Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences) [Archive] - Page 6

Tappers Dad

12th Jul 2008, 09:08

BUOY15

Nice Nimrod fly-by at RIAT yesterday
Guess it must have been airworthy:ok:
TD and Shona - you are both suffering from myopic dislexia - you can see the writing on the wall, but you can't read the message! - much like Tac Navs that try to fight the ac but are not listening to the rest of the cre:8
I appreciate your struggle, but MR2 will survive until MR4A enters service- you have to accept that this is a foregone conclusion

I really don't understand why you have to make personal attacks on myself and Shona, you have been banned from here once for your insensitive remarks and I would have thought you would have now shown restraint.

Shona did not attend the recent visit to London by the families. If you are able to read newspapers you will have seen that ,

But we are still not satisfied that the planes are fully airworthy," said Mr Dicketts.

Another family member Michael Bell said none of coroner's suggestions or the Borad of Inquiry report from last December had been fully implemented."We who have lost our loved ones are not in agreement," he said.

A third report into the crash is being conducted by Sir Charles Hadden-Cave, QC, and Mr Dicketts insisted if anyone in the RAF was found to be negligent the minister agreed that "action will be taken against them".

As you can see there appers to be a number of people with myopic dyslexia.

Oh, by the way, stop hiding behind your false name (Buoy15) and be a man. Or are you ashamed of who you are and what you write on here ?

If the RAF fully believed what they say why have they asked BAE to strip down a Nimrod at Boscombe ? (Ainsworth told us it was to insure they had not missed anything). Like they did on XV230 . Makes you think doesn't it or perhaps not.

PS; You appear to be unable to spell dyslexia sir.

dunc0936

12th Jul 2008, 13:29

Can the BOI fundings be found on line, I am slowly ploughing my way through the whole thread, but have not found any links to it yet???

Duncan

Biggus

12th Jul 2008, 15:41

With regard to the stripping down of a Nimrod for inspection, the phrases used in the newspaper article include.....'the RAF will'.....'the RAF is to'.... Which, in terms of the English grammar used, implies this is a future event that is yet to happen.

Does anyone know when this will occur, and how much later before the results are announced....???

And before anyone 'flames' me on this somewhat emotive thread, I do not have an agenda, or an axe to grind, nor am I calling for the fleet to be instantly grounded. I am just seeking information!!!

nigegilb

12th Jul 2008, 16:17

Don't bother asking Sir Glenn Torpy, he went to a meeting with the families of the deceased and wasn't even briefed on the situation. One of the families told him that he thought the Nimrod was at Boscombe. One wonders why Torpy bothered to attend.

Experts at the Inquest testified that Nimrod was XV230 was not airworthy on that fateful day and that the aircraft could only be considered airworthy when risks were reduced to ALARP. Now we have a politician, namely Ainsworth telling the families that it is ALARP, airworthy and safe to fly, because someone "has told him."

Why are we taking the word of a politician, when the experts say something different?

Why is a serviceable frame being stripped when Ainsworth has no worries about the safety of the aircraft?

davejb

12th Jul 2008, 17:42

Why are we taking the word of a politician, when the experts say something different?

Why is a serviceable frame being stripped when Ainsworth has no worries about the safety of the aircraft?

At a guess, (1) Because if a politician says something oten enough, then a large part of the public will come to accept that it is truth...or at least get fed up enough to not bother either way any more....
and (2) in the absence of any other activity - apart from slipping the ALARP work another few months, of course - this way they can point at something and claim they were doing all they could etc etc.

Will looking at every nut and bolt identify other potential weaknesses where systems interact with each other?

KeepItTidy

13th Jul 2008, 02:05

DaveJB , you quoted there a serviceable aircraft is being stripped and no worries to Ainsworth ?

You are one that says the aircraft is not serviceable to fly , so what is it meant to be safe of unsafe . Its ok to fly a serviceable jet to Boscome yet fly an unserviceable one any other time ?

davejb

13th Jul 2008, 04:14

Keepittidy,
sorry, are you able to repost that in English? You might like to check whether you meant unserviceable or non-airworthy?

If you'd like to check my posts I have not at any point said the aircraft is unserviceable - what I HAVE said is that I find it difficult to reconcile the coroner's verdict, the series of contradictory statements from those charged with Nimrod safety, and what appears to be the RAF's own regulations on what constitutes airworthiness being ignored by the RAF. I have asked on here for clarification of some of these points. My official position on all this is best described as 'confused, and dubious'.

I continue, still, to be more than a little cynical about the political leadership and the Air staff. That 230 clearly WASN'T airworthy has been admitted extensively by everyone from Torpy down to the recruiting Sgt in Blckpool CIO, so I think there's a bit of an onus there to show the aircraft has now been made safe. Much of what I've seen recently simply looks like spin.

It took 25 years for the 'right' combination of circumstances to arise for the weaknesses in the AAR system to be catastrophically demonstrated, my post's final point was simply to remind folk that this accident resulted from an interaction between mutliple systems...so the strip is quite likely to show components that are wearing badly perhaps, or might show that something deep in the bowels is leaking a bit, but it won't show that (for example) when the pressure spikes to X PSI there's a fuel overflow that tracks down thisaway and makes contact with a hot air pipe at Y hundred degrees..... it's not just that the components have to be okay, but they have to work together okay too. THAT is my concern - I am not saying that the Nimrod isn't okay, what I'm saying is that there needs to be more by way of proof than a politician standing up and saying so.

Dave

Tappers Dad

13th Jul 2008, 07:19

BAE battles to rebuild its reputation (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/07/11/225292/bae-battles-to-rebuild-its-reputation.html)

BAE battles to rebuild its reputation

BAE is also concerned that the MoD has yet to decide whether to increase its firm production order for the Nimrod MRA4 from nine to 12 aircraft, as the type moves towards a delayed in-service date of late 2010.

I wonder why that is ?

downsizer

13th Jul 2008, 08:03

I wonder why that is ?

Money I expect:rolleyes:

nigegilb

27th Jul 2008, 18:32

Good to see Andrew Johnson and the Indy keeping up the pressure. Further bulletins on ITV News tonight.

Death-crash spy planes are still leaking fuel
Britain's 18 Nimrods remain in daily use in Afghanistan, two months after a coroner called for the entire fleet to be grounded
By Andrew Johnson
Sunday, 27 July 2008

Crews on the RAF's ageing Nimrod spy planes have reported more than 300 fuel leaks in the two years since the disastrous crash which claimed 14 lives in Afghanistan in September 2006.

Bob Ainsworth, Defence minister, revealed that since the explosion near Kandahar, which caused the heaviest loss of life in a single incident since the Falklands war, crews had been under an obligation to report all fuel leaks.

In May private correspondence between Mr Ainsworth and his Tory Shadow Liam Fox had suggested there had been 111 fuel leaks since the disaster. However, this week Mr Ainsworth revealed that the figure of 111 referred solely to leaks from fuel tanks inside the fuselage of the 40-year-old craft.

It was this type of leak that caused the Afghanistan explosion on Nimrod XV230 when the fuel came into contact with a hot air pipe after mid-air refuelling.

Graham Knight, the father of Sergeant Ben Knight, 25, who died in the Nimrod crash, reacted angrily last night. "We've said all along that not enough has been done to ensure the safety of these aircraft. That there have been 111 leaks proves the point. Even one leak is too many if it's in the wrong place," he said.

A similar incident to the XV230 catastrophe is believed to have resulted in an emergency landing of a Nimrod in 2007. The Ministry of Defence has admitted that it has not been able to find the cause of that second fuel leak but it suspended all air-to-air refuelling as a result and took the hot air system out of use.

One Nimrod has also been taken out of service and stripped down to check for mechanical problems.

In May, the Oxfordshire coroner called for the entire Nimrod fleet of 18 aircraft to be grounded until they were made safe, following the inquest into the 14 personnel who died. However, the aircraft is essential for operations in Afghanistan – it acts as a radio transmitter enabling ground troops to communicate in the mountainous country – and the MoD has insisted it is safe to fly.

"In November 2006, after the loss of Nimrod XV230, [the Government] introduced mandatory fuel leak reporting procedures on all leaks associated with fuel tanks within the fuselage, the fuel system and any residual fuel found in specific areas of the aircraft," Mr Ainsworth said. "So far, our analysis indicates that since the introduction of these procedures, 111 fuel leaks have been recorded."

He added that, in total, more than 300 leaks had been recorded, half of which were from the wing fuel tanks leaking into the plane's slipstream. Experts say that while it is not unusual to find leaks on aircraft, 111 in such a small fleet seems excessive.

Gerald Howarth, the Conservative defence spokesman, said yesterday: "The leaks are a matter of great concern. It's well known that there have been problems with the fuel system, which is why it is important the Government expedites the programme to replace the fleet."

That £3bn programme to strip down the Nimrods and refurbish them is years behind schedule and millions of pounds over budget. It has left the cash-strapped MoD unable to afford the refurbishment of three R1 Nimrods, which carry out top-secret surveillance.

Instead, the MoD is reportedly on the verge of buying three US aircraft known as RC-135 Rivet Joints, along with listening technology. Some defence experts say this is a tacit admission that the British Nimrod – based on the 1950s Comet airframe – is beyond refurbishment.

Tim Ripley of Jane's Defence Weekly said the R1 had been due for an upgrade to see it through to 2025.

"The airframe is the same as the other Nimrods," he said. "They can't afford to get a new one, and can't keep them going, so they have to come up with a solution to replace the planes."

Craig Hoyle of Flight International magazine said it was becoming "politically unacceptable" to upgrade the Nimrod airframe. "The findings of the board of inquiry report into the crashed Nimrod reach over into the R1 fleet as well."

Biggus

27th Jul 2008, 19:54

Firstly....'One Nimrod has also been taken out of service and stripped down to check for mechanical problems'......

Use of the word 'has' implies that it has actually happened. To the best of my knowledge it remains an intention. I asked the question before on 12th July, and (as with most of my questions) got no reply. But has the aircraft actually left Kinloss yet, or is it just 'going to' at some point!

As to the point regarding the R1, I believe that the reason it won't be kept going to 2025 is on the grounds of cost. When the MR2 goes, if the R1 was left to soldier on, then the cost of maintaining certain type specific items would be prohitbitive for a fleet of 3....

Tappers Dad

27th Jul 2008, 19:59

Channel 4 had this as there headline news this evening.

Nimrod aircraft fuel fears revealed
Click on this link to watch it. Default Viral Title Player (http://link.brightcove.com/services/link/bcpid1184614595/bctid1691261740)

Last Modified: 27 Jul 2008
By: Sue Turton (http://www.channel4.com/news/authors/sue+turton/106295)
The safety of Britain's ageing fleet of Nimrod spy planes has been called into question.

A Ministry of Defence document revealed there have been almost three times as many fuel leaks in the past two years as previously thought.

Safety procedures on the Nimrod were reviewed after a crash in Afghanistan in 2006 which killed 14 servicemen.

Relatives of some of the dead expressed their surprise at the new figures and said it was further proof the decades-old aircraft are not airworthy.

PPRuNeUser0139

27th Jul 2008, 20:13

from the Telegraph:
Nimrod families may get 'close to £1m' compensation - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/2463575/Nimrod-families-may-get-%27close-to-andpound1m%27-compensation.html)

nigegilb

27th Jul 2008, 20:20

What is the Ministry afraid of, a gross negligence manslaughter charge?

Just saw the ITV News piece, noticed in the MoD statement that there was no mention of the word airworthy, only that Nimrod was safe to fly. Funny that, still we have it on record that Ainsworth stated that Nimrod is airworthy. I wonder how many people in the UK believe him.

John Blakeley

28th Jul 2008, 18:49

In his statement to Parliament and to the Press on 4 December Des Browne said:

The BOI established the most probable cause of the fire and subsequent loss of XV230 and in doing so identified failings for which the MOD must take responsibility.

He then added:

My Department has taken a number of steps to ensure that a similar accident cannot occur again. (He did not mention that it almost had with the still, as far as I am aware, unknown cause fuel leak which led to the incident of 5 November 2007 - even though this had already happened.) We are learning the lessons from the accident and have already implemented many (but not all, and some are still incomplete) of the 33 recommendations of the BOI report. On the basis of these actions, the CAS's professional judgement is that the Nimod fleet is safe to fly. I have accepted his advice. I have, however, decided to put in place a review of the arrangements for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2. (This is the Inquiry led by Mr Haddon Cave, which has yet to report its findings.)

So, until this independent Inquiry reports it would seem that whilst senior management are, led by CAS, saying the aircraft is safe (and is obviously being kept serviceable) they cannot, as yet, be assured that it is airworthy - perhaps somebody here knows differently or can comment further on progress with the Inquiry's findings and the availabilty of this "assurance".

There was a question as to where the BOI can be found - the link to the online version of the full BOI is at:

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoiNimrodMr2Xv230.htm

JB

drustsonoferp

28th Jul 2008, 19:05

The number of leaks found on an aircraft is irrelevant. Whether they are acceptable leaks or not is.

Stain, seep, run? Location?

Any aircraft will leak. Manufacture of fuel cells able to flex,vibrate, be subject to extremes of temperature and yet be structurally sound and fuel tight is extremely difficult.

A more interesting figure to speculate about would be the number of leaks recorded per aircraft of any airline of your choice vs the Nimrod.

Tappers Dad

28th Jul 2008, 19:27

drustsonoferp

I thought I would take up your challenge re A more interesting figure to speculate about would be the number of leaks recorded per aircraft of any airline of your choice vs the Nimrod.

So I just typed in aircraft fuel leaks into google and all that seemed to come up was stories on Nimrod.

Duncan D'Sorderlee

28th Jul 2008, 19:39

TD,

So did I, and the no 2 story was a company that fixed fuel leaks - nothing to do with Nimrod. Admittedly no 1 was a bbc news story. In fact, only 3 of the top 10 stories related to Nimrod. I'm not convinced that this proves anything.

Duncs:ok:

drustsonoferp

28th Jul 2008, 20:04

Tappers Dad: So I just typed in aircraft fuel leaks into google and all that seemed to come up was stories on Nimrod.

This illustrates much of my point. XV230 was lost as the result of a fuel leak; this sets a precedent for reporting news of Nimrod fuel leaks as there is a greater public appetite for Nimrod fuel leaks than on an Airbus/Boeing transporting you across the ocean.

Notwithstanding the lack of reports on fuel leaks available open source via a google search, any aircraft will leak fuel, and part of the operating manuals will state what sort of leak rate is allowable, and where.

It might not be in the interests of public confidence in flight to inform potential passengers how many leaks their prospective aircraft has currently or in the recent past, which is not to say that leaks would necessarily be denied if an airline were asked directly. The results of such a question are more than likely to be akin to asking Tesco if they support underpaid workers in sweatshops in order to purchase cheap clothing.

JFZ90

28th Jul 2008, 20:14

I did a search for "aircraft fuel leak" in google, and came up with...

1.

Air Transat Flight 236 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236)

2.

Passengers in mutiny over 'fuel leak' jet - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/unitedarabemirates/1487100/Passengers-in-mutiny-over-'fuel-leak'-jet.html)

3.

Al Jazeera English - Asia-Pacific - Fuel leak may have caused jet fire (http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2007/08/2008525121237236500.html)

4.

Pilot lands safely after fuel leak | Airline Industry Information | Find Articles at BNET (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CWU/is_2005_Jan_4/ai_n8642342)

8.

Aviation Maintenance Magazine :: Fuel Leak From Human Error (http://www.aviationtoday.com/am/topstories/5536.html)

9.

Fuel leak may have caused Taiwanese jet fire - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-08-21-japan-jet_N.htm)

First Nimrod story at number 10.

Fuel leak blamed for RAF Nimrod crash | UK news | guardian.co.uk (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/dec/04/afghanistan.military)

There are alot of Nimrod stories for sure, so I'm not having a go TD, but all aircraft can/do leak, not just Nimrod - lets not loose sight of that.

Then again there is always this story -

British Airways jet crash at Heathrow caused a masive fuel leak - mirror.co.uk (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-stories/2008/02/19/british-airways-jet-crash-at-heathrow-caused-a-masive-fuel-leak-89520-20324407/)

- interesting that the cause of this fuel leak has been deemed a flawed implementation in all Boeing 777s - I wonder if the changes demanded by the CAA/FAA in the aftermath of this have all been embodied or whether many 777s are still flying with the "not as safe as it could be" fuel 'stopcock' cockpit moding that contributed to causing this (fortunately not lethal) leak. PS I know this had no bearing on what caused the crash in the first place.

Craig Hoyle of Flight International magazine said it was becoming "politically unacceptable" to upgrade the Nimrod airframe. "The findings of the board of inquiry report into the crashed Nimrod reach over into the R1 fleet as well."

This is the real issue here, as I feared this has now got nothing to do with engineering and risk, and more to do with whether the Govt is seen to be "doing something about Nimrod, as its in the papers, and is damaging". Politics and airworthiness shouldn't mix, but they clearly are here.

Tappers Dad

29th Jul 2008, 09:01

Craig Hoyle of Flight International magazine was quite right when he said "The findings of the board of inquiry report into the crashed Nimrod reach over into the R1 fleet as well."
this is lincolnshire- news, entertainment, jobs, homes and cars (http://www.thisislincolnshire.co.uk/displayNode.jsp?nodeId=156130&command=displayContent&sourceNode=242285&home=yes&more_nodeId1=156139&contentPK=21176445)

NIMRODS COULD BE SCRAPPED
08:00 - 29 July 2008

Nimrod spy planes that fly over the skies of Lincolnshire may be scrapped, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed.
The MoD is considering axing three Nimrod spy planes based at RAF Waddington and replacing them with American RC-135 Rivet Joints.
The spy planes, operated by 52 Squadron, are due for an upgrade as part of a £3bn programme to refurbish the entire Nimrod fleet.
But the upgrades are now well behind schedule and millions over budget.
An MoD spokesman said: "We are considering a range of options to continue the capability currently provided by the Nimrod R1 until around 2025 - namely airborne electronic surveillance.
"As part of this work we are currently considering acquisition of the Rivet Joint system as an option to meet the capability requirement."

The decision to look at the future of all Nimrods follows an inquest where its aged design was blamed for a crash in Afghanistan which claimed the lives of 14 servicemen.

fergineer

29th Jul 2008, 09:39

TD dont just think that it is the Nimrod that suffers from fuel leaks......I have flown the Nimrod, Dominie and C130 in the RAF and all suffered from fuel leaks...I have flown C130 in the middle east for RAFOman and guess what they leaked as well......I have flown Tristar in civvy street for 4 different airlines -1,-50,-100,-150,-200 and the -500 and guess what they all leaked fuel. What happened to 230 may well have been caused by a massive fuel leak mixing with hot air I dont know but dont let the fact that there have been 300 fuel leaks in 2 years throw you as someone has alteady said what classification of fuel leak were they.....

Winco

29th Jul 2008, 10:19

fergineer

You are quite correct in what you say, but.................

how many of those aircraft that you quote have been lost due to a massive fuel leak?

I think thats the point TD is making.

Distant Voice

29th Jul 2008, 11:13

During the course of the Coroner inquest into the loss of VX230, MOD stated that a hot air duct replacement program was to be undertaken in the engine bay areas. These ducts are by the way the same items that BAE Systems declared life expired and in need of replacement back in June 2005. The transcript records the following;

Mr Evans (Mod barrister); You are also aiming to replace all ducts in the engine bays and the hope is that should be done by the end of this year.

Gp Cpt Hickman; Yes, that is correct.

It now transpires that Gp Cpt Hickman meant the end of the financial year (March 2009), and not the end of this year (December 2008).

On the subject of ducts, it is reported that a second duct failure happened around March 2006. QinetiQ's view on this is that the risk associated with this system should now be regarded as a being "Occasional/Catastrophic". This according to my Hazard Risk Index table puts it as being an A (Intolerable Risk).

NB. The duct replacement program not only covers the engine bay areas, but the cross-feed system as well (including the 5-way junction)

nigegilb

29th Jul 2008, 13:48

Let's be absolutely clear here. Nimrod XV230 exploded because of an abysmal failure to implement airworthiness regulations. This failure to implement airworthiness regulations is directly linked to a reduction in funding since the 90's which has led to inexperienced and poorly qualified personnel tasked with the responsibility to maintain the build standard. Nimrod XV230 should have had dry bay protection but didn't. Nimrod Xv230 should have had bomb bay fire protection and fuel tank protection, but didn't. Neither does its replacement MRA4. Nimrod XV230 should have had its safety case reconsidered following its change of use to overland ops, but didn't.

Let's not get overly focussed on fuel leaks. MoD would probably prefer us to do this, it facilitates a "one-off" argumentation used consistently by MoD drones.

This is a very big argument with as many as 6 fatal crashes interlinked, possibly more. Big events are coming up, regarding Chinook and C130 Herc. Keep a close eye on the Puma inquest. An Inquest where DSF tried to impose censorship unheard of in the UK.

Cave will report in time on airworthiness failures. As someone who I trust implicitly said to me, "time to move on."

KeepItTidy

29th Jul 2008, 14:59

Go to giggle at that report there from the lincolshire paper . they say 52 Squadron , cant even get the squadron number correct.

Im sure this news has been on PPrune for last few months about replacement for the Nimrod R1, the Rivet Joint is on another thread so its not new news just to confirm that one.

and I not sure if this is 100% fully correct , the Nimrod R1 has more airframe hours than the MR2 and would make sense to be looking for replacement quicker than the MR2 that may be the reason.

bvcu

29th Jul 2008, 15:50

and to go on a tangent with the rivet joint you're replacing an ageing a/c with an even older one .......... !!!!! surely its cheaper to put the resources needed into the nimrod fleet .

EdSett100

29th Jul 2008, 23:06

Winco:how many of those aircraft that you quote have been lost due to a massive fuel leak?

