Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)

[Mick Smith]

Buoy15
You've been told on a number of occasions by family members that this isnt about compensation but you just cant resist being offensive to people who have lost their relatives and listened to three weeks of evidence as to why it happened. If you're happy, I'm glad for you. I'm sure we all are since it means you have no need to read this thread. So why dont you just **** off and keep your offensive, drunken, pathetic rants to yourself.

[davejb]

You are a fool. I pity anybody who has you in their chain of command.

[Tania Nolan]

Compensation
compensation
compensation

I thought it was Bob Ainsworth who had insulted the families with his comment about being airworthy but I think you have just beaten that with your above comment.

Having sat through three weeks of all of the evidence and been with all the families this was and never has been about compensation.It is about the truth and making sure this never happens again.

I am fully aware of all the genuine guys that still fly as do the families and it is about protecting their arses. I am glad to say that they do not talk out of theirs like you do.

[Laboratoryqueen]

Just checked in
Seems you lot intend to milk this accident till the MK2 goes out of Service in 2012 - not to worry, youv'e got your experts, Jimmy James and Deputy Coroner Walker to help you - Have Fun
By the way - the present Mk2 will fly safely until 2012, because I know the genuine people who service and fly it; they are more familiar with things that you lot could not even guess at and have something called moral fibre!
How about changing thread and trashing the RN for crashing a Nuc T boat into the seabed through negligence at a cost of £5m rather than demoralising ISK personnel with your vendetta about compensation which the MoD have already agreed to
Please tell me in man readable English what this saga is about and what your narrow minded objectives are - because if you can't see them, I can

Compensation
Compensation
Compensation

Ah Yes! Lets ground the MR2 and close Kinloss?

And before you know-alls get on your high horses - I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying

Can we now put this to rest, and let ISK get on with the job of fighting a war in Afgan and Iraq, plus SAR, JMC, OPS CT, Spec Ops, OCU, whilst still finding time to raise money for charities in their 'spare' time and wish them well



I am not speaking for all the families on this, I can never do that as I can only say what my family and myself believe in, though none of the families seemed to be gunning after anything more than to know the Nimrod is safe for those who still fly in her and those who work on her.

As you ask for a family member to answer your question here you are.

I have many friends at ISK, ground crew and aircrew and many others, my boyfriend is also there and all of them are well aware of my views. I went on the Nimrod shortly after the accident, I am doing it again next week.

I have only ever wanted facts, to know why I lost my brother, and since his death, to know it could be prevented from happening again. I do not want to see ISK grind to a halt, I only want to know the fleet is being given all which has been promised.

According to several witnesses the resources are provided upon request so if they claim this, they should now put their money where their mouths are and give the fleet what it needs to allow it to be safe and to do the job it needs to do.

The coroner isn't an expert, he made his decision because of the evidence he was presented and by the witness statements. As there was such an overwhelming amount of evidence and even an IPTL stating the fleet was not airworthy and never had been, what choice did he have. The coroner has not asked for the fleet to be grounded permanently, he has asked for it to be grounded and made ALARP. Once that standard is reached there would be no problem with flying.

My contributions are solely from evidence which was presented in court, I am not an expert on the Nimrod, I am just a family member of one lost on 230, I am just a friend of those who service and who fly on her, I am just someone who does not want to lose another person I love because the MoD screwed the fleet.

You keep saying about compensation, no amount of money will ever compensate the loss, no amount of money will ever bring them back, personally I would give anything to have him alive. The best compensation package I could ever receive is to have my friends still flying and safe.

I haven't ever said anything against those at ISK, apart from saying I have the utmost respect for them, The IPTL, the MoD and BAe however have made many mistakes and it is those at ISK who are paying for them.

[Winco]

buoy 15

You are an utter disgrace to the RAF and you bring shame on the service.

You are entitled to your opinions about what happened to the jet on that day and you are equally entitled to your opinions as to the aircrafts current safety/airworthiness, I have no problem with either.

What you are NOT entitled to do, is to make outrageous, unfair, untrue and offensive statements about the families of those left behind by this tragedy. Your friends and colleagues at ISK must be really proud of you.

Moderator, if this isn't a good enough reason to ban someone from this forum, then I don't know what is. Please delete buoy 15 asap, his comments are offensive and liabelous IMHO

[Donna K Babbs]

Buoy 15,

It must be about 4 years since you left the fleet but you insist on posting arrogant and offensive comments that cause far more damage, in my opinion, than any previous speculation.

Having read your recent comments I suggest that you get on with your life outside the Nimrod front line and leave those of us still flying the aircraft to get on with our jobs. I for one, as ISK currently serving aircrew, would like the whole situation resolved safely and quickly.

Yes, there have been procedural changes to reduce risk. No, I do not feel that the aircraft is as safe as it needs to be.

Please do us all a favour and f*ck off back to your precious golf course and leave the families, and others who care about the safety of the crews still flying, alone.

[OilCan]

airsound, forgive me, I am still confused.

Running engines will use the ‘feed’ gallery, how can this prevent seals in the AAR/refuel gallery from drying out? They are completely separate galleries.

Prolonged maintenance beyond 5 days is a regular occurrence. Any degradation of seals in the AAR/refuel gallery would become apparent during the next ground refuel and/or preparation for the next flight. Fuel feed seals would remain submersed because the tank isolation cocks are closed after the engines have been shut down, thereby trapping fuel in the feed gallery. After a certain period of inactivity (7 days ISTR), then a procedure of antidet runs, or in the case of scheduled maintenance, post recovery checks are required specifically to guard against such degradation. I fail to see how any ‘dried’ seals would go undetected.

I’d like more info on the video. When/how was it found? Which gallery? If it were to occur again in flight, what potential ignition sources are in proximity?

Da4orce, I look forward to any more details you can offer on the 1tk blow off tracking and the previous leak incident.

Thank you both for your continued patience. I hope you have gathered, I am not just an interested bystander, but one of the many now stuck in the middle trying to reconcile the views of so called experts, and some not so expert. :(

buoy15, please close the door on the way out. :mad:

[BEagle]

buoy15, how anyone who describes himself asa retired Senior Officercould write such offensive drivel as you do is beyond my comprehension.

One hopes you will b*gger off and spend more time ruining good walks with your wretched golf bats rather than upsetting relatives of the Nimrod accident victims on PPRuNe.

[Da4orce]

buoy15
If only you had told us about this round of golf before we could have saved a whole load of public money and distress and heartache for the families by cancelling the Coroners Inquest.

So how did the golf go, let me get it right there was you, 2 engineers from ISk and expert from Rolls Royce, an expert from Eaton, Head of Engineering from BAEs, expert from Qinetiq amongst others?

I'm just going to email Hadden-Cave QC to tell him he needn't bother with his review because you have sorted it all out!

[Biggus]

Buoy 15

The Nimrod MR2 will not fly safely until 2012......
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if only because it is going out of service in

2011
2011
2011.

So much for basic credibility. Oh, and JMC as such doesn't exist any more. Your Ops comment is also incorrect.

Perhaps you should get your Air Eng friend to tell the MOD/RAF/IPT that the aircraft is safe to fly, and they don't need to carry out any of the BOI recommendations, like replacing fuel seals. The MOD could then save a small fortune!

I suggest you just enjoy your retirement, and carry on boring everyone else at the 19th hole with your tales of being a 'cold war warrior'.

Why is it that I just know you'll be back?

[EdSet100]

Oilcan,
I believe that the leak on XV230 2 weeks before the accident, as referred to by the Coroner, was a No1 tank blow-off event. The air eng and AGE both gave evidence clearly proving the fuel loss to be a blow off valve. The Coroner and the families' counsel called it a leak.

The residual fuel stain, still visible after flight, commencing near to the blow-off exit, did not run near to the 7 tank dry bay, but ran underneath the fuselage, which broadly supports 2 lines of thinking:

1. Fuel from that blow-off did not enter the SCP duct shroud.

2. That stain was not evidence of a leak from the 7 tank dry bay.

I am led to believe that a BAe engineer later supported the case, on oath, that blow-off fuel wouldn't enter the SCP duct shroud. Brave call

Conclusion: The Coroner, with the evidence given, quite reasonably discounted No1 tank blow-off as the source of fuel in the dry bay. However, in fairness to the BOI team, the valve is directly ahead of the SCP duct (at the bottom of the dry bay) and the BOI team were correct to identify the possibility that fuel from the blow-off exit could track into the SCP duct shroud.

The video showed a fuel leak from the 7 tank refuel valve coupling, that failed during a ground refuel. It clearly supports the case for a refuel pipe coupling leak during AAR.

I strongly disagree with the Coroner's diagnosis that the leak probably came from a feed pipe further ahead on the Rib 1. Pressure in any Nimrod fuel feed pipe cannot exceed 25 psi, because that is the maximum pressure of all of the pumps. It is a sustained pressure, without spikes. The Coroner suggested that, while the crew used standard AAR techniques that caused aggravating pressure spikes, another totally unrelated failure, without aggravation, occurred somewhere else.

I ask this of anyone:

Which of the 2 fuel sub-systems was most likely to fail during the 10 minutes of AAR? The fuel feed system, while working under normal loads without aggravation, as it had been for the last 1 hr 40 min, or the refuel system, which lay dormant, exposed to an adjacent very hot pipe radiating 450C, which is suddenly working under pressure from 2 carter pumps? I don't understand how the Coroner can think the former scenario is more likely. I agree that it was possible. Clearly, any fuel leak is possible at any time, but we must consider that it would have been the most incredible co-incidence. In fact, it is so unlikely that the BOI team didn't consider it a possibility in that particular circumstance. Neither do I.

Incidentally, if the Coroner is to be believed, the cause of the accident was not related to AAR. Do you believe him? I don't.

