Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC [Archive] - Page 5

misd-agin

20th Jan 2009, 17:26

The Aviation Herald (http://avherald.com/h?article=41370ebc/0005)

http://avherald.com/h?article=41370ebc/0005 (http://avherald.com/h?article=41370ebc/0005)

http://webmail.aol.com/40627/aol/en-us/Mail/get-attachment.aspx?uid=1.21542010&folder=Sent&partId=4

(http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100000075x1216817552x1201106465/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072%26hmpgID=82%26bcd=DecemailfooterNO82) Accident: US Airways A320 at New York on Jan 15th 2009, ditched in Hudson River
By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Jan 18th 2009 21:53Z, last updated Sunday, Jan 18th 2009 21:59Z
The NTSB reported about first data from the flight data and cockpit voice recorder in their last public brief today. The data quality of both recorders is excellent, the FDR features 700 parameters.

According to the FDR the engines started to run down simultaneously as the airplane climbed through 2700-3000 feet. The airplane subsequently reached a maximum altitude of 3200 feet. This ties in with the observation, that the airplane intersected a string of primary targets visible on the radar (but not to the NY departure controller). The rolldown of the engines was very rapid and went below idle setting.

The cockpit voice recorder contains the whole flight from before engine startup. Flight preparation, working the various checklists and takeoff were routine. About 90 seconds after liftoff the captain remarks about birds, about 3 seconds later thumps are being heard and the engines can be heard running down. This is 210 seconds before the end of recording. The captain confirms loss of power and takes control of the airplane. He then calls MAYDAY (which wasn't briefed by NTSB so far), reported to ATC that they hit birds and lost both engines. The first officer is attempting to restart the engines, but isn't successful. 90 seconds before splash down the captain advises cabin "Brace for impact" via the PA, then tells ATC "We're gonne be in the Hudson", the Ground Proximity warning systems triggers and continues throughout the remainder of the flight.

The NTSB described the atmosphere in the cockpit as a very calm collected exercise (the spokeswoman even remarked "routine conversation, I was more nerveous[listening to the tape, editor's note] than them").

The airplane is currently on a barge, which is estimated to move to New Jersey late Sunday after the airplane has been defueled.

The first stage fan blades of the right engine are intact, there is damage (denting) to the front cowling of the engine (editor's note: probably meant engine inlet). Both wings show leading edge damage, the right wing is badly damaged and leaks fuel. The belly underneath the tail is badly damaged, all doors to belly compartments opened causing bad damage there, too.

Because of the fuel leakage it was decided to defuel the airplane on the barge before moving it to a workshop in New Jersey.

The left hand engine may have been located in the Hudson river, there has been one sonar return of interest, which has not been known to local authorities so far. Additional survey is currently being done on that object before probably divers will be sent down to prepare the object for recovery.

The NTSB said, that "Miracle of the Hudson" is a wonderful picture, although both flight and cabin crew had been trained for years to do this.

Honeybuzzard

20th Jan 2009, 17:44

As a SLF and Birder, I seem to recall that the record height for a birdstrike was 37,000 feet - A Vulture over Africa. I also remember reading of a group of Whooper Swans being radar tracked at 26,000 feet over Scotland.

Blink182

20th Jan 2009, 17:58

#1004
Picture shows a completely acceptable method of Fan retention iaw MM practices , such as for JT9 and CF6 engines...have personally done this for a 2 engine ferry on a DC10.......... lots of other checks are carried out, such as boroscope insp on the other engines. RB211 required that the fan blades are removed altogether .

JayEmKay

20th Jan 2009, 18:53

Honeybuzzard Quote: I also remember reading of a group of Whooper Swans being radar tracked at 26,000 feet over Scotland.I have passed birds at 26,000 whilst climbing north out of JFK. (thought to be Canada Geese)
Fortunately ATC warned us and it was 'all eyes looking'. (about 1985)

forget

20th Jan 2009, 19:37

Just a thought, but how about l@sers to target flocks and scare them away??

Scare them away? Not a chance. Years ago I was at a Guy Fawkes fireworks display in a country park. In the middle of the show, the biggest airborne bangs and flashes you can imagine, a flock of Canada geese was illuminated flying directly through the display and heading for the lake half a mile away. Their deviation due to the fireworks - absolutely nil.

Had I not see it I wouldn’t have believed it.

rattletrap

20th Jan 2009, 20:03

llondel

20th Jan 2009, 20:15

CHfour:
My old company had an SOP to have the landing lights on below FL100. My current company (LOCO) likes them off as much as possible to save bulbs.

Are aircraft bulbs that unreliable then? The ones used on cars seem to be amazingly reliable considering the vibration and other environmental factors. Granted that aviation is probably worse, but mechanical damage is going to happen whether the bulbs are powerd or not. Or is your current company concerned that it might have to upload a couple pounds more fuel to keep them on for a few more minutes?

JayEmKay:

a flock of Canada geese was illuminated flying directly through the display and heading for the lake half a mile away. Their deviation due to the fireworks - absolutely nil.

I've seen quotes from WW2 bomber pilots who say that taking a straight course through the flak was best because it provided minimum time in the target area. Perhaps geese work the same way?

(OK, if it's targetted flak or you get coned by searchlights then you'd better evade)

Birds in general don't seem to cope very well with high-speed objects - even when faced with a car they react very late sometimes, and a few don't make it. I assume this is evolution, in that they've never needed to react to something that big and fast.

morbos

20th Jan 2009, 20:30

Screens are a non-starter. A 4lb+ bird at 250kts is a cannon round basically. Since the encounter could be at any altitude perhaps the best defense is a good offense. Some way to

1) detect the object on approach to the engine
2) ensure it does not get to the engine(s).

The idea would be some sort of directed energy release from the side of the a/c linear with the axis from the spool. Well timed, it would remove the threat from entering the engine. I think 1) is achievable and testable but 2) is tougher given the thin sides of a/c and the extra weight needed for such a rarely needed system.
(obviously this system is only for a close to body engine mounts, #1 and #4 would be on their own in a 4 engine application).

Pontius Navigator

20th Jan 2009, 20:46

Now that we know this same a/c experienced a compressor stall in the right engine 2 days earlier. . . Is a compressor stall so routine that they go unreported?
:confused::confused::confused:

How do we know the same a/c experienced a compressor stall in the right engine 2 days earlier/

Err, perhaps it was reported?

....and that US Airways prefers a pilot to carry less than full fuel....

No operator, military or civilian carries more fuel than needed for the leg with one exception. It would be frankly irresponsible to carry, say, 5hrs fuel for a 2 hr 30 min sector. The exception is where there is a large price advantage in carrying cheap fuel through an expensive destination - not applicable in the US I would have thought.

would condensation be a factor? Could an engine go through a series of stalls from water contamination in the fuel and be damaged to the point that the damage is not noticed until tasked?

And the relevance of this?

rcav8r

20th Jan 2009, 21:00

Engine 1 (left)
Installation date: Jan. 15, 2008
Total flight hours: 19,182.10

No.1 celebrated its 1 year installation by taking a dunk to the bottom of the Hudson. :ouch:

rattletrap

20th Jan 2009, 21:38

How does a jet engine rack up 19,182.10 hours of operation in one year? Was this engine used when it was installed?

infrequentflyer789

20th Jan 2009, 21:40

The birds have been there before the airports

Apparently not the geese, at least not in these numbers. A few years ago the CAA wrote this:

In the 1970s and 1980s the population of geese was
such that goose strikes were rare. Hence the
probability of a multiple engine incident was
considered extremely remote. However the Canada
Goose population in North America has increased
from 2 million in 1990 to 5.7 million today 10, and the
trend continues.
In 1953 the then small, and previously stable, UK
population of about 3,000 geese began to increase at
an average rate of about 8% per year. The UK goose
population was over 73,000 by 1991 and has now
reached around 130,000 11.
See: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/1437/srg_acp_00018-01-030303.pdf

fleigle

20th Jan 2009, 21:40

It didn't say it was new when it was installed, did it?.

nahsuD

20th Jan 2009, 22:58

Now that we know this same a/c experienced a compressor stall in the right engine 2 days earlier....and that US Airways prefers a pilot to carry less than full fuel....would condensation be a factor? Could an engine go through a series of stalls from water contamination in the fuel and be damaged to the point that the damage is not noticed until tasked? Is a compressor stall so routine that they go unreported?

:confused::confused::confused:

I apologize if this has a different, more reliable, source, but as far as I know, we only know that CNN reports an email from a PAX who was on the same A/C a few days before. That hardly qualifies as "now that we know".

Robert Campbell

20th Jan 2009, 23:24

In the 1970s we used to joke that the windshield was rated for a 1 lb. bird at 300 kts. or a 300 lb. bird at 1 kt.

airfoilmod

21st Jan 2009, 02:19

I think most if not all professional pilots would:

Engage their Brain, experience, and training presented with a similar challenge. Out come notwithstanding.

I've (We've) been tossing this around, for several days. The agreement is basically, Hero? Hmmm. not really.

Captain Sullenberger's actions (and solutions) were elegant and exquisitely performed. What was he to do? Turn down the assignment Fate had arranged? Or even consider anything but doing, again, what his training and experience commanded?

The non flying, actually, non-airline folk, act resentful at the thought that this is perhaps not Heroism. Not to be taken for granted by anyone, certainly, but expected, because his passengers depend on him and FO Skiles. Calm? Professional, Creative, Dependable. Predictable. The Captain just lives down the road, I hope to meet and speak with him someday. I've met him before, so many times, over a long length of Time.

I think to call him Hero, to make him wear that odd badge, to suit people who truly don't understand the nature of the exercise, is unfair.

AF

jugofpropwash

21st Jan 2009, 02:21

First, let me admit that I am only SLF. However, I *have* read all 52 pages of this thread, so perhaps I get a bit of credit... :)

Two questions/comments:

1. Perhaps in this case - with aircraft intact, wings to stand on, and boats coming - it is better that the majority of the passengers did not don life vests. Let's be honest - if folks had put them on, a good number would have inflated them inside the aircraft. If they had, perhaps everyone would not have gotten out.

2. There did not seem to be nearly enough life rafts (slide rafts, or whatever you choose to call them). They appeared to be nearly full, and it appeared at least half the people were standing on the wings. If boats had not been nearby, or the aircraft had broken up, people would have died from hypothermia due to immersion regardless of whether they had vests on. If the back doors are going to be unusable in the event of a water landing, then it seems the possible 'raft' capacity of the rear slide should be ignored. Moving the slide to the front of the plane while the aircraft is sinking just isn't going to happen.

Am I wrong?

subsonic69

21st Jan 2009, 02:48

jugofpropwash

1. to be honest. it would be IDEAL to have the lifevests on. It is true that boats are coming in and the plane is not sinking (quickly). But to add more safety in the case that the aircraft begins to sink rapidly, they would still float on the water even if they don't know how to swim.

In the case of people inflating there lifevests prematurely. That would totally depend on the person itself. Even if the crew was highly experienced and instructed all the passengers. Some would still be panicking in that situation and might instinctively react to inflate the vest, making it harder for them to go out of the exits specially the overwing exits which is smaller than the doors. and ofcourse if they do jump in the water which is very cold, hypothermia might kill them if the rescuers werent there to pull them out quickly.

2. In the case that there were not enough life rafts. I can definitely assure you that there is enough for all the passengers even at full load. The life rafts at the aft doors were not inflated and only the ones in the FWD doors are inflated. ( as you can see in the pic, they have no choice but to stay on the wings, since they cant use the aft emergency slides which doubles up as a life raft when detached from the aircraft)

http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/200901/r330855_1491688.jpg

airfoilmod

21st Jan 2009, 02:53

That one, that aircraft, is a thing of beauty.

AF

jugofpropwash

21st Jan 2009, 03:09

Subsonic-

>2. In the case that there were not enough life rafts. I can definitely assure you that there is enough for all the passengers even at full load. The life rafts at the aft doors were not inflated and only the ones in the FWD doors are inflated. ( as you can see in the pic, they have no choice but to stay on the wings, since they cant use the aft emergency slides which doubles up as a life raft when detached from the aircraft)

But that's what I'm saying - there may be plenty of rafts, but are there enough USABLE rafts? The rafts at the back doors aren't going to be of much use if the back doors won't open, or alternately, if you flood the aircraft opening them.

Bus Junkie

21st Jan 2009, 03:25

Andy, you have never operated a 320 out of LGA. Having flown for the real US Airways out of LGA summer and winter, I've never had to do a bleeds off take off. Andy, bleeds off max power when deicing out of ORD? or EWR as an fo? No wonder we got those eternal memos about flexing with no contamination. Get a grip and go back to your poker game.

I suspect it was a "Bleeds Off" takeoff, which may have helped the situation immeasurably.

Deicing was being done in LGA, and even if you don't deice yourself, a bleeds off takeoff (APU running, supplying air for packs) will stop a lot of the stink of sucking up Deicing fluid on the runway, AND that crap is slick and a lot ends up on the runway, so I tend to always go bleeds off/MAXpower when deicing is being done (regardless of whether or not I deiced)especially at LGA with the short unforgiving runways.

If the APU was running for takeoff then there was no rat deployment at all, full electrics were always available, and a simple push of the yellow electric pump would restore much of the hydraulics if the engines weren't even windmilling.... On the otherhand, to restore the blue system the RAT manual deploy button would have to be pushed with the APU running...

IF the APU wasn't running, then the crew was even busier (though they may have immediately pushed the start switch at the beginning of the event) will be interesting to see.

Good job all around, can't wait to read the cvr transcripts and the reports...

Cheers
Wino

Zulu01

21st Jan 2009, 04:01

Reading ALL the transcripts so far and listening to the actual survivors on TV, the Raft on the port side - over wing did inflate but turned turtle, they tried twice to turn it right side up without success due to the very slippery surface of the wing. It can be still be seen draped behind the wing in later pics including the pics when the plane was towed against the bank when the wing is in the air

Mäx Reverse

21st Jan 2009, 07:21

I fear we have to be a bit careful with the wording here.

Definitions:

A SLIDE is mainly designed for use in the evacuation of an aircraft on 'terra firma'. Typically found on Short/Medium-Range aircraft as the A320.

A SLIDE-RAFT is a bigger version of a slide (typically 2-lane) which features additional survival-equipment (water, foot, roof, rows, pressure re-regulation, manual inflation) an ist meant to carry 30-50 of peole for longer periods of time.

Slides and Slide-Rafts are Self-Inflating if doors are opened in 'Flight Mode' (sometimes called 'Automatic Mode') and can be detached from the airframe after inflation.

A RAFT is a portable, self-inflating version of the Slide-Raft (less the slide funtionality) and has to be manually brought into the water after a ditching.

In my airline the A320 does only carry SLIDES, even when operating over extendes water areas. No rafts are required by certification authorities. Obviously a slide can support a couple of PAX for a limited amount of time (limited as there is no way to re-regulate the slide pressure).

Our Intercontinental Jets like A330, A340, B744 feature SLIDE-RAFTS and portable RAFTS with a total capacity way in excess of the passenger capacity of the aircraft.

The Slides of the accident aircraft definitely look like our slides, not sure if AI offers SLIDE-RAFTS on the A320 as an option after all.

The A320-Overwing-Exits features a more complex, two-lane slide 'around-the-corner-down-the-wing' to get people quickly down the wing in an evac-scenario. I doubt that it will be of much use in a ditching.

Regards, MAX

Airbus Girl

21st Jan 2009, 08:08

I also fly A320 and reading the above posts:-

1. Ours have standard slides, which as mentioned above, are meant to be used only as FLOTATION devices, they are not like the proper rafts you find on a long-haul aircraft.

2. We use packs off as standard for take off, they go on at 1500 feet when the power is reduced (and we have APU off for take-off). If this was the case here then the aircraft never would have been pressurised. Equally, the packs could have been on for take-off or the APU could have been running supplying the packs but at low level the aircraft still wouldn't have been pressurised.

timpet

21st Jan 2009, 10:57

I too am a frequent SLF who has read all 52 pages of this thread (including some of the postings which have been apparently subsequently whisked away by the mods) and have found them both entertaining and informative, so thank you all.

A couple of comments.

Firstly, don't fall into the trap of taking things too literally or semantically. There have been a variety of posts about the lack of recognition for the entire crew, the repugnance about the apparent hero worship of 'Sully" as well as the ignorance of the media.

I reckon we all know and believe it was crew effort; almost any professional pilot on this forum could have done the same thing; "Sully" is no super-hero, just a superbly competent professional; and journalists get things wrong (frequently). And in additon, the fates or gods conspired to line up a perfect series of circumstances to pull this one out of the fire.

But human beings are simple creatures. As any good marketer will tell you, they love a great, and well articulated, story. And turning Sully into a hero and making the whole deed heroic is part of that human need for story telling - it allows everyone to engage with the incident.

You should all bask in the reflected glory bestowed on the profession, without worrying too much about whether the facts are entirely correct or what the dictionary defintion of 'hero' may be. Every individual on that plane got home eventually despite the fact that it had two engines out. What an outcome! Sure, there will be serious lessons to be learned from it but don't try too hard to kill the amazing story, because it is the story which will be the conduit for the power of those lessons.

The second point I'd make is that I may occassionally bury my head in a newspaper during a safety briefing, but don't patronise me for it. I do so because I can quite literally recite the safety briefing (almost any one of them on any aircraft type in Asia, Euorope or the US) rote. I do not take my life or safety lightly and I always familiarise myself with the locations of the exits and the position of the life vests (or seat cushions :)) prior to take off. I also run through a quick mental check list of what I would do in the event of an emergency.

So may pilots seem to have expressed in these pages that they hope if a similar set of circumstances occured to them, they would act in a similar manner to this flight crew. Similalrly I hope that, as SLF, I would do the right thing 'in the unlikley event of an emergency'. But I may not. Not because I fail to pay attention to the safety briefing or give it the gravitas it deserves, but simply because I am human.

We never know how we will react until we are tested.

Cut the SLF's some slack. They may not have donned their life vests as they should have but they are human.

Most importantly, they all got home.

Thanks and kudos to the crew, the aircraft, the circumstances, the profession, the fates, the gods, the glider pilot rating and also to human frailty as well as human achievement. :D

And spare a thought for the poor geese as well. ;)

damagecontrol

21st Jan 2009, 11:06

I would like to know why they changed the colour of the slides to silver/grey as rather than the yellow that it was in the past???:confused:

G-CPTN

21st Jan 2009, 11:45

One aspect of the behaviour of the geese as discussed here seems to concentrate on them having been disturbed and subsequently taking flight into the path of aircraft taking off, however it seems likely that these particular birds were in transit through the zone. No amount of ground patrols or scaring measures would affect these birds from following their long-established migratory routes.
Geese do move locally from roosts to feeding grounds and it is maybe this behaviour that should be studied with respect to this incident, in particular the times of day when these 'local' flights (of the geese) occur.

