberger: Again, I would hate to guess. I have not seen the data. It was less than 250 knots the entire time. And I think once the thrust loss occurred, our speed began to decay very rapidly because the nose was still up in a climb attitude, but without climb thrust on the airplane. It required a substantial but smooth push to get the nose down to attain and maintain our best lift-over-drag airspeed.

Air & Space: So that was your first move: to get the nose down.

Sullenberger: Yes.

Air & Space: When you’re in this situation are you just trying to make it go as far as you can?

Sullenberger: My initial focus was to fly at the proper speed while we were assessing the situation. We needed our best lift-over-drag airspeed while we were trying to decide where we could go. Once we had considered and ruled out both LaGuardia and Teterboro as unattainable, then we flew that same speed down to a lower altitude where we began to slow so that we could put out flaps for landing.

Air & Space: How did you slow down? Were you using control surfaces?

Sullenberger: No. We slowed by raising the nose. Our descent rate was more rapid than usual because we had essentially no thrust. So in order to maintain a safe flying speed, we had to have the nose far enough down that we could hold that speed as we descended. Of course that resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent.

Air & Space: Did you flash back on any of your experiences as a glider pilot? Did it feel natural to you?

Sullenberger: Actually not very much after the bird strike felt very natural, but the glide was comfortable. Once we had established our plan, once we knew our only viable option was to land in the river, we knew we could make the landing. But a lot of things yet had to go right.

I get asked that question about my gliding experience a lot, but that was so long ago, and those [gliders] are so different from a modern jet airliner, I think the transfer [of experience] was not large. There are more recent experiences I’ve had that played a greater role.

One of the big differences in flying heavy jets versus flying lighter, smaller aircraft is energy management—always knowing at any part of the flight what the most desirable flight path is, then trying to attain that in an elegant way with the minimum thrust, so that you never are too high or too low or too fast or too slow. I’ve always paid attention to that, and I think that more than anything else helped me.

I also participated as an Air Line Pilots Association safety volunteer on the NTSB teams that investigated two of the airline’s previous accidents: the San Luis Obispo PSA 1771 crash in 1987 and the later Los Angeles runway collision in the early nineties.

The way I describe this whole experience—and I haven’t had time to reflect on it sufficiently—is that everything I had done in my career had in some way been a preparation for that moment. There were probably some things that were more important than others or that applied more directly. But I felt like everything I’d done in some way contributed to the outcome—of course along with [the actions of] my first officer and the flight attendant crew, the cooperative behavior of the passengers during the evacuation, and the prompt and efficient response of the first responders in New York.

Air & Space: When the birds struck, the engines stopped operating, is that correct? They weren’t at idle power; they were at nothing?

Sullenberger: Again, I have not seen the data. They certainly were not capable of producing usable thrust.

Air & Space: In trying to relight the engines, could the computer have misread the situation and kept the engines from producing the thrust you needed to recover?

Sullenberger: I would not want to speculate on that, and that would be all I could do at this point. I have not seen the data from the recorders. As far as I’m concerned, it was clear to Jeff and myself that neither engine was producing thrust.

Air & Space: Had you trained for dead stick landings as an airline pilot?

Sullenberger: That’s never been part of our annual recurrent training. I do remember on a number of occasions attempting in the simulator under visual conditions—not a water landing, but an attempt to make a runway. We would be set up on a nearby heading where we could see the airport, and we knew that it was at a place and an altitude where it was possible to get to the runway. That was the one thing I remember practicing some years ago.

Air & Space: Does the Airbus operator’s manual have a procedure for ditching?

Sullenberger: Yes.

Air & Space: So your first officer would have found that procedure and had a checklist to go through for the ditching procedure?

Sullenberger: Not in this case. Time would not allow it. The higher priority procedure to follow was for the loss of both engines. The ditching would have been far secondary to that. Not only did we not have time to go through a ditching checklist, we didn’t have time to even finish the checklist for loss of thrust in both engines. That was a three-page checklist, and we didn’t even have time to finish the first page. That’s how time-compressed this was.

Air & Space: Did the airplane have a ditch button that would have sealed certain openings in the cabin?

Sullenberger: Yes, it’s called a ditching push button. And there was not time. We never got to the ditching push button on the checklist. It wouldn’t have mattered anyway. The vents that are normally open are small. And once the airplane touched the water, the contact opened holes in the bottom of the airplane much, much larger than all of the vents that this ditching push button was designed to close.

