Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)

[tucumseh]

TOFO

I sincerely hope you're right.

But, my money’s on - “HOW MANY senior officers and Ministers were told of this BEFORE XV230 crashed? Sod that, we don’t want to know”.
Remember, Adam Ingram was given what amounted to an executive summary of the Haddon-Cave report in 2005. He did nothing. Can't see the CPS going near him.

[The Old Fat One]

It is not a question of having faith, nor is it a case of turning a blind eye because things might get difficult for somebody up high. If the civvy police and the HSE are involved (as reported) then the cat is already out of the bag. Thus my point regarding the irrelevance of "anybody's duty" as this is now a matter of legal process.

Whosoever makes the decision of whether or not to mount a prosecution (as opposed to an investigation) must give due regard to the objective consideration of the probability of success (assuming any law has been potentially broken). It is very difficult to bring criminal charges to employment related incidents. Witness the case of the poor electrician who was shot in head (six or seven times) on the tube by the police, whilst he was going about his lawful business. No prosecutions of anybody, either at the operator level or the management level, despite a number of HSE violations and demonstrable operational incompetence.

My point therefore is simply this. If there is no prosecution it will be because either the law has not been broken, or there is no realistic prospect of success. It will not be because of a cover up and it will not be because of a lack of resolve or duty.

I'm not naive; I just have a reasonable knowledge of the law.

[tucumseh]

TOFO

Agree with everything except, with respect, this;

It will not be because of a cover up and it will not be because of a lack of resolve or duty.


There already has been a cover up and, after the accident, Ingram still refused to acknowledge anyone had done anything wrong. Similarly, after Haddon-Cave reported, D/Air Staffs were in denial.

Since January 1988 (that I can prove), a long list of senior staffs and Ministers have been formally notified of the failings reiterated by Haddon-Cave. I quoted but one example when Ingram was notified a year before XV230 crashed. I submit, therefore, that their failure to act shows both a lack of resolve and breach of Duty of Care. I'm not convinced much will change.

[The Old Fat One]

To clarify...

I'm not referring to anything before HC, or anything to do with past military airworthiness (Nimrod or any other aircraft).

I am only referring to the ongoing Nimrod police investigation (post HC) and the possible outcome of that investigation.

Frankly, I know squat about the military airworthiness regime, past or present, other than when it directly affected me as an operator of the aircraft. And my philosophy of risk in relation to military service doesn't sit well with some members here present, so no need to get into that again. :cool:

[Chugalug2]

I can appreciate your position TOFO as a Nimrod operator. Many, well very many, years ago I was a Hastings co-pilot (not sure if that put me into the "operator" slot) when there was a terrible crash that killed all on board (both crew and trainee paras). Within days the entire world wide 80+ fleet was grounded and remained so for many months while remedial work to the elevator hinges and the general tail plane area was carried out. That impressed me (particularly as I had to spend a great deal of that time in Sydney where we just happened to be). I didn't associate that with some larger picture of RAF Accident Investigation and Airworthiness provision, though I do now.

Fast forward through the 80's/90's to the present day and we see that professional implementation of the Regulations fall from excellent to execrable. In time that meant fatal accidents resulted and many needless deaths happened. The Regulations did not effectively change but the attitude of those at the very highest levels charged with enforcing them did. It is in their interests to have all these accidents seen as one off and separate whereas they are all linked with that common bond of deliberate and enforced suborning of the Airworthiness Regulations. That is a serious offence under Military Law and it is the will of the RAF Higher Command to have a full and comprehensive investigation into that which is in question. Undoubtedly it is their duty to do so, but will they?

By stove piping it to merely look at one fleet the investigation is immediately restricted in time and space. Haddon-Cave tried to open out his Review but didn't go far enough back. The Provost Marshal needs to do just that. If the civil police were investigating the ram raid of a certain bank branch they would not turn a blind eye to the same MO at other branches of other banks stretching back over the years. Same suspects, same crime!

Unless and until those responsible both for these crimes and for the cover up (as tucumseh points out, not for lack of being told!) are brought to book then the Airworthiness of UK Military Aircraft will remain uncertain, because the same people are still able to compromise it. The only solution I feel is to remove Military Airworthiness provision and Military Air Accident Investigation to an MAA and MAAIB respectively, both independent and separate of each other and of the MOD. That will not happen until the full extent of this scandal is laid bare. That will not happen unless a thorough criminal investigation occurs. I have yet to be convinced that is even likely.

[tucumseh]

TOFO

I understand what you say but I don't think you can separate the two (past/present airworthiness and current investigation) unless one can guarantee and demonstrate true independence of the latter (and the MAA).

I don't think we can, not least because Ministers, past and present, have declared they are quite content for those who failed before to still hold positions of responsibility. That is, I think there are still too many who will be asked to sit in judgment of themselves. I hope I'm wrong.

[The Old Fat One]

My final offering on the subject...until perhaps the outcome is known.

It is not up to us to determine whether or not a crime has been committed - we may have an opinion on the subject, but we don't represent the judiciary on this issue (or if we do we are in contempt of court for discussing it here!!). It is the responsibility of those tasked to investigate to determine any breach of the law and the evidence as it stands.

Given the circumstances (HC and all the media coverage, plus three investigative bodies) I am entirely happy this investigation will be carried out properly and effectively. It does not follow that there will be a prosecution and the prosecuting authority certainly will not be considering the wider aspects and history of military airworthiness, they will considering the prospects for a successful prosecution against one or more individuals if, and only if, they have clearly broken one or more laws.

We should also all remember the fundamental principle of law in the UK...innocent until found guilty by 12 good men (or women).

That's the legal system in our green and pleasant land, and I for one, would not want it any other way.

[Chugalug2]

TOFO:
It is the responsibility of those tasked to investigate to determine any breach of the law and the evidence...
Agreed absolutely
...the prosecuting authority certainly will not be considering the wider aspects and history of military airworthiness, they will considering the prospects for a successful prosecution against one or more individuals if, and only if, they have clearly broken one or more laws.
Well quite, but I'm not calling for the consideration of "the wider aspects and history of military airworthiness", I'm calling for an investigation into alleged suborning of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations stretching back over many years.
This affair involves many very senior officers, not just the relative juniors that have been named by H-C. If investigation is limited to them alone or perhaps others at or below their level that will tell us more about the attitude of the "Prosecuting Authority" than of anything else.
As to a fair trial and proper process, who is gainsaying that? Certainly not I. Of course those charged are innocent until proved guilty, a process not shared by the pilots of ZD576. Oh, that was merely an administrative process? So that would be all right then!

