Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)

[nigegilb]

May I respectfully suggest that if you are not close to the centre of this tragedy probably best not to sound off about the delay. I understand what Lon Mil is saying. Not necessarily helpful to get angry without knowing the full facts. All the same, very difficult situation

[El Grifo]

Finally got a reply from the Beeb relating to my and many others complaint about their "shoot from the hip" reporting in the early period after the crash.

Here it is exactly as I received it :-

Thank you for your email.

We can't agree that, as a story breaks, coverage should be limited to what is officially announced by the Ministry of Defence. However, the last thing we would want to do is to distress the families of our Armed Forces, to whom the nation owes so much. That is why we take great care in our reporting of casualties.

Little was known for certain for several hours after the MoD's announcement that 14 lives had been lost in an air crash in Afghanistan. This is often the case in conflict reporting, where there may be only the most sketchy details of major developments for hours or days after they have happened. BBC correspondents therefore try to distinguish on air between what is known and what is not; what is fact and what is speculation; to correctly attribute claims and, also, to report accurately what credible sources are saying about an event.

So, while other channels were saying the aircraft was probably a Hercules, our defence correspondent was able to say he was getting "strong guidance from a supposedly reliable defence source" that it was not. In saying it could be a Chinook helicopter, we made clear this was what sources were saying rather than an official announcement or established fact. On News 24, for instance, our defence correspondent said: "We don't know yet for certain whether it was a Chinook. The MoD isn't saying. It's an indication we've had that it might have been."

While the US military has guidelines that aircraft type should be released within two hours of news of a crash, the MoD do not release information until the next of kin have been informed. The MoD’s concern is one shared by the BBC and set out in guidelines agreed by the two organisations. No one should hear a close relative named in a TV or radio broadcast as killed in action without first having been properly, and privately, informed.

On the narrow issue of releasing names, therefore, the BBC does wait until the official announcement. We feel, though, that a wider policy of restricting our coverage to official releases is not realistic in today's world of instant communication from the battlefield and multiple sources of information which are often, on the web, directly accessible to our viewers and listeners. The issues you raise are the subject of constant debate and discussion within the BBC and we will continue to weigh very carefully how we report British casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thank you, once more, for taking the time to contact the BBC with your feedback.

Regards
BBC Information
__________________________________________
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ - World Wide Wonderland

[Chris Halpin]

The reply I recieved. Only a little different from yours El Grifo, I think everyone will get the canned response.

Thank you for your email.

Little was known for certain for several hours after the MoD's announcement that 14 lives had been lost in an air crash in Afghanistan. This is often the case in conflict reporting, where there may be only the most sketchy details of major developments for hours or days after they have happened. BBC correspondents therefore try to distinguish on air between what is known and what is not; what is fact and what is speculation; to correctly attribute claims and, also, to report accurately what credible sources are saying about an event.

So, while other channels were saying the aircraft was probably a Hercules, our defence correspondent was able to say he was getting "strong guidance from a supposedly reliable defence source" that it was not. In saying it could be a Chinook helicopter, we made clear this was what sources were saying rather than an official announcement or established fact. On News 24, for instance, our defence correspondent said: "We don't know yet for certain whether it was a Chinook. The MoD isn't saying. It's an indication we've had that it might have been."

While the US military has guidelines that aircraft type should be released within two hours of news of a crash, the MoD do not release information until the next of kin have been informed. The MoD's concern is one shared by the BBC and set out in guidelines agreed by the two organisations. No one should hear a close relative named in a TV or radio broadcast as killed in action without first having been properly, and privately, informed.

On the narrow issue of releasing names, therefore, the BBC does wait until the official announcement. We feel, though, that a wider policy of restricting our coverage to official releases is not realistic in today's world of instant communication from the battlefield and multiple sources of information which are often, on the web, directly accessible to our viewers and listeners. The issues you raise are the subject of constant debate and discussion within the BBC and we will continue to weigh very carefully how we report British casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Thank you, once more, for taking the time to contact the BBC.

[Always a Sapper]

Finally got a reply from the Beeb relating to my and many others complaint about their "shoot from the hip" reporting in the early period after the crash.
Here it is exactly as I received it :-
Thank you for your email.
We can't agree that, as a story breaks, coverage should be limited to what is officially announced by the Ministry of Defence. However, the last thing we would want to do is to distress the families of our Armed Forces, to whom the nation owes so much. That is why we take great care in our reporting of casualties.....

..............n which are often, on the web, directly accessible to our viewers and listeners. The issues you raise are the subject of constant debate and discussion within the BBC and we will continue to weigh very carefully how we report British casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thank you, once more, for taking the time to contact the BBC with your feedback.
Regards
BBC Information
__________________________________________
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ - World Wide Wonderland


Mmm funny enough exactly the same as the one I recieved in my mail box today.... Must be the party line no doubt cleared by nue ......

[El Grifo]

Must be the party line no doubt cleared by nue ......

nue................ nue.................

run that by me again pls. :}

[gravity victim]

My reply (just arrived from the Beeb) says:


"So, while other channels were saying the aircraft was probably a Hercules, our defence correspondent was able to say he was getting "strong guidance from a supposedly reliable defence source" that it was not. In saying it could be a Chinook helicopter, we made clear this was what sources were saying rather than an official announcement or established fact. On News 24, for instance, our defence correspondent said: "We don't know yet for certain whether it was a Chinook. The MoD isn't saying. It's an indication we've had that it might have been."

A pretty weak explanation, which does not justify their damaging speculation. 'Not a Hercules" is a very big jump to 'could be a Chinook'.

[nigegilb]

I think part of the explanation for jumping from Herc to Chinook is the description by MoD that an aircraft had gone down. No clarification on helicopter or fixed wing. Once it was established that Hercs were safe, the amount of people missing probably led to conjecture that it was likely to be a Chinook. Not at all helpful to the relatives, and something that the Beeb should not have transmitted. But it also comes down to the initial handling by the MoD. No clarity and hours slipping by.

Like I have said before, I do not think this was handled well by either the MoD or the Media.

[Jackonicko]

I wonder whether any of those who angrily wrote to the Beeb, whining and demanding an explanation and apology for their speculation did the same to whoever is ultimately responsible for the MoD press desk, which was at least equally culpable.

Thought not.

After all, journos are the real enemy......

[flipster]

Are you getting a complex Jacko?

Please don't

Flipster

[Wader2]

Don't think the MoD Press Desk get away with anything. They get plenty of feedback but, unlike the Beeb, there are internal comms as well as Pprune.

[Tourist]

Jacko(ff?)
Finally you undrstand!:ok:

[Guernsey Girl II]

Jacko, I sent an email to the BBC and I didn’t send one to the MOD press office.

I didn’t send one to the press office because, as I understand it, they were complying with the long standing principal of no details until NOK have been informed.

The BBC (and other UK news outlets) calling UDI due to the fact that ‘the Americans do it differently’ doesn’t wash with me.
Would you rather that MOD had, 1 hour in, announced that it was a MR2 just ‘cause the US do it that way’ and have 50 ish sets of loved ones in Moray waiting for the knock at the door from Officers in No1s.

As it stands, the ‘Nations Flag Ship News Service’ had god knows how many people at Odiham worried out of there minds for no good reason apart from being first and dam the accuracy! Such is the demand to feed the god of 24 hour ‘perma-news’. I expect better from the BBC.
:mad:

[Chugalug2]

The BBC (and other UK news outlets) calling UDI due to the fact that ‘the Americans do it differently’ doesn’t wash with me.
Would you rather that MOD had, 1 hour in, announced that it was a MR2 just ‘cause the US do it that way’ and have 50 ish sets of loved ones in Moray waiting for the knock at the door from Officers in No1s.

GG11, leopards don't change their spots, neither does the Beeb! In the early 70's we lost a Herc at Fairford, no survivors (No4 Prop went into reverse on a roller, not finger trouble, but a control line that jumped a pulley IIRC). This was about 1630 Hours. Within minutes the Beeb was on the line demanding details. They were politely told that these were not going to be available until later, as the priority was to get the Sqn Cdr, Staish, Padre and Queen Bee round to the various widows, partners, mums, dads etc. Could they please hold the story over until the (then) nine o'clock news so that these same people would not learn of the loss first from the Tele? "Not a chance, the public has a right to know, blah, blah". So while they were only half way through their sorry task, the Beeb fearlessly did their stuff. ITV News, by comparison, obliged as requested and waited until the (then) 10 o'clock bulletin. The strutting arrogance of the Beeb shines like a beacon over the decades!

[Colonal Mustard]

Where does the law stand with regards to having a tele NOT capable of receiving the beebs channels, would you then NOT be required to have a licence......? anyone know for certain:hmm:

[Pontius Navigator]

Sorry Colonel. Pay and smile.

[ZH875]

CM:

"If you use a TV or any other device to receive or record TV programmes (for example, a VCR, set-top box, DVD recorder or PC with a broadcast card) - you need a TV Licence. You are required by law to have one.":{

http://www.tvlicensing.co.uk/information/index.jsp

[C130 Techie]

Also received what seems to be the standard response from the BBC. Funny old thing it did not answer the points I made in my complaint, in particular regarding the use of the so called 'experts'.

GG II

That pretty much sums up my feelings

[Colonal Mustard]

Woot....just got my reply from the Beeb, Completely different reply from everyone else, they state.

"we are extremely sorry for the reporting of the crash of the aircraft in the manner we did, we will be looking to sack the correspondent concerned in this erroneous reporting and will be looking to.......Wait.......we have information from a credible defence correspondent that this kind of reply is not consistant with our standard replies and thus will be removed immediately, it is beyond our remit to apologise and we WILL be increasing our licence fee to pay for our MD`s increased salary........"

Yep, i got the standard Sh***:mad:

[enginesuck]

I am looking for a copy of the Repatriation Footage, does anybody know where i can find one or of a site that might host it?

[GlosMikeP]

I wonder whether any of those who angrily wrote to the Beeb, whining and demanding an explanation and apology for their speculation did the same to whoever is ultimately responsible for the MoD press desk, which was at least equally culpable.

Thought not.

After all, journos are the real enemy......
Journos the real enemy? No, I don't think so. As we discussed before on an old thread, comms are 2-way and the interface needs better definition. Hopefully MOD is working on that.

As it is, I believe there was sufficient concern on the inside that they didn't need pushing, just for once.

However, for my £1, the Beeb has been known for ever as the voice of reason, balance and accuracy. It's funded by the licence fee and therefore shouldn't feel the need to get the news first; it should feel obligated to get it right first time, every time though. The simple fact is, it didn't and lost credibility and goodwill (though not forever) as a result.

Both sides need to reflect on what went wrong and do something about it, perhaps paying some attention to the old adage we have one mouth but two ears.

[Chugalug2]

However, for my £1, the Beeb has been known for ever as the voice of reason, balance and accuracy. It's funded by the licence fee and therefore shouldn't feel the need to get the news first; it should feel obligated to get it right first time, every time though. The simple fact is, it didn't and lost credibility and goodwill (though not forever) as a result.


You are surely joking GMP. The Beeb has had a political agenda to the left of centre for years. It is so ridden with dogma and PC that to say it is the voice of reason, balance and accuracy makes me wonder if you really do listen to the message that is being so relentlessly pumped out. Not just the news and current affairs progs either. Woman's Hour, that years ago was a non-political general interest prog (I remember that marvelous actress Hattie Jacques talking about Tony Hancock's Half Hour for example), has now been taken over by the Feminist Brigade, with speakers (who invariably have American accents) forever moaning about men!. I don't for one minute deny the right of people that have such views to express them, I do protest that the method used is a compulsory annual tax on all TVs. Of course they would be hard put to fund such spiel in any other way, unless they found a billionaire who has a thing for Ermin! The days of glory, in WW2 and the 50's, are long gone. The Beeb is now a tree hugging socialist monster and needs putting down, like all corporations that proclaim themselves British, but are in fact anything but!

[pr00ne]

Chugalug2,

“The days of glory in WW2 and the 50’s are long gone”

WHAT!!!!!!!!!!

You think a war that claimed the lives of millions, ruined the lives of countless more and bankrupted half the western world was some kind of “glory”?

I grew up in the 50’s and if you think THEY were some kind of “glory” then you are harking back to a past that only ever existed in your imagination.

As for Woman’s hour, you clearly listen to a VERY different programme to the one I do

Whilst the likes of Greg Dyke most probably DID have a rather strange agenda he is long gone and largely discredited. I think you are being rather harsh on an organisation that takes pride in not presenting a visual or verbal equivalent of the Daily Mail.

[Chugalug2]

The days of glory I refer to are those of the BBC! In WW2 it was rightly seen throughout Occupied Europe as the voice of freedom and hope, particularly as it told it how it was (as far as was permitted), warts and all. That tradition continued after the war, and as the sole Broadcasting Authority it took its mandate from Lord Reith to heart, and strove to entertain and inform in as unbiased and objective way possible. With the appearance of competition that changed. Today it sees itself, I think, as the counterweight to the likes of the 'Daily Mail' and rival Broadcasters, and feels obliged to position itself left of centre. In other words what strove to be apolitical is now very political, and funded by a tax levied on everyone, no matter what their political convictions. I say that is wrong!
As to the 50s, I too grew up in that bleak decade. All the more tribute to the Beeb then that they cheered us up with quality broadcasting!

[BEagle]

Hmm, following the 50's thread drift, I recall the nation recovering from the first disastrous post-war labour government, but then later the other disasters of Beeching's short-sightedness and Duncan Sandys infamous 1957 Defence White Paper... Neither of whom even had the excuse of being labour politicians and thus not knowing any better.

But I was more interested in all the low-flying jets which flashed around Somerset, plus the products of Hornby Dublo and Airfix. The sun did indeed shine in summer, but it was VERY bleak in the winter. And my pocket money was 6d per week.... There was but ONE TV channel where I lived to be watched on our 12" Bush TV - which we didn't have until 1955. Merryfield GCA used to break through occasionally - and it needed a rotary converter as our electricity came from a 115V petrol generator. But Muffin the Mule was still legal in those days.

Many broadcasters of those days were ex-military and had a robust distaste for media queens. As the former have become fewer, the latter have increased their influence on the media in general. Not just the BBC.

In 1953 we were supposed to be in a 'New Elizabethan' age. But when the headmaster at my prep school told us, as 1960 came along, of all the wonders coming in the 1960s, he was a bit wrong there! Profumo Affaire, Great Train Robbery, the Krays.........

Back to the thread - any further official announcements regarding the specifics of the Nimrod accident?

[safetypee]

- any further official announcements regarding the specifics of the Nimrod accident?
One of the ‘Sundays’ has a plausible ‘official’ leak, which reports that there was fuel / fumes in the cabin resulting in fire / explosion. A tentative link with the recent AAR.

[BEagle]

safetypee, that's most interesting.

I recall when we first started refuelling Nimrods in the 1980s, there was a procedure we had to go through to check proper fuel transfer. "Fuel flows, fuel stops, fuel flows..." during the first stages of any onload to the Nirmod. A legacy of the somewhat rudimentary Malvinas war probe system and associated plumbing?

The check was later dropped once the systems had been improved, I understood?

My AAR role check included a Nimrod AEW3. Having watched it jousting away trying to catch the drogue as its front radome bow wave pushed it away, I always wondered how much fatigue the probe system was designed to take....

[GlosMikeP]

You are surely joking GMP. The Beeb has had a political agenda to the left of centre for years. It is so ridden with dogma and PC that to say it is the voice of reason, balance and accuracy makes me wonder if you really do listen to the message that is being so relentlessly pumped out. Not just the news and current affairs progs either. Woman's Hour, that years ago was a non-political general interest prog (I remember that marvelous actress Hattie Jacques talking about Tony Hancock's Half Hour for example), has now been taken over by the Feminist Brigade, with speakers (who invariably have American accents) forever moaning about men!........The days of glory, in WW2 and the 50's, are long gone. The Beeb is now a tree hugging socialist monster and needs putting down, like all corporations that proclaim themselves British, but are in fact anything but!

Nope. Deadly serious in fact. Yes they have problems but not I think as raw as you paint them. Conservatives complained of Beeb's left leaning when they were in power and it's not that unusual to hear this lot complaining of media bias against them (notably the Today Programme, on which Blair refuses to be interviewed!) now. With both sides complaining the conclusion I draw is that they've got a broad balance - which means I don't always agree with the tone of what I hear either.

Regrettably the PC agenda is everywhere these days, not just the Beeb so it isn't fair to knock them alone for it. It is unpalatable, though, I agree and removes facts. You have only to recall the discussion on the Dambusters' film on this site for that!

However, on the central theme, for the Nimrod they got it terribly wrong - not through bias but through missing the entire point of what they are there to do and how they should behave. For that they got a direct missive of invective from me (and lots of others), for which I got a wholly inadequate response of embarrassed 'doing their best to avoid the point'.

But would I rather listen to my local radio station for quality news? I don't think so. Would abandoning the licence fee improve the quality of reporting? I doubt it. Are all journos at fault and inherently bent on distortion. No. And do I have a better solution to how it should be done? No, but I did try to get a discussion on it moving here - so chip in if you do have a workable solution because no one else seems to have.

[Chugalug2]

Fair enough,GMP, we are going to have to agree to disagree! As to the Tories and New Labour complaining equally about the Beeb's bias, I would say that is probally due to the bias being to the left of both of them! Trying, like you, to bring all this back on thread, my contention is that this was not an isolated slip from normally impeccable standards, but pretty well par for the course.
My personal experience, posted 27th September, of a similar circumstance to the Nimrod loss, concentrated my mind wonderfully on the Beeb's haughty attitude to HM Forces. As the boss gave me the task of being responsible for liaising with the family of one of the deceased, I can only say that I have never felt more inadequate or humbled in the face of such grief stricken stalwart courage. But never mind that, we are the Beeb and we've got a scoop, nothing on the other side until four hours later! As the young people of today would say, Muppets (a term of ridicule and contempt, my Lord)!

[GlosMikeP]

.......concentrated my mind wonderfully on the Beeb's haughty attitude to HM Forces. As the boss gave me the task of being responsible for liaising with the family of one of the deceased, I can only say that I have never felt more inadequate or humbled in the face of such grief stricken stalwart courage.

But never mind that, we are the Beeb and we've got a scoop, nothing on the other side until four hours later! ......

Not easy, I agree. One of the points I made to the Beeb was high loss rate I'd known over the years and the misery misinformation causes.
But being wrong isn't failing to achieve balance - it's just being wrong.

Regarding the scoop point you make, that's precisely were I'm coming from. Since they are financed through the licence fee, they don't need scoops. They must achieve accuracy, though. If they have the right to demand payment of the licence fee (where independents have to make a commercial gain) they have the responsibility to get their story straight, and be known for doing so.

And on that point, we need to keep complaining when they get it wrong and cross reference back to other times where they got it wrong.

[ORAC]

BBC mounts court fight to keep 'critical' report secret
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/15/nbeeb15.xml)
The BBC has spent thousands of pounds of licence payers' money trying to block the release of a report which is believed to be highly critical of its Middle East coverage.

The corporation is mounting a landmark High Court action to prevent the release of The Balen Report under the Freedom of Information Act, despite the fact that BBC reporters often use the Act to pursue their journalism. The action will increase suspicions that the report, which is believed to run to 20,000 words, includes evidence of anti-Israeli bias in news programming.

The court case will have far reaching implications for the future working of the Act and the BBC. If the corporation loses, it will have to release thousands of pages of other documents that have been held back. Like all public bodies, the BBC is obliged to release information about itself under the Act. However, along with Channel 4, Britain's other public service broadcaster, it is allowed to hold back material that deals with the production of its art, entertainment and journalism.

The High Court action is the latest stage of a lengthy and expensive battle by Steven Sugar, a lawyer, to get access to the document, which was compiled by Malcolm Balen, a senior editorial adviser, in 2004. Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner, who is responsible for the workings of the Act, agreed with the BBC that the document, which examines hundreds of hours of its radio and television broadcasts, could be held back. However, Mr Sugar appealed and, after a two-day hearing at which the BBC was represented by two barristers, the Information Tribunal found in his favour. Mr Sugar said: "This is a serious report about a serious issue and has been compiled with public money. I lodged the request because I was concerned that the BBC's reporting of the second intifada was seriously unbalanced against Israel, but I think there are other issues at stake now in the light of the BBC's reaction."

The BBC's coverage of the Middle East has been frequently condemned for a perceived anti-Israeli bias. In 2004, for example, Barbara Plett, a Middle East correspondent, was criticised for revealing in an episode of Radio 4's From Our Own Correspondent that she had been moved to tears by the plight of the dying Yasser Arafat. MPs said it proved that the corporation was incapable of presenting a balanced account of issues in the Middle East.

Figures released by the Information Commissioner's Office show that there have been 105 complaints about the BBC's attitude to the Act since it came into force in January 2005. Only four of these have been dismissed and the rest are being examined. The BBC has lodged at least 25 complaints about the way other organisations have dealt with its requests.

The BBC declined to say how much it was spending on the High Court action. "We will be appealing the decision of the Information Tribunal," a spokesman said. "This case has wider implications relating to the way the Act applies to public broadcasters."

[Chugalug2]

Since they are financed through the licence fee, they don't need scoops. They must achieve accuracy, though. If they have the right to demand payment of the licence fee (where independents have to make a commercial gain) they have the responsibility to get their story straight, and be known for doing so.


That is exactly what they used to do, and were renowned for in the 40's and the 50's, as I have previously said. The fundamental reason why they no longer practice that, is that they now, unlike then, have an agenda. It is certainly left of centre and basically hostile to our armed forces. I remember the outrage when the Beeb reported the fortunes of the British and Argentinian forces in the Falklands Conflict in the same measured even handed way. Plenty of balance there, but not appreciated by anyone who felt a British affinity in the proceedings. Of course one must also recall the infamous Mr McDonald (?) at the MOD and his doom laden statements read out at very slow dictation speed! It is war that points up these shortcomings and attitudes, and this war will be no exception. As long as the BBC affords itself the luxury of having a corporate political view, rather than merely an objective one, the way they deal with the success or failure of our Armed Forces will be biased, and that bias will show whether intended or not. I think we have to have Armed Forces, we don't have to have a broadcaster funded by an annual tax on TVs! For my money, and maybe others' as well, they are past their sell by date. It would be ironic if the BBC is added to the casualty list of Bliars wars, would it not?