Fizix

21st Jan 2009, 11:56

Every individual on that plane got home eventually despite the fact that it had two engines out. What an outcome!Well done to ALL the crew, ALL the rescuers, ALL the SLF and well summarised, timpet.

It is an amazing outcome indeed ... all the holes in the cheese lined up!

Wader2

21st Jan 2009, 12:02

however it seems likely that these particular birds were in transit through the zone.

Geese do move locally from roosts to feeding grounds and it is maybe this behaviour that should be studied with respect to this incident, in particular the times of day when these 'local' flights (of the geese) occur.

Quite, a point I have been making frequently. There is a BAM DIS for the area. As the birds will always relocate from a roost to a grazing ground there is no amount of ground scaring that will stop them - they will still seek out other grazing areas.

Where I am we have regulate dawn and dusk sorties, often with 500 plus and only 5 minutes separation between waves. A magnificent sight in VMC but a condition where a bird detecting radar is essential for safe navigation in IMC.

I would guess that will be a major recommendation.

BTW, not sci-fi but a number of birds could be fitted with SIF and Charlie.

wileydog3

21st Jan 2009, 13:02

Rattletrap, few flights depart with FULL FUEL as it is not necessary and is a waste of fuel and $$$.

You imply that the compressor stall was not reported. Do you have facts to verify that? Or is that just unfounded assumption?

Never forget that while there may be various pressures applied at any organization (such as scrutiny of fuel requests) the PIC has final say and has to then climb into the cockpit. Ask yourself.. would you take an airplane you felt unsafe or lacking sufficient fuel?

wileydog3

21st Jan 2009, 13:13

Fizix said It is an amazing outcome indeed ... all the holes in the cheese lined up!

Actually, using the old Swiss cheese model, the crew stopped the unfolding event and thus they were the final barrier that kept this from being an event with fatalities. There are no procedures really for a dual engine failure, low altitude followed by a ditching in a river near an inland city. This is where good airmanship and a team comes into play.

And in some ways, it highlights the fact that not all events can be managed through SMS or TEM or the most current jargon. A good aviator with a good crew is going to have to improvise in very unusual situations. And there is not going to be a checklist, a procedure, a policy that can cover such events. This is not to say that it is not going be be tried, however.

Wader2

21st Jan 2009, 13:17

. . . there is a small natural lake right . . . it attracks a lot of bird life. I am always fearing a birdstrike when large aircraft land here. :ooh: I like birds with feathers too, but when it comes to the metal ones, the feathered ones must stay away... or on the ground.

Bird control take many forms. One is not to fly in the same airspace as the birds. For ground feeding birds, or lake ones come to that, the best thing is to let them feed as scaring them puts them in conflict with aircraft.

Many long lived birds become habituated to aircraft and will avoid flying in to aircraft. I have tens of thousands of birds feeding but the only bird strike we had was when a helicopter disturbed roosting geese at night.

Look around Heathrow (LHR) there are huge reservoirs and sewage farms within 3 miles with on just 3 miles from 09L. I am sure there is a risk here but equally that it is constrained.

kenhughes

21st Jan 2009, 15:01

Re post # 966: If this is a direct quote, does no one else find it strange? (Bolding mine):

John Hodock, another passenger on the Tuesday flight, said in an e-mail to CNN: "About 20 minutes after take-off, the plane had a series of compressor stalls on the right engine.

No passenger, unless a pilot himself, would say that the plane had a series of compressor stalls. They would be more likely to say that the engine blew up, caught on fire, exploded, etc.

I can't even imagine CC telling the passenger, "Oh, don't worry, it's just a series of compressor stalls - now eat your pretzels like a good passenger".

Is John Hodcock a real person, or is he a plant by the lawyers looking to make a buck or two?

forget

21st Jan 2009, 15:12

No passenger, unless a pilot himself,

There are people, other than pilots, who can recognise a compressor stall. :hmm:

kenhughes

21st Jan 2009, 15:16

There are people, other than pilots, who can recognise a compressor stall.

Agreed. I came back to edit my post, but you had beat me to it. :}

Can we agree on "the average passenger", rather than "no passenger"?

lomapaseo

21st Jan 2009, 15:21

Re post # 966: If this is a direct quote, does no one else find it strange? (Bolding mine):

Quote:
John Hodock, another passenger on the Tuesday flight, said in an e-mail to CNN: "About 20 minutes after take-off, the plane had a series of compressor stalls on the right engine.

No passenger, unless a pilot himself, would say that the plane had a series of compressor stalls. They would be more likely to say that the engine blew up, caught on fire, exploded, etc.

I can't even imagine CC telling the passenger, "Oh, don't worry, it's just a series of compressor stalls - now eat your pretzels like a good passenger".

Is John Hodcock a real person, or is he a plant by the lawyers looking to make a buck or two?

There is always the possibility that what he said has been translated by CNN using their off-line experts.

At any rate the word is out and will be considered in the on-going investigation. As I suggested earlier the analysis of the DFDR can tell the difference between bird caused fan damage and a weak compressor.

BTW it is possible to have both (in spite of what CNN says)

forget

21st Jan 2009, 15:23

Compressor stall. Here YouTube - Compressor stall A330 (http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=8D5AqAxE330)

wileydog3

21st Jan 2009, 15:31

VanHork, think of the engine having a very bad cough with possible fire coming out one or both ends. With the 'coughs' the engine will vibrate or bang around.

This is the F100 engine...
YouTube - P&W-F100-220C Engine Stall (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mQNUrYoFM2E)

In this video you can see a compressor stall shaking an F-16

YouTube - F100 Fighter Engine - 3 (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q_h0yfCwyk)

armchairpilot94116

21st Jan 2009, 15:53

Jet engines cant digest birds well , would propeller aircraft generally fare better or would damage to the blades render them even worse in bird strikes?

Here is a clip of a bird welcoming the first visit of the A380 demo plane to TPE. Wouldnt be good PR if a few of his flock ended up causing the A380 to land in a bad way.

YouTube - A380 reach Taiwan (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yyjbq5nRZE8&feature=related)

(turn down the volume on your computer as the clip is rather loud)

Loose rivets

21st Jan 2009, 16:08

Something I saw once spells out the balistic power of a bird's head. The luckless creature, about the size of a chicken, was hanging by its neck on the outside of a DC3 windscreen. Its head was inside, still attached.

ChristiaanJ

21st Jan 2009, 16:36

Most of you have probably seen this one, but saves looking it up.

Thomsonfly 757 birdstrike (http://fr.youtube.com/watch?v=mthiIOhCUSE)

That was a heron.

Classic example of a series of stalls after a strike.

CJ

awblain

21st Jan 2009, 18:39

Robert's joke of a windscreen taking a 1lb bird at 300kts or a 300lb bird at 1kt brings up a useful scaling, as the kinetic energy of the bird goes as mass times speed squared.

The sobering kinetic energy of a 20lb goose at 300kts matches that of a 3000lb car at 25kt, or a 72,000lb boat at 5kt.

The damage done should thus rise quickly with speed, depending on how exactly the bird is `processed': how much of the bird's kinetic energy is dumped into how many fan/compressor blades. I speculate that the details of impact are relatively independent of speed, since the speed of sound in the (unfrozen) bird is probably like that in water, of order 1500m/s, well above closing speed (~150m/s), and above the maximum fan tip speed
(less than 800 m/s? - even for a 3m diameter fan at 5000rpm).

Just after departure at ~150kt there would only be 1/4 of the kinetic energy going in as at 300kt. Also, since geese are quite quick (~60 kt), a head on is probably going to more damaging than an overtake: impact at 360kt vs 240kt differs by a factor of more than 2 in energy.

Pontius Navigator

21st Jan 2009, 19:24

ChristiaanJ

21st Jan 2009, 20:05

I do doubt there are 60 lbs geese flying around.

I remember the DC-3 used on the Fairford-Filton shuttle run in the early Concorde days (I flew on it).
That one 'collected' a 'mere' gull through the right windscreen.
F/O leant forward for an unknown reason... next moment there was this huge bang above his head, a shower of glass and feathers, and a big bloddy splash on the C/B panel behind him.

His time hadn't come yet.

CJ

precept

21st Jan 2009, 20:47

See following link to update on missing engine and other findings.

Latest News | Top Stories | News Articles (http://breakingnews.nypost.com/dynamic/stories/N/NY_PLANE_SPLASHDOWN_BAOL-?SITE=NYNYP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT)

Pontius Navigator

21st Jan 2009, 20:51

Jet engines cant digest birds well , would propeller aircraft generally fare better or would damage to the blades render them even worse in bird strikes?

Props may or may not hit a bird.

One figure I recall was that a bird would have to be 8 foot long to be certain of being hit by the propellor in a Tucano flying possibly at 250kts. (The 8 feet is certainly the figure I recall).

The issue here is that the bird would probably hit the cockpit without being chopped up by the propellor.

To pre-empt the next 'bright' idea - you would probably need multi-bladed, contra rotating propellors to chop up the birds before they entered the turbo-fan arc. Of course we woulc always by the Turnmanski turpoprops.

robbreid

21st Jan 2009, 21:02

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
January 21, 2009
************************************************************
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION INTO DITCHING OF US
AIRWAYS JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
In its continuing investigation of US Airways flight 1549,
which ditched into the Hudson River adjacent to Manhattan at
approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 15, 2009, the National
Transportation Safety Board has developed the following
factual information:
The right engine has been externally examined and
documented. An examination of the first stage fan blades
revealed evidence of soft body impact damage. Three of the
variable guide vanes are fractured and two are missing. The
engine's electronic control unit is missing and numerous
internal components of the engine were significantly
damaged.
What appears to be organic material was found in the right
engine and on the wings and fuselage. Samples of the
material have been provided to the United States Department
of Agriculture for a complete DNA analysis. A single
feather was found attached to a flap track on the wing. It
is being sent to bird identification experts at the
Smithsonian.
The left engine has been located in about 50 feet of water
near the area of the Hudson River where the aircraft
ditched. The NTSB is working with federal, state and local
agencies to recover the engine, which is expected to occur
sometime on Thursday.
The NTSB has learned that the right engine experienced a
surge during a flight on January 13, 2009, and that
subsequent maintenance actions included the replacement of a
temperature probe. Investigators from the NTSB's
Maintenance Records group are researching this report by
examining applicable maintenance records and procedures.
The NTSB's Survival Factors group is in the process of
interviewing passengers to learn more about the events
surrounding the ditching and the emergency evacuation and
rescue. The Operations and Human Performance group is
interviewing US Airways flight operations training
personnel.
The checked and carry-on baggage is in the process of being
removed from the aircraft. Representatives from the NTSB's
Office of Transportation Disaster Assistance are working to
coordinate efforts with US Airways to return these items to
the passengers.
The on-scene documentation of the airplane is expected to be
completed by the end of the week. Preparations are underway
to facilitate movement and more permanent storage of the
airplane so that more detailed documentation of the damage
can be performed at a later date.
###
NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]

galvonager

21st Jan 2009, 21:12

About 90 seconds after liftoff the captain remarks about birds, about 3 seconds later thumps are being heard and the engines can be heard running down.A question from the SLF gallery here: can any evasive action be taken in situations like that, and if yes, is it advisable? As others have shared in this discussion, geese (apparently) stick to their pre-selected heading, so it would fall upon the pilot to prevent a collision. Would the reaction of an A320 to control inputs (it's not a fighter jet, after all) allow it to change its trajectory sufficiently in 3 seconds to avoid a bird strike?

ChristiaanJ

21st Jan 2009, 21:32

Previous post reminds me of another earlier question....
"How big the chance of both engines being hit?"

If the geese in a 'V formation' fly about three to four feet apart, and the diameter of an A320 engine inlet is about four to six feet (strictly my guess, without any googling, too late in the day), the chance is not that far from a hundred percent (elementary operational research....).

Maybe it's high time we taught those geese to go and fly and feed and roost elsewhere...?

Or maybe it needs a major crash in the Bronx, with a few hundred dead?

The threat is there, and reports quoted earlier indicate it's increasing.

The "miracle on the Hudson" should not blind us to the fact that the likeliness of this happening again is increasing steadily, and the next "incident" may well occur under less "miraculous" circumstances than this one...

CJ

lomapaseo

21st Jan 2009, 21:34

Graybeard

21st Jan 2009, 21:40

from wiki:

In September 1987, a B-1B (84-0052) from the 96th Bomb Wing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/96th_Bomb_Wing), 338th Bomb Squadron, Dyess AFB (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyess_AFB) crashed near La Junta, Colorado (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Junta,_Colorado), while flying on a low-level training route...

The root cause of the accident was thought to be a bird strike (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bird_strike) on a wing's leading edge during the low-level flight. The impact was severe enough to sever the fuel and hydraulic lines running along the forward spar that served that side of the aircraft, whereas the other side and its two engines functioned long enough to enable the three crew members to eject. The B-1B fleet was later modified to protect the various supply lines, which lie along the edge.[50] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-1_bomber#cite_note-Jenkins_p114-49)

GB

Desk Jockey

21st Jan 2009, 21:47

I would like to know why they changed the colour of the slides to silver/grey as rather than the yellow that it was in the past???

Radiant heat protection to reduce damage from exposure to fire.

patrickal

21st Jan 2009, 21:54

A question from the SLF gallery here: can any evasive action be taken in situations like that, and if yes, is it advisable? As others have shared in this discussion, geese (apparently) stick to their pre-selected heading, so it would fall upon the pilot to prevent a collision. Would the reaction of an A320 to control inputs (it's not a fighter jet, after all) allow it to change its trajectory sufficiently in 3 seconds to avoid a bird strike?

And an answer from the SLF gallery. It probably all depends on how much time you have. I was on a USAir 737 coming from into PHL from ROC about 10 years ago. We had desended through a thin cloud deck, and as soon as we came out of it, the plane rolled violently to the right into an extremely steep bank angle. I was in a left window seat, and saw a string of birds fly by just below the wing. After we leveled off, the pilot came on to apologize and explain that, upon exiting the cloud deck, we were heading right into a large formation of geese...at 9,000 feet. Evidently he had enough time, but at that speed, we were just lucky. I don't think that 3 seconds from the time you spot them, especially a large formation, is enough to change the direction of an aircraft to avoid a large flock. One bird maybe, but I don't know how you react that fast.

Here is another YouTube video showing a bird strike that brought down a jet fighter, with the view being from the cockpit camera. Watch how fast the bird is upon him.

YouTube - F16 bird strike and eject (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zN_Zl64OQEw&feature=related)

Not sure how you avoid that.

ChristiaanJ

21st Jan 2009, 22:07

galvonager,
I think part of the answer is in the answer to the question "how long does it take you to say ""OH SH!T"" ?

I'm serious. You've got to see first, and then assess.
That's at least a second gone (say "twenty" once.. under those circumstances seconds are very long...).

After that, whatever you do, push or pull, the aircraft you're flying DOES have a certain amount of inertia.

If you were not exactly on those birds' trajectory... you'll miss them. If you were, anything you will have done on the controls in the two remaining seconds before you hit them will not have made the slightest difference.

I often wonder here, how many people have counted "twenty, twenty, twenty" to roughly count off three second and have understood how short (or long) it can be... before answering certain posts?

CJ

ZQA297/30

21st Jan 2009, 22:13

Jet engines cant digest birds well , would propeller aircraft generally fare better or would damage to the blades render them even worse in bird strikes?
from birdstrike.org
(Admittedly turbo-prop)
10 March 1960. A Lockheed Electra turbo-prop ingested European starlings into all 4 engines during takeoff from Boston Logan Airport (MA). The plane crashed into Boston Harbor, killing 62 people. Following this accident, the FAA initiated action to develop minimum bird ingestion standards for turbine-powered engines.

galvonager

21st Jan 2009, 22:26

It kind of makes me think about you as a passenger being relocated from a left window seat to a right window seat in 3 secs. The aircraft weighing a lot more would have a great deal more resistance to moving that far.Well, yes, exactly - therefore my question - how much could be done? Thinking about it (and please correct me if I'm wrong), the biggest deviation could be achieved in the vertical direction, more specifically down, as aided by gravity. However, thinking further, it seems that in this particular instance, with flight 1549, it would be a bad idea to try to duck under the geese. Because, if unsuccessful, one would end w/o engines, at a lower altitude, worse off than if no action was taken.
So, is there consensus, that in cases like this, where you see the birds just small seconds before intersecting them, you can't realistically expect to be able to do anything to avoid them?

morbos

21st Jan 2009, 22:29

I don't think avoidance is a realistic possibility in all cases.

1) Night
2) high altitude with high speeds.

Luckily, 1&2 are rarer cases.

Still, even low and slow and in daylight is not conducive to fast evasive action. Also there is the possibility of going the wrong way even if such action is taken (ryanair).

Canuckbirdstrike

21st Jan 2009, 22:51

Morbos, some factual corrections:

1. The bird strike rate is actually slightly higher at night.

2. High altitude events are not that rare either.

Those who choose to fly above 250 knots below 10,000 ft. are playing with fire.

Take a,long and hard look at the physics and the certification standards for aircraft and engines and you will most likely change your operating speeds.

Despite what many think bird behaviour can be managed to yield significant reduction in bird strike risks. Success requires an integrated apporach to the problem.

Unfortunately, wildlife management regulations are poor or non-existent and not science driven and performance based. The evolution in regulations is slow. Canada has enacted decent regulations, but it still requires that all the stakeholders buy in to make a difference.

protectthehornet

21st Jan 2009, 23:49

as a pilot, I think your question is quite valid. I learned to fly 34 years ago at a small airport right next to a bird sanctuary. I learned how to avoid birds as some learn cross wind landings...part of the routine.

Contrary to the other answers you received, I believe the answer is yes, you can maneuver an airliner and avoid birds. I've even reminded my colleagues of the maneuver and they seem to agree. I've decided not to publish my maneuver here, but should the need arise, I would certainly use it. I think it would be quite easy if you had a true 3 seconds.

It was a good question and the answers you have received don't do it justice.

For those of you wondering what the maneuver is and why I don't publish it here, if I were wrong, I wouldn't want it on my shoulders. But I would do it in a heartbeat and changing, even a few feet, might save you.

downunderscouser

22nd Jan 2009, 00:17

I was under the impression most birds are only day VFR ;) most don't fly at night or in cloud. The occasional owl or predatory bird might fly at night.

You rarely see common species of birds flying past dusk, I see them all heading for their nests to rest and avoid predators.

lomapaseo

22nd Jan 2009, 00:31

For those of you wondering what the maneuver is and why I don't publish it here, if I were wrong, I wouldn't want it on my shoulders.

I wholeheartedly agree with that.

Robert Campbell

22nd Jan 2009, 00:57

I hit a Mallard Duck at 12,000ft., IMC in a DC-3 while picking up light rime ice.