However, I do strongly believe that the cause of the accident (fuel onto a hot pipe) and, also importantly, the potential for another similar tragedy, has been isolated. Yes, there might be fuel leaks and yes, there will be hot air pipes and they, too, might occasionally leak. But where the fuel might leak it will not now ignite in an area not protected by fire warning and suppression. Where hot air might leak, it will be sensed by overheat detectors, as it always has been (which discounts the BOI's 3rd possibility). Both of these possibilities exist throughout the world of aviation. They are necessary evils if human beings want to fly. I suggest this makes the Nimrod as safe as (or, no less dangerous than; you can spin it whichever way you like) any other aircraft in the world in this respect.

Ed

[chappie]

clearly the rant that bouy 15 has highlighted a few things about himself so here goes....

he is extremely out of touch, especially as a retired senior officer.

i am thankful that he is retired as it is a travesty that someone with such a closed mind and so little worth for human life should be seen as a leader.

possibly, the dellusions of grandeur have caught up with him and the dementia has well and truly set in. if this is not the case, i simply suggest you either get yourself a stronger pair of glasses to be able to actually read the facts. get yourself a stronger hearing aid to ensure you can hear properly and shame we haven't figured out a way of taking out your brain for a damn good polish so it's working properly then popping it back in. then hopefully you can then actually understand, or take on board what has been said to you....oh, wait a minute, that's right you clearly don't have brain,oops, sorry!

i was posting much stronger rants but then why would i come down to your level.

as families we can hold our head high and we know what is true and we do not have to reply, nor try to convince you or anyone about compensation.

mods, please do something about this user. he is not just insulting me and other family memebers and colleagues but the memory of our lost loved ones.

per ardua ad astra

[EdSet100]

Buoy 15:I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying

I'm sure you're right about his view and that of his colleague. However, I'm also sure they would not want to be associated with the manner in which you are contributing to this discussion.

Sincerely,
Ed

[Tappers Dad]

Something that has not yet been reported or mentioned on here is that I asked Group Captain Hickman Nimrod IPT leader if they had done a Battle Damage Assesment on the Nimrod as required in Def Stan 00-970. He replied NO as it was a legacy aircraft and fly's too high. I had to point out to him that Nimrods have to take off and land at very low levels especially in that northern DOB .

When the transcript of Mr Walkers summing up comes out you will be able to read this.

So you not only are the RAF flying un-airworthy ac but they have not even concidered any protection against battle damage.!!!!!!!

Chappie ring any alarm bells with your Hercules case ?


Buoy 15:
Unfortunatly it is not air engineers who decide the airworthiness of the Nimrod but Group Captain Hickman ( Perhaps someone could tell me if he is an engineer?)



DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 9
68
9.9 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE
INTRODUCTION
9.9.1 This Clause contains design aims and requirements which enhance the survivability of the aeroplane and its crew by reducing their vulnerability to battle damage.

9.9.2 See Leaflet 21 for general background information on Reduction of Vulnerability to Battle Damage, Design Aims, Vulnerability Analysis, Protection Measures, Battle Damage Repair, and Kill Categories. Refer to Clause 4.22 for Crash Landing and Ditching requirements and Clause 9.10 for Protection Systems for Aircrew.

9.9.3 Table 4 gives the Defined Threat Effects and also contains some data which may be used in a Vulnerability Analysis if more specific information is not available.

9.9.5 See Part 0 - Definitions for: SURVIVABILITY, VULNERABILITY, SUSCEPTABILITY, THREATS, THREAT EFFECT, SPECIFIED THREAT
EFFECTS, DEFINED THREAT EFFECTS, SORTIE, MISSION, BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR, and PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE (TABLE 4).

NOTE: These definitions apply to terms used in this Clause and in the Leaflet 21. They may not be the same as definitions of the same terms

[StopStart]

buoy15. Wow. As someone who's been a Ppruner for about 13 years I thought I'd pretty much seen it all. Good drills fella, you've set a new low.

We all have strong opinions about these matters but to simply accuse the bereaved, on an open forum, of just being money grabbers is pretty sickening. If that's the sort of person you really are then the military is certainly better off without you.

Time to get back to the golf course to reminisce about great and important you never were.

:rolleyes:

[EdSet100]

TD:I had to point out to him that Nimrods have to take off and land at very low levels especially in that northern DOB .

It is a military jet, TD. So, when necessary, we have to do military things and we move into a different category of risk analysis. There's not much more that can be said about this on this forum.

Gp Capt Hickman is an engineer. He is not an air engineer. They are two different specialisations, with different skill sets.

Ed

[FE Hoppy]

Incidentally, if the Coroner is to be believed, the cause of the accident was not related to AAR. Do you believe him? I don't.

Nor do I.

I've stayed away from this thread for a while but if this is the coroners conclusion the whole process was pretty much useless.(if flight safety was the issue)


I don't know the flight profile but I'm pretty sure the differential pressure across the fuel feed lines was lower at the AAR altitude than it had been for other phases of the flight and therefore a leak occurring at that time from a feed line was less likely than during the previous 1:40 flight time.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Bout15 said:
And before you know-alls get on your high horses - I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying

And what about the other Air Engineers and in fact other aircrew who have quit already due to their fears of safety?

Surely out of all on a crew the Air Eng knows more about the aircraft systems than most on the crew (dependent upon experience obviously as there are some very knowledgeable guys flying the jet), therefore they would be deemed to be in the best position to make such a judgment.

You are a horses ass and, in my own opinion, typical of your kind. Arrogant, know it all and brash beyond comprehension.

Go away small man and don't come back.

[airsound]

Oilcan
I should reiterate that I am neither a Nimrod person nor an engineer. But I have been hearing some of the evidence. This is my view of some of what you ask.
Running engines will use the ‘feed’ gallery, how can this prevent seals in the AAR/refuel gallery from drying out? They are completely separate galleries.
Yes, but running engines suggests refuelling, which would keep the AAR/refuel gallery wetted. I suppose in the absence of that, you could insert a requirement to defuel and refuel after a certain period of inactivity. (Merely a suggestion on my part)

I'm not really able to comment sensibly on your other point
Prolonged maintenance beyond 5 days is a regular occurrence. Any degradation of seals in the AAR/refuel gallery would become apparent during the next ground refuel and/or preparation for the next flight. Fuel feed seals would remain submersed because the tank isolation cocks are closed afterthe engines have been shut down, thereby trapping fuel in the feed gallery. After a certain period of inactivity (7 days ISTR), then a procedure of antidet runs, or in the case of scheduled maintenance, post recovery checks are required specifically to guard against such degradation. I fail to see how any ‘dried’ seals would go undetected.
Except to say that the 'drying out after 5 days' evidence came from the coupling manufacturer, FRS. I don't think 'antidet' procedures came up in evidence, but Gp Capt Hickman (ex IPTL and current airworthiness delegation holder for MR2) did talk about checks on the seals every 30 days which involved visual checks and, where pipes are empty, blowing air thorough them and listening for whistling leaks. This was greeted with a certain amount of derision.

I hope that helps - I'd love to spend more time on it, but I'm way behind on my day job after the days at the inquest..... sorry.

airsound

PS I think EdSet answered your query on the video.

[KeepItTidy]

Im shocked by bouy15 comments and I apoligise from all the people at ISK for one persons harsh view of the situation. As a senior officer retired, it is probably one of you lot that have got ISK to where it is now, and rather than stay in have balls to fight changes you sit and mock people who have done nothing personally to you. Hang head in shame

I think an unexpected fuel dump over a certain golf course may change your views

[nigegilb]

Ed Set, you said before that if Hickman described the fleet risk as tolerable but not ALARP then you were in trouble. You suggested that his evidence was being misrepresented. Well, you now know that, this is exactly what he said, and there is no regulation which allows for the fleet to be described as airworthy. ( Sunday Times would have run that article through their lawyers). I have read transcripts of Hickman's evidence and he appeared to confuse tolerable risk with tolerably safe.

In your view, now that you can be assured that the fleet is not ALARP and will not be until the end of the year at the earliest, would you agree that the fleet cannot be described as airworthy?

TD's point, I believe, is that he understands the need for Nimtod to continue live ops, but he cannot support the stance taken by Torpy, Thornton, Ainsworth and Browne, that the Nimrod is safe to fly and airworthy.

We all want honesty here and many do not believe we are getting it.

If Nimrod crews are happy to fly with increased risk then so be it, but do not ignore 3 weeks worth of evidence in doing so and falsely representing the position with regard to military airworthiness regulations.

[Mick Smith]

Re the ALARP issue, which given the fact that AAR is not taking place and the source of ignition in the No 7 Tank dry Bay has been isolated, is surely the most immediate issue, ppruners might be interested in this press release from Angus Robertson:

NIMROD MP WRITES TO MOD DEMANDING SAFETY UPDATE

The Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP, who represents the home base of the Nimrod fleet RAF Kinloss, has written to the Ministry of Defence demanding a safety update on the aircraft.

His letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne follows a Coroners Inquest recommending that the fleet be grounded owing to safety concerns in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan.

Last week Mr Browne confirmed in writing to Angus Robertson MP that not all safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft had been implemented.

Now Mr Robertson has asked for a status report from the MOD to establish which safety requirements had been implemented, which have not and when they will be completed.

Speaking about his call for an update Mr Robertson said: "Despite the findings of a Coroner the Ministry of Defence has decided not to ground the Nimrod fleet and Ministers say they are satisfied with safety arrangements.

"They have said this although they know that the risk levels to the aircraft are not as low as is reasonably practicable.

"The MOD must now confirm which of 30 key safety recommendations have been implemented in full, which have not and when all safety measures are scheduled to be completed in full.

"Defence Ministers must get a grip of the situation and restore confidence in their own assessments.

"The talented and hardworking military and civilian staff at RAF Kinloss and their families deserve better leadership and management from the MOD."

Background - Letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne MP (26 May 2008)

Many thanks for your letter of 19th May 2008 relating to the QinetiQ report Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report dated October 2007 which was recently released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Under the rules of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), for an aircraft to be safe the risk must have been 'reduced to a level that is ALARP (as low as is reasonably practicable) and broadly acceptable or tolerable'.

According to the QinetiQ report only half this condition was in place in the Nimrod fleet - while the risk associated with the aircraft was tolerable "the level of risk present to the fuel system is not ALARP".