[fergineer]

Gentlemen the thread creep here is totally uncalled for, I lost friends of mine on the Nimrod and when I read the thread I expect to read things about the crash not how good cars were from another era, please have the respect for our dead breteren and remove all the posts about cars, you may start another thread if you need too.
Regards
Fergi

[PPRuNe Pop]

Agreed! Please stay on topic.

PPP

[BEagle]

DCO, Fergineer

[FJJP]

Ditto. I, too, lost a good friend in the accident...

[Chugalug2]

BBC mounts court fight to keep 'critical' report secret
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/10/15/nbeeb15.xml)

Thanks ORAC (great tag, I assume it's the desktop with attitude in Blake's 7?). Possibly more damning evidence to rid us of this turbulent beast one day! If the Beeb has a 'position' on the Middle East, you may be sure it has a position on every other major issue as well. I suspect that recruitment to this august body ensures that only people with 'issues' that coincide with the party line are admitted, and only then if they are from minority, ethnic or feminist backgrounds and most certainly no one who has been a paid mercenary as I was once denounced by a member of the "teaching" profession!

[GlosMikeP]

Agreed! Please stay on topic.

PPP
How is it off thread?

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=242005&page=2

[Chugalug2]

GMP: I think, and hope, that our exchanges re the BBC and its coverage of this accident are deemed on thread, but that the brief flurry of posts recalling 'all our yesterdays' of the 50s were rightly seen as off topic. If I am wrong in this assumption ppp, fergi, FJJP et al, please say so, and my posts will follow the others that have already been removed!
Chug

[GlosMikeP]

Aha! They were so briefly visible I missed them, hence my question. That probably explains it. Couldn't work out how a 50s car related to anything we'd discussed!

[hobie]

How is it off thread?[/

GlosM ..... there were indeed a few posts that slipped over the line ..... no harm was meant .... just the mind slipping back in history as you sometimes do when faced with tragedy, perhaps attending a funeral service and meeting up with old buddies etc etc ..... I suppose it's a form of protection but the posts were off thread and did upset some so were properly removed .....

[BEagle]

From today's Sunday Times:

The Sunday Times October 29, 2006


Fuel leak blamed for Nimrod disaster

Michael Smith


AN RAF Nimrod spy plane that crashed in Afghanistan last month killing all 14 men on board broke up in mid-air after a fractured fuel line set off explosions, an official inquiry has found.

The Nimrod MR2, which was providing intelligence for a Nato operation against Taliban fighters west of Kandahar, had just refuelled at 22,000ft.


Sources have disclosed that an RAF board of inquiry’s preliminary report has found that the fuel line fractured either as the Nimrod MR2 was being refuelled or shortly afterwards.

Fuel and vapour that leaked into the bottom of the fuselage then caught fire, possibly because of an electrical fault. Enemy fire has been ruled out as a cause.

The wreckage was so damaged that the investigators have not found direct evidence of the fire. They have had to rely on the pilot’s transmissions before the explosions and records of work done on the plane.

The conclusions will lead to serious concern about the RAF’s Nimrod fleet given that the aircraft have been flying since 1969 with a big upgrade started four years ago. The refurbishment was delayed by a series of problems — for instance, the wings BAE Systems designed would not fit the fuselage. The revamped aircraft will not return to service until 2009.

Nimrod XV230 (the lost jet’s call sign) was providing electronic surveillance for British special forces taking part in Operation Medusa against the Taliban.

The pilot reported a fire on board and was trying to land at Kandahar nearby when a series of explosions led to the aircraft breaking up in mid-air.

Debris was scattered over an area more than a mile long, according to the inquiry, which is taking place at the aircraft’s station, RAF Kinloss in Morayshire.

The crash was the biggest single loss of life for the services since the Falklands war in 1982 and the biggest for the RAF since a special forces C-130 Hercules was shot down by insurgents in Iraq two years ago, killing all 10 men on board.

Soldiers from the RAF Regiment secured the Nimrod crash site and recovered the bodies, but the destruction was so extensive they were unable to recover many aircraft parts.

The crew of 14 consisted of 12 RAF men from 120 Squadron and two special forces signallers relaying intelligence gathered to troops on the ground. Within 24 hours investigators arrived from Britain, but the hard evidence was limited and they had to rely on photographs, maintenance documents and recorded cockpit transmissions.

They concluded that the fuel was safely delivered from the tanker via the refuelling probe above the Nimrod’s cockpit.

It was then pumped down the fuel line to where a computerised control box steadies its flow into the tanks in the wings.

The fuel line that fractured is believed to be somewhere near the control unit in the bottom of the fuselage. The transmissions show the pilot reported a fire, but was apparently unaware of the fuel leak that had caused it.

The full report is some months away but a source close to the inquiry said: “It is clear that there was a fire and perhaps one or more explosions aboard the Nimrod and these factors indicate a fuel source as the cause of the tragedy.”

The Nimrod fleet has not been grounded but recommendations for flight safety will be made by the Defence Aviation Safety Centre at RAF Bentley Priory, northwest London.

“This is a very difficult investigation,” a senior defence source said. “Every aspect of the aircraft’s paperwork history has been checked . . . and all other MR2s have been checked out as a matter of standard practice.”

[nigegilb]

It appears we have lost another aircraft to a fuel/air explosion. Very sad.

[FJJP]

The loss of an aircraft and crew from any fleet is sad. As for worrying, of all the hundreds of thousands of sorties flown by the Nimrod fleet this is the only one lost due to a fuel fire. Previous losses are attributable to other factors discovered during the Boards of Inquiry, some of which have led to mods to the airframe or systems.

There will probably be a programme of inspections [I would guess tied in with one of the deeper servicing schedules], just to check out the likely areas that led to this tragedy.

I doubt whether crews will be worrying or sweating over flying the Mighty Hunter for fear of a repetition. My guess is that this is a tragic one-off failure.

[Strato Q]

The crash was the biggest single loss of life for the services since the Falklands war in 1982 and the biggest for the RAF since a special forces C-130 Hercules was shot down by insurgents in Iraq two years ago, killing all 10 men on board.

My maths might not be good, but in my book 14 is more than 10!

[forget]

My maths might not be good, but in my book 14 is more than 10!

The statement says - "The crash was the biggest single loss of life for the ..........RAF since a special forces C-130 Hercules was shot down by insurgents in Iraq two years ago, killing all 10 men on board".

It's correct.

[enginesuck]

From today's Sunday Times:
The Sunday Times October 29, 2006
Fuel leak blamed for Nimrod disaster
They concluded that the fuel was safely delivered from the tanker via the refuelling probe above the Nimrod’s cockpit.
It was then pumped down the fuel line to where a computerised control box steadies its flow into the tanks in the wings.
The fuel line that fractured is believed to be somewhere near the control unit in the bottom of the fuselage. ”


Wow that computer is good.... What the Hell..... load of rubbish:confused:

[J.A.F.O.]

The statement says - "The crash was the biggest single loss of life for the ..........RAF since a special forces C-130 Hercules was shot down by insurgents in Iraq two years ago, killing all 10 men on board".
It's correct.

No, surely it would have to be the biggest since one which was bigger.

In a newspaper report full of mistakes then it's a bit petty to pick on this in the circumstances but surely Strato Q is correct.

[Nov71]

StratoQ. My reading suggests that the C130 crash was then the RAF's largest loss of life in one incident. Subsequent incidents, before Nimrod, killed less than 10 in each incident. Nimrod killed 14, making it now the RAF's largest loss of life in one incident, taking the 'record' from the C130 incident

[k1rb5]

StratoQ. My reading suggests that the C130 crash was then the RAF's largest loss of life in one incident. Subsequent incidents, before Nimrod, killed less than 10 in each incident. Nimrod killed 14, making it now the RAF's largest loss of life in one incident, taking the 'record' from the C130 incident

This 'discussion' is SAD in more than one sense of the word. Haven't you got something better to bicker about ladies?

[shandyman]

Well said K1RB5. I wish people could leave this whole thing alone and wait for the AIB. I appreciate that people may have 'an interest' but trust me, it's hard enough for the families as it is.

Shandyman

[Jackonicko]

No-one could have more sympathy than I do for the families left behind by this tragedy, and in an ideal world, we'd all leave it until the BOI reports.(And the BOI would be infallible and incapable of being swayed by anyone with an agenda, and there'd certainly never have been the need for multiple multi-page Chinook threads).

We'd be content to listen to the light programme and wonder whether to buy one of those televisions we'd heard about.

And all journalists would be decent chaps, highly educated, probably former Hurricane pilots during the recent spate of unpleasantness, and so they'd be just as hesitant in raising the subject before the BOI had ground its course.

And Mr Churchill's Government, and its civil servants, would never, ever allow aircrew's lives to be risked in 30 year old aircraft, and if they were lost would have nothing to fear from the most rigorous reports.

But we're not in an ideal world, and threads like this one (and the one that BOAC chose to close) are the virtual water cooler around which people can try to make sense of what happened, and through which non-specialised journos might stand a faint chance of learning something that might make their ramblings slightly less badly wrong.

The stories will be written and broadcast regardless, and the more balanced and correct they are, the less the families will be hurt.

Even if journos wait until the BOI, it's in all our interests that they have some passing knowledge of what has happened, because they won't have time to learn it once their editors press the go button.

[GlosMikeP]

I agree. This is an open forum for discussion and not for condolences. That said, it shouldn't be open for daftness either.

Any of us acquainted with the Nimrod and its fit and foibles will have our suspicions and opinions and this is as good a place to discuss them as any. And if it isn't, close the thread.

[k1rb5]

This 'discussion' is SAD in more than one sense of the word. Haven't you got something better to bicker about ladies?

I can't talk for anyone else but I was referring to the 'debate' about which was the greatest loss of life, not the discussion as to the cause of the incident.

Regards to all

k1rb5

[Jackonicko]

I'd agree, Kirbs. It's as insensitive as the Ford Anglia debate was. This thread ought to stay more tightly focused than is the norm on PPRuNe, out of respect. And I apologise for diverting it with this post and my last.

[hobie]

It's as insensitive as the Ford Anglia debate

Oh dear ...... why on earth raise that again .... explanations made .... apologies posted ..... messages deleted ..... and here we go again ... dear $$$$ give us strength ....

[WASALOADIE]

Suspension of Nimrod AAR.

A decision to suspend temporarily all Nimrod air to air refuelling has been made following the discovery of a fuel leak on a Nimrod MR2 which landed safely in the Middle East on 8 November following an air-to-air re-fuelling operation. An investigation into the cause of the fuel leak is underway. The temporary suspension is purely a precautionary measure and the decision should not be construed as pre-judging the findings of the Board of Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the loss of XV230. The Board of Inquiry investigating the circumstances surrounding the crash of XV230 over Afghanistan is still underway and has not come to any firm conclusions on the cause of the crash. It would be unhelpful to speculate on the causes of the crash until the Board of Inquiry has reported.

[flipster]

I would thought that such suspension was sensible - after all, I believe that the Nimrod AAR capability was a 'quick fix' for the Falkands campaign which then stayed as part of the capabilities of the ac - like other ac I could mention. As there have been less tankers to play with for some years now and those that remain are very busy trucking elsewhere, perhaps the Nimrod's AAR bits had gone unused for a while and eventually becoming 'less serviceable'? Also, this would give the engineers less opportunity to spot any problems early.

Anyone know if this is the case, or have the 'rods been doing lots of tanking recently?

If the AAR piping has not been kept 'well-oiled', is there any read-across to other fleets that haven't been doing much tanking recently - ie all of them?
One for the BOI to ponder I suspect!

[toddbabe]

I understand completely the sensetivities at current, and I know the families of some of the men lost read these threads, that said What we are talking about here and in particular what WASALOADIE raised about the cessation of AAR and ongoing fuel problems the Nimrod has are a major concern to all of us that fly on them.
Whilst waiting for the board of inquiry to complete it's report ( some months away) this thread is a genuine place to air concerns and thoughts about the ongoing crisis regarding nimrods and fuel, we could all hang around and await boi but in the meantime what about those people still flying in a plane with a questionable serviceability?

[Safeware]

toddbabe,

While in no way diminishing your concerns (or those flying) the difference between serviceability and risk needs to be recognised.

For the engineers working to provide the goods, an aircraft may be servicable but will carry some risk of failure (and I've commented earlier about issues of flying unserviceable aircraft).

For those flying serviceable aircraft, there remains a risk that something goes wrong. What happens when it goes wrong is important. Figuring out if something is too risky, and taking steps to reduce that risk is what the wheels will be on at the moment.

sw

[nigegilb]

SW, from what I understand of the checks carried out after the loss of XV230 further evidence was found of particular concern to the AAR fleet. What was not immediately discovered was a source of ignition. If by the nature of AAR sorties a pressure fuel leak can occur with associated misting of fuel, and the source of ignition may still be present, then surely it is a logical decision to cease AAR soties.

The source of ignition in the case of TWA 800 was a very old and damaged wiring system. Plain fact, we are operating and maintaining very old aircraft, this is yet another sign of an overstretched military suffering because of a lack of investment in its people and equipment.

And before anyone criticises me for speaking out ahead of the BoI, we could have been discussing another Nimrod tragedy here.

[Safeware]

Nige,

'then surely it is a logical decision to cease AAR soties' - I agree completely. My point was that we shouldn't over-egg the issues by trying to compare apples and oranges - ie serviceability vs risk.

Having established that there is a failure mode that can occur in a system that was S when the ac took off, and that this failure mode is hazardous (production of fuel mist) in the presence of an ignition source, the options are - a) remove the possibility of the hazardous failure mode occuring or b) remove the source of ignition. As b is as yet unknown, a has to come first.

regards

sw

[nigegilb]

SW, agreed. Which surely places a question mark over the original decision to resume AAR training and AAR ops 3 days after a major tragedy.

[Safeware]

Nige,
I'm not out to pre-judge the BOI on the 3 day decision, because I know how hard it is to get the first signal out. And my experience was with everyone surviving, ADRs and a non-hostile environment (well as non-hostile as Lincs gets :) ) They may have had nothing to go on, and the nature of the beast is that it wants positive evidence at that point.

sw

[Mad_Mark]

SW, agreed. Which surely places a question mark over the original decision to resume AAR training and AAR ops 3 days after a major tragedy.

AAR Training can be done without fuel uplift. It is important to ensure that there are enough prod-capable pilots available so that vital ops can continue when any problem that may be found has been fixed - if indeed such ops have been temporarily stopped.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[toddbabe]

Mad mark AAR ops have been stopped!
As the BOI is very unlikely to find the cause of the crash and in light of the more recent refuelling problems I think it is very sensible to cease AAR ops.
What is very difficult however is that if a definitive fault isn't discovered ( I don't think so ) then where does the nimrod go from here? without positive evidence of the fault (s) how can AAR ops ever resume? if they do not resume operations will suffer and the men on the ground will once again be even more exposed and under supported.

[Pontius Navigator]

AAR Training can be done without fuel uplift. It is important to ensure that there are enough prod-capable pilots available so that vital ops can continue when any problem that may be found has been fixed - if indeed such ops have been temporarily stopped.
MadMark!!! :mad:

Unless the AAR system has been changed since I had my training many moons ago, and indeed I may be talking b*ll*cks, but I believe a dry prod is not exactly dry.

The hose was full of fuel at full trail. When the receiver engaged and pushed forward the fuel in th ehose has to go somewhere. The somewhere used to be in to the receiver. Only a few pounds at a time but several prods later was sufficient to extend the range of the receiver and shorten the pubrise time for the tanker.

[RAF_Techie101]

I believe the hose of the tanker has to be pressurized with fuel to stop it flapping about in the airflow and keep it vaguely steady. Again, I too may be talking rubbish but that's what I've been led to believe.

[ORAC]

Correct for the centreline HDU IIRC, which of course is all that is relevant for the Nimrod.

[Pontius Navigator]

Now I can come clean with a clear conscience. My training was with Valiant tankers and the story was true. Not only did the receiver collect what was in the hose, but the Valiant used to crack the transfer pumps for a moment as well.

[BEagle]

Dry = not 'wet', rather 'mildly moist'.....

We like moist....:E

[Art Field]

Indeed the only way to prevent any fuel passing from a centre line hose into a receivers fuel galleries is to insert a bung in the pipery at the back of the probe nozzle. Just shutting off tank inlet valves will not stop the galleries pressurizing. I have a feeling this method was used in the early Tonka trials but my memory is not .........

[BEagle]

Which, though crude, is rather safer than the problem which happened on an early Buccaneer....

Jolly matelot decided to trust his hand at prodding, since the jet proudly sported a shiny new AAR probe. Find Victor, frighten it with a wacky join, cleared astern, stabilise, trim, watch the references, slight addition of power, stabilise, clunk, nice contact, green on, fuel flows....

Or rather, call astern, hoof on the power and chase the basket. But make contact all the same.

Hmm, thought our fishy friend, no more fuel showing in the master or slave tanks - silly old buggers in the Victor must have porked up. Disconnect and slope off back to the concrete boat and will have a dig at the crabs later.

45/25/25, 20psi blow, mirror on, 86+ HP, steady and steady lows going beeeeep, boop, boop on the ADD, thud, hmm, seems a bit of a firm landing even for a Bucc.

Taxy in, fold wings, roll bomb door, shut down, get out.......:uhoh:

A few minutes later, the jolly jack tars fold the nose to put the cab in the shed - and about 1000 lb of fuel pours out.

It seems that the dockyard maties who installed the probe were from a different team who were supposed to install the plumbing from probe to fuel tanks.

Never mind, I'm sure that a fuel-cooled Blue Parrot was no worse than an air-cooled version.....:hmm:

[I_c_oldpeople]

Lay off those triangular tablets duuude........

:ok:

[BEagle]

As reported in today's Sunday Times:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-2460265,00.html

[Mick Smith]

ORAC
I am the so-called ****-stirring journalist concerned and I would like to make a few points.

A) I have every sympathy for the relatives concerned but as others have pointed out on this thread there are serious issues affecting those left behind which need to be addressed. If you dont think this is a serious issue that puts other people's lives at risk I suggest you go elsewhere.
B) That article is an entirely accurate account of what my sources said, much of it confirmed by the MoD, which given the opportunity to deny the resignations notably failed to do so. It has nothing to do with ****-stirring it is an effort to get this important information out into the open so that there can be a debate. It is supposed to be what the media do, keeping the public informed of things that are going on that shouldnt be going on.
C) Since I am a long-standing member of this forum I thought I was entitled to be treated courteously and your post does not do so. But I would be very happy for it to remain up here in its current form so long as the moderators allow this comment from me to remain up here in return.

There have been a lot of comments made about the media on this forum following the crash, some of it falling very much into the "Good point well made" category, but far too much of it being as pathetic and ill-informed as your post. We all have a job to do in life. As some members already know, for 15 years of my life I was in the services. Now I'm a journalist. I was not responsible for that aircraft going down but I would be responsible if a second one went down and I had deliberately kept information I had that might have prevented it happening out of the public domain.

Have a good day

[DEL Mode]

Unfortunately the post has been removed (ORAC), however, I feel it is a prudent time to comment.

1. In the civil world, an airline has to prove to a regulator (CAA?) that it has sufficent funds to carry out its operations and perform necessary maintenance. If it does not then its air operators approval will be withdrawn (I stand by to be corrected).
2. If an airline has an incident or accident it is investigated (by the independent AAIB) to determine the probable cause, identify mitigation and ensure it does not occur again. This is how formal regulation works.

The RAF for years has been challenged to reduce costs. I am aware that operational requirements mean that the civil model is difficult to apply to the military environment.

Please tell me how the MoD ensures compliance with 1 and 2?

I am not a journo, know no journos, and do not have an opinion on journo's, but as a tax payer I am concerned that the Military are overstretched, under resourced, and constantly being challenged on cost. I welcome any journos who bring these issues to the focus of Joe Public. Rant Over.

Sorry to drag this post on, but I think it is necessary.

[Mick Smith]

ORAC
I have no idea why the original post was taken down but if it was done by you please feel free to put it back up again. I am happy to let it stand as long as my response to it does.

[ORAC]

My origal post, which I removed because I did not want to get into an argument due to the sensitives of the subject related to this article (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-2460265,00.html) and the comment I regarded it as ****-stirring, without amplification. I had replied privately to Mr Smith, for the same reason. He, in reply, accused me of lying as to my reason for withdrawing and for failing to place my reasons here. I now do so.

The implication is that the aircraft is being flown when unsafe. I consider that a slur on both engineers and authorisers. Previous posts have discussed the difference between unserviceability and safety.

The second implication is that aircrew knew it was unsafe, in the period between the crash and the next leak, and resigned in protest at being made to fly it. Whilst that is possible, it implies that, within days of the accident, sufficient was known about the accident to make such decisions. That is not borne out by this thread.

The thrown in anonymous comment regarding a startling "lack of care" raises the accusation to the level of culpable negligence.

It may or not be true that the Nimrod has a deficient fuel tank fire prevention system, or that it requires one in its operating envelope and based on previous incidents, or that one is feasible. But the implication, again, is that the omission of one is a further proof the aircraft is unsafe.

Pending the result of the BOI, and with AAR already suspended, I regarded the article's claim the aircraft continues to be unsafe as unproven, alarmist, insulting to those involved and likely to be distressing to the families of those on the fleet.

[Mick Smith]

I didnt accuse you of lying ORAC. You said in your PM that the article would upset the relatives and I pointed out in response that if you really believed that was a reason for not writing the article you wouldn’t have posted it on this thread.

I have dealt with the argument on the relatives in my previous post. I'm not going over it again. You now claim I am blaming the aircrew. It is difficult to see how that could be the case given the fact that the article says that aircrew are resigning as a result of their concerns. You also claim that the article makes a number of other implications.

The article doesn’t imply anything it simply states a number of very worrying facts, which include the facts that the preliminary BOI report said there was a leak in the fuel pipe during or immediately after AAR; that the MoD has confirmed that there was a second such incident on 8 November and that AAR has been suspended as a result.

Like your original post, your PM was in fact largely taken up with the completely baseless suggestion that I was somehow misrepresenting the resignations which were at any event an irrelevance.