Presumably you are suggesting that XV230 suffered a massive fuel leak. There is no evidence that a "massive" leak started the fire. A QQ scientist proved that 300 ml (contents of a fizzy drink can) can start a massive blaze if it comes into contact with a very hot surface.

You are wrong to imply that XV230 was brought down by a single massive fuel leak.

Ed Sett

EdSett100

29th Jul 2008, 23:19

Keepittidy:and I not sure if this is 100% fully correct , the Nimrod R1 has more airframe hours than the MR2 and would make sense to be looking for replacement quicker than the MR2 that may be the reason.
No, it would not make sense to replace the R1 quicker on that basis.

Ed

KeepItTidy

30th Jul 2008, 04:15

Ok Edd

Agree to make sense in the Air Force is a silly thing to say as nobody knows that meaning anymore, decisions are based on making things as awkward as possible with least amount of cost :ok:

I always thought the R1 had more hours than the MR2s , I must be wrong cause they wanting to use them to 2025, how the hell are they going to manage that ?

Never mind Im sure it will all work out

Wader2

30th Jul 2008, 12:31

KIT, airframe hours is but one measure of fatigue. Pressurisation cycles and operating profile may be highly significant too.

EdSett100

30th Jul 2008, 13:21

KIT:I always thought the R1 had more hours than the MR2s , I must be wrong cause they wanting to use them to 2025, how the hell are they going to manage that ?

The R1 probably does have more flying hours than the MR2, but it has a longer fatigue life (which is more relevant than hours in the air) due to the way it is used in comparison with the MR2.

OK?

Ed

Biggus

30th Jul 2008, 14:59

And the cost of sustaining the R1 is not affordable (read post 1310 - why do I bother???). The R1 is being replaced on COST grounds. It is not about whether or not it would be feasible to keep it going in engineering terms, but how much that would COST.......

Watch my lips, cost, cost, cost.......

No doubt our political lords and masters may also be glad to see the backs of 'Nimrod' on other grounds, but that is beside the point......!!

Secretsooty

31st Jul 2008, 11:30

It's not just cost grounds, although that is indeed a major part - if you take away 14 or so aircraft (MR2) within the next few years, leaving only 3 (R1) then it becomes increasingly difficult for outside agencies to provide engineering support when the economies of scale are fighting against you.
For instance, do you really think an engine manufacturer would keep a production line open, taking up valuable space that could be utilised more effectively on more lucrative projects, just to trickle-feed a few engines through a year for the next umpteen years when nothing else uses the same engine? No, nor do I, which sort of puts the nail in the coffin of the R1 in my book.

KeepItTidy

31st Jul 2008, 16:47

Well if FI is the limiting limit in these matters I find that strange that the FI in an R1 would be diffrent to that of an MR2, with FI usually calculated with Servicings and Airframe hours, with the R1s coming through a major track the same rate as an MR2 this does not make sense and no major airframe structure any the diffrent especially 49 its an MR2 at heart. Anyway I see the point now of not keeping the R1 in the fleet if only 3 are going to be used.

Secretsooty

31st Jul 2008, 18:17

Keep It Tidy, the FI is worked out against Sortie profile Codes, the R1 and MR2 fly totally different profiles. R1 - mainly low-high-low like a civvy airliner, MR2 - all over the shop, literally! Even some of the engine internals are lifed completely differently dependant on which airframe variant they are fitted to, to the extent the engines have a different mark number even though they appear almost identical in every visual respect.

On the subject of AAR and fuel leaks, Here's a theory of mine to kick around. I wonder if anyone has considered this:-
The pipelines in the bomb-bay will no doubt have been constructed from a material having a similar thermal expansion coefficient to the airframe they are attached to, but what happens when everything is in equilibrium and suddenly there is a change of temperature (and hence dimension) due to the high flow rate of fuel at potentially a considerably different temperature to the airframe....? Is there sufficient flex in all the FRS coupling seals to allow for this dimensional change? Is this why the leaks never seem to be reproduced on the ground? I reckon the old MOD700(?) standard of AAR system with the rubber pipes snaking their way through the cabin was better in this respect, apart from their being located within the cabin, obviously. I sometimes wonder if replacing a fair length of the metal AAR pipework in the bomb-bay with aeroquip would be the proof of the pudding??

nigegilb

3rd Aug 2008, 12:29

Some good news for the thread.

Firstly, B15 has been banned from pprune for good after yet another deeply offensive post.

Secondly, it would appear that an awful lot of things are happening within the MoD regarding Nimrod.

The bottom line espoused by the MoD is that "as AAR has been stopped, the Nimrod is now airworthy, so job done." Many of us who care about the way airworthiness has been mishandled in the MoD know that is a deeply flawed statement. The 2nd line might be that airworthiness work concerned with ALARP is complete so Nimrod is airworthy. Again, anyone who read the Hickman transcripts would struggle to make sense of the argument.

I have been critical of CAS, I was staggered by reports of his lamentable performance before the families a few weeks ago. That said, credit where it is due, it would appear that he has implemented many changes and he is working extremely hard to deal with many of the issues raised on this thread and others. It is not the style of Govt Depts to admit they are wrong. I wished I could go further here, but I can't, enough to say that MoD are worried about airworthiness issues and are acting.

I am not convinced that there is enough technical ability to deal with the challenge and it will of course require additional funding, another worry, but I am happy that they are responding.

Tappers Dad

3rd Aug 2008, 14:12

Nige
That said there is the small matter of 300 Fuel leaks + the ducting lifting has not been completed +Bob Ainsworth said in Parliament on March 14th 2008 that "The number of Nimrod MR2's planned to be in service with the RAF on 31st March 2008 was 15. The average number of Nimrod Mr2's which were fit for purpose in Feb 2008 was 5.

Bob Ainsworth said in Parliament on May 20th 2008 (The inquest finished 23rd May)
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 20 May 2008 (pt 0003) (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080520/text/80520w0003.htm)
Nimrod MR2
Number in service 15
Average number of aircraft in Forward Available Fleet 10
Average percentage of total fleet in FAF 63
Average number of aircraft Fit for Purpose 6
Average percentage FFP of Forward Available Fleet 65

So only one more Nimrod fit for purpose 2 months later.

They are still scrapping along when it comes to Fit for Purpose aircraft and leaves the UK very short of Maritime Defense/Reconnaissance Aircraft.

zedder

3rd Aug 2008, 16:55

Tappers Dad

3rd Aug 2008, 21:42

From the minutes of the meeting with Bob Ainsworth and Sir Gen Torpy
10th July 2008 at the MOD London

Ageing Aircraft
The issue of ageing aircraft was raised. Was the MOD capable of servicing ageing aircraft? In response, the CAS confirmed that the MOD was doing a huge amount on the issue of ageing aircraft. On Nimrod, specifically, we had decided to carry out a complete tear-down of an aircraft to ensure we knew everything there was to know about the aircraft. ( Actually BAE are doing the strip down)

My answer to Bob Ainsworth on the day was. it is a bit late now, I would have hoped you already knew all there was to know about this aircraft after all you say it's airworthy. His answer was they didn't want to miss anything.:ugh:

Jayand

4th Aug 2008, 04:51

"My answer to Bob Ainsworth on the day was. it is a bit late now, I would have hoped you already knew all there was to know about this aircraft after all you say it's airworthy. His answer was they didn't want to miss anything.:ugh:"
Apart from the bloody point!!!!!!!
Have we really seen the end of that bloody idiot bouy 15? he managed to crawk back last time!!!!

Squidlord

4th Aug 2008, 10:22

nigegilb wrote:

it would appear that [CAS] has implemented many changes and he is working extremely hard to deal with many of the issues raised on this thread and others. It is not the style of Govt Depts to admit they are wrong. I wished I could go further here, but I can't, enough to say that MoD are worried about airworthiness issues and are acting.

(See first para. of post 1161.) Although mainly motivated by aviation safety issues, it goes wider than airworthiness (i.e., it's all MoD equipment safety).

I am not convinced that there is enough technical ability to deal with the challenge and it will of course require additional funding, another worry, but I am happy that they are responding.

I think the technical ability is available but I share Nigel's concerns over funding and would add willpower. This is not just a matter of changing a few procedures, doing a few more audits, etc. I think the problems within safety management within the MoD (possibly restricted to certain areas, e.g. aviation safety) are so engrained that changing them is going to take a hell of a lot of time, money, effort and discord. But the actions the MoD are taking are a necessary start so, personally, I am trying to be hopeful.

A long time ago, Distant Voice wrote:

What I can't find in 00-56 is guidance for when something is not safe (either broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP). Also, I can't find reference to say that the Safety Management System has a certain time to rectify the problem, just that if a risk is assessed outside the above criteria, it cannot be tolerated except in exceptional circumstances.

I don't think POSMS or other MoD documentation, e.g. JSPs, gives guidance either. However, it is certainly possible to argue that there is "time to rectify the problem" whilst maintaining the ALARP status of risks (also in post 1161 - this time in the last para., though not explained further there). I could explain more if anyone's sufficiently interested.

Back to nigegilb:

The 2nd line ["espoused by the MoD"] might be that airworthiness work concerned with ALARP is complete so Nimrod is airworthy. Again, anyone who read the Hickman transcripts would struggle to make sense of the argument.

I think this is almost certainly because Hickman was a poor witness (in respect of his claims about safety and ALARP). Also in post 1161, I wrote:

The concept of safety, as defined by MoD policy and regulation (see Def Stan 00-56, POSMS, etc.), depends crucially on how a system or equipment is used and maintained. It makes no sense to talk of a system or equipment being safe (or that the risks associated with that system or equipment are ALARP) without a context of use and maintenance.

and I gave the simple example:

Think of your own car. In some sense, it is "safe" if driven in accordance with the rules of the road and properly maintained. Now suppose you never maintain it or MoT it, and/or drive it at 100 mph through crowded playgrounds. Same car ... but is it safe now?

Since then, the following, very significant posts have been made by some of the best contributors to this discussion (in many cases, the posts are just the words of the posters and in others, very significant quotes are given from, e.g., the coroner's inquest, the MoD, etc.). In all the posts, claims are made about safety and ALARP. Virtually none (maybe none at all - haven't checked in the fullest detail) of those claims about safety and ALARP are made with reference to a context of use and maintenance. Consequently, those claims are just about meaningless!! No wonder everyone's so bloody confused!

1242, 1244, 1246, 1250-1252, 1254, 1256, 1259-1260, 1267, 1271-1272, 1291, 1303

Given:

the context of use of the Nimrod has significantly changed more than once since the XV230 accident and is likely intended to change again significantly in the next few years
and such changes have had and will have very significant effect on the safety of Nimrods,if any reader of this thread wants to get anywhere with these discussions about ALARP and safety, they're going to have to pay attention to the fact that the context of use is vital. If they don't, they will remain confused, seeing contradictions where, likely, none exist.

And yes, it's true that the MoD are just about the worst offenders in this regard. The MoD don't seem to be that concerned with being explicit about the context of use and maintenance in their statements about safety and ALARP (as evidenced by Hickman's testimony to the inquest and other MoD statements on the safety of Nimrods). This is a major failing on their part that has led to a great deal of confusion both within and without the MoD (on this thread!).

If you doubt the vital importance of the context of use and maintenance:

1. go back to the posts listed above and find all the instances where people claim to have found contradictions over statements about ALARP and safety and see how many of those apparent contradictions would be nothing of the sort had the individual claims been caveated with references to *different* contexts of use and maintenance. And see how many of Hickman's confusing statements about ALARP and safety could be explained were he to have been careful in defining contexts of use and maintenance.

2. Look again at the definition of "safe" in POSMS (the most relevant source for this discussion - the definition in Def Stan 00-56, Issue 4 is, unfortunately, slightly different though not in the emphasised text below):

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DefenceEstateandEnvironmentPublications/ASEG/ProjectorientedSafetyManagementSystemposmsManual.htm (mhtml:{4F9ED4D6-C991-45FF-BE91-DA5583714C20}mid://00000011/!x-usc:http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/DefenceEstateandEnvironmentPublications/ASEG/ProjectorientedSafetyManagementSystemposmsManual.htm)

Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, FOR A SYSTEM IN A GIVEN APPLICATION IN A GIVEN OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The emphasised text (my emphasis) is the equivalent of the "context of use and maintenance" that I keep referring to. It's vital!

Chugalug2

6th Aug 2008, 13:48

Squidlord, as one of the many posters whose work you have quoted you say in reply to my call for an MAA:
The MoD is currently considering a separate MAA organisation but I doubt if they are seriously considering making it independent of the MoD. I don't know whether Chugalug2's claims hold water (no evidence is provided). Perhaps the idea of an independent MAA will be considered by Haddon-Cave's Nimrod Review:
I am sure you are quite correct in your assumption that the MOD are not considering an independent MAA. The words turkeys and Christmas spring to mind. However any other form of MAA would be unable to carry out its remit of ensuring Military Airworthiness and would thus be a waste of time and money.
You say I do not provide evidence for my claims. This isn't a Court of Law or even a Judicial Review. It’s a forum in which we express our points of view. If these are at variance with those of others they are rightly and swiftly challenged. You also say in post 1161:

I don't really understand "airworthiness". I know the definition in JSP 553 but it is vague and has no obvious connection with ALARP

This seems to be a common theme throughout this thread whereby generic terms such as Airworthiness appear alien (it is even confused with serviceability in some posts) and more specific ones preferred (such as ALARP). I realise that this is all part of the moving on since my day, but I still feel a slight unease. Airworthiness (I will not try to quote a definition, but it would be helpful if an up to date authoritative one could be posted) is the woods in which the trees such as ALARP exist. If we know each and every tree but are only vaguely aware of the woods, is that not a danger in itself? If there were anything to learn from this and similar threads it is that the Regulations are sound enough, it is their implementation that is at fault. Without an awareness of the culture that lies behind them, that implementation is prone to compromise. The name of that culture is Airworthiness. Time perhaps it was the subject of more scrutiny in itself before we go on to examine the likes of "acceptable" etc?

nigegilb

6th Aug 2008, 15:51

Chug, I got this reply, an opinion from an expert not so long ago.

In very simple terms, if MoD (or Government) contracted out Military Airworthiness Regulations to, say the CAA, the first thing CAA would do is ask "What is the design baseline for each aircraft?". MoD can't answer. Then "Resurrect the build standard so we can establish a contractual baseline". That needs huge investment and many many years. It could never get off the ground for most legacy aircraft. If CAA did accept a contract, there would be so many get out clauses necessary that it would be worthless. MoD would be so heavily liable, it would be a pointless exercise.
However, a good compromise would be to create a MAA for all emerging and future aircraft. If they acted quickly, that could encompass quite a lot, and in a few years the likes of Sea King, current Lynx, Tornado etc etc would slowly disappear. That would spread the cost pain while demonstrating something is being done.
I think this compromise would avoid MoD having to admit they have more or less ignored airworthiness for 20 years. While we'd like to hear them admit this, it's politically unacceptable and they'd be potentially tied up in litigation for decades. I think this is why they don't change the Chinook verdict. But, Nimrod is the thin end of the wedge.
Of course there is much more to consider, but the above is, I think, a good line to take which MoD may actually be thinking about now. It's an obvious option. I wouldn't be surprised if they didn't suddenly make an announcement on this.

Chugalug2

6th Aug 2008, 17:04

Nige, as you say an independent MAA must work. If it literally cannot work with legacy aircraft then they must be excluded from its remit and remain by implication unairworthy! What an indictment of the MOD and those charged with the implementation of military airworthiness regulations. What a betrayal of those who have to go on operating such types, and those NOK who have fought so tenaciously to ensure that the avoidable accidents that their loved ones died in should not be repeated. What is there now to prevent that? The MOD? The RAF higher command? I wouldn't buy one of Squidlord's used cars off of either one!

nigegilb

6th Aug 2008, 18:45

Chug I still find it astonishing that most people are willing to accept the word of a non-expert minister stating that Nimrod is now airworthy. OK he is only repeating the advice received by qualified people from within his organization. But hey, everyone remembers CAS reassuring the world about the safety of Nimrod to continue AAR in the aftermath of the midair explosion. Now look at the line MoD take on AAR.

It has been BANNED and it will never be allowed to resume. Airworthiness implementation has been so badly eroded I doubt the MoD have any clue how to construct a road map leading them back to where they were before the swingeing cuts were introduced in the 1990's.

BTW don't lose heart on this, things are astirring. Nuff said.

EdSett100

7th Aug 2008, 21:54

It has been BANNED No it hasn't. The aircraft remains cleared to conduct AAR when tasked to do so. Currently, the commanders choose not to task the Nimrod with operations requiring AAR. However, it is unlikely that AAR will be carried out again on MR2 or R1. Its not about safety; its about political will, or the lack of it.

On one hand, Nige, you dismiss the politicians and the airships because you believe they are misleading you and the public about Nimrod safety. Yet, it is they who are restraining the Nimrod operators from returning to AAR.

XV235's diversion into Kandahar is the only reason we are not conducting AAR at the moment. The report on that incident (for that was all it was...a minor incident in the air that became a major news story) has now been issued. If that aircraft did not divert, an IR would not have been raised, the minor leak into a benign and well ventilated area would have been investigated, fixed and sent up for more much-needed AAR; all routine stuff. But, no, our leaders are displaying the same emotional frailties as the crew and they are not taking a structured and balanced view of the situation. What saddens me most is that the crew on XV235 did not have all the facts available, so the human factors naturally took over while, on the other hand, our politicians and airships do have all the facts available and they are allowing flawed and frail human factors to take the lead in their decisions.

Dave Angel

7th Aug 2008, 22:30

But, no, our leaders are displaying the same emotional frailties as the crew and they are not taking a structured and balanced view of the situation.

You weren't there so don't be so condescending :mad:

nigegilb

7th Aug 2008, 23:08

EdSett, I am certain Bob Ainsworth has used the word banned, you say the Nimrod is cleared to AAR when tasked, just goes to show you can't believe a word politicians say.

Can you just confirm that Nimrod is cleared to AAR with no restrictions?

Or is it still under AOC2Gp authority when operationally necessary and subject to ACC tasking?

Could you also confirm that the 6 recommendations specific to AAR in QQ Report 2007 have now been completed.

Ainsworth said recently that the 6 recommendations have not been acted on because the aircraft no longer carries out AAR.

"Even as the bereaved relatives held a press conference outside court yesterday, the MoD declared that the Nimrods, based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland, would not be grounded.

Officials insisted that new measures have removed the risk of a similar accident, as air-to-air refuelling has been banned for Nimrods and the hot air system involved is now switched off for all flights."

Bob Ainsworth in the recent HoC debate, "Of the 30 recommendations in the report, six related to air-to-air refuelling, which no longer takes place. "

"Confirming the leak figures in a written reply to a request from his Conservative opposite number Liam Fox last week, Mr Ainsworth said the abolition of mid-air refuelling and the shutting down of the aircraft's hot air system during flight meant the risks were now "extremely low".

There you go Ed, abolition, banned, six outstanding recs ignored because AAR no longer takes place. Do you understand why I said AAR was banned?

Winco

8th Aug 2008, 07:44

Ed,
That is either a very bold, very stupid or very naiive statement to make about XV235, and I think it is probably the middle one.
To further state that the RAF has now declined to allow AAR of Nimrod because of the crews 'emotional frailties' is a pretty poor thing to say about your fellow aviators at Kinloss, as well as your superiors.
I have no doubt that those on board 235 that day might not agree with your comments, but then again, as you keep telling us, you know best.

nigegilb

8th Aug 2008, 08:11

Winco, ignoring the fact that you, I and just about every pilot I know would have diverted to Kandahar in similar circumstances, remember the Captain ordered a ground evacuation as well, which I also agree with. Ed Sett makes an interesting point and that is, the ac is safe to continue AAR. He really should be careful though as this is contrary to the heavily spun line coming out of MoD HQ.

""The MoD must be loving this. Many still thinking, or want others to think, “leaks + ignition source = not airworthy, therefore stop AAR = airworthy”. That is precisely what MoD wants everyone to believe - that stopping AAR makes the aircraft airworthy, so all is ok.

The MoD had to admit it was not airworthy, not because it leaked, but because the airworthiness regulations, and underpinning procedures and processes, had not been implemented. It just so happens the catalyst was Nimrod/fuel leaks/AAR/hotpipes. It could just have easily been any other aircraft and its systems; in fact a series of previous BoI reports shows that the same failures were responsible for previous accidents.

Those who state the R1 is affected are only partially correct. ALL aircraft are potentially affected. THIS is where MoD doesn’t want to go; it wants to limit the damage by perpetuating the myth that stopping AAR on Nimrod solves all their airworthiness problems."

I am not expecting a reclearance for AAR any time soon and I think Edsett knows that.

cold at the back

8th Aug 2008, 09:56

The RTS for R1 and the MR2 now states -
AAR

Limitations.
Air-to-Air refuelling is prohibited.

Regards
catb

nigegilb

8th Aug 2008, 10:17

CATB, you waited over five years for your first post, have to say it was worth it, thank you for the clarification.

Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day. I suppose it is a natural step for Bob to start writing RTS instructions as well.

Ed Sett?

Distant Voice

9th Aug 2008, 14:39

Does anyone know how far we have got with the duct replacement program? (see my posting No 1323) Until it is complete we are flying Nimrods with an HRI of A (Intolerable risk) for the hot air system.

DV

Distant Voice

9th Aug 2008, 14:45

nigegilb

9th Aug 2008, 18:14

It would appear someone is listening. I have posted here many a time that MRA4 has LESS protection than the aircraft it replaces. I have also pointed out the complete void in defensive capability when compared with the American multi mission aircraft P8A.

Well, would you believe it, New task for BAE ....To study Fuel Tank Protection for MRA4 .

Another victory for common sense, not an easy task when dealing with MOD.

That only leaves;

Dry bay protection,
Bomb bay protection,
Under-floor fire protection,
Fuel probe inerting,
Flight deck armour,
on the list!