Being warm bodied, I guess the Duck wasn't worried about the icing. He had hot wings; all I had were boots and prop alcohol that I could smell when it was on.

Feet and feathers in the right windshield wiper were the identifying parts.

galaxy flyer

22nd Jan 2009, 01:11

I've had one at night at 9,500 feet in VMC. There is nothing I wouldn't believe in aviation!! Birds are a problem, but "playing with fire", I'm not so certain. I could see a day where we do what Dover AFB does during migration seasons, have a "controller" who can see birds on a radar tuned to see birds and perhaps restrict ops during peak times. But will airlines and passengers stand for waiting for an hour to avoid birds or, as Dover does, close down during sunrise and sunset hours.

GF

Robert Campbell

22nd Jan 2009, 01:19

I've already come to that conclusion. Get an old WX RADAR dedicated to bird watching at certain airports.

The DC-3s I flew in the 70s didn't have RADAR, however, we were often successful in getting the bored Center Controllers to tune their sets to paint weather when there was T'storm activity. At 2 or 3AM they didn't have much to do.

Occasionally, a controller was "too busy". I ended up flying through large cells on three occasions. All I can say is that the DC-3 is well built.

Capt Claret

22nd Jan 2009, 01:52

Multiple bird strikes flying into Timika in West Irian (WABP) on two consecutive Friday evenings some years ago.

Both resulted in #4 coming off the wing, one was cooked, the other not.

dvv

22nd Jan 2009, 04:47

On Jul 29, 2007, at 4:16 in the morning, an An-12 hit a flock of birds on climb-out from UUDD at between 220' and 250' AGL. No.3&4 quit, no.1&2 weren't enough to maintain altitude. The aircraft hit trees and crashed. All 7 crew perished.

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jan 2009, 06:46

Migrating geese tend to fly at night, at high altitude above cloud or at least in clear air. They will happily climb, india mike, to reach clear air. The climb can take an hour or more.

On avoidance, at 300 kts the aircraft is flying at approximately 1500 feet in 3 seconds or just over a quarter mile. If it takes one second to appreciate the potential for collision you are just 1000 feet away.

In this instance the aircraft was in a climb at possibly 30 feet per second rate of climb. The perception problem is in 3 dimensions and the PF believed they would pass over the birds.

You have 2 seconds left . . .

Totally_Bananas

22nd Jan 2009, 06:46

Here is another example of a birdstrike at night!

http://www.int-birdstrike.org/BS4.JPG

http://www.int-birdstrike.org/BS2.JPG

http://www.int-birdstrike.org/BS3.JPG

21 Oct 2007 Nocturnal birdstrike with a song thrush (c.73 g)
British Mediterranean (BMed), A320, struck en route in the UK on 21 Oct 2007.

Honeybuzzard

22nd Jan 2009, 07:45

Many species of Birds migrate at night. Both short and long distance migration. If you are outside at night in the UK try this: Listen and after usually only a few minutes, you will hear the high pitched calls of Redwings overhead (a migratory Thrush). Many thousands of these Birds are constantly on the move at night.

scotavia

22nd Jan 2009, 09:38

As one of many aspects of my former work as an air traffic control assistant I carried out thousands of hours on the airfield doing active bird control.
RAF Kinloss suffered a terrible fatal take off birdstrike accident and as a result of the post accident recommendations the bird control team became full time covering all operational hours at Kinloss.
One part of the service included watching approach and departure paths, records of bird activity were kept, a pattern of bird movement tracked. This included large skeins of geese and birds feeding on the tidal estuary.

During the five years of my time in charge of the bird control unit we had no damage caused by birdstrikes. Air traffic relayed our warnings to aircraft resulting in take off delays, overshoots and circuit training was avoided during the high risk times.
Pioneering work in bird control came from the Dutch air force, in the Uk courses have been organised by MAFF.
To get the best out of the bird control system you need dedicated keen operatives and an air traffic system to relay warnings plus an airport authority who fully understand that it is not a part time job done by a person who skives inside the office and dashes outside to fire off a few shellcrackers
every hour.
I wonder if a proper study of bird activity has ever been done at New York airports?
http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/images/misc/progress.gif

TeachMe

22nd Jan 2009, 10:29

Considering that many on PPRuNe complain about people who buy near existing airports like LHR and then complaining about noise and expansions, it seems a bit of a double stnadard at best for some to suggest the solution to birds near airports is to get rid of the birds and bird sanctuaries near airports!! Lets face it, the birds were there first, just like LHR was there before the subdivisions. Of course, usage patterns for airports and bird sanctuaries vary over time and may be the source of conflict, the point still remains valid.

While every situation and thus solution is different and unique, I would suggest that in some situations it is the airport that needs to be relocated. This seems especially true considering that in some cases, as noted above, changing the birds' behavior is near impossible.

TME

(edited for spelling and to make milder)

scotavia

22nd Jan 2009, 11:42

Just a few things gleaned from 5 years in bird control which may be useful to aircrew and ground airport operatives.

Knowing where the birds are on the ground is a good start and sometimes they are best not disturbed when a airmove is very close(had to stop the security police letting their gaurd dogs chase gull flocks off empty dispersals at night)

They do usually take off into wind and the stronger the wind at surface the lower they stay.

After several studies in Europe ,on balance, longer grass around 6 inches average is better.It discourages flocks where the species needs a clear view of possible danger.(But many officers in charge of RAF airfields disliked this cos they hated untidy grass !! )

Heavy rain which floods soft grass airfield areas will bring worms to the surface and increase bird activity. Land drainage should be maintained. Marshes attract birds so those inside the airfield ownership should be drained. Even the RSPb rep at air safety meetings agreed with this.

The use of raptors ie Hawks to control birds is useful but the best part is that you get a keen operative who will be out and about and they have a good knowledge of bird behaviour.

nunki

22nd Jan 2009, 12:06

Adding to the response of TeachMe:
(SLF only).
Geese learn their traveling routes from their parents. Thus, the ways they travel have been established over some considerable amount of time. Also, they have determined travel seasons, mostly two times per year, according to seasons. Monitoring of the flocks and their migration behavior surely already is done by ornothologists, for example here (http://www.aou.org/search_results.php3?cx=001438041981384979139%3Ajjtxgjq1zdi&cof=FORID%3A9&q=geese+migration&sa=Search#1103). Can it really be that difficult to regularly pass these observations on to whom is concerned with the security of (civil) air traffic?

protectthehornet

22nd Jan 2009, 12:27

someone mentioned prop engines and birds...perhaps they meant radial piston props...i think they might have a better chance to keep running.

Canuckbirdstrike

22nd Jan 2009, 13:06

Pontius, thanks for correcting my poor reading skills. I agree that avoidance at night or high speed is problematic.

Overall avoidance options are limited and problematic. While in general birds tned to dive away from aircraft, this is not a given. Second, sonce bird encounters are more frequent a low altitude during critical phases of flight when maneuvering ability may be limited and/or constrained by obstacles.

With respect to wildlife control, the key is an integrated approach that uses habitat management (strategic), harassment and predation (tactical) as well as detecting and warning processes. The problem is in our instant society everyone is looking for the "silver bullet" as a solution. Unfortunately, no one solution works and wildlife management is a guerilla warfare activity that requires constant reevaluation of the enemy and changing of tactics.

Radar detection is now a proven technology with lots of development work being done with ex-military doppler radar and sophisticated software to identify bird species and predict route/altitude. Work will need to be done to determine how all the stakeholders; pilots, ATC and airports will use the information, but the future will bring much better tools to detect birds.

forget

22nd Jan 2009, 13:18

Ref silver life rafts. Radiant heat protection to reduce damage from exposure to fire.

If this is some sort of 'metalised' coating does it also give a radar reflection?

airfoilmod

22nd Jan 2009, 13:22

It's hard to let your post go w/o a reply. Your reference to hypocrisy concerning Real Estate (homes) and sanctuaries (airports) is surprising
to me. As I understand it "sanctuary" is a term that implies Human action to protect bird habitat. Suggesting an air field be moved to accomodate bird life seems a "wild" statement. If you are granting parity to Birds regarding the location of their abode and ignoring Flight safety, you come off as a "loon" (sorry). You didn't mean that birds have equal standing in the degree of care regarding the right to be safe from mid-air collision did you?

AF

TeachMe

22nd Jan 2009, 15:07

Airfoilmod,

I always respect your points. I do not in any way suggest that flight safety be compromised. You note that sanctuaries are made by humans, but more correct I would suggest a bird sanctuary is all that is left after us humans are done with the rest of the land. Of course it would be best for that bird sanctuary land to be far from an airport but it seems all too often that both are near each other (perhaps due to land values??).

I do not however like the idea of getting rid of scarce natural habitat only in the name of economics and convenience. My point with the mention of LHR is that it is illogical to say that first there gets priority (airport operation over homeowners objections) but then say we have to get rid of preexisting natural habitat to make the airport safer when birds conflict with planes.

Actions need to be taken to reduce the risk of such acidents such as this one, and in some cases perhpas relocating the airport would be the best option, even if that airport is farther away. It might even be the only option as it seems that sometimes nothing will prevent birds from being around cerrtain locations at certain times. Yes, I know this would be bl...dy expensive and difficult but if planned for over time then reasonable (eg Incheon, Korea, Bangkok and Hong Kong although for differnet reasons) and beneficail for numerous reasons, not only birds.

As for there being more geese, well true, but there are also more 320s.

airfoilmod

22nd Jan 2009, 15:24

I presumed a position similar to the one I am used to counter, philosophically and politically:"move the airport" "move the homes" etc.

I see your point, mostly the argument is about flight path, noise, and nitwits demanding dangerous and flight critical manouvering to avoid the din of a turbofan which more than likely is putting bubble and squeak on their sorry table.

Economic consideration seldom has to do with supply. More often than not, it is distribution that rears its ugly noggin; "not here, not now".

LaGuardia is situated in a precarious place, politically and economically.
Midway? Meigs Field? DFW DIA? FailSafe is a concept, not a reality.

Aviation is wicked safe and getting safer. Geese seem to be doing well also. Proximity forces us to look at things that may annoy us. I love birds, I love a/c, they don't mix well.

My bottom line? (Today.) : As Humans we overestimate our importance to the Planet, vis-a-vis survival. We can't kill it, it can kill us.

rgds. AF

Rotorhead1026

22nd Jan 2009, 15:26

As for there being more geese, well true, but there are also more 320s

Well, at least two less geese and one less 320 ...

And one less Seminole ... this one happened at night recently

Aero-News Network: The Aviation and Aerospace World's Daily/Real-Time News and Information Service (http://www.aero-news.net/news/genav.cfm?ContentBlockID=cf657a5a-33fd-4d3f-be18-0d31c3baab21&Dynamic=1&Range=NOW&FromDate=01%2F02%2F2009&ToDate=01%2F22%2F2009&Category=%2Fnews%2Fgenav.cfm)

with tragic results.

OFBSLF

22nd Jan 2009, 15:32

Also, they have determined travel seasons, mostly two times per year, according to seasons. Monitoring of the flocks and their migration behavior surely already is done by ornothologists, for example here.
Here in the US, we're having more and more geese become resident. They don't migrate. The resident geese still fly around each day. They just don't migrate: Goose facts & figures (http://www.innolyticsllc.com/gooswbiology.html)

lomapaseo

22nd Jan 2009, 15:41

We need to cut the geese some slack until such time that they are shown to be the culprits.

Wader2

22nd Jan 2009, 15:48

Here in the US, we're having more and more geese become resident. They don't migrate. The resident geese still fly around each day. They just don't migrate: Goose facts & figures (http://www.innolyticsllc.com/gooswbiology.html)

Also in the links previously posted, the Geese use the Atlantic Flyway in October and May - we are a little early for migration.

The figures quoted before were for about 750000 resident and 250000 migrants. The number shot was IIRC avove only 250000.

That's a lotta goose and a lotta more than 320s.

Ranger 1

22nd Jan 2009, 16:19

As someone who's day to day job almost tied up with Bird Hazard Control (18 years), I have read a lot of comments by posters on here with interest, certainly what has come to notice is that many on here have limited knowledge of Bird Hazard Control and how it is achieved.

I agree with lomapaseo that we should cut the geese some slack for now until all the evidence has been gathered and the investigation completed.

It was interesting to read from scotavia his account of Bird Hazard control in his days as an RAF controller, the following made me smile,

"Knowing where the birds are on the ground is a good start and sometimes they are best not disturbed when a airmove is very close(had to stop the security police letting their gaurd dogs chase gull flocks off empty dispersals at night"

I hope the practice of leaving birds where they are, in the hope they will not move is no longer practised, as they will move when you don't want them to, its best to hold the aircraft, clear them then release the aircraft when the have been fully dispersed, the only exception to this is if the aircraft is rolling and you discover the birds or if the aircraft is on final approach within a certain distance which will not enable the bird controller to clear the airfield and approaches in time.

At night on airfields the active Taxiways & Runways including their margins should be checked, birds should be cleared using special tactics as no to disturb any roosting birds on the remainder of the airfield and its approaches and Climbout's
:ok:

ChristiaanJ

22nd Jan 2009, 16:22

OFBSLF,
Thanks for the link!
A 15% annual increase.....
Airbus and Boeing must be wishing they could achieve that....

CJ

Silver Spur

22nd Jan 2009, 16:33

Wouldn't it be great if they could incorporate "Predictive Bird Strike" in airliners like the Predictive Windshear.....;)

etesting2000

22nd Jan 2009, 17:13

NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
January 21, 2009
NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION INTO DITCHING OF US AIRWAYS JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER In its continuing investigation of US Airways flight 1549, which ditched into the Hudson River adjacent to Manhattan at approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 15, 2009, the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

The right engine has been externally examined and documented. An examination of the first stage fan blades revealed evidence of soft body impact damage. Three of the variable guide vanes are fractured and two are missing. The engine's electronic control unit is missing and numerous internal components of the engine were significantly damaged.

What appears to be organic material was found in the right engine and on the wings and fuselage. Samples of the material have been provided to the United States Department of Agriculture for a complete DNA analysis. A single feather was found attached to a flap track on the wing. It is being sent to bird identification experts at the Smithsonian.

The left engine has been located in about 50 feet of water near the area of the Hudson River where the aircraft ditched. The NTSB is working with federal, state and local agencies to recover the engine, which is expected to occur sometime on Thursday.

The NTSB has learned that the right engine experienced a surge during a flight on January 13, 2009, and that subsequent maintenance actions included the replacement of a temperature probe. Investigators from the NTSB's Maintenance Records group are researching this report by examining applicable maintenance records and procedures.

The NTSB's Survival Factors group is in the process of interviewing passengers to learn more about the events surrounding the ditching and the emergency evacuation and rescue. The Operations and Human Performance group is interviewing US Airways flight operations training personnel.

The checked and carry-on baggage is in the process of being removed from the aircraft. Representatives from the NTSB's Office of Transportation Disaster Assistance are working to coordinate efforts with US Airways to return these items to the passengers.

The on-scene documentation of the airplane is expected to be completed by the end of the week. Preparations are underway to facilitate movement and more permanent storage of the airplane so that more detailed documentation of the damage can be performed at a later date.

NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson (202) 314-6100
[email protected] ([email protected])

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jan 2009, 19:49

"Knowing where the birds are on the ground is a good start and sometimes they are best not disturbed when a airmove is very close(had to stop the security police letting their gaurd dogs chase gull flocks off empty dispersals at night"

I hope the practice of leaving birds where they are, in the hope they will not move is no longer practised, as they will move when you don't want them to,

. . .

At night on airfields the active Taxiways & Runways including their margins should be checked, birds should be cleared using special tactics as no to disturb any roosting birds on the remainder of the airfield and its approaches and Climbout's
:ok:

I think these are just two parts of a similar problem. Knowing the base that Scotavia was at I know that it was better not to disturb the birds on the ASP as this was well clear of the taxiway and runways. At least you knew where they were. The clue is in your answer - as no to disturb any roosting birds on the remainder of the airfield that, exactly was Scotavia's point.

I hope the practice of leaving birds where they are, in the hope they will not move is no longer practised, as they will move when you don't want them to,

This would have been the answer in the Elmdorf case. The geese were extremely close to the runway and only needed spooking to get them up.

But where the birds are safely in a roost that is not adjacent to the operating area then I think you are saying that they should not be disturbed. The bird strike we suffered last year was because the disturbance occurred close to the birds. The only way we could have avoided the bird strike was to give the birds priority.

Finally, the point of control is 'what birds' and 'what roost'.

But all this misses the point. These geese were not in a roost and they were not disturbed until, that is, the A320 arrived at the intercept point.

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jan 2009, 19:51

Just to let it stand on its own:

Any bird control issue should be directed to solving the problem that caused the crash - a mid-air collision at 3000 feet with birds probably in transit.

We should not be looking at how to keep birds away from airfields - that is a quite different issue.

beamender99

22nd Jan 2009, 20:15

BBC has just been showing new footage of the impact.
Easily the best yet.
Now online
BBC NEWS | World | Americas | New footage of Hudson plane (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7846186.stm)

ChristiaanJ

22nd Jan 2009, 21:15

I can hardly believe some of the posts on here....

Do we really have to wait for a few more crashes.. not "miraculously" without loss of life like this one, but wiping out 150-odd people (another 320 or 737) or more than 300 people (7*7, A330... ) and maybe another hundred or so on the ground, before anything is done?

Removing one of the "clear and present dangers" in the form of bird "sanctuaries" within a couple of miles of LGA is fairly straightforward. Moving LGA, JFK and Newark, plus the New York metropolis, is not.

The birds have plenty of other places to go. New York does not.

To "protect" a few thousands birds (those in the area) we now daily put how many people at risk?

CJ

lomapaseo

22nd Jan 2009, 21:36

Do we really have to wait for a few more crashes.. not "miraculously" without loss of life like this one, but wiping out 150-odd people (another 320 or 737) or more than 300 people (7*7, A330... ) and maybe another hundred or so on the ground, before anything is done?

Removing one of the "clear and present dangers" in the form of bird "sanctuaries" within a couple of miles of LGA is fairly straightforward. Moving LGA, JFK and Newark, plus the New York metropolis, is not.

The birds have plenty of other places to go. New York does not.

To "protect" a few thousands birds (those in the area) we now daily put how many people at risk?

CJ

Your suggestion sounds as simplistic as putting screens in front of engines. The practicality and method vs effect is what always makes life difficult for us humans who try to fool with mother nature.

I'm all for some surgical intrusion for a small effect overall (we reduce 1 out of 500 bird strikes in the new york area), but let's not fool ourselves that it will amount to hill of beans in the worldwide risk.

We still don't know where in hell those birds came from and whether or not they were on the visa waiver program or not. If we can identify the birds and their likely takeoff and landing points then we might have a chance of doing something as practical as closing down a runway at certain times of the year. You try fooling with mother nature and she will beat you every time by simply moving in a new species of bird and more of them.