My response to that was as follows:

"The fact that a number of aircrew have resigned over the issue - and it is a fact - shows how importantly it is taken as an issue among the aircrew.

"MoD was asked about the second leak, the suspension of AAR and the resignations by email. My only reference to the resignations in my email soliciting a comment from the MoD was "I also understand that a number of aircrew at Kinloss have put in their resignations since the crash."

"The response to that should have been one of the following: a) there have been no resignations since the crash; b) there have been resignations since the crash but they had nothing to do with the crash; or even c) there have been resignations since the crash but we are unable for legal reasons to say why the personnel concerned have resigned.

"It was none of the above. The response was: "I cannot stand up your assertion that resignations have gone up. There has been no marked increase in the number of aircrew applying to leave the RAF in the wake of the Nimrod crash."

"This is typical MoD. I had in fact made no such assertion and the response was standard MoD evasion"

[ORAC]

You now claim I am blaming the aircrew. It is difficult to see how that could be the case given the fact that the article says that aircrew are resigning as a result of their concerns. Where do I blame them for anything? And, actually, the article doesn't say that they are resigning as a result of their concerns - it just implies it.... :hmm:

The article doesn’t imply anything it simply states a number of very worrying facts

SEVERAL RAF aircrew have resigned amid serious concerns over the safety of the force’s ageing Nimrod spy plane Implication it was the cause of their resignation, not stated as a fact.

It is understood RAF crews were worried about the decision to allow the Nimrods to resume flying three days after the Afghan crash. A number of servicemen resigned after the crash and before the latest incident. Same implication.

“The lack of duty of care is startling. Checks that were carried out immediately following the crash revealed further evidence of fatigue issues within the pipework.” Implication that the fatigue found required action to be taken and the failure to do so was a lack of duty of care to a culpable degree.

Similar implication reference a fuel tank suppression system.

Just as the title of the article, ‘unsafe’ Nimrods, with the unsafe in brackets....

[tucumseh]

Del Mode

“1. In the civil world, an airline has to prove to a regulator (CAA?) that it has sufficient funds to carry out its operations and perform necessary maintenance. If it does not then its air operators approval will be withdrawn (I stand by to be corrected).
2. If an airline has an incident or accident it is investigated (by the independent AAIB) to determine the probable cause, identify mitigation and ensure it does not occur again. This is how formal regulation works.

Please tell me how the MoD ensures compliance with 1 and 2?”


I can assure you there are very simple, concise and mandated rules to ensure such compliance for Item 1. I’ve just looked at my old copy and it’s about 15 pages, plus a few appendices dealing with attrition, wastage, RSD&P and such like.

The basic premise underpinning the above is that each item in the inventory is seen to be “owned” by an identified individual whose primary role is to ensure compliance. This is not hundreds of staff, but typically around six for a single Service. Or was when I did it many summers ago. (Probably is hundreds nowadays, given the rampant inefficiency we see every day).

Then reality kicks in, usually in the form of benchmark rulings from on high. Among the better known are, for example, that it is unnecessary to ensure an aircraft or equipment is safe when delivered off contract, or that it can be supported properly through-life or for the aircrew to be trained adequately. That there are relatively few problems in the aircraft world is often not down to routine implementation, but to staffs being prepared to ignore instructions not to implement them.

I’d say the rules governing Item 2 are more robust in their implementation but I still know of cases where the mitigation was identified in advance of the accident, and ignored. Luckily, only one that I can recall was fatal.

[BEagle]

ORAC, surely 'implication' is somewhat subjective?

I'm not quite sure why you're rising to cross swords with Mick - he seems to be doing a very fair job in exposing the truth about the way things are. Very useful to have an on-side journo who is both knowledgeable and sympathetic, I would have thought?

[Ordynants]

Very useful to have an on-side journo who is both knowledgeable and sympathetic
Must be the only one in the country then:E

[Not Long Here]

As someone who has just a few hours in the Nimrod, and I have enjoyed every minute of them, I can get quite defensive about the aircraft. Yet......there has to be time to call it a day. Remember the Bahama Mama, the aircraft with the "impossible" total electric failure that went to Istres. I am sure there is a few more which I can't remember offhand.

It is not the fault of anyone at the front-line if there is now a problem with the aircraft. It worries me immensely that there was evidence of a post AAR fuel leak recently, if its the first, or the unfortunate case of the loss of 230 I don't know. But it may be time for a "capability holiday" wrt to AAR until this is sorted.

You can't blame the groundcrew, or the aircrew or the authoriser. All will run with the best advice available at the time from the relevant specialist authorities but the constant dilution of experience on every front at ISK seems to herald time.

[nigegilb]

Surely if there is doubt there is no doubt. I fail to see the difference between the first fuel leak and the 2nd incident. Why decide to continue flying AAR after the loss of an aitcraft doing AAR and yet cease AAR only after a 2nd incident. All the facts could not have been known after the crash and yet the crews were sent up there almost immediately.

[speeddial]

Supposing there was another model of the Nimrod, based on the same era of air frame, still being flown which was also AAR capable...would they be having the same problems?

[Sideshow Bob]

ORAC for one who claims to worried about the sensitivity of the families you have done a very good job of turning this thread into a slanging match. They were my friends and so are the Air Eng's that have PVRed. :*

nigegilb
The RTS has been revised to allow AAR in exceptional circumstances only.

[nigegilb]

SB, so it all comes down to military risk, something about which I have a great deal of experience. A military under pressure at a time of war. The temptation is always to press on, in this case we almost had a 2nd tragedy. When will we learn from our American allies? You cannot do war on the cheap, it costs lives.

Has the new Nimrod got fuel tank protection? It bloody well should have.

The decision to continue flying AAR in exceptional circumstances did not affect operational flying because the 2nd incident occurred in theatre. Did the AAR course at Kinloss continue? If so, will someone care to explain the exceptional circumstances?

[Chugalug2]

SB, so it all comes down to military risk,
You cannot do war on the cheap, it costs lives.
Has the new Nimrod got fuel tank protection? It bloody well should have.


Keep up the good fight Nige, eventually the pennies will drop, one after the other! Doing war on the cheap costs money as well as lives. The whole point of RAF Flight Safety, of which I am proud to say I was involved in some 35 years go, was not to avoid military risk, which we all signed up to, but to avoid it when it is inappropriate. This includes all shades of technical shortcomings which are by definition avoidable. The bottom line aim of Flight Safety is force maintenance, to avoid losses that therefore reduce capability. Having suspect plumbing, or unprotected fuel tanks, are classic examples of being penny wise and pound foolish. Whatever happened to Flight Safety these days, gone the way of powers of a subordinate commander and an integral chain of command? The sooner old ways that work are reintroduced, and all the myriad quangos with the cryptic initials scrapped, the sooner we will regain a balanced military capability that is now conspicuous by its absence.

[nigegilb]

Just to underline your point Chug. Approx 2/3rds of the Herc fleet is being fitted with foam at a cost of around £18m. We have lost 2 Hercs in the last 22 months. The cost of a replacement SF Herc off the shelf is around £50m!

Now then, Nimrod 4 is costing an awful lot of money. I have lost track but I believe around £300m each. You don't need to be good at maths to realise, in the case of the Herc £600,000 per ac, foam fitted is very good value. Of course, the USN have fitted foam to the P3 Orion MAR, but then all of their mil ac are protected.

[SaddamsLoveChild]

NigeGilb - may I suggest that both crews were irreplacable.

[nigegilb]

SLC I apologise, I was not referring to the Nimrod tragedy because we do not yet know the cause. That we have lost 2 talented, priceless crews is undeniable fact. It is too early to state if lack of fuel tank protection was a factor in the Nimrod crash. However, lack of foam was a major factor in the Herc crash and we await the BoI for the 2nd Hercules that perished on a strip this year, thankfully with no loss of life. However, I strongly believe that no mil ac should be procured without fuel tank protection and I would hope that those involved in the Nimrod procurement project are looking at this.

[BEagle]

You will no doubt recall that, a few years ago a DHL A300-B4 was hit by a MANPAD missile after leaving Baghdad. The missile did not hit the engines, it hit a wing tip. The outer tank caught fire and exploded; all 3 hydraulic systems were lost and the crew only managed to land with exceptional flying skill and differential thrust.

This is what the wing looked like after the landing:

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/DHLA300.jpg

If this wasn't a wake-up call to all who task large aircraft to fly into hostile areas, then what is. Surely the MoD had cause to think after this incident?

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/DHLwing.jpg

EVERY large aircraft, whether old, new or yet to come into service should have on-baord fuel tank inerting. I spoke to a bunch of Kwinty-Kwoo boffins after this event; they were pre-occupied with boffinry designed to decoy or jam missiles. None of which is any use if the missile actually hits...

Or a large calibre shell, for that matter.

nige - it might be interesting to ask whether MoD studied the DHL A300 incident - and if they didn't, why not?

[ORAC]

Of interest, BEagle, does the FSTA contract specify fuel tank inerting? I know the FAA is making it a requirement, including retrofit on existing aircraft, but only for the 40 odd A330s on the American register.

[nigegilb]

Beags, as you imply there is an obsession with fancy DAS kits. Fuel tank inerting systems protect against electrical fuel pump malfunctions, fires, attack from AK47s up to SAMs, and they are relatively cheap. USAF install it as No.1 base protection. I have been saying this til I am blue in the face. The fire reported in the starboard wing root of XV230 could have originated from the refuelling pipe adjacent to the wing fuel tank. This is why I wanted to talk about fuel tank protection on the Nimrod. It is a debate that should have been happening before this tragedy because it applies to every large ac going sausage side.
US retrofit airliners with no risk from being shot at whilst MoD sends Mil crews to war with no protection. It is not on.

[Hugh S]

Orac: While I agree that a large dose of cynicism is healthy when it comes to dealing with the press, I think it is unfair to tar all journalists with the same brush. Mick Smith has made some valid points and asked questions that the public, and more importantly crews at ISK, would like answers to. The Nimrod is an ageing aircraft that seems to be developing more problems as it gets closer to retirement. This is a reflection on the DPA, not the aircrew or ground engineers.

[Skeleton]

Orac: The Nimrod is an aging aircraft that seems to be developing more problems as it gets closer to retirement. This is a reflection on the DPA, not the aircrew or ground engineers.

Sadly I agree with the above, and its not the first time.

The Buccaneer is a prime example. There are more modern aircraft I could also mention but this is not the place to do so.

Value for money is one thing. I hope the beancounters will get the message this time round.

Sadly I fear not.

[GlosMikeP]

Value for money is one thing. I hope the beancounters will get the message this time round.

Sadly I fear not.
I fear you may be right. As covered in other threads, VFM appears to have gone out of the window in pursuit of staying within the (too low) defence budget.

All the progress made over the past 15 years to go for real VFM seems to have reverted to VFM=cheapest.

You get what you can afford, and pay for. However, that's not really the fault of DPA: it's a politcal problem of a government wanting a Jaguar for the price of a Mini and making everyone dance to that tune.

[flipster]

Just remember that every bit of kit that our valiant services manage to eke out of the MoD, invariably is made by the the lowest bidder!

I am with Nige - irrespective of 206/230 BOI results, fuel tank protection for all ac whether they be AT, MPA, SH or FJ.

[airsound]

Apologies for coming a bit late to the thread (do pay attention, 007) - but I really have to say, ORAC, that you’ve made me quite grumpy. At least, I think you have, although I can’t be quite sure because you’ve removed the vital evidence. Whatever, I believe that your treatment of Mick Smith is surprisingly ill-informed, not to say thoughtless.

I realise that, to some PPRuNers, the mere mention of a journalist is enough to precipitate heaving heaps of pavlovian grumpitude - but I hadn’t thought you, ORAC, to be one of those. But have you considered the logical extension of your excoriation of Mick S? In his ST article, it seems to me, he was doing exactly the sort of thing that we desperately need the media to be doing - exposing misrule, misgovernment and plain penny-pinching incompetence on the part of our current (and recent past) elective dictatorships. Indeed, my big fear is that that we are rapidly approaching a national situation where democracy is replaced by presidential rule without the benefit of cabinet examination or parliamentary scrutiny.

In that situation, almost our only defence is a free and independent media. The trouble with that is that it is, well, free, and independent. Which, of course, means that there will always be reporting of the kind that virtually everyone on PPRuNe (me included) will despise. Sad to say, quite a lot of that will come from parts of the same appalling Murdoch empire that Mick Smith writes for. But I believe that Mick’s article was a model of journalistic competence. It was well researched and well argued, it exposed something that we needed to know, it was factual, and it didn’t contain groundless speculation. And, importantly, it was in an organ that the movers and shakers read. So, let’s not include Mick in the sad pantheon of muckraking, sensationalist scumbags.

If you want to sh1tbag journos, ORAC, please choose the ones who deserve it - which gives you a target-rich environment anyway - but lay off people like Mick Smith. He’s on the side of the good guys.

And, btw, if anyone’s interested, I have never met Mick, and I’m not familiar with his previous oeuvres. But I’ll be looking out for him.

Grumpitude ceased. Standing by for incoming.

airsound

[ORAC]

Airsound, check your PMs.

[The Swinging Monkey]

ORAC
I'm not sure what your 'beef'' is with Mick Smith, but as far as my friends at ISK are concerned, he is right on cue with hjis comments.
As for the PVR rates since the crash, the fact is that:
a) the number of Nimrod aricrew PVRs HAS gone up
b) the number of requests from Nimrod aircrew to come off flying ops has also gone up
c) the problem is not only with Nimrod MR crews! I understand the R fleet is having a similar 'debate'

I have little time for journos, only because 99% of what they write is utter 'tosh, however, on this occasion Mr Smith has got it correct, and I for one applaud him for publishing it. Thanks Mick
TSM

[will261058]

And that's why all Nimrod starter motors are fitted with overspeed cut-out switches now.


The CDS has also confirmed that the crew reported a technical problem, connected with a fire, just after refuelling.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5314358.stm
Nimrod starter motors have always been fitted with overspeed switches.

[enginesuck]

More Sloppy reporting..... its even worse in the actual paper....

http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/tm_headline=scandal-of-raf-nimrod-kept-in-air-by-a-teapot%26method=full%26objectid=18203437%26siteid=66633-name_page.html

[toddbabe]

Is it that sloppy though! they may have embellished a bit but wouldn't say it was that far from the mark.
The fact that someone has spoken out from Isk speaks volumes in itself, people usually loyal and professional wouldn't speak out if they didn't think there was a serious problem going on here.
'Its all too easy to brush it under the carpet and say sloppy reorting/

[Hugh S]

...they wouldn't speak out if they didn't think there was a serious problem going on here...
This is nothing but media scaremongering. The report makes the problem look dreadful but it's no more than a little inconvenience and a slower trip home.
The aircraft must have been depressurised at low level in the first place to allow the launcher to open, and the door just wouldn't close when the crew had finished. Simple - fly home below 8000' just like the SH, SARH and FJ world, all with the advantage of a better view!

[toddbabe]

The teapot was just part of the article, has everyone forgotten about the four serious fuel leaks since the crash that was mentioned in the report!?
I reiterate that a member of the crew wouldn't have spoken out about the fleet unless he/she was fed up of it all and concerned about it's safety.
Yes the record has picked up on the more trivial part of it for a headline but their are more issues here.

[BYALPHAINDIA]

Part of the problem here is that the 'MOD' don't think?

As someone mentioned earlier, You would have thought the DHL A300 incident would have 'Rang Alarm bells' with the MOD regarding 'Vulnerable' Aircraft like the Hercules and the Nimrod operating over enemy lines.

What has always annoyed me about the MOD is that they have the Approach of 'We''ll only fix it if it's broken' But in this case It is too late as what we are discussing here.

You cannot Sail a Tight Ship when your running the RAF.

The MOD chief's are obviously not on the 'Ground' with the people and their Equipment, Instead all their decisions are made in some office in London, They listen to others point of view but then go and do what they want?

The Nimrod has proved to be a loyal 'Workshorse' for the RAF, But they can only give it so much life time as in Concorde's case.

The MOD should have concentrated on upgrading the safety features of the oldest Aircraft in the fleet, Instead of getting excited about the MR4 program.

The Nimrod was operating over enemy lines without any Fuel Tank protection, A risk that is critical to the the Aircraft and it's crew.

The 'Media' said that the Nimrod Captain only had 2/3 Minutes to look for a suitable forced landing, I cannot imagine the scene in that time.

This tragic accident along with the 2 Hercules crashes in 22 months, will 'Backfire' on the MOD, And constantly remind them that If funding for safety projects is not maintained it will risk losing it's Standards, Safety, Morale, and most importantly it's people.

The service personnel will only take so much, They are people not Robots!!

Regards.

[BEagle]

From today's The Sunday Times:

Des Browne, the defence secretary, appears to have misled MPs when he told them an independent report had ruled that the RAF’s Nimrod aircraft were safe to fly.

See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3736587.ece

[EdSet100]

Hi Beagle,
The report referred to by Des Browne does indeed highlight areas where the fuel system does not meet risk category ALARP (as low as reasonably practical). However, to be exact, he said the following (taken from Timesonline):


“QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate,” said Browne.


The words, "and.....in light of measures taken" refer to Limitations put in place on 4 Sep 06, to mitigate the risks that would later be highlighted by the report. Therefore, the report (which covers all aspects of the fuel system) together with the Lims, which were in place well before the report was commissioned, gives the whole system a clean bill of health. The Lims remain in place to day and will do so for the rest of the Nimrod MR2/R1's life.

Ed Sett

[Distant Voice]

Good Morning Ed Sett, I see we have moved back to the old thread. No problems.

I am afraid the report takes into consideration "In light of that measures taken", and still regards the fuel system as non-ALARP.

DV

[ORAC]

I believe ALARP has been superseded by ALAPE - As Low As Politically Expedient....

[Mick Smith]

EdSet
The report says the fuel system is not ALARP. The latest copy of Defence Standards defines ALARP as:

As Low As Reasonably Practicable. A risk is ALARP when it has been
demonstrated that the cost of any further Risk Reduction, where the
cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other
resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from
that Risk Reduction.

This seems to include a good measure of wriggle room for an aircraft or its fuel system to be declared ALARP if as with Nimrod it has a desperately needed capability and yet the report specifically says that the fuel system - not just the air-to-air refuelling system, the fuel system - is not ALARP.

The latest copy of defence standards defines safe as:

Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.

So ALARP seems to be the one factor that has to be present.

http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/00/056/01000400.pdf

:confused:

[JFZ90]

From today's The Sunday Times:

Des Browne, the defence secretary, appears to have misled MPs when he told them an independent report had ruled that the RAF’s Nimrod aircraft were safe to fly.

See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle3736587.ece

The times article just has a link to a copy of 00-56, but implies it is a link to the QQ report they are qouting. Have I been misled!!

Is there a link to the actual QQ report - I'm not sure who to believe here, so I'd like to read it myself.

[mary_hinge]

As a comparison to the civil aircraft industry, In May 2001, the Federal Aviation Administration released a comprehensive Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR No. 88) requiring all the airframe manufacturers and Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) holders to conduct a safety review of all fuel system components. Included were requirements to prepare special maintenance inspections that operators of transport aircraft would use to determine the continued safety and airworthiness of the fuel system on their respective aircraft. This was also taken on by EASA.

As part of the process to get to ALARP, as per SFAR88, all staff, from the Hangar cleaner through to the “chief cheese” receive at least a 2 hour briefing per annum on aircraft fuel systems and safety. The technical staffs receive a more comprehensive training programme with regular refresher training, all under the watchful eye of EASA!

A good basic overview is here: http://www.fus-goodrich1.com/sfar88/overview.asp?expand=6

[Mick Smith]

No JFZ90 there is no copy of the QinetiQ report on the TimesOnline site, that is a mistake by whoever put the story up on the website. It is as you surmised the MoD's safety rules and should have been linked as such later in the sentence. I am trying to get it changed. We cannot put a copy of the QQ report on the web because it is copyright controlled and was issued under FOI with a warning that it therefore could not be disseminated.

[shona beattie]

Now I know why I have been refused these documents under freedom of information. Well done Jimmy Jones for obtaining this report through freedom of information and Mick Smith for publishing this. Absolutley shocking and cruel. RIP Crew 3.

[JFZ90]

No JFZ90 there is no copy of the QinetiQ report on the TimesOnline site, that is a mistake by whoever put the story up on the website. It is as you surmised the MoD's safety rules and should have been linked as such later in the sentence. I am trying to get it changed. We cannot put a copy of the QQ report on the web because it is copyright controlled and was issued under FOI with a warning that it therefore could not be disseminated.

Thanks for the honest admission. Bit of a contradiction releasing it under FoI (i.e. anyone can do this) and then preventing further dissemination. I assume this is due to a wish to protect QinetiQ IP rather than any MoD imposed limitation.

Now I know why I have been refused these documents under freedom of information. Well done Jimmy Jones for obtaining this report through freedom of information and Mick Smith for publishing this. Absolutley shocking and cruel. RIP Crew 3.

I'm not sure I know the reasons from this why its not been released - it is likely to be due to QinetiQ IP restrictions (noting the "no further dissemination" caveat) rather than any more sinister desire to hide anything, but in this case I would have thought it would actually be helpful to find some solution to publish the report - without visibility of it is hard to judge whether Des has really been misleading as the Times implies - my gut feeling is he has not and it is both a twist on the conclusions of QinetiQs findings, coupled with a misrepresentation of what ALARP really means in this context that has opened up the perception of something misleading having being said. Without seeing the report with my own eyes I'm not convinced that perception is valid.

[Mick Smith]

Going back to that definition of ALARP I can quite easily see - given the wriggle room - how the RAF or the MoD could have said as far as we are concerned the aircraft is ALARP. But what happened here is not that. What happened here is that Des Browne said an independent report by QinetiQ had declared the fuel system safe, and if the risk has to be ALARP for the system to be safe, which is what the defence standards document says, then QinetiQ most definitely didn't do that.

[Distant Voice]

I have read Mick Smith's report a number of times, and it is clear that what is being said it that the Nimrod was not safe at the time of the accident, and it still wasn't safe in mid 2007 when the QinetiQ report was published. This is after all the mitigation concerning hot air pipes and SCP being isolated had been taken into consideration.

I suspect that when Des Browne claimed last Dec that the aicraft was safe, the same degree of "spin" was being applied to the word "safe" as was applied to the famous "15 mins threat" from Saddam's rockets. And we all know how that turned out.