[Ray Dahvectac]

Does anyone know how far the RAFP have got with their investigations covering Air Comdr Baber and Wg Cmdr Eagles?

From today's Sunday Times:

Nimrod deaths: officer faces trial

"A senior RAF officer who has been blamed over the death of 14 servicemen when a Nimrod spy plane burst into flames over Afghanistan is facing a court martial.

Air Commodore George Baber, responsible for the safety of the RAF Nimrod, which crashed on September 2, 2006, now faces the threat of a two-year jail sentence as military investigators concluded there is sufficient evidence to charge him.

They are set to refer the case to prosecutors, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has learned.

Baber, a group captain before the crash and who was responsible for fleet safety along with Wing Commander Michael Eagles, was later promoted.

Baber and Eagles have been under investigation by the Royal Air Force’s Special Investigations Branch (SPA) at RAF Henlow in Bedfordshire since December 2009. Both men were named in a report by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in October 2009. It said the crash occurred because of a “systemic breach” of the military covenant, the nation’s duty of care to the armed forces.

Baber will face a court martial if the SPA decides to press charges. Eagles is still under investigation.

Baber retired from the RAF in January but he could still face a court martial if the military prosecutors decide to press charges within six months. "

It's a step forward, but by no means a conclusion.

[Just This Once...]

It's a step forward...

No it isn't. A few should 'swing', but not that man.

[Dengue_Dude]

I've kept out of this discussion up to now, but there really is a flaw in this process.

Should people be accountable? Most certainly.

But we in the Forces were subjected to institutional neglect, it just took a senior officer to 'override' the normal criteria for safety for it to be adopted and literally we would fly in the face of common sense, logic and airworthiness. Often we, as crew accepted that, because we too had a career, or could be subjected to duress.

The difficulty comes in when one day there is a line drawn in the sand and suddenly they (the managers) really ARE accountable.

Is it fair to prosecute these guys - well thankfully, it's not my decision, but this all feels like a spin on the Emperor's New Clothes.

As (now ex) aircrew, I am glad that managers do not just glibly sign red line entries - however anyone in the military can curtail their career by seeming to be intransigent.

Perhaps it is time again to look at 'professional' managers and remove the age-old idea that you need to move every 3 years to maintain a career path. I used to get fed up with explaining an aircrew viewpoint to JENGOs that constantly changed (not their fault). When they rotated, they took all their experience with them to an (often) unrelated job.

As an ex SFSO (deputy), I am deeply cynical about this latest push. It will inevitably end up with deployment of umbrellas rather than the meaningful change of paradigm that would result in safer aircraft that go in the way of danger.

It would be nice not to be taking the danger with you.

[Chugalug2]

RD:-
It's a step forward,
I would rather classify it as depressingly predictable. By stove-piping investigation into Nimrod Airworthiness alone, the RAF Provost Marshal and his subordinates ensure that those who ordered the suborning of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations across not only that but many other fleets as well, stretching back over the past three decades, thus pass under their Radar. Are we surprised?
The one enlightening fact (presumably) to emerge from this piece is that liability to Court Martial expires mere months after such officers leave service. So be it, all the more reason that such grossly illegal acts be subject to investigation by the civil authorities. At least 62 lives have been lost in military airworthiness related accidents involving Transport, Fast Jet and Helicopter, as well as Maritime aircraft. The Royal Air Force has shown a marked reluctance to carry out thorough Air Accident Investigations, let alone pursue those ultimately responsible for that unairworthiness. If the DPP shows half the resolve of HM Coroners to overcome such disgraceful reneging of responsibility we might expect their involvement, now that the military have displayed once again the limits of their interest in these matters.
Can't we?

[Biggus]

No doubt the "system" will take 6 months to decide whether to proceed with a prosecution, by which time the 'window of opportunity' will have shut - thus providing a convenient excuse to avoid a court case which would generate adverse publicity.

Or am I being too cynical...?

[engineer(retard)]

Will they also drag in the people who sliced the budgets that undermined the system?

[Chugalug2]

JTO:-
The standard of airworthiness should be common across civilian and military aircraft, as should the rule of law should it all go wrong.

If you mean by your first statement that the Regulations should be enforced by separate and independent authorities agreed. But let us be clear, military and civil airworthiness are different beasts, requiring separate regulations and enforcement, due to the differing nature of civil and military operations. As to your second statement I totally agree. Even if military airworthiness regulations are different from civil ones, the ordering and execution of their suborning should be, and I believe is, a Criminal Act and subject to investigation and prosecution by the Civil Authorities.

If a British soldier was believed to have deliberately shot a comrade dead while on Active Service, investigation might well be done initially by the Military Police but the files would be passed on to the DPP soon enough if evidence did indeed point to murder (always supposing the files survived the Ferry crossing of the Channel!). So the issue is not simply of whether or not one is liable to Military or Civil Law but also of the gravity of the offence. Murder is the gravest offence and is invariably tried in a Civil Court whatever the background of the accused. Manslaughter is the next most serious, and should be dealt with in the same way. Gross Negligence leading directly to resultant death falls within that category, and is applicable in this instance. That would presumably have been the offence with which the pilots of the Mull Chinook would have been charged had they survived the deaths of their pax and evidence of their alleged Gross Negligence obtained. They didn't survive, nor has any such evidence emerged of course. In comparison the Senior Air Rank Officers involved in the RTS of the Grossly Unairworthy Chinook HC2 into RAF service have survived unscathed to date, despite evidence of their activity.
They were RAF Air Marshals, JTO, just to make the point, with the exception of the C.A. of course.

[tucumseh]

Will they also drag in the people who sliced the budgets that undermined the system?


Quite right. There will be quite a few bricking it over this aspect. Not only those who knowingly wasted money and robbed the airworthiness pot to compensate, but those who issued direct orders to (a) ignore the airworthiness regulations and (b) make false declarations they had been adhered to.