I for one was pretty happy about JFK, after the DC10 accident in 1975 trading off a 5-7 lb great black back gull problem for a 1. lb smaller gull and more of them. Of course they still damage a lot of planes but at least we don't take out multiple engines at the same time.

With the accident on this thread we still don't know the particulars of how big or how many birds and how much damage to the engines. When all of this becomes known then we can start searching for practical recommendations.

Pontius Navigator

22nd Jan 2009, 22:04

As Lompaso says, it does not seem to be the resident bird population in the adjacent sanctuaries.

I can hardly believe some of the posts on here....

Me neither.

Removing one of the "clear and present dangers" in the form of bird "sanctuaries" within a couple of miles of LGA is fairly straightforward. Moving LGA, JFK and Newark, plus the New York metropolis, is not.

The birds have plenty of other places to go. New York does not.

A quick fag packet calculation shows that geese would need to fly for some 3 miles before they could reach a height of 3000 feet. Why would they do a circle climb to height?

Look at all the websites both quoted here and elsewhere, where is Cheaspeake Bay? Maybe it needs concreting over or netting?

Who designated the Atlantic Flyway for geese? Can the FAA realign the flyway?:\

ChristiaanJ

22nd Jan 2009, 22:35

lomapaseo and Pontius, thanks.

The suggestion isn't mine....

But getting rid as much of possible of the "locals" and hopefully changing their flightpaths (even for some of the residents) doesn't seem beyond the wit of man. I don't consider that as 'too simplistic'.

It won't eliminate the high-altitude strikes and it might not even have avoided this one either (which was at about 3000 ft). But it would reduce the total number of strikes, if pursued sensibly and agressively.

On a lighter note, if they continue to "go forth and multiply", as they seem to be doing, how long will it take for them to overtake us humans? Isn't it high time we started eating them, rather than the few remaining fishes in the sea?

CJ

PJ2

22nd Jan 2009, 23:21

airfoilmod;
Re, "As Humans we overestimate our importance to the Planet, vis-a-vis survival. We can't kill it, it can kill us."

No kidding! Another thread of course, but "profound indifference" comes to mind when notions such as "human progress" and "human survival" are raised in the same breath as "the", (not "our"), planet. We could disappear due to our activities or through other natural occurence and there wouldn't be so much as the slightest quiver on earth, so indifferent is it to our continued and incidental existence. It will carry on, perhaps changed due to what we have done to the accidentally congenial environment in which we evolved, without intention, without direction, and without us, as it did before we arrived 3 billion years ago.

protectthehornet;
Re, "Contrary to the other answers you received, I believe the answer is yes, you can maneuver an airliner and avoid birds. I've even reminded my colleagues of the maneuver and they seem to agree. I've decided not to publish my maneuver here, but should the need arise, I would certainly use it. I think it would be quite easy if you had a true 3 seconds."

On takeoff, in general, the possibility of avoiding birds if one sees them in time, is there. I know of several takeoffs in which the pitch attitude has either been flattened or increased sufficiently to decrease/increase rates of climb right after liftoff, with good success and safety, and well within the performance capabilities of the aircraft in the 2nd segment climb phase.

That said, let us examine the question of bird avoidance using known facts about eyes, speed and mass:

From a discussion on depth of field, (image sharpness, not resolution), and why it works in photography, by Ansel Adams in his Basic Photo Series, the human eye, he states, generally cannot resolve any image sensed by the retinal structure (rods, cones) that is less than 100th of an inch in length (as projected on the retina). Obviously distance and object size determine the angle subtended and the consequent image size projected onto the retina but if the distance between light-sensing rods/cones is less than the size of the image as focussed by the lens/iris, it literally cannot be seen where there are no "sensors".

An imperfection in a photographic negative known as "out of focus" is known as a "circle of confusion" and will appear as a tiny blob instead of as a sharp pinpoint. An image, (retinal or photographic - same principles) is made up of points of light - our eyes are able to focus only very narrowly so our depth of field is small, and sharpness of the image only occurs in a very tiny area in the center of our field of view. Peripheral vision can sense motion and color but cannot focus sharply.

So, if that tiny blob on the photographic film, the CCD of a digital camera or our retinas is less than 1/100th of an inch in diameter, the image is perceived as "sharp" by the eye and therefore the mind.

A large goose 1000ft ahead of the aircraft will not be seen by the human eye because it's size that far away subtends an angle which is too narrow to project an image onto the retina larger than 1/100th of an inch - the eye is blind to the "dots" that are large geese 1000ft away. All we have to do to consider this is to draw, in our mind's eye, two lines from the body of a large goose 1000ft away and imaging, through an intuitive comprehension of trigonometry, the angle subtended by these two lines and image the size of the image thereby generated on the retina.

If we instead choose the size of a flock of geese, we may see it as a whole in which case the chances of avoidance are increased slightly.

At the initial climb speed of the A320, accelerating through about 180kts (above 1500ft AGL at the time of the collision), the aircraft is doing about 300fps, (feet per second).

I know you know this but for reference for others, 250kts is 420fps, 300kts is 505fps and 350kts is 590fps.

Now, that's all "Calibrated Airspeed" - TAS's will be higher, again as you know. For example, a pilot who chooses to fly at 250kts IAS below 10,000ft in descent may actually be doing close to 300kts, "physically" through the air depending upon temperature and pressure of the air, (wind and therefore groundspeed are obviously not factors!) and, given the per-squared law, will be meeting any object at 500fps and the energy commensurate with the mass so encountered - again, you've menioned this so I know you know this.

You have correctly pointed out that a pilot who has spotted birds ahead may have, at "lower speeds", (flaps extended speeds), up to 3 seconds for "avoidance" but I would disagree that this can be done at 420fps (250kts) only because of the above reason...the birds cannot be seen in time at that speed and one does not have 3 seconds at 500fps but perhaps 1 to 1.5 second(s) at best.

Airliners do not maneuver quickly not only because of mass/weight but because they are travelling so fast and require, as any aircraft does regardless of mass, very high bank angles at such speeds to achieve a high rate of turn. Thus, for passenger comfort, unless it is an emergency survival maneuver, an increase and especially a (negative 'g') decrease in rate of climb or altitude is attended by significant 'g' loads which can present risk to those in the back, the only maneuver left that is not attended by such forces is roll, and of course even that would not be for turning out of the way (given the physics of turning at high speed described) but would be for momentarily presenting a smaller (banked frontal profile to what we assume would be a mainly horizontal formation of larger birds. (That said, seagulls don't flock or fly like that).

These notions and one solution are not unusual but are not present in any SOPs, AOMs or unofficial techniques I have read anywhere. One is in test pilot territory beyond 45deg of bank in airline work, notwithstanding the captain's authority to take any action he or she deems necessary to preserve life and property.

The Airbus 320/340 series will not exceed a 45deg bank angle without holding the stick in the roll-command position. But it will do just over 60deg of bank if held there manually. C* laws will not permit further bank angles.

The conclusions I would like to draw here are:

1. The human eye is incapable of resolving images smaller than 100th of an inch such that size, vector (speed and direction) and altitude can be determined with accuracy. Birds that can do substantial damage to an aircraft are still not large enough for the human eye to see from 1500ft or 3 seconds away at 300kts. Even at 300fps, that only leaves 5 seconds for reaction.

2. That at typical jet transport speeds even below 10,000ft, avoidance of birds when such are spotted, "even in time", is not a certain exercise and will always have an unpredictable outcome.

3. That the per-squared law guarantees that at higher speeds damage is likely to be exponentially worse depending upon where on the airframe the strike occurs.

4. I think the term "playing with fire" is appropriate where a crew chooses to exceed the legal 250kt speed limit below 10,000ft when descending.

As discussed earlier in this thread, the "elasticity" of flesh rapidly reduces with higher speeds so the "splat" factor is higher at low speeds and spreads the impact loads over a wider area. At high speeds the flesh mass is concentrated in a smaller area because it does not have time to splat, or spread out, so the impact is just like taking a very heavy, very fast sledge hammer to aircraft skin, engines or windshield - the equivalent of over 100,000lbs of force which has to be absorbed by the airframe, etc.

As far as I know, there is no waiver or relief in descent except if a higher speed is required to remain clean. I know that for the B777-300, the max clean speed at MTOW is approximately 264kts so it is highly unlikely that any heavy transport needs to exceed the speed limit to remain clean while descending into the terminal area.

All this said, birdstrikes are part of the inevitability of aviation, mitigated by knowledge, regulatory compliance and airmanship.

lakedude

22nd Jan 2009, 23:25

I recall a report, must be 40 years ago, of an Electra that took a goose through the centre windscreen. It fetched up in the toilet at the back. The aisle, fortuitously was clear and the toiler empty. The aircraft was at 180 and the goose iro 60lb. The figure that sticks in my mind was the force - 300,000 ft lbs.Looks like a couple of typos or something here?

Even 20lbs would be a large goose, no way a goose hits 60lbs.

From wiki:

Canada Goose - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_Goose)

An exceptionally large male of the race B. c. maxima, the "giant Canada goose" (which rarely exceed 8 kg/18 lb), weighed 10.9 kg (24 pounds) and had a wingspan of 2.24 m (88 inches). This specimen is the largest wild goose ever recorded of any species.
300,000 ft lbs could be a measure of torque (unlikely in this case) or a measure of work. Ft lbs is not a measure of linear force .

Brian Abraham

22nd Jan 2009, 23:47

Courtesy of AVweb
http://www.avweb.com/newspics/usairways-flight1549-flight-path-map_credit-imjustsayin-Flickr_large.jpg

protectthehornet

23rd Jan 2009, 00:03

I believ much has been learned about the eye since ansel. It was said that it would be impossible to see certain things from orbit for example...indeed anything manmade.

But, ships could be seen on the ocean, found by their wake.

Other interesting things could be seen and the eye books were rewritten.

One must be vigilante while being in the pointy end of the plane...birds, planes, toy balloons...and everything else one could imagine.

PJ2

23rd Jan 2009, 01:01

protectthehornet;
I believ much has been learned about the eye since ansel
No doubt, but not sure of your point. That the eye is better than that? Perhaps, but you don't say how so.

The wake-of-a-ship example is the same as the birds-on-a-wire example which was always the case and not the result of new learning in the physiology of the eye and doesn't change the 100th-of-an-inch resolution or so, capability.

Anyway, all fwiw.

E.Z. Flyer

23rd Jan 2009, 01:32

I beg all your pardon, but why at 3:29 are we turning down the Hudson and not back to LGA?

Excuse me, thank you.

OFBSLF

23rd Jan 2009, 02:17

Intruder

23rd Jan 2009, 02:19

He didn't think he could make LGA. If he did not, there would be a LOT of dead people in the airplane and on the ground...

Andu

23rd Jan 2009, 03:04

I beg all your pardon, but why at 3:29 are we turning down the Hudson and not back to LGA?Believe it or not, I did a not altogether dissimilar exercise in the sim. about three years ago, where we suffered a double engine failure (what seemed to me) to be too just far from any of the available airfield options. (The examiner put us in a situation where there was no clear choice between La Guardia, JFK or Newark.)

I chose JFK, (if only because I was familiar with it) and was very pleasantly surprised to see how far we managed to stretch the glide - i.e.,the aeroplane (a 773) went much further than I would have hoped, and we got in, but only with a VERY late selection of gear and a very late turn onto finals.

But had it been the real world outside my windscreen and I had just suffered a real double engine failure, would I have even considered stretching the glide, unsure I would make it, in a dead stick approach over the very built up southern Long Island, when I had a 'sure thing' - the Hudson - as an alternative? Absolutely not.

The Monday Morning Quarterbacks armed with computer models may prove the the aircraft would have made it back to LGA from the 3:29 position. However, that will not have been totally (note that word) obvious to the captain in the split second (and note that vitally important phrase as well) that he had to make a decision.

hefy_jefy

23rd Jan 2009, 04:01

I just hope none the passengers trod on the "No Step" signs...

wouldn't want to damage anything.

Smeagels Boyfriend

23rd Jan 2009, 04:29

Turning back to LGA?

Absolutly no way on the earth would you want to turn an aircraft at 1200 feet more than 90 degrees (actually loooks like 120 ish) back to LGA ACROSS NEW YORK. I'm no expert on the glide distance of an A320 but it would have been less than the actual glide distance he actually achived just due to the loss of lift in the turn. In my view that would have been a massive risk and almost certainly ended up with HUGE loss of life. Go's against every basic instinct taught at an elementary level, loose engines and turn towards one of the biggest citys on earth Hmmmmmlet me think, maybe not. I'm sure his logic would have been (in that split second) possibly land in a New York street and definatly die, or maybe make it in the Hudson. I'm certain he made 100% the correct call becuase they all made it.

Looking at the map above it looks like he made the decision at 3:28 and 1600 feet to ditch the LGA idea, and frankly i don't blame him. Just look at his position, where he had to glide to and over what!

pattern_is_full

23rd Jan 2009, 04:43

E.Z. Flyer: I think the answer to your question is that up until the 3:28 mark (1600 ft) the crew were planning a return-to-airport at LGA. At that point they had a clear view of the airport and decided it was too risky. A 2-D map does not show vertical obstructions, which were, of course, not a factor on the big wet runway called the Hudson.

The pilots looked at all the factors and decided the Hudson was the preferable option.

One other point that was brought home to me in simulating this event (and the simulation actually tracked the real world better than I expected) was that even if one could make either LGA or TEB, one did so with no reverse thrust available.

I'll leave it to the real A-320 drivers to calculate how much runway they'd need with no reversers and a touchdown in maximum-glide configuration/speed.

banana9999

23rd Jan 2009, 05:18

Go's against every basic instinct taught at an elementary level

No wonder they're not around anymore!

awblain

23rd Jan 2009, 06:11

I'm not sure it's the number of megapixels in the eye that determines its optical performance. The detectors are a bit flakey, but the processor is very fast and well tuned.

An absolute limit to performance should be diffraction from the pupil, which could be up to 5mm behind sunglasses. This corresponds to a best possible resolution ability of order (wavelength/diameter) ~ 1/10,000 radians, 20 arcsec, 1ft at 10,000ft, or 50ft from low earth orbit. (1 arcsec is about an inch from 30,000ft.)

However, to see a bird you don't have to resolve it as such, as long as it's dark enough to see as a black dot on the sky background. I suspect this is the factor that determines when they could be spotted, rather than the angle subtended. Of course, even if they can be seen, seeing is one thing and avoiding is another.

To confirm little things with high contrast are visible: stars are tiny (~1 arcsec with atmospheric refraction, ~0.1 milliarcsec without). Your eye can't perceive their extent, but they can certainly be seen.

PJ2

23rd Jan 2009, 06:18

Understand awblain, thank you - great explanation.

Avoiding is indeed another matter! ;-)

sussex2

23rd Jan 2009, 07:07

I'd love to reply to a couple of posts but cannot find out how to quote a post.
Would be most obliged for some kind soul to tell me.

Vee1Kut

23rd Jan 2009, 07:54

You take off, your doing 200 kts in the climb, you hit about 3400 feet, you lose your engines...you look around, nothing but buildings, a big river, and the runway behind you.

You have two choices, 180 back to the runway, at 3000 + ft, you get about a 3 mile glide in clean configuration...you take your chances there isn't a plane on the runway, that you judge it correctly and don't land long or short....

Or you go for the river...you don't have to pick a landing spot, you have miles to glide over water, with the longest flare you can imagine, to land as softly and smoothly as you can. This latter choice guarantees no post crash fire, this aircraft is designed for ditching, and river rescue, ferries, boats are literaly minutes away.

The skill here wasn't in flying, gliding, landing, picking a spot, airspeed control, but choosing to land there, vs all these other guys that have figured yet another way to fly an airliner to the scene of the accident.

Hat's off to the the pilot who chose to ditch, and put lives before trying to save the equipment

Birds: Fact of life, we can't regulate them away, train them to fly around airports.

GANNET FAN

23rd Jan 2009, 09:27

http://i40.tinypic.com/10mu7tt.jpg
http://i43.tinypic.com/2hgg01g.jpg
http://i42.tinypic.com/15exwr6.jpg
http://i41.tinypic.com/x25iqh.jpg
http://i41.tinypic.com/k2fk8m.jpg
http://i39.tinypic.com/2drs0ep.jpg
http://i40.tinypic.com/ipqjc4.jpg
http://i44.tinypic.com/2n9cqdf.jpg
http://i44.tinypic.com/syxdao.jpg
http://i39.tinypic.com/9a8zo4.jpg
http://i41.tinypic.com/6zc9zd.jpg

Wader2

23rd Jan 2009, 10:35

eye . . . optical performance. The detectors are a bit flakey, but the processor is very fast and well tuned.

There are at least three other factors on sighting the birds.

The first is the tendency for the eye to focus at infinity. This was probably not a factor here at low altitude.

Next is the processor time. From an object becoming detectable by the eye to the brain recognising that there is an object there is a finite time - we are not talking reaction here, just the time before the brain has acknowledged the object's presence. In a military study of aircraft closing at I believe over 1000 kts (may be a bit less) it was determined that the observed aircraft would actually be behind the observer by the time the brain acknowledged its presence. Again that is unlikely to be the case in a 'low speed' bird strike.

The last factor is human. Was there a sufficiently large structure in the forward area to cause a blind spot? An object in the blind spot will remain hidden if it is on a collision course. To avoid this it is necessary for an active external scan and moving the head to look around a blind spot. If the PF was head down then the PNF would be looking out - this would also reduce the time available for reaction and avoidance. I am sure that this will be considered here.

Duck Rogers

23rd Jan 2009, 11:32

I've spent all morning deleting posts containing the turbanned geese picture. Jet Blast is down there........... next one to post it here wins a thread ban.

Duck

Madbob

23rd Jan 2009, 11:45

GF thanks for the pics showing the ac being recovered - just a thought, why didn't someone lower the undercarriage whilst it was up in the air? I am sure it would have been happier standing on the barge on its wheels....

I accept that the airframe is a write-off but it might save un-necesary secondary damage.

MB

Smilin_Ed

23rd Jan 2009, 11:53

Given that the airframe probably experienced some very unusual loads in various places, there would be a chance that one or more gear would not drop. That would be a worse situation than having all three up.

NigelOnDraft

23rd Jan 2009, 12:11

I beg all your pardon, but why at 3:29 are we turning down the Hudson and not back to LGA?As the groundtrack diagram shows, the aircraft looks like it could have made LGA or TET... However, in order to pull off a successful forced landing at either requires:

An alignment with a runway - preferably into wind
Knowledge that the chosen runway is clear of other aircraft
Judgement / skill / co-ordination to arrive at the threshold of that runway at less than 50', at Vapp - Vapp + 20K, with (nearly) Full Flap and Gear down
If the last item is not achieved in any 1 aspect, then not only is everyone in the aircraft probably dead, but also maybe lots on the ground.