If MoD can not conform to the safety rules that they set, based on those outlined by HSE, then I have concerns for those crews who are required to fly Nimrod today. I know there will be cries of "I wouldn't fly if I did not think it was safe", but for God sake start to examine the facts.

Des Browne and CAS decided, last December, to play with the meaning of "safe", because to apply the rules, that they have set, would mean grounding the fleet.

DV

[JFZ90]

Going back to that definition of ALARP I can quite easily see - given the wriggle room - how the RAF or the MoD could have said as far as we are concerned the aircraft is ALARP.


OK,

But what happened here is not that. What happened here is that Des Browne said an independent report by QinetiQ had declared the fuel system safe, and if the risk has to be ALARP for the system to be safe, which is what the defence standards document says, then QinetiQ most definitely didn't do that.

I don't think you can have it both ways in this context. The fuel system and its safety is a fundamental building block of being able to declare an aircraft 'safe'. It is impossible to say an aircraft is acceptably safe in one breath and then try and imply the fuel system in the same aircraft is not safe in another. It doesn't work like that. It maybe that the fuel system is unsafe in certain conditions (that hence must be avoided), but by definition the aircraft will also be unsafe in those conditions (hence must also be avoided). I can only guess that the QinetiQ report discusses some of these conditions and this is where the story arises, but this would not detract from the overall assessment of aircraft safety, hence I must conclude that the story is without any meaningful foundation.

I think your comments Mick confirm you have realised this. If I understand this correctly then you have just confirmed that a story that was published on Page 2 of my paper this morning was probably fundamentally flawed and hence you could conclude a rather unfair slur on Des B. People often talk about stuff in the papers being incorrect or spun, but I can't remember the the last time the journolist concerned admitted this was the case on the same day his article appeared across the country!!

[Distant Voice]

JFZ 90. With all due respect, if you are not careful you are going to disappear up your own jet pipe on this one.

As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED

Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.

DV

[Tappers Dad]

JFZ 90.
Check your PMs

[JFZ90]

JFZ 90. With all due respect, if you are not careful you are going to disappear up your own jet pipe on this one.

As I read the Mick Smith report, the bottom line is that QinetiQ declared the Nimrod fuel system "Tolerable but not ALARP"; and that is Not Safe. QED

Any one who tries to claim that it is safe is misleading aircrews and the general public.

DV

Having had a quick look at some of the key facts in the QQ report, it seems blindingly obvious to any reader that they state that the "operation of the fuel system is tolerably safe given the mitigation currently in place".

You can argue about what "tolerably safe" means, but even to an uneducated reader its fairly obvious this patently does not mean "unsafe" as I think you are trying to imply.

Further, in the recommendations, QinetiQ state that the given lims and mtn activities in place "mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels". "Acceptable" is not a word QinetiQ/Boscombe are prone to using lightly and if there was any reason to say the aircraft was not safe they would absolutely not hesitate to say so.

It is hard for me to see how Mick has concluded that Des B misled anyone in his statement based on whats in the QQ report - on the contrary I now see his article as misleading in itself, based as it is on twisting & exaggerating the significance of some statements relating to ALARP.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90: You must of gone to the same spin school as Des Browne and CAS. What part of Def Stan 00-56 (issue 4) do you not understand.

If it is not ALARP it is NOT SAFE.

QinetiQ say the system in not ALARP.

Now, come on JFZ, this is not rocket science.

The levels of risk are; Broadly Acceptable, Tolerable and Unacceptable.

"Tolerably Safe" is a term which does exist.

DV

[Mick Smith]

JFZ90

The article is not misleading in any way. It states accurately that the QinetiQ report found the system tolerable but not ALARP. It goes into extensive detail to explain why ALARP is a key part of the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules and being tolerable is not enough. If it is not ALARP then it is not safe.

Does the limited paperwork you have access to say it is ALARP or does it say it is not ALARP? It says it is not ALARP.

Does it also say that in order to be ALARP no fewer than 30 recommendations need to be taken up? Yes it does.

How many of those relate to AAR? Just five.

Look again at the definition of safe under the MoD's own rules - Defence Standards 00-56 as issued in April 2007.

Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is
ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive
safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application
in a given operating environment.

Does that definition say that being tolerably safe is enough? No it doesnt. The system must be ALARP and either broadly acceptable or tolerable. If QinetiQ says it isnt ALARP then it can not be deemed safe under the MoD's own rules.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90; Can I draw your attention to what the "educated" BOI said about the Nimrod Safety Case (2-22):

"NSC is a body is a body of evidence that assures that the aircraft is safe to operate within the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. It is a suite of documents providing a written demonstration that risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)"

That body of evidence does not exist, and that is why the fuel system is not ALARP.

I fully appreciate that QinetiQ/Boscombe will not use "acceptable" lightly. But they also know the implications of using the term "broadly acceptable", and they do not use it.

DV

[Da4orce]

As a lawyer once said to me it's the little details that matter, find that thread and pull it, very often you can pull the whole thing apart!

[JFZ90]

Mick

In short, the reason I can state that I found your article misleading is that when I read it I came to the conclusion that the QinetiQ report must fundamentally contradict the statements that Des B gave to the house some time ago. I think this is exactly what you wanted our readers to conclude.

This is an extremely serious accusation, and if true would suggest he was either lying or trying to hide the fact that the aircraft was in fact not safe. The severity of this inference is no doubt why your editor felt it appropriate to have it on page 2 of your paper this morning.

However, on reading (admittedly only parts of) the report, QinetiQ clearly state that the measures taken, in their view, "mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels".

This provides quite a different spin on the story, and is entirely consistent with what Des said. I can only conclude therefore that the ALARP comments in the same document are being taken out of context deliberately to create a 'story'.

[Mick Smith]

You arent listening really are you JFZ90? Des said QinetiQ had said the fuel system was safe. QinetiQ actually said it was tolerably safe but not ALARP. ALARP is a fundamental part of the MoD's own definition of safe. Under those rules, a system cannot be safe without it. Tolerably safe is not good enough on its own. It must be ALARP. That's not my rules, that's the MoD's own rules.

[Distant Voice]

Mick, give up. You are beating your head against an MoD brick wall. We all know, including QinetiQ, that a risk level of "accepatable" has know real meaning. If QinetiQ really thought the system was safe they would have used the correct term "broadly acceptable".

Des Browne and CAS took advange of the lose terminology and mislead MP's, aircrew and the general public.

DV

[JFZ90]

You arent listening really are you JFZ90? Des said QinetiQ had said the fuel system was safe. QinetiQ actually said it was tolerably safe but not ALARP. ALARP is a fundamental part of the MoD's own definition of safe. Under those rules, a system cannot be safe without it. Tolerably safe is not good enough on its own. It must be ALARP. That's not my rules, that's the MoD's own rules.

I note your argument, but respectfully suggest it fails to give the reader the true picture.

The actual words in the QinetiQ report in the conclusion:

"Having considered the evidence referenced in this safety case report, noting that there are outstanding recommendations and the level of risk present to the fuel system is not ALARP, the operation of the fuel system is tolerably safe given the mitigations in place".

Whilst you can pick up on the slight variations in terminology, surely the correct interpretation of QinetiQs statement is that even though there are some aspects that should be followed up, the system in question is assessed as QinetiQ as tolerably safe. Your assertion that it is not and hence Des was lying is totally misleading, as the statement above notes the ALARP aspect you seek to make so much of!!!!

Mick, give up. You are beating your head against an MoD brick wall. We all know, including QinetiQ, that a risk level of "accepatable" has (k)no(w) real meaning. If QinetiQ really thought the system was safe they would have used the correct term "broadly acceptable".


So let me get this right DV - QinetiQ, by saying the risk is "acceptable" are actually communicating in a secret code - by not saying the magic "broadly acceptable" words they really mean it is "totally unsafe". Yes, I see now, your line of thinking makes absolute sense - NOT.

Its really me who should give up - I thought for a moment back there that you had started to question your article, but now I can only conclude it has all been a deliberate misrepresentation. I hope you're comfortable with the 99.9% of your readership who take your articles at face value and will be talking about how "the government lied about Nimrod safety" based on your assertions. Very poor show.

[Mick Smith]

JFZ90
You were going fine until your last paragraph because you were putting across your interpretation - in my view a misinterpretation - but your no doubt honestly held view. Thereafter you accused me of mendacity which I do not accept. My interpretation is not just my interpretation because not being an expert I checked the principle with two separate experts. They were the ones who confirmed that the system has to be ALARP to be safe, not that I and any reader who wants to cannot read it in the defence standards regulations which are very clear, although obviously not to you.

You have a view to which you are entitled. But your last paragraph is complete rubbish. As I said earlier, I very carefully and accurately laid out the point about ALARP in the article and yes I am comfortable that 99.9 per cent of our readers will believe that when Des Browne said the QinetiQ report had found the fuel system to be safe he was not giving an accurate picture. I am not going to accuse him of lying, and the article didn't do that either, because that would imply he knew it was inaccurate. But as the article did say, he certainly appears to have misled MPs.

[JFZ90]

Mick

I admit you are also entitled to hold your view, and I can see how you could interpret things the way you have, even though I feel strongly this is an incorrect interpretation. In this respect I suppose I should give you the benefit of the doubt about whether you sought to mislead readers - so apologies if I did not above.

There is potential for alot of confusion in this area and I think a misconception that demonstrating ALARP is the same as saying something is totally safe. This is absolutely not the case. The best example of why this is not so is probably the Harrier, which whilst it can be regarded as having ALARP safety, it is by design a fundamentally quite hazardous piece of kit (1 very high performance engine, fast jet, etc.). You can argue its ALARP however as to make it safer (e.g. add another engine for redundancy etc.) is not in any way practical, and the risks are tolerable with migitations (ejection seat, careful where you fly it etc.).

I'd be interested to know what background your 2 experts have and whether they really think the QinetiQ report is really suggesting something at odds with what Des said.

[tucumseh]

A couple of random thoughts, accompanied by direct extracts from the MoD’s own literature.

The QinetiQ report refers on a number of occasions to the Hazard Log and also to the lack of an audit trail that can demonstrate airworthiness.

A Hazard Log must contain the following;

Part 1: System data, including information of the build standard (which means it must be maintained), usage, environment etc and Safety requirements (legal, certification, safety elements of the – in this case – Air Staff Requirement and Risk Matrix). By definition, this means the Design Authority and MoD MUST have the ASR. They don’t.

Part 2: Hazard Data (a record on every identified hazard with its description, associated possible accidents, how it is analysed etc).

Part 3: Accident Data (a record on possible accidents for the aircraft, target Risk Class, how it is analysed, assessed Risk Class)

Part 4: Statement of System Safety (the assessed Risk of the aircraft)

Part 5: Journal (the running log or diary of significant events in the Safety programme).


In other words, it’s not a simple “log” but a significant body of work and a major task on a whole aircraft. All this is a through-life process – not a one-off. If you like, the Hazard Log is the heart of the Safety Case system. Like a case in law, the Safety Case is a body of evidence presented as a reasoned argument. However, unlike most areas of law the activities are not presumed safe (innocent) until proven unsafe (guilty). The Safety Case MUST prove that a system is safe. The onus is on the MoD to demonstrate they comply with all the regs and ensure Risks have been mitigated to ALARP. They can’t. This why Des Browne admitted liability.


Those who read my posts will know I bang on about maintaining the build standard. From part 1 above, you will see this is mandated. Maintaining the build standard has 17 core elements;


Appointment of a Design Authority.
Investigation of faults
Design of modifications
Submission of proposed modifications
Design incorporation of approved mods and changes, and maintaining configuration control
Holding and maintenance of master drawings
Management of Component replacement / unavailability (sometimes, wrongly, called obsolescence)
Responsibility for complete systems (as opposed to a single “black box”).
Provision of Technical advice to MoD and their agencies
Visits to User units (primarily to discuss system performance with users)
Packaging and handling
Supply of documents (to IPTs and agencies)
Management of sub-contractors, and monitoring their capability.
Preparation of amendments to Technical Publications
Conduct of Trials Installations
Holding and maintaining the Sample and Reference systems.
Dealing with day to day correspondence from MoD, their agencies and suppliers.

Do any Nimrod operators or maintainers see anything in the above that is not carried out? Out of date tech pubs? Drawings not available or out of date? Faults not investigated? Configuration Control not maintained? A contact number at the Design Authority and immediate access? Unavailable spares? If you do then, by definition, there has been a major failure of the Safety Management System. Both QinetiQ reports are, quite simply, a catalogue of such failures.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90: It is clear from what you say in your second paragraph to Mick Smith that you do not understand the concept of ALARP. Adding a additional engine to a Harrier is not what ALARP is about.

Furthermore, I can assure you that QinetiQ fully understand the the meaning of "Broadly Acceptable". And whilst they are happy to throw in the non-Def Stan term "acceprable", they are not prepared to go all the way and place "broadly" in front of it.

Was this a way of sending a secret message? I have no idea. What I do know is that the report was initially issued in Sept, for comment. It was then published for General Release in Oct. I say "General Release", it has taken the families of the lost crew over four months to get their hands on a report that claims to give the Nimrod system a clean bill of health.

DV

[JFZ90]

JFZ90: It is clear from what you say in your second paragraph to Mick Smith that you do not understand the concept of ALARP. Adding a additional engine to a Harrier is not what ALARP is about.

When I was first taught about ALARP more than 10 years ago the Harrier example was used to highlight the principle quite well I thought. The Harriers loss rate doesn't meet 'normal' safety targets, due in large part to its VTOL / single engine design. The fact that you wouldn't consider e.g. adding another engine to Harrier to improve its loss rate (totally impractical) is exactly what ALARP is all about.

From what you said earlier,

If it is not ALARP it is NOT SAFE.

I was concerned that you or a reader may erroneously draw the conclusion that ALARP = safe from your statement above. I hope the Harrier example shows why this is not the case - it is considered as safe as it can be, but this should not be confused with "it'll never go wrong & crash" which is a different thing.


Was this a way of sending a secret message? I have no idea. You're kidding right?

[Mick Smith]

I understand entirely what you mean JFZ90. I wasnt intending to simplistically say that it it's ALARP it's safe and I accept that was a possible conclusion that someone might have taken from what I said. As all will by now understand I hope, :rolleyes:all I am saying is that if it is tolerable but it isnt ALARP it isn't safe, as shown even more clearly than in the defence standards document in table 7.1 from this document from the MoD website:

http://www.asems.mod.uk/smp07.pdf

[OilCan]

actually Mick - it says Unacceptable
not - it isn't safe

...which could say as much about the procedure itself (or lack of) as it does about the actual nuts and bolts.

sorry to nit pick but you guys started it.

carry on chaps :p

[Da4orce]

Mick,
I found the defence standards document surprisingly easy to read, it provides clear descriptions of ALARP and supports your article on Sunday.

I haven't read the whole document but this stood out amongst the sections that I have read:


10.1.6 The Project should demonstrate any claims that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that risk is tolerable and ALARP and demonstrate that they have exercised their common law “duty of care”. The level of evidence required is a function of the level of risk and the domain. This will also involve demonstrating that further risk reduction methods have been actively sought and considered in a systematic way.


I would imagine that this document played a significant role in prompting the apology from the SofS for Defence. It seems reasonable to believe that he was advised that the MoD could not demonstrate that 'steps have been taken to ensure that risk is tolerable and ALARP' and were unable to 'demonstrate that they have exercised their common law “duty of care”.

The Def Stan document is also very clear in identifying those with responsibility for ensuring the procedure:


3.1 Accountability

3.1.1 The IPTL is accountable for the completion of this procedure.

3.2 Procedure Management

3.2.1 The IPTL may delegate the management of this procedure to a member (Safety Manager) or members of the IPT.


I now feel like I have approximately 0.01% of the knowledge that tucumseh has on this subject!

[BEagle]

The Project should demonstrate


'Should' does not imply a mandatory requirement, it merely implies a strong recommendation. The words 'shall' or 'must' imply mandatory requirements.

However, where a strong recommendation is not observed, those to whom it applies must be able to explain the reasoning for not observing the recommendation.

I also found Mick Smith's article clear and concise. He should be lauded for his investigative efforts!

[tucumseh]

Another gem from MoD archives……..


“Pre-requisites to Successful safety Management”


Successful Safety Management requires (MoD) to follow good practices in areas such as;


Quality (How many resident QARs do we have now?)
Configuration Management (Funding slashed from 1991-on and now considered a vague concept and, at worst, a “waste of money”).
Use of suitably qualified and experienced personnel (Difficult, following CDP’s decision in 1996 that such people were not required. He ditched two generations and left us with airfix pilots and physiologists making engineering decisions).
Management of Corporate and Project Risk (Corporate are on the greasy pole and Projects are denied resources).
Design Reviews (Ah, a hobby horse of mine, ever since 2* ruled it ok to waive a Critical Design Review knowing critical safety risks were outstanding. Luckily, I ignored him).
Independent Review (Despite QQ not being truly independent, I have the greatest respect for the likes of Boscombe Down who, consistently, over a long period, have provided what stability and common sense there is in aircraft Safety Management. To paraphrase Beagle, if their recommendations are ignored it should be mandatory for the IPTL to document his/her reasons. I utterly detested being told to ignore them when their recommendations caused embarrassment to my boss’s mate. But, equally, I was disappointed when they withdrew under pressure only to phone me up and say “We were told to withdraw, but can you please make the aircraft safe?”).
Closed Loop problem reporting and resolution (Closed, in the sense if you report a problem, the door is closed. If you’re on the outside, you’re ignored. If you’re on the inside, you’re on the carpet for a career brief on your brief career).
Focus on Safety culture (In that the Safety and Risk managers are treated as a nasty culture festering in the corner of the floorplate).
Cynical, moi?

[Chugalug2]

Cynical, moi?
Well certainly moi, tucumseh! Your continuing testimony on the threads of this forum show how the regulations and procedures to provide for and maintain the airworthiness of HM aircraft have been systematically and deliberately ignored or circumvented over the past few decades at the behest, direction and instruction of senior officers. Of course Brown and Co want as much bang for as few bucks as possible. It is the purpose of those regulations and procedures to ensure that the few bucks are not so few as to render military aircraft unfit for purpose, ie unairworthy and as often as not unsafe. It is the responsibility of senior officers to ensure that this does not happen. That responsibility would appear to have been reneged on. The important thing is to reverse this dysfunction and make our aircraft safe and fit for purpose again. How should that be done? At the risk of sounding like the ignored guest at Fawlty Towers endlessly repeating his drinks order to no avail, remove all responsibility and authority for the regulation of Military Airworthiness to a separate and independent MAA with a relationship to the MOD similar to that between the CAA and the civilian operators.

[helgar33]

Can I just butt in here and ask about another part of the Sunday Times article and see if what I understand is correct. The part that concerns me reads: -

''TheQinetiq report found that during air-to-air refuelling fuel was flowing at twice the speed deemed safe for vital parts of the fuel system. It also showed that a light on the flight engineer's panel that would flash if there was too much pressure in the fuel system had been deliberately disconnected''.

''Twice the speed''!!! Putting a huge amount of pressure on the system and possibly causing a fatal leak heh?! :hmm:

I am now wondering when was the warning light disconnected? Under whose orders? Under what circumstances? I know that the Qinetiq report was released last year but ultimately was the disconnection made before or after 2nd September? :hmm:

Please discuss.....

Crew 3 family member- please be gentle!

[EdSet100]

Helgar, the light you are referring to is the "5 Tank Overpressure" warning.

When the Nimrod was built, consideration had to be given to mitigation against refuel valves failing to close when their associated tanks reached full while filling them up on the ground. Despite the presence of a ventilation pipe, a tank could rupture under the pressure of fuel being pumped in through the stuck open valve at a greater rate than the vent pipe could handle. Therefore, all the tanks are fitted with blow-off valves, whose diameters match the bore of the refuel pipes. This ensures that if a blow-off valve opens, it has the capacity, together with the vent pipe, to dump the fuel onto the ground at the same rate that it enters the tank, therefore protecting the tank from a rupture. This was designed for ground refuelling only. The No 5 tank is in the fuselage and its blow off valve was fitted just forward of the No 2 engine intake. This is not an issue when the engine is not running, which is always the case when refuelling on the ground.

When the AAR system was installed, it was recognised that a No 5 tank refuel valve might fail to close when the tank became full during AAR and that it's blow off valve might then send copious amounts of fuel down the intake of No 2 engine. Therefore, they installed a pressure switch which would activate the "No 5 Tank Overpressure Warning" light and simulataneously close the 5 tank refuel valve, by interupting its electricity supply.

Mick Smith, please take note:

It was later recognised that the warning system was inadequate: the pressure switch might not work in time to stop fuel passing through the valve, or the valve might be physically jammed open, so no electrical control would have any effect, and, lastly, the crew, having seen the warning, would not be given sufficient time to safely withdraw from the tanker before the fuel entered the engine intake. Further mitigation was then designed as follows:

A restrictor is now fitted into the refuel pipe for No 5 tank, such that the effective bore of the pipe at that point is less than the tank's vent pipe. This ensures that if the refuel valve jams open the vent pipe has the capacity to direct all of the surplus fuel to the vent outlets at the back of the wing at the same rate that it enters the tank. The blow off valve is now redundant and has been removed and blanked off. The warning light will never come on, so it has been "deliberately" removed.

In summary, the RAF/BAe have cleverly replaced a dubious warning system with a far safer arrangement that now completely avoids the possibility of overpresssuring the tank. It is a pain in the neck during AAR because the refuelling rate has slowed considerably, but we recognise the need for it. The modification was carried out in the late 80's.

Helgar, I hope this has helped. I will write another message about the flow rates.

Mick Smith, I urge you or your colleagues to pm me whenever you want to write anything in the Timesonline about anything technical on this aircraft. Helgar is clearly concerned about what has been written. This is yet another needless discussion.

Regards
Ed Sett

[helgar33]

Ed Sett
Thank you for your very thorough description of the tank 5 warning light disconnection. The detail which you went in to was much appreciated and has made things alot clearer for me and hopefully for others who are also following information that concerns XV 230. 'Needless discussions' are needed by us uninformed types!;) I look forward to part 2.
Regards helgar33.