Whatever Baber is accused of, it is a far lesser offence than committed by others. If he or his Council have half a brain cell between them, this won't go any further.

The Sunday Times? Sloppy journalism. Yet again, they miss the real story.

[Rigga]

DD said:
”The difficulty comes in when one day there is a line drawn in the sand and suddenly they (the managers) really ARE accountable.”

The Line in the Sand was never "redrawn" it was always there and "they" were always accountable but allegedly ignored the line - whether by choice or direction.


Chug said:
“But let us be clear, military and civil airworthiness are different beasts, requiring separate regulations and enforcement, due to the differing nature of civil and military operations.”

This is where Chug and I seem to disagree.

I believe that only the parameters of military airworthiness differ from civil airworthiness by their higher role envelope. The regulation and enforcement of these different parameters should be to the same standard.

Operational readiness and the basic airworthiness of the aircraft should not be confused.

Airworthiness is the damage tolerance of the aircraft structure, the multiple redundancy of control systems and how it maintains those levels of redundancy to complete its flight sector within certain safety margins. I believe these margins already reflect in 'military' standards.

"Operational readiness" is the ability of that airworthy aircraft to accomplish its designed mission and includes the dedicated role equipment for that mission. Those role equipment bits that affect the airflow and/or handling of the aircraft should also be subject to airworthiness regulations. The rest is just role equipment used by an operator to deliver some form of service or product to the end receiver.

[Chugalug2]

Rigga, I suspect that it was my poor choice of words that sets us apart rather than fundamental disagreement, but let us see.
What I meant was that the Military and Civil Air Regulations are different and thus have to be enforced separately by different regulatory authorities. The reason that they differ is because civil aviation has one overriding aim, that is the safe transportation of passengers and or freight between airports, whereas the preoccupation of military aviation is to achieve and fully exploit air superiority against enemy forces with air power.
Civil aircraft thus have many layers of redundancy, the weight and performance penalty of which is an acceptable cost. Military aircraft require maximum payload, and maximum performance to deliver air power. The weight penalty of complying with civil regulations would be self defeating, making the aircraft inferior to its opponents in its ability to deliver air power and hence more vulnerable. In addition tactical commanders must have the discretion to operate outside of the regulations if the military situation demands, but of course would have to report and justify such action to the authority as soon as possible.
So the Military Regulations acknowledge this difference, but they should be as rigidly enforced as the civil ones. Different Regulations, different enforcement but to the same standards as civil enforcement. Are we on common ground now, Rigga? I do hope so ;-)

[Rigga]

Pretty much... We are on the same wave but not quite on the same board.

Whether you add 100 tons of pax or 100 tons of bombs to an airframe the only real difference is the delivery method.

As you say, the airworthiness of the frame within its designed role parameters is a standard practice and should be adhered to.

[Chugalug2]

Whether you add 100 tons of pax or 100 tons of bombs to an airframe the only real difference is the delivery method.
The point I was trying to make is that 100 tons of anything will degrade aircraft performance. In civil aircraft that is in addition to the weight penalty of complying with the civil regs. In a military aircraft the weight penalty of the "anything" is an operational requirement. Adding the weight penalty of the civil regs is not and would impair ability to deliver Air Power. Agreed?

[Distant Voice]

I know some of you are going to jump down my throat over this one, but I am prepared to take that chance.

I note from the BOI report on XV230 that the aircraft suffered a just ONE fuel coupling leak in 2006; it is my understanding that the leak was in the same area as that on XV235. What I have not been able to establish is when in 2006, although everything points to the EQ1. Can anyone shed any light on this one?

DV

[manccowboy]

No doubt the "system" will take 6 months to decide whether to proceed with a prosecution, by which time the 'window of opportunity' will have shut - thus providing a convenient excuse to avoid a court case which would generate adverse publicity.

Or am I being too cynical...?

But if the military decide to drop the case I'm sure the family's of the deceased could pursue a private prosecution? Surely they would have access to any evidence collected under the freedom of information act?

[The Old Fat One]

But if the military decide to drop the case I'm sure the family's of the deceased could pursue a private prosecution? Surely they would have access to any evidence collected under the freedom of information act?


I don't think so. The families action would be against the MOD, not a person within the MOD. The law of vicarious liability applies.

[green granite]

Hmmmmmm, from wiki

Modern vicarious liability

The general rule in the criminal law is that there is no vicarious liability. This reflects the general principle that a crime is composed of both an actus reus (the Latin tag for "guilty act") and a mens rea (the Latin tag for "guilty mind") and that a person should only be convicted if he, she or it is directly responsible for causing both elements to occur at the same time (see concurrence). Thus, the practice of holding one person liable for the actions of another is the exception and not the rule in criminal law.
Vicarious liability in English law

The primary exception arises through statutory interpretation where the verb used to define the action in the actus reus is both the physical action of the employee and the legal action of the employer. For example, the activity of "driving" is purely a physical activity performed by the person behind the wheel. But when a cashier takes money as payment for goods, this is only the physical activity of selling. For goods to be sold, the owner of the goods must pass legal title to those goods. In default, the customer would commit the actus reus of theft. So the owner sells the goods at the same time that the employee takes the money. Similarly, only the holder of rights can grant a licence to another or permit another to do something that would otherwise have been unlawful. The verbs "possess", "control" and use may also have dual relevance depending on the context. Many of these are strict liability or regulatory offences, but the principle has been used to impose liability on a wide range of activities undertaken in a business or commercial environment.

[The Old Fat One]

Or in plain English as explained to me by the MOD when I was a serving officer...

If you break the law you're on your own.

If you cock up, but it's merely an error/mistake/slip up/whatever you're not accountable...we are.

Thus in this instance, if the RAF take successful action against the aforementioned, I guess they can be subsequently cast to the wolves. If they don't take action (and neither does the Thames Valley Police or Health And Safety Executive) I would have thought it logical that the MOD has to take it on the chin if the families take any action???

Would an employment lawyer like to comment?