I might add that none of the above is trained for either... from starting the process from such a low height (we do double engine failure training from high altitude, but with a lot of planning between both crew, and with both concentrating on the forced landing, not one trying to restart engine(s) ).

I am reluctant to state this crew showed "extraordinary" levels of skill in what they did, since that might imply that "most" airline crews would not have achieved it, and we do not yet know enough about what they did. However, the "decision" to go for the water does seem crucial to the outcome.

I am surprised by the numbers here who seemed to think an airliner would break up on ditching, many's the time I had considered it the better option than an off airfield forced landing if required, and requiring much less skill (luck?) than a successfull "on airfield" forced landing. Whether in the past I or they were in error is irrelevant - we now have evidence that water is a definite option :D

NoD

Wader2

23rd Jan 2009, 12:24

I am surprised by the numbers here who seemed to think an airliner would break up on ditching

Nigel, actually I am not, but may be we are talking modern construction techniques.

In the 70s we were shown a film of a model HS-801 ditching in a water tank. The recommended profile was a wheels up landing with the rear fuselage rake entering the water first. As the aircraft slowed the nose 'hammered' down in what we were told was 25g (IIRC) and in the actual aircraft would lead to floor failure and the nose breaking off.

The first time we susspected that a ditching was actually survivable was when a Dutch Atlantic had his engine cowling blow open in flight. All survived the ditching. The next time it was proven was when Art Stacey ditched one in the Moray Firth.

So perceived wisdom was that ditchings were not survivable in modern jets and many are perhaps unaware of those instances that were successful.

captplaystation

23rd Jan 2009, 12:49

It will interesting to learn if any pitch control remained available after the empennage entered the water, thereby slowing down the tendency for the nose to drop quickly. It looked reasonably controlled and not too violent in the video ,which was of course a large plus in the survivability.
Again thumbs up :ok: to Airbus if the integrity of the flight controls was not compromised by the initial impact with the water.

airfoilmod

23rd Jan 2009, 13:24

It is my belief that an object observed in the windscreen field, if on a "collision course", has no "movement" (other than an increase in size with time), and can be "determined to be not a threat by the Brain"

"Where is my aircraft moving".... Toward the part of the scenery that is "still".

AF

Gary Brown

23rd Jan 2009, 13:52

Can I ask the question about the turn back a different way?

I guess I must be wrong, but I had understood the sequence to be a) rejection of return to LGA (involving a long turn to port off the initial near-northbound track and back on to a easterly heading); b) rejection of TEB, lying pretty much on the initial northerly track (though not aligned to it); c) decision to turn southerly and ditch in the Hudson.

The track shown suggests that the rejection of LGA came after the rejection of TEB - so, over Inwood Park, the the long turn to port onto a southeasterly course pointing roughly back to to LGA is corrected somewhat to starboard so as to to line up with the river. So, up to a fraction of a second before 3.29 did the guys think that a return to LGA was somewhat possible?

AGB

mickjoebill

23rd Jan 2009, 14:08

The latest video on BBC shows in a wide shot, what looks like the complete length of the wake, from the point the tail skimmed the water taken just as the aircraft comes to a halt. Any comments on the length of the "water roll"?
Linked here again
BBC NEWS | Americas | New footage of Hudson plane (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7846186.stm)

Seeing the forward slide deploy and then settle at a reasonable angle for a passenger to slide down, I wondered how many passengers chose not to exit onto the slide because they did not consider it a life raft?

Maybe some who had a choice, initially went to the wing exit as they thought the slide would send them into the water?
This could explain why the rafts were under utilised?

Only after a few people sit in it does it flatten out and look like a raft?

Mickjoebill

RatherBeFlying

23rd Jan 2009, 14:23

From the AvWeb map it looks possible to proceed down the Harlem River Parkway and turn final to LGA at 1200-1300 or so.

It even looks like they might have to add drag to avoid overshooting.

Now what's the glide ratio when you drop the gear? What if that leaves you a bit short?

Rashly asuming that the gear comes down in time and does not drop you short, then you will need to ask the hydraulics for flap to steepen the glide and lower the landing speed.

Again what happens if adding flaps leaves you short? Retracting flaps generally incurs an immediate height loss (keeping in mind that in BA038 reducing the last increment of flaps got rid of a bunch of drag for not much loss of lift).

A successful landing at LGA or TEB, as many have already noted, requires crossing a precise point in space at a precise speed. A hundred yards or so short would likely lose all aboard.

On the Hudson, a mile plus or minus wouldn't have made much difference.

whatbolt

23rd Jan 2009, 14:33

"GF thanks for the pics showing the ac being recovered - just a thought, why didn't someone lower the undercarriage whilst it was up in the air? I am sure it would have been happier standing on the barge on its wheels....
I accept that the airframe is a write-off but it might save un-necesary secondary damage."

The damage to the panels under the belly is reportedly extensive. That will have included the landing gear doors which will probably be jammed in the paneling around them. Even if they had managed to get the 3 gears down someone would have had to go in there and make sure they are locked. It would be a brave man and for not a worthwhile reason.

Pontius Navigator

23rd Jan 2009, 14:45

Better would have been inflatable crash bags. They are used to jack up a damaged airframe and could have been used here too.

trident3A

23rd Jan 2009, 15:23

This shows the impact (albeit from a way off)
Newly released video shows plane landing on Hudson River - Truveo Video Search (http://www.truveo.com/Newly-released-video-shows-plane-landing-on-Hudson/id/901984028)

Frangible

23rd Jan 2009, 16:09

Are there any reports of bird in the left engine, which the divers recovered?
If APU was still working why would the RAT deploy?
Would APU be off already at this stage of flight?
And why not gear down for the ditching? Increased drag, yes, if long glide is the goal, but otherwise gear would surely absorb much energy on impact before being sheared and make the halt less violent than the engines "scooping" the water.

glad rag

23rd Jan 2009, 16:47

Frangible, understand your theories, but we have fact now.

Flying Lawyer

23rd Jan 2009, 17:37

GAPAN Press Release

London, 22 January 2009

The Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators (GAPAN), a City of London Livery Company, whose Patron is HRH The Duke of Edinburgh and Grand Master HRH The Duke of York, has awarded a prestigious award, the Master’s Medal, to the crew (air and cabin) of US Airways Flight 1549.

Under the command of Captain Chesley B (Sully) Sullenberger, the crew ensured the safety of all 146 passengers after executing an emergency ditching and evacuation of their Airbus 320 aircraft on the Hudson River, New York, on 15 January, following a catastrophic bird strike and double engine failure.

The Master’s Medal is rarely awarded and only for an outstanding aviation achievement, and at the discretion of the Master of The Guild, currently Air Commodore Rick Peacock-Edwards, who said:
“The reactions of all members of the crew, the split second decision making and the handling of this emergency and evacuation was `text book` and an example to us all.
To have safely executed this emergency ditching and evacuation, with the loss of no lives, is a heroic and unique aviation achievement. It deserves the immediate recognition that has today been given by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators.’’

The formal award of the Master’s Medal to the crew of US Airways Flight 1549 will be made later this year, most probably at the Guild’s prestigious Annual Trophies & Awards Banquet in the City of London’s Guildhall in October.

The Guild is the premier organisation for aviators and was established in 1929 to maintain the highest standards of air safety through the promotion of good airmanship.

-ends-

Safety Concerns

23rd Jan 2009, 17:37

It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the ditching, the normal electrical supply (AC and DC buses) and all three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight control law remained in Normal law.

For info for those who may be wondering

PJ2

23rd Jan 2009, 18:14

dvv

23rd Jan 2009, 18:39

That picture — how do we know it's the real path that the aircraft traveled, and not just an arbitrary interpolation of the flight's radar info from flightaware.com?

Capvermell

23rd Jan 2009, 18:46

The Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators (GAPAN), a City of London Livery Company, whose Patron is HRH The Duke of Edinburgh and Grand Master HRH The Duke of York, has awarded a prestigious award, the Master’s Medal, to the crew (air and cabin) of US Airways Flight 1549.Along with Mayor Michael Bloomberg the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators seem to be taking quite a big risk that something completely unexpected about the accident may not yet turn up during the investigation.

Whilst one appreciates that this is now a 24 hour news society and that everyone wants to be seen to jump on the band wagon it seems a little depressing when a crusty old body like this, with an even more crusty old Royal Patron, can't wait until the official report comes out before taking its decision.

There still seems to be a slight risk that after careful further analysis it may be concluded (with the benefit of hindsight and after far longer to think about the matter than these pilots actually had at the time) that Captain Sullenberger almost certainly could have reached La Guardia or Teterborough safely and that while he got away with it he took a massive and unnecessary gamble with everyone's lives by ditching in the Hudson. To be perfectly honest I think this is now rather unlikely because this event has now acquired such a folklore like media status that it will not be politically convenient (and we know from past incidents that the NTSB and even more so the FAA is sometimes susceptible to political pressure) to reach such a conclusion, even were it to turn out to be true.

Nonetheless surely both Air Transat and the Air Canada Gimli Glider incidents show that modern Boeing and Airbus jets can be brought down safely without any engines working but with other control surfaces fully operational. That being so someone may eventually start to ask why landing on a runway wasn't possible here. Obviously the main cited reason will come down to lack of altitude (as both the other two flights had engineless descents from cruising altitude) and the fact that those two airports were in largely unpopulated areas whereas La Guardia and Teterborough airports were in densely populated areas, especially when approached from Manattan.

But there still seems at least some remaining risk that whilst Captain Sullenberger clearly did a brilliant job of ditching in the Hudson safely (once he had taken his decsion to do so) that the NTSB may eventually determine that he need not have ditched in the Hudson at all. Certainly in days gone by worthy bodies like this Guild would always have waited to be sure of the outcome of the official investigation before they bestowed such honours.

PJ2

23rd Jan 2009, 18:49

Just like everything else that's been presented here, we don't know that the map isn't arbitrary. That's the whole problem, and benefit, of informed speculation. But there is no innate accuracy to the map at all, although it may turn out to be 100% correct.

The question that always must be kept in mind is, what can be observed from direct evidence. Our collective (and my) conclusions that both engines failed and that the aircraft was in alternate law and that the RAT was deployed and APU running may be incorrect given the new information just above. Speculation is fine so long as it has some experience behind it and isn't morphed into conclusions.

Capevermell;

Like many, I dont know what the rush is. Certainly our times need heroes but a lot of this is the media selling air-time, newspapers and magazines precisely to sell 'hero" in our times - they know upon which side their bread is buttered.

That said, because these kinds of events are extremely rare, it's not possible to reasonably compare accidents despite the temptation to do so. Neither TEB nor LGA presented attractive landing opportunities - short runways, much narrower constraints on a successful outcome and the possibility of under/overshooting a small mark, a high risk which was immediately removed by the river where time and distance permitted setting the aircraft up for a controlled forced landing. It was the right decision which will not need political correctness to ignore other outcomes, all of which would have been much higher risk. In such aviation incidents, it is hard to argue with this kind of success.

lomapaseo

23rd Jan 2009, 18:49

Thank you Safety Concerns; What's the source please? (read back through the last five pages thinking I'd missed it, that's all).

That's pretty big news - means no flame-out, just the inability to develop sufficient thrust to remain aloft.

Typical wording from a flight safety department advising their users.

I don't believe that you can interpret a flame out or not from the wording, but only that there was enough RPM to drive the aircraft power.

To assess flameout you need EGT.

PJ2

23rd Jan 2009, 19:16

I don't believe that you can interpret a flame out or not from the wording, but only that there was enough RPM to drive the aircraft power.

To assess flameout you need EGT.
From within the cockpit in order to execute the Engine Shutdown QRH item, yes indeed, but not necessarily in an investigation or as is being done here, informed speculation; "Flame out" can indeed be interpreted from other factors.

Someone has posted that the electrics and hydraulics were normal and that the a/c was in Normal Law. I asked for the source because that hasn't been said anywhere else that I can find. If all that is the case, then the engines were running in some fashion.

I say that because a windmilling N2 at 190kts will not be rotating fast enough to drive hydraulics and keep the generator on line. If even one generator is offline, the aircraft is in Alternate Law.

Either the engine(s) was/were near normal idle at around 55 to 60% N2 and sufficient to drive both systems, or it/they was/were sub-idling (due to damage) in which case very high EGT's would be experienced or it was not running - ie, no flame.

So the statement that the aircraft was in Normal Law is important - I don't see it as merely coming from a Safety Department without supporting information directly from the investigation, for precisely the above reasons.

forget

23rd Jan 2009, 19:26

Saftey Concerns. Where did this come from It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the ditching, the normal electrical supply (AC and DC buses) and all three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight control law remained in Normal law.

Several Googles of your exact phrasings shows one hit. Your Prune post. :confused:

Capvermell

23rd Jan 2009, 19:43

It was the right decision which will not need political correctness to ignore other outcomes, all of which would have been much higher risk. In such aviation incidents, it is hard to argue with this kind of success.

I think the fact that no one died or was even seriously injured will ultimately see to it that Captain Sullenberger's decision cannot be brought in to question because the decision he took then led to a demonstrably successful outcome.

On the other hand if Captain Sullenberger had taken precisely the same decision but due to slightly different tidal conditions or marginally less precise control of the aircraft trim it had cartwheeled and broken up then no doubt quite a different view would have been taken. Especially as in a near freezing temperature river most of the one third or so of pasengers who might possibly have survived the impact and then swum away from the aircraft in warmer water (despite the catastrophic break up) would not have done so due to being left in freezing water with no life jackets.

In such a circumstance one could easily see an NTSB report concluding that the pilot should have headed for one of the two potentially reachable nearby airports and that his chances of a more survivable outcome there were considerably better.

So the successful outcome is clearly influencing the conclusion about the wisdom of the original Hudson ditching decision, even though if the ditching had gone horribly wrong the actual decision to ditch, at the time it was taken by the pilots, would have been for precisely the same reasons.

snowfalcon2

23rd Jan 2009, 20:00

Is there in fact any previous recorded occurrence of an airliner that has managed to perform a safe planned low level engine-out landing at an airport, without major damage? Or, for that matter, any occurrences that did not go well?

Gimli and Air Transat/Azores come to mind as airport landings, but both cases started from cruise altitude with lots of planning time. Ryanair 737 in Rome did not really have any option, and BA038 neither.

galvonager

23rd Jan 2009, 20:01

That picture — how do we know it's the real path that the aircraft traveled, and not just an arbitrary interpolation of the flight's radar info from flightaware.com?That would depend on what data they used. If you go to the Passur LaGuardia airport monitor (http://www4.passur.com/lga.html), and re-play starting at 15:26, you will see the following track, which appears to follow a slightly different route. In particular, notice how the helicopter is turning right to avoid them (it is a helicopter, even if it appears as a plane on the image), which it wouldn't do if 1549 was to their right, over the highway, as that other picture suggests.

http://img.zamunda.net/bitbucket/track1549.jpg

dvv

23rd Jan 2009, 20:26

NigelOnDraft

23rd Jan 2009, 20:29

Capvermell

In such a circumstance one could easily see an NTSB report concluding that the pilot should have headed for one of the two potentially reachable nearby airports and that his chances of a more survivable outcome there were considerably better.
So the successful outcome is clearly influencing the conclusion about the wisdom of the original Hudson ditching decision, even though if the ditching had gone horribly wrong the actual decision to ditch, at the time it was taken by the pilots, would have been for precisely the same reasons.
But there still seems at least some remaining risk that whilst Captain Sullenberger clearly did a brilliant job of ditching in the Hudson safely (once he had taken his decsion to do so) that the NTSB may eventually determine that he need not have ditched in the Hudson at all
I would agree about the comments on GAPAN being a bit hasty - but being positive, maybe that more facts will emerge supporting the crew which would make their achievements even more remarkable, and adding value to a GAPAN award that is somewhat devalued by an award prior any formal investigation :{

I disagree with your comments above however... In my experience AAIB and NTSB reports are reluctant to state that A.N.Other course of action would have been better... unless it clearly would have been at that time.. and not judged by the actual outcome...

I am an A320 Capt, and if my engines fail at low level, or even high level, I am unaware of any advice or training as to whether I should land on an airfield, or water, or snow, or.... There comes a time when the Airlines and Authorities have to leave the decisions to the crew on the day. Only after various accidents and experiences add evidence might they make recommendations for future such events. Double engine failures in modern twins are still so rare that such an experience database has not, IMHO, yet been built up :ooh: The USAir crew have added to that (limited) database in a very positive way, IMHO ;)

NoD

galvonager

23rd Jan 2009, 20:46

galvonager (http://www.pprune.org/members/214111-galvonager), this app uses exactly the same data the previous picture is based on, but with its own kind of interpolation, which may or may not be a better approximation of the real track.You're saying that the only data we have are the data points (marked on the first image as such), and everything else is interpolation? That's quite possible. Still, the helicopter behavior makes the Passur track more believable to me.
Does more complete data exist at all anywhere? (The data points on the first picture, being the presumed basis for mine, are from the transponder, right?)

dvv

23rd Jan 2009, 20:51

galvonager (http://www.pprune.org/members/214111-galvonager), ok, disregard my previous post — the passur data do seem more detailed :ok: But I'm still a little bit suspicious about the passur app — a little bit later on in the replay, there are two N461SA's flying around :oh:

Green-dot

23rd Jan 2009, 20:52

There still seems to be a slight risk that after careful further analysis it may be concluded (with the benefit of hindsight and after far longer to think about the matter than these pilots actually had at the time) that Captain Sullenberger almost certainly could have reached La Guardia or Teterborough safely and that while he got away with it he took a massive and unnecessary gamble with everyone's lives by ditching in the Hudson.

Is there in fact any previous recorded occurrence of an airliner that has managed to perform a safe planned low level engine-out landing at an airport, without major damage? Or, for that matter, any occurrences that did not go well?

LY 1862 comes to mind. On October 4, 1992, the 747-258F was climbing out after takeoff. At low altitude it lost 2 engines on one side, was subject to rapidly degrading hydraulic systems and with damage to its high lift devices (the latter most likely unknown to the crew) attempted to return to Schiphol Amsterdam airport. It circled over highly populated areas twice, failed to line up for the landing runway, stalled, and crashed into an appartment building killing the 4 persons on board and many in the building. With hindsight, if the aircraft had been diverted away from populated areas immediately and had ditched into the nearby Ijsselmeer, it would have required considerably less airborne time while still marginally controllable and the 4 persons on board would possibly have survived with no casualties on the ground.

With that accident in mind, Captain Sullenberger in my humble opinion, took the right decision to ditch.

Green-dot

snowfalcon2

23rd Jan 2009, 21:01

A successful landing at LGA or TEB, as many have already noted, requires crossing a precise point in space at a precise speed. A hundred yards or so short would likely lose all aboard.