Yet more evidence, if any were needed, that MoD policy is increasingly based on Pprune posts. This one is simple. The MoD must have got the shock of their lives when the link was posted to the 1981/82 MoD(PE) specifications for foam in (a) Fuel tanks and (b) Dry Bays.

EdSett100

10th Aug 2008, 07:04

Nigegilb,
I wish to unreservedly apologise for wrongly contradicting your statement that AAR is banned. I was not keeping up to date with the Release to Service document. No excuse.

Regards
Ed Sett

EdSett100

10th Aug 2008, 07:40

Winco,
Who do you think you are? When you have read the XV235 report, if you ever do, you might then be qualified to some small degree, to comment on what the crew did and what you might have done yourself. You will never be qualified to infer that I am stupid and that I am always saying that I know best. Whenever possible I stick to facts from the documents and manuals. If I get it wrong, when writing from my home pc, I will not edit the original message, but I will write another message correcting myself and, if necessary, apologising for my error. One apology I will never give, because I will never be guilty of it, is for personal attacks, like yours. I look forward to your reply...

Regards
Ed Sett

nigegilb

10th Aug 2008, 07:46

That's OK fella, sounds like politicians are writing RTS these days. I was more interested in the fact that the Kandahar IR follow up report effectively cleared the aircraft to continue AAR.

Perhaps you can help me on this one.

Post XV230, when AAR was still taking place I understand that at least two incidents happened very similar to XV230, involving serious fuel leaks. Two IRs were submitted detailing the theory that the high angle of attack/Deck angle and slow speed was allowing the fuel running along the airframe to re-enter the aircraft? I understand on one of these occasions the flares were corroded by the fuel and this gave the ground crew/armourers massive problems with how to dispose of them. If the flares had gone off in flight, a catastrophic failure could have occurred. I remember from my time on Hercs that flares left in automatic can be set off by the tiniest of heat sources. I can guess what the setting is for Kandahar airfield having operated out of similar places myself. I would say the crew were very lucky.

Strange because I don't remember the BoI referring to these two incidents.

Any ideas? I would have thought the very fact that these IRs had been raised was proof enough to warrant an investigation.

Chugalug2

10th Aug 2008, 09:53

Nigegilb:

Yet more evidence, if any were needed, that MoD policy is increasingly based on Pprune posts.

Nigel, what might appear as a throw away line, or mere bravado, is upon reflection one of the most damning comments, of a very great many, made of the MOD and the RAF Higher Command on this Forum. I truly believe that the MOD is in meltdown. Whatever credibility it ever had for long term planning and provision of UK Defence needs now lies in tatters. It has been infected by the hour by hour, never mind day to day, presentation imperatives of its political masters forming the present administration (I cannot bring myself to characterise them as a Government). As Squidlord reminds us they have very serious safety issues to attend to that extend beyond those of Flight Safety. It is, however, the latter that this thread, this forum, must be principally concerned with. Nige says he sees little or no way of the MOD retracing its path back to the days when it would, when it could, properly implement UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. If he is right, and I suspect that he is, then the situation is very grave and prompt and urgent action is necessary. Aviation doesn't conveniently wait for Ministers to become 'mindful', for Senior Officers to become 'somewhat concerned'. It bites you in the arrse and then we'll have yet another thread born that will last a decade or more. Bite the bullet now SoS's, ACM's, Your Honour, and get an independent MAA rolling. It will have the limitations envisaged by Nige, it will confer Grandfather Rights on compromised aircraft, but it will be many orders of magnitude safer than the shambles left for us by the beancounters from over twenty years ago who dared to ask, "what cost benefit is all this Flight Safety really giving us?". I think that their question is now only too tragically answered.

nigegilb

10th Aug 2008, 10:22

Powerful post Chug, I am afraid the evidence keeps rolling in. I am trying to check out reports of cracks on VC10 and TriStar fleet. Massive pressure to keep the Afg airlift in motion. Things are getting grim in Bastion, nuff said in open forum, but no matter the pressure, safety has to come first.

Take a look at the Puma BoIs. Question marks remain over the training and experience of crews carrying out SF Missions at a time when pressure is on to REDUCE training costs. I have been told that the loss rate acceptance for Puma has gone from 3 years to 18 months. Haven't substantiated this yet, but where are the anticipators? Is it really cheaper not to fit them. One definite fatality and loss of puma as described here.

Coroner: Training was 'insufficient' (http://archive.oxfordmail.net/2007/6/5/157147.html)

"Equally interesting, from a safety viewpoint (which affects, for example, the competence and experience component of airworthiness), is the fact that while MoD can make a case to lower safety requirements due to exceptional circumstances (the ALARP argument) this specifically DOES NOT apply to training. I'm actually told that this has been re-iterated recently by various top level MoD safety committees.
I'd say they are standing into danger on this one. It seems fatuous to claim its ok as they can do more time in a simulator. If the simulator is sufficient, then why not buy/use more? This is why sim time is always balanced with real flying. I wonder if a risk assessment has been done? Same old issues. Safety decisions made for financial reasons. Who will be brave enough to wave the red card?"

I'd say MELTDOWN is an accurate way to describe the situation. And at the top of the list, concerning airworthiness issues is Nimrod, even though it has been described as "safe to fly".

zedder

10th Aug 2008, 10:24

Have to say I agree completely with you there Chug. As usual, the Beancounters know the cost of everything but the value of nothing.

Biggus

10th Aug 2008, 18:16

Sorry in advance guys for stupid/naive question (which probably won't be answered - thanks for the last answer zedder), but in post 1352 Nige says......

'Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day......'

If that is true, by which I mean that statement was actually made (as opposed to that statement is correct!) and is indeed the Govs/MODs stated position on the matter, then why is rectification work, such as duct replacement, being carried out, presumably at some cost?

Winco

10th Aug 2008, 21:18

ED,
A simple question..............................
What would you have done if you had been the Captain of XV235? Would you have got the aircraft on the ground asap??

Another simple question.....................
You say in your post 'the crew on XV235 did not have all the facts available, so the human factors naturally took over while, on the other hand, our politicians and airships do have all the facts available and they are allowing flawed and frail human factors to take the lead'
So, not only was the Captain wrong, but the rest of the crew were wrong together with the politicians and the airships were they? It seems like everyone got it wrong except you Ed!

It was you that made an unfair and unwarranted comment about the Captain of 235, and I feel you were wrong and you should retract it, so sorry Ed, no apologies. Oh, and as for me saying that you are always right, well, what are you suggesting now then Ed, that I got that wrong also?

nigegilb

10th Aug 2008, 21:58

Biggus this is what Ainsworth said on 1st July 08;

The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.

I am in process of contacting QQ and BAe to check out their demurring position. MoD are publically trying to close the book on airworthiness issues surrounding Nimrod, at the same time, tearing a "serviceable" frame apart and carrying out AW work, which will continue until at least next June. I am told that Nimrod is the number one concern at the top of the Air Force, I am really not surprised. Perhaps time for a PQ, if anyone has genuine info about the duct work I will see that the deed is done just send me a PM.

Regards,

Nige

BTW I understand the rectification cost is £52m! And sadly, that is not new money, so another project must have been robbed.

Distant Voice

12th Aug 2008, 14:01

Ed and Winco,

I have not read the final report covering the incident involving XV235, but it was my understanding that the Captain and crew acted the way they did because fuel was spraying from a coupling "like water from a hose pipe with a fingure over the end" into the bomb bay. This was a repeat of an incident on the ground on 15th Oct, and this was the first AAR flight since that incident. The fault on the ground uncovered other leaks in the system which could have been active in flight on 5th Nov. QinetiQ stated in their 2006 report that one of the problems was that infight conditions can not aways be replicated on the ground. In flight could be worse. Also, it is worth remembering that the Coroner stated that the fire on XV230 was fed from a feed line, not a refuel line. So whilst disconnecting from the tanker may have solved the "hose pipe" problem, there was no way of knowing what other damage had been done.

Ed, I can not believe that the crew would not have raised an IR had they been aware of all the facts. I draw your attention to the two incidents mentioned by Nig, 8th Nov 2006 and 8th Dec 2006. This was fuel in the bomb bay following AAR. By the way Nig, I have no idea why these IR were not mentioned by the BOI. I have asked the same question myself.

DV

Chugalug2

12th Aug 2008, 17:25

Distant Voice:

Ed, I can not believe that the crew would not have raised an IR had they been aware of all the facts.

Well neither can I DV, And I cannot believe that anyone else can doubt that an IR should have been raised, whatever they might be aware of. Might the point at which incidents no longer rated Incident Reports coincide with the start of the deterioration of UK Military Airworthiness enforcement, or is it a case of chickens and eggs? At any rate they are coming home to roost with a vengeance now!

Zedder:

As usual, the Beancounters know the cost of everything but the value of nothing.

Very true, but the real flies in the ointment are the Air Officers who went along with the Beancounters and enforced this suicidal pact. With leadership like that the problems we are faced with now followed as sure as night follows day.

Distant Voice

20th Aug 2008, 09:57

nigegilb, can you read your PM's.

DV

euringineer

28th Aug 2008, 09:57

THE 2nd ANNIVERSARY MEMORIAL SERVICE AT THE NMA ON TUE 02SEP08

A Service of Remembrance will be held at the National Memorial Arboretum on Tuesday 2nd September 2008. The service will be celebrated by Rev Fr Bob Halshaw, Resident RAF Chaplain RAF Kinloss and the Last Post/Reveille will be played by a Trumpeter of The Band Of The Royal Air Force Regiment.

We intend meeting at 1045 and attend the National Remembrance at 1100 in the Chapel. We will then assemble at the Armed Forces Wall section containing the names of the crew and have the short service.

Hope that you can spare the time to either join us or spend some time on the day remembering that even the best are not spared from tragedy.

R.I.P. CREW 3 No 120 SQN ROYAL AIR FORCE, ROYAL MARINES AND PARAS.

nigegilb

31st Aug 2008, 07:21

Families sue MoD over air victims' right to life
Afghan spy plane deaths were unlawful, historic test case is to be told
Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
The Observer, Sunday August 31 2008
Article history

Benjamin Knight and Stephen Swarbrick were killed on RAF Nimrod XV230 after a refuelling fault led to an explosion. Photograph: AFP

Families of servicemen killed when their Nimrod spy plane exploded in the British military's biggest loss of life since the Falklands War are to sue the government under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), claiming it failed to respect their right to life.

In what promises to be a historic and controversial legal test case that could trigger scores of similar claims from British military personnel serving around the world, the families will tomorrow issue proceedings against the Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, alleging the government failed to offer adequate protection to men by minimising the risks of a fire on board the plane.

It will be the first time the Ministry of Defence has faced a legal challenge under the ECHR and the case is likely to cause a furore as it raises complex questions about the extent to which the government can be liable for the deaths of military personnel killed in war zones overseas. It will also refocus the debate around the military's preparedness for combat and the condition of the equipment being used by the armed forces in theatres of war.

The RAF Nimrod XV230 Nimrod exploded on 2 September 2006 in Afghanistan, killing all 14 servicemen on board including Benjamin Knight, 25, and Steven Swarbrick, 28, whose families are launching the legal action.

Evidence presented at the inquest into the mens' deaths highlighted a series of faults with the plane, which exploded after an airborne refuelling operation. The coroner, Andrew Walker, heard how the plane had no fire detection and suppression system and that there were serious design flaws with the way it had been modified that meant ducts were prone to overheat. However, a safety code drawn up for the plane in 2001 considered the possibility of it overheating after refuelling 'improbable'.

Walker was scathing about the RAF and the MoD. He said the aircraft had 'never been airworthy' and called for 'this cavalier approach to safety to come to an end'. Largely on the strength of the evidence presented at the inquest, the families have now decided to start legal action against the government.

'We feel had this happened to a private company somebody would have resigned by now, somebody would have said, "This was my fault",' said Benjamin's father, Graham. 'Heads rolled over Terminal Five and that was just about a backlog of luggage. Fourteen men have died and still there's been no resignations.'

Earlier this year, in a ruling that has paved the way for tomorrow's groundbreaking legal action, a judge ruled that article 2 of the ECHR imposed obligations on the state to take sufficient steps to protect the life of its military personnel and to minimise the risks posed to them even when serving abroad. 'A soldier doesn't lose all protection simply because he is in hostile territory carrying out dangerous operations,' Mr Justice Collins said in his ruling.

In the case of the Nimrod tragedy, the families argue more should have been done to reduce the threat of an explosion after refuelling. 'The families feel there was a duty on the defendant to ensure the aircraft was airworthy,' said their barrister, John Cooper. 'It was not airworthy.'

A spokeswoman for the MoD said: 'We cannot comment on a potential lawsuit; any such action would of course be addressed when presented to the MoD. We have ceased air-to-air refuelling and the use of very hot air systems when our Nimrods are in flight. These measures, together with the enhanced aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures introduced ensure the aircraft, as it is today, is safe to fly. 'But Graham Knight said the measures were not enough. 'At 25 my son's life was taken away because somebody didn't do their job properly,' he said.

You Sir, Name!

31st Aug 2008, 21:09

Story now on the BBC website:

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrod families take legal action (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7591013.stm)

Alber Ratman

31st Aug 2008, 21:53

If it is now a legal action, continued speculation that is seen on this thread isn't in the interest of anybody involved. Hopefully events will see closure on the matter sooner than later so that the other families involved can have peace.

nigegilb

1st Sep 2008, 17:59

Wonder how long Des will remain in charge for, failing to minimize risk is still a moot point for many of us......

Nimrod families launch claim against the MoD as others prepare to follow suit

Two families bereaved when an ageing Nimrod aircraft exploded in Afghanistan have lodged a High Court action against the Defence Secretary as military lawyers claimed many others plan to follow suit.

By Aislinn Simpson
Last Updated: 4:09PM BST 01 Sep 2008

Benjamin Knight, 25, and Steven Swarbrick, 28, were killed along with 12 other service personnel on September 2, 2006 when their 40-year-old plane exploded in a fireball moments after a mid-air refuelling.

The coroner who heard their inquest said the Nimrod had "never been airworthy" and called for the MoD's "cavalier approach to safety to come to an end".

A writ was served on Defence Secretary Des Browne, accusing the Ministry of Defence of negligence, failing to minimise risk and a breach of the right to life in relation to the mid-air accident.

The case is one of the first to use a ruling in the High Court earlier this summer knocking down the MoD's claim that the Human Rights Act cannot be does applied to service personnel serving abroad.

At present, there are 10 similar claims lodged with the High Court against the MoD or Mr Browne, including one relating to a soldier who accidentally shot himself on a firing range in Iraq and a number of cases concerning deaths in Snatch Land Rovers.

Solicitor Jocelyn Cockburn is representing a number of families suing MoD including that of Pte Phillip Hewett, 21, one of three soldiers who died when their Snatch Land Rover was targeted by insurgents.
She said that rulings by coroners that were critical of the MoD on issues ranging from body armour shortages, poorly-protected vehicles and other aircraft accidents could pave the way for a series of claims.

"The amounts of money paid in damages in these cases is not a great deal," she said. "The main impact is that it will be humiliating and embarrassing for the Ministry of Defence. Maybe the next time they go to war things will be done a bit differently."(Hear hear).

John Cooper, who is representing Mr Knight and Mr Swarbrick's families, added: "The chances of success in this case are very high. There are a number of families who are very interested in the outcome and will be carefully considering whether they can bring a similar action."

Chugalug2

1st Sep 2008, 19:28

The coroner who heard their inquest said the Nimrod had "never been airworthy" and called for the MoD's "cavalier approach to safety to come to an end".

Thank God for the Coroners! After the debilitating effects of Cool Britannia, The Third Way, Good Days to Bury Bad News, Cash for Honours and Living with Prudence this poor nation's champions are surely the incumbents of this 800 year old institution. Ironic that such an ancient and arcane body should be the salvation of the youngest and most high tech of the UK's Armed Forces. For when the history of our times is written, the debt owed to them by the Royal Air Force will surely be seen as profound. Why? Just wait and see the chain of consequences that follows. I salute them all!

nigegilb

1st Sep 2008, 19:53

Hope you are not implying criticism of CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy there Chug, might have to report you to Stasi Chief J Smith.....

Tourist

1st Sep 2008, 20:02

It's lucky that the cost of fighting this suit/paying the families if they win won't come from the military budget isn't it................
Oh......wait a minute.......

nigegilb

1st Sep 2008, 20:45

It would certainly have been cheaper to have disconnected the SCP before the crash,Tourist and after previous incidents. But you raise an interesting point regarding compensation. It is my understanding that MoD has insurances that pay for statutory compensations, however, I do not think that MoD will be able to claim in the case of Nimrod, presumably because of negligence issues. Furthermore the cost of the program to ALARP Nimrod is around £52m, taken directly from other frontline projects. At the same time £2.8Bn has been wasted on BOWMAN.

Think back to the Hercules, cost of foam in 2002, $20,000 per set. Cost of relacement Herc £50m. Cost of crew-priceless.

Negligence in any industry is very expensive, I hope you agree.

Chugalug2

1st Sep 2008, 21:49

nigegilb:

Hope you are not implying criticism of CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy there Chug,

I try not to imply such criticism, merely spell it out. But the changes that I envisage would extend much further than rearranging the deck chairs and their occupants on the promenade deck. The root and branch reforms that must occur in the higher command of the Royal Air Force as well as at the MOD will track back to these outspoken independent advocates of the common man. Given the state of denial within those two bodies it was never going to be self driven. The security of this Nation should never again be left to the mercy of the likes of those who have put it in this parlous state, and I am particularly thinking of those senior officers who presided over the dismembering of the enforcement of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations.

The Gorilla

2nd Sep 2008, 08:54

Chugs

We are well beyond rearranging deck chairs on the promenade. Torpedo and his silent associates should be playing nearer my God to thee on the promenade deck at this point. HM Royal Air Farce is one ship going down rapidly due to basic design flaws, how quaint in such a different world.

:\

dunc0936

2nd Sep 2008, 09:16

I have now read the thread from start to Finish, Im half way through the BOI, does and one know where I can get a copy of the QQ report?

Regards

Duncan

Tappers Dad

13th Sep 2008, 20:52

RAF sits on Nimrod reports - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/rugby_union/article4747626.ece)
This link may change

RAF sits on Nimrod reports

The report makes similar conclusions to those made by Andrew Walker, Deputy Oxford Coroner, with regard to the XV230 incident, also blaming misalignment of fuel pipes and couplings.
It said most fuel leaks into the bomb bays of Nimrod MR2 aircraft had been caused by misaligned pipes or couplings and that some in the second aircraft were out by as much as 10 degrees, well outside safety limits.
It also criticised the lack of training given to technicians servicing the aircraft and their supervisors on fitting certain types of couplings, despite the same problem being reported by the official RAF board of inquiry into the fatal XV230 incident.
Calls for proper training to be given to the technicians had been ignored for more than six months and had only been implemented in December after the second incident.
The report, which was a flight safety investigation rather than a full-scale board of inquiry, noted that “the emotional issues relating to the tragic loss of XV230 had a massive impact on way that this emergency was dealt with.”

dunc0936

14th Sep 2008, 09:52

Does the RAF not have their own in house training schools any more? or has it been a case of cutting back on training and contracting out servicing and maintanence????

surely the MOD would have learned from their mistakes in the passed, I rememeber seeing recently on TV an article about the Nimrod, and how the officer being interviewed on board was saying how safe it was now, but if half the systems and AAR are shut down to make it safe, then surely it is not the operational aircraft it should be? what would it take to be able to conduct AAR safely on that aircraft other than money?? what are the techinical challenges?

I'm almost half way through the BOI report, just finding it hard to get a copy of the QQ report. With this thread and the BOI it totals near 750 A4 pages.

Regards

Duncan

Distant Voice

14th Sep 2008, 17:42

I understand that the second report mentioned in the Times article, relating to a second duct failure, was available in early 2006 several months before the XV230 accident. This report was requested at the inquest several times, but it was never presented. Following this incident, which involved XV229, it was strongly suggested by BAe that the risk level should be raised to REMOTE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI B). Subsequently, in Feb 2008, QinetiQ recommended that because this was the second failure the level should be set to OCCASSIONAL/CATASROPHIC (HRI A), which is classed as being INTOLERABLE. Currently, IPT have it set at IMPROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI C).

Until the duct replacement programme is completed in June 2009, this will be the state of the fleet. So I say to the guys who are still flying, ask what mitigation is in place to cover this level of risk. You will probably be told that the risk is mitigated by regular inspections. This is another point addressed by QinetiQ; hazards can not be mitigated by inspections, or fire dectection and suppression. Hot gasses escaping from a duct can only be mitigated by having adequate shielding.

No wonder MoD wanted to keep these reports away from the inquest.

DV

speeddial

21st Sep 2008, 07:50

New article in the Daily Mail

Revealed: Damning new evidence of fatal flaws in RAF death crash Nimrod jets

Revealed: Damning new evidence of fatal flaws in RAF death crash Nimrod jets | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1058774/Revealed-Damning-new-evidence-fatal-flaws-RAF-death-crash-Nimrod-jets.html)

FATTER GATOR

21st Sep 2008, 15:25

Badly spun kack, as you might expect from the Mail on Sunday.

Nothing that will make me, or a couple of hundred other aircrew, think twice about flying.

Still happy to fly in it. Still happy to go to war in it. Still happy to be thrown around at 200 feet over the sea in it. Still happy to save lives and guard our nation in it.

FG

EdSett100

21st Sep 2008, 16:04

Whether or not we aircrew have confidence in the jet is irrelevant. Mis-aligned couplings can never be acceptable.

Aircrew were briefed on Friday on the 1st Qinetiq report on the teardown. Misaligned couplings were not mentioned in the presentation and I believe they were not scoped in that particular report.

Anyway, life just got very awkward for the fleet management.