[Distant Voice]

Baber's future looks secure;

The FTL team is growing | Ferranti Technologies Ltd (http://www.ferranti-technologies.co.uk/news-room/default.aspx?ID=26)

DV

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

The Old Fat One:-

Thus in this instance, if the RAF take successful action against the aforementioned, I guess they can be subsequently cast to the wolves. If they don't take action (and neither does the Thames Valley Police or Health And Safety Executive) I would have thought it logical that the MOD has to take it on the chin if the families take any action???

Would an employment lawyer like to comment? Nimrod explosion families win £15million payout | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1317310/Nimrod-explosion-families-win-15million-payout.html)

[MATELO]

No compensation really for the loss of a fantastic crew.

[davejb]

One crew member I knew for 20 years as a friend,
not a very close friend, just a guy I flew with for a fairly short while, somebody I ran into work now and then who returned the favour when my own wheels weren't available - and let''s face it, even taxis are hard to come by at 3 am on Boxing Day when some bloody Russian is trying to prove Christmas is a decadent fallacy...we just happened to be on 'friendly chat' terms for 20 years or so.

He left somebody I've just seen described as a 'partner' - they didn't mention kids for some reason - I don't think 800k excessive, I find it sobering that this is considered a 'record payout' for a highly trained SNCO with over 20 years flying under his belt.

After all, it's only 486.3 times the claim Sir Peter Viggers made for keeping his duck house in order, and I'm fairly sure that my pal was contributing rather more than 486.3 ducks did to the future of this country. To those who consider it a huge sum, look at the bonuses paid to white collar workers - not just bankers, but they're probably the most obvious targets here.

That this is a 'record' payout is, in my opinion, an indictment of our own priorities.

Apart from that, have a happy Easter and remember "if it's shaped like an egg, it isn't fattening".
Dave

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Is it an appropriate amount? It is the figure that lawyers representing the families have accepted.

How much do you value your own life?

A few here will say they have large life cover, but the majority value their life as their outstanding mortgage - £150K ?

Negligence & Liability has got these guys' relatives an extra £800k on top of the normal death-in-service benefits.

[dervish]

Negligence & Liability has got these guys' relatives an extra £800k on top of the normal death-in-service benefits.



I'd say leave off the families and point toward the negligent.

[Distant Voice]

In July 1998, the Nimrod Airworthiness Review Team (NART) produced a report which expressed real concerns about ensuring the future airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet. Haddon-Cave touches on this report, very briefly, in his review, but fails to spell out any details and in particular fails to identify the mistakes made to that date; in fact H-C shows a relunctance to go back beyond 1998. I understand that attempts to obtain this report under FOI appear to have been "blocked" under the MoD claim that "we can not locate" it. This sounds like the Chinook story over again when the CHART report was "burried" after being produced in 1992.

DV

[Just This Once...]

DV - Be carefull here fella. Having lost friends too I support your concerns and have supported your efforts on here but:

I understand that attempts to obtain this report under FOI appear to have been "blocked" under the MoD claim that "we can not locate" it. This sounds like the Chinook story over again when the CHART report was "burried"...

...is getting very close to calling a bunch of us on here liars. I am not & we are not. The FOI request has tumbled all the way down and we have been looking really hard to find the documents whilst trying to make the near-impossible deadline.

You & others have worked really hard to become part of the safety system - you have succeeded to the extent that you & others repeatedly draw us away from current issues whilst we are trying to ensure that these in-service aircraft are safe. Please think about what you are posting and what it means to some of us on here.

[Pontius Navigator]

JTO,

I agree with what you say and the undoubted efforts to find the documents. One problem I am sure you face was the turnover of personnel in the intervening years.

I put in an FOI request when FOI came in and it drew a blank not least as it was something from 25 years or more back. I went back to the correspondy and suggested where they might look. A week later I got the photographs that I had asked for.

So maybe some ppruners from that period might suggest where to look.

[Distant Voice]

JTO.

No, I am not calling anyone a liar, but it does seem that search methods needs to be reviewed. Let's face it, it was easily found for H-C so that he could make his case, but now this important document can not be located.

I futher understand that the "can not find" reply came just a few days after acknowlegement of the FOI request. It was some 17 working days inside the "the near-impossible deadline". It appears to be a quick response.

DV

[tucumseh]

DV - Spot on about Haddon-Cave having a copy.

Any Airworthiness report, especially one prepared after the ISD, must be held by the IPT/Project Office, Director of Flight Safety, Chief of Logistic Support, ACAS/Release to Service Authority, A&AEE and the Aircraft Design Authority, as an absolute minimum. Given the NART report was so damning (much like CHART, which makes Haddon-Cave's report look like a pat on the back), it would be inconceivable for BAeS not to have been given significant tasking to sort things out.


As the aircraft has been removed from service, and presumably most of the MoD staff redeployed, my first stop would be BAeS and Directorate of Flight Safety. And, given these reports all have a common theme - systemic failure to implement mandated regs - CAS himself should have copies, along with a brief pointing out "same old problems, yet again", in case he didn't realise it himself.

[Chugalug2]

JTO:
you & others repeatedly draw us away from current issues whilst we are trying to ensure that these in-service aircraft are safe. Please think about what you are posting and what it means to some of us on here.
You have just made an excellent point, which is well taken, well by me at least. An obvious solution to your dilemma, as well as that of "you and others", is that the "trying to ensure that these in-service aircraft are safe" be removed from the MOD entirely to a separate and independent Military Aviation Authority, as well as to a separate and independent Military Air Accident Investigation Board. In that way the UK Military Airfleet might well reacquire the airworthiness that it has lost with such tragic effect. If not, I suspect that I and others will go on pestering and being the bloody nuisances that we already are.

[Distant Voice]

JTO, "we can not find it" does not just apply to the NART report. The BOI report into the loss of XV230 indicates that during the course of 2006 the aircraft had ONE fuel leak from a coupling. This data came from the computerised Maintenance Data System. However, a request for additional information relating to the date of the fault and its location on the aircraft could not be satisfied because "we can not find it"; even when the same search criteria was provided as that used for the BOI search. Initially MoD claimed that it would take too long to go through all XV230's documention to find the fault, until they were reminded that they had it on a computer data base.