Exactly. I'd speculate that Capt. Sullenberger's glider experience did influence his decision not to try for La Guardia or Teterboro.
Fact is, to achieve a precise landing in a glider, the glidepath can be very effectivelly controlled with airbrakes that can be instantly set to any desired position during the final.
In an A320, even if the crew could rely on having power for the flight controls (which they couldn't) the time required for any flap setting change makes glidepath control imprecise. The only remaining trick, a sideslip, would require some previous training experience to get an idea of its effectiveness.
So even if they had been able to set up an approach, the risk of either an undershoot or overshoot (with no guarantee of available brake pressure) would have been significant.

BOAC

23rd Jan 2009, 21:08

To all those tempted to pontificate about the 'decision', please take a MOMENT to remember it will take days to assimilate the necessary parameters and performance details, and they had minutes.:ugh:

I can see all you 'experts' now, prooning about the dreadful accident in which the a/c crashed into the city killing many hundreds........

"Why didn't they ditch in the river?"

fleigle

23rd Jan 2009, 21:11

Reporting on FlightGlobal;
1) right engine remained at about 15% N1
2) left engine at about 30% N1
3) RAT deployed
4) flaps and slats at mid-position (pos. 2?)
f

ChristiaanJ

23rd Jan 2009, 21:12

BOAC,
Thanks, you made the point I would have tried to make. I'm with you.

PFR

23rd Jan 2009, 21:28

RAT...?
I think if one looks closely at photo 6 of Gannet Fan's post, you will see the RAT is deployed...
PFR..

jugofpropwash

23rd Jan 2009, 21:31

One other thing to consider for those second-guessing the crew...

Ditching into the river, worst case scenario, you have 155 dead on the plane, possibly a few more if it were to hit a boat.

On the other hand - try for an airport and don't make it, going over heavily populated areas and tall buildings - there could easily be ten times that many dead.

lomapaseo

23rd Jan 2009, 21:42

PJ2

So the statement that the aircraft was in Normal Law is important - I don't see it as merely coming from a Safety Department without supporting information directly from the investigation, for precisely the above reasons.

Agree!

and I believe that this answers your original question, thanks for the heads up

Capvermell

23rd Jan 2009, 21:55

To all those tempted to pontificate about the 'decision', please take a MOMENT to remember it will take days to assimilate the necessary parameters and performance details, and they had minutes.:ugh:

Just as it will take the NTSB far longer still to assess and analyse the information and inspect the hull of the ditched aircraft.

And this is why the action of GAPAN in awarding medals now rather than waiting for the NTSB to confirm the heroic nature of Captain S's actions in the light of all the gathered evidence would appear to be so premature.

Smilin_Ed

23rd Jan 2009, 21:56

In the long run, Captain Sully might possibly be criticized for bashing up the airplane, but he cannot be blamed for killing anyone. He did the best he could with the information available (energy) and made a splendid choice.:)

Dani

23rd Jan 2009, 22:03

Adding to the return-to-LGA question asked earlier:

It is a very well proven rule of thumb that if you make an unrestricted climb out of an airport, it is always more than 5% (the angle of an ILS). That allows you to return on a glide return to your airport of origin. Plus or minus. The two-engine-climb is mostly more than 10%. A all-engine-out gliding path is around 5%, if you don't extend any flaps or gear.

If you watch the actual path of the A320 in question, you see that he did a shallow turn towards TBO, but finally saw that it was out of question. Then he turned to the Hudson. If he would have turned directly back as the rule of thumb suggests, he would have made it. That still doesn't guarantee that he would have made a precision gliding landing on the runway and that he could have stopped there (remember: only 7 brakes applications!)

Sully's decision was the right one because he succeeded. But I'm still convinced that I would have decided differently in his case. I hope I never have to be in his position...

Dani

fireflybob

23rd Jan 2009, 22:16

This argument reminds me of the Star Trek episode when the ship is being attacked by the Klingons. A lady commander is in charge on the bridge. It all starts to go wrong with the ship disintegrating as she issues various orders to the crew. Everything suddenly stops and then Captain Kirk walks in - they are in the simulator. Kirk proceeds to debrief the commander in unequivocal terms. When he has finished she asks "Captain Kirk, permission to speak?", "Granted" he replies.

"If I may say so, Captain Kirk, I was in a 'no-win' situation" Kirk replies "One of the things you have to learn as a Starship Commander is that sometimes you are in a no-win situation!"

Human beings do the best they can with the resources available at the time. In fact Sullenberger and his crew did win - everyone is still around to tell the tale.

H.Finn

23rd Jan 2009, 22:23

The referral to electrical systems (AC and DC) remaining powered, all three hydraulic systems remaining operational and the flight control law remaining Normal Law comes directly from an Airbus Flight Safety Department Accident Information Telex, which also states that No. 1 engine delivered minimum thrust (about 35% N1) until a restart attempt at about 500ft height.

bubbers44

23rd Jan 2009, 22:40

When the captain looked back at LGA after the turn to the west they were trying to do a restart checklist. He probably thought he could make it back for a downwind landing on a short runway if the gear and flaps came down on schedule but by the time the restart failed it probably wasn't an option any more. If they had tried to land at LGA and failed to get configured and not get on the short runway it would have been a disaster. He had seconds to decide what was the best chance of survival and I think he made the right decision. 155 people are very happy he chose the river.

aguadalte

23rd Jan 2009, 22:45

Since it is not classified, and for the sake of Flight Safety, here it goes:

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTMENT TOULOUSE

ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX

SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

OUR REF: USA US1549 AIT N°2 DATED 23rd JANUARY 2009
Previous ref: USA US1549 AIT N°1 DATED 16 JANUARY 2009

SUBJECT: US AIRWAYS Flight US1549 ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

This is an update to the AIT N°1 issued on 16th January 2009.

The information which follow has been approved for release by the US National Transport Safety
Board (NTSB) and represent the highlights from the initial analysis of the available data: mainly
Digital Flight Data Recorder, aircraft components, ATC script and radar.

The A320 aircraft was operating a scheduled flight US1549 from New York, La Guardia airport to
Charlotte, Virginia on 15th January 2009, when the aircraft ditched on the Hudson river shortly
after take-off at 15:30 local time.

The aircraft performed a normal flex take-off in slats/flaps configuration 2 from La Guardia airport
with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying.

At time T0, soon after the aircraft was in clean configuration at an airspeed of about 210kts, both
engines suffered a simultaneous and sudden loss of thrust at about 3000ft pressure altitude. The
engines N1 decreased abruptly to 35% and 15% on engines 1 & 2 respectively. This sudden and
simultaneous loss of engine thrust is consistent with the reported bird strike on both engines and
also with the initial observations from the remaining engine 2. (Recovery of engine 1 being still in
progress).

The captain took immediately control of the aircraft making smooth nose-down pitch inputs to
maintain the airspeed at about 200kts.

At approximately T0+20 sec, the crew changed the aircraft heading towards the Hudson river.

There was no more response from the engine N°2. The engine N°1 continued to deliver a
minimum thrust (N1 around 35%) for about 2 minutes and 20 seconds after T0.

At approximately T0+2min20sec, the crew attempted at about 500ft/200kts a quick relight on
engine 1 without success.

The crew then selected slat/flap configuration 2 which was achieved.

From then on and until the ditching, the heading remained almost constant. The speed decreased
from 200kts to 130kts.

Ditching occurred 3 minutes and 30 seconds after the thrust loss in the following conditions:
- Airspeed was about 130kts (at the Gross Weight, Valpha max is 125kts and Valpha prot is
132kts)
- Pitch attitude was 10 degrees up and bank attitude was at 0 degree.
- Flaps and slats were in configuration 2. Landing gear up

It is to be noted that at all times during the event and up until the ditching, the normal electrical
supply (AC and DC buses) and all three hydraulic systems were fully operational and the flight
control law remained in Normal law.

In line with ICAO Annex 13 International convention, the US NTSB (National Transportation
Safety Board) continues the investigation assisted by Accredited Representatives from the
French BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses) as State of aircraft manufacturer. Airbus
continues to support the NTSB investigation with advisors on-site and in the various investigation
working groups.

Airbus has no specific recommendations at this stage. Should there be the need for
recommendation as a result of the investigation, operators will be notified accordingly.

DingerX

23rd Jan 2009, 23:30

As for building height, the highest buildings I've seen around 125th st. (where you end up if you extend the centerline of 31) are on the order of 21 stories. So I'd liberally put building height at 300 feet ASL.

Could he have made it? Maybe -- I'll wait for the reports from the simulator on that one. But they'd have to have been luckier than they were.

Let's be honest here: it'd have to be a spectacular screwup such that in those final feet of low-power flight, the aircraft caused anywhere near the casualties on the ground than people it had on board.

The "worst case" on ditching in the Hudson *might* be 155 dead, but that would require a spectacular screwup as well. On the other hand, the odds of the majority of passengers surviving a controlled-flight water landing are pretty good, while the same numbers for an urban landing are not so great. So "worst case" for a ditch is a significant number of survivors.

You can argue out the details: was flying over water and attempting a relight a good idea, or should they have just kept it where it was, since it was working to some degree, and tried to put it on a runway, hoping that the situation didn't get worse?

But, what it boils down to is this: there's the moment to make a decision. That decision's not always the best one, but it is best to make it. And there's the moment to realize that the planned course of action isn't going to work out. That moment is way before it starts to fail: ideally, it's when you catch the first whiff of cognitive dissonance. When the odds look good, but the number of unknown and uncontrolled critical variables starts to increase, that's when it's time to simplify. You can only get so lucky.

And these guys couldn't have gotten luckier.

protectthehornet

23rd Jan 2009, 23:46

it seems that there is a significant error in the telex from airbus in post 1171 above.

The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.

Quite a mistake.

Charlotte is in the great state of North Carolina. There is a significant town in Virginia called Charlottesville.

SO, if airbus can get the state wrong, why not other things too?

Very interesting about the engines producing some thrust

Capvermell

24th Jan 2009, 00:02

On the other hand, the odds of the majority of passengers surviving a controlled-flight water landing are pretty good, while the same numbers for an urban landing are not so great. So "worst case" for a ditch is a significant number of survivors.

That might very well be true in 70F water in the summer time. However if the plane here had broken up and caught fire on impact I highly doubt if very many (or indeed possibly any) passengers would have survived. Those not immediately carried to the bottom or burnt to death would probably have drowned wthin minutes in the icy waters. And passenger boats would not have been nearly so keen to rush to the rescue if the river had been ablaze with jet fuel.

The sad example of Air Florida Flight 90 would also rather suggest that ditchings in to freezing rivers in January do not normally go at all well for passengers or crew and that despite his clearly exceptional level of skill as a glider pilot Captain Sully cannot have set down on the Hudson at all confident of the kind of result he actually achieved. That result was no doubt his best possible case but probably only a 5% or so expected probability at best.

Any review of the history of loss of all engine power incidents would probably have suggested that some kind of controlled landing on to a runway was far more likely to have more survivors so one can only assume that the pilot took his decision virtually certain that an attempt to return to La Guardia would not result in a landing on the runway. And British Midland at Kegworth clearly indicates just how appalling the results usually are when loss of all engine power and an attempt at a controlled landing instead sees the afflicted aircraft landing just short of the target runway.

Airbubba

24th Jan 2009, 00:06

it seems that there is a significant error in the telex from airbus in post 1171 above.

The destination is listed as Charlotte, Virginia.

Remember the old Airbus manuals that were written in French and translated to English by a German? This error may be the result of a similar multilingual effort.

barit1

24th Jan 2009, 01:03

Just to make it clear to the non-technical observers:

35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.

thcrozier

24th Jan 2009, 01:50

Personally, I think it is a little early to be handing out awards. The crew obviously did a fine job, but I think that even they would agree the award-givers might be politically motivated.

If it were me, I would rather wait until the investigation is finished; and then, if the aviation community were to decide that I was deserving, I would humbly accept whatever accolades were bestowed upon me.

Most of the professionals here would have done a fine job given the same circumstances. I think it is important to remember that we are all trained to deal with similar situations. If only one in a million pilots and crews are up to the task, I don't think I would feel comfortable flying again, with anyone, including myself.

glhcarl

24th Jan 2009, 01:54

Just to make it clear to the non-technical observers:

35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.

But like I have said all along the engines were providing enough thrust to supply full hydraulic and electrical power. The crew had complete control right to touch (splash) down.

DC-ATE

24th Jan 2009, 02:24

Capvermell -

"The sad example of Air Florida Flight 90 would also rather suggest that ditchings in to freezing rivers in January do not normally go at all well for passengers or crew....."

The Air Florida accident could hardly be called a planned/controlled ditching.

lomapaseo

24th Jan 2009, 02:35

35% N1 is NOT 35% thrust, but indeed a great deal less - perhaps 10% thrust or even less.

agree, but it sure does make you wonder what the engine controll was controlling on for each engine since the implication was that the engines were in a steady state condition.

llondel

24th Jan 2009, 04:11

I find it interesting that comparisons are still made with the Potomac incident. Surely there's no real comparison because in that instance the aircraft stalled due to icing conditions and so came down largely out of control, whereas the Hudson landing was done with a glider with full control.

As with BA038, where I believe it has been shown in a simulator that it was possible to reach the runway, the benefit of hindsight and practice is what makes it possible. When you're up there and the engines quit with no warning, you only get one go. It doesn't have to be perfect, it just has to be good enough, and in this case it was.

Another example was American 191 at Chicago, where several crews crashed the sim having gone into it cold, but the crews that were told what had happened to the wing were able to recover and land.

Imagine knowing in advance everything that was going to happen - you could cut out most of the precautionary briefings and just do the one or two that were specific to your flight.

Capt Kremin

24th Jan 2009, 04:30

The union cannot stop Capt Sullenberger from giving interviews. Until the investigators formally exonerate the crew from any blame, there are legal implications that Capt Sullenberger is obviously, wisely, paying heed to.

Machaca

24th Jan 2009, 05:01

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/1549-Engine-L-01.jpg

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/1549-Engine-L-02.jpg

Machaca

24th Jan 2009, 05:14

...according to Flightglobal (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/01/23/321591/hudson-a320-partial-engine-power-aided-textbook-ditching.html):

Officials have also confirmed that the A320's Hamilton Sundstrand-built ram air turbine (RAT) had deployed from its compartment near the root of the left wing during the event and that the Honeywell auxiliary power unit in the tail had been operating.

USav8or

24th Jan 2009, 05:20

"When will Captain Sullenberger be interviewed on TV? If he was interviewed on 10, or 20 shows, I'd watch all of the interviews. I read that he's willing to be interviewed, but supposedly the union won't permit interviews."

Huh? Why would the union care whether he interviews or not?

Investigation is going on and he chose to hold off on interviews for a brief time.

Not for long though (see below).

I would also like to see the first officer being interviewed. Watching the news reporting I'm starting to think USAirways is the first commercial airline that utilizes one pilot only. :confused:

Hero pilot giving first interview to Katie Couric

8 hours ago
NEW YORK (AP) — Katie Couric has landed the first interview with hero pilot Chesley Sullenberger, who brought his distressed plane down in the Hudson River with all his passengers surviving.
The interview with Sullenberger and his crew will be shown on CBS' "60 Minutes" on Feb. 8.

SASless

24th Jan 2009, 10:27

All this second guessing is well and good....but hind sight is always 20/20!

I would suggest as in American Baseball....the tie goes to the runner.

Everyone lived due to the decisions and actions of the US Air Crew....Flight and Cabin....and that is what matters.

You can "what if" and "I Woulda...." all day long....but you were not there....you did not have to make those decisions.

You cannot argue with success!

Far better to make a good forced landing area than land short in a horrible place. No one worries too much about landing long in such a situation now do they?

bernardd173

24th Jan 2009, 10:29

".... it sure does make you wonder what the engine controll was controlling on for each engine since the implication was that the engines were in a steady state condition."

No, you can't imply that from the available infomation. It's very possible the controller was trying to deliver full power by allowing max fuel to the powerplant etc etc but lousy combustion or the mechanical damage, stopped the hardware from spinning at more than 35%. Think of this analogy - what happens if one or two spark plugs fail on your car? You, as the control system, ram your foot to the floor to demand maximum power, but how fast can you go?

lomapaseo

24th Jan 2009, 13:06

lomapaseo

24th Jan 2009, 13:11

This event is beginning to look more and more like the Rome starling ingestion.

Bird guts all over the place with little visible damage.

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/1549-Engine-L-02.jpg

bernardd173

24th Jan 2009, 13:37

Well then it wouldn't be at steady state because the EGT would be going over limits

The report from Airbus says "The engine N°1 continued to deliver a minimum thrust (N1 around 35%) for about 2 minutes and 20 seconds after T0"

Again, you're trying to imply things that have not been stated. There is no evidence here that the engine control systems were definitely operating correctly or that the feedback loops were closed.

misd-agin

24th Jan 2009, 14:14

N1's rotating - is that perhaps just windmilling rotation with perhaps little, or no N2? N1 rotation does not mean you have an operating engine, even one stuck at a low idle stall.

"Loss of lift in turns" - the plane doesn't lose lift in the turn. The vertical component of lift is reduced in a turn, which impacts your gliding distance.

The decision to turn back - at the location of engine failure there are not suitable landing locations in the direction we were heading(looked around yesterday). Your choices are the Hudson or turn south to locate a better spot(not many).

After the turn southbound their location was above Rt 9(Broadway) and Dyckman St at 1700'(estimated). Prevailing winds were probably from the west or NW. The distance to where they landed is just under one mile farther than TEB rwy 06 or LGA 13. That's without figuring in the impact of the winds aloft.

However, we've had days to figure this out, while they had to make a quick decision. TEB would have been a very tough choice. Misjudge your gliding distance and your second options are much worse. LGA 13 you had some other options(East River abeam Riker's island).

The reality is they would have been fairly busy, while we've got hours to figure this out.

Folks have stated - "if you stretch your glide". You can't "stretch your glide". You can max perform the airplane or by using drag, or poor techniques, decrease your glide distance. Trying to "stretch" your glide beyond what the airplane is capable would actually reduce your glide performance if you were correctly flying the proper glide profile.

rageye

24th Jan 2009, 16:05

from FOXNews.com (http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2009Jan24/0,4670,PlaneSplashdownHomecoming,00.html)

DANVILLE, Calif. — Friends and neighbors of the pilot who safely landed a crippled jetliner in New York's Hudson River planned to give him a hero's homecoming on Saturday.

The mayor and other officials were preparing to greet US Airways Pilot Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger and his family with a ceremony on Danville's town green.

Sullenberger, who lives in this San Francisco Bay Area suburb, has been lauded nationwide for gliding Flight 1549 to an emergency river landing on Jan. 15 after both of the plane's engines were disabled following a collision with a flock of birds. All 155 passengers and crew members were rescued.