In your letter you confirmed that: "Of the 30 safety recommendations contained in the QinetiQ report: 21 have been accepted and are being implemented; 3 are being considered for implementation and a further 6 are on hold as they relate to Air-to-Air Refuelling. Following the leak incident on Nimrod XV235 on 5 November 2007, all Air-to-Air Refuelling on the Nimrod fleet was suspended. This suspension remains in force".

Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?

The answer to these questions will be of relevance to the independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the Royal Air Force Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 being conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC and I have sent him a copy of this correspondence.

[Da4orce]

Nimrod fleet has faults, MoD admits in private

By Andy Bloxham
Last Updated: 9:42PM BST 25/05/2008

The Ministry of Defence has privately acknowledged that the RAF's ageing Nimrod fleet is riddled with faults despite its public insistence that the aircraft is safe.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2028013/Nimrod-fleet-has-faults,-MoD-admits-in-private.html

[JFZ90]

The ALARP debate & therefore the accusation of being misleading about safety appears to have been caught up in some of the statements in the QQ report recommendations. To take one quoted above, relating to the Min Master Eqt List (MMEL) recommendation, you could argue that whilst this is an important activity, the impact on the current aircraft risk whether this is done now, or say in Dec 2008 is zero. You can argue this should not impact your decision to fly or not.

It should be remembered that I don't think SoS ever mentioned ALARP when saying it way safe, and I don't think anyone from the MoD has stated ALARP=safe, or not ALARP=unsafe. To say not ALARP=unsafe is a potentially misleading overly simple interpretation of the quoted safety guidance which has a table which states "not ALARP = unacceptable". An important factor that has not been discussed much here, but as Tuc has posted above, relates to "can you fly when you don't (yet) comply?"


I have touched on this before and I can offer what I have done when faced with similar situations. The general principle is that you are given a “reasonable time” to comply.


You can see this can easily apply to the MMEL issue as it doesn't directly impact safety. Indeed in the case of TWA800 etc. many aircraft continued to fly with extant risks and 10+ years have passed with some recommendations not having been implemented in civil aircraft. To me the MMEL is not really an ALARP issue, and this I think is making things more complicated than they need to be.

The one area where it seems you could have a debate on extant risks relates to the seals issue. At the moment I'm not convinced either way on the seal debate to be honest as there is not enough information around. That is not to say the IPT don't have enough information to make that call - I assume they do.

On the one hand you can say any seal can leak at any time, so the aircraft design must take this into account, which it now appears to - on this basis the aircraft can be considered safe (as long as its maintained correctly which no-one seems to be doubting etc.).

On the other hand there are all these snippets of information about EATON said this wasn't safe, IPTL ignored and took BAES advice etc. Care must also be taken as these companies will be extremely risk averse and will not want to be associated with any percieved mistakes in this case. If you look on the EATON website they go to great lengths to say how they have fuel rigs and can help aircraft manufacturers design systems etc. Who's to say they didn't do that with Nimrod/BAES and but now want to distance themselves from any liability?

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb:Ed Set, you said before that if Hickman described the fleet risk as tolerable but not ALARP then you were in trouble. Thats because Def Stan 00-56 Part 2/4 (Tuc's message #590) indicates that the risk cannot be signed off.Well, you now know that, this is exactly what he saidyes.
and there is no regulation which allows for the fleet to be described as airworthy. ( Sunday Times would have run that article through their lawyers).On the face of it, yes.he appeared to confuse tolerable risk with tolerably safe.
Which is regrettable if that is the case.would you agree that the fleet cannot be described as airworthy?
I would agree, if Gp Capt Hickman was correct with his risk assessment. IMHO, the risk meets the "Broadly Acceptable" standard, as defined in the JSP, due to additional aircrew measures in place, as indicated by Air Cdre Beber. This means that while ALARP is not satisfied, attempts must be made to make it so, in order to sign it off. This is what we are doing.

Ed

[EdSet100]

Nimrod fleet has faults, MoD admits in private

Daforce, all aircraft have faults. The concept of perfection is worth aiming for, but all aircraft around the World suffer from imperfections. If you want to construct a solid case in your fight against the MOD, I suggest you focus on design, modifications and safety cases, and who did what and when, before 2 Sep 06. There is very little to support the case since then.

Ed

[nigegilb]

Thanks Ed, we are in agreement. Hickman also suggested that money was an issue. Comes down to who has been advising CAS.

Ainsworth's reply to the Coroner's verdict was insultingly fast, something he might regret.

Clarity is now needed from Mod.

The reason I have quoted newspapers ranging from The Sun to the Guardian is because they represent the full range of political opinion.

Many people are coming to the conclusion that the MoD cannot be trusted-period. The RAF is now being damaged in the same way.

Someone needs to take the big picture view concerning the damage being done to the military here. The MoD appears to have blood on its hands and it is still in denial. Many mothers and fathers will be watching and deciding that they do not wish to place the lives of their sons and daughters in the hands of the RAF or MoD.

I hope the SNP MP gets an honest answer to his well pitched questions.

An awful lot depends on it.

[Laboratoryqueen]

It's not so much that AAR was ruled, it's just that through the evidence several experts stated that fuel coming into contact with the SCP pipe would be unlikely but not impossible.

The coroner had to try and define as the most probable cause what events led to the loss of 230. He began with the possibility of the blow off from 1 tank, however all evidence suggested this was not likely to track along and enter 7 dry bay, but it was not ruled in factors which sustatined the fire.

If there were a pool fire caused by fuel from the blow off this would have burned for approximately 100 seconds and then gone out as the fuel would have been burnt away, there had to have been a further cause which was needed to sustain the fire. When looking at a possible leak from the refuel/defuel system, it was stated that this would not be likely as those pipes are below the SCP and would not come into contact with the pipe. If it had been a spurt of fuel it would need to have soaked into the lagging on the pipe, but again the problem comes in that once AAR had been completed, the amount of fuel in that system would not be enough to sustain the fire.

It was asked, by a family member, if the fire burned for 100 seconds would this be enough to heat the fuel in 7 tank to a point where it would boil and pressurise, the answer was yes. Then they asked if 7 tank pressurised would this have caused a vent or blow off, again the answer was yes. 7 tank feeds to 1 tank, it was proved that as well as venting, fuel would have been fed to 1 tank due to the pressure. The vent and feed pipes are above the SCP and it was shown that fuel at this time would be in a constant flow through those systems and was most likely where the fuel to sustain the fire came from. It was also agreed by experts present and by members of the BoI panel, that the vented fuel would have ignited as the flames would be in contact with that area, that the feed system to 1 tank from 7 tank would likely to have been breached and with fuel feeding to 1 tank, if that had over pressurised and blown off it would now be venting at a constant rate, so also able to fuel the fire.

I doubt I've explained that too well at the moment, forgive the fact as I have a mad 3 year old wanting my attention.

The misalignment of pipes was listed by Eaton Aerospace as highest fuel leak cause with failed coupling or seal at the bottom. Pipes are aligned by hand and as was stated by a witness it can be difficult to do so when reaching high above the head and into an area with a great deal of pipes and cables. It was not specified which pipes had been found misaligned, it was found that two pipes on one plane were misalinged after 230 when all Nimrods were checked.


The actual definition GP CPT Hickman gave for the Nimrod now is not ALARP at present but they are working towards that standard by the end of year and it is tolerably safe.

[PPRuNe Pop]

buoy15 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=49684)

Is taking a well earned ban after making his disgraceful remarks. I cannot imagine a worse case of contempt for the families than his - should he attempt another such post he will be gone - permanently.

I regret that we didn't pick it up sooner.

[Tappers Dad]

Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air), said:

"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."

What about the last 30 odd years prior to XV230 crash Bob Answorth is on record as saying it was not airworthy during this time ?? So they did ask personnel to fly in aircraft which were not safe !!!!!!!!!

Safe to fly and airworthy are not the same thing !!!!!!

Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff, had reaffirmed that the Nimrod was airworthy “and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident”.

Didn't he say in the Panorama Programme in June 2007 that"AAR was as safe as it needed to be".
In December 2007 we had a Nimrod declare a Mayday following AAR with fuel pouring into the Bomb Bay.

Put your trust in these people if you like but the evidence speaks for itself.

[Dave Angel]

buoy15 (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=49684)

Is taking a well earned ban after making his disgraceful remarks. I cannot imagine a worse case of contempt for the families than his - should he attempt another such post he will be gone - permanently.

I regret that we didn't pick it up sooner.

Thanks PPRuNe pop, from a serving member of ISK who is ashamed that Bouy15 was once associated with it.

My very best wishes to all of the families of our lost friends.
DA

[chappie]

PPRuNe Pop making a stand. as a family member, who tries to grapple with all of this i'd like to say a heartfel thank you and a thankyou to all those who have defended us. this is an open forum with many differing views which is good. that is how we learn, open our minds and discuss pertinent issues. i have no right to tell someone what to think but i do feel that repeated refusals to acknowledge the replies to offensive remarks does warrant the closing down of that said person. especially so when this action causes distress.

Dave angel, again a heartfelt thankyou for your post. it is a travesty that you feel you had to to do it but absolutely appreciated.

thankyou from a very grateful me :ok:

[OilCan]

Ed, your post #773 has clarified a lot, thanks.

Lab Queen, though you explained that rather well…

…which brings me back to my current frustration..

Can anybody explain exactly where the remaining risks are which make it any more dangerous than any other aircraft? – other than the legal niceties and definitions.

It’s perhaps a little ironic that from an operators perspective, I would have a heightened sense of trepidation flying an aircraft that has just had all the seals replaced in one go! – much like a post major air test. :eek:

[Safeware]

Oilcan,

The detailed risks are probably things that people won't want to talk about here.

But the biggest risk is probably that the poor airworthiness and safety management regime means that Rumsfeld rules and people don't not know what they should know.

sw

[OilCan]

Safeware,

fair point, in which case pm me.

re Rumsfeld; he also said something about, somepeople know they don't know whilst others don't know they don't know. :ooh: (or something to that effect)

My point is, what (else) do they know that I don't?
-------------------



on 2nd thoughts

please don't pm me, lets have it open for others to see.