DV

[Lima Juliet]

The "Directorate of Flight Safety" is actually the "Inspectorate of Flight Safety" or IFS. Sadly the single service RAF IFS at RAF Bentley Priory became the joint service Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC) that then became DARS (can't remember what that stood for) at RAF Northolt before being broken up into the Military Aviation Authority (MAA) accross many locations. All this took place over the space of 10 years and so the NART report from 1998 could quite easily be lost. Don't forget that 10 years ago intranet sites were just coming in and I believe that the 1998 NART report would either be paper-only or even worse on CD ROM. Certainly the Sentry Airworthiness Review of the same period was on CD ROM only with the odd paper copy.

So where could it be? Filed away with lots of paper files kept at one of the file repositories, languishing in a desk somewhere at Kinloss or the back of a filing cabinet in Flight Safety organisation, or just plain lost. Don't forget that paperwork can be destroyed if no longer required after a certain amount of years gathering dust (and rightly so, because otherwise the RAF would be drowning in paperwork following its short 93 year history).

The fact that the RAF can't find a copy doesn't surprise me. A copy might turn up, but don't hold your breath. I don't believe there is any conspiracy theory at play here or with Chinook.

LJ

[Distant Voice]

Leon, Haddon-Cave had a copy of the report in 2009. On page 359 of his report he quotes from pages 13 and 30 of NART's Executive Summary.

DV

[tucumseh]

LJ

Agreed.

If someone has asked for it under FoI, surely the easy thing to do is phone H-C and say "Can we have our report back please?". That would cost quite a bit less than the £600 limit MoD often hides behind under FoI, even at BT prices.

[Distant Voice]

JTO; I note that at the bottom of page 360 (foot notes) of the Haddon-Cave report he refers to notes and briefs that he has seen that discuss the NART report. So clearly in 2009 he read the main report and comments on the report, and today MoD can not locate the main report. Surely, all statements of fact made by H-C must be backed up with supporting evidence. If the NART report can not be produced then you can trash Capter 13 of the H-C report and much of the case against General Cowan and ACM Pledger.

I strongly recommend that you have another look.

DV

[tucumseh]

BGG

Sorry, my mistake. But, that being so, and that NART would be right up there in the Safety Case evidence which must be retained through-life, then all the more reason why it should be easily found.

Not only that, but it would be evidence in an ongoing investigation (Air Cdre Baber) and to destroy it would be to obstruct justice.

[Squidlord]

Chugalug2:

An obvious solution to your dilemma, as well as that of "you and others", is that the "trying to ensure that these in-service aircraft are safe" be removed from the MOD entirely to a separate and independent Military Aviation Authority, as well as to a separate and independent Military Air Accident Investigation Board

Perhaps inadvertently wrongly expressed but this is definitely not the answer. The MAA is a regulator and the very last thing you want is to remove responsibility for safety away from the operator to the regulator. See Cullen, Robens, reports, etc. for how previous safety cultures involved a lack of responsibility for safety on the part of operators because they believed their (only) safety responsibility was to satisfy the regulator, standards, etc. Regulators obviously bear some responsibility for safety but primary responsibility must reside with operators.


Leon Jabachjabicz:

All this took place over the space of 10 years and so the NART report from 1998 could quite easily be lost. Don't forget that 10 years ago intranet sites were just coming in and I believe that the 1998 NART report would either be paper-only or even worse on CD ROM.

[...]

The fact that the RAF can't find a copy doesn't surprise me. A copy might turn up, but don't hold your breath. I don't believe there is any conspiracy theory at play here or with Chinook.

Maybe no conspiracy theory but (like BigGreenGilbert), I think LJ goes too easy on MoD. The NART is a vital document and losing it is not acceptable.

FWIW, over the last decade, there have been a handful of times when various bits of MoD that I have written reports for have had to ask me for a copy because they can't find it. My suspicion is that individuals within MoD know where to look for things but as soon as they move out (did someone else say that high turnover in MoD was a problem!), the knowledge is lost to organisations. Even less excusable now when everything should be electronically stored and searchable (and I see no reason why the 1998 NART shouldn't be available electronically in a centralized database of Nimrod documentation).

[tucumseh]

Squidlord

Perhaps inadvertently wrongly expressed but this is definitely not the answer. The MAA is a regulator and the very last thing you want is to remove responsibility for safety away from the operator to the regulator. See Cullen, Robens, reports, etc. for how previous safety cultures involved a lack of responsibility for safety on the part of operators because they believed their (only) safety responsibility was to satisfy the regulator, standards, etc. Regulators obviously bear some responsibility for safety but primary responsibility must reside with operators.


I understand exactly what you are saying. In my experience, the practical problem came when addressing the concept of "Safety is everyone's concern". If you dared report a safety problem, especially in the late 80s, throughout the 90s and into the 00s, then you risked your career.

The MoD(PE) / DPA 2 Star in charge of (e.g.) Chinook and Nimrod is on record (1998) as stating that we (engineering project managers) can completely ignore functional safety, going so far as to specifically rule one can (and should) make a false declaration that such a contractual obligation has been met in full, when in fact it had been waived to save time and money. Our 4 Star, CDP, agreed in writing as have 5 Ministers for the Armed Forces and PUS. These rulings reflected those of the staffs of the RAF Chief Engineer made in the early 90s.

Given that background, little wonder MoD don't like "going there". Too many of those involved still hold senior posts at AbbeyWood. As ever, matters will improve when they leave and their replacements can order an about turn without fear or censure. To this end, Haddon-Cave but scraped the surface. It is the "ART" reports of the early/mid 90s which reveal the detail he, for whatever reason, chose not to report. They make appalling reading. You are right; they should be held electronically and every member of every PT should have copies and have the content ingrained in their memory.

[Chugalug2]

Squidlord:
Perhaps inadvertently wrongly expressed but this is definitely not the answer. The MAA is a regulator and the very last thing you want is to remove responsibility for safety away from the operator to the regulator. See Cullen, Robens, reports, etc.
I'm not for one moment saying that responsibility for safety be removed from anyone, because "Flight Safety Concerns You" as we well know (or should do!). Perhaps in turn my riposte to JTO was poorly expressed in merely quoting back his words to him rather than more precisely making my point. That point is well made by tuc, i.e. that the enforcement required of a regulator must be independent to ensure full compliance with its regulations. Without that safeguard the regulations can be, and were, ignored and safety suffer. Even so safety is still the responsibility of everyone, from AC2 to ACM in the RAF as well as their counterparts in the other Armed Forces and the Civil Service. That it suffered so dramatically and tragically, when illegal orders to ignore the Regulations came down the CoC, is an indictment of all those who failed to disobey them. An easy thing to say, I know, but:
All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.
See Edmund Burke!