Community members planned to celebrate his feat with music, an honor guard and other presentations.

Sullenberger has said little publicly about his experience. Although he and wife Lorraine planned to attend Saturday's ceremony, they were not expected to speak at length, a family spokeswoman said.

Sullenberger attended the inauguration of President Barack Obama on Tuesday, and the family returned to California this week.

Katie Couric has landed the first interview with Sullenberger and his crew. It is scheduled to be shown on CBS' "60 Minutes" on Feb. 8.

PJ2

24th Jan 2009, 17:20

There are a couple of minor inconsistencies that no doubt will be sorted out in the days and months to come.

The "report from Airbus" indicates that the No.1 Engine N1 was around 35% - that's about idle thrust - the N2 at idle thrust is about 55 to 58%, sufficient to power both the hydraulic pump (yellow system) and it's generator. The report only indicates that the No.2 engine N1 was 18%, a bit more than half of normal - assuming the fire was still lit, the N2 was obviously high enough to drive the Green system hydraulic pump and it's generator, powering all systems - I see where you were going, Safety Concern and appreciate both your obvious credibility and the now-available background to your post.

Not sure why a relight was attempted on No1 if it was running but those kinds of decisions will come out in the official reports. Obviously they "wrote off" No.2 as a candidate for a restart in the time they had.

One other item - some posts indicate that the RAT was deployed (and that it "can be seen" in photo #6 in the series just posted) - I'm not sure about that but if both generators were running the system would not normally (key word) deploy the RAT. Also, some say the APU was running; the Airbus communique says nothing about this, but again we will learn about this shortly, I'm sure.

The speed and pitch attitudes surprised me a little - lower, and higher, respectively, especially where Alpha-Prot was - indicates a heavier airplane than I thought, (20,000kg, as I understand the fuel load to have been, is a lot of fuel for this airplane, though).

dicksorchard

24th Jan 2009, 19:49

I have read this thread from begining to end and have enjoyed reading 90 % of the posts ..

However i found myself wondering very early on just how much longer it would take for the thread to turn sour with regards to Captain Sullenbergers & First Officer Jeff Skiles descision to ditch in the Hudson ?

We didnt have to wait very long for the sour grapes to ripen now did we !

I personally think it is very wrong to speculate what did or did not happen to Flight 1549 particurly at such an early stage in any accident investigation .

speculation =

Contemplation or consideration of a subject; meditation.
A conclusion, opinion, or theory reached by conjecture.
Reasoning based on inconclusive evidence; conjecture or supposition
Particurly when posts on this thread are now inferring that the cockpit crews descisions where flawed ?

The " i would have done it different "brigade and the " they where just doing their job so don't deserve any credit " need to take a chill pill 7 a deep breath because none of you have ever been put in exactly the same position as " Sully & Skiles " and it is very unlikely that you ever will !

lets wait for the full accident report guys ...casting aspersions & sour grapes dos'nt suit you so called professionals .

PJ2

24th Jan 2009, 20:04

dicksorchard - couldn't agree with you more on "casting aspersions or sour grapes" but are such comments coming from the professionals or from those who don't fly, or don't fly professionally?

As more becomes known to the airline piloting community, including a public document from Airbus, those who fly the airplane and those who fly alike, will place themselves in the same situations perhaps to test one's thoughts? I think it is quite natural to respectfully consider this crew's clearly brilliant thought processes and subsequent handling, always with an eye to the fact that nobody commenting has done it. I think the thread has stayed remarkably on-topic compared to others which really deteriorated early on, (but consider others which have rejuvenated themselves like the BA038 thread).

Nobody is ever going to wait for the report so the goal should be, I think, stay to known facts and employ one's own "time-in" (experience/knowledge) to keep the speculation informed while always respecting professional courtesies - such a professional approach keeps the troll and SCWAG factor down by keeping standards high.

Second-guessing work is very bad form indeed and with your comments on this, I fully agree.

glad rag

24th Jan 2009, 20:43

Quite agree.
Here was a crew, who, given a no win situation, were left to make the decision, in mere moments and who had the balls to take it and see it through.

repariit

24th Jan 2009, 20:53

Capt. Sully just made his first public statement before his home town community: "I think that I can speak for our entire crew when I say that we simply did what we were trained to do."

This just following the praise from all of his town officials.

ChristiaanJ

24th Jan 2009, 21:13

Maybe just an irrelevant remark...

But somehow I feel less reluctant to condemn some of the "what if " and what when" posts.

If they lead some people to try it out on the sim, or even just think it through and question their original mind-set.... it may add something to our knowledge.

Cap, coat and lifevest.

CJ

lomapaseo

24th Jan 2009, 21:19

Christiaanj

But somehow I feel less reluctant to condemn some of the "what if " and what when" posts.

If they lead some people to try it out on the sim, or even just think it through and question their original mind-set.... it may add something to our knowledge.

I absolutely agree

airfoilmod

24th Jan 2009, 21:30

One stops learning, one should cease flying.

protectthehornet

24th Jan 2009, 22:07

I've followed this whole thread from day one. The results of the investigation will be very important to the next incident like this will be very important.

Did Sully make the right choice?

A pilot has to have certain priorities of action? Should he save himself first? No, his passengers and his crew must be put ahead of his own well being.

But, those innocent people on the ground must be even farther ahead of the passengers and crew. Why? They didn't buy a ticket to be part of the aviation experience.

So, keep those on the ground safe...FIRST THING...and Sully did that.

Next, keep his passengers and crew safe...landing in the hudson had some risk involved, but less risk than some of the other options.

Were there any other options available, YES.

But the hudson option minimized risk to the innocents, and maximized a safe outcome for the passengers and crew.

The 'bus has a gadget which shows an arc of where the plane will end up at idle thrust, it becomes active when flaps are selected. I think it should be changed to always show glide range in present configuration.

I have to think the FADEC was partly to blame. In old fashioned jets you could put lots of fuel through, over temping the thing and getting some thrust. We used to say that a jt8d would run at firewall power for 8 minutes before failing. If sully could have gotten 2 minutes of half thrust, I don't think his feet would have gotten wet.

We shall see.

I do remind all of you who pilot multi engine aircraft of any sort. Always be ready to be a humble single engine pilot that suddenly loses 100 percent of his power. In a little single engine plane, you should always be looking for a spot to land JUST IN CASE.

I also submit that sully's glider experience is not the saving grace some think it is. Sailplanes often fly for hours finding thermals or other forms of energy to keep flying. No such luck on that fateful day.

Minimize the risk to others
Maximize the safe outcome for passengers and crew

The MINIMAX SOLUTION! (or modification thereof))

Mark in CA

24th Jan 2009, 22:28

DANVILLE, Calif. (AP) – The pilot who safely landed a US Airways jetliner in the Hudson River says he was only doing his job.

Pilot Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger is being given a hero's homecoming in Danville, the San Francisco suburb he calls home.

During brief remarks at Saturday's celebration, Sullenberger said circumstance determined he would be flying with an experienced crew on Jan. 15.

Sullenberger says, "We were simply doing the jobs we were paid to do."

Around 3,000 people gathered under drizzly skies in the town square to welcome Sullenberger home.

Joetom

24th Jan 2009, 22:29

The final report will have many details i'm sure, it will not have the exact information that the crew were getting during the events of that short flight, like sound/vision/feeling etc etc etc.

From the limited information around, it does appear the crew did a great job and got a great result, period.

I take my hat off to all crew in the aircraft and on the ground/water.

Happy new year.

RobertS975

24th Jan 2009, 23:10

The Air Florida 737 did not ditch into the Potomac... it crashed into the Potomac after first striking the bridge and at least one of the vehicles on the bridge. IIRC, the landing gear was still down!

mid_life_pilot

24th Jan 2009, 23:41

I haven't had chance to go through all the pages of this discussion so apologies if this has already been covered.

I caught the end of the O'Reilly factor on Fox News this morning and Geraldo flashed up an FAA report from 2 days prior to the Hudson river landing stating that the same plane embarking on the same sector suffered a climb out engine compression failure and had to turn back and land which obviously it did so safely. Apparently Geraldo was on the case and would let everyone know - haven't seen any follow up to this as yet.

This might explain why Sullenberger has been kept away from the public eye since the landing! Of course, going by the principal of believing nothing you read and only half of what you see I'll wait until the official version of the truth is out.

lomapaseo

25th Jan 2009, 01:22

Bird strike cover up?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I haven't had chance to go through all the pages of this discussion so apologies if this has already been covered.

We don't deal in conspiracy theories here and vague references to validate them. If you can't be bothered to read the thread and the facts therein, then you offer zilch to the discussion.

If you want to join the discussion with counters to reported facts by bringing in new analysis in a point by point rebuttal then place your cards face up on the table.

flipperb

25th Jan 2009, 01:33

There was an NTSB release last week that stated something to the effect of an ATC transcript for 1549 to be released soon. Although I've seen media articles with snippets from the transcript, I'm yet to see the full ATC (or CVR) transcript. Anyone?

Super VC-10

25th Jan 2009, 08:55

As far as I can see, the Masters Medal was awarded for the airmanship shown in the successful ditching with no loss of life.:ok: GAPAN by awarding the medal have made no judgement on whether the action of the crew contributed to the accident or not, nor on whether the decision to ditch was the correct one or not. :ugh:

Shamrock 602

25th Jan 2009, 09:30

Reports here of a homecoming event for Capt Sullenberger in Danville, California:

AP TV (via YouTube) YouTube - Hudson River Pilot Gets Hero's Welcome Home (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVileY9RmnA)
LA Times Hero pilot Sullenberger's hometown honors its favorite son - Los Angeles Times (http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-pilot25-2009jan25,0,4232323,full.story)

Not that he could say much more than express his thanks, for obvious reasons. But he was quoted as saying this:

"Circumstance determined that it was this experienced crew that was scheduled to fly on that particular flight on that particular day, but I know I can speak for the entire crew when I tell you, we were simply doing the jobs we were trained to do."

NigelOnDraft

25th Jan 2009, 11:36

The 'bus has a gadget which shows an arc of where the plane will end up at idle thrust, it becomes active when flaps are selected. I think it should be changed to always show glide range in present configuration.I trust you aren't serious :ugh:

If you are, I doubt the Crew looked at their ND in the whole process, and the ND the Airbus types I fly do not show useful things like rivers, bridges and ferries, just useless things like Waypoints and NDBs that are not a lot of use when your engines fail at 300' :{ However, Mr Airbus installed some nice windows, and I suspect this crew looked out of those... an art somewhat being lost :ooh:

NoD

precept

25th Jan 2009, 11:54

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington , DC 20594

January 24, 2009

************************************************************

SECOND UPDATE ON INVESTIGATION OF DITCHING OF US AIRWAYS
JETLINER INTO HUDSON RIVER

***********************************************************

The following is an update on the National Transportation
Safety Board's investigation of US Airways flight 1549,
which ditched into the Hudson River on January 15, 2009.

The left engine, which had separated from the aircraft
during the ditching, was recovered from the Hudson River on
Friday afternoon, January 23, 2009. The initial external
examination of the engine revealed dents on both the spinner
and inlet lip of the engine cowling. Five booster inlet
guide vanes are fractured and eight outlet guide vanes are
missing. A visual examination of the engine did not reveal
evidence of organic material; there was evidence of soft
body impact damage.

Both of the engines will be boxed and shipped to the
manufacturer in Cincinnati where NTSB investigators will
oversee a complete tear-down of each engine. Advanced
technology will be employed to detect any organic material
not apparent during the initial visual examination.

Several NTSB investigators remain on-scene and are
supervising Airbus technicians as the aircraft wreckage is
prepared for long-term storage. This process includes
removing the wings and the horizontal and vertical
stabilizers. The aircraft wreckage will be shipped to a
secure storage facility where it will remain available to
the NTSB throughout the course of the investigation.

The NTSB wishes to acknowledge the support and cooperation
of the numerous federal, state and local agencies that
worked so closely with Safety Board investigators and were
of great assistance throughout the entire on-scene phase of
the investigation.

###

Media Contact: Peter Knudson
[email protected]
NTSB Public Affairs: 202-314-6100

LocBlew

25th Jan 2009, 12:00

No doubt NigeOnDraft!

But the Airbus I fly, does show rivers on the ND (although not bridges nor ferries...).:}
Under lower visibility circumstances it could certainly be a useful feature for a quick initial decision of where ditching is possible.

mid_life_pilot

25th Jan 2009, 14:15

@lomapaseo

We don't deal in conspiracy theories here and vague references to validate them. I you can't be bothered to read the thread and the facts therein, then you offer zilch to the discussion.

If you want to join the discussion with counters to reported facts by bringing in new analysis in a point by point rebuttal then place your cards face up on the table.

Sorry, did I stumble into the Professional Pilots FACT Network? I thought I was on the rumour network, my bad. :ugh:

Anyway, here is a link to more information that I've now been able to find:

US Airways Hudson river plane had CFM56-5B engines FAA requested inspection for compression stall problem | DWS Aviation (http://www.dancewithshadows.com/aviation/airbus-plane-that-landed-in-hudson-river-had-engines-which-faa-had-earlier-ordered-to-inspect/)

"It has been revealed that the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had ordered stringent inspection of the type of engines on the US Airways plane that splash-landed in New York’s Hudson River after a few of those engines were found to have a rare kind of stall problem known as “compression stall.”

And later:

""CNN says that, on January 13, 2009, two days before US Airways Flight 1549 landed in the Hudson River, the same plane – also named Flight 1549 and taking off from New York’s LaGuardia Airport to Charlotte, North Carolina, the United States – had encountered problems. Four passengers on that flight on January 13 had said that the crew told the passengers on the intercom that the plane was experiencing “compression stalls.”
Meanwhile, the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) confirmed that there was an entry in the maintenance log of the plane that landed in the Hudson River that a compressor stall had occurred on January 13, 2009."

Can I come out to play now or do I have to finish my dinner first? Sad.

protectthehornet

25th Jan 2009, 14:16

I never said the crew used the arc showing how far the plane would go. I did say the system should be revamped to always show the range of the glide/power off descent regardless of congifuration.

Of course the pilots looked out the window and judged their glide capability by the old fashioned method. (if one wished to learn what this method is, it has to do with the spot on the windshield going up or down...contact me for the name of a fine book with a full description)

Having flown out of LGA many times, I can assure you that it should not have been the first time any professional pilot at least considered putting her down in the hudson.

The greater question of how to do the same thing on instruments with very limited visiblity does come to mind. After all, there are other causes of dual engine failure than birds. And there are still jets out there without fancy moving map displays.

The phony CVR transcript is amusing in its own little way. If it were me flying, I would be heard to say...THIS AIRBUS IS A PIECE OF #$%^. AND SO ARE ALL ENGINES MADE BY GE. But this is just a personal opinion and doesn't reflect the views of pprune.

tggzzz

25th Jan 2009, 15:13

protectthehornet write much that seems sensible, but then...

I also submit that sully's glider experience is not the saving grace some think it is. I will be interested to hear his opinion - he is the only one that can judge that.

Sailplanes often fly for hours finding thermals or other forms of energy to keep flying. No such luck on that fateful day. True but that's a poor point that doesn't really support your contention.

Characteristics of flying a glider that I suspect were relevant:
running out of "up" is a normal experience, and unexpectedly landing in the middle of nowhere is SoP
there is no such thing as an "ideal" circuit. In a powered aircraft the circuit is good if the plane is at the specified height/speed/direction all the way round the circuit. If they encounter air moving at +6kt or -6kt they just adjust the throttle. Glider pilots aren't fazed by not having a means of "getting out of sink"; they just adjust the pattern accordingly. Which he did rather successfully.
standard training includes repeated "engine failures" at 150ft when climbing at 35 to 45 degrees (If the mud floats around your face, you got it about right, if it hits the canopy you were too enthusiastic :) It isn't unusual for glider pilots that are converting to powered licence to be congratulated (by the instructor) for their speedy accurate reactions (nose down, choice of the appropriate field) to surprise engine failures on takeoff
accurate zero bank landings are mandatory, with a 25m wing 1m off the ground - might have been helpful avoiding digging one engine into the water
glider pilots are used to knowing how the aircraft behaves when low and slow (they speed up in order to land :) E.g. in older gliders the best climb in a thermal occurs just above stall speed, so it is normal to be in a 45 degree bank experiencing pre-stall/spin wing buffet.So, I suspect gliding experience was helpful, but I'd like to hear the captain's opinion.

chris weston

25th Jan 2009, 16:38

protect the F18 1202, sir

Great post

I have to think the FADEC was partly to blame. In old fashioned jets you could put lots of fuel through, over temping the thing and getting some thrust. We used to say that a jt8d would run at firewall power for 8 minutes before failing. If sully could have gotten 2 minutes of half thrust, I don't think his feet would have gotten wet.

In dire emergency, big red button please. "I have control".

Buck has now stopped.

Methinks the FADEC team writing the software to protect the donks never had the Hudson in mind - up close and personal.

Huge respect for Sully and his crew, enhanced by seeing him on the newscasts today.

Yes I've read every post.

CW

barit1

25th Jan 2009, 16:48

With all due respect, the ability to manually override engine control schedules was removed for good reason. While it was possible to achieve some manual control on a JT8D-vintage engine, with a pressure ratio of 12 -15 perhaps, it's just not feasable in a modern compressor with double that compression (or more).

The industry understands this issue, and it's the price that's paid for high fuel efficiency.

lomapaseo

25th Jan 2009, 17:13

Methinks the FADEC team writing the software to protect the donks never had the Hudson in mind - up close and personal.

You are correct and by FAR regulation they have to do that, else it couldn't get certified. In the old steam driven days with knobs that a pilot could twidle the design regualtions did not regulate pilots so the pilots felt empowered.

Well in todays glass cockpits and computer driven era the pilots are still empowered but alas they don't have the same knobs to twiddle anymore and they pretty much have to sit and watch the thing do whatever it's gonna do.

The safety related presumption is that the design regulations provide sufficient protection (within a 1 in 10,000,000 probability) and by taking the pilot out of some controll you gain by reducing pilot error.

Yes the controll logic needs to be examined and reported (my earlier question: what was it controlling on see post # 1179 )

In the end the issue comes down to the bird design certification standard and the balance between capability and need to avoid. By regulation you can't design a FADEC to take the engine outside its certified envelop

Wee Weasley Welshman

25th Jan 2009, 17:21

Whilst being a retired gliding instructor and active airbus pilot I can't think that my gliding experience would make one iota of difference in a double engine failure scenario. Its very much chalk and cheese.

System knowledge, QRH skills, RT discipline, CRM and plain old flapability factor would be far, far, more important than any thermal-hunting expertise.

The media is feeding in its usual ugly way.

WWW

protectthehornet

25th Jan 2009, 19:05

Barit1 makes a good point...indeed the industy knows about fuelconsumption...but

one wonders if the smaller inlet of the JT8d type of engine and its non computer controlled ways might have survived this unique encounter.