The 'white collar' workers appear to have reached an impasse with regard to grounding the fleet or not. Meanwhile, the 'blue collar' workers have to decide which group of experts to believe.

This forum is for some of us, the only mechanism with which to balance that judgment.

[nigegilb]

Just wanted to pick up this point from Lab Queen;

The actual definition GP CPT Hickman gave for the Nimrod now is not ALARP at present but they are working towards that standard by the end of year and it is tolerably safe.

This is where I think he is confused. Tolerable refers to tolerable risk reduced to as low as reasonably practicable, if ac deemed airworthy. Not tolerably safe.

I find that worrying if this is the man in charge.

"Hickman insisted that "tolerably safe" was safe and it didnt matter that it wasnt ALARP and that they had given themselves until the end of the year to get it ALARP, no regulation allowing this could be cited. Hickman appeared to think that "tolerable" and "acceptable" were in this case levels of safety rather than levels of risk. At the end of his testimony, Walker thanked him politely and said: "If you came here with a view to reassuring the relatives, I feel that you have fallen well short of that." In mitigation, I understand he was put under considerable pressure whilst giving evidence, could not have been easy for him.

"This morning he [Coroner] asked Hickman who was still in court though not in the box whether if he as the coroner said that it had to be ALARP as soon as possible it would have any effect on the process. Hickman's response was "no it wouldnt have any effect, it's driven by resources".

[GasFitter]

Gas Fitter, the can do attitude is commendable. After all the engineers can fix anything, the crews could fly anything........My question to you is this..?

Do you think there is a comprehensive and robust system of ensuring airworthiness and "reasonable" safety in the RAF for aircraft?



Yes, I very much do. The system is good, but it's how the people use the system (or not) that introduces greater risk. I know of NO pilot outside of the training world that always religiously uses the FRCs and aircrew manual for EVERY sortie. Experienced crews will tell you, for each fleet, that there are little work-arounds, quicker "informal" procedures, "quick-fixes" etc that go on every day, on every sqn and often on every sorties/formation. that applies to groundcew as well. if we all followed the book to the letter, we would hardly turn a wheel. So the system is set and we choose through experience, knowledge, ignorance, operational pressure, human factors to move away from the system. We do it at our peril sometimes, but we do it with good intention. However, what I do feel is important, is that ambitious, aggressive or cavalier engineers or operators do nothing to support that system.

[JFZ90]

Can anybody explain exactly where the remaining risks are which make it any more dangerous than any other aircraft? – other than the legal niceties and definitions.

I can only guess that this is related to the QQ report which had 30 recs - it says something like "these recs need to be reviewed and where appropriate acted upon before the equipment risks would be ALARP." The implication being that if the 30 recs are done, then the aircraft is ALARP.

I don't know if there are any more issues/risks precluding ALARP, but from what I've heard on here the ones in the QQ report are not really specific ALARP risks in the traditional sense in any case - e.g. as Tuc mentions one states a consideration should be given to creating a Master Minimum Eqt List. I think another says something like "further work should consider whether consitutued crews are competent". Pretty general woolly recommendations on the whole - no glaring 'ignition source X must be removed or mitigated' etc. that you could really see the risk of. There is something about considering reinstating a Tank 5 pressure warning, but I think Edset (or someone else) has already stated why this was a red herring in an earlier post on this thread.

I suspect that if there was a tangible "must fix risk X before its ALARP and can fly again" issue it would be plastered all over here and the papers. The only thing that springs to mind that has been discussed here is the seals and perhaps their lifing issue, but as you say replacing them all at once could create more problems than it solves - which would be a truely ironic outcome.

[GasFitter]

Gas Fitter,

What the hell are you on about? This isn't Korea is it? This is 2008 and whatever you say about the coroner, these guys didn't need to die and the aircraft should not have crashed frankly.

I agree with you.

I for one applaud the guy for having the courage to say that.


I agree with you, but there are other courageous wrong people as well

It's time for this so-called head of the RAF, Torpey, to be a true leader, stand up and say 'I'm sorry' and then hold his head in shame and resign. A leader? He couldn't lead a dog frankly. A total waste of space and oxygen IMHO.

And replace him with .................. he's a servant of the HMG like all serving personnel.

[Da4orce]

On Hickmans evidence:


In mitigation, I understand he [Hickman] was put under considerable pressure whilst giving evidence, could not have been easy for him.


He was under pressure because he was being so evasive and the Coroner and the lawyer (for most of the families) were becoming increasingly frustrated with his attitude (hence the Coroners remark). He danced around simply questions that required a yes or no answer and had to look to the MoD legal team for reassurance every time he answered a question.

Lets be very clear about the facts:

The SoS had already admitted liability prior to the Coroners verdict
The consensus of opinion from the expert witnesses at the Coroners inquest was that the Nimrod has never been airworthy (according to MoD standards) and remains unairworthy.
Hickman admitted that the Nimrod is not ALARP therefore by the MOD's own definition is not airworthy.
The families asked the Coroner not to record a verdict of 'unlawful killing' because the MOD had already indicated that they would appeal and drag everyone through a new inquest (probably 2 years down the line).
The MOD saw fit to withhold documents from the inquest.
The MOD argued that the Coroner should not conduct an Article 2 (HRA) hearing, (The case law suggests that it is only those inquests that are concerned with a possible breach of Article 2 by an agent of the state that need to have a wider scope. Other types of inquest can be more limited.It is for the Coroner to decide whether Article 2 applies and therefore which questions s/he will need to address during the inquest.) The MOD argued against this but lost.
The Coroner praised the BOI for what they achieved from a "standing start".
The MOD/RAF failed to provide any evidence that the Nimrod is airworthy (according to their own standards).
The RAF told the Coroner that air and ground crew at Kinloss had been informed that the Nimrod was not airworthy but that ALARP was being worked towards (target end 2008).It should be astonishing that serving crew are having to ask questions on a public forum to establish the reasons why the Nimrod is not airworthy, unfortunately I'm not remotely astonished. Bob Ainsworth didn't bother to furnish himself with the facts of the case before he gave his reaction (he admitted in a subsequent TV interview that he had not read the verdict), so why would I expect him to tell the people at the sharp end.

Unfortunately we are going to have to wait for a copy of the Coroners Inquest transcript to become available before many of the questions can be answered. Or you could of course as Grp Captain Hickman why the Nimrod is not airworthy!

[EdSet100]

Lab Queen,
If there were a pool fire caused by fuel from the blow off this would have burned for approximately 100 seconds and then gone out as the fuel would have been burnt away, there had to have been a further cause which was needed to sustain the fire. When looking at a possible leak from the refuel/defuel system, it was stated that this would not be likely as those pipes are below the SCP and would not come into contact with the pipe. If it had been a spurt of fuel it would need to have soaked into the lagging on the pipe, but again the problem comes in that once AAR had been completed, the amount of fuel in that system would not be enough to sustain the fire.

I'm impressed with your knowledge, but I would like to make one small, but important, correction: the SCP pipe is below all of the fuel pipes in the bay.

Everyone takes it for granted that the fire started after the AAR sequence. We do not know that. There was no fire detection in the bay. It is entirely possible that a small (?) fire was in there within seconds of the AAR commencing. It would not have been visible to the lookouts. The ESM Op might not have been looking out of his window, indeed he might not have been at his station. The tanker eng would not be specifically checking the Nimrod on the CCTV for leaks or fire and, anyway, the black fuel fire smoke would look just like jet exhaust from the inboard engine on the CCTV screen. We do not know, for sure, when that fire started. The fire warning came from firewire a few feet away in the bomb bay. I'm certain that the fire did not start just before that warning. I notice that the BOI team has not placed a precise time on the clock that the fire started, because there is no evidence of when it started. 6 minutes in contact. Everyone, on both aircraft, was very busy.

Ed

[Laboratoryqueen]

ED

It was the experts who stated the only fuel pipes above the SCP were the vent and feed pipes, that the others are below and that there would not be fuel in the vent and or feed system which would give rise to sustain the fire. The diagrams provided in court also show vent and feed are the only ones above.

As for the sequence of events, very true, we do not know the exact moment the fire began, all we do know is that after AAR the Nimrod pulled alongside the Tristar, the Nimrods Port/left side to the Tristars starboard/right side and the Nimrod then ascended by a height of 1000 feet. The underside of the nimrod was in view and no sign of fuel venting or smoke or flames were visable. A fuel fire takes effect in a very small space of time and it is also vigourous in it's effects and will also produce a long gout of flame. We do know that the Nimrod cleared right and then the bomb bay fire warning alarm sounded 36 seconds afterwards.

They are the only things we truly know as to those sequence of events.

[GasFitter]

Gas Fitter,

... you are very wrong to criticise the Coroner in the way you have - a similar criticism was made by very senior RAF officers about results of the Mull of Kintyre FAI when the Sheriff did not agree with the RAF's position and unjustified verdict.

Don't start me on the MoK issue, one that I am very close to. My thoughts would send most PPruners into orbit on that subject.

An airworthy aircraft is just that airworthy! A RAF aircraft should indeed be as airworthy as a 737 flying from Luton.

I can't remember the last time I saw any AAR on Easyjet!

.... obligations that rightly, in my view, apply to MOD as to any other walk of life. The Coroner was right!

IMHO, the Coroner, and you, are wrong. It seems that you are suggesting that the Army were right. Perhaps it's the end of the 100 year experiment and we should hand it all over to EasyJet after all! Keep it all very safe, no risk wars.

[GasFitter]

If this happened in a civilian firm then there would be charges of corporate manslaughter at the very least for the officers in charge of the station, engineering, and operations. Is the MOD and the RAF completely devoid of all morality in this or what?

You answered your own question there, fella!

[davejb]

That's a very good point Ed,
even if what 'everyone' thinks is correct, there are questions that simply don't have 100% certain answers... I hope the entire airframe has been examined with a fine tooth comb to ensure there aren't any other areas where fuel and ignition source are capable of mixing.