[EAP86]

The MAA's first tranche of new regs can be found here:

Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Military Aviation Authority (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/MAA/)

Lots to read...

[Duncan D'Sorderlee]

Jimmy Jones again:

BBC News - 'Safety failure link' to Chinook and Nimrod crashes (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-14065398)

Duncs:ok:

[collbar]

Great.. another thing to fight your way onto the section computer to read, assuming you can find it!!.. dont suppose there will be a hard copy available!
Please think of the guys at the workface who dont have a computer each!

[tucumseh]

Dunc

Jimmy Jones again:

BBC News - 'Safety failure link' to Chinook and Nimrod crashes (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-14065398)




If you read CHART and Haddon-Cave, you would immediately pick up on the point JJ made on TV.

Haddon-Cave was given irrefutable evidence the systemic failings commenced in the late 80s. He accepted everything put to him except that baseline, inexplicably claiming it was 1998. This error was compounded by naming certain senior officers who were around at that time (Cowan, Pledger and Baber).

CHART makes it clear the systemic failings were evident in the 80s - confirming the evidence given to H-C. In fact, H-C's report is a pat on the back for MoD compared to CHART.

That being so, then one is entitled to ask if H-C named the right people. Far from causing the problems, the named officers inherited 15 years of neglect. Can one expect that to be corrected by one man during a 2 year posting? Common sense says no.

Simple question that demands an answer - As CHART was sent to only two people, RAF Chief Engineer (Alcock) and copied to ACAS (Bagnall), what action did they take to implement the recommendations and help prevent recurrence? Haddon-Cave confirms the answer - nothing.

So, the thrust of the Newsnight report is absolutely correct - CHART, NART and Haddon-Cave are inextricably linked. And the crucial fact is that for 7 years before CHART (June 1985 to August 1992), senior RAF and MoD staffs had been consistently advised of what each report later said.

[tucumseh]

The MAA's first tranche of new regs can be found here:

Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Military Aviation Authority (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/MAA/)

Lots to read...I've read a few selected documents. Absolutely gobsmacked that, for example, they got the definition of the process that maintains the Safety Case 100% wrong, not even mentioning "Safety Case". As that was the headline failure noted by Haddon-Cave, you'd think they'd make the effort to get that one right. They compound matters by omitting the safety net whereby the necessary funding is (was) ring-fenced; but now it can just be used by anyone at the expense of safety (again, as reported by Haddon-Cave). That is like leaving Orville and Wilbur out of the history of aviation. I just gave up. :ugh:

[Chugalug2]

tucumseh:
I just gave up.
So should the MAA as presently constituted. It makes the Press Complaints Commission look like a powerfully effective and objective enforcer of journalistic principle by comparison. Both are of course part of the beloved British love affair with Self-Regulation. Both are useless. The latter merely ruining peoples lives by its ineffectiveness, the former costing them.
It seem likely that the PCC is destined for the big news room in the Sky (no pun intended, though it is rather good, all things considered, wouldn't you say?). Time that the MAA was similarly sent off to its regulatory Valhalla and a truly independent one, entirely separate from the MOD, put in its place, together also with an independent MAAIB.

[Squidlord]

EAP86:

The MAA's first tranche of new regs can be found here:

Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Military Aviation Authority (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/MAA/)

If folks are interested to take a look, the risk management Regulatory Instruction that was discussed here

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/399143-new-military-aviation-body-set-up-3.html

is essentially Regulatory Article 1210 in

http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/A85B2F85-4960-4398-9038-0C8B4B0C9DE2/0/GEN1000SeriesPrints.pdf

[ORAC]

Independent: Revealed: The secret report that could have saved 14 lives (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-the-secret-report-that-could-have-saved-14-lives-2352728.html)

Concerns over Nimrod airworthiness dismissed as 'emotive' eight years before fatal 2006 crash

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

It's getting interesting. When might we see the actual report?

Even though it duplicates the post, I'm going to put this on the Haddon Cave thread for the sake of the archives.

[Rigga]

Following SPHLC's post on the Airworthiness Thread I thought I'd stick my oar in here ....

Reading these MAA regulations - I can see where "EASA Part 145" is starting to form, but there are still large bits missing - and there is no mention of any aircraft "management" (EASA Part M) in there at all?

I suppose mandating the ownership of "management" accountability and responsibility is not yet the MAA's thing. - Probably not even teething yet?

In this instance I credit Groupies and Sengo's as line co-ordinators and not 'Managers' - At this level, Managers hold the REAL Purse Strings and are not just given some annual dosh to worry about and stir some local stuff with.

Forgot to mention.....
I hear that three European countries (including France!) have now signed up to the next regulation set to hit MOD - the European Military Airworthiness Regulations (EMAR's)

We'll have to wait and see who's the Boss....

[Nimbus265]

Reading these MAA regulations - I can see where "EASA Part 145" is starting to form, but there are still large bits missing - and there is no mention of any aircraft "management" (EASA Part M) in there at all?

In fact the pilot CAMO scheme being introduced does not even make reference to EASA Part M, which I find rather daft, as Continuing Airworthiness Magement has it roots in EASA Basic Regulation. Perhaps the MOD have a better way :ugh:

Having said that, if the quality of the Manual of Air Safty is anything to go on, then I shouldn't be that surprised. A 1/3rd of it contains a description of the rest of the MRP, a bit is borrowed from the second edition of the ICAO Safety Manual, and the rest describes the ASMS policies to be inplemented.

It does seem to have been rather cobbled together. As a Manual, it lacks any real "why" or "how" information that you would expect a 'manual' to contain and is is written in such a way that is more in keeping with a reactive safety management system, rather than a proactive or predictive system.

... jumps off of soap box....

[Nimbus265]

I hear that three European countries (including France!) have now signed up to the next regulation set to hit MOD - the European Military Airworthiness Regulations (EMAR's)

The initial issue of EMARS is a more like an abridged version of Part 145, and is focused on Reqts for Maintenance Organisations; ergo a MAOS type scheme.