So, in order to get the fuel efficiency, build the engine, put the FADEC on it and a red button, as previously suggested, BUT that red button would REPROGRAM the FADEC to a 8 minute limit...allowing 25% more fuel to be introduced and all other parameters INCLUDING vibration to be overlooked. You could even transmit a signal saying...ENGINE NO GOOD NO MORE.

I think it will always be easier to swap engines, then to refloat a plane.

RobertS975

25th Jan 2009, 19:17

The Air Florida 737 that crashed in the Potomac would have lived if either pilot pushed the throttles forward regardless of what their gauges were telling them.

And it is hard to disagree with those who argue for the concept of the override button...

lomapaseo

25th Jan 2009, 19:43

And it is hard to disagree with those who argue for the concept of the override button...

any override button has to be certified as "safe" not exceeding limits, else the FARs need to be changed (not in our lifetime).

OTOH you can always opt for a "reserve thrust" option on an engine, which means it is certified for birds at that condition and then takeoff normally with less than reserve thrust and after ingesting birds you can have a big red button to push.

Or if it's EGT/TIT overlimits that really is part of your concern you can mandate the maximum allowable deterioration of an engine on-wing such that even after a bird ingestion you have lots of margin.

sorry there is no quick practical solution just multiple contributors to pick at.

Lost in Saigon

25th Jan 2009, 22:54

any override button has to be certified as "safe" not exceeding limits, else the FARs need to be changed (not in our lifetime).

Boeing aircraft already have "Override" switches.

There are two switches labeled "EEC". (Electronic Engine Control)

If you turn off EEC you will get all the power you want and will over temp the engines if you firewall the power levers.

barit1

26th Jan 2009, 00:26

But what vintage Boeing are you addressing? The 733/734/735 have CFM56-3 with essentially hydromechanical controls w/electronic trim, where the 736/737/738/739 are FADEC machines. A great deal of difference. (Hint: look up FADEC!) :8

Lost in Saigon

26th Jan 2009, 00:31

Yes, all Boeing FADEC aircraft have EEC switches. I believe this includes most 757, 767, 777, and the newer 737's.

lomapaseo

26th Jan 2009, 01:10

Boeing aircraft already have "Override" switches.

There are two switches labeled "EEC". (Electronic Engine Control)

If you turn off EEC you will get all the power you want and will over temp the engines if you firewall the power levers.

agree

So I'll have to be careful of the my use of the word overide if all it does is turn off a system. However any system left running I believe has has to meet its design intent without exceedances (caused by the system).

Airbubba

26th Jan 2009, 01:18

Yes, all Boeing FADEC aircraft have EEC switches. I believe this includes most 757, 767, 777, and the newer 737's.

I don't think Pratt '75's have them, unless you include the switches on the maintenance panel. Of course, I guess you could pull circuit breakers if you could find them in time.:)

VNAV PATH

26th Jan 2009, 06:50

LOST IN SAIGON said :

Boeing aircraft already have "Override" switches.

There are two switches labeled "EEC". (Electronic Engine Control)

If you turn off EEC you will get all the power you want and will over temp the engines if you firewall the power levers.

As far I know on T7, you can only switch EEC to Alternate modes ( soft and hard )

In both cases , you keep overspeed protection ( N1 ) but you loose overboost protection ( overthrust ) . Can help anyway !

CAAAD

26th Jan 2009, 07:13

The results of a serious bird event are usually much more complex than a reduction in efficiency causing EGT limitation.
Compressor damage will lead to a reduction (or elimination) of surge margin. The ability to select increased fuel flow would not help in this instance.
Much time is spent during engine certification in deciding the best course of action following bird ingestion, involving bleed management, throttle manipulation and so on.
In this case it seems that the ingestion event was so severe that the engines were overwhelmed. Overfueling would have served no purpose.

Aircraft are currently certificated against the most severe possible environmental hazards in terms of climate, icing etc.. Large flocking birds have only recently been recognised as a paticularly severe environmental hazard. The pioneering CAA paper was published in 2002, but I'm not sure if matters have progressed in the meantime.

wileydog3

26th Jan 2009, 11:39

VNAV path In both cases , you keep overspeed protection ( N1 ) but you loose overboost protection ( overthrust ) . Can help anyway !

Overboost on a jet engine. Over-temp, yes. Over-speed, yes. Overboost, no. Overboost is a recip term and problem.

Surrey Towers

26th Jan 2009, 11:55

I recall seeing a film that GE and IAE made, independently of each other, which showed a shower of dead chickens being shot into the engines. These tests were quite impressive but as with ALL tests they are never conclusive. The reason?

You cannot allow for every possible situation.

This was one and you can draw the circles round it as tight as you want but it is unique.

So is some of the garbage written in the aftermath of this single incident.

BOAC

26th Jan 2009, 11:57

Overboost is a recip term and problem. - Wiley - it is also in all the Boeing 737 stuff I have seen! Now, let's get onto 'Throttles'?:)

Canuckbirdstrike

26th Jan 2009, 12:27

It is critical to remember that the CFM56 was certified under the OLD FAR 33 standards that are based on a single 4 lb bird. The new Standard is a single 8 lb bird. Many migratory birds, especially Canada Geese exceed even 8 lbs.

Lastly it is important to understand what the standard for ceritfication of the engine for a single large bird is:

(3) Ingestion of a single large bird tested under the conditions prescribed in this section may not cause the engine to:
(i.) Catch fire;
(ii.) Release hazardous fragments through the engine casing;
(iii.) Generate loads greater than those ultimate loads specified under Sec. 33.23(a); or
(iv.) Lose the ability to be shut down.

It doesn't have to continue to run.....

Once all the FDR data is available for this event, the results of the engine teardown and the bird data is know it will be interesting to see how the information is presented.

Information to date indicates that if the aircraft did hit a flock of geese that the engines exceeded the certification standard.

lomapaseo

26th Jan 2009, 12:40

Interesting that both engines had locally damaged Inlet Guide vanes. (not commonly seen)

Is there any controll logic that having sensed this could fail-safe all the engine IGVs to full open?

I still feel that it is significant that the engines appeared to be in a fail safe mode not requiring pilot intervention to protect them furthur

Wader2

26th Jan 2009, 12:48

Regarding the bird ingestion test, does the test make any distinction between fans of different diameters?

One might assume that a larger fan has more robust blades and guide vanes than a smaller one therefore they can offer the same degree of resistance or survivability.

On the other hand a larger fan may be more susceptible to damage, for the same bird, if it is struck on the outer edge of the fan disc.

Also the larger intake will have a higher probabilty of catching a bird than a smaller one.

So, is it a one size fits all or do they factor in fan size?

barit1

26th Jan 2009, 12:51

Although overboost is a carryover from recip days, the term is so prevalent in the airline community that the OEM's continue to use it. :}

forget

26th Jan 2009, 13:06

Avweb.

According to the NTSB, the engine showed "evidence of soft body impact damage," but failed to supply visual evidence of "organic material" (read: birds) following its unscheduled powerwashing in the Hudson River on Jan. 15. The left engine, previously attached to the US Airways Airbus A320, was dented on both the spinner and intake lip. Plus, five booster inlet vanes were damaged and eight outlet guide vanes were missing. Both engines will now be shipped to Cincinnati where investigators will oversee a complete teardown and use "advanced technology" to detect the existence of the aforementioned organic material.

DC-ATE

26th Jan 2009, 14:05

It is simply not possible to protect or certify one of these turbine engines (no matter the size or make) against all hazards they might encounter. It is a 'risk' that must be taken if one chooses to fly.

lomapaseo

26th Jan 2009, 14:12

Regarding the bird ingestion test, does the test make any distinction between fans of different diameters?

So, is it a one size fits all or do they factor in fan size?

The certification ingestion test FAR 33.77 factors in inlet capture area (generally requiring more birds).

The later generation engines (not the CFM56) increases the size of the birds vs capture area and yes as size goes up the quantity goes down just the same as mother nature per square foot.

mono

26th Jan 2009, 16:32

Both engines were hit by at least 1 and possibly several LARGE birds. Damage was such that several IGV's and OGV's were euther damaged or even missing. And yet the would be "engineers" here on PPRUNE seem to think that a big red switch to allow the pilot to over-ride the FADEC would have saved the day (or at least allowed at dry landing)

Well listen up! The engines were knackered, shot. Damaged/missing IGV's/OGV's would have disturbed the airflow through the engine so much that any pilot over-ride would have had, if anything, the opposite effect and caused a massive surge.

The vast majority of a/c flying around today are FADEC controlled. FADEC does not limit EGT (it's quite possible to overtemp a FADEC engine as the frequent overtemp inspections that are carried out by engineers all over world are testimony to. FADEC will HELP prevent over-boost and overspeed of engines but by all accounts this was not the issue it was not producing enough power not limited 'cos it was producing too much.

Hats off to the pilots who did an excellent job of getting the a/c down without loss of life and WAIT for the report to establish the full story.

John Farley

26th Jan 2009, 16:55

Well said mono.

Sadly, these days on the net, one has to get used to people writing stuff that actually only shows the gaps in their knowledge.

protectthehornet

26th Jan 2009, 18:44

so how do you know for SURE that the inlet guide vanes and other damage (except for so called soft body damage) was fully caused by the birds? how much of it could be due to the water?

we shall see...and there are no dumb thoughts on this forum...just closed minds.

and HEY WILEYDOG

our airline has published stuff on overboosting/ ;-)

VNAV PATH

26th Jan 2009, 18:49

Wileydog3 said :

Overboost on a jet engine. Over-temp, yes. Over-speed, yes. Overboost, no. Overboost is a recip term and problem

Probably a semantic problem , but my Manual says :

" thrust protection is not provided (...). As a result thrust overboost can occur at (... ) "

Somewhere else:

" avancing the thrust levers full forward provides some overboost (...)

And refering to my old time engine course , on a thrust vs Temp. graph , until the thrust break temp. the graph is flat and means thrust limitation ( case resistance ) then there is EGT limitation ( mettallurgy resistance) )

patrickal

26th Jan 2009, 19:41

And yet the would be "engineers" here on PPRuNe seem to think that a big red switch to allow the pilot to over-ride the FADEC would have saved the day (or at least allowed at dry landing)

Agreed!! I am not an engineer nor a commercial pilot, but when I look at the "probably not accurate" map showing the flightpath altitudes and airspeed. what strikes me is that if they were to try to do anything other than what they did, they would be rapidly sacrificing altitude by making hard turns, dropping gear, and possibly setting slats/flaps. Plus they had no idea what other damage to flight controls had been incurred.

I should also point out that either Teteboro or LGA would involve clearing some pretty high obstacles. Take a look at this IAP for Runway 19 at TEB. Look at height of all of the obstacles to be cleard for any return to LGA or landing at TEB. http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0901/00890I19.PDF . Plus he would have to use RWY 19, as RWY 24 is only 6030 feet, a real risk with no power and possibly no brakes or spoilers also.

The only sure thing they had was what they had in front of them. Anyone that second guesses this team, given the results they accomplished, is just plain stupid. I would go so far as to include the NTSB in that group if they do in the end come out and say that they could have reached LaGuardia or Teterboro. Let the results speak for themselves. Has anyone tried this in a sim yet?

Patrick

kenparry

26th Jan 2009, 19:46

Patrick:

There's no point "trying to replicate in a sim", because you do not know what to replicate

protectthehornet

26th Jan 2009, 19:52

so many people have indicated that one would drop the gear and lose gliding distance

gee...if you can land gear up on the water, you can land gear up on the ground if you need too (assuming flat, like a runway).

yes, the pilots (plural) did fine. the stews did fine too, especially the one who stopped people from opening the rear doors.

StbdD

26th Jan 2009, 22:35

Passenger 8F

Thursday was a difficult day for all of us at the firm and I left the
Park Avenue office early afternoon to catch a cab bound for LaGuardia
Airport.

I was scheduled for a 5pm departure, but able to secure a seat on the
earlier flight scheduled to leave at 3PM. As many of us who fly
frequently often do, I recall wondering if I'd just placed myself on a
flight I shouldn't be on!

Just prior to boarding I finished up a conference call with my
associate, ******* (New York), and our placement, the CIO of
United Airlines. When I told him that I was about to board a US
Airways flight, we all had a little fun with it.

I remember walking on the plane and seeing a fellow with grey hair in
the cockpit and thinking "that's a good thing... I like to see grey
hair in the cockpit!"

I was seated in 8F, on the starboard side window and next to a young
business man. The New York to Charlotte flight is one I've taken what
seems like hundreds of times over the years. We take off north over
the Bronx and as we climb, turn west over the Hudson River to New
Jersey and tack south. I love to fly, always have, and this flight
plan gives a great view of several NY landmarks including Yankee
Stadium and the George Washington Bridge.

I had started to point out items of interest to the gentleman next to
me when we heard a terrible crash - a sound no one ever wants to hear
while flying - and then the engines wound down to a screeching halt.
10 seconds later, there was a strong smell of jet fuel. I knew we
would be landing and thought the pilot would take us down no doubt to
Newark Airport. As we began to turn south I noticed the pilot lining
up on the river still - I thought - en route for Newark.

Next thing we heard was "Brace for impact!" - a phrase I had heard
many years before as an active duty Marine Officer but never before on
a commercial air flight.

Everyone looked at each other in shock. It all happened so fast we
were astonished!

We began to descend rapidly and it started to sink in. This is the
last flight. I'm going to die today. This is it. I recited my favorite
bible verse, the Lord's Prayer, and asked God to take care of my wife,
children, family and friends.

When I raised my head I noticed people texting their friends and
family….getting off a last message. My blackberry was turned off and
in my trouser pocket…no time to get at it. Our descent continued and I
prayed for courage to control my fear and help if able.

I quickly realized that one of two things was going to happen, neither
of them good. We could hit by the nose, flip and break up, leaving few
if any survivors, bodies, cold water, fuel. Or we could hit one of the
wings and roll and flip with the same result. I tightened my seat belt
as tight as I could possibly get it so I would remain intact.

As we came in for the landing, I looked out the windows and remember
seeing the buildings in New Jersey, the cliffs in Weehawken, and then
the piers. The water was dark green and sure to be freezing cold. The
stewardesses were yelling in unison "Brace! Brace! Brace!"

It was a violent hit - the water flew up over my window - but we
bobbed up and were all amazed that we remained intact.

There was some panic - people jumping over seats and running towards
the doors, but we soon got everyone straightened out and calmed down.
There were a lot of people that took leadership roles in little ways.
Those sitting at the doors over the wing did a fantastic job…they were
opened in a New York second! Everyone worked together - teamed up and
in groups to figure out how to help each other.

I exited on the starboard side of the plane, 3 or 4 rows behind my
seat through a door over the wing and was, I believe, the 10th or 12th
person out. I took my seat cushion as a flotation device and once
outside saw I was the only one who did….none of us remembered to take
the yellow inflatable life vests from under the seat.

We were standing in 6-8 inches of water and it was freezing. There
were two women on the wing, one of whom slipped off into the water.
Another passenger and I pulled her back on and had her kneel down to
keep from falling off again. By that point we were totally soaked and
absolutely frozen from the icy wind.

The ferries were the first to arrive, and although they're not made
for rescue, they did an incredible job. I know this river, having swum
in it as a boy. The Hudson is an estuary - part salt and part fresh
water - and moves with the tide. I could tell the tide was moving out
because we were tacking slowly south towards Ellis Island, The Statue
of Liberty, and The Battery.

The first ferry boat pulled its bow up to the tip of the wing, and the
first mate lowered the Jacobs ladder down to us. We got a couple
people up the ladder to safety, but the current was strong pushing the
stern of the boat into the inflatable slide and we were afraid it
would puncture it…there must have been 25 passengers in it by now.
Only two or three were able to board the first ferry before it moved away.

Another ferry came up, and we were able to get the woman that had
fallen into the water on the ladder, but she just couldn't move her
legs and fell off. Back onto the ladder she went; however, the ferry
had to back away because of the swift current. A helicopter arrived on
station (nearly blowing us all off the wing) and followed the ferry
with the woman on the ladder. We lost view of the situation but I
believe the helicopter lowered its basket to rescue her.

As more ferries arrived, we were able to get people up on the boats a
few at a time. The fellow in front of me fell off the ladder and into
the water. When we got him back on the ladder he could not move his
legs to climb. I couldn't help him from my position so I climbed up
the ladder to the ferry deck where the first mate and I hoisted the
Jacobs ladder with him on it…when he got close enough we grabbed his
trouser belt and hauled him on deck. We were all safely off the wing.

We could not stop shaking. Uncontrollable shaking. The only thing I
had with me was my blackberry, which had gotten wet and was not
working. (It started working again a few hours later).

The ferry took us to the Weehawken Terminal in NJ where I borrowed a
phone and called my wife to let her know I was okay. The second call I
made was to *****. I knew she would be worried about me and could
communicate to the rest of the firm that I was fine. At the terminal,
first responders assessed everyone's condition and sent people to the
hospital as needed. As we pulled out of Weehawken my history kicked in
and I recall it was the site of the famous duel between Alexander
Hamilton and Aaron Burr in 1804. Thankfully I left town in better
condition than Mr. Hamilton who died of a mortal wound the next day! I
stayed with my sister on Long Island that evening, then flew home the
next day.

I am struck by what was truly a miracle. Had this happened a few hours
later, it would have been pitch dark and much harder to land. Ferries
would no longer have been running after rush hour and it would not
have been the same uplifting story. Surely there would have been
fatalities, hypothermia, an absolute disaster!

I witnessed the best of humanity that day. I and everyone on that
plane survived and have been given a second chance. It struck me that
in our work we continuously seek excellence to solve our client's
leadership problems. We talk to clients all the time about the
importance of experience and the ability to execute. Experience showed
up big time on Flight 1549 as our pilot was a dedicated, trained,
experienced professional who executed flawlessly when he had to.

I have received scores of emails from across the firm and I am so
grateful for the outpouring of interest and concern. We all fly a
great deal or work with someone who does and so I wanted to share this
story - the story of a miracle. I am thankful to be here to tell the
tale.

There is a great deal to be learned including: Why has this happened
to me? Why have I survived and what am I supposed to do with this
gift? For me, the answers to these questions and more will come over
time, but already I find myself being more patient and forgiving, less
critical and judgmental.

For now I have 4 lessons I would like to share:

1. Cherish your families as never before and go to great lengths to
keep your promises.
2. Be thankful and grateful for everything you have and don't worry
about the things you don't have.
3. Keep in shape. You never know when you'll be called upon to save
your own life, or help someone else save theirs.
4. When you fly, wear practical clothing. You never know when you'll
end up in an emergency or on an icy wing in flip flops and pajamas and
of absolutely no use to yourself or anyone else.

Thanks to all who have reached out …I look forward to seeing you soon!