I cannot conceive of any ditching or water landing where it would help. Theoretically I understand why the engineers included it. It sounded like a good idea, but not in practice. We had a successful water landing, and even then, from seeing pictures of [the airplane] being removed from the river by a crane, there were much larger holes than the vents this button was designed to close.

Air & Space: Do you still love to fly?

Sullenberger: Oh, yeah. It’s been a passion since I was 5. I can remember at 5 years old knowing that I was going to fly airplanes. And I was just fortunate enough at every juncture to be able to get to the next goal. I’m not sure what I would have done had I not been able to fly. I never even considered anything else.

Air & Space: What's the best landing you've made?

Sullenberger: A time I'd flown into San Francisco, on an evening when air traffic wasn't particularly heavy and the air traffic controllers do not have to impose upon you a lot of constraints. It was a pretty night and I could see the airport from far away, and I tried to make as smooth and elegant a continuous descent as I could. You could barely feel the wheels touch.

Air & Space: Any advice for aspiring pilots?

Sullenberger: Well, not just for aviators, but for all of us. My view of the world is that people are best served when they find their passion early on, because we tend to be good at things we’re passionate about. I think we also need to find people whom we admire and try to emulate them

Air & Space: And who did you admire?

Sullenberger: My first flight instructor, L.T. Cook Jr., was a Civilian Pilot Training Program instructor during World War II, a real gentleman and a stick-and-rudder man. He was a cropduster and had his own grass strip in rural Texas. In 1967, I paid $6 an hour for the airplane and gas and $3 an hour for his time. Among the thousands of cards I received [after the ditching], I discovered one from his widow. She wrote, "L.T. wouldn't be surprised, but he certainly would be pleased and proud."

[Desk Jockey]

AIG photo ban
I'm intrigued by this - post 1728 refers - as I suspect the salvage operation could have been performed with far less collateral damage. The impression one gets is of a hurried job with inadequate gear; a conspiracy theorist, which I'm not, might venture that it's almost as if further damage was being deliberately inflicted to ensure as little as possible was recoverable.

Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.

I think you need to explain that further. What extra damage was caused and how could the recovery have been better? How would that have aided the investigation?

[lomapaseo]

I doubt that the suppression of photos has anything to do with technical coverups, etc. More likely to do with ownership and job specifications.

I suspect that future photo jobs will have more fine print in them.

Most investigative agencies like to have first access to the high quality pics

[H-295]

I'm a professional photographer, and have run into this type of corporate mentality before.

Here's an exchange I had with US Air regarding their attempted suppression of the aircraft recovery:


On Apr 21, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Customer Relations wrote:

Dear Mr. Campbell,

Thank you for contacting Customer Relations at US Airways. US Airways
has been fully cooperating with the investigation of Flight 1549 since
the event occurred. The aircraft hull which operated as Flight 1549 is
under the control of our insurance company and the NTSB. We are aware
that a photographer would like to publish or sell photographs of the
aircraft hull that may include our trademarks, service marks, etc., and
we are currently seeking information from the photographer to determine
if the photographs' release or sale would violate the intellectual
property rights of US Airways or otherwise interfere with the NTSB
investigation of this accident.

Sincerely,

Edie Curtin
US Airways Customer Relations
Corporate Office

US-09CAMPBELL-044P6


My reply:


Dear Edie:

The aircraft is out in the public domain; not in one of your hangars. You haven't got a leg to stand on, and you know it.

The images are all over the web, anyway.

Bob

[broadreach]

Desk Jockey, your post 1746

Quote
I think you need to explain that further. What extra damage was caused and how could the recovery have been better? How would that have aided the investigation?
Unquote

Certainly. I don't know what extra damage was caused, but I would expect a fair amount more than had the crane operators used broad webbing strops instead of steel, and had the aircraft been settled on the barge supported by rubber sausages.

It may be that by the time the aircraft was lifted out of the water, AIG and USAir had already agreed as to whose responsibility salvage would be and precisely how that would be carried out.

it may seem perfectly logical that an aircraft that's been ditched, submerged in brackish water for a few days and been bashed and yanked this way and that, is not going to represent much value to anyone. But insurance relies upon the insured acting at all times as if uninsured. Which means, amongst other things, don't make matters worse than they already are.

As for aiding the investigation - don't think my post suggested that!