It is certainly more far more aligned to EASA regulations than to UK MRPs.

[tucumseh]

As a Manual, it lacks any real "why" or "how" information

With respect to the basic requirements of being able to demonstrate airworthiness (i.e. a maintained Build Standard and, hence, Safety Case);


"Why" used to be taught to MoD staff from Day 1. Direct Entrant staff now arrive, apparently fully trained :Ebut having skipped 5 grades. That would be ok(ish) if they realised they had skipped 5 grades and were required to retrospectively attain key competencies, but....


"How" was in a procedural Def Stan which was last amended in May 1991 (at AL1) and finally scrapped, without replacement, 2 years ago. The reason it was last amended in 1991 was shortly thereafter AMSO promulgated the policy that airworthiness was no longer to be maintained in accordance with the regulations. Again, that would be ok(ish) if there was a proven replacement process, but there wasn't. The "framework" was simply torn down, with funding chopped 28% in 3 successive years. (CHART specifically mentions the FY1991/92 cut, although says it was 25%).

Hence, Haddon-Cave's 1998 baseline is palpable nonsense.

[EAP86]

There was more about this initiative (MAWA) on the EDA's website some time ago but I'm not sure whether its still there; try searching for "MAWA". There are 26 participating Member States involved and have been for some time – the initial moves started in 2008 under an Air Cdre who shall not be named. EMAR 145 was the first one finished probably because it is the simplest to adapt. Its been ratified by several pMS but I'm not sure how many. EMAR 66, 147 and M are also in prep will follow.

Another task force have prepared an EMAR 21 and its getting close to ratification. An EMAR version of MIL HDBK 516 has been started. Lots of the other building blocks are being put together, in fact, allegedly good progress continues to be made despite the numbers of nations involved. Maybe someone who is better informed (MAA?) could say more?

[Distant Voice]

If a closed bomb bay is effectively pressurised by the "injection" of bomb bay heating air, would you expect hot gasses to flow into it, or out of it?

DV

[cornish-stormrider]

depends on the relative pressure from where the hot gases are as to the pressure in the bomb bay.

[Distant Voice]

I am talking about gasses from a fire.

In the case of ruptured hot air pipe on XV227, photographic evidence shows that the gasses from the pipe (located at bottom of dry bay No.7) did not find their way into the bomb bay. As a consequence the bomb bay alarm was not activated. Which tends to suggest that XV230 bomb bay alarm was activated by a fire in the bomb bay, not the dry bay.

DV

[FATTER GATOR]

My friend, I fear you are in danger of wrapping yourself up in an ever decreasing spiral of trying to make information fit whatever it is you want to prove.

Why don't you go public and state here exactly what your hypothesis (plural) are, exactly which people you want to prove are at fault, what punishment you want them to undergo and anything else you want the powers-that-be to do. Justice is a subjective matter, but bear in mind that our armed forces will still need to fly aeroplanes.

Also, try this.
Go and get formal training in Aeronautical Engineering and 'major' in something along the lines of air-accident investigation. Then, with technical credibility established, start from the beginning and see where you end up.

FG

[Distant Voice]

My friend, I fear you are in danger of wrapping yourself up in an ever decreasing spiral of trying to make information fit whatever it is you want to prove.

My concern is that is what the BoI and H-C appear to have done. By the way I did spend several years involved in investigative aeronautical engineering, and in my book, the "Blow-off" and gasses coming into the bomb bay theory does not fit. I can not speak for the experience of the BoI members and H-C in that field.

The photgraphic evidence, not mentioned by BoI or H-C, clearly indicates that in the case of XV227 the hot gasses did not flow from Dry Bay No.7 to the bomb bay, therefore, on the balance of probability it is unlikely to have happened with XV230. The "blow-off" was not seen by the tanker crew, and the theory rejected by the coroner, not just me.

Finally, an Air Incident report, involving AAR of XV260 on 8th Nov 2006, provides the evidence that the tanker crew could see venting and "blow-off" (if they took place). This report gets no mention by the BoI or H-C, probably because it does not fit "what they wanted to prove"

DV

[Chugalug2]

FG:
Go and get formal training in Aeronautical Engineering and 'major' in something along the lines of air-accident investigation.
Wouldn't that advice be better put to the BoI's that have consistently and wantonly failed to identify the systemic failures of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the MOD) to ensure the airworthiness of UK Military Aircraft?
Would not the first lesson of such formal training be the requirement that all such investigation be separate and independent of the Airworthiness Authority?
Would not the second lesson of such formal training be the requirement that all such investigation be separate of and independent of the Operator?
Would not the third lesson of such formal training be that the MAA is none of these things? That unless and until there be an independent Military Airworthiness Authority and a Military Air Accident Investigation Board, separate from each other and from the MOD, the death toll of avoidable Military Airworthiness Related Air Accidents will simply go on rising?

[JFZ90]

Can you say a bit more about this 'investigative aeronautical engineering' you've been involved in DV?

[Distant Voice]

Dear JFZ 90, happy to do so. Nimrod trials officer at A&AEE Boscombe Down and Nimrod CEDIT.

Now, what are the BoI and H-C's claim to fame, in this area?

DV

[Distant Voice]

What I find difficult to understand is that H-C spends some 174 pages dealing with the Nimrod safety case, and how people like Baber and Eagles failed to recognise the fact that Dry Bay No.7 did not have fire detection and suppression, and yet the abuse of the STF procedure and in particular this witnesses important statement, gets no mention. In fact H-C has the impertinence to state, "The Inquest produced little factual evidence of value to the Review" This statement indicates a clear violation of the Nimrod safety case; unofficial amendments to RTS document, equipment installed on the galley table, circuit breakers being used as switches etc.


THE CORONER: Did you have any problems with Special Trials Fit in the equipment?

SQN LDR ******: To put it in context, I am a qualified trials officers at the General Duties Air Assistance Course in 1992 and then spent three years from 1992 to 1995 at Boscombe Down as a trials officer doing special trials fix on the Comet aircraft, the laboratory aircraft. So I did have a bit of knowledge of the system and how it should be used and I just wanted to sort of point out as part of this that I thought you were abusing it slightly.

THE CORONER: And why would you [think] it was being abused?