Biggus

21st Sep 2008, 17:25

FG

Best get yourself out of the crewroom and across to NLS or the IPT and find out everything that is going on as a consequence of the strip down - the information won't find you. You might still feel you have no problems flying (in) the aircraft, and I am not trying to convince you otherwise, but at least you choice will be based on the best facts currently available, rather than just faith in the 'old girl' and the system.

Tappers Dad

21st Sep 2008, 17:40

EdSett100
I was briefed by a senior officer from Kinloss yesterday who rang me up and told me there were problems with corrosion and hydraulic pipes chafing and also informed me there would be an article in a Sunday paper. I asked the senior officer if corrosion could be a serious problem "Yes" he said "It can be"

I understand that a spokesman at the MOD said they had found untoward issues during stipdown.

I will be asking for a copy of the 1st Qinetiq report on the teardown of Nimrod MR2 XV236 via the FOI so I can read it for myself and let you know exactly what it said.

EdSett100

21st Sep 2008, 22:30

TD, thanks for your offer, but we have been told that the QQ report will be available to us to read all in the next few days.

I know that the photo in the Mail on Sunday was not taken during the teardown. It originated from the investigation into XV235's incident. The Mail's article suggests that it came from QQ. It didn't.

EdSett100

21st Sep 2008, 23:17

DV:So I say to the guys who are still flying, ask what mitigation is in place to cover this level of risk. And I say to you, DV, that you are going into areas that you know little or nothing about. You are viewing this risk too simply. High Pressure (HP) air ducts exist in all jet engine compartments, worldwide. They all have joints that might fail, never mind corrosion and they all have the same type of mitigation (detectors). Anyway, regardless of the mode of failure, all of the HP ducts on the Nimrod that are charged in flight are within the fire zones of the engines. I don't have any argument with the upgrade from "remote" to "occasional", in determining the rate of failure. However, a more accurate assesment of the effect of a single duct failing in the most dramatic manner would be, "inconvenient" at worst. All of those ducts are surrounded by titanium panels and the engines themselves. Although they are also routed outside the engine compartments, they are not charged with any air in flight.

To confirm my point: Worst case: during take-off one of the ducts bursts and the associated engine loses some power. There might even be some damage within the engine compartment. The power loss leads us into well rehearsed reactions which lead us into a safe mode of operating the aircraft. A warning will be received on the flight deck and the engine will be shut down and the duct will become dead. A single engine shut down will never be a hazard to a Nimrod. If there was any damage within the engine compartment it will be engine associated but the engine is not now running, so its inconsequential. Catestrophic (loss of aircraft)? Thats a ridiculous assessement.

QQ are not Nimrod experts.

Regards
Ed Sett

The Swinging Monkey

22nd Sep 2008, 12:20

EdSett100

Can you tell us exactly what indications are there in the cockpit when a duct bursts, other than a slight loss of thrust, which I assume the pilots might feel? Are you saying that if a duct bursts (even a little burst) there will be an appreciable and noticeable decrease in thrust and there will be a warning in the cockpit?

And are you also saying that, if a slight decrease in thrust IS noticed, the actions for that are to shut the engine down?

Even if that were the case, and even if it was during your own 'worst case' scenario, surely there is a serious risk of fire/explosion immediately the duct fails or leaks, especially during the take off run?

Wouldn't it all be a bit too late then?

And as for saying the QQ are NOT Nimrod experts, I can't disagree with you, but may I ask who you believe are the experts on this subject?

Thanks
TSM

EdSett100

22nd Sep 2008, 16:57

TSM, at the risk of turning this thread into a Nimrod OCU:Can you tell us exactly what indications are there in the cockpit when a duct bursts, other than a slight loss of thrust,A red warning light comes on.which I assume the pilots might feel? I very much doubt that they would feel a loss of thrust or even a swing towards the associated engine. A loss of HP air from a single engine does not significantly affect the handling of the Nimrod. A single engine flame-out is not hazardous, even if the pilot does nothing. There might be a drop in rpm, which might be observed.And are you also saying that, if a slight decrease in thrust IS noticed, the actions for that are to shut the engine down?No. I'm saying that if the red warning light comes on, the crew will shut off the air supply from that engine (best case) or in the worst case, reduce the power on that engine and it might have to be idled or shut down to put the light out. This all standard FRC stuffEven if that were the case, and even if it was during your own 'worst case' scenario, surely there is a serious risk of fire/explosion immediately the duct fails or leaks, especially during the take off run?
No, it is only hot air coming out of a duct into a very secure area. There might be a bang. However, for obvious reasons there are no combustible materials in the engine compartment, except fuel/hyd liquids which are inside stainless steel pipes and routed well away from the hot air pipes. The electrical wire insulation will not burn. If the crew does not react immediately to the warning light, it is possible in the worst case that the firewire will activate and the engine will then be shutdown within seconds.Wouldn't it all be a bit too late then? You are assuming that a burst HP air duct means instant explosion and fire. If it did, no aircraft in the World would get an airworthiness certificate, because no aircraft is airworthy if a single failure could cause that effect. As I said, most jet aircraft have HP air ducts connected to the engines.may I ask who you believe are the experts on this subject?The experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments, made sure that the compartments contain nothing that is flammable, gave us the warning systems in case of duct failures, carried out flight testing and issued us with the drills, which we practise regularly.

I would agree that a HP duct failure outside the engine compartment could be very serious if not dealt with immediately. XV227 is an example of this. However, no HP air exists outside the engine compartments in flight. Therefore, we flight deck aircrew are not worried in the slightest about the slow progress in replacing the ducts. This is a non-story from DV.

Regards
Ed

Tappers Dad

22nd Sep 2008, 18:36

EdSett100

Why don't the MOD ask the experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments then. Why spend thousands and thousands asking QQ to do reports to then turn round and say sorry we are ignoring your advice.
Having read the report on XV235's incident it appears there are no Nimrod experts at Kinloss either:

RAF Form 765B (Revised Jul 05)
g. The tradesmen involved in the rectification of XV235's leak in Sep and Oct were relatively inexperienced on the Nimrod ac and neither had previous experience of working on Avimo couplings. Furthermore, the supervisors of these tasks had not been trained on Avimo couplings. The importance of pipe alignment and stress, differing pipe lengths with the same part number, joint spacing and all types of coupling assembly and locking must be emphasized through training. The training requirement for FRS couplings had already been identified following inconsistencies noted in coupling locking by the XV230 BOI. After consultation with, and support from the Nimrod IPT, a Training Improvement Form (TIF) was submitted to TDF by the NLS Prop Trade Spec on 27 Apr 07. The TIF recommendation was supported by OC TDF and sent to SOS Evaluation on 11 Jun 07. A reply was received from SOS Evaluation, RAF High Wycombe, on 6 Sep 07 stating that they had carried out an investigation and had been assured by NIMS that the training was adequately covered in the propulsion course at Kinloss and suggested that if the training was still considered to be unsatisfactory then an external validation should be completed. Further investigation by the Prop Trade Spec revealed that the NIMS training was insufficient providing only an overview of couplings but the detailed maintenance requirement of fitment and assembly was lacking. On 7 Sep 07 a further explanation of this urgent training requirement was e-mailed to SOS Evaluation by the Prop Trade Spec; OC FSW also sent an unambiguous e-mail on 7 Sep 07 giving the TIF his full support. To date the Prop Trade Spec has received no formal response from SOS Evaluation with regard to the TIF.

Original signed
XXXXXXX XXXXX
Investigating Officer
ExtXXXX

These are the words of the investigating officer ,

bvcu

22nd Sep 2008, 19:48

Think we can safely say this is an industry problem, look at the recent report of a 747-300 written off in Bangladesh after an incorrectly assembled fuel coupling caused a fuel leak and fire. Just in my 30 odd years fixing aeroplanes the training has been drastically reduced, trades have disappeared . The newer generation aircraft are generally easier to work on. Legacy aircraft both civil and military require greater skills to maintain which takes time to learn, and then you need to retain those skills , how many people want to remain spannering an old fleet with minimal job prospects? No easy answers to any of it except investment in people and money , but we are in a culture of cutting costs and standards. Also look at the equivalent aircraft in this role , the P3 , severe corrosion problems , with a large chunk of US fleet grounded or out of service soon , soon to be replaced by a 1966 designed jet . So no different to our issues really. Think we need a rethink on our military investment , if we are going to do the job properly we have to pay for it . Looking at the job done by the Nimrods in well over 30 years has been very good value for money, so a few more million a year to keep what is not a large fleet going safely would be a good investment.

Chugalug2

22nd Sep 2008, 20:45

bvcu:

Think we can safely say this is an industry problem,

In my view it is a regulation problem, and very unsafe. Your analysis of the problems of maintaining and operating "legacy" aircraft is, I am sure, quite correct. It is one of the reasons that "legacy" aircraft tend to be shunted off the Civil Register where there is effective Airworthiness enforcement. In the case of the MOD that condition does not apply. It is not in anyone's legal discretion to determine by how much Airworthiness Regulations should be enforced. They must be fully enforced at all times. In the case of UK Military Aviation this can only be done by a stand alone independent Military Airworthiness Authority.

EdSett100

24th Sep 2008, 00:02

The XV235 Kandahar investigation report has been published on the web at:
Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Flight Safety (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/FlightSafety/)

nigegilb

24th Sep 2008, 07:14

Thanks Edsett, a most illuminating report. Numerous airworthiness issues, lack of engineering training and experience, lack of publicised technical procedures, failure to brief front line crews on essential BoI information. I am surprised by the criticism made of the Captain. This aircraft was landed 8 minutes after the fuel leak was detected and the aircraft was handed to engineers for investigation. SOPs are there for guidance. There is an infamous case of an airliner that allegedly crashed because of a failure to shorten the normal check-list. Swissair 111 Aftermath (http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0011767) Difficult to judge in this case because the info on the emergency procedure has been removed.

However, there would appear to be a disconnect between the public pronouncements of the safety of Nimrod by CAS and the actual feeling on the front line at the time. A leadership issue? I haven't seen the word emotion used so widely in a report of this nature before. You could easily replace that word with experience, but it handily places responsibility for a supposedly unnecessary diversion squarely with the crew. And what if the Captain hadn't ordered one of his crew to monitor the bomb bay? A procedure that was not official at the time.......

One question screaming out to me, why not carry out an AAR air test in these circumstances? Testing equipment capable of delivering less than 50% of actual AAR flow rate would appear to be woefully inadequate. Interested in your comments?

Thumbs up to the crew who were in the dark as to circumstances that had killed their colleagues a year earlier.

BEagle

24th Sep 2008, 07:46

nige, I haven't had time yet to read the whole thing, but the underlying tone I detect is acute MoD embarrassment over something they hoped would simply go away.

The aircraft commander's prompt actions in landing as soon as reasonably possible with this leaky old beast are indeed praiseworthy; that the incident then leaked out into the public domain seems to have given cause to spite - hence the irrelevant comments about ' unnecessarily increased workload due to flying and communicating at the same time' or whatever to stick the knife in where it doesn't belong.

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg
Thumbs up to the crew who were in the dark as to circumstances that had killed their colleagues a year earlier.

Seconded!!

nigegilb

24th Sep 2008, 09:22

Beags, couldn't agree more with your comments about sticking the knife in without good reason.

Initiating a MAYDAY call is common practice by the operating pilot in the event of EFATO and is a call with which every pilot should be familiar. Comms in Afg are notoriously poor, the Captain correctly continued to make RT transmissions until a response was received/relayed.

The crew were criticized for failing to complete the post AAR checklist and field approach check list. However, the Air Eng allowed the fuel pressure to dissipate in the refuelling gallery and completed a purge of the probe before landing. He was clearly continuing to carry out his duties dilligently. The Captain had initiated a break out and presumably an emergency rate/speed descent, but still managed to brief procedures in the event of a ground evacuation and gave thought to opening up the bomb bay doors in the limited time available to him. Clearly, the Captain was fully in control of events and was thinking ahead and managing the high workload situation in a highly professional way.

The only person whose judgement I would question is CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy. He was the person who sat on essential information contained in the BoI. He must have known about safety concerns regarding AAR on the Nimrod front line but chose to do nothing. Indeed he publically pronounced the safety of AAR on a television program. After this incident AAR was suspended and has now been banned!

Latest rumour reaching my ears following the tear down at Boscombe, is very worrying. I won't state what I have heard publically, but I and many others are watching closely.

Softie

24th Sep 2008, 10:32

The only person whose judgement I would question is CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy. He was the person who sat on essential information contained in the BoI.Nig, I note you have a thing with CAS but all BOI reports are made to, and released by, the convening officer ie. in the case of XV230, AOC 2 Gp.

Chugalug2

24th Sep 2008, 10:33

Of all the people involved in the incident to XV235 on 5th November 2007 the very last one to be criticised is surely the aircraft captain! The MOD should have, and no doubt did, breathe a collective sigh of relief that his rehearsed game plan had his crew safely landed and evacuated within an amazingly short time of receiving the initial call indicating a bomb bay fuel leak during AAR. That the sigh of relief soon turned to irritation at the MOD when it was surmised that the fuel leak had stopped almost as soon as it had started, again thanks to an alert crew, and thus didn't constitute a threat in their eyes justifying a Mayday and immediate diversion is more a comment on that inept institution rather than anyone else. Perhaps the captain should be grateful that he has not been deemed to have been "Grossly Negligent"! Emotional? You bet given such a craven and corrupt system undoing the work of generations before, who indeed knew and applied TOFO's maxim:

The principle purpose of any accident investigation is to learn lessons and apply resolutions. All other outcomes (apportioning blame, commercial factors etc) are secondary.

KeepItTidy

24th Sep 2008, 12:25

Nigegilb Latest rumour reaching my ears following the tear down at Boscombe, is very worrying. I won't state what I have heard publically, but I and many others are watching closely.

Well I hear them rumours too but its going to be blown out of all proportion just to make a good press story.

davejb

24th Sep 2008, 18:41

XV235: For the little this is worth, I think the captain did a stirling job there -
look at the total flying hours, without intending any offence this isn't a flight deck occupied by swaggering, hoary old Shacklebomber types with a fund of stories about Ballykelly and a back support.... to my mind this looks like very sensible preplanning combined with decisive action from a crew who don't have that big a fund of experience to call on when the brown stuff hits the fan. I can easily imagine myself echoing the S1's calls too.
Dave

KeepItTidy

25th Sep 2008, 01:33

FATTER GATOR (http://www.pprune.org/members/168113-fatter-gator)

Usual dross.
Badly spun kack, as you might expect from the Mail on Sunday.

Nothing that will make me, or a couple of hundred other aircrew, think twice about flying.

Still happy to fly in it. Still happy to go to war in it. Still happy to be thrown around at 200 feet over the sea in it. Still happy to save lives and guard our nation in it.

best words ever ,still happy to tell my wife im not going to be in this weekend as im fixing the jets for monday morning .
People that know **** all can say what they want but those who work there are happy to work on her and know she is good to go , if people dont know what engineers and crew say then balls to you all you have no idea and never will . take as much money as you want from the MOD but the aircraft is taking flak from wrong guns. I think as soon as the money guns have gone then the aircraft will fly safely and we can all get back to doing what we do best. Saving lives

Winco

25th Sep 2008, 07:17

KIT

Interesting words there.........................

'as soon as the money guns have gone then the aircraft will fly safely'

It kind of suggests that the aircraft ISN'T flying safely??

Winco

25th Sep 2008, 10:16

mileandahalf

Yes, a fair point I suppose! I'm currently on a stop over in Auckland and I hadn't noticed the time, so that's my excuse!!
Fishing? Me? .....well maybe just a little, but it does have a serious note when someone who (appears) to be current groundcrew comes out with a statement like that, pi$$ed or not!
Regards
The Winco

KeepItTidy

25th Sep 2008, 11:15

Mileandahalf you are sure right :O

Winco my statement was not what you assumed it was, but just in case our words got mixed up , my referral to flying safely means out of the tabloids harm after all the only reason the Nimrod right now is unsafe to fly is the damage the press has done.

Its just a pity that the good stuff is never posted to public.

cornish-stormrider

25th Sep 2008, 12:20

OK keepItTidy. Fair point, now a question for you. Would you allow your nearest and dearest to fly on Nimrod (hypothetically I accept) on an operational flight (or a training flight that mimics all the conditions) ??

Lets assume that the question of enemy fire is not part of this hypothetical situation.

Would you stake their lives on its ability to function as needed and be safe for them to be in it??

For a comparison I would have to make in my previous job would be would I allow my wife to drive the lorry I have just safety inspected or operate the machinery I maintain. If I cannot answer yes then why should I expect anyone else to, just because a piece of paper from my director says that it is as safe as it needs to be.

KeepItTidy

25th Sep 2008, 13:01

The answer to all Cornish

YES

I have no worries about flying Nimrod and im due to fly in a Nimrod very soon as you mention it. I as of recent seen crews fly in and out of theatre and they have gave no concerns either but I cannot speak for all.

For many people they dont have any idea what is done to make every aircraft get into the air but for a few people who have concerns I wish you could all come for one day and work alongside all and I guarentee your thoughts would change after that.

Thats my little piece that I would just like to add , im sure like always Ill be brought down in flames and some microsoft flight sim geek that claims to be a pilot will tell me otherwise. :ok:

anyway im ready for the incoming

mad eng

25th Sep 2008, 19:58

Brave man who states he has no worries flying..... It's been proven that flying is dangerous, as is driving, train travel etc etc. I worry about flying, every time I go. But no more than I worry driving on the A9. Worry is what makes me ask all the difficult questions those who know me hate. Worry is what drives safety and safety leads to less worry. So KIT please worry, every time you work on the aircraft I will fly. Worry that what you are doing is right and that you are doing it to the best of your ability.
The blase way in which many state the aircraft is so safe is, I fear, nothing to do with safety but more to do with feeling that they are under attack form people who want to blame someone for the state of the fleet. You are NOT under attack. I, we, are not blaming the overworked, under staffed, under supported ground trades.
To declare that there are no issues with the Nimrod would be naive in the extreme and those issues are not with individual tradesmen or NLS, they go much deeper, both airframe wise and supervisory. I for one salute NLS for the sterling job they have done in recent years but please beware you don't undermine your opinion by not accepting we have serious issues.

Regards
Mad Eng

Keep up the good work

KeepItTidy

26th Sep 2008, 11:22

I will be honest I do fear everytime I go flying but thats any aircraft :E
Anyway I have faith everyone has done enough to ensure this can never happen again but you are right there are issues and Im sure in the too near future there will be more issues, and yes maybe I like many are now hiding from the truth rather than fact, why and how I dont know but maybe its the fact every day you open the paper and see negative rather than good. I just cant get over why people are saying the aircraft is unsafe to fly when clearly its from people who are not even part of it. If the aircraft was not fit to fly then it would not ,thats what I cant get my head round. People quote APs, Defstans etc etc about this paragraph and that stating this etc etc , does that make an aircaft they have never worked on able to dictate its U/S. If I can get my head round this I promise never to post again :ok:

enginesuck

26th Sep 2008, 13:19

Keep it tidy,

You are a sensitive soul ! It will achieve nothing here trying to convince people your faith in the aircraft we work on , why cant you just let them get on with it, while we get on with the good work we are doing, it needs no justification to others just be happy and content for the part you play. :ok:

Tappers Dad

26th Sep 2008, 13:21

I have been Pm'd by a number of people asking to see the Qinetiq Nimrod fuel leak study report, if anyone would like a link to this PM me.

KeepItTidy

26th Sep 2008, 13:52

enginesuck
You are a sensitive soul ! It will achieve nothing here trying to convince people your faith in the aircraft we work on , why cant you just let them get on with it, while we get on with the good work we are doing, it needs no justification to others just be happy and content for the part you play. http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

You know me ES do I really look sensitive :E but you are right , this is the last place really to talk about these matters and If i caused offence to armchair pilots around the world then great.
I was just trying to keep the thread alive as its one of those dying threads that needs some input now and again,saying that in truth it needs putting to bed sooner rather.

Good luck all that stil looking for what they after and ill stay out of conversation from now on, I keep saying this every 6 months and I never seem to learn

Distant Voice

26th Sep 2008, 16:42

Ed Set 100 you said
And I say to you, DV, that you are going into areas you know little or nothing about

Clearly, from that statement and the points raised in your posting there is a strong indication that you are not as well informed as you make out to be. I hope you are not too senior in the chain of command.

I did not identify the hazard, nor did I set the severity. They were done by BAE Systems Chadderton Airworthiness Dept and the Nimrod IPT. The hazard in Maitenence Zone 413/443 was identified during the Zonal Hazard Analysis and the development of the Hazard log leading to the issue of the aircraft level baseline safety case in 2004. As a result hazard NM/H66 in the Nimrod Phase 2 Hazard log was raised to detail the potential for hot air leaks from LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on surrounding structure and systems (electrical wiring, CSDU oil pipes, fuel pipes and hydraulic pipes). As a result of this, the hazard was set at INCREDIBLE/CATASTROPHIC.

Following the second duct failure, which took place in this area, Chadderton recommended, in early 2006, that "the probability of failure should be reassessed to IMPROBABLE or more likely REMOTE" The IPT elected to settle for IMPROBABLE. Subsequently, during a reassessment of the Hazard log structure in 2008, QinetiQ recommended that because there had been a second failure the probalility level should be set at OCCASSIONAL. This has got nothing to do about understanding Nimrod, but about having specialist knowledge in system failure rates.

So at present we have a hazard set at IMPROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "C") by the IPT, when QinetiQ believe it should be at OCCASSIONAL/CATASTROPHIC (HRI "A"). But in your posting you state that "I do not have an argument with the upgarde from 'remote' to 'occassional'. Your problem, it seems, is with the severity. Well that has been set at "CATASTROPHIC" from day one, not by me, but BAE and the IPT.

By the way, with regards to mitigation, a temperature sensor (S7) is located at Rib 2 (17 " away from the duct failure), and was unable to detect the failure. But there again, nothing detected the failure on XV227.