I can't but wonder where this leaves the Mk4 - I mean, this ihas hardly been a ringing endorsement of the upper echelons of RAF engineering, has it?

[GasFitter]

Gas Fitter

... The aircraft could just have well been lost after AAR on the way to the Falklands, or some other more mundane AAR tasking.

Fair point.


... what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!

It's a matter of military judgement taking all of the relevant factors into consideration and mitigating them as best as possible. There were bods on the ground that needed that type of support, which without it, could well have cost more than 14 lives. Difficult call, requiring big kahunas! Nevertheless, it was made. There's no 'risk-free' wars out there!

[GasFitter]

Ok then air expert Mr Coroner Walker - if XV230 "has never been airworthy" - how did I manage to complete 306 hrs and 5 minutes in that frame, flying from 1973 as a Mk1 and converting in the 80's to a Mk2, and be here today writing this thread?
A BOI is far more in depth than any Coroners inquest (viz, 12 months vs 2 weeks) and should be accepted in good faith, not dismissed in the pursuit of compensation - particularly from an alleged 'MoD hostile Coroner'
I have flown in every Nimrod in the fleet and have had more than my fair share of in-flight heart stoppers, but was lucky to sort them and walk away
This was a unique, tragic accident due to an in-flight system failure rather than systemic engineering ignorance that some of this audience would imply
As this drags on, it starts to insult the memory of Al Squires, his crew and the groundcrew who honestly signed for, and produced, a serviceable ac for that sortie, that day.

I agree with your posts, putting a rational view into the Forum. Unfortunately, there are many PPruners who feel that to have an alternative opinion that may, in some way, support our leadership is somehow bizarre, disloyal to colleagues etc ... and some may even call for your posts to be scrubbed ... oh, they have. You're a shot in the arm for free speech and an alternative opinion!

[davejb]

Gasfitter,
the point is that it's meant to be the chaps on the other side who try to kill you, not your own. The rest of humanity has advanced past General Melchett's style of leadership since 1918, the RAF is apparently dragging its feet a little. I can well remember when big frights occurred, and we'd all be sent flying asap to 'demonstrate our faith in the aircraft'.... I always thought that was a sensible as handing everyone a rabbits foot - it worked about as well. It would be nice if just for once the top brass would err on the side of caution - I'll say this for them, they've got huge b@lls though, I expect they'll be lynched if anything goes wrong now they've decided to ignore the inquest verdict.

The aircraft would have been safer had a number of incorrect assumptions been made, including an apparent stunner...did BAe really not appreciate that we habitually shut down engines on task, and would tend to restart them later? (Sorry if I misunderstood that bit, that's what it sounded like).

Apart from the human misery, given the lack of resources that is now the lot of the armed forces it's stupid to mismanage them to the point that they are lost. The need to get some platform up to do the job is understood -this is perhaps an occasion when Gordon should simply open up his chequebook and buy what is needed (or pay for Nimrod to reach ALARP asap), instead of trying to fight wars on the cheap all the time. Why should our aircrew fly in an aircraft that is, by the RAF's own standards, not airworthy, especially if a big wad of cash will fix it faster?

Edited to add:
Buoy15's posts (and presence) were not censored because he had an alternative view to the majority. His temporary removal is in response to repeatedly insulting the next of kin of the dead crew. Take a deep breath.

[Winco]

Gas Fitter,

I would ask again, what the hell are you on about?
Please don't tell me or any of us here that you actually agree with the comments that buoy 15 made do you?

I asked the moderator to ban him, not for spouting his opinion on the accident and not for spouting his opinion on the airworthiness of the jet. I agree that he has (had) as much right as anyone here to pass his own comments and judgement on thosed 2 issues.

I asked for him to be banned because his comments regarding the families of those lost in 230 were wholly and grossly offensive, and were utterly shameful in fact.

Moderator, thank you.

[GasFitter]

I'm sorry, but yes, I do.

I didn't read any posts that directly accused the families of anything. If that did happen, then I would certainly not support that in any way, but it's not that clear that buoy15 did .... unless I've missed something!

For me, it is the Coroner's comments that I am questioning. His comments may have been of some comfort to the families, but I do not agree with those comments as it simplifies a very complicated subject and any lasting good that may have come out of this very, very sad business has been lost by such a headline grabbing statement. I believe that he could have been more specific and thus more effective.

[Archimedes]

GF - unfortunately, you have missed something...

B15's later posts, far from putting a rational view into the Forum ended up accusing all the families of being interested only in compensation, and nothing else. See post #763 on page 39 for the final attempt

One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...

[cooheed]

Gas Fitter said:
"It's a matter of military judgement taking all of the relevant factors into consideration and mitigating them as best as possible. There were bods on the ground that needed that type of support, which without it, could well have cost more than 14 lives. Difficult call, requiring big kahunas! Nevertheless, it was made. There's no 'risk-free' wars out there!"

The fact that a 'mission' needs/should be conducted should not needlessly put our aircrew at risk for what is conceived to be a 'critical mission'. We can assume that every time they go up in support of ops, they are supporting critical ops, but don't for one minute think that the war can be won on the basis of one platform. Maybe commanders out there should re-evaluate their knowledge of the combat estimate.

[Da4orce]

Apart from the human misery, given the lack of resources that is now the lot of the armed forces it's stupid to mismanage them to the point that they are lost. The need to get some platform up to do the job is understood -this is perhaps an occasion when Gordon should simply open up his chequebook and buy what is needed (or pay for Nimrod to reach ALARP asap), instead of trying to fight wars on the cheap all the time. Why should our aircrew fly in an aircraft that is, by the RAF's own standards, not airworthy, especially if a big wad of cash will fix it faster?


Argh DaveJB this where the RAF/MOD disagree with you, Baber and Hickman were asked by the Coroner whether resources were an issue and they both said no. The Coroner suggested to Hickman that grounding the fleet may serve to focus resources on making the airframe ALARP but Hickman disagreed, "resources are not an issue". The Coroner could draw only one conclusion, they just don't want to do it!

I like to think of myself as a patriotic individual, it pains me to say it but when listening to some of the RAF witnesses (2 in particular) I was ashamed to be British and bitterly embarrassed for those brave members of the armed services that actually have some sense of professionalism, integrety, and honesty.

[Safeware]

Oilcan,

I wasn't trying to insinuate that I know. I'm not on the inside on this and as I expect that the hazard log is Restricted, I don't think people on the inside, with access are going to say.

Tapper's Dad may have been given such information at some point, and the safety case report would certainly have covered them, but as they are 'live', things may have moved on.... On the other hand.....

sw

[KeepItTidy]

Well I would like to think that the RAF can give the much needed cash for all aircraft in the fleet , but many of the case lately has been the Governments refusal to give the MOD/RAF/Navy/Army a larger budget to maintain all of the equally important assets needed for what has been asked. The Government has shown its annoyance to a few senior military figures for speaking out, althought not as many as you would like to think.
I really think the MOD will make swift quick changes but is being asked to do this with a very low budget , it must be very difficult task to share what pennies you have to all troops etc but I guess the Nimrod will be one of the top priorities, Its just up to the politicians to deliver and fast and maybe this inquest will push that, we will see and people will post if things dont.

[Biggus]

Gas fitter,

My second point was not directed at you specifically, and the full quote is...

As for the line taken by politicians and senior RAF officers to the effect....'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', what about the fact that AAR sorties over Afghanistan carried on in the days immediately following the loss of XV230? That fact gets convienently forgotten!

The point I was trying to make is that lots of politicans (such as Ainsworth) and senior officers are all now saying...'if we considered the aircraft unsafe we wouldn't let it fly....', or words to that effect. The day after the loss of XV230, when the reasons for the loss were still unknown, and the aircraft "could" presumably be unfit to fly, a crew were sent up on almost a repeat mission. The point I was making is that, in the light of this fact, who can reasonably believe what the politicians/senior officers are saying. They have already sent it up at least once when they didn't know what was going on - so accepted a risk they now state they will never take!!

For what it is worth, I wasn't passing judgement on whether or not the operational decision taken immediately after the loss of 230 was correct (which it would appear you think I was), rather I was passing comment on the faith we can put in senior office/ploitician's statements.

Hope that clarifys thhings somewhat!

[davejb]

DA4ORCE:
yep, but I've also seen
"This morning he [Coroner] asked Hickman who was still in court though not in the box whether if he as the coroner said that it had to be ALARP as soon as possible it would have any effect on the process. Hickman's response was "no it wouldnt have any effect, it's driven by resources".
-which wouls suggest that resources are the limiting factor in getting ALARP soonest, and (I may be wrong but) generally resources equals cash.

Keepittidy:
Yep also - the problem (again) is that if the cash to fix Nimrod comes from the existing pool, then all that is being altered is priorities - I'm surprised that this isn't simply the outcome, promise the earth and then rob some other important budget blind to pay for the required fixes, the usual cosmetic changes. The overall picture for the armed forces only actually improved if new cash, from outside the existing MOD budget, is injected.

It's all symptomatic of second class thinking at high level - the concept of lean has been misunderstood. It's one of those ideas where reversibility is assumed without a moment of thought - "an effective 'lean' system still does the job whilst saving money...ergo (decides HMG) if you save money then it's lean...so it'll automatically work okay." At which point they slice another inch off the pile of fivers sitting in front of the relevant Admiral / Field Marshall/ Air Chief Marshall and everyone gets a knighthood.

[Biggus]

If resources aren't an issue why aren't there Nimrods now at ever major aviation technical centre in the country, Marshalls of Cambridge, Heathrow, etc with civy techies swarming over them carried out BOI recommendations.

Or why isn't there a tented city of techies from Waddo, St Athan, Cosford, Leuchars, etc currently set up at Kinloss working 3 shifts 24/7 to get the work done.

I think you'll find resources aren't an issue when politicians/senior officers are asked, but when it actually comes to opening the chequebook and providing the manpower...............