SQN LDR ******: From what I remember of my training, the definition of a special trials fit is a fit that has gone onto the aircraft for the duration of the trial which, in exception
circumstances, could be taken into operational use.

THE CORONER: So, your criticism here is that the special trials fits just stay?

SQN LDR ******: Exactly. I mean, yes, my interpretation would be you had an urgent operation requirement, special trials fit onto an aircraft, take it to theatre, get the job done, bring it back, take the equipment off. Whereas, we were doing go to theatre, take it back, onto a different aircraft, that goes out. So, yes, there were ... and there are reasons behind that why I think it is not quite the way to play business.

THE CORONER: And why do you think it is not quite the way.

SQN LDR ******: Okay, one of the reasons I have a degree in electrical and electronic engineering, so to my mind moving cable harnesses regularly is not good practice.

THE CORONER: Why?

SQN LDR ******: Just potential damage.

THE CORONER: To the harnesses?

SQN LDR ******: To the actual cable harnesses when they are moved from one aircraft to stored, moved back to another aircraft.

THE CORONER: So potential damage to the cabling and constant shorting?

SQN LDR ******: Potentially.

THE CORONER: With a fire?

SQN LDR ******: Potentially.

THE CORONER: Potentially, yes.

MALE SPEAKER: Right, you say specifically, and this was the reason I wished to ask you this question, “we will (inaudible) in writing but before the accident there were three circuit breakers we were meant to pull before taking it and we didn’t”. What did you mean by that?

SQN LDR ******: Okay, what had happened was when we first arrived in theatre, the problem is you do not have ready access to this equipment in the UK. So you often arrive out in theatre to an aircraft that has got, in this case I believe it was four or five separate special trials fits fitted to it and that is the first time you have really got, to get to grips with it again. Somebody at Kinross had tried to be helpful when they produced like a local briefing package where they had in the back of the release to service document for each special trials fit they made, sort of make a waiver of, if you are going to do air to air refuelling you need to pull the circuit breaker or not use this particular item.

THE CORONER: Why do you think that was? Why did they say pull those circuit breakers?

SQN LDR ******: Because of the way it is being fitted to the aircraft, it is another safety break, if you like, just in case. Because they had not had the opportunity to fully embody the equipment onto the aircraft and perhaps test it as thoroughly as it should have been.

THE CORONER: So, (inaudible) if the system is switched off during air to air refuel then chances of any problems associated with electrical shorting or failure in that period are removed?

SQN LDR ******: They should be zero.

THE CORONER: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: What was it about air to air refuelling in particular that meant that the special trials fit had to be switched off during that process?

SQN LDR ******: Well, as if have just explained, it was because of ... when you have not properly embodied something onto the aeroplane, the big issue for us as the operating crew is that the air to air refuelling checks when you have not embodied it will not reflect what you need to do. Until a piece of equipment is serviced embodiment modification that will include changing all the paperwork that goes with it. So as part of your air to air refuelling checks you would have then been told pull this circuit breaker, pull that circuit breaker, do not use that. What had happened was that was not in the formal checklist so crews had ... as I say, somebody had tried to develop a local checklist that had an error in it and as a result of the accident we had a quick look back to make sure we were doing things properly, and that is when we discovered that error.

THE CORONER: Do you think that error might have had anything to do with what happened to this aircraft?

SQN LDR ******: In reality I do not, but at the time I made this statement obviously, you know, it was fresh after the event and –

THE CORONER: So, fresh out of the event, what made the connection in your mind?

SQN LDR ******: Purely because with my background I was aware of how we were using special trails fits and I wondered if the way we had used them might have been significant.

THE CORONER: So it was just in your mind that there might have been some electrical failure that might have been responsible for the ignition of fuel?

SQN LDR ******: Possibly that. The other aspect was were trying to sort of, you know, put ourselves into that crew’s position in terms of the time line as it was described to us. And one of the things post having done your air to air refuelling is obviously putting circuit breakers back in to get this equipment working again, and potentially that might have been significant.

THE CORONER: Potentially, yes, thank you.


The abuse of the STF system is covered in the CHART report (1992), the HEART report (1997) and the NART report (1998), and yet all follow up documents and MoMs appear to have got lost. I strongly recommened that if anyone from the MAA reads Pprune they should demand that these documents be made available to the new organisation. If we do not know where we have gone wrong in the past (or hide the past), how can the future be any better. Perhaps, one day, H-C will explain why this vital evidence was ignored.


DV.

[Chugalug2]

DV:
Perhaps, one day, H-C will explain why this vital evidence was ignored.
Now you are getting to the very nub of the case, for in truth we both know that he will not. Perhaps even more important we both know that the MAA will not take on the MOD as the responsible authority that shaped this farrago as it cannot, no matter how much it declares itself to be independent. Even if that were not so the British desire not to make waves will decide that what is past is past, there's no point crying over spilt milk etc etc. Let's get real, the important thing from now on is to prevent another Mull, Iraq, or Afghanistan, etc, avoidable airworthiness related fatal military air accident. That can only start to happen if there be a truly independent MAA and MAAIB, separated from each other and from the MOD. No doubt there are insurmountable difficulties to doing that, but surmounted they must be, or the needless death toll will simply go on rising inexorably.

[The Old Fat One]

Having read the last few posts, for the interested bystander it is little difficult to see where this is heading?

Is the aim to try and ascertain beyond reasonable doubt the exact cause of the accident. I would suggest...no chance, the evidence is not available nor will it ever be. And what purpose would that serve anyway? The aircraft is out of service.

Is it to prove that military style airwothiness procedures were all ****ed up? I thought that had been proved and acknowledged already? I'll leave it to others to get all worked up about the effectiveness of otherwise of the new system...not my ball park. (Aside than to mention that airworthiness is a cost and the greater the cost, the less aircraft we can afford. That's not an argument to cut corners; that's an argument to risk manage in a cost effective manner).

Is it to prove the HC enquiry was a farce? Again, most interested parties, on all sides of the divide, decided that the day after the thing was released.

If it is to dig up dirt leading to a proper public enquiry as to why the UK no longer has an LRMPA capability, then full steam ahead and more power to your elbow. But I think you are wasting your time because it is not going to happen.