[dodgysootie]

Ed Sett,

"A restrictor is now fitted into the refuel pipe for No 5 tank,"

Just a thought Ed, with the 5 tank under a normal refuel pressure of 50 psi, what would be the back pressure behind this restrictor acting on the 5 tank refuel line along the Stbd rib 1? As you know the 5 tank is always the last to fill when uplifting a large fuel load and to my mind, when the second to last tank is shut off, would there not be a pressure increase or 'pressure spike' down the 5 tank refuel line as a result?

DS

[Mick Smith]

EdSett. Apologies for not responding sooner.

Mick Smith, I urge you or your colleagues to pm me whenever you want to write anything in the Timesonline about anything technical on this aircraft. Helgar is clearly concerned about what has been written. This is yet another needless discussion.

Thanks for the offer. I took the issues to the MoD three days before the article appeared and was told they couldnt answer them in detail because of the independent inquiry. Your comments would have no doubt informed the article. BUT...

I was reporting what the QinetiQ engineers said was the case and it isnt a needless discussion. It's a very important discussion, not least because the QinetiQ engineers who wrote the report saw it as so important that they said the following recommendation needed to be carried through before the aircraft was ALARP:

Further consideration should be given to the AAR procedures to ensure that tank 5 does not suffer from over-pressurisation, including reinstatement of the tank 5 over pressurisation warning

I now look forward to the flow rate explanation. For the record, the QinetiQ engineers said:

FRS Couplings. It is noted that the maximum permissible flow rate for type /N is 1,052.7 kg/min. Flow rates during AAR have been measured at 2,100 kg/min. It is therefore recommended that assurance is sought that FRS couplings are suitable for use in the Nimrod fuel system for the purpose of AAR given that measured flow rates have been seen at approximately double the qualified flow rates of the FRS coupling.

They also said:

There no longer exists an in-depth knowledge of working on the Nimrod aircraft within NLS and it is not unusual for tradesmen when faced with something that they have never undertaken before to seek advice and support from other areas at Kinloss, FSS are able to provide support but NLS also seek help from FRA on an unofficial 'old boy' approach.

and

Human errors are more likely to occur where experience and manning levels are low. The combination of these factors creates additional tensions and uncertainties. At Kinloss there have been examples of poor practice or human errors occurring which might otherwise have been avoided.

I should stress having re-read my post that the last two quotes are not meant to be a snipe at you, your comments are always useful, only reinforcing the point that, along with the overstatement of the state of risk involved with the fuel system, this was not exactly the ringing endorsement Des Browne painted it as.

[Edited to add final paragraph]

[shona beattie]

Just received the qinetiq report, unfortunately it does not give me the reassurance I was looking for. If this is what Des Browne calls safe, I wonder if I have received the wrong report?

[Da4orce]

It's no consolation I know but if media reports are correct it appears that our current Defence Secretary's days are numbered.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=322895

[EdSet100]

Helgar, I hope I didn't give you the impression that I think you are the cause of a needless discussion. My criticism was directed to the media, who published an article that was clearly meant to stimulate a discussion, which I (and I forget that others do not have the opportunities that I have, to find the facts) wrongly described as needless. It should be needless in a Nimrod crewroom, but valuable in a bereaved family's home. For that slip of the tongue I apologise.

Dodgysootie:when the second to last tank is shut off, would there not be a pressure increase or 'pressure spike' down the 5 tank refuel line as a result?
Yes, there would be a momentary pressure surge, which would be felt throughout the pipework (but not in the tanks), right back to the refueller's pump, which should react.

Mick,
As I have indicated above, I should not have used the word "needless". If Shona and Helgar are concerned about the QQ report, I agree that it needs discussion and clarification. QQ are not experts on the technicalities of all aircraft. I don't doubt their expertise in safety matters and specific subjects such as combustion analysis, fluid dynamics and aerodynamics, etc. Their suggestion that we consider re-installing the 5 tank overpressure warning is based on insufficient information (and thats our fault, I guess, for not giving them the full history), However, the IPT will doubtless give it due regard and for the reasons I have stated the device will probably not be needed. Its unfortunate that it provoked a headline moment for the press which then gave rise to family interest.

With reference to flow rates, yes, before the accident, we did experience fuel flow greater than the max permitted rate quoted by QQ. That specification in the QQ report was new to me (and most other aircrew, I believe) when I read it. I would be very interested to know where that max flow rate is published. There is no way that the Release to Service flight trials unit would approve the use of tanker pumps that would exceed manufacturers' published limits on the receiver's aircraft.

Since Dec 06, we have drastically reduced flow rates, markedly reduced the amount of fuel we can put into each tank and taken steps to obviate pressure surges. There are no more pressure surges any more. These changes in our proceures were done solely as a precautionary measure to ensure that AAR is now conducted even more comfortably within the bounds of safety.

Therefore, with the QQ report as a basis, the operational measures now in place make the fuel system, as designed, more secure than ever before.

The fuel leak on XV235 came out of the blue. We had not spilled a drop of fuel during AAR since Oct 06 before that incident. As I have mentioned before, the investigation into that incident is now complete. We await its publication. I would be very surprisd if the cause of that leak is down to flow rates, pressure spikes, age of the pipes or the reliability of the seals.

Ed Sett

[BEagle]

There is no way that the Release to Service flight trials unit would approve the use of tanker pumps that would exceed manufacturers' published limits on the receiver's aircraft.


Other way round, surely? There's no way any aircraft should be permitted to conduct AAR unless its fuel system can safely accept the standard fuel flow rates provided by the specified tanker.

[Mick Smith]

EdSett

Its unfortunate that it provoked a headline moment for the press which then gave rise to family interest.


To be fair it didnt provoke any headlines, it was a brief line in a piece that was headlined Browne Misled MPs on Nimrod and concentrated on his apparently bogus claim that QQ had said the aircraft's fuel system was safe when the risk was in fact tolerable but not ALARP, which as we have rehearsed endlessly here does not amount to safe. The discussion over the two one-line points which I included and you responded to is interesting but I hope irrelevant to current safety because both relate to AAR.

There were 30 recommendations that had to be carried out for the risk to the aircraft to be ALARP and only five relate to AAR. The key question I asked the MoD and they were not able to answer was: "Have they been carried out and if so had they been carried out when Browne stood up and cited the QQ report as showing the fuel system was safe?" If people want I can post all 30 recommendations here and let you take the QinetiQ experts apart piece by piece but the MoD and the RAF can't on the one hand rest on the report for showing the system is safe and at the same time say the people writing the report didn't know what they were talking about.

As for Shona's post, I got the impression her concerns were about the report as a whole rather than one or two isolated lines from it.

[tucumseh]

Beagle, you are of course correct, but so too is the essential point. If the data presented is true, then there has been a breakdown of the system integration and safety management processes, whereby the physical safety of each aircraft system may be safe in isolation, but functionally unsafe when mated and used.

However, EdSett is not wrong as for some years now (in my experience) Trials Installation aircraft have often acted as the sole Integration Rigs, for a variety of reasons. (Boscombe, especially, rightly complain about this). Primarily, as a means by which prime contractors can transfer risk back to MoD. That is, they claim “It works on the bench, so it’ll work on the aircraft”. They claim payment from a gullible non-engineer project manager and later, when the problem appears, stick their hand out saying “You paid up, our job was complete, we need more if you want it to actually work”.

This was formally condoned by 2 and 4 Star in DPA, and confirmed under FoI.

[Mick Smith]

Tucumseh said:

the physical safety of each aircraft system may be safe in isolation, but functionally unsafe when mated and used.


Which is presumably why the QinetiQ report said:

The fuel system for the Nimrod is understood as is the fuel system for the Tristar. When these systems are combined, however, during AAR, the mated system is in effect a new third system that it is believed, will behave differently from the separate Nimrod and Tristar fuel systems. While some activities have been undertaken to understand how this system responds, further work is required to understand how the mated system responds and behaves during AAR operation.

The AAR system had been in use for 25 years when QinetiQ made this statement.

[shona beattie]

Yes that is correct Mick. However there are another 11, qinetiq reports post 2nd September which I am still waiting for.

[JFZ90]

To be fair it didnt provoke any headlines, it was a brief line in a piece that was headlined Browne Misled MPs on Nimrod and concentrated on his apparently bogus claim that QQ had said the aircraft's fuel system was safe when the risk was in fact tolerable but not ALARP, which as we have rehearsed endlessly here does not amount to safe. The discussion over the two one-line points which I included and you responded to is interesting but I hope irrelevant to current safety because both relate to AAR.

The article was on Page 2 of the Sunday Times which you could argue is pretty high profile, hence "headline" news. It certainly caught my attention. I think you are making a plea here not to dismiss your article just because two one-line points have been showed to not create a correct impression with respect to Nimrod safety.


There were 30 recommendations that had to be carried out for the risk to the aircraft to be ALARP and only five relate to AAR. The key question I asked the MoD and they were not able to answer was: "Have they been carried out and if so had they been carried out when Browne stood up and cited the QQ report as showing the fuel system was safe?" If people want I can post all 30 recommendations here and let you take the QinetiQ experts apart piece by piece but the MoD and the RAF can't on the one hand rest on the report for showing the system is safe and at the same time say the people writing the report didn't know what they were talking about.

There is therefore some irony surely that in the same post you declare that people can't say on the one hand this is right, and then say this is wrong - its either all correct, or all wrong. Can we therefore conclude that the thrust of your article is either all correct or all wrong? With this logic do the two one-liners that are misleading suggest we should disregard your entire article?

A interesting example of why it is easy to get things wrong is your quotation of QinetiQs comment:

Further consideration should be given to the AAR procedures to ensure that tank 5 does not suffer from over-pressurisation, including reinstatement of the tank 5 over pressurisation warning

Now, it seems apparent that you concluded in the absence of other information that this means "no over pressurisation warning" = "not safe". When you read it again, it is also clear that not only is this NOT what it actually says, but this does not actually contradict what edset has now mentioned either - QinetiQ only say further consideration should be given to the issue - not "thou shall reinstate" - there is the option that they reconsider it and dismiss it. Hence neither Edset nor QinetiQ are incorrect, it is only your interpretation (or spin) on what one of them has stated. In this respect no-one needs to "take apart" the 30 recommendations to undermine your conclusions. I think this is a good example of why, in my opinion, your article, based as it is on incomplete information, is not really helpful and just creates angst and potential misunderstandings.

[davejb]

25 years...
not really.
In my youth we prodded VC10's, Victors of course, and Hercs...I think the problem is that the Tristar came later to the party, and everyone figured 'well. all the others were okay, why should Tristar be any different?'.

(This is) personal opinion based on limited understanding now, but I'm surprised that nobody seems, prior to the crash, to have known (or considered the implications of, at least) the difference in pressure during AAR as tanker type is changed. Mind you, I'm even more flabbergasted to discover that the extra conditioning that was plumbed in when converting to the Mk2 was never intended to be used in flight - did I read that right? 20 odd years back I was simply told 'oh we need that'....it was as remarkable then as having a port wing....

Please remember to blame the people making decisions 20+ years ago, not those currently in post who inherited what they had every reason to believe was a well tried, reliable system. It is NOT reasonable to expect people like Martin Cannard to take up a post and promptly nip down the line, spanner in hand, to double check 25 years of received wisdom - whoever decided not to prove the system properly post Falklands did so 5-10 years before Martin was a 2nd Nav on 206. (A bloody good one, by the way).

Dave

(edited for small typos and, as ever, spellinge)

[Tappers Dad]

davejb

"Please remember to blame the people making decisions 20+ years ago, not those currently in post who inherited what they had every reason to believe was a well tried, reliable system. It is NOT reasonable to expect people like Martin Cannard to take up a post and promptly nip down the line, spanner in hand, to double check 25 years of received wisdom"

Airworthiness and the safety of aircraft is on going, just because it was OK 20 yrs ago doesn't mean you never revisit it to ensure it complies to modern standards.Everyone from groundies to Station Commander had a responsibility for the airworthiness of the aircraft. Martin Cannard et al would have known which aircraft were serviceable and what problems they may have.

The Buck stops somewhere

May I repeat what was said at the BOI Briefing 4th Dec 2007.

Question to the Secretary of State for Defence:Was XV230 safe to fly ?
Answer: In hindsight and in those particular circumstances No

What circumstances ? There was nothing unusual about XV230 in fact most witnesses told the BOI it was one of the best a/c in the fleet.

So what in what particular circumstances was it flyng.

No different from any other Nimrod, it follows therefore that all Nimrods were not Airworthy at that time .

[EdSet100]

I'm certain that he will return to Kinloss in the top job. In the meantime....

Beagle:Other way round, surely? There's no way any aircraft should be permitted to conduct AAR unless its fuel system can safely accept the standard fuel flow rates provided by the specified tanker. Yes, agreed, if there is only one flow rate available (not including the refueller's tanks' booster pumps) from the tanker. The V force (do you remember the Vulcan tanker?), VC10 and C130 tankers had only one centre line pump associated with each HDU. The Tristar has 3 Carter pumps, of which 2 may be used in parrallel simultaneously, depending on the receiver's capability. I believe that one single Carter pump does not meet the Def Stan; two together far exceeds it. Nimrod was trialled and tested to accept both pumps simultaneously. We now (or, until recently, did) only use 1 Carter pump.

Mick, I think we can agree to draw a line under the discussion about the intentions and impact of the latest article in your paper. It remains the top UK newspaper in my eyes and I'm sure nobody would wish you to stop asking questions and doing your research.

TD:Question to the Secretary of State for Defence:Was XV230 safe to fly ?
Answer: In hindsight and in those particular circumstances No

What circumstances ? Answer: AAR is the circumstance he refers to, IMHO.

it follows therefore that all Nimrods were not Airworthy... to carry out AAR .. at that time. otherwise, no argument from me.


Ed Sett

[Mick Smith]

JFZ90
Your attempts to twist what I and QinetiQ said are a waste of time. The bottom line is that the report was an accurate account of what QQ said, which was not what SoS said, that was the headline news, not the over-pressurisation warning, although that is also in the QQ report and given what happened is also reportable. If the QQ experts expressed concern in a written report they must have had a reason.

EdSet
Thanks for your, as ever, reasoned arguments. I'm happy to leave discussion here.

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett. With regards to knowing about fuel flow rates, the data was published by Flight Refuelling on 8-5-68.

The same document states that "Service life unlimited, with seal inspection every 5 years. Shelf life 5 years."

DV

[Squidlord]

I am not aware that the term "tolerably safe" is defined anywhere in MoD policy or regulation. However, it has come to be used, in the field of defence aviation at least, in roughly the following manner. To say an aircraft is "tolerably safe" is the same as saying that the risk associated with operating that aircraft is "tolerable" ("tolerable", as applied to risk, is a term that is well-defined in MoD policy and regulation). This is a right pain because not only does this lead to the confusion between "tolerably safe" and "safe" (which are not equivalent, as pointed out above) but also, the term "tolerably safe" is used in other contexts and industries to mean "the risk is tolerable and ALARP" (which is much closer to the MoD definition of "safe").

The distinction between "tolerably safe" (meaning the risk is "tolerable") and "safe" is not, in my opinion, well understood within the MoD. I find it very plausible that Des Browne may have been misinformed by the MoD in respect of any statements he made concerning whether or not the Nimrod in question was "safe". I would expect QinetiQ to very well understand the distinction, though I would think it regrettable if they used the terms "tolerably safe" or "acceptable" without explicitly defining them (the latter was probably used in a generic sense rather than in the sense of "Broadly Acceptable", which is also a well-defined term).

Also, some reference has been made to Def Stan 00-56, "Safety Management Requirements for Defence Systems" (from which the MoD definitions of "safe", "tolerable" and "broadly acceptable" have been taken in preceding discussion). This standard is not strictly applicable to safety management by the MoD itself. Instead, the standard is intended to specify requirements for safety management by contractors to the MoD. For example, BAE or any other supplier of safety-related military equipment.

The document that specifies MoD safety management requirements, at least for the IPTs (Integrated Project Teams) that procure and administer MoD equipment, is the Project Oriented Safety Management System (POSMS). It can be found at:

http://www.asems.mod.uk/posms_manual.htm

It shares many of the principles and definitions of Def Stan 00-56, inheriting many of the definitions directly. It is a much larger document but also provides a lot of very readable (for the layperson, I would have thought) guidance.

In my opinion, the distinction in the scope of applicability between Def Stan 00-56 and POSMS is also not well understood within the MoD and its contractors.

[Distant Voice]

Squidlord; I agree with you, the statement "tolerably safe" has no real meaning. It is like saying a person is "restrively free", there is a conflict of terms.

You say that "tolerably save" is used in some industries to mean tolerable and ALARP, which is a condition I can understand. However, QineiQ make it quite clear that the fuel system is not ALARP. The term "acceptable" is used at times in the report, but according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, "acceptable" means "tolerable". At no point in the report does QinetiQ state that the system is "broadly acceptable", because they know what that means.

Perhaps someone did misinform Des Browne, but I also believe that words were played with in order to give a false indication of the condition of the Nimrod fuel system, with current mitigations.


I understand the point you make about DEF STAN 00-56, but I would like to draw your attention to the first paragraph of that document.

"Under UK law, all employers have a duty of care to their employees, the general public and the wider environment. For the MOD, this includes an obligation to manage the safety risks associated with military systems and their operation. In addition safety is a vital characteristic of defence systems as it is often has a significant impact upon operational effectiveness. In accordance with the general guidance provided by the Health and Safety Executive, MOD will discharge this duty by ensuring that, in as so far as risks are not judged to be unacceptable, they are reduced to a level which is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)"

DV

[tucumseh]

Squidlord


Good first post.

POSMS has been referred to or quoted here often, and Mick Smith recently provided a link. You are correct that it is better written than many other standards. Most Def Stans, JSPs etc originate from a time when the target audience had to have certain minimum direct experience of aircraft and their equipment. So radical have been the changes in MoD that the same audience today is likely never to have been near an aircraft, and non-engineers are permitted to make engineering decisions affecting design and safety. You will appreciate that this is a serious breaches of the regs.

May I expand on two points.

You are correct in that successive Secretaries of State (and Mins(AF)) have been misled by their MoD staffs in Ministerial responses. We all know they are not chosen for their detailed knowledge of Defence matters and they invariably simply sign what’s placed in front of them.

Noticeably, there does not seem to be a process to ensure successive and even concurrent post holders are given consistent advice. For example, well before XV230 Adam Ingram was personally advised the airworthiness regs were not being implemented properly. He denied it, despite supporting evidence in various BoI reports. Before that (in my own experience), it was CDP and his XDs; and before that………. The list goes on. Later, in the XV230 report, ACM Sir Clive Loader simply repeated this. Des Browne accepted it, yet RAF Air Staffs and Ainsworth continued to cite Ingram’s previous denial.

The bottom line here is that Des Browne has accepted that a raft of “standards”, including 00-56, 57, POSMS, 553, 123, 125 and so on, have not been implemented properly. The root problem, in a management sense, is that successive regimes in MoD(PE), DPA, DLO, DE&S, AMSO, AML and the rest have consistently ruled they may be treated as optional. (It follows that less money was spent on the subject, and it is almost impossible to resurrect an unused funding line). This is the same mentality that decreed, for example, that it is sufficient to have a Risk Register, but don’t dare ask for resources to actually mitigate the risks. Or by all means have a Hazard Log; but populate it? How odd. That Critical Design Reviews may be waived. That personnel may be disciplined for having the temerity to insist on implementing these regs (rulings upheld by the very people responsible for airworthiness and who brief Ministers). These are the real problems.

[Safeware]

As regards understanding the preceding discussion on Tolerably Safe, I think it all needs to come back to the HSE explanation rather than the defence standard. I also think it is where CAS thinks he got his "safe as it needs to be" line from.

As I've said before, have a read of "Reducing Risks, Protecting People" at http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm particularly paras 122 - 133 and, as regards Tolerable, at para 124:

The zone between the unacceptable and broadly acceptable regions is the tolerable region.
Risks in that region are typical of the risks from activities that people are prepared to
tolerate in order to secure benefits, in the expectation that:
 the nature and level of the risks are properly assessed and the results used properly
to determine control measures. The assessment of the risks needs to be based on the
best available scientific evidence and, where evidence is lacking, on the best
available scientific advice;
 the residual risks are not unduly high and kept as low as reasonably practicable (the
ALARP principle – see Appendix 3); and
 the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP criteria,
for example, by ascertaining whether further or new control measures need to be
introduced to take into account changes over time, such as new knowledge about the
risk or the availability of new techniques for reducing or eliminating risks.

Spot what is missing from this sad story?


sw

[JFZ90]

Are the numerical definitons of tolerable and broadly acceptable in relation to Nimrod safety known (i.e. is this information releasable)?

I assume "broadly acceptable" (at system/aircraft level) is up around the 10-7 / 10-8 failures (with critical safety consequences - i.e. loss of life/serious injury) per (flight) hour, but where is "tolerable" risk zone - 10-5, 10-6? I assume these numerical definitions have been set by the Nimrod project, based on extant HSE guidance & other project comparators?

Can anyone point to some example HSE type rates for different types of system/project (e.g. airliners/oil production platforms etc.)?


EDIT to add - safeware, you appear to have partially answered one of my questions a few minutes before I asked it - I didn't see your post before I posted!

[Safeware]

JFZ90, to try and answer all of them:
Are the numerical definitons of tolerable and broadly acceptable in relation to Nimrod safety known? This should be available to those who have the safety case.

I assume "broadly acceptable" (at system/aircraft level) is up around the 10-7 / 10-8 failures (with critical safety consequences - i.e. loss of life/serious injury) per (flight) hour, but where is "tolerable" risk zone - 10-5, 10-6? I assume these numerical definitions have been set by the Nimrod project, based on extant HSE guidance & other project comparators?
Military Airworthiness requirements are in JSP 553, Civil requirements are in Certification Specifications (eg CS.25). They represent single figure numerical targets rather than "zones"

Can anyone point to some example HSE type rates for different types of system/project (e.g. airliners/oil production platforms etc.)? The HSE guidance is based on risks to people, rather than about different technologies / industries. However, it does have some interesting stats about various activities.

sw

[JFZ90]

Thanks safeware,

The HSE doc is interesting reading, and has a refreshing tone on how common sense needs to be applied to assessing risk.