[OilCan]

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

Pleeeeese don't ask me to do the airtests. :(:(:(:(:(:(:(

Money doesn't = manpower, and certainly doesn't = expertise.

Biggus, you are joking - right.

[EdSet100]

Lab QueenIt was the experts who stated the only fuel pipes above the SCP were the vent and feed pipes, that the others are below and that there would not be fuel in the vent and or feed system which would give rise to sustain the fire. The diagrams provided in court also show vent and feed are the only ones above.

Well, when he is presented with experts like that, the coroner has no chance of making an accurate assessment. The diagrams you saw were drawn during MR1 days, before the MR2 was built. There is not a single picture-style image (similar in style to one you refer to) of the SCP connection to the crossfeeed pipe in any book that I have ever seen, except in the parts catalogue. There are plenty of schematic air supplies diagrams showing the SCP connecting into the crossfeed pipe, but they do not portray any other systems or the zonal location of the connection.

The floor panel of the dry bay includes the fairing around the SCP elbow, where it exits the bomb bay. The SCP elbow, within that fairing, is therefore at the bottom of that bay. All fluid in that bay will fall onto that elbow. That fact is at the core of the BOI's findings. I understand that the BOI team's technical expert was not given an opportunity to clarify this, and other very important and relevant issues. The Coroner knew that the BOI expert had all the answers, but he chose not to take his evidence. What on earth is that about?

When a BOI team comes up with a finding of un-airworthiness that leaves the SoS with no choice but to apologise, it would be reasonable to assume that the BOI team has not been steered from above.

The Coroner was misled by some experts and consequently made an incorrect diagnosis of the cause of the fire. He was also misled by an incorrect analysis of the extant risks.

Ed

[Mick Smith]

Well, when he is presented with experts like that, the coroner has no chance of making an accurate assessment. The diagrams you saw were drawn during MR1 days, before the MR2 was built.

Are you sure about that EdSett and if so how? Why would diagrams about a potential blow-off from the No 1 tank have been drawn up during the MR1 days? No-one is suggesting that the BoI was trod on from above. They did their job and they did it well to the point where SoS had no choice but to apologise. That has nothing to do with the blow-off theory. It was just one potential source of fuel. The problem was the source of ignition. At any event, the BAE Systems experts were required to prove their theory about the blow-off not being capable of reaching the No 7 dry bay with tests, which they did.

[Laboratoryqueen]

There were some poor witnesses, the kind who are labeled expert and yet can not recall technical details in relation to their expertise. Many times the coroner asked for clarification from the BoI panel who were in attendance for the entire three weeks.

It was not the coroners job to disregard the evidence provided in the BoI report, but it is his job to take into account every possible and probable cause, which he did and he sought the opinions of the BoI panel in doing so. He can only make his conclusions on what evidence is presented before him, he did ask several times for the MoD to provide specific documents, some were forthcoming, if late, but some failed to appear.

The narrative did not give one specific cause for the fire, it gave the most probable causes due to the evidence and testimony of the witnesses. The coroner is not an expert, in simple terms he is one who gathers information and fact of an event and has to make a judgement on what is before him. That isn't helped when you have witnesses who have both held the same position, IPTL stands strong on this, contradict each other.

The facts which were brought to light during the inquest, the most probable causes, what may or may not have happened that day will always be open to debate. Out of all of the evidence there is only thing which stands out and which can never be disputed, that 14 brave men died while doing their job in the most professional manner.

I don't know how many of you have heard the voice recording but I'm sure those who have done will be aware, there's no fear, they just do what they have been trained for.



Just spotted Mick's post, to add to his. The problem wasn't just the source of ignition, it was also to find what sustained the fire. If the blow-off had tracked into 7 bay, causing a pool fire, once that fuel had burnt off the fire goes out. There had to have been a constant fuel supply, otherwise you are missing one of the three factors to produce fire.

[OilCan]

nige post #799

"This morning he [Coroner] asked Hickman who was still in court though not in the box whether if he as the coroner said that it had to be ALARP as soon as possible it would have any effect on the process. Hickman's response was "no it wouldnt have any effect, it's driven by resources".


Very enlightening, thank you.


Mick
the original Mk2 fuel system was identicle to the Mk1 in almost every respect, the Mk2 only being modified with the advent of AAR in 82 and again a little later when the system was tidied up. The 'blow off' has always been there to protect the tank during normal ground refuelling. The routing of the Xfeed pipe differed slightly between the Mk1 & Mk2 at the point where it passes from the bomb bay to the Stbd 7 tank dry bay. This was to facilitate the addition of the offtake to the SCP.

- hope that helps.

[nigegilb]

As we scratch around trying to understand this very big subject, I sought the big picture view, without getting into the complex detail, this I think is where we should focus now.


"The big problem with ppprooone and to a lesser extent the inquest is that people get bogged down in unnecessary detail. Yes, it's necessary at some point. Blow off valves and fuel leak runs are vital to understand, but discussing them in this context diverts from the big issue - that MoD admitted not implementing their own airworthiness regs, and that failure will generally apply across the MoD. MoD will be happy with this diversion, and I suspect it's a deliberate ploy by some. Many think the issue gets down to the 30 recommendations, and if the risks contained therein are reduced ALARP then the aircraft is airworthy, safe, fit for purpose and serviceable. Not true - mitigating them will help, but nothing more.

It is a Requirement that the Project Director (in the case of MR2, the IPTL) discusses the Top Ten (or 5 or 20, whatever is agreed) risks with his boss (1 or 2 Star) every month. In MoD(PE) and DPA, the requirement was 2 Star be notified of progress, regardless of the PD's rank/grade. Clearly, the time involved is inordinate, so they have "traffic light system" and if it shows all greens, then 2 Star would tick the box. In this context, safety and Risk management are two items and if either shows red or amber he MUST address it. If there are Class A (unacceptable) safety risks, it MUST show red. If there are Class Bs (tolerable and ALARP) which are not ALARP, it MUST be red. Not only does he see the individual risk but he sees at a glance that the process of IMPLEMENTING the mandated airworthiness regs is failing.

To answer to your question Nige, THIS is where there have been senior failings in both MR2 and MRA4 - lack of management oversight; and is where one needs to focus."

Oil Can refers to post 799, this for me, is key and one wonders if Hickman meant to mention resources in this way. I was told by a Group Capt last year that the RAF would love to have a host of safety and defensive measures on the MRA4 but the money simply was not available. "...their hands slip on the greasy pole if they annoy bosses but highlighting risks and, worse, seek resources to mitigate them."

The cavalier attitude toward safety that was mentioned, that resulted in standing Management and Resource risks appears to have fallen on deaf ears. I doubt that is the case private and the pressing need for change will hopefully become irresistible when Cave gets round to issuing his own report.

"JSP553 requires competence, experience and corporate knowledge. Clearly, these were missing. This is not a SAFETY Risk, it is a MANAGEMENT Risk and a RESOURCE Risk, which results in an emerging/secondary SAFETY Risk. Fix the primary risks, and you reduce (mitigate) the others."

Perhaps the RAF should begin this task by removing some of the people at the centre of these very clear and startling management failings.

[Mick Smith]

Oilcan
Money doesn't = manpower, and certainly doesn't = expertise.


No it doesnt and couldnt now, but the lack of manpower and the lack of expertise are a direct result of the failure to fund in the first place and the ludicrous 2004 decision to make large cuts at a time when the services were as busy as at any time in recent history are directly responsible for both.

Re your post on the diagrams

Not sure the differences you point out do help my understanding of anything other than the basis behind Ed's point. I do realise the blow-off was always part of the system. But as I understand it the tests, diagrams and "tea stain" evidence not only showed that the fuel from a blow-off could not get up into the No 7 bay but also that the angle at which the No 1 tank was lying during tanking was not as accentuated as the BoI believed.

[airsound]

This may be repeating stuff in earlier posts, but I' m posting it so that we can all see what these people actually wanted us know they said, on the record. This is an MoD News Release, what they call 'A Defence Policy and Business news article'

23 May 08

Minister of State for the Armed Forces Bob Ainsworth MP and the RAF's most senior engineer, Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, have made statements following the conclusion of the Inquest into the crash of RAF Nimrod XV230 on 2 September 2006 in which 14 servicemen lost their lives.

Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air), said:

"My thoughts today are first and foremost with the families and friends of those who died, and with the men and women of the Armed Forces, who I know feel the loss of their colleagues very deeply.

"From the evidence heard at the Inquest, and from the findings of the Board of Inquiry, it is clear that the crew of XV230 acted with the utmost professionalism in the face of a complex and demanding emergency situation. I pay tribute to their courage and dedication.

"With respect to the airworthiness of the aircraft today, we have stopped air-to-air refuelling and no longer use the very hot air systems in flight. This eradicates any dangers from the serious design failures noted by the Coroner that have been present in this aircraft since the 1980s. These measures have been supplemented with enhanced aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures to ensure the aircraft, as it is today, is safe to fly.

"In addition, to ensure we can operate the aircraft safely until its planned retirement from service, we have in place an effective package of more permanent measures which are being progressed as quickly as practicable. All of this work and our safety assessment are based on advice from both inside and outside the Department.

"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."

Bob Ainsworth said:

"My thoughts are with the families, friends and colleagues of those who died in XV230. On behalf of the MOD and the Royal Air Force, I would like to apologise again to the families of those who died for our failings which led to this tragic incident.

"I would like to reassure all those concerned that the Chief of the Air Staff has reaffirmed to me that the Nimrod is airworthy, and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident. The independent review of the airworthiness and safety of the Nimrod is ongoing.

"I have noted the coroner's comments and I will consider them carefully. The Nimrod is saving lives in operational theatres every day. However, if it was not safe we would not be flying it; it is safe with the measures we have taken and that is why we will not be grounding the fleet.

"Finally, in remembering the crew of V230, we must not forget that that they acted with the utmost professionalism throughout and I pay tribute to them."

Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne MP, added:

"The deaths of 14 brave servicemen in Afghanistan nearly two years ago was a profound and tragic accident, and my thoughts and sympathies are with their families today. The safety and security of our service personnel is an absolute priority for me. That is why I have sought the advice of the RAF’s most senior officers and have been assured that the changes we have made to the Nimrod mean that it safe to fly."

airsound

[Laboratoryqueen]

The safety and security of our service personnel is an absolute priority for me. That is why I have sought the advice of the RAF’s most senior officers and have been assured that the changes we have made to the Nimrod mean that it safe to fly."

To hell with asking the most senior officers, most of them are so far away from the real RAF they may as well just be politicians themselves. If he really wants to know what is truly going on then he should speak to the ones who actually do the work, listen to the workers not the managers.

[GasFitter]

GF - unfortunately, you have missed something...

B15's later posts, far from
Quote:
putting a rational view into the Forum

ended up accusing all the families of being interested only in compensation, and nothing else. See post #763 on page 39 for the final attempt

One was reminded of Clem Attlee's note to Harold Laski which read 'Your remarks have caused great resentment. A period of silence from you would now be welcome'...

Mmm, yes, I read post #762 for the first time. A little strong, I must admit! But will he be vindicated when/if any compensation is forthcoming?

[Safeware]

Gasfitter, But will he be vindicated when/if any compensation is forthcoming?

No, because his insult is that they are chasing compensation.

Compensation won't bring loved ones back. Campaigning to make sure no-one else has to go through the same again, now that's different, and far more noble.

Don't get tarred with the same stick as b15.

sw

[nigegilb]

I know we all have day jobs but I have a specific question for Edset, or anyone else who can answer. First a precis of some specific questions at the Inquest.

["Our reaction to leaks through the vent system was to introduce a checking system by blowing air through it.

Do you use soapy water like with a bicycle tyre?

Yes. And we listen for hissing air. Done in hangar. We cease all other maint work while this is going on, so they can hear whistling of leaks." ]




Edset, there was a suggestion that Leak test Test Equipment may have been “lost” and was not available in theatre.

Is this the case?

Is this “listening” a new test has it been validated by the DA as a proper methodology?

Have the APs been amended?

People trained?

Surely a repair is not complete unless verified in accordance with the AP - which calls up defined test equipment?

Can Edset confirm that there are engineering concessions signed as the repairs could not be verified if this test equipment is not available.

The aircraft under test obviously needs to be demonstrably serviceable.

Regards,

Nige

Edited to add that if the MoD are taken to the cleaners over the deaths of 14 people and it runs into millions it might just change a few attitudes regarding the proper funding of airworthiness issues in general.

Sadly in this case an almost cost-free fix could have prevented their deaths.

[tucumseh]

Instead of discussing discrete issues, try thinking about risk / safety management this way. When we talk about probability of occurrence, we say the chances of an event happening must be at least one in, say, 1000. Fine, analysis of the initial design, coupled with the mandated processes for maintaining this figure, shows one in 1500. Go for it, the risk is “broadly acceptable”.

We have infant failures etc and re-assessment shows 1:1400. OK. Now, consider this scenario. Call it hypothetical if you will (at your own peril);


This bottoms out and stability is achieved, then some clown says “OK, that’s enough; we’re mot monitoring reliability any more – we moving from proactive to reactive”. 1:1250 now.

Then he says, no problems last year, so this year we stop amending tech pubs. 1:1150.

Then, no more obsolescence tasks. 1:1050.

Then, no more single Fault Investigations (MF760s), you must save them up and when you have (x) you raise an omnibus request. 1:950.

Now, no configuration control, you will only address safety tasks. 1 -in-800.

Now, NO SAFETY TASKS. 1:650.


Above funding cuts force Service Users to expand the boundaries of Service Engineered Modifications into complex system design, without access to a maintained build standard, skills, expertise etc. 1:550.

Are you beginning to appreciate the cumulative effect?

But, even worse (because they should know better), MoD(PE) 4 Star “I don’t want experienced engineers”. 1:400

Then, his 2 Star “System integration is optional”. 1:300

Then, “Achieving fitness for purpose is optional – it is ok to pay off a contract knowing the aircraft is unsafe”. 1:200.


Question – At what point did the risk that mandated airworthiness regs were not being implemented properly move from “Broadly Acceptable” to “Tolerable, if ALARP” and then to “Unacceptable”? (And yes, the risk was notified and recognised; there are numerous public domain reports proving this). Was the Senior Officer in charge managing this situation, was he merely monitoring it, or was his head buried up his a##?

Then, tragically;

Tornado/Patriot (BoI - IFF failure warnings not integrated properly)

Sea King ASaC (BoI- Anti-collision light system not fit for purpose)

Hercules (Failure to implement airworthiness regs, as witnessed by post crash agreement to retro-fit ESF).

Nimrod XV230.

MoD, May 2008 - “It’s ok if we’re moving toward ALARP”. Really? WTF did you move away from it in the first place?





RIP each and everyone of you. CBs and knighthoods to the ####wits who oversaw all this. My utmost contempt for those who stood back. Best of luck to those who still serve. The above indicates you need it.

[Da4orce]

We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe

Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air),
Bob Ainsworth
Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne MP

We had the same assurances in the immediate aftermath of the crash, this is what some of the people at the sharp end thought then...

“It’s not a nice place to work just now,” one Nimrod crew member said. “Confidence in both the aircraft and the hierarchy are at an all time low. Ground crew are leaving in droves and a number of aircrew, pilots, engineers and back end [surveillance operators], are jumping ship. More worrying are the six major leaks we have had since the accident and the hurry to resume air-to-air refueling after each one.”

“We've not heard a dicky bird then suddenly the ACC [the then Air Component Commander] in the Gulf wants us airborne and tanker capable again. So, we had a jet air-to-air refueling over Kandahar four days after the accident!! Unbelievable. I can't see how that could ever possibly be considered to be good risk management.”

http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2007/03/the_scandal_of_.html

Why would anyone believe a word that Ainsworth et al say?

[andgo]

Quote.
MoD, May 2008 - “It’s ok if we’re moving toward ALARP”. Really? WTF did you move away from it in the first place?

Never moved away, we were never there, now we're moving toward this 'new' requirement. (One that we should always have had, but we didn't)

No-one mentioned this when it was all accepted into service, including the so-called expert Jimmy Jones.

Deepest sympathy to the families, I knew most of the crew. It was a privilage to serve along side them.

[OilCan]

tuc, agreed 100% what a mess. :}

Whats the chances of an event on a post major air test as aposed to an in service aircraft?

How are those odds affected if such major work is carried out by inexperienced, unsupervised or contract labour with questionable type certification and suitable authorisations? :{

The devils in the small print.

[Laboratoryqueen]

Helgar33

Bouy15 is very much in a minority in airing that view. We know we are not running after compensation and as you say, any payout will effect benefits already received and would not equate to the amount of a full working life. No amount of money will ever compensate for our loss, and will never lessen that loss.

Stay strong xx

[nigegilb]

LabQueen SoS Defence has the power to waive the reduction in existing benefit. The widows I have had contact with regarding XV179, signed legal contracts without even knowing why or how they lost loved ones. The legality of signing these contracts without legal advice and whilst grieving will probably not stand up to scrutiny. PM me if you need more detail.

SoS Defence has already agreed to pay compensation, there is no ambulance chasing going on here. In my opinion legal advice should be provided to loved ones caught up in all of this. As it is in Australia. Don't listen to the likes of B15 he is what people call an "oxygen thief" in the military.

You are right to ignore everything Ainsworth says, the ministry of defence did not even allow the families a 30 minute press conference without interfering with a ridiculously pre-emptive assessment of a 3 week process.

[Tourist]

Tuc

SK ASAC anti colls work perfectly well as do the same anti colls on all the other fleets. Total red herring.

[tucumseh]

Tourist

Thank you. I read the BoI report. It clearly states the strobe light installation was not "fit for purpose" and specifically cited Def Stan 00-970 (Design and Airworthiness Requirements), chapter and verse. (The bit about interfering with crews' vision). Which is more than the Nimrod report did. I haven't heard anyone say the members were wrong. I'm not aircrew so can't comment on what the practical effect would be of switching off the lights in darkness, without NVG; which is what was concerning the BoI. My point was that it was one of a series of BoI reports which criticised the implementation of the regs - Nimrod was by no means the first.

[Tourist]

The lower anti Coll is routinely turned of at low level or in cloud because the reflection of the bright light is distracting to the pilots. To say that it is not fit for purpose because it is a bright flashing light is imbecility. Its job is to be a bright flashing light. It performs in this role admirably. Unfortunately light has this pesky habit of reflecting. You might as well say that the atmosphere is not fit for purpose due to its effect on light.

[nigegilb]

Edited to add, the Sea King BoI made its recommendations in order to improve safety, after a very thorough investigation and after test flights in the Sea King. I find your attitude to BoIs difficult to understand, but frankly, you are entitled to your opinion.

Problems with the HISL were known about before the crash and you are fully aware who fought tooth and nail on this subject. You have also had the BoI reasoning explained to you, with regard to the criticism concerning the turning off of the lower strobe.

You will be horrified to know that R4 are covering this tragic accident in a program to be aired shortly.

I am fully aware of the functions and settings of the Sea King HISL, I agree that IR strobes had nothing to do with this accident, I may have misled you by not explaining my comment.

You state that Nimrod should be flown even if the risk is higher than ideal. Fine, let's just hear some honesty from senior levels of command on this subject.

[Tourist]

Nige,
Stick your drivel up your sanctimonious @rse.
I am a Seaking pilot. Are you? I knew the aircrew. Did you?
It is not an IR strobe as anybody who knew anything about the aircaft would know if they hadn't got all their knowledge about a subject from reading frankly b@llox BOI's and Coroners inquiry's (unairworthy for 30 odd years, what c@ck!)

Drivel is in my opinion what this thread is full of anyway
I don't subscribe to Bouy 15's view that the families of the nimrod crew are after compensation, however, I honestly believe that that whilst their motives are good, their campaign is detrimental to current serving members of the armed forces.