Ed, if you still believe there isn't a problem, ask yourself why has MoD finally decided to change some 37 hot air ducts in the engine bay areas, many of which were declared as being "life expired and in need of replacement" back in early 2005. Stop burying your head in the sand and look at the facts.

Not bad for someone out of his depth.

DV

nigegilb

26th Sep 2008, 17:10

DV, I wonder if you have tried to pass that information along to the QC carrying out the review?

I understand that the e-mail address for the review (not located at the QC's chambers, but in an MoD building) only gets to the MoD secretariat. (The same Secretariat A shall we call him..... who was seconded to the Deepcut review). Someone with a keen interest in this review sent numerous e-mails, Secretariat A eventually acknowledged receipt of the first submission, but inferred it contained nothing of interest. In an effort to submit it direct to the QC, it was then sent it to his chambers - and got a rather curt reply from.... Secretariat A...... It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!

I am wondering if this will go the same way as the Deepcut review!

Distant Voice

26th Sep 2008, 17:36

Ed Sett100, you said
Misaligned coupling were not mentioned in the presentation

Well, knowing what is stated in the XV235 report, someone should be asking IPT how couplings can be checked for alignment to 1 degree, not 4 degrees. The need for 1 degree alignment is stated in the Declaration of Design and Performance document of 1968, but I am not aware of any procedure to ensure such conformity.

The same DDP clearly states that the max fuel flow rate for the seals/couplings is just over 1000 kg/min, but XV230 recieved fuel at twice that rate. We have got hung-up with delivery pressure, but flow rate seems to have been overlooked when we moved to AAR.

DV

Chugalug2

26th Sep 2008, 19:04

Nigegilb:

It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!

Which either makes the QC a victim of MOD intrigue or a willing participant in it...you pays your money and makes your choice! Given the "Waiting for Des" saga of the sticky at the top of this forum I know where my suspicions lie. There is dirty work afoot I fear!

davejb

26th Sep 2008, 19:57

Keepittidy,
firstly I would like to say that as EX Nimrod aircrew (with many old friends still on them) I am glad to see that the groundcrew remain, as they were in my day (not THAT long ago) comitted to providing a service that far exceeds 'civvy' attitudes to earning a crust. Actually I think you'd find that the vast majority of current and ex Nimrod aircrew posting on here share that sentiment - and the temporary heightened level of 'bonding' (?) that occurs when a crew and a groundcrew were matched up for the duration of a Fincastle or Airde Whyte was quite something - in other words you don't have to persuade anyone who is or was Nimrod aircrew that the lineys have their hearts in the right place, none of us have ever (to my knowledge) ever held lineys in anything but the deepest respect.

There's always a 'but', isn't there? ;)

Two points - one - a LOT of the people you are dismissing as Microsoft Flight Simmers are ex-aircrew, some with an awful lot of time on type. Having spent a lot of time in ops during my 23 yrs in the RAF I only have 3500 hrs on type - I was crewed up for a time with a guy who had 20,000 hrs - you can't casually dismiss everyone who disagrees with you, these aren't all Walts by a long chalk.

Two - the Mail photo and article that FG dismissed: As I understand it the tolerance on fuel pipe connections is supposed to be 1 degree? The photo - whether of 235 or another aircraft - clearly shows a connection that a blind Ukranian plumber's guide dog would bark at. Later posts include links to official RAF reports that confirm the hand built nature of each airframe's fuel system meant that (effectively) special training was required to ensure the groundcrew could maintain the fuel system correctly - and that this trainingt was NOT actually delivered. This isn't a dig at the groundies, the tradesmen concerned are blameless - it's the training system that let THEM down. The picture, unless photoshopped, clearly shows that the fuel system of THAT aircraft was not as it should be, and it's quite easy to understand how THAT fuel connection would quite possibly spray fuel if fuel (under pressure) passed through the pipe.

Please understand that current and previous aircrew have a deep respect and liking for the groundcrew - particularly the lineys. Many of those you seem to dislike on here have got a lot of Nimrod time, and sufficient understanding of the aircraft and systems to form a reasonably valid opinion that may well be different to yours.

People like DV, who may not have any prior experience, are often pointing out that the RAF, or somebody paid by MOD to investigate some aspect of the Nimrod, have themselves reported back to the MOD/RAF with critical comments. It isn't a case of spin, it's a case of the RAF/MOD setting a standard and being caught out, so it's unfair to suggest their comments are worthless - they're simply pointing out that QQ etc don't agree with the RAF...if the report is somehow 'wrong' due to QQ etc being numpties, then why were they asked to do the review in the first place? (Don't hire someone to investigate something then dismiss their report because it doesn't say what you wanted it to!)

As for FG - sir, I have a lot of respect for those still doing the job, but please remember that there are 7 NCOs behind you* who you share responsibility for, whose only option at the moment is to fly or find themselves a job outside at very little notice... Forget the histrionics, are the fuel couplings within 1 degree as per specs?

Dave

* and 1 in front, but the flashing lights usually keep him amused....

Distant Voice

26th Sep 2008, 20:43

Davejb;

Good posting, and for the record I do have experience.

DV

davejb

26th Sep 2008, 21:34

Covec,
were I still in I suspect I would feel pretty much as you do.

DV - no aspersions intended, of course..:)

Safety_Helmut

26th Sep 2008, 22:07

DV, you post #1417 was an excellent reply to EdSett's ill informed comments. As a safety engineer of over 10 years, I read EdSett's comments with deep suspicion, but unable, without the detailed knowledge of the systems and that area of the aircraft to disagree.

Your point:
This has got nothing to do about understanding Nimrod, but about having specialist knowledge in system failure rates. is absolutely spot on, QinetiQ may not be Nimrod experts, but they do have the system safety engineering expertise to extract the right information from those who are !

Well said DV

S_H

EdSett100

27th Sep 2008, 01:30

DV:Clearly, from that statement and the points raised in your posting there is a strong indication that you are not as well informed as you make out to be.Well, you would say that anyway, so I'll not dwell on it.I did not identify the hazard, nor did I set the severity. They were done by BAE Systems Chadderton Airworthiness Dept and the Nimrod IPT. The hazard in Maitenence Zone 413/443 was identified during the Zonal Hazard Analysis and the development of the Hazard log leading to the issue of the aircraft level baseline safety case in 2004. As a result hazard NM/H66 in the Nimrod Phase 2 Hazard log was raised to detail the potential for hot air leaks from LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on surrounding structure and systems (electrical wiring, CSDU oil pipes, fuel pipes and hydraulic pipes). As a result of this, the hazard was set at INCREDIBLE/CATASTROPHIC.
I don't doubt your word. I strongly question the categorisation of CATESTROPHIC.
A HP air duct blow-out inside any one of the engine compartments will not bring the aircraft down. The very worst it will do is damage the engine, as you have just described, which is not catastrophic.Well that has been set at "CATASTROPHIC" from day one, not by me, but BAE and the IPT.
Yes, I know. They are wrong. BAeS, IPTand QQ did not design the aircraft. BAeS and the IPT made some big mistakes in risk analysis before Sep 06, which is why the whole process has started over again.By the way, with regards to mitigation, a temperature sensor (S7) is located at Rib 2 (17 " away from the duct failure), and was unable to detect the failure.Which means that it was an insignificant failure. None of my colleagues are aware of this 2nd duct failure. Now I know why (based on what you have just said); it was so insignificant that it didn't activate the warning which means that an Incident Report was not raised (an IR is usually raised for a Rib 2 overheat; they are never catestrophic, but are worth publicity). The slight damage must have been discovered after flight.But there again, nothing detected the failure on XV227.. The XV227 (SCP) duct was not monitored for failure in the same way as the ducts in the engine compts. As you know, that duct has been out of service since 2 Sep.Ed, if you still believe there isn't a problem, ask yourself why has MoD finally decided to change some 37 hot air ducts in the engine bay areas, many of which were declared as being "life expired and in need of replacement" back in early 2005. Stop burying your head in the sand and look at the facts.

If BAeS says that the ducts are lifex it does not mean, de facto, that they present a catastrophic risk. I agree that the ducts are more vulnerable to failure than in-life ducts, but it is simply not a problem if one fails. Please remember I am referring only to ducts in the engine compartments. I am not burying my head in the sand. I accept that you are passing on info from organisations that we should trust and you place great store in them, but they have been wrong before. I believe that in the fullness of time, the CATESTROPHIC evaluation will be downgraded.Not bad for someone out of his depth.True enough. I only wish I could show you the ducts and the amount of protection around them (and I don't mean the duct heat shields; I'm talking about titanium walls and and a very solid engine)

Regards
Ed Sett

Distant Voice

27th Sep 2008, 08:42

They are wrong. BAeS, IPT and QQ did not design the aircraft. BAeS and IPT made some big mistakes in risk analysis before Sept 06

Ed, I am begining to believe that in your eyes everyone is wrong apart from Ed Sett. Who do you believe and trust? If it is none of the main engineering agencies, then you should not be flying. Yes, they have made mistakes with risk analysis in the past The mistake has been to UNDER ESTIMATE the risk, and unfortunately IPT are still under estimating the risk associated with Hazard NM/H66. This is a Cat "A" risk - INTOLERABLE (Hazard log definition, not mine). The thought that it may/could be/in the fullness of time be downgraded is meaningless. It is about what the risk is, and not what it may be. What evidence, other than personal guts feeling do you have for making this comment? If there was any chance of the risk moving in that direction, do you think that we would be changing 37 ducts (HP, Anti Ice and Cross Feed) before mid 2009 on an aicraft that is due out of service in 2011. Come on Ed, I know that I was born on a Friday, but it wasn't last Friday.

The Nimrod problem is like a jig-saw. By pulling together all the pieces (evidence) we hope to get an idea of what the real picture is. The trouble is that there are people like yourself who seem afraid to view that picture. And there are those people who keep pieces of the jig saw hidden under the table, or worse still loose them.

Once again, get your head out of the sand and see the picture.

DV

nigegilb

27th Sep 2008, 09:15

Is it hardly surprising that Nimrod aircrew post on here their concerns about the prospect of carrying out AAR duties in the future when woefully inadequate testing equipment is used to give an NFF conclusion from engineering?

Perhaps CAS should volunteer himself for some Nimrod AAR testing in the UK before proclaiming that Nimrod is as safe as it needs to be to continue AAR sorties.

I am in receipt of information suggesting tha the build standard was NOT maintained, and MoD knew about it (as a contract was let on Woodford). If the build standard is not maintained, then by definition the Safety Case cannot be valid, as there is no way of proving it reflects the up to date (or any) build standard - as required by JSP 553. In turn, the MoD cannot demonstrate compliance with airworthiness regs.

Everything is now hanging on the QC's review, no wonder MoD have their tentacles all over it.

Distant Voice

27th Sep 2008, 13:01

None of my colleagues are aware of this 2nd duct failure

Ed Sett, it seems to me that you are not talking to the right people at Kinloss. The 2nd duct failure and its affect on hazard NM H66, including the "upgrade" to OCCASSIONAL (As defined in Safety Case Report MBU-DEF-C-NIM-SC0713) was discussed in some detail at the second safety case review at BAeS Chadderton on 29th and 30th Jan 2008. QinetiQ letter, dated 5th Feb 2008 states that "Representatives from the Nimrod IPT, RAF Kinloss, STANEVAL and BAE Systems were in attendance, and comprised of Aircrew, Ground Support staff and BAE Systems Airworthiness"

DV

EdSett100

27th Sep 2008, 18:06

SH:DV, you post #1417 was an excellent reply to EdSett's ill informed comments. As a safety engineer of over 10 years, I read EdSett's comments with deep suspicion, but unable, without the detailed knowledge of the systems and that area of the aircraft to disagree.
If you are unable to disagree with my comments, how can you say that they are ill-informed?

DV:Ed, I am begining to believe that in your eyes everyone is wrong apart from Ed Sett. Who is "everyone", DV? Let me guess: you and a few other critics on pprune. I've mentioned this before and I'll reiterate it: if anyone who works/flies on the Nimrod believes that it is unsafe, he/she does not need to write his/her concerns here to get the message heard. The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here. Furthermore, there is no ground swell of criticism or feelings of unease on the fleet, therefore I suggest that most of us, on the Nimrod, tacitly agree with the views I express here.

DV, you have raised a valid point in that I should not be in disagreement with the IPT over a safety issue. Therefore, I need to know exactly what you are referring to. You appear to have access to documents (Hazard Log) that are not available to me this weekend. So, lets set a baseline for this discussion about the OCCASIONAL/CATESTROPHIC risk set against Hazard NM/H66. Which ducts are detailed in that Hazard? I need to know which ducts you (and BAEs/QQ/IPT) are saying are a Cat "A" risk. We could be at cross purposes.

Regards
Ed Sett

Winco

27th Sep 2008, 19:16

EdSett

You are begining to annoy people with your 'I know more than you know' attitude to everything and everyone on this forum. It matters not a jot what evidence is put before you or what anyone says here, you are always right and the rest of us are wrong.

Just who the hell are you Ed? Are the CAS in disguise or ACAS? or maybe even the AOC? Why not come clean and tell us, because you are obviously someone with far more knowledge and information than the rest of us on here all put together.

How much info/evidence has to be presented to you before you will even begin to see anyone elses point of view?

KIT, I have yet to hear anyone on this forum say a single derogatory remark about the groundcrew at all, and especially about the lineys. Unfortunately you have taken the comments of (ex) Nimrod aircrew such as myself to heart, out of context and reached the wrong conclusion, and there simply was no need for that. Get over it and understand that you are all highly respected by the aircrew - even ex Nimrod aircrew.

As davejb points out so well, the aircrew do NOT in any way hold you responsible, so please get over it, and don't read something that isn't there.

The Winco

zedder

27th Sep 2008, 19:45

Winco, you've been annoying people on this Forum for at least the past year. I'm almost certain I will have served with you on an MR2 Sqn (I assume you did serve on one?) and I wonder if I thought then that you were as much of an arrogant dick as I think you are now.

EdSett100, you are 100% correct in your assumption that most of us still on the frontline have given up banging our heads against the wall trying to defend what we obviously view to be a perfectly safe aircraft to fly otherwise we wouldn't be doing it.

As someone who has worked at Boscombe Down and in an IPT, I can personaly vouch for having seen an enormous amount of rubbish spout from the lips of so-called experts over the years. I suspect it is just as likely (perhaps moreso when no-one is there to challenge them) to flow from their keyboards and appear in reports that are then touted as the 'fact of the matter'. I applaud your tenacity EdSett but I really do think you are wasting your time.

To all at Kinloss that have worked their butts off recently despite all the constraints - fantastic effort all round and you can be rightly proud that we continue to deliver the goods.

tucumseh

27th Sep 2008, 20:33

I don’t want to get involved in the debate about ducts, couplings etc. The simple fact is that Air Chief Marshall Loader rose above that and stated;

(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.

(b)“I am clear that further activity must be undertaken for our other aircraft types to check whether there is any read-across of lessons we have learned from this accident at such enormous (and immensely sad) cost”.

By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations).

In the context of Nimrod, and the other in-service aircraft he refers to at (b), the key component is the requirement set out in Chapter 5 - “Management of Airworthiness In Service”.

There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State).

Now, if I may, a little verifiable history.

In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules. (I know, certifiable, but read on……).

In an effort to avoid dismissal of the individual charged with this “offence”, a “junior” (Air Cdre equivalent) instigated an internal audit aimed at ascertaining to what extent this MANDATED process was actually applied.

In 1996 the 1 Star Auditor reported direct to PUS, advising him that “….. reductions and relocation has diluted the experience of staff involved in the management and control” (of this process) and was therefore “unable to provide an assurance to PUS that (the aforesaid MANDATED process) is operating effectively”.

(The “offender” was not sacked).

This was not your typical narrowly targeted report. The areas covered included almost all in-service front-line aircraft and their equipment, across all 3 Services; and included HQ policy departments. There were 22 recommendations and MoD cannot say which, if any, were implemented. Many of the 22 simply state that MANDATED processes should be implemented. The report is unclassified and was copied to the principals for retention and (supposedly!) protection against future action.

Two years later, in a separate ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (i.e. the 4 Star charged with attaining airworthiness, and maintaining it for in-service aircraft not yet transferred to AML/DLO/CDL) upheld the 1992 ruling for MoD(PE) staffs, except that the threat of dismissal was downgraded to formal verbal warning. This has subsequently been upheld by four Mins(AF), most recently last month.

THAT, my friends, is what those who seek to achieve and maintain airworthiness, safety, serviceability and fitness for purpose are up against. And THAT is precisely why the various reports discussed here are one huge catalogue of failures…….

“in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.

I’m an agreeable chap really, and I agree with ACM Loader.

KeepItTidy

27th Sep 2008, 22:34

Winco

Im not looking for self sympathy or **** that you say , I have never once asked for that. I do my job and i do my job well and i know I do.I come here and i get a lot of stick but I know im good at my job and im happy to be Nimrod. I for a while hated my employers but until now I know we do a fecking damm good job and every day im happy knowing that a few hundred army guys are safe what the Nimrod does. I hated politics just like this conversation goes but thats one thing I cant change , i just give the best I can , its just a shame that everyone is blinded by money and self importance.

*** my spelling , bad :( *****

Chugalug2

28th Sep 2008, 10:41

tucumseh:

(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”....
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations)....
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State)....
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules....

Thank you for bringing this navel contemplating thread back to reality tuc! Your post underlines the fundamental point that the airworthiness of HM' s aircraft is the responsibility of the Airworthiness Authority, the MOD, not lineys at KSS but the MOD! That responsibility has been reneged on deliberately and it would seem with some malice by those senior officers charged with its implementation. The airworthiness process, as you say, is clear and unambiguous. Action by the MOD over the past two decades has been clear and unambiguous; it has turned its back on implementing airworthiness action and endeavoured to persecute those who attempted to carry out their responsibilities as required by law. The MOD is unfit to hold such serious responsibilities which should be rested from it by the establishment of a dedicated independent MAA.

EdSett100

28th Sep 2008, 22:12

NG:Someone with a keen interest in this review sent numerous e-mails, Secretariat A eventually acknowledged receipt of the first submission, but inferred it contained nothing of interest. In an effort to submit it direct to the QC, it was then sent it to his chambers - and got a rather curt reply from.... Secretariat A...... It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!
The QC is often out and about and, like most busy execs, he probably trusts his private secretary in his office in Chambers to read his e-mails and forward all XV230 business to his MOD address. I do agree with you, though, that it is not the job of a secretary to infer what is important or not (unless the QC read it and directed the sec to write the reply on his behalf).

Hugh S

28th Sep 2008, 23:28

EdSett
The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here.

You are either in a ground tour or don't listen to people speaking in the crew room. Although the majority of aircrew seem to be either worried but prepared to accept the risk, or not worried at all; most of my squadron colleagues take a keen interest in PPrune.

Distant Voice

29th Sep 2008, 07:53

Hugh S;

Great to hear from active aircrew. I like several other people on this thread are simply trying to ensure that aircrew and ground crew have as much information as possible so that you can make their own calls. For me, statements like "It is a good jet" and " I would not be flying it if I did not think it was safe" are not back up with evidence. The 14 people who lost their lives on 2nd Sep 2006 thought it was "a good jet" and would not have flown if they thought it was not safe. They made their call based on the evidence that was made available to them at the time. They new nothing about, unprotected pipe sections, coupling misalignment, excessive fuel transfer rates, life expired hot air pipes, a second duct failure, the casual way in which the SCP had been reactivated and the fact that the whole fleet was not airworthy.

DV

DV

Tappers Dad

29th Sep 2008, 22:03

Just received this from the MOD:

My Question

“Can you please tell me the name of the Nimrod IPT Leader between
2004 and the end of September 2006?”
“Can you also tell me the name and the rank of the person with
delegated airworthiness responsibility for the Nimrod fleet prior to and
including September 2006?”

MOD Answer
2. I have now conducted an independent review looking at both the
handling of your request and the substance of the reply.
Some of the information you sought is not available in the public
domain in precisely the form that you have requested, but I consider that this should also be provided to you. The answers to your specific questions are therefore as follows:
a. Between 2004 and 21 July 2006 the position of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held by Group Captain (now Air Commodore) XXXXX
XXXXX.

b. From 18 September 2006 to the end of that month this position
was held by Group Captain XXXXX XXXXXX.

c. From 2003 until the end of September 2006, Group Captain
(now Air Commodore) XXXXXX XXXXX was the delegated airworthiness
holder for the Nimrod fleet.

Between 22 July and 17 September 2006 the post of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held on a temporary basis by a person whose name is not
already in the public domain and does not meet any of the criteria I set out above. Their name therefore remains withheld under s40(2).

I have redacted the names not the MOD.

Interesting that they won't tell me who the IPT leader was at the time of the Crash of XV230.

The Raf/MOD and SOS for Defence and Armed forces Minister have all told us they have nothing to hid.Well it appears that they have!! ........:=

dunc0936

30th Sep 2008, 09:51

Hi All, I’m now up to date with the thread, the BOI and the XV235 report, though I still have the QQ report to read. There are a few questions I'd like to ask and comments to make form an outsiders point of view seeing I have never been inside a Nimrod (though I hope to address this soon as I have requested a visit to Kinloss)

Having just flown back from my hols, and read both the above reports while there (I know I was bored just sitting on the beach) one thing that no one seems to have mentioned in great detail is the strains put on the airframe during operations including AAR.

A civil aircraft such as the Boeing 737-800 I flew in just flies straight and level with no excessive turns etc. However the Nimrod does totally the opposite, its flight parameters are totally different i.e. height, rate of ascent/descent tight turns etc, but also during AAR it is tucked in behind and slightly below another large aircraft usually the Tri-star. The turbulence must be very large and also doing in bad weather if and when required must but increased stresses on the airframe and more important the Couplings, Seals and Joints which and the main crux of this thread has/was this taken in to account when designing the aircraft and it maintenance schedule.