I'm a bit rusty here, but I was under the impression that projects had to set specific targets, which was based on HSE / comparative projects but can take other factors into account (the "gas leak" example in the HSE doc is interesting in this respect). Hence in theory the Nimrod (or any other a/c) safety targets could still be different/vary from other comparative aircraft. Is there a copy of JSP553 on the interweb, or can you paraphrase the bits relating to safety targets?

Re my question on oil-rigs etc. if I understand the principle correctly the HSE outlines / can advise on a certain rate of risk to people that is publically acceptable, and uses this to set targets for/regulate operators (i.e. an oil rig operator would need to show how his procedures and systems supported meeting/exceeding the acceptable risk to people rate). Interesting to read that you're more at risk farming than working on oil rigs.

[tucumseh]

Here's an easily understood diagram from MoD literature.

Class A risks are Unacceptable. Class B and C are Tolerable, if ALARP. Class D are Broadly Acceptable.

In other words, any risk where the severity of harm is "catastrophic" (i.e. loss of aircraft) must be reduced to ALARP even if the probability of occurrence is "incredible". But, as JFZ says, individuals projects can apply their own criteria, within the boundaries of the regulations. Specifically, this does not include "It's never happened before, so won't happen".

When you map the various risks noted in BAeS and QQ reports, you'll find there are a number of Class As that were not mitigated to ALARP.



http://i214.photobucket.com/albums/cc291/exploringtheblue/matrix.jpg

[tucumseh]

Sorry, I'd just add that it is my opinion that "loss of aircraft" would be catastrophic. In this, I differ from a number of senior staffs who have ruled otherwise. Perhaps there is too much elasticity in a system which allows this view to prevail.

[JFZ90]

Thanks Tuc,

I think this is a difficult area as I tend to agree that surely "loss of aircraft" is catastrophic (not only due to risk to the pilot/aircrew, but also those near the smoking hole).

However, when you consider fast jet aircraft with only one engine the numbers game wrt loss rates starts to get a bit tricky - does this automatically mean single engine aircraft are likely to be "unsafe/unacceptable"? Theoretically this would mean F-16s and Harriers are fundamentally flawed designs, but its difficult to argue this given their basic success (despite their (especially early) loss rates).

"... when you map the various risks noted in BAeS and QQ reports, you'll find there are a number of Class As..."

Really? I'm getting a bit confused by this, I would have thought that all risks in Class A would need to be mitigated usually to a lower level (i.e. B or C) through system design or procedures? Otherwise how can you demonstrate you can meet the overall target? Surely a system with lots of real unmitigated Class As would be causing mayhem on a regular basis.


PS - there are some useful ALARP fallacies explained here.

http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm

[tucumseh]

(not only due to risk to the pilot, but also those near the smoking hole).

Nail on head. The concept of certain a/c losses not being catastrophic ignores the airworthinesses components dealing with ground crew, areas being overflown etc.

My comment on Class A risks existing on Nimrod was based on (a) my interpretation of, in particular, the BAeS report, and (b) loss of a Nimrod being deemed catastrophic. I hasten to add this is the report in which BAeS recommend urgent mitigation but were seemingly ignored.

[Da4orce]

DV wrote:

I understand the point you make about DEF STAN 00-56, but I would like to draw your attention to the first paragraph of that document.

"Under UK law, all employers have a duty of care to their employees, the general public and the wider environment. For the MOD, this includes an obligation to manage the safety risks associated with military systems and their operation. In addition safety is a vital characteristic of defence systems as it is often has a significant impact upon operational effectiveness. In accordance with the general guidance provided by the Health and Safety Executive, MOD will discharge this duty by ensuring that, in as so far as risks are not judged to be unacceptable, they are reduced to a level which is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)"


The MoD have admitted that 230 was unsafe at the time of its loss and they have admitted that they failed in theirobligation to manage the safety risks associated. They have clearly failed in their duty of care to crew 3, what then is the chance of HSE prosecution against the MoD?

[Safeware]

wrt HSE prosecution - it would be a Crown Censure, not a prosecution.

I wonder who would receive it - CAS or ACAS as the man who signs off on an RTS?

sw

[helgar33]

The quote which T D refers to which reads ‘was XV230 safe to fly’ was unfortunately inaccurately recorded in the minutes, which we have just recently received, from the BOI meeting in London on 4th December. What I actually asked was '' with the evidence you have seen; was XV 230 airworthy that day''. To which Sir Glenn Torpy replied ''in hindsight and under those circumstances I would have to say no''. Others in the room repeated this question with ''was XV 230 airworthy'' adding on ''yes or no'' to which Sir Glenn answered ''NO''.
I had just made several statements of fact, as I saw them, and had asked the following questions; which had prompted Sir Glenn to make the statement about ‘circumstances’. What I said and asked was as follows: -

1. That there was a major design flaw in the MK2 adaptation i.e. when the SCP was added.
2. That BAe designed the Nimrod and added on th SCP and did the safety case and didn’t realise that the SCP got hot!
Why wasn’t there a Nimrod specialist to accompany BAe to tell them what the SCP did i.e. that it got hot?
3. Who looks at and collates information which has been recorded; to help with identifying patterns e.g. with an increase in leaks?
Why was this not done before?
4. Why was the limiting of Tank 1 contents from 16,000 to 15,000 lbs accepted as a viable solution to a problem? Especially when it is difficult to judge levels (of fuel) accurately; due to pressures at that height.

This led straight on to my question ‘’ with the evidence you have seen; was XV 230 airworthy that day’’.

NB. most of the answers to the above questions were ‘’we will be looking in to that with the next inquiry’’ i.e. with the Hadden-Cave inquiry.

I have copied the above word for word from my notes and apologise for the grammar. I was pretty upset that day!

The inquest next month will probably reveal yet more unacceptable ‘circumstances’.
helgar33

[BEagle]

I think 8 top class engineers have a better idea what left on that fatefull day than anyone else

Although 8 experienced maintenance technicians (not 'engineers') might well have stated that there were no reported unserviceabilities within their trade area, that is most emphatically not the same thing as accepting an inherent design flaw. About which they probably had no knowledge.

As tucumseh has stated, the graphical relationship between probability and severity of harm is indeed straightforward enough. Whether it was properly complied with is another question.

[Tappers Dad]

Strongbowfan
"I know for dam fact that aircraft was Serviceable the day it left"

The a/c may have been serviceable that day however serviceable and airworthy are not the same. If you have been following this thread tucumseh has shown the differerence very clearly on a number of Occassions.

The MOD/Goverment/RAF have all admitted that XV230 wasn't airworthy because it failed to conform to airworthiness regulations eg: JSP 553-Def Stan 00-970 etc.

JSP 553

The formal definition of airworthiness is:

"The ability of an aircraft or other airbourne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant), or to the general public over which such airbourne systems are flown".

AAR has been stopped and the SCP switched off . Why ? Because they were/are a significant hazard to aircrew. As the loss of XV230 showed.

[tucumseh]

Strongbowfan

and im sorry i just have to add one thing , its taken over a year but finally we have a graph , a statistic bit of pish that officers use when they giving them briefs to all, somehow i knew within myself that one day we would get a graph here , with all shades of colours and looks great , many hours spent making one for what !!!


And I’m sorry you’re so anti-safety and airworthiness (although seemingly pro-serviceability, so on the right track), but you are in exalted company judging by the number of the senior staffs you allude to who have also told me I’m talking “pish” (or words to that effect, and normally followed by darker threats) when trying my best to impose some semblance of order on a fragmented and woefully inadequate airworthiness system. Certainly, I thought the 2 Star responsible for MRA4 was taking the “pish” when he told me I’d have received a better annual report had I not insisted on properly implementing the airworthiness regulations. In fact, I thought he’d been on the “pish”, so ludicrous and dangerous was his stance. But then his bosses “pished” on me by supporting him. I’m used to it and it’s water (or pish) off a duck’s back.

[Softie]

BEagle states:

8 experienced maintenance technicians (not 'engineers') All RAF maintenance personnel are engineering technicians and mechanics and know their jobs and are not afraid get their hands dirty. There are too many who call themselves 'engineers' who don't know one of a spanner from the other. These experts are usually engineering managers or so far away from the front line that they have little or no knowledge for which they are responsible. Please be careful not to put down the few professionals we do have.

I do not, in any way, denigrate the dying breed of Air Engineers who are expert and professional system operators.

An Engineer.

[EdSet100]

TD:AAR has been stopped and the SCP switched off . Why ? Because they were/are a significant hazard to aircrew. As the loss of XV230 showed.
I would like to amend that statement:

The SCP was definitely a significant hazard to the aircraft and crew in the years leading up to 2004, as demonstrated by the incident on XV227. Thereafter, it was made safe. It still is today.

AAR is safe. Nimrod is no more dangerous to refuel in the air than any other type.

AAR and SCP (or crossfeed pipe) operating simultaneously (or during the same flight): extremely dangerous. This is the circumstance that should been identified and prohibited under airworthiness requirements. It is irrelevant to serviceability and maintenance activities, which we know were carried out to the normal high standards.

Lets not get into a terminology bunfight over "engineers" (ground or air) and "technicians"

Ed Sett

[Safeware]

Strongbowfan,

I'm not sure what you're trying to get at in your post, esp 12 aircrew and 8 engineers that day accepted that aircraft as being serviceable , thats all that matters

??

sw

[OilCan]

EdSet100

The SCP was definitely a significant hazard to the aircraft and crew in the years leading up to 2004, as demonstrated by the incident on XV227. Thereafter, it was made safe. It still is today.

AAR is safe. Nimrod is no more dangerous to refuel in the air than any other type.

AAR and SCP (or crossfeed pipe) operating simultaneously (or during the same flight): extremely dangerous. This is the circumstance that should been identified and prohibited under airworthiness requirements. It is irrelevant to serviceability and maintenance activities, which we know were carried out to the normal high standards.

Spot on. :ok:

[helgar33]

I am greatly hoping that the comment about 'serviceability' of XV 230 that day are not levelled in any way at my post yesterday about ''was XV 230 airworthy that day'' (which I posted for factual accuracy reasons) I would be deeply hurt and horrified if that were the case. I am utterly convinced that my late husband, his crew, and the ground engineers who serviced XV 230 on September 2nd, were carrying out their jobs to the highest of standards; as was always the case. I am 100% certain that XV 230 would not have taken off that day if there were any doubts in any of their minds as to its safety. The problem arose directly after an AAR event; the risks of which, in my mind, were not properly assessed many years ago and could not have been known by the crew or ground crew.
I went to great pains to mention that the 'airworthy' question arose after many statements of fact that I made on 4th December e.g. that the design of the Nimrod, SCP add-on and the safety case were all done by BAE, I also mentionned that 'correlation of information' over many years was not carried out i.e. at an office some-where! None of this refers to 'serviceability' and I deliberately did not mention 'serviceability' on 4th December or in my post.
I also asked a question about tank 1 i.e. ''why the limiting of tank 1 from 16,000 to 15,000 lbs was accepted as a viable solution''? The reason I asked this was because it is widely assumed that the blow off valve from tank 1 blew off and that this fuel tracked down the outside of the Nimrod and entered the SCP housing. It was in no way said or meant as a stab at any one involved with the servicing of XV 230 that day. I was searching for reasons why the suspected 'blow-off' occured, as I was told that this event was thought to be a strong contender in the causes of the crash. The reason I mentionned what Sir Glenn said was because I wanted to accurately tell you i.e. 'word for word' what I said and what was said in reply; without emotion or slant on the facts. I am sad that I have felt the need to clarify what I said, when I had hoped that the original post spoke for itself, and can only hope that the post that appeared after my post did not actually refer to mine; though I feel deeply that it did which upsets me to the core.
helgar33

[betty swallox]

Helgar33,
Thank you for clarifying that in your first paragraph. I knew the aircraft captain very, very well. He would have not taken the jet were he not a million per cent happy.

[Safeware]

Strongbowfan,

Thanks, I don't think anyone (with any sense) has ever asserted here that those involved in the front line operation and maintenance of Nimrod knowingly acted in an unsafe manner and that what they were doing was "to the best of their knowledge and ability"

sw

[JFZ90]

wrt HSE prosecution - it would be a Crown Censure, not a prosecution.

I wonder who would receive it - CAS or ACAS as the man who signs off on an RTS?

sw

This is an interesting question, that will careful assessment of the facts. Technically, you would probably have to say (without being specific) that the key failings relate to both the original design and assumptions with respect to the addition of SCP & AAR capabilities etc. I'm not sure what safety analysis procedures were in place at the time these features were originally designed (e.g any zonal/hazard analysis type reviews during PDR, CDR etc., where they independant, etc.), but this may have some bearing on what went amiss re extant policy at the time. There was also alledgedly a more recent Safety Case produced which I assume should have followed best practice - hence it could be argued that some aspects were missed during this assessment, as this should have flagged up the design flaw if it had been done rigourously. It raises a question as to whether the MoD is responsible as it had the Safety Case commissioned, or whether the supplier of the Safety Case was in some way negligent. This will be a grey area as the supplier of the Safety Case may claim to have not known about x,y,z, (e.g. SCP operation in flight), hence its not their problem. This is a difficult one as you could argue that a competent Safety Case supplier should check assumptions and facts such as these - its part of the probing remit of Safety Case compilation to ensure the evidence is there to back up assertions of safe operation. Ultimately there is the argument the MoD is always responsible in such matters, hence is not able to discharge its reponsibilities to check the quality of externally produced Safety Cases. Was the Nimrod one reviewed by a 3rd party? Was this a fundamental part of the Safety Case process that was adopted anyway? It has admitted that there must have been a failure in the safety process, but there will be interesting lessons to be learnt as to exactly how the failure happened - it may prove quite hard to identify one action where you can definately say "that person should have spotted that issue".

Bottom line is it'll depend on what is found during the investigation, and speculation without all the facts is unlikely to reveal the true picture.

[Distant Voice]

Engineers are normally commissioned officers (Ground) with degrees, technicians are ground NCO's, and Flight Enginners are normally SNCO's who monitor Nimrod systems, in flight.

DV

[BEagle]

Engineers are normallly commisioned officers (Ground) with degrees
Correct

technicians are ground NCOs
Correct - although the branch was once known (correctly) as the Technical Branch, it was later re-named (wholly incorrectly) as the Engineering Branch


and Flight Enginneers are normally SNCOs who monitor Nimrod systems, in flight.


They are Air Engineers, commissioned or non-commissioned and they do considerably more than 'monitor' systems.

The common denominator is that all are skilled professionals who work together within their distinct fields of specialisation as a team with a common goal.

[Distant Voice]

EdSet 100, you said,

The SCP was definitely a significant hazard to aircraft and crew in the years leading up to 2004, as demonstrated by the incident on XV227. Thereafter it was made safe. It still is today

Sorry, must agree with TD. Following the XV227 incident the SCP was brought back into operation by RTI/NIMROD/119, dated 26th April 05, and was back to its "significant hazard" status at the time of XV230's accident.

DV

[MightyHunter AGE]

Beagle quoted:
Although 8 experienced maintenance technicians (not 'engineers')

I am an Engineer according to all my qualifications and my 22 years of experience.

It doesn't say Aeronautical Technician on my certificates it says Engineer and my IEng (Incorporated Engineer) status does not actually say ITech so thank you for degrading my job.

I am in now way degrading what an Air Engineer does but I would argue that I am more of an engineer that a flight 'systems monitor/operator'.

[EdSet100]

Hi DV:
Following the XV227 incident the SCP was brought back into operation by RTI/NIMROD/119, dated 26th April 05, and was back to its "significant hazard" status at the time of XV230's accident.
Presumably you are quoting the QinetiQ zonal hazard assessment of the fuel system. If that assessment is correct, we can only conclude that, since the day that the MR2 entered service, every time the SCP was switched on the aircraft and the crew were at significant risk of a fire. The SCP was installed before the AAR system, so the BAe designers had a clean sheet to work on. Are you suggesting that BAe designed a dangerous aircraft for the RAF to fly?

Ed

[davejb]

Okay -
some of the ground crew are engineers, I would be surprised if the majority were not technicians. Some of the air engineers might well be airborne systems monitoring personnel, some will be engineers - and I doubt any of the former are indifferent to becoming part of the latter. (I'm not an engineer, nor an ex-engineer, but I haven't specifically forbidden my daughter to marry one - although the uglier ones should of course be avoided to prevent undue regression at the attractiveness level. Pilots are another matter).

I doubt Beagle intended offence...he was closer to actuality than the first definition....

All I recall of MR2 conversion on the SCP is a brief mention that it provided extra cooling for all this new kit - that was probably the Janet and John version for the back end lot. I was i/c teapots on alternate tuesdays at the time. I never had a scoobies that this was actually a potential ignition source, was ANYONE briefed during MR1 to MR2 conversion that this addition would probably work best without inflammable materials/liquids in close proximity? I'm completely unaware of any suggestion 20+ years ago that this wouldn't be used in flight - my impression is that this is simply an assumption made by BAe, one they had no reason to make.

Ultimately that would then, in my opinion, make them responsible for the inability, at least, for anyone at Sqn level to join the dots and question the safety of the AAR system when that got plumbed in. Anyone who has seen a few AAR evolutions has probably seen fuel blowing all over the shop - it's only dangerous if you have an ignition source. Neither I, not those I flew with - to my knowledge - were aware of the ignition source being introduced with the MR2.

Dave

(This is also why I believe, TD, that the blame doesn't lie with current or past aircrew - you can only base your decisions on what you've been told and the documentation for the aircraft. It is those who DID have the information, but failed to pass it on or correctly interpret it, that I believe accountable).

[tucumseh]

Davejb

you can only base your decisions on what you've been told and the documentation for the aircraft. It is those who DID have the information, but failed to pass it on or correctly interpret it, that I believe accountable.


This is absolutely correct, and goes to the heart of the issue; with one caveat – the application of engineering judgement, knowledge and good practice; all of which feature heavily in MoD rules covering decision making and delegation of authority.

The trouble is, of course, when someone declares he doesn’t need engineers in posts requiring daily engineering decisions affecting safety and airworthiness, and he’s getting rid of a vast proportion of them from the very department you, at the front line, depend on for continuity and support. I speak, of course, of CDP’s lunatic decision in 1996.

His ruling is a matter of record – I disagree with it. The safety risks were advised and they have come to pass. However, don’t think I’ve got a downer on just one man. This decision was just one of a long line of anti-engineer policies introduced in the 90s, commencing some years before when RAF suppliers at Harrogate were given control of support funding and permitted, nay encouraged, to over-rule engineering decisions to the detriment of flight safety. The first thing they did was slash funding to maintain the build standard (which includes maintaining safety). Their 2 Star threatened dismissal for those engineers who complained. In fact, at one point a ruling was made that ANY admin grade was senior to ANY engineer. A young lady supply manager about 3 grades below me was appointed as my line manager! That lasted about a week (much to her relief), but illustrates the mentality.

Having correct and up to date documentation (APs for example) is an important part of Maintaining the Build Standard, and hence airworthiness. A point I think I may have made before (which absolutely no-one comments on). I’ve demonstrated that knowing the current build standard is a mandated requirement (as it must be detailed in the Hazard Log), yet broad MoD practice is NOT to maintain it. What process, procedures and regulations cover this? Are they implemented properly? No – that is the reason why the Government has accepted liability.

Finally, I never criticise BAeS on this thread. On the face of it, there have been lapses, but you must always remember two things;

The design is Under Ministry Control (UMC). Read the Def Stan.
It is therefore the responsibility (duty) of MoD to ensure their appointed Aircraft Design Authority, and all vendor DAs and DCs, are under continuous contract in accordance with the Def Stan. Ant break or reduction in level of cover almost automatically breaks the airworthiness audit trail. And, preferably, the ADA must have a degree of contractual control over the actions of all other DAs/DCs – including Service DAs who design and embody Service Engineered Mods. This procedure is also laid down in a Def Stan (which at a rough guess about 4 people in MoD could quote).

So, I hesitate to point the finger until I know the answers to these questions. Perhaps Des Browne was briefed properly for a change, and the key is in his admission?

[Wasser]

JFZ90

For offshore platforms, companies normally work to an Individual Risk criteria of one fatality in a thousand years. Risks greater than this have to be evaluated and measures taken to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Workers are grouped by their exposure to risk averaged over a year. Individual Risk figures are then derived from, amongst other criteria, a hazard anaylsis of the work area and number of people in that area.

However as a result of the Texas City Refinery incident, which killed 15 and injured over 100 people, BP were fined by an american court for this method of calculating Individual Risk. Those killed had been in or around temporary accommodation, located close to process plant. The Judge ruled that the Individual Risk should have been calculated on the risk to those in the temporary accommodation at that time and not averaged over one year. I assume by this he meant that had the risk had been calculated by this method, the risk would have been above the acceptable limit and measures would have been taken to reduce the risk, ie move the temporary accommodation away from the hazardous plant.

Findings from the enquiry into the incident can be found here and have lessons for all.

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article1545068.ece

Because of better platform safety design, one of the greatest contributers to Individual Risks to offshore workers is now helicopter transport, which is why the wearing of survival suits, rebreather sets, PLBs when travelling offshore are mandatory by most companies.

Regards the engineers/technician debate, surely it’s the ability of the individual to perform their role that’s important? As a Chief Technician at Kinloss, I saw the best and worst of Engineers - an ex‑technician converted to an Engineer (how can that happen) on NAEDIT who looked after his technicians and backed them to the hilt when right, apossed to a highly qualified Engineer at NLS who didn’t have a clue about man-management and whose decision making policy was to say “yes” to those above, regardless of the situation :ugh:.

[JFZ90]

Wasser - interesting. I guess its possible that the "over a year" / "instantaneous" risk calculation issue was really a weak defence by BP for their culpability. By this I mean it would have been quite easy for the judge to show that the BP risk was not ALARP even on a "average yearly" basis - just moving the accommodation block (relatively low cost) had a significant impact on safety (15 confirmed killed, but upto say 100/200 people not exposed to a clear potentially lethal risk during an incident at the refinery).

--------

I wasn't going to enter the engineer / technician debate, but the quote below is perhaps a bit misleading as to what an engineer really is....