The military must always fight with what it has, not what it would like to have, and our leaders chose to use Nimrod safe or not. It is part of being in the military that your leaders may knowingly send you on missions that you may not return from. Sometimes the mission is important enough to risk the aircraft and crew.
I do not understand why you all seem tobelieve that aircrew should not be subjected to the same risks as the troops on the ground.
Leaders must have the right to make tough decisions involving others lives, and even more importantly must be safe from legal action even if wrong in their decision. Could you imagine winning the second world war if every death caused an inquiry?
A leader who is watching his back will win nothing, and the legal costs of this and numerous other actions will all come out of our small budget.
Everyone involved was in the military. It comes with the territory.

[OilCan]

....so we need a light that only the good guys can see...

..Speechless one, report level passing! :rolleyes:

[Laboratoryqueen]

The military must always fight with what it has, not what it would like to have, and our leaders chose to use Nimrod safe or not. It is part of being in the military that your leaders may knowingly send you on missions that you may not return from. Sometimes the mission is important enough to risk the aircraft and crew.
I do not understand why you all seem tobelieve that aircrew should not be subjected to the same risks as the troops on the ground.
Leaders must have the right to make tough decisions involving others lives, and even more importantly must be safe from legal action even if wrong in their decision. Could you imagine winning the second world war if every death caused an inquiry?
A leader who is watching his back will win nothing, and the legal costs of this and numerous other actions will all come out of our small budget.
Everyone involved was in the military. It comes with the territory.

Yes the military do fight with what they have. The military have accomodation which is, in some cases, not fit to live in, they have inadequate kit, they have defective equipment, they have a shortage of man power, they have a lack of funding, they have a lack of resources, they have a government which happily screws them over day after day, watching news reports of brave men and women dying or injured, while they relax in their second home having dinner cooked in their brand new kitchen, all at the expense of the tax payer and at the expense of what could provide the funding required for the forces.

Casualties of war are expected, but generally by enemy fire, not killed by the very equipment which is meant to save lives.

The guys on the ground rely on having eyes in the sky, like the Nimrod but when they are relying on one platform to provide that support and to lose it in such a way, what then? How effective would the support be to those on the ground when their support has to make emergency landings due to technical faults or in this worst case, when it crashes.

We were told after this event that all would be done to prevent this ever happening again, we were told funding would be put in place to prevent this. One week later, the very man who made those promises then announced a further armed forces budget cut. Short promises from this government.

The leaders chose to use Nimrod but those same leaders can't seem to agree on what is safe or not.

[Tappers Dad]

The reasosn why Assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire Andrew Walker told the inquest “The aircraft was never airworthy from the first release to service in 1969." Was because he had in front of him the drawings supplied by BAE Systems of the Nimrod conversion from a Comet and the R1 to Mr2 conversion. In his questioning of the Senior Engineer from BAE Systems the engineer agreed that a section of the cross feed pipe where there were bellows were never lagged and was only inches from a fuel pipe. He also agreed it should have been as it was a fire hazard.

PS;
http://www.manxradio.com/readNEwsItem.aspx?id=20890
The Celtic League is asking the Manx government to restrict the use of Ronaldsway Isle of Man Airport by RAF Nimrod aircraft.
The call comes in the wake of comments by an English coroner investigating the deaths of the crew of a Nimrod, which exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan in September 2006.

[The Equivocator]

Tuc

By your estimation then, anyone with more than 300 hundred hours should have been subject to a significant flight safety incident...:E

Now I'm sure that's not what you mean, but goes a long way towards demonstrating that all statistics can be forced to demonstrate whatever facts or arguments are desired. Or indeed that this sort of safety factoring has little significance to the layman, but a differing albeit confusing significance to engineers.

Interesting to note that the compensation issue has raised a couple of hackles. Then it's suggested by a frequent poster that the MOD should be taken to the cleaners for millions; I'm assuming this money would be used altruistically for implementation of Nimrod safety recommendations?

I don't agree with the tone of Buoy15 and his posts, however I also have difficulty in understanding what the end game is here?

RAF BOI sits over a long period, utilising Nimrod SMEs, civil aviation safety investigators and submits detailed report. This report seemingly widely accepted, but discredited in some quarters as being 'in house'.

MOD admits major safety/system errors. Probably/possibly influenced by impressive campaign orchestrated by relative of deceased.

Sqn Cdr is awarded national recognition, which results in undignified public slanging between relatives of deceased and 'serving' RAF incensed by criticisms of one of their own.

MOD offers compensation to relatives, who don't want any compensation.

Short, non-expert coroners inquiry results in various legal opinion aiming off in different directions?

Coroner states Nimrod has never been airworthy, following three weeks of confusing testimony from various expert and some dubious witnesses with varying degrees of interest in the case.

Ex-RAF types with no obvious interest in the case jump on bandwagon of MOD failings. Feathering own nest for future in politics?

So, following an apology, compensation and an independent inquiry by a MOD appointed QC, what does the barrack room want?

Nimrod grounded?

Corporate manslaughter charges?

More money for families?

More money for Nimrod?

Anyone got a clue?



Also interesting to see the selective ratification of quotations; an emotive quote from a presumably serving Nimrod Sqn mate is taken at face value, demonstrating the MOD approach to be devoid of safety reasoning. This is Daily Mail reporting at the very best.

On a lighter note...

If we ever need to go to war in the Irish Sea, we will have lost a major force multiplier and staging post to Barrow in Furness due to the Manx governments potential ban for Nimrod on Ronaldsway. :rolleyes:A UN security council meeting has been convened...

[Laboratoryqueen]

Nimrod grounded?

Corporate manslaughter charges?

More money for families?

More money for Nimrod?

Anyone got a clue?


!) I don't want the Nimrod grounded, I do to know all has been done to ensure she is safe, and to ensure those who fly in her are safe.

2) Corporate manslaughter would not achieve anything apart from an attempt at laying blame, that will not bring change anything saftey wise, it would just defer from the fact.

3 and 4) Personally I'd prefer to see the money put into the fleet and into providing better facilities and equipment for the forces. Enough have died through failings and lack of equipment.

While there is a need to understand why this happened I do feel more and more that the lives of those lost are being over looked, almost as an afterthought by some. What I want at the end of all this is to know no more lives will be lost in this way, that means more than anything to me.

I do believe a lot can be learnt from listening to the groundcrew and the aircrew, not just talking to them but listening to them and taking note instead of just discussion with those in ivory towers.

[tucumseh]

Equivocator


Tuc

By your estimation then, anyone with more than 300 hundred hours should have been subject to a significant flight safety incident...:E



I think you know I was illustrating the concept of cumulative risk, and the figures I chose were deliberately ridiculous such that no-one would think them real.

I wanted to show that a broadly acceptable risk could change in classification through time due to external factors, and simply point out that there must be a management process to identify this and determine when it moves into a higher risk class (Tolerable, if ALARP or Unacceptable).

Everyone talks about the risks/hazards associated with couplings and seal and leaks, which is fine. Perfectly valid. But the actual criticism in the BoI report, which led to Browne accepting liability, is that MoD didn't implement the regs. Failure to implement them MUST have an associated risk (cause and effect). One may start out with good intent, and the probability of occurrence is remote, but the events I listed are very real and, in my opinion, changed the nature of this risk significantly over a long period. That is why the regs require experience and retention of corporate knowledge. If you lack either, a new Risk or Safety Manager coming into the IPT for a 2 year tour (and these roles are very often minor tasks among many others) will think his inheritance is a long term stable position; but in fact he has a very unstable foundation for one of the pillars of airworthiness.

If you mitigate THAT risk, the benefits flow down and automatically help to mitigate other risks.




Best wishes

[Madbob]

At the risk of thread creep what is the view of the MOD being both the end user and arbiter of whether its aircraft are airworthy or not.

I am not an expert here but surely in Civvy Street it is not allowed, nor would it be considered good practice, for an airline to set airworthiness standards for its ac. The airworthiness standards are set by the FAA, CAA, JAA or whoever and policed accordingly in a way that seperates the responsibilities between the operator and the enforcer.

It would seem that the MOD has the final say whether an ac, be it Nimrod, Herc, VC10 or whatever (all now getting very, very long-in-the-tooth) is still safe to fly or not. Surely this is a conflict of interest that can't continue. I think that this was also an issue in the RAN Shark 02 BOI where the RAN had run-down spares and support for their Sea King fleet anticipating a withdrawal from service that never happened. Result was old ac, shortage of spares, canibalisation, over-stretch in maintenance departments leading to short-cuts on the job to keep the cabs flying....sounds all too familiar.

Maybe there needs to be an independent body (perhaps QinetiQ) to oversee the airworthiness standards and remove the MOD's conflict of interest before there are more Coroner's inquests. There must be others on PPRuNe who could expand on this thought....it might even be worthy of becoming a new thread.

MB

MB

[Tappers Dad]

Just in case anyone thinks that Andrew Walker spoke to the wrong people :ugh:
Here is a list of the witnesses that gave the evidence he based his verdict on.

Redacted for this forum--Coroner's Officer
Redacted for this forum--The medical evidence, causes of death.
Redacted for this forum--Executive Officer, Nimrod Detachment
Redacted for this forum--Engineering Officer
Redacted for this forum--Aircraft Ground Engineer
Redacted for this forum--Propulsion Tradesman
Redacted for this forum--Electrical Tradesman
Redacted for this forum--Armour Tradesman
Redacted for this forum--Airframe Tradesman
Redacted for this forum--Aircraft Ground Engineer
Redacted for this forum--Propulsion Tradesman
Redacted for this forum--Engineering Officer
Redacted for this forum--Air Engineer
Redacted for this forum--AAR Pilot
Redacted for this forum--AAR Air Engineer
Redacted for this forum--Pilot
BAE Witness--Design history of aircraft including the introduction of the engine cross feed pipe
BAE Witness--Hazard analysis following above
BAE Witness--Design and operation of the fuel system including the seals
Qinetic --Combustion Analysis of Nimrod MR2 XV230 Accident
Qinetic--Nimrod Fuel Leak Study (