Has any analysis been done on the affects of the AAR on the Nimrod, before the crash and also now that it is mostly done from behind a Tri-Star rather than a VC10? It seems that no analysis was done on the different flow rates from the VC10 to the Tri-Star, did this put extra pressure on the Joints/cupping/seals?

From the XV235 report there seems to be a distinct lack of training for new and existing Ground crew am I right or wrong??? Any comments Hugh S!!!!!

Has there ever existed a Nimrod ground crew training school? Or at least instructors to teach/coach and advice new and existing ground crews?

From the BOI it seems that the No 7 Dry bay is an essential part of the aircraft with both the Blue and Green Hydraulic systems going through it,
amongst other important equipment essential to the running of the aircraft, if this is such an important part of the aircraft then why no fire detection and suppression systems and does all that equipment need to be together in one bay? This was also commented on by AOC No 2 Group.

In the BOI the AOC No 2 Group commented that the SO1 engineer post at Kinloss has been re-instated. Was this post removed across the RAF?? And if so has the post been Re-instated across the force or just Kinloss?

That’s all the questions for the moment, I’m still listening and learning and getting my head round it all, is there non classified drawings/photo’s available of the Nimrod?

Regards

Duncan

nigegilb

30th Sep 2008, 10:26

Dunc, this thread normally resembles a battlefield rather than a free flow of views and information. So much of this saga has been played out in the full glare of the media it might be useful to place your questions in some kind of context.

For example, who are you? what is your interest? Are you a journo?

Might get some answers then,

Regards,

Nige

dunc0936

30th Sep 2008, 10:36

erh nope, not Journo, I'm a deprtment Manager for a large Tesco Store. Been on here and Arrse for some time now, I started the thread about a protest march on Arrse,

My interest is the RAF and the Armed forces in General, my brother serves in the RAF, but due to poor eye sight I have been unable to do so myself, beleive me I have tried everyway possible,

if you look at me website www.ukcoldwar.org.uk (http://www.ukcoldwar.org.uk) might give you a better idea about my interests, there are a few people like magic mushroom who might be able to describe me better than I can do myself lol

Regards

Duncan

any other questions please pm me happy to answer

Distant Voice

30th Sep 2008, 10:56

TD

It is clear from your posting that Group Captain (Now Air Commadore) xxxxxx was in-charge of the Nimrod IPT when they issued the RTI to reactivate the SCP in April 2005, following the XV227 incident in late 2004. This was done at a time when it was known that serveral ducts in the hot air system were "life expired and require replacement". In fact the 5-way duct (adjacent to No. 7 tank dry bay) had a safe life and inspection period determined back in 1982 of 3200hrs and 800hrs respectively, however this was never translated into any maintenance documentation. In 2005 the fleet had exceeded 3200hrs.

Furthermore, after a second duct failure and pressure testing of selected ducts from XV227 and XV228 showed corrosion and cracking (5-way duct included), confirming the ealier fears, the IPT allowed the use of the SCP to continue. On 3rd Sept 2006 the SCP was switched off, never to be used again. TOO LATE IPTL.

Here is a question for the IPTL. If you have a problem with a power socket in your house, and a specilatist electrician tells you that because of age, and the risk of fire, all sockets in your house should be replaced, do you.

(a) Stop using the sockets and have them all replaced? or
(b) Replace the defective socket and continue to use the others?

If you select (b) and your house burns down you are NEGLIGENT. If lives are lost its MANSLAUGHTER.

DV

dunc0936

30th Sep 2008, 11:55

dv the last part of your last post rings so true, having read the BOI and the qq report this point seem to ring true throughout the whole thread. I would go a long way to say that this problem is not the fault of the hard working and dedicated ground crew but much higher up the ladder.

Duncan

Winco

30th Sep 2008, 15:29

DV
I think you have just hit the nail fair and square on the head, well done, can't better that at all.

KIT
What on earth is your problem? Perhaps you could advise us all on here whereabouts it is, that you are getting a lot of stick? Maybe you could point out where there is a single derogatory comment about the groundcrew on this forum? You won't be able too, because there are NONE! No one has ever laid or apportioned any blame whatsoever to any groundcrew on this forum for the loss of 230. On the contrary infact, there has been nothing but praise from everyone, aircrew and groundcrew alike, about how you have had to deal with an extremely difficult situation in appalling circumstances. So, stop feeling sorry for yourself, and thinking that everyone is against you, because they are not, and certainly not me. I am sure that you do a great job on the aircraft, but you now need to stop telling us.

EdSett,

I spoke to a Sqn Ldr (aircrew) mate a Kinloss last night, and we discussed your comment about nobody in the crew rooms interested in PPrune. Well, I'm not sure what crewroom you visit, but on his squadron, it is still the main topic of conversation. (He is a Nav, but hey, he is still at the coal face) Are you sure you arn't the CAS??!!

TD
Keep up the fantastic work Sir!

Hugh S

30th Sep 2008, 20:24

DV,

There are quite a few aircrew who are completely happy with the safety of the Nimrod and I am very happy for them. There are also a reasonable number, just like me, who have completed their own personal risk assessment of flying the Nimrod. They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think they they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.

If the pressure placed on the MOD by the likes of TD, Tuc, Nige, yourself and many others helps to improve the safety of the Nimrod then even EdSett must surely be happy. Keep up the good work!

Duncan,

My instinct was to ignore your post or make a purile but witty response, but I'm not AIDU so I have taken your post seriously.

The Nimrod engineering school has been in here at Kinloss for years and provides top-quality specialist training for Nimrod engineers. The school is staffed mainly by experience Nimrod tradesmen with years of experience.

The training referred to in the BOI is in a specific area and involves components that are very rarely replaced. Although this is a problem that needs to be addressed, it is a failing of senior management - NOT the Nimrod school.

Just for the record I'm aircrew and am a firm believer in the ability and dedication of the line engineers.

Distant Voice

30th Sep 2008, 20:52

Hugh S;

Thank you for the comments. That's all we are trying to do, keep up the pressure to improve safety, and keep you informed of all the facts we uncover. No one is knocking what you do and what the ground crews do, it his highly commendable and respected. We simply want you to be in a position to make the call based on the best information available.

Thanks again.

DV

davejb

30th Sep 2008, 21:39

As an outsider it's hard to gauge the opinion on the squadrons - mind you, it's a lot easier now there are so few to canvas - I post on this thread because I still care about old crewmates and friends who are still in, I imagine they might feel somewhat constrained in what they say online...I don't.

Airworthiness is regulated, although like all regs when you get right down to the nitty gritty some of the regs turn into some sort of cloudbank.

The RAF has clearly gone for saving money instead of making sure the airworthiness of the 6 or 7 aircraft currently in service is maintained, after a long period of 'all okay so far' things have turned round and bitten them on the aspidistra...to the extent that a genuine 'proper' fix is probably too expensive. I see the current prevarication as a means to spin out the life of MR2 to ensure MR4 finally gets into service before MR2 goes to the knacker's yard. (or MR5 arrives - a rebadged Chipmunk with a very powerful set of binos in the back.) Call me a cynic.

What the RAF/MOD has done over decades is despicable, although you can understand perhaps that the defence budget never allowed the RAF to do otherwise. Money is the root of all imcompetence, to paraphrase.

Dunc - well done for trying, as a complete outsider, to understand this stuff. Ultimately this is about money and backbone - nobody failed to do things through malice, although stupidity is another matter. They probably felt virtuous as they cut essential programs by saying they were the guys willing to make the hard choices - this is a term the banking industry of the western economies is now learning means 'self opinionated, clueless w***er'. This is a boom time for soup, if the late 1920's early 30's are anything to go by.

Nimrod groundies are taught a lot of stuff, it turns out that some pretty important things were omitted and it took a while to find that out because the people supposedly teaching it said they WERE teaching it. (Confusingly it seems they weren't. You kind of have to wonder if they were a bit dim, lying, or hoping a magic flying pony or similar would sort it all out like happens on the TV.) Unfortunately when this was finally realised nobody sorted it out quickly enough, possibly because they were also a bit dim (lazy is an alternative opinion), or they didn't have the cash/backing to do anything about it....which is what I'd put my fiver on to be honest.

Historically this isn't really that unusual - it's only the advent of instant worldwide chat via the internet that has allowed the dirty washing to be displayed so readily and that has allowedgeneral revulsion to be expressed at the apparently callous attitude to the loss of life...the guys bombing the Belgian bridges in Fairey Battles got a few gongs and the odd barrack block named after them (not my idea of an honour, mind)? What about the Coastal crews who were tasked to take Hudsons over Germany to make the numbers up - not much H&S there, I'd suggest! I think it's a sign of progress that we are so concerned about this sort of thing, compared to previous generations.

EdSett100

30th Sep 2008, 23:03

Winco, Hugh S, I wrote:The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here.

OK, granted, an unknown percentage of my colleagues visit the site. It could be most of them or it could be just a few. Who knows? The point I was trying to make is that there is clearly not a significant number of Nimrod people actively arguing against me, in writing, here. That is a fact. If people read this discussion and feel strongly against my opinion, they are welcome to get stuck in and join the debate. Other subjects on pprune (JPA, data security, etc) attract many serving critics, but its not happening here. So far, it appears to me that the majority of the foremost critics of current Nimrod safety are not currently associated with the aircraft. I therefore suggest that most of my colleagues are content that the aircraft is safe, but I do not have absolute proof, of course.

I simply responded to DV's assertion that I believe that I am right and that everyone else is wrong. I questioned his use of the word, "everyone".

Hugh S I am intrigued by your comment:There are also a reasonable number, just like me, who have completed their own personal risk assessment of flying the Nimrod. They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think they they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.
Firstly, the Safety Case is currently being re-written, with aircrew representation (Staneval) right there in the mix with the engineers and safety analysts. Speak with the Staneval to get the info you and the others need to decide for yourself. Staneval has all the reports to hand together with the expertise to answer any queries you have. Your last sentence is self-contradictory. Either you are happy it is safe and you are not taking unacceptable risks or you are not happy it is safe and you are taking unacceptable risks. If its of any help to you, BAeS, IPT, FSW and Staneval all have a stake and a veto. None of them are saying its unsafe and using their veto. I suggest you trust their individual and collective judgement.

DV, et al, are asking good questions and testing the robustness of the judgement. I try to answer them with facts.

Finally, I am on a flying sqn and I am current.

dunc0936

30th Sep 2008, 23:22

EdSett100

did you view my comments/questions about the ac, as i said I'm in no position to critises anyone say for the Government and maybe the heads of the MOD etc, even though I have never served and am trying to learn this as an outsider I have total repsect for the Ground and aircrews and would find it very hard to accept that the ac is less safe now than it was before the tragic loss of XV230. I personally want to just keep the pressure on the government over funding of the armed forces and to me this is a good case of what happens when funding is cut

Regards

Duncan

Chugalug2

1st Oct 2008, 00:19

davejb:

Ultimately this is about money and backbone - nobody failed to do things through malice, although stupidity is another matter....
Historically this isn't really that unusual - it's only the advent of instant worldwide chat via the internet that has allowed the dirty washing to be displayed so readily and that has allowedgeneral revulsion to be expressed at the apparently callous attitude to the loss of life...the guys bombing the Belgian bridges in Fairey Battles got a few gongs and the odd barrack block named after them...

Sorry dave, but I can't agree with you there;
1. When a Senior Officer hounds a subordinate and attempts to get him dismissed for carrying out his legal obligations to enforce the MOD's own Airworthiness Regulations because he has ruled that it is an offence to comply with the mandated rules that ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations), I call that malice.
2. The Fairey Battles were shot down in their droves because they were no match for the Me109s given that there is only so much that one LAC gunner armed with a Lewis gun can achieve, not because they lacked for airworthiness per se. Oh, and there were no gongs either for said LAC gunners, as I was bitterly reminded by one at a Squadron reunion recently!
3. Agree your point about the Internet though, thank God for that and also for the 800 year old institution of HM Coroners. :ok:

Hugh S

1st Oct 2008, 09:26

EdSett,

I appreciate that your post was written at midnight but if you re-read my comments you will see that I am not contradicting myself but stating a fact:

They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think that they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.

The safety case is being re-written but had not been re-written. The fact that there have been a number of fuel leaks due to technical or engineering failures and also a number hot air leaks for the same reason, coupled with a flawed original safety case leave me not completely happy.

I am, however, content that the aircraft is safe enough for me to continue flying. I have read all of the incident reports, the QQ reports and, of course, the BoI, and am fully aware of the background and potential implications of them all.

It is the fact that information has been hidden from those that need it that worries me most. I understand that there are a number of reasons why details need to be kept away from the public domain but the FoI Act removes those arguments. Keeping crews in the dark leads to mistrust.

I appreciate that hindsight is a lovely thing but please explain why I should have complete confidence in a system that approved the reinstatement of the SCP with the catastrophic results that followed.

If you are in a currently in a flying tour and are saying that you are completely happy with the safety of the aircraft then I am pleased for you. I am also currently on a Nimrod squadron and believe there is still work to be done, and I am certainly not alone.

dunc0936

1st Oct 2008, 09:50

why I should have complete confidence in a system that approved the reinstatement of the SCP with the catastrophic results that followed

Hugh, from a civies point of view, it is totally right to question safety, it should not be seen as causing trouble, a ac type could have been flying for 40yrs with almost no accidents and no crashes but it would in my opinion a idiot who blindly accepts that safety record. as the BOI said you can have a old aircraft that is in excellent condition but also a brand new part that has a major fault hidden in it..... so questioning how safe something is just common sense, does not mean in your cause you won't fly in her

Duncan

Winco

5th Oct 2008, 17:59

EdSett100

I would agree with you that the majority of those critics of Nimrod safety are 'ex' Nimrod operators like myself, however, that is not a sufficiently sound reason to simply just ignore us all and dismiss what we say. Many of us have a lot of experience in aviation, including a considerable amount of time on Nimrod, and I think that our genuine concern for the safety of our fellow aviators is worthy of comment, irrespective of whether it agrees with you or not.

The one thing that you cannot argue against is the fact that one aircraft and crew was lost, and one aircraft came pretty close to following it. And yet all you can say (and keep on saying) is that the aircraft is safe and that the aircrew are happy to fly it. Hugh S certainly dosn't appear to share your views does he? Or is he a 'one off?'

I would suggest to you that many aircrew were certainly NOT happy to fly it, and some are still not happy to fly it!

Now, you can argue all day and all night long about how safe YOU believe the aircraft to be and you can try your best to convince us that the majority of your colleagues feel the same however, truthfully................

How many current aircrew have reservations about the aircrafts safety?
How many QFIs left, as a direct result of the loss of 230?
How many Navs, AEOs and AEOps left following the loss of 230?
And finally, how many aircrew have expressed serious concerns over the aircrafts safety and/or asked to be taken off Nimrod flying duties?

You claim that there is not a problem amongst the aircrew at Kinloss because nobody (from Kinloss anyway) has come onto this forum and disagreed with you, therefore you must be correct. Maybe your right, I don't know. However, by the very same argument, I don't see dozens of aircrew from Kinloss coming on this forum agreeing with you either!

The Winco

EdSett100

5th Oct 2008, 21:39

Winco:And yet all you can say (and keep on saying) is that the aircraft is safe No, that is not ALL I say. Yes, I do constantly re-iterate my firm belief that it has been safe since the accident, but I usually provide some detailed information why this is this case. I have explained why a worst case HP duct failure is not catastrophic. DV will tell you that if its not deemed "catastrophic" it doesn't meet the unsafe criteria. I have referred to the QQ combustion analysis commissioned by the BOI to prove that AVTUR does not ignite on surfaces at moderate temperatures thus proving that the fuel leak on XV235 did not warrant an emergency landing and it was not similar to XV230. I don't make this stuff up (others have done the work) to prove my point.
I don't dismiss you, and I think you are being unfair by suggesting that I do. I do, however, dismiss pointless rhetoric and personal attacks. I've known for some time that you are ex-Nimrod, and you are a very experienced pilot, but these facts alone are not a qualification to enter into a debate about current safety issues. Bring some technical input to the table and I will answer you. By all means ask questions, but do not say I am wrong when I give factual answers:

How many current aircrew have reservations about the aircrafts safety? I don't know and none of us can know for sure, but they are not showing it to me, casually as a colleague, or their execs, properly. Crewroom chat should be taken further if it represents real unease. I cannot believe that junior officers have not got the guts to go to their execs with their worries. So, I can only presume that, in general, there is an air of confidence about safety. I do accept that the flow of information to the aircrew (and their families) could and should be better and the crewroom chat that I have witnessed has been more about those communication failings than the core issue of safety itself.How many QFIs left, as a direct result of the loss of 230?
A few have left since Sep 06. I believe there might be one or two more, soon. Unless they are duplicitous, which I doubt, their stated reasons for leaving were not about safety. Netjets. How many Navs, AEOs and AEOps left following the loss of 230?
And finally, how many aircrew have expressed serious concerns over the aircrafts safety and/or asked to be taken off Nimrod flying duties?
I don't know the answer to either question. Do you? Anyway, safety is not established by popular opinion. It doesn't matter a jot how many people agree with me or you. Technical analysis provides the answer and this has been done. It could be communicated better, though.

Regards
Ed

tucumseh

6th Oct 2008, 07:18

"it has been safe since the accident"

While the MoD may be correct in saying it is safer since the accident, I very much doubt if they have had the time or resources to get to the point where they can demonstrate this in accordance with their regulations. I have noted here, on many threads, that a key component and long standing MoD weakness is the requirement to maintain the build standard, as the current BS and use MUST be reflected in the Safety Case. If it is not, then how can MoD demonstrate compliance?

I do note however, that the only Defence Standard describing the procedures has recently been placed (in part) on the D/Stan website. This, 14 years after it was announced it was to be cancelled and not replaced. (Which illustrates the mentality we're dealing with. Beancounter - "What's the purpose of this Def Stan?". Engineer - "It's the bible on maintaining airworthiness". BC - "Ditch it". Result? Last update, 1991). The Standard remains valid(ish) but, laughably, MoD cannot find the 20 specifications it calls up (which form a book bigger than the Def Stan itself); without which efficient and timely implementation can only be carried out by some old dinosaur who knows (or wrote) the specs. In practice, what happens is that someone with no training whatsoever tries to make it up as he goes along. Yet this is a discipline that, 20 years ago, you weren't allowed to go near unless you'd (a) worked hands-on with the subject equipment or aircraft, (b) been an engineering project manager on scores of projects and (c) proven yourself capable of making good decisions. In short, these people were hand-picked as airworthiness was deemed rather important. Which leads us to the competence, experience and corporate knowledge components of airworthiness.

And it is in the application of airworthiness regulations that MoD criticised itself . Some posters on pprune agreed, many disagreed. But focussing on the "It's safe now" mantra only diverts attention away from the BoI comments and the QC's remit. I suspect such diversion is the remit or agenda of those seconded to the review. They certainly don't seem to be doing much about ACM Loader's 2nd statement, that the wider impact of these failures across other aircraft fleets be assessed.

Winco

6th Oct 2008, 09:49

EdSet100

I have come to the conclusion that you are NOT who you say you are on this forum, and I'll tell you why.

You say that whenever a technical point is brought to the table, you answer it. So let me put this to you;
In post 1233 You were asked by TSM what method of leak detection was used at Kinloss on the Nimrod.
In post 1238 you were asked the same by myself.
In post 1258 I asked you again.
In post 1292 Terry K Rumble asked you exactly the same.
Any idea why you have NOT replied to any of those requests?
Could it be that you don't know and to get on the phone to someone at Kinloss is a bit difficult? Maybe it is too embarrassing to disclose what (if any) methods are currently used or were being used when 230 was lost. So what is to be Ed?

The other thing is that you have displayed an unbelievable degree of knowledge on this forum regarding the Nimrod. Indeeed, I and many others, have applauded you for it, and I would go as far as to say that I do regard you as an expert on the aircraft, but too much of an expert to be on a flying sqn at Kinloss. The thing is, you seem to know just a little bit too much frankly. The average B cat on the squadron is a pretty clued up chap. An A cat is considerably better and knows considerably more, but you exceed all of them, and thats why I don't believe you are just a 'normal sqn shag!' You know too much Ed!

You constantly refer to reports by civilian agencies when it suits your cause, and yet you dismiss the same company when they produce a report that doesn't assist you in your cause. QQ is a classic case. Most people know that AVTUR on its own won't ignite - indeed, unless you have the right conditions it's a bu**er to ignite, we don't need telling that. However, spray it under pressure out into a mist, mix it something pretty hot and whilst it might not be the ideal conditions, there is a strong possibility that it will go bang! But, because you cannot 'technically' prove that on 230, you dismiss it. Wrong.

Your comment about the crew of 235 sickens me frankly, and I regard it as an insult to the captain and his crew. I have not spoken to anyone who disagrees with his/their actions during this incident. They did exactly the right thing, declared an emergency and landed the jet quickly, perfect, and I take my hat off to them all. I would have done the exact same thing. Whoever feels it necessary to criticise them clearly knows little, if anything, about flying aircraft.

So, you are on a Nimrod squadron and you don't know how many QFIs you have left the fleet? It has been common knowledge for some time that the Nimrod fleet does not any QFIs left, and if you don't know that, then you cannot be who you say. Everyone knows! It's even been in the press! The same goes for the rest of the aircrew. You don't know how many have quit or expressed concern over the aircrafts safety? I wonder where do spend all your days at Kinloss?

The one point I agree with you is when you say 'safety is not established by popular opinion' You are of course totally correct. However, safety is not established or improved by shoving your head up your arse and hoping it goes away either!

So, who are you? Well, I think you are probably someone working for the MOD or perhaps a staff officer working for someone close to the top of the food chain, desperately trying to push out the 'official views' onto the rest of us. Sorry Ed, it hasn't worked with me, and I think most people on here will soon reach the same conclusion as I have about your true identity.

The Winco

betty swallox

6th Oct 2008, 13:52

Winco.
Not sure why you feel the need to stir it again. ALL the QFIs that left in the last while did NOT leave due to 230. They all have their reasons, but 230 was not one of them. They are all personal friends of mine. The end.
BS

Duncan D'Sorderlee

6th Oct 2008, 18:16

If the Nimrod fleet has no QFIs left, how come there are 4 courses on the OCU? 10 pilots in all!

Duncs

:ok:

Froobs

6th Oct 2008, 18:57

Oh dear Winco, I think you are a Liney Walt. An officer calling the aircraft a jet? Standards old chap.

DaveyBoy

6th Oct 2008, 23:13

I don't see dozens of aircrew from Kinloss coming on this forum agreeing with you either!

I agree with EdSett100.

betty swallox

7th Oct 2008, 08:41

So Winco.
There are no Nimrod MR2 QFIs? "I think you will find" there are 5, yes 5 at Kinloss presently. Your lack of awereness on this worries me in the respect that does this mean all your other arguments are premised on inconsistencies? I'll leave the readership to decide...
BS

Distant Voice

7th Oct 2008, 10:17

Let's forget about QFI's for a moment and talk about actions to bring the fleet to ALARP. Gp Capt Hickman stated at the inquest that in the move towards ALARP several hot air ducts (37) were to be replaced in each aircraft by the end of the year (now known to be the financial year). Can someone tell me how many aircraft have had their ducts replaced as part of this programme, to date?

DV

betty swallox

7th Oct 2008, 13:00

Let's not forget about QFIs. Let's start to have truth on this thread, rather than nonsense and scaremongering.
BS

Mad_Mark

7th Oct 2008, 13:42

Ed - I agree with you (well most of what you say).

Winco - You're a tw@!

DV - Are you trying to divert the readers attention away from one of your supporters when he has been proved to be spouting ****e? This joins a lot of the other ****e that he, you and the others that are not Nimrod crew, groundies or even at ISK have been spouting. Your cause for us and the aircraft is valiant, but it is gravely damaged, as are your reputations, amongst many of us with daily contact with the Mighty Hunter when you constantly post 'facts' that are completely wrong.

As has been said above, if we have no QFI's here then who in hell is training all the student pilots going through 42 at the moment? If there are so many aircrew leaving the fleet because of the aircraft then how come I know of so few? Most are leaving for many other reasons, those I know of that are leaving or have left due to 'aircraft safety' concerns can be counted on fewer fingers than I have on one hand - and no, I'm not from Buckie so I only have the normal number of fingers per hand!

MadMark!!! :mad:

Hugh S

7th Oct 2008, 16:07

Although the Winco hasn't really thought through his previous post I think tw@! is a little extreme; "Muppet" would have sufficed.

His comments regarding QFIs are about 12 months out of date: at one stage there was a serious potential problem due to the exodus of QFIs but what the PVR taketh, the CFS giveth back.

As outsiders TD, Winco, DV etc. cannot be in possession of all the current facts but ultimately they are not stirring the sh*t out of malice. If their perseverance puts pressure on the MoD to ensure that aircraft is made as safe as possible and the risk ALARP then how can it be a bad thing?

For the record, I also agree with MOST of EdSett's comments. However, I am still concerned about the safety of the aircraft, despite EdSett's reassurances and my own experience with thousands of hours on type. My worries are based as much on the MoD's lack of transparency and apparent attempts to hide the truth as the physical problems that we already know about.

davejb

7th Oct 2008, 19:32

Well said Hugh S.

Occasionally people get carried away - that doesn't mean they're bad people, or that everything they say is wrong...we all spout balls now and then.

(Granted some of us make a hobby of it).

Dave

zedder

7th Oct 2008, 21:10

But guys, Winco is getting all his gen from a mate on the 'coal face':

EdSett,
I spoke to a Sqn Ldr (aircrew) mate at Kinloss last night, and we discussed your comment about nobody in the crew rooms interested in PPrune. Well, I'm not sure what crewroom you visit, but on his squadron, it is still the main topic of conversation. (He is a Nav, but hey, he is still at the coal face) Are you sure you aren't the CAS??!!

As we all know, the pool of Sqn Ldr Navs at Kinloss, let alone on the 'coal face' is actually pretty small. Given that 1 got posted down South a couple of weeks ago, and that 1 is female, that leaves quite a small number even if you interpret 'coal face' in the loosest terms. I know for a fact that PPrune is not the main topic of conversation in our crewroom, so that reduces the list by 3. I'm also assured that it is not the main topic of conversation on the painting by numbers Sqn, so another 3 off the list. That leaves a very small list, most of whom I've talked to.

Now how big is the pool of Wg Cdr Nimrod Pilots who left the fleet in 1996 and that now fly for BA and come from Geordie Land?

Mad_Mark

7th Oct 2008, 21:38

Hugh...
Although the Winco hasn't really thought through his previous post I think tw@! is a little extreme; "Muppet" would have sufficed.
My feelings about Winco are not based solely on his last post but on his posting history, and I stand by them. He may well be a very nice chap, but that is not how he comes across to me. I am sure that some of you may think the same of me, we are all entitled to our personal opinions.

MadMark!!! :mad:

betty swallox

8th Oct 2008, 10:53

Oh come on you lot. Stop adopting the nanny-state pretence of mutual apologising and back slapping...Winco was WRONG in his postulation of MR2 QFIs, or the lack thereof. The end.

Yashin

8th Oct 2008, 11:06

Ah but Betty, how many QFIs have sideburns like yours I wonder? ;)

DaveyBoy

8th Oct 2008, 18:06

Strangely enough, Zedder, PPRuNe is not the main topic of conversation in our crewroom either, and I think that covers all bases!

That is not to say that it this thread isn't occasionally mentioned in briefs to correct misinformation, of course, but that's a long way from the 'entire Squadron hanging on every word written here' image that some might imagine!

EdSett100

8th Oct 2008, 20:04

Winco,
Despite the writings of others, here, regarding the QFI situation, I will reply to your post and hopefully close off some of your avenues of interest.

1. I stated in my previous message that I usually provide some detailed information. I do not profess, as you have just asserted, to answer fully every question in this discussion. So, when you and others asked me about my use of the word, "appropriate" when detecting leaks, that was the best word I could think of at the time without giving falsehoods. Anyway, I have now done the courtesy of finding the answer for you, TSM and Terry Rumble, whom I well remember from earlier days on the fleet. Incidentally, to close off one avenue, I didn't phone Kinloss, because I am here, and I took a short walk to speak with people who know the answer:

The first method of leak detection is done by the crew if they see (visually or on a gauge) or smell a fuel leak. The aircrew manual has some excellent guidance in this respect and if the leak is from a feed pipe it will be stopped in all cases. Hopefully the location of the leak will then be passed to the ground crew and the problem is resolved. A leak from the unpressurized refuel system or a fuselage tank is unlikely to be detected in the air. Wing tank leaks will be seen while airborne, but might not be stoppable without dumping from that tank, which can be done if fuel reserves permit. Any leak that is not detected by the crew will be discovered by the ground crew when they see drips or traces of fuel in the area of the source. On most occasions the pipework in that area will be pressurized and subject to flow and that should provide the source. If that fails, the visual search area will expand and more pipes will be pressurized. If, despite all this, the leak source still cannot be identified, the pipes will be examined for damage, alignment at couplings and torque settings at the couplings. If this doesn't give the answer, the couplings that are most likely to be the source will be disassembled and refitted with new seals. If fuel vapour is sensed throughout the aircraft during flight, there are a few known causes: back draft through the DMVC (engines at idle or depressurized flight), or an open beam window (aircraft depressurized) from a leak that is external to the cabin. We have 2 tanks within the pressure shell but they are double skinned with an overboard vent in case of a tank leak, so sensing a leak from either tank while airborne is not normally possible unless the backdraft occurs. Overall, I am content that we, the aircrew and the groundcrew, have the appropriate measures in place to detect fuel leaks. There is only one outstanding measure, that can be used only in extremis when everything I have mentioned has been already done and the aircraft leaks again during the next flight. This can only be caused by airborne flexing (more than 1 degree) of a serviceable coupling, which will give only a very small leak (otherwise we would have found it on the ground). In this very rare event, we have no choice but to wrap the suspect couplings in poly bags as rudimentary leak detectors and fly the aircraft for a short flight. Bearing in mind that everything else has been already been done, this is a very simple, yet efffective, method of both containing an insignificant leak and providing us with its location. Its use requires high level authority. I am not aware of its use on the Nimrod.

2. Please do not get hung up over who I might be. Its what I write that matters. Thank you for your comments in your 2nd paragraph, but I think you might have done my mates on the sqns a dis-service; one dog loving eng in particular.

I will continue my reply, particularly about 235 and 230, in another message later.

Regards
Ed

Charlie Luncher

8th Oct 2008, 21:55

Mad Mark
But you have been to Buckie and Ill wager you remember how hard it is to get a Taxi early in the morning:ugh:. You may even be lucky seeing Ricky Purkiss trying to blend in with the locals:E.

The Sad state of the conspiracy inspired Sun/Mirror readers is to state your "expert" opinion and not even consider the impact or truth. QQ is not renowned for hiring the cream of UK science for the job, but more obsessed by budgets and the next report when I worked within the beast.
DV, Winco do you ever consider your direct impact on the people you claim to be looking out for? Because I feel your good has be outdone by your dramatic f'ups.
Just an opinion from a simple man not an "expert"
Charlie sends

Distant Voice

9th Oct 2008, 03:28

Charlie L

Perhaps you could expand on some of my "dramatic f'ups"

DV

Tappers Dad

9th Oct 2008, 12:38

From the RAF Kinloss website

RAF Kinloss - History (http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafkinloss/aboutus/history.cfm)

Since their introduction Nimrods have an excellent safety record, although two tragic accidents stand out in the memories of all service personnel. In 1980 two pilots Flight Lieutenant Anthony and Flying Officer Belcher were killed when their aircraft struck birds on take off and crashed in woods to the east of Kinloss airfield. The remainder of the crew survived. In 1995 at the Toronto Airshow, the entire Nimrod Display team were killed when their Nimrod crashed.

Strange I thought had been another one since then.

Terry K Rumble

9th Oct 2008, 12:40

Ed,

Thank you for your reply and for the responce to my question about checking for fuel leaks on the aircraft, although I wish, with hindsight, that I hadn't bothered. It has clearly caused a degree of aggression and upset amongst some people, and for that I'm sorry.

I have no intention of taking sides here, but I would say that in my opinion, everyone is searching for the same ultimate goal. Some people are obviously more placid in the way they post, and certainly some others are far more 'forthright' shall we say, but at the end of the day, everyone is entitled to their opinion irrespective of what the rest of us might think. Calling our fellow aviators names is pointless, and serves no useful purpose at all.

So, maybe its time for us all just to take a step back, and cut each other a bit of slack as far as the name calling and open aggression is concerned? It will not do any of us any good whatsoever in our overwhelming single aim of getting a safer aircraft for you guys to fly.

Charlie,
I'm not sure if any of us think (before posting) about the direct impact any of our posts might have on the guys still on the fleet. That said, I do genuinly think that the majority of the stuff written here is meant with the very best of intentions, and not with malice in any way. I agree that it doesn't always come over that way, but I'm sure that it's all well meant. That's not the case as far as the name calling goes though, and I think it's time for it to stop, please.

Thanks once again Ed, and Best wishes to all at Kinloss
TKR

EdSett100

9th Oct 2008, 21:55

TD,
Oh dear, oh dear. There can be no acceptable reason for that error. I know someone who can get that changed asap. Something tells me that his section will be inundated with messages tomorrow. If its not corrected within a week, feel free to write to the Stn Cdr and it will then be done.

Ed

Tappers Dad

10th Oct 2008, 07:02

Thanks Ed I will take you advice

Distant Voice

13th Oct 2008, 20:39

Having re-read the transcript of Gp Capt Hickman's evidence at the inquest, it is clear that in the eyes of the IPTL the Nimrod was not ALARP in May and is still not ALARP.

HICKMAN: "In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, they are still hot and have not been switched off. Now these are measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not at ALARP."

As the replacement programme of hot air pipes will not be completed until mid-2009, it is clear where we are today regarding a/c safety.

DV

EdSett100

13th Oct 2008, 21:42

DV,
It is true that the replacement programme is not yet complete. It is also true that there are pipes that are not switched off. These are the pipes that I referred to in an earlier post in that the worst case failure of any one of those old fully charged pipes is not catastrophic. IMHO the Gp Capt didn't represent the facts as well as he could. Although it is a fact that replacement pipes will reduce the risk of a blow out, the resultant effect of the programme is to place the aircraft in the most safe condition with respect to duct failures. Therefore, in theory, our risk of duct failures is not ALARP (ie. is not most safe). However, we don't require the most safe/lowest risk condition for the ducts (as previously explained) in order for us to continue flying during the replacement programme.

You haven't yet answered my earlier question about the scope of the QQ report that stated that a pipe failure is catastrophic. I haven't seen that particular report. Which pipes did they refer to?

Regards
Ed Sett

DaveyBoy

13th Oct 2008, 22:31

Ed,

Would it not be more accurate to say that, in terms of hot air ducts at least, the risk is currently ALARP because the risk from the old pipes is, as you say, tolerable, and it is neither reasonable nor practical to replace them all within a shorter time period than we are doing due to the 'down-time' and manpower that would require? Especially when we have to balance that against the need to keep aircraft available for operations.

Equally, by the middle of next year, will the risk not still be ALARP, because all the ducts will have been replaced, we will be at a lower risk state, and we will have reached that state in a time that was reasonable and practical given the resources and commitments we had?

Dave

EdSett100

13th Oct 2008, 22:57

Dave,
Yes, I would agree. ALARP uses the word, "practical", which brings in many factors, as explained in the JSP and mentioned by you, including the dreaded "cost-benefit analysis" As I said, the Gp Capt didn't do the aircraft many favours. Good point.

Regards
Ed

Safety_Helmut

14th Oct 2008, 12:42

Yes, I would agree. ALARP uses the word, "practical
No, Ed, it doesn't ! P is for practicable, which is different in meaning to practical.

S_H

OmegaV6

14th Oct 2008, 13:03

Before things get out of hand ... :)

practical or practicable
If something is practical it is useful and likely to be successful; if it is practicable it can be carried out, or put into practice: You have made a practical suggestion, but I wonder if in this case it will be practicable?

© From the Hutchinson Encyclopaedia.
Helicon Publishing LTD 2008. (http://www.helicon.co.uk/)
All rights reserved

Distant Voice

14th Oct 2008, 14:36

Ed Sett100.

Please obtain a print out from the Cassandra Hazard Log database for Hazard H66. This covers ducts in Zones 413 and 443.

Sometimes you remind me of the man who thought he had cancer. As long as he didn't go to the doctor to have it confirmed he was contented. Sometimes you have to face up to reality.

DV

Papa Whisky Alpha

14th Oct 2008, 19:31

PRACTICABLE/PRACTICAL

Whilst following with interest the arguments regarding the differences between Practical and Practicable the term ALARP does not use either as a stand alone term, but is referring to Reasonably Practicable which has a different meaning.

Where the requirement comply is "so far as is Practicable" then compliance is required in the light of current knowledge and invention regardless of cost. (In every day speak - if it can be done it must be done).

Where the requirement is to comply "so far as Reasonably Practicable" this implies that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the sacrifices necessary to avert the risk in the other. If it can be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them -the risk being insignificant in relation to the cost then the person concerned has discharged their duties. This judgement must be made anterior to any accident or incident which arises.

The term Reasonably Practicable implies that an employer must undertake a risk assessment of his undertaking and put in place measures to ensure that risk is reduced to ALARP. this is also a requirement under the Management of Health and Safety at Work regulations 1999.

In the Coroners' Court the IPTL was forced to admit that the aircraft was not risk assessed ALARP but they were working towards it. It was also admitted that the hazard analysis by BAE systems was different to the results used, the likelyhood having been reduced making less urgent the response. The ITPL also admitted that he did not know what the requirements were on the employer under the Health and Safety at Work,etc Act 1974.

Chugalug2

14th Oct 2008, 21:38

Distant Voice:

Sometimes you have to face up to reality.

While we brace ourselves for yet another trip down Semantics Lane could I remind us all that there is clear testimony on this and other threads that the mandated airworthiness protection of Nimrod and every other aircraft in the Military Fleets has been systematically and deliberately compromised over the last two decades by the MOD? Arguing about the pressure of water supplied to the Firefighters' hoses seems irrelevant to me if little or none of the water is aimed at putting out the fire devouring your house. The Nimrod was not the first, nor I fear the last, to suffer so tragically from this neglect. It may yet prove to not even being the one to suffer the greatest loss of life from this cause. The solution lies not in the rate of replacement of Nimrod plumbing, vital though that may be, but in the speedy removal of UK Military Airworthiness Authority from the MOD and into an independent MAA.

EdSett100

15th Oct 2008, 22:39

DV:Please obtain a print out from the Cassandra Hazard Log database for Hazard H66. This covers ducts in Zones 413 and 443.

I'll do that, thank you.

Re your 2nd para: It is more a case that I am someone who has been told he has cancer, by someone one who reads a Family Health Encyclopedia. Can we stop this personal stuff, please? Its tiresome.

Its obvious that you and I do not agree, but that doesn't give either of us the right to submit personal criticisms. If you want me to agree that the aircraft is unsafe, you must do it by technical persuasion. You have offered Hazard H66. I will do you the courtesy of reading it.

Regards
Ed

OilCan

15th Oct 2008, 22:53

...advantage Edset..:ok:

..new balls please..:p

:D:D:D:E

RAF_Techie101

16th Oct 2008, 08:50

Ahh yes - Ed Balls...

Tappers Dad

17th Oct 2008, 21:49

If anyone wants to read the 1st report on the stripdown of the MR2 by QQ it waa posted here todaay. Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Flight Safety (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/AirSafetyandAviationPublications/FlightSafety)

QinetiQ: Nimrod Ageing Aircraft Systems Audit

These reports concern the Nimrod Ageing Aircraft Audit during the period from contract award on 1st August to 1st September 2008. The first report details the Audit, while the second report summarises the sentencing undertaken by engineering maintenance specialists to investigate the 19 example observations reported in the Audit.

Nimrod Ageing Aircraft Audit Report PDF [2.5 MB] (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/24B29818-8953-42B1-874A-C983316C6C2F/0/nimrod_ageing_aircraft_audit_report.pdf)
Nimrod Ageing Aircraft Sentencing Report PDF [3.9 MB] (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9979AC87-DB51-4FC0-A48C-724480B21091/0/nimrod_ageing_aircraft_sentencing_report.pdf)

Tappers Dad

18th Oct 2008, 08:22

Unrecorded faults on spy plane

The Press Association: Unrecorded faults on spy plane (http://ukpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5gEfj2yz4eTdJSh3C7cZvUKwRM7Ng)
8.40am

An inspection of an operational Nimrod spy plane revealed "a number of faults" which had not been recorded in its maintenance documents, the MoD said.

Nobody In Particular

18th Oct 2008, 09:43

Without knowing the exact details in the case of the Nimrod, I have to say that I would not be at all surprised. The state of an old fleet probably means that the aircraft documentaion would be a foot thick if everything got recorded and then people would become quite blase about it!! The tolerance level of what needs recording and what does not is down to professional judgement of the technicians and engineers maintaining the aircraft, iaw approved data, whom I have absolutely no doubt will not ignore significant 'faults' dents. scratches etc. Have a look at any current fleet (Typhoon included)and you would probably find the same..... no sensationalism here I'm afraid.

NIP

tucumseh

18th Oct 2008, 09:56

The report notes the following DEFECTS.

Corroded earthing straps.
Broken earthing straps.

Oh dear. But never fear, Mins(AF) have already ruled that such defects (meaning the quality of the design is the root cause, as opposed to servicing problems) are of no consequence. Wonder what BAeS think of this?

You may as well ditch engineers and place administrators in charge of engineering and airworthiness decisions. Oh, wait a minute……….

dunc0936

19th Oct 2008, 12:04

just a question, this thread has been going for a long time now, with lots of very well informed people contributing, do we have any idea if the top brass or MOD are reading or listening to any of this, is there a campaign group for the minrod?

Duncan

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU

19th Oct 2008, 12:15

dunc0936. There seems to be a very vocal campaign group for permanently grounding (no pun on bonding braids intended) the aeroplane.

dunc0936

19th Oct 2008, 12:35

true, i personally dont want to see them grounded, from the little knowledge i have gained there is no need, what i meant was just to make sure the money is there to maintain them correctly and let the crews do their jobs correctly without the bean counters telling them no.

Duncan

bong-bing

19th Oct 2008, 18:44

For :mad:rSake ?

I personally have had enough of the slanging matches re the Rod.

Time to move on people. Surely there is more to your life than this.

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

Tappers Dad

19th Oct 2008, 20:03

Bong-Bing
You have only done two posts and yet you say I personally have had enough of the slanging matches re the Rod.

Then stop reading them .

airsound

20th Oct 2008, 08:39

TD, thanks as ever for your continuing vigilance in keeping us up to date
If anyone wants to read the 1st report on the stripdown of the MR2 by QQ it waa posted here todaay. Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Flight Safety
When I followed that link, I noted with some amusement the item above the Qinetiq audit, which the dear old Ministry had titled
Nimrod VX235 Flight Safety Investigation Report

so I followed that, to find (increased font size is mine)
Nimrod VX235 Flight Safety Investigation Report
Due to continuing public interest in Nimrod airworthiness, it has been decided that the final Flight Safety Investigation Report into the fuel leak that occurred on Nimrod MR2 XV235 on 5 November 2007 will be released.
The report itself, unsurprisingly, has the id correct.

I asked myself - how can they be so totally inattentive to important detail?

But then I remembered the recent evidence at the Hercules inquest from Chris Protheroe, a senior Accident Inspector at the AAIB. He was obliged to tell the Coroner that the rather important word 'not' had been missed out of two significant conclusions in his written report - causing the Coroner to remark that Mr Protheroe might be an expert on accidents, but was clearly not expert on proof-reading.

Seems you can't take anything at face value.....

airsound

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 09:15

goes back to my last post, not the one that got deleted, clearly, we are better at getting the fact right than some at the MOD lol

Mad_Mark

20th Oct 2008, 09:39

Is that it Airsound? A typo? Nothing else? You're hanging onto a typo?

Beggars belief really.

Not only is this just a typo but it was probably made by a civilian web-minor (not even a web-master) that knows nothing of the RAF let alone the Nimrod or the particular incident!

Come on Airsound, you really are clutching at tiny straws with which to have a go at authority/MOD with :ugh:

MadMark!!! :mad:

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 09:39

No on that point I do agree with you, ok you could argue that with something as important as this then perhaps proof reading first might not have been a bad idea, but there are bigger and more important issues we as a group are trying to deal with here (you included)

I was just wondering yesterday weather or not it might be interesting for those who wanted to, to meet up, put faces to names and discuss this over a few drinks. There some very well informed people on here.... I leave myself out of that as I’m still learning. But this safety issue might not be a bad thing to look at right across the RAF and help out the ground crews when they hit a wall due either to money or bureaucracy.

What do people think?

Duncan

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 11:16

ha ha yes supposed i deserve that one. Though i will say i have never tried to proclaim to be even remotely an expect in the subject just asking i hope some sensible questions from an outsiders point of view

Duncan

airsound

20th Oct 2008, 11:59

Thanks M+0.5 and MM - I knew I could count on you. But I'd forgotten just how quick your QRA was. Keep up the good work.

airsound

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 12:32

yes indeed a list would be good, there are some people on here i have a lot of respect for. But you might know the true experts better than me?

Duncan

tucumseh

20th Oct 2008, 12:59

They made a typo? So what?

As someone with airworthiness delegation, I always preferred Boscombe Down to get it right when they said “the aircraft is safe” or “the aircraft is not safe”.

However, I concede that this matters not a jot, following 2* and 4* rulings that (a) Boscombe can be completely ignored if they say “not” and (b) the aircraft can be delivered and contract paid off in the full knowledge that it is neither airworthy nor fit for purpose. Thus leaving the RTSA completely in the clag, forcing him to either delay RTS (career limiting) or sign a hefty wad of Service Deviations in which the terms “Operational Constraint / Limitation” and “safety” feature heavily.

As I said, I disagreed with the rulings, but I know there are many here who seemingly agree.

MerlinV8

20th Oct 2008, 13:25

Correct me if I'm wrong but aren't Nimrods about forty years old or somthing? I didn't think they operated them in this day and age? I remember watching doco's when I was a little kid with them in and they were old then!

davejb

20th Oct 2008, 13:36

Yes they're old, and if things had gone to plan they'd have been replaced by a largely rebuilt version. Old aircraft aren't that unusual - a good few of those shiny civvy passenger aircraft you see are old too!

airsound

20th Oct 2008, 13:40

M and a half

You really are a tad wearisome, and I didn’t particularly want to engage with you. But you’ve said two things that are plain wrong. Well, maybe more than two, but these two will do for the time being.
1.the report .... was used by Airsound to indicate a lack of attention to detail by those writing the report. If you had troubled to read what I said before disagreeing with it, you might have noticed that I said
The report itself, unsurprisingly, has the id correct.

2. You imply that I claim to be a Nimrod expert. I am not, and have not claimed to be. I have never flown in a Nimrod, and I am not an engineer.

But I do claim to be a reasonable observer, researcher and reporter. Also, I probably spent more time at the Nimrod Inquest than anyone except the families, their representatives and the Inquest staff. Were you there? I don’t think so, although I wouldn’t necessarily know. I was also present when the MoD presented its lengthy and rather strange briefing on the release of the BoI report.

airsound

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 14:43

will have to look at putting that list together? Excel spread sheet

Duncan

MerlinV8

20th Oct 2008, 15:04

Good point, even 747s are pretty old in design now I guess, 1968 wasn't it? but the nimrods remind me of the old comet, probably because of the engine placement, don't get me wrong, I would love to see a nimrod fly overhead, as much as a P51 :eek:

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 16:22

there is nothing wrong with the age as far as i can see, i did post some time ago saying that from where i saw it the problem was lack of money to allow the ground crew to be able to do their job correctly and give the aircraft the tlc they needed. Look at the B52 some of them are as old and yet you dont here of them falling out of the sky!

Duncan

Squidlord

20th Oct 2008, 21:39

A couple of months since I've been able to contribute to this thread so some of the posts quoted below are quite old.

Chugalug2:

If there were anything to learn from this and similar threads it is that the Regulations are sound enough, it is their implementation that is at fault.

I understand this is not a view shared by Haddon-Cave (Nimrod Review). Apparently, he thinks JSP 553 is a bit of a mess (I agree). Incidentally, I have heard a rumour that legislation specifically to sort out military aviation safety/airworthiness is a possibility.

Chugalug2 (two months ago) also suggested a debate about "airworthiness" but nothing came of it, so I won't bite.

Tapper's Dad:

Why don't the MOD ask the experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments then. Why spend thousands and thousands asking QQ to do reports to then turn round and say sorry we are ignoring your advice.

davejb:

if the report is somehow 'wrong' due to QQ etc being numpties, then why were they asked to do the review in the first place? (Don't hire someone to investigate something then dismiss their report because it doesn't say what you wanted it to!)

I wonder if there's a misunderstanding over QQ's role in all of this. The primary reason QQ are retained by the MoD to provide advice is their independence (from the MoD and BAE, as the Design Organisation). Of course, to provide worthwhile advice, QQ have to be experts to some degree. But I agree with EdSett when he says they are not the definitive experts. The MoD & BAE hold that status. It is definitely the case that QQ do (and always will) make recommendations that for some reason or other (e.g., it could be ignorance of all the facts or sheer mistakes) are inappropriate. That's not a criticism, it's a fact of life (I think QQ do a very good job in general).

I think it would be entirely remiss of the MoD to retain QQ's (safety) services and then ignore their advice. But I'm not aware of that ever happening. In my experience, the MoD takes QQ's advice very seriously. Sometimes it discounts it but (again, in my experience) only after very serious consideration.

DaveyBoy:

Would it not be more accurate to say that, in terms of hot air ducts at least, the risk is currently ALARP because the risk from the old pipes is, as you say, tolerable, and it is neither reasonable nor practical to replace them all within a shorter time period than we are doing due to the 'down-time' and manpower that would require? Especially when we have to balance that against the need to keep aircraft available for operations.

Equally, by the middle of next year, will the risk not still be ALARP, because all the ducts will have been replaced, we will be at a lower risk state, and we will have reached that state in a time that was reasonable and practical given the resources and commitments we had?

I have always suspected that DaveyBoy's analysis is the correct one. Unfortunately, the MoD's ability, including Hickman's (as EdSett says), to explain this sort of thing is limited.

dunc0936:

just a question, this thread has been going for a long time now, with lots of very well informed people contributing, do we have any idea if the top brass or MOD are reading or listening to any of this, is there a campaign group for the minrod?

Some relatively senior people involved with, e.g., Nimrod and Hercules certainly do keep an eye on the debates here on PPRune. Unfortunately, I get the impression they see it a cesspool. Of course, there's a load of crap posted here, but I think they should be able to wade through that and take account of much of the very good stuff.

dunc0936

20th Oct 2008, 22:35

Squidlord

I agree with what you say, I have printed off this whole thread and read it from start to finish, hence why I said in my post about some of the interested people and regular posters meeting up say in London for a chat of a drink to talk in person, I personally would find it interesting to meet the people behind the names......

As I have said I have nothing to do with the Nimrod other than a general interest, so I don't proclaim to even remotely understand the Nimrod fully, though I'm getting better understanding with all the doc's Im being supplied lol

Duncan

Chugalug2

21st Oct 2008, 20:38

Welcome back Squidlord and thanks for the mention! I would say that "airworthiness" has indeed been debated, if not here then on the Parliamentary Questions thread, since your last visit. Perhaps your concern rather is what is to be the future of UK Military Airworthiness Regulation? That indeed is a big debate. Should it continue under the MOD, where self regulation has been so tragically shown to have failed, or placed with a separate and independent MAA? The coroner's verdict on the Hercules accident, and the Nimrod Review (Mr Haddon-Cave QC)may well have views on that. Interesting though that you already have information on the QC's views re Airworthiness Regulations. Are there any other of his feelings that you can share with us?

tucumseh

22nd Oct 2008, 06:06

Squidlord

I think it would be entirely remiss of the MoD to retain QQ's (safety) services and then ignore their advice. But I'm not aware of that ever happening. In my experience, the MoD takes QQ's advice very seriously. Sometimes it discounts it but (again, in my experience) only after very serious consideration.

No argument with much of what you say, but surely the classic example of MoD ignoring Boscombe Down airworthiness advice is Chinook, when the latter “grounded” the PE Fleet a matter of days before the Mull of Kintyre accident. MoD defends their decision to this day, even though the reasoning has never been explained.

Another example relates indirectly to the Tornado/Patriot accident in 2003, whereby the PE 2* in charge of Chinook (!*!*) ruled 4 years previously that it was sufficient for a system (IFF) to be physically safe, but Boscombe’s complaint that it was functionally unsafe could be ignored – thus leaving the aircraft vulnerable to “friendly fire”. Still the only example I’ve known of Boscombe being so exasperated they used the word “crap” to describe the system, in the draft MAR recommendation report. (Removed under pressure from PE’s non-technical/anti-safety beancounting brigade, who trotted out the old “safe in peacetime” argument; which rather ignores the mandated requirement for the a/c to have the functionality in order to train for warfighting. This is precisely the argument which proves that DEC and IPT are wholly involved in “fitness for purpose” – see Hercules thread. Can you imagine the politicians saying “Go to War” and 2Gp replying “OK, give us a couple of years while we scheme and embody a few hundred modifications into the simulator and kit you bought us 10 years ago for this purpose, then train the aircrew”?).

I can assure you the original decision was NOT taken after serious consideration. Even in hindsight, and following the criticism in the BoI report, PE/DPA 2* and 4* continued to uphold the underlying concept – functional safety can be ignored (i.e. trading out Performance) if it means Time and Cost can be maintained. Four successive Mins(AF) have also ruled this, in writing. Of course, it is not generally ignored, but my experience tells me never to assume both physical and functional safety have been satisfied, especially if the functionality is primarily used in wartime.

Oh, and unlike MoD who destroy all such records (the audit trail) after 5 years, people with airworthiness delegation are encouraged from an early age to retain evidence of their decisions for all time, in case the finger is pointed at a later date. The above example remains a simple matter of written record.

KeepItTidy

24th Oct 2008, 01:08

Are we finished yet ?

dunc0936

24th Oct 2008, 08:42

I hope so mate as I did not really understand most of what has been said in the last few posts, way above my head

Duncan

Tappers Dad

24th Oct 2008, 09:29

KeepItTidy
Are we finished yet ?

Not at all I could tell you all about the meeting held to decide if the Nimrod was ALARP 1 month after Ainsworth said on the day of the Inquest verdict the a/c was ALARP

But I don't want you to get bored so I wil pass it on to those who are interested.

Distant Voice

24th Oct 2008, 12:16

Just read the Nimrod AAA reports, and whilst I am still concerned about the Nimrod's airworthiness, I have now become concerned about the standard of servicing across "the other side of the airfield"

XV236 had just completed a MAJOR servicing, and without going too deep below the surface we find:

(1) Corrosion on hydraulic couplings between locking wire and coupling.
(2) Out of spec scratches on pressure bulk-head
(3) Misalignment of heat shield on hot air duct.
(4) Lack of clearance between hot air pipes and fuel lines.
(5) Corrosion on earthing tags
(6) Crushed conduit
(7) Unclamped cables
(8) Damaged boot and oil contamination on electrical plug.

Perhaps there is a "typo" in the report. It should read pre Major, not post Major.

I note that in the QQ report of Feb 2006, it was recommended that a teardown be carried out on wing tank joints of Nimrods being returned for MK4 conversion. The objective being to assess the condition of several major primary features of the primary structure of the Nimrod wings. I wonder if that was ever carried out? Probably not, as it would be unlikely to support any airworthiness claim by MoD.

DV

DaveyBoy

24th Oct 2008, 12:16

I would be interested to see details of the meeting, Graham, and I'm sure that many other people who have an interest in the MR2 would be as well. I don't think you would bore anyone by posting them here, and I believe that KeepItTidy's comment referred to the people taking up space on this thread trading personal insults instead of sticking to what we should be discussing -- which is exactly the sort of thing you are talking about.

spanners123

24th Oct 2008, 12:23

DV,
Not sure you have read the report correctly as it states:-
'The tear down aircraft XV236 arrived on 29 August having successfully completed a post-major servicing test flight'

Missing out test flight does make a difference!
:=

Distant Voice

24th Oct 2008, 12:47

Spanners123.

I have assumed that a post Major test flight is the test flight carried out immediately after a Major. If I am wrong - Sorry.

DV

nigegilb

24th Oct 2008, 13:48

TD, I understand that MR2 is ALARP according to the RAF but that, wait for it, ALARP plus a new standard will be hitting the streets soon.

Hope it makes sense to someone.......

DaveyBoy

24th Oct 2008, 13:49

A post-major test flight is indeed the test flight carried out immediately after a major. XV236 was made to carry out such a flight before being sent down for the forensic teardown. However, it had not recently completed major servicing.

EdSett100

24th Oct 2008, 16:29

XV236 was sent for teardown instead of a Major servicing. The Post Major Air Test was carried out to ensure that the aircraft was representative of the fleet with respect to its functionality. I understand that it passed the test.

Regards
Ed Sett

KeepItTidy

27th Oct 2008, 21:03

XV236 was due to go into major but instead was torn down instead probably to save money. In reality it is unfair to judge the fleet on an aircraft that is 4 years from its last major servicing so like every aircraft that approaches that time its not exactley new and things like corrosion and normal wear and tear does exist. I think the MOD screwed up there as well without saying anything too much its made a bit more work that intended, but thats not for me to judge on.

Wrathmonk

27th Oct 2008, 21:49

Cautiously entering the lions den .... but surely using an airframe that was scheduled to go in for a major is the best frame to be torn down as it should show the 'worst case' position (and, therefore, in theory the rest of the fleet should be in a better position). If they tore down a frame that had just come out of a major wouldn't that of had the potential of hiding all sorts of "normal corrosion" and "wear and tear" issues that had recently been fixed/replaced as part of the servicing schedule? Or am I reading too much into this?

EdSett100

27th Oct 2008, 22:51

Wrathmonk, your point is spot on. The RAF put up the worst case for examination.

Where it is hurting us, now, is that a number of small defects have been found by an independent organization that have to be addressed. So, in response to the report we are now checking all of the other jets in the same places and dealing with each arising by repair or deferment.

It is important to note that our worst aircraft in terms of hours flown since its last deep servicing has, so far, produced nothing of any significance in airworthiness or routine maintenance aspects.

Where is this project leading us?

On the basis that XV236 will be the fleet leader as it is torn down and all the others will then be checked (and repaired where necessary) where XV236 is less than perfect, we will end up with a fleet of Nimrods that are all nearly perfect but will each have a bulging list of acceptable deferred faults. Just in time to scrap them.

Regards
Ed Sett

KeepItTidy

1st Nov 2008, 02:26

Well for once light at end of tunnel few months of no time off and much hard work by many and of course the vodka swilling monkeys playing there part , for the Nimrod fleet the last few months we still there and doing good and when required we can still pull together and thats the good thing that comes out in all of it.
Downside people pi55ed off and it dont help these days we have 1/4 engineers we had like 10 years ago.
Happy Balance needs to be restored very soon , like Techie Pay or flying pay for engineers , we could call it FlytechiePaywithoutflying, a few quid a day extra for staying in school a few years extra. Admin people get paid the same now , good on them i congratulate but it has devalued the techie status and this in my place of work has really pissed people off. Question is to the board that decide what trade value is has to decide if technical trades are worth it ?

enginesuck

1st Nov 2008, 09:08

and that has what exactly to do with this thread?

tucumseh

1st Nov 2008, 09:19

and that has what exactly to do with this thread?

In my opinion, everything, as you need engineers to keep an aircraft serviceable and airworthy. In saying this, I accept MoD disagrees with me but live in the hope Mr Haddon-Cave will mention this in his report and, for example, the practice of permitting administrators to make or over-rule engineering decisions, leading to deaths, ceases.

nigegilb

1st Nov 2008, 11:01

I am sure MoD are ecstatic now that Tuc is on first name terms with Haddon-Cave......I am actually looking forward to this report.

Engineers at Kinloss get my vote for a pay rise and a LOT more recognition.

What happened to Nimrod IPTL BTW?

andgo

1st Nov 2008, 17:43

Believe he still has trouble talking, still got both feet in his mouth:E

Tappers Dad

2nd Nov 2008, 09:23

News of the World
By Robert Kellaway, Defence Correspondent, 02/11/2008

Nimrods grounded

BRITISH forces in Afghanistan had no airborne surveillance cover for TWO WEEKS after fuel gauge faults grounded two 30-year-old Nimrod planes last month.

Senior officers believe it compromised safety of our forces on the ground.

An insider said: “Bosses claim unmanned aerial vehicles covered them. But RAF Nimrods have specialist crews who listen in, observe targets and direct ops. The Taliban rightly fear them.”

An MoD spokesman said aircraft were regularly sent to the UK for maintenance but added: “We do not comment on the detail of operational deployments.”

The MoD already faces £20m lawsuits after a Nimrod crashed in Southern Afghanistan, killing all 14 on board two years ago—after a fuel leak.

Duncan D'Sorderlee

2nd Nov 2008, 10:03

TD,

The News of the World is wrong.

Duncs:ok:

Tappers Dad

2nd Nov 2008, 10:08

Duncan D'Sorderlee

What make you say that, were you out there ?

Duncan D'Sorderlee

2nd Nov 2008, 10:11

TD,

The Nimrod Force is not grounded.

Duncs:ok:

Biggus

2nd Nov 2008, 11:46

DD

The article didn't say the 'Nimrod Force' was grounded. It said that two specific aircraft were grounded - due to a fuel gauge problem. If the article had said 'unserviceable and not fit to fly' it might have been technically more accurate. Perhaps the word grounded was used so the general public could understand, although the term is emotive.

As to the truth of the article.....who knows, but why make it up....???

The MOD spokemans comments are interesting....'aircraft were regularly sent to the UK for maintenance'....implies there may be some element of truth to the story. As always, a grain of truth and a whole load of spin???

RAF_Techie101

2nd Nov 2008, 13:18

As always, one tiny element truth and the rest made up to make a dramatic story. As someone who WAS out there, I can honestly tell you to just ignore the tabloids here.

Duncan D'Sorderlee

2nd Nov 2008, 13:33

Biggus,

You are indeed correct to state that the term 'grounded' is emotive; that is why I stated that the article was incorrect. If NoftheW had said something different, they might have been correct; they didn't, hence the article was wrong.

However, I do take your point.

Duncs:ok:

Distant Voice

2nd Nov 2008, 17:04

As I understand it the article is not correct. Nimrods were returned to Kinloss because of an additional task place on the fleet in North Atlantic and there were not enough serviceable aircraft back home to cover it.

DV

Tappers Dad

2nd Nov 2008, 21:05

It doesn't surprise me the story is incorrect, I had cause to question a Nimrod related story last year that had incorrrect "facts " in it and had an apology letter from them.

RAF_Techie101

2nd Nov 2008, 21:36

TD - I thank you for not believing word for word the stories published in the newspapers. I understand the situation you're in, and despite disagreeing on a lot of things, I appreciate your ability to see both sides of the story, as most of the newspapers seem intent on discrediting the Nimrod fleet at every opportunity.

KeepItTidy

2nd Nov 2008, 22:23

Techie 101 yep have to agree there too. To use the term grounded when it was not the case is a bit over dramatic and unsensitive and just shows the desperation of some people to make a story up. I now sympathise for these famous people who get slandered so the press can make a few quid.
Yet in GW2 the MOD were treated to very special treatment from the forces to get there stories, just a shame it dont work the other way around. I would be less inclined to give them anything from now on if thats the way they are going to be. No doubt ill have half the family calling me up now asking why the fleet is grounded as it was in the news.....

yawn

Laboratoryqueen

3rd Nov 2008, 21:33

Just been having a quick read through of this thread since I last had a wander over here and some of the comments are simply astounding.

The fact that the Nimrod being used in the fly past for the Queens celebrations. It would have been a crime not to have her involved, if she were absent from the fly past it would have provided more fuel to the media scare tactics. And in my opinion she looked fantastic. The comments made by the BBC in relation to her appearance and direct comments to the loss of crew 3 were out of place and should never have been made, but that is my opinion.

In relation to family not being invited to the 120 reunion, why would we be included? It was a private affair for those serving and ex serving squadron personnel. We all have been given full invitations to attend any family days, open days and other such events. We also are welcome any time we may wish to visit 120, to see the various memorials in place for the crew or simply to call in for a coffee.

I've just spent another week at Kinloss and as usual made very welcome. This time having my kids with me, who were also made very welcome, given a full tour of a Nimrod, inside and out, and given the full works. Thanks guys, they loved it and now fully understand why I feel the way I do about those at ISK. 120 and Kinloss in general have not forgotten us and never will. They continue to show support and continue to care, as I always will for them, you could do with some better coffee though :O

As for what gets said in the papers and in the media. I've never taken notice of what journos say, most is based on very loose facts, the majority is written to scare us and to elicit a negative reaction. All the good which the fleet does tends to be ignored. They are very adept at mis-quoting.

As always, my deepest respect to all the groundcrew and the growbags :D