All RAF maintenance personnel are engineering technicians and mechanics and know their jobs and are not afraid get their hands dirty. There are too many who call themselves 'engineers' who don't know one of a spanner from the other. These experts are usually engineering managers or so far away from the front line that they have little or no knowledge for which they are responsible. Please be careful not to put down the few professionals we do have.

I do not, in any way, denigrate the dying breed of Air Engineers who are expert and professional system operators.

An Engineer.


'engineers' who don't know one of a spanner from the other.

As far as I'm concerned, if you know how to design a spanner, make it the right dimensions to cope with the stresses it will be subject to without overengineering it, and are able to develop the processes and systems to manufacture the spanner safely, set & test it meets quality criteria, and do the whole thing cost effectively on a large scale with consideration of environmental & political impacts of your enterprise, then you are an engineer, usually with a professional CEng qualification. Such an engineer may have started his/her career as a technician.

If you can do up / loosen nuts with a spanner against a set of laid down procedures (i.e. to a specified torque) but couldn't do all of the above, you are not an engineer, but probably a technician.

I appreciate there are both types in the RAF, but the discrimination above applies to all engineers / technicians and to those who have bothered to acquire the broader set of skills/experience is quite important.

I can use plasters & take pills, but I wouldn't call myself a doctor or a nurse, so technicians shouldn't really call themselves engineers for the same reasons.

[Da4orce]

Edset


Hi DV:
Quote:
Following the XV227 incident the SCP was brought back into operation by RTI/NIMROD/119, dated 26th April 05, and was back to its "significant hazard" status at the time of XV230's accident.

Presumably you are quoting the QinetiQ zonal hazard assessment of the fuel system. If that assessment is correct, we can only conclude that, since the day that the MR2 entered service, every time the SCP was switched on the aircraft and the crew were at significant risk of a fire. The SCP was installed before the AAR system, so the BAe designers had a clean sheet to work on. Are you suggesting that BAe designed a dangerous aircraft for the RAF to fly?

Ed


Refering to para 40 of the BoI report:

The Board concludes that the formal incorporation of AAR capability within the Nimrod did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and was a possible Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.

[JFZ90]

Well I have always called myself an Engineer and im a technician. My insurance company calls me an aircraft engineer too.Im not airborne but ground but nobody knows the difference except us. I have learned Maths Engineering Science , Physics , Chemistry, Design etc you name it and that is part of technician training. Even the aircrew ask for the engineers :/

So dunno where this debate got off track , does it really matter anyway

It is quite possible that technicians are trained to a level in the RAF where they approach "engineer" levels of skill & experience. This is quite possible in some if not all areas of engineering and this may blur the definitions. For me it really hinges on whether, given your training, you feel able to tackle the list of activities confidently in my first list above. In this respect, the originator of this somewhat tangential debate who sort of said "I know how to use a spanner so I'm an engineer" may actually have been selling his own skills a bit short.

Does it matter? Some think so, certainly other countries (such as France) think it does where an engineer has the same social standing (and pay) as a doctor. It seems to matter less to people (including many engineers) in the UK - where public perception means the UKs best known "engineer" is not Brunel but "Kevin from Coronation Street" (clearly a mechanic/technician, not an engineer).

Another way to look at is to ask - do you think Kwikfit fitters should call themselves engineers?

[JFZ90]

Edset

Quote:
Hi DV:
Quote:
Following the XV227 incident the SCP was brought back into operation by RTI/NIMROD/119, dated 26th April 05, and was back to its "significant hazard" status at the time of XV230's accident.

Presumably you are quoting the QinetiQ zonal hazard assessment of the fuel system. If that assessment is correct, we can only conclude that, since the day that the MR2 entered service, every time the SCP was switched on the aircraft and the crew were at significant risk of a fire. The SCP was installed before the AAR system, so the BAe designers had a clean sheet to work on. Are you suggesting that BAe designed a dangerous aircraft for the RAF to fly?

Ed
Refering to para 40 of the BoI report:

Quote:
The Board concludes that the formal incorporation of AAR capability within the Nimrod did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and was a possible Contributory Factor in the loss of XV230.

As I understand it the SCP was added to the Nimrod build standard first - and fully certified - with the AAR being added later. In this respect you would expect the safety implications of the changes to be assessed as they were introduced. You would not expect the SCP change "team" or process to assess the safety implications of the yet to be fitted AAR system. Hence it is possible (and from what I can see true) that the SCP system was "safely" incorporated into the design.

The AAR change, as per your BoI quote, appears not to have been however. Without the facts and understanding the design process adopted it is not possible to say what went wrong where, but you might have expected the reviews of the AAR design as it progressed to have looked at the potential impact of the AAR system on the rest of the aircraft. Many features of the design suggest that safety, in terms of the AAR system itself, its integration into the fuel system and into the aircraft as a whole was indeed considered to a large extent. What appears to have been missed is the impact of the venting of fuel from one of the tanks. You would have expected the team/process to have asked "are there any safety / hazards associated with venting fuel from the forward tank". Without the facts it is impossible to say whether this question was asked or answered, but it maybe the case that the team/process did ask the question but did not consider the possibility of fuel streaming down the fuselage, re-entering the aircraft and pooling in areas of the fuselage. In hindsight it is easy to say this risk should have been considered and analysed fully, but I think it is plausible that they may have (erroneously) assumed that the fuel would harmlessly stream out and away from the aircraft and discharge the risk. I think I read somewhere that they did consider the risk of fuel entering intakes & vents downstream of the tank vent, so the risks of fuel venting were not ignored.

From what I've gathered in the BoI, and again without the benefit of the full picture, this seems probably the most important safety/design process failure that contributed to the loss of 230. Whilst it is true that the subsequent safety case should also have flagged up this risk, it is perhaps not surprising that if it was missed (i.e. erroneously assumed innocent) in the first place the same assumptions would be made again during the hazard analysis / safety case refresh.

It is perhaps important to recognise that this design / analysis error, once it had been made, would not necessarily be picked up by any of the remaining airworthiness activities and certification. The alledged lapses in airworthiness build standard maintenance, resource issues and other shortcomings oft discussed here would also have no bearing on this design error, once embodied in all aircraft. It is probably likely that tighter integration between the user and the safety case process may have increased the chances of it being picked up in the later review, but I'm not sure any MoD regulations were "broken" as such during the latter safety case process in this respect - this could be an interesting area and certainly a key area for learning lessons.

I'd be interested to know whether any fuel system / aerospace engineers feel that the "fuel re-entering hazard" should have definately been picked up in the first place or whether this is a relatively "new" risk that surprised the fuel system engineering community.

Did users know it was happening, or did they assume the pooling was from a some pipe "leak" somewhere in the aircraft that only manifested itself in flight, and hence was not repeatable on the ground?

[OmegaV6]

JFZ ... an excellent post IMHO.

May I also add the following view - AAR for the Hercules, and I believe for the Nimrod, was bought in at an exceedingly rapid rate in response to the requirements of the Falklands War. It worked. It worked so well it was continued AFTER the war.

Is it not possible, even probable, that many of these Safety Case/Design Studies etc etc, were simply not done due to the pressures of the time ??

When things were "tidied up" after the war, and became much more a "permanent fixture" .. I wonder how many times it was "assumed" that things had been checked the first time around, when in fact they had not ??

Everything I read in this thread seems to indicate that folks believe the introduction of AAR was done in a long slow and researched process - I don't believe that to be the case.

[davejb]

AAR on the Nimrod MR2 was a very rapid affair, that went from zero to fitted within the period of the Falklands conflict itself.

[Da4orce]

Did users know it was happening, or did they assume the pooling was from a some pipe "leak" somewhere in the aircraft that only manifested itself in flight, and hence was not repeatable on the ground?

I doubt that the data is out there given that it wasn't being looked for but it would be interesting to see whether analysis of historic leaks would provide evidence of the scenario that you describe, given what is now known about the risk of vented fuel entering the fuselage.

Such analysis, if it were possible, may provide a much clearer picture of the level of risk in relation to vented fuel entering the fuselage.

[JFZ90]

There have been a number of discussions on Nimrod threads as to whether the AAR fit was done in a rush, and how it was later 'properly' engineered post the Falklands.

Whilst it is possible that "the mod was rushed" maybe a factor, it is also possible that this had no bearing on the risk being erroneously discharged - it seems clear to me that a lot of systems and safety thinking is evident in the AAR design, so its not as if "safety considerations went out of the window" during its incorporation.

It seems plausible that team/process did ask the question but did not consider the possibility of fuel streaming down the fuselage, re-entering the aircraft and pooling in areas of the fuselage - it seems plausible that this would have been missed whether the mod was rushed or not.

I have no experience of aircraft fuel systems or AAR, but have to say I can certainly see how, in a design review, the "fuel re-entry risk" could either not get raised or be discharged as a remote/improbable or only pertaining to miniscule quantities of fuel re-entering and therefore not needing to be analysed further etc. Does this make the engineers involved incompetent or careless? As I could see myself making such assumptions & discharging this risk, I'd say not necessarily. But then again, I'm no fuel systems / AAR engineer, so it'd been interesting to see what others may think of the "obviousness" of this risk. I don't recall it occurring to anyone else here during the pre BoI speculation which suggests it is perhaps not that obvious a hazard.

[EdSet100]

I said (post #439):The SCP was definitely a significant hazard to the aircraft and crew in the years leading up to 2004, as demonstrated by the incident on XV227. Thereafter, it was made safe. It still is today.

On reflection, bearing in mind the routing of the crossfeed duct, which is necessarliy open to supply air (at up to 500C, 250psi) to the SCP, I now believe that the aircraft is at considerable risk whenever the SCP is operated with the engines at or above cruise power. This effectively makes the system either useless or dangerous, by design, IMHO.

Furthermore, and far more importantly, whenever the crossfeed duct is open at or above engine cruise power, the aircraft and those on board, are at risk due to possible leakage from nearby fuel or hydraulic pipes. This is why we now have procedures prohibiting us from opening the duct above 80% (air and ground use).

This is basic stuff and should have been identified when the MR1 and R1 aircraft were built, tested (Jimmy Jones) and released into service.

Bottom line: while the SCP system might be safe, as a standalone system, it cannot be used due to the unsafe nature of the crossfeed pipe, when open, in most circumstances.

Ed

PS. While the maritime Nimrod force has been castigated by other operators for many years for flying around with serviceable engines shut down to save fuel, it is now apparent that we were at a greater risk of a fuel/hydraulic fire than we ever were of a loss of thrust. It was only because the engines were shut down that the crossfeed duct was open in flight. Truly ironic.

[Tappers Dad]

davejb (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=189431)

http://www.airsceneuk.org.uk/oldstuff/2007/431falklands/falklands.htm


British Aerospace's (BAe) Manchester Division received instructions to design and fit probes to the Nimrod fleet on 14 April (1982 )and Marshall Aerospace of Cambridge received similar instructions in respect of the Hercules the next day. The probes were taken from RAF stocks, being mostly removed from de-commissioned Vulcans, plus some new ones intended for the VC10 tankers that were then under construction. The Nimrod probing programme exemplifies the collapsing of development schedules, BAe Woodford taking just a fortnight to complete the initial installation, thereby enabling the first 'wet' prod to be made on 30 April. The second aircraft with machine-produced parts was rolled out only two days later and service clearance for the kit was obtained on 5 May. An initial batch of sixteen aircraft was modified and designated Nimrod MR Mk2P (for probe). To compensate for the effect of the probe on its handling characteristics a small ventral fin was added beneath the tail along with small finlets that are often mistaken for radio aerials above and below the tailplanes.

[davejb]

TD,
thanks - I was just answering the earlier query... I was on MR2 at the start of the conflict, sans probe, and managed to be back on Ascension before the end on MR2P with probe, for once my fading mental faculties were happy the memory was correct.

Dave

[JFZ90]

On reflection, bearing in mind the routing of the crossfeed duct, which is necessarliy open to supply air (at up to 500C, 250psi) to the SCP, I now believe that the aircraft is at considerable risk whenever the SCP is operated with the engines at or above cruise power. This effectively makes the system either useless or dangerous, by design, IMHO.

Furthermore, and far more importantly, whenever the crossfeed duct is open at or above engine cruise power, the aircraft and those on board, are at risk due to possible leakage from nearby fuel or hydraulic pipes. This is why we now have procedures prohibiting us from opening the duct above 80% (air and ground use).

This is basic stuff and should have been identified when the MR1 and R1 aircraft were built, tested (Jimmy Jones) and released into service.

Bottom line: while the SCP system might be safe, as a standalone system, it cannot be used due to the unsafe nature of the crossfeed pipe, when open, in most circumstances.

Ed

PS. While the maritime Nimrod force has been castigated by other operators for many years for flying around with serviceable engines shut down to save fuel, it is now apparent that we were at a greater risk of a fuel/hydraulic fire than we ever were of a loss of thrust. It was only because the engines were shut down that the crossfeed duct was open in flight. Truly ironic.

Interesting. I take back my initial assumption that the SCP design when embodied was safe. It appears that while not perhaps overtly unsafe, some features of its implementation/operation did include some significant potential safety shortcomings/risks from day 1 that should at least have been recognised.

While I can sympathise with the design team missing the "AAR venting fuel & it re-entering the fuselage" risk, the crossfeed pipe (at 400C) being near a potential (if probably remote) source of a fuel leak is a fairly fundamental risk that probably deserved some tangible mitigation in the first place, irrespective of AAR.

[tucumseh]

Quote:

Bottom line: while the SCP system might be safe, as a standalone system, it cannot be used due to the unsafe nature of the crossfeed pipe, when open, in most circumstances.

Ed


Interesting. I take back my initial assumption that the SCP design when embodied was safe. It appears that while not perhaps overtly unsafe, some features of its implementation/operation did include some significant potential safety shortcomings/risks from day 1 that should at least have been recognised.


Two good posts. Well said. What we're talking about here is, in essence, the difference between Physical and Functional Safety, a basic component of Systems Engineering.

As I've said before, I didn't agree with my 2* (x2) and 4* ruling that the latter was optional. And I don't believe successive Mins(AF) should have been advised to uphold the rulings.

It is one thing to inadvertently miss something like this in a complex system design - but quite a different thing altogether to make a deliberate decision to leave a design functionally unsafe and teach staff (and industry) that it's ok and they will be rewarded for doing so.

So, when the QC looks into the FACT that airworthiness regs weren't implemented properly, I hope he starts at this level of "management", as their rulings set the tone. All too often these things start at the bottom and come to a sudden halt when a scapegoat can be found.

[Da4orce]

Independent article from Sunday 4th May: (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/army-chiefs-ignored-warnings-spy-plane-was-unsafe-to-fly-820864.html)

Army chiefs 'ignored warnings' spy plane was unsafe to fly...

The Ministry of Defence is bracing itself for what is set to be the most damaging allegations so far over failure to provide service personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan with adequate equipment. An inquest this week into 14 men who died when an ageing Nimrod spy plane exploded in mid-air in 2006 will hear evidence that the MoD ignored repeated warnings from RAF pilots and ground crew that the planes were unsafe to fly.

[airsound]

....is finally up and running.

http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/index.htm

Interesting terms of reference.

I understand the Review will be represented at the Inquest, which starts Tuesday 6 May with a visit to Brize Norton for families, and formally in Oxford on Wednesday 7 May.

airsound

[Al R]

The inquest starts.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/7386975.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/06/uk_enl_1157979584/img/1.jpg

[zedder]

Because CAS said so. Supposedly he has followed the lead set by the Army and the Navy for Serving witnesses at Inquests. This is also consistent with members of HM Forces being seen in Uniform in the 'public eye' more frequently.

[airsound]

Erm, Strongbowfan, because they were/are witnesses at an inquest, I guess. An inquest which is, like all inquests, not a trial, but a means of establishing who the dead people were, and when, where and how they died. As the coroner explained today.

I mean, why should service personnel not be named at an inquest? No one else (well practically no one) gets anonymity.

I would have thought a better question would have been 'why were so many of the service witnesses at the Hercules inquest identified only by letters?' In fact, in the case of one of them, he named himself, and the coroner said he was not to be named by the press. No explanation given.

Today's RAF witnesses didn't all have to be in uniform - one was in a suit.

I suppose the very occasional one might become threatened by having their photo and/or moving pix broadcast to the world - but surely not many, and anyone who is seriously worried can presumably ask for anonymity.

I'm sure that the MoD's barrister David Evans (I presume I can name him here?) would have been out of the trap like a shot if he thought someone was possibly courting the tiniest smidgeon of lack of security.

I suggest that there is sometimes a bit too much 'special pleading' for members of the armed forces to be treated differently to other citizens of this country that we're all proud to be part of.

It's that kind of attitude that can lead, if we're not very careful, to the MoD using security as an excuse for not telling the taxpayer why they've screwed up. Fortunately, they'd never do that, would they?

airsound

[flipster]

Sorry peeps - new on this thread,

Could anyone tell me why there is a 'Review' - that is in addition to the Coroner's Inquest for XV230?


Flipster

[TOPBUNKER]

Any chance that they might just admit, one day, that the things that were and are not very pointy things have been underfunded for decades. And that those investment decisions were mostly made by promoted former operators of said pointy things.

Oh, and perhaps there was an interest in Whitehall of agreeing with chancellors various to keep British Waste of Space in business and thus guaranteeing promotion in the Building and future employment after retirement elsewhere?

Oops - written in the early hours - but I hope people get my gist!

[Chugalug2]

Tried to post the Terms of Reference set by the SoS, but the quote fragmented into computer gobbledygook, Flipster. Review website is at
http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/
The only person who can truly answer your $64,000 question is Mr Browne. Of course, it now appears that his tenure may not allow him to be around when this review presents, nor come to that his own Mull Review (will he be mailing that in from his retirement cottage?). Some might say that the reason for these reviews and his early departure were not unconnected, but I could not possibly comment. Of course the Coroners Inquest is into the deaths of the occupants of the aircraft, whereas the review seems to be aimed more at the aircraft itself, but the difference is merely one of semantics I guess.

[Al R]

Why shouldn't serving officers be named? Christ.. they're happy enough to be seen and named, booted and spured in RAF News when it suits them. So to do it for the interests of justice doesn't seem unreasonable to me. One of the reasons that we have one avoidable debacle after another like this is because nobody has the balls or the moral authority to submit themselves to accountability, or to demand it from others.

[Squidlord]

Strictly, I don't know why it was deemed necessary to have the Review as well as the Inquest. However, the scope of the Review is clearly different to the Inquest so we can take a pretty good guess. The ToRs for the Review are:


In light of the board of inquiry report:

· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;

· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;

· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;

· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.



The first two bullets focus on Nimrod and thus will overlap with the Inquest significantly. I believe that the third bullet, though somewhat vague, indicates that the scope of the Review covers MoD's approach to Safety Cases in general and not just for the Nimrod. (I suppose it's conceivable that the scope of the third bullet may end up being confined to aircraft Safety Cases, to make it practicable.)

[Da4orce]

BBC - RAF Nimrods 'had fuel problems' http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7390471.stm

Sergeant Andrew Whitmore said he first noticed the corrosion while investigating the cause of a fuel leak on a Nimrod in the same fleet as the XV230, before the tragedy.

He described it as "quite shocking" and said the "salty air" was the most likely cause of the corrosion on the aircraft, which is heavily used for air-sea rescues.

But the court heard that a check of all the couplings across the entire fleet was only ordered after the incident.


At that point the fleet was grounded and engineers found further corroded couplings.

"We didn't find any leaks but it was only a matter of time," said Sgt Whitmore.

"We found dinted fuel pipes and broken bonding leads."

The RAF continued air-to-air refuelling after the tragedy but a further two incidents involving fuel leaks led to the practice being suspended, the court heard.

[JimBall]

The RAF Nimrod aircraft that exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan killing all 14 servicemen on board was “beyond its sell-by date”, a former senior air force commander admitted at an inquest yesterday.

Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.

He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.

Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.

[Old Fella]

Is it only Wg Cdr Bromehead who believes the cause of the Nimrod accident was fuel leaking onto a bleed air pipe? At 3000' a SAM could well have been involved. The fact that the Nimrod was 37 years old may or may not have been a factor. There are many aircraft much older than 37 years of age still flying safely. On going maintenance over the years often results in the aircraft age becoming irrelevant. Lets wait for the official findings before getting too judgemental.

[srobarts]

Is it only Wg Cdr Bromehead who believes the cause of the Nimrod accident was fuel leaking onto a bleed air pipe?
Well the Board of Inquiry seem to agree with him..
BoI Report (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/243C5BC8-D3B6-4014-BEDE-1DC4FAD5518F/0/20071126_nimrod_xv230_boi_parts1to2_16.pdf)
A precised version is available on the BBC website. BoI Briefing (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/243C5BC8-D3B6-4014-BEDE-1DC4FAD5518F/0/20071126_nimrod_xv230_boi_parts1to2_16.pdf)

[NigelOnDraft]

OF - since when was 3000' anywhere near FL220 :ugh:

We have a published BoI which may one suggest you read... and then decide the purpose and scope of the inquest re the direct causes of the accident v the broader environment that led to those cause ;)

NoD

[Old Fella]

NoD and srobarts. My apologies for responding to the post of JimBall without first referencing the BoI report. JimBall says "The 37 year old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3000 feet" which was the basis of my comment re SAM's. I will read the BoI report to properly inform myself of the findings. Addition. I have read the BoI Briefing and whilst I accept that there was indeed fire present from shortly after the refuel operation at FL220, the fact that the explosion did not occur until 3000' AGL could reasonably lead to the possibility that a SAM was involved in the final moments of the fatal flight. The BoI Briefing states that much of the wreckage was not recovered due the hostile environment and the scavenging by nationals.

[Training Risky]

What an amazing coincidence that Johnny Taliban would have chosen exactly the right place in time and space to watch the stricken Nimrod descend from FL220 and level off right into Johnny's SA-7 threat envelope at a very handy 3000'.

This shows that Johnny Taliban must have massively superior I&W and seemingly limitless supplies of MANPADS to spread around Afghan in the event of stricken Nimrods descending into the threat band.

I say again, either amazing luck, or superior intelligence and C2, or perhaps...

(RIP fellas:()

[Satellite_Driver]

Dear Old Fella,

If you are determined to make an arse of yourself, would you mind awfully doing it somewhere else? :rolleyes:

Ta very much,

Sat Driver

[nigegilb]

Today's Times;

Nimrod fuel leaks unrepaired in 'cuts turmoil'

Michael Evans, Defence Editor

The RAF Nimrod aircraft that exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan killing all 14 servicemen on board was “beyond its sell-by date”, a former senior air force commander admitted at an inquest yesterday.

Wing Commander John Bromehead, the officer commanding Logistics Support Wing at RAF Kinloss, home of the Nimrods, at the time of the crash in September 2006, believed the accident was caused by leaking fuel igniting on a hot air pipe. The 37-year-old surveillance aircraft burst into flames at 3,000ft.

He told the Oxford hearing: “The bathtub curve [As described here byTuc], is a general engineering principle, that is when something gets old it is more likely to break. I did have concerns that the Nimrod may be hitting the far end of the bathtub curve.” Wing Commander Bromehead revealed that in recent years there had been “a dilution of skills and experience” among RAF engineers, which made it more likely that problems with aircraft could be missed.

Continual cost-cutting and management restructuring had created “turmoil” in the RAF, which was why he had decided to leave the air force.

He had not been told in the months before the crash of a rise in fuel leaks on Nimrods, which he admitted was a “really serious failure”. However, he said that when leaks occurred, they were not always repaired. They were dealt with according to severity, with engineers ensuring that they were within “prescribed limits”.

When the board of inquiry report was published in December, Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, apologised to the families of the victims for the shortcomings that led to the crash.

Ten of the victims were serving with the RAF, one was from the Parachute Regiment and the other was a Royal Marine. The inquest was adjourned until Monday.

[tucumseh]

Times Report


I’m not entirely comfortable with the Wg Cdr being described as “a senior air force commander”. While pprune readers know very well that a “mere” Wg Cdr is s##t under the feet of most of his seniors, it gives the public (perhaps including some of the bereaved) a false impression that he was in a position to fix the problem; and deflects attention away from those of his seniors who were advised many years ago of the problems and did nothing. Rather like flipster’s evidence and experiences.

He mentions the “bathtub curve”. Fine. Was this followed by an explanation of cause and effect, and how we are taught to mitigate the effects? Or a (retired) Air Vice Marshal being asked to explain why, in 1992, he supported his non-engineering staffs (in AMSO) when they reduced support funding on the basis that “reliability improves with age, so we don’t need funding for spares and repairs”. That is, their bathtub was open ended and all their toys floated out, only to be grounded. Sorry, a little humour. If a Wg Cdr made such a decision, it may only affect his small area of responsibility. When an AVM pronounces, it affects ALL aircraft support across 3 Services. And, as I always say, once cut it is almost impossible to get it back.

The most senior people knew of this. That is why the QC’s review must be wide ranging. What I’ve just described is a failure to implement airworthiness regs. In fact, it drove a bus through them. That cavalier and self-serving attitude toward airworthiness is precisely what ACM Loader was alluding to in his comments which forced SoS to admit liability.



For those interested, the good book (and it is a good book) says that if the failure rate increases you (the User HQ) address the following. (But first, you have to know the failure rate IS increasing. Funding for that has been slashed).


Improve reliability. Seldom the cheapest route as there are compensatory measures that can achieve the desired outcome. Anyway, funding has been slashed.
Increase number of aircraft. Can’t, funding has been slashed.
Reduce Flying Rate. Already done, but then increased again as we’re at war, but funding is still being slashed.
Reduce repair pipeline time. This costs money, and funding has been slashed.
Increase Recovery Rate at 1st line (and 2nd for equipment). This needs e.g. spares, trained manpower, facilities, up to date servicing procedures etc; all of which have been reduced due to slashed funding.

The regs also note you need trained staffs to not only monitor this, but manage it to a successful conclusion – two very different things. I once moaned and groaned that we had plenty monitors (which is something you do at school dinners) but few experienced managers. If I recall, the subject was a critical safety problem caused by a non-engineer making an engineering design decision. A (proper) senior officer told me I was splitting hairs. Really?


Did I mention – funding has been slashed. It doesn’t help that the same AVM I mentioned above deemed refusing to knowingly waste money a sackable offence. Management set the tone. When that particular tone emits, is it little wonder MoD is going to hell in a bucket?

[flipster]

Tuc

Eloquent as ever - the break must have done you good!?

So, one can appreciate that funding has been slashed (!) ....but is there any answer to the MoD's failings on airworthiness?

[chappie]

i have refrained from being involved in this but i would like to say that my thoughts and respect are with all the families and those affected by the tragic loss of those brave men. take heart from those trying to do what is right and trying to prevent this from ever occuring again. intentions are only good. sadly as i know all too well and as re iterated from the mouth of one officer (though he claims he can't recall) it will take someone being brought down and being killed to change things. sadly, we know too well of the reality of those words and how they haunt us. i want to say that i hope to god that the families are not subjected to the constant repeated phrase being spouted out from witnesses i cannot recall.

keep the faith

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks Chappie I will pass on your thoughts and respect to the other families.

tucumseh at least someone knew what the Bath Tub curve was as well as Chirstmas tree and Hanger Queen

[Da4orce]

Yeah, according to Mr Bromehead the RAF has lots of Christmas Trees and Hanger Queens. :oh:

[tucumseh]

In fact, so many we can't see the trees for the forest.


How do control and limit Xmas Trees? Implement DGDQA Standing Instruction - 0136. MoD don't like this, as it's the one that gives lie to the fallacy that only Commercial can commit MoD to a contract. But it's the project manager's primary tool to control the standard and cost of repairs. Ignore it at your peril. That they do, places people in peril.

[Safeware]

He had not been told in the months before the crash of a rise in fuel leaks on Nimrods, which he admitted was a “really serious failure”.
I find it amazing that someone with QR640 responsibilities is in the position to say this, assuming of course that he is admitting that it is the fact that he wasn't told that was the serious failure, and not the rise in fuel leaks, or the crash.

Something else intrigues me at the moment, unless I'm missing something. In the case of XV230, the MOD has admitted liability on the grounds of maintenance of an airworthy aircraft, yet in the case of XV179, where the MOD knew that the fitment of ESF was "reasonably practiable", they haven't admitted liability. Is there some element of "double standards" here?

sw

[tucumseh]

Something else intrigues me at the moment, unless I'm missing something. In the case of XV230, the MOD has admitted liability on the grounds of maintenance of an airworthy aircraft, yet in the case of XV179, where the MOD knew that the fitment of ESF was "reasonably practicable", they haven't admitted liability. Is there some element of "double standards" here?


Precisely. And add Tornado/Patriot and Sea King, where the BoIs stated the same thing, but using different terminology than ACM Loader. That is, procedures and regs were not implemented properly. One assumes this will be raised in due course on 179 - what the other two lack is a concerted campaign from a knowledgeable viewpoint. I know one set of families have been denied access to key documents, preventing them from doing what TD has achieved.

[Biggus]

Safeware,

What makes you think he held QR640 responsibilities?

[airsound]

What makes you think he held QR640 responsibilities?

In his evidence, Wg Cdr Bromehead said he was the QR640 holder from June 2005 to June 2006. He was closely questioned on this by, among others, barrister Mike Rawlinson, for some of the families.

airsound

[Exrigger]

I wonder if those at the top nowadays know what a Christmas tree aircaft or hangar queen is, or understand what is involved in the rob (sorry cannabalisation) culture that is abound. The RAF Coningsby station Commander and his high ranking visitor (cannot remember his name nowadays) in 1996 did not know what I was talking about and yet the visitor seemed quite proud that he had slashed the Tornado spares budget by over a million pound and had seen no evidence that this had made any difference to the supply of spares, even the OIC supply was not aware of the scale of the problem.

[Biggus]

airsound

Thanks for that!

[Nobody In Particular]

..no surprise there..the RAF is well and truly bust !! It simply cannot afford to do what the Govt wants it to do. A downward spiral me thinks.....:uhoh:

NIB

[Da4orce]

http://www.oxfordmail.net/display.var.2264663.0.inquest_plane_may_have_been_switched.p hp

Relatives of 14 men killed when a spy plane crashed in Afghanistan may have been shown a replacement aircraft after the one they were meant to see developed a fuel leak, an Oxford coroner said today.

Coroner Andrew Walker, ordering inquiries into the matter, asked lawyers at the Oxford inquest this morning: "Was the aircraft the family was shown last week the aircraft they were meant to see, or was another one flown down from RAF Kinloss because the other had a fuel leak?"

[Softie]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7396687.stm

A recording from the cockpit of an RAF Nimrod taken moments before it exploded has been played at an inquest to the families of the 14 men who died.
The aircraft exploded minutes after air-to-air refuelling near Kandahar, Afghanistan, on 2 September 2006.
A Harrier jet pilot who was flying nearby told the Oxford inquest he saw a "massive, catastrophic explosion".
Flt Lt Douglas McKay said the blast was spherical in shape and "about twice the diameter of the aircraft's wing span."
He said he initially saw two fires coming out from the rear of Nimrod XV230, some 90 seconds before the blast engulfed it.
The Nimrod was "totally destroyed before it hit the ground", Flt Lt McKay said.
Final moments
The blast was caused by fuel leaking and igniting on contact with a hot air pipe, the inquest has already heard.
The first part of the onboard audio recording, which ends about two minutes before Nimrod exploded, reveals the crew's communications about the refuelling procedure.
But moments later an engineer announces that there is a fire warning.
While more fire reports from his crew come across the radio the captain, Flt Lt Allan Squires, orders to steer towards Kandahar for an emergency landing.
However, at 3,000ft the aircraft exploded.
The Ministry of Defence has defended the Nimrod fleet's safety record.

[Softie]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7398039.stm


The explosion which downed a spy plane in Afghanistan killing 14 servicemen on board was due to a "fundamental design fault" an inquest has heard.
The coroner had before heard it was because fuel leaked into a dry bay and ignited on contact with a hot air pipe.
But on Tuesday, a senior RAF officer said a mistake was made during a hazard assessment of the Nimrod which could have identified that risk.
It exploded minutes after refuelling in Afghanistan in September 2006.
Hindsight on hazard
Air Commodore George Baber told the inquest at Oxford Coroners Court that had they known then what they knew now, the Nimrod would not have been passed as safe to fly.
He led an Integrated Project Team (IPT), who with BAE systems carried out a comprehensive hazard analysis of the plane.
When hazards were identified and categorised at a meeting in August 2004, he said, the possibility of an explosion in the dry bay was graded in as "improbable".
It should have been graded higher and warranted further action, he admitted.
The design flaw was to have fuel in the same compartment as a hot air pipe, he said.
He told the inquest: "At the heart of this was a fundamental design flaw. This hazard assessment process was an opportunity to catch any inherent design flaw.
"We failed to catch that design flaw. The consequences were catastrophic and that is why we are here today."
He described the categorising mistake as a "failure".
Buck stopped
Asked by Michael Rawlinson, the lawyer representing the families of the dead servicemen, whether the Nimrod was safe to fly, Air Commodore Baber answered: "I find it difficult to answer because the simple answer is 'no' because we had an accident.
"Any aircraft we fly carry hazards all the time. Clearly if we knew then what we know now we would not have flown the aircraft."
As head of the IPT, he said he was responsible for deciding whether the aircraft was airworthy and the buck stopped with him.
The men died when a 37-year-old Nimrod exploded after undergoing air-to-air refuelling near Kandahar on September 2, 2006.
The crew on Nimrod XV230 had no means of tackling the initial fire and were forced to attempt an emergency descent to the air base. But it exploded into flames at 3,000ft.
Plane grounded
Earlier, the coroner heard how a technical problem grounded an RAF Nimrod plane due to be shown as part of the inquest.
Relatives were to view the plane but a hydraulic problem meant a second plane had to be shown at RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire, last week.

[tucumseh]

When hazards were identified and categorised at a meeting in August 2004, he said, the possibility of an explosion in the dry bay was graded in as "improbable".

See……….

http://www.dstan.mod.uk/dtd/data/5624.pdf

“Fibrous Polyester Material for use as a Flame and Fire Suppressant in Aircraft Dry Bays” dated March 1981.

Well, someone identified the hazard as it applied generally to aeroplanes and developed one method by which the risk could be brought ALARP, with MoD (much later) issuing a specification in 1981.


On Nimrod, MoD now acknowledge they recognised the hazard, but thought the probability of occurrence “improbable”. If one maps that to the Risk Classification Matrix (see earlier in the thread), and accepts that the Severity of Harm should the risk occur is “Catastrophic” (loss of aircraft and crew) then the risk is classified as “C” and is only Tolerable if ALARP. Therefore, the admission that it should have been “graded higher” is largely academic, as the requirement was to make it ALARP anyway. (Even if the probability had been assessed “incredible” it would still be a Class C).

So, if the report is accurate there is something missing from the evidence. Having agreed the risk was Tolerable, I’d be asking why the next mandated step of making it ALARP wasn’t taken. (And this is where you may get to the root cause, because embodiment costs money and reduces capability for a time, which would highlight the risk associated with cuts in the MRA4 programme numbers. It would also, of course, at the very least demand declaration of planning blight and a complete reassessment of MRA4 at a politically unacceptable time).

And I wouldn’t be talking about 2004, given the date of the specification for making such risks tolerable and ALARP. This is important. At that date, MoD could claim we were in “exceptional circumstances” and perhaps that they didn’t have a reasonable time to mitigate the risk. (Not that this holds water). The legal clock starts when you identify and classify.

There may indeed have been what MoD call a “design flaw” but using that phrase to explain why a properly identified risk was not mitigated to ALARP is disingenuous.

[tucumseh]

And just to show I'm fair-minded, the buck doesn't stop with the Air Cdre (who was presumably a Gp Capt as IPTL) if he can demonstrate that at any time he, or his stakeholders, were denied funding to maintain any component of Airworthiness.

I have been, numerous times on many aircraft types, including Nimrod.

[Small Spinner]

Much of what happened and perhaps is still happening in some cases, comes from a normalisation within an organisation.
The risks are identified and classified, and because of the nature of operational flying become accepted as 'normal'.
The same risks were accepted by NASA, with the solid rocket boosters on Challenger (despite numerous issues and problems arising with them over a number of years), and they were never revisited, because "we operate in a high risk environment".
Pressures associated with essential tasking of a 37 year old airframe become such, that even serious concerns are lost in noise.
Does that make any one part of that organisation culpable? Well probably not. But what it does serve to emphasize is that where the standard HM Forces culture of 'getting the job done' and 'old outdated equipment' are present at the sametime, there will be a high probability of tragic consequences.

[tucumseh]

Small Spinner (D1??)

While you are correct, it should be emphasised that the regs specifically don’t permit the argument “We’ve never had a crash, so it must be ok” or “The risk has never occurred so…..”. This doesn’t prevent the MoD from constantly trotting this line out (year after year on Mull for example), but they’ve now been well and truly hoisted.

Nor is the Duty Holder permitted to rest on the laurels of previous work – airworthiness and safety are through-life processes subject to constant review. If money isn’t provided for this, then the “requirement” fails scrutiny and MUST be reported up the chain. If one looks at the letters of delegation, this includes the RAF’s Chief Engineer (a 4 Star?). In fact, this delegation specifically excludes “key aspects of safety and airworthiness” which MUST be referred upwards. I won’t copy it verbatim, because not all letters are the same, but typically these exclusions include;


Advising the Air Force Board on engineering matters, in particular airworthiness of aircraft and performance of ground systems (assuming the GSE exists, which was an issue on Nimrod).
Specifying RAF engineering policies and procedures, including standardisation of maintenance and repair methods, QA (!!), modifications, engineering documentation and tech pubs.
Defining standards for, and methods for monitoring, structural integrity.
In short, and in this weeks language, the IPT and Users must work within the confines of regs that flow down from God+1. They have some scope for doing their own thing, like approving production permits or concessions.

Of course, the real problem comes when someone is daft enough to actually delegate such a problem upwards. When I was a boy, you got a pat on the back. Now you’re constructively dismissed from post. You cannot imagine the odium someone in an IPT faces if they identify a risk that can only be mitigated at a higher level. You may as well start job hunting.

[JFZ90]

When hazards were identified and categorised at a meeting in August 2004, he said, the possibility of an explosion in the dry bay was graded in as "improbable".

Tuc,

Your conclusions above may prove correct, but the way I read the Air Cdre testimony is slightly different. It seems to me from what he says that they did infact incorrectly grade the hazard during the analysis (and indeed this must have happened also in the first place 20+ years ago when the SCP mod first went in under the prevailing safety analysis techniques). In this scenario the IPT would not have asked for more money etc. from above to fix it as you allude, but would have left the hazard there as they didn't pick up on it. Indeed, the IPTL would surely admit the latter if it were true as he could then pass the buck upwards as you say for lack of funds.

He did not however, and hence this was clearly therefore a key mistake. Ultimately he is correct as the IPTL to take responsibility for this mistake, though the error will have been 'made' or more properly not picked up by the various contributors/checkers of the Safety Case (a combination of IPT project officer(s) in his team, his contractor(s) (DA & safety case compiler / supplier), and his independant safety advisors who he contracted to review the Safety Case (probably Boscombe, maybe others)).

What is interesting here, and will surely form one of the key issues in the "procedural review" is that infact all/(most of?) the relevant extant safety processes and safety case procedures appear to have been followed*, and still a design flaw was left in the aircraft. Hence it is not so much a case here of "MoD not following its own procedures" that led to the loss (though I do not question whether this is potentially another valid issue that you Tuc raise regularly), but seemingly more a case of "MoD/suppliers followed procedures but despite this a design flaw still prevailed in the certified product".

For me the role of Boscombe (and other safety independants?) in this process failure will be interesting - after all are they not there to pick up on these kind of issues during Design/Safety Case reviews? Isn't this what they are contracted/paid for?


* this remains to be fully explored / understood.

[tucumseh]

Sorry JFZ90, I read it differently (and of course, unless you were there – I wasn’t – we don’t know exactly what was said).


The design “flaw” (I notice the imprecise use of terminology) and the subsequent management of the resultant hazard are two different things. The first was a one-off if you like; the second is the through-life bit.

The hazard may have been graded incorrectly (presumably he means it should have been remote, occasional, probable or frequent – not improbable). The point I made is that this is largely irrelevant. Whatever the probability of occurrence, the severity of harm was “catastrophic” (and so it proved) so the risk had to be reduced to ALARP. It clearly wasn’t and the existence of multiple references to the engineering solution in the airworthiness and safety regs compounds this. This is the long standing and presumably oft-repeated error (due to the requirement for constant review). As for the “design flaw” I deliberately don’t comment on the intricacies of the fuel and AAR systems, only to say that each, in isolation, may be physically safe, but when integrated the “system of systems” may not be functionally safe. (Which is presumably the justification for ceasing AAR and still flying). I confine myself to commenting that this is not unusual, especially when either or both are Service Engineered Modifications. I also state, from a position of personal knowledge (and from being in possession of relevant letters via FoI) that the 4 Star in MoD(PE) and DPA specifically ruled that it was acceptable for such a “system of systems” to be physically safe, but not functionally safe, thus rendering the aircraft not fit for purpose and placing the aircrew in danger. (And, again, so it proved in a separate accident in 2003). In doing so, he was upholding the rulings of various 1 and 2 Stars, some of whose responsibilities included Nimrod.


Hence it is not so much a case here of "MoD not following its own procedures" that led to the loss (though I do not question whether this is potentially another valid issue that you Tuc raise regularly), but seemingly more a case of "MoD/suppliers followed procedures but despite this a design flaw still prevailed in the certified product".


While I know for a certain fact MoD routinely don’t follow these regs, in this case I’m merely repeating what the BoI report says. The main point I make is that this was not a revelation, but a re-iteration of a long known problem. The MoD is trying to compartmentalise the Nimrod accident, but the same failures led to other fatal accidents – again I’m merely citing the BoI reports. I don’t agree MoD followed procedures. The risk was not reduced to ALARP. This is directed policy. It is not left to chance that someone spots these risks/hazards. The regs and Design and Airworthiness Requirements (00-970) are chock full of references to the basic risk and technical reports on the subject, and they are published by D/Stan on their site for all to see.




For me the role of Boscombe (and other safety independants?) in this process failure will be interesting - after all are they not there to pick up on these kind of issues during Design/Safety Case reviews? Isn't this what they are contracted/paid for?

Good question. Were the Design Authorities (not just BAeS) under proper continuous contract to maintain the build standards? I can’t speak for BAeS, but I know the answer to many other DAs. No, they weren’t, and this is a matter of policy going back to 1991 which the IPT can do little about; in fact nothing if the funding and political will does not exist. It’s a case of crossing fingers and hoping. Again, this is a clear failure to implement regs. I am very careful not to condemn the IPT here. Many platform IPTs simply have no control whatsoever over much of the kit in their aircraft. I know what it’s like to assume management of both aircraft and equipment modification programmes only to discover that configuration control, tech pubs, drawings etc are 15 years out of date (something highlighted in the QQ report and which is a serious breach of airworthiness regs). This is not speaking out of turn – it is merely lending credence to a Public Accounts Committee report which, in 1999, said precisely the same thing. The MoD cannot pretend they haven’t been told the regs aren’t being implemented. Ingram signed a letter refuting it! Bet he wishes he hadn’t.

[Chugalug2]

JFZ90, unlike you, tucumseh, and others who post here I am part of the great unwashed who don't understand many of the cryptic initials standing for processes, organisations, procedures and I know not what, that is your "Lingua Franca". Because of that I see your post not as the erudite reasoned logic as I am sure it really is but as symptomatic of the bureaucratic jobsworth world that is the MOD's Military Airworthiness Regulation and Enforcement System. Lots of huff, lots of puff but b****r all Regulation or Enforcement, in this case at least it would seem. You may see the solution as an in depth look at Boscombe Down's part in all this, you may be right, but I suspect that such an Inquiry would be as effective as all the other BoI's that are the subjects of various threads on this Forum. From where I stand, that is outside looking in, this is a Tower of Babel that is for whatever reasons past its sell by date. The result has been the needless loss of many precious lives. It does not, and cannot, do its job, to ensure the Airworthiness of the UK Military Air Fleets. That awesome responsibility must be placed in more capable and responsible hands, that is a separate and independent Military Airworthiness Authority to which the MOD would be subject and responsible just as Air Operators are in the civil world to the CAA who have made a far far better fist of their responsibilities in this field than the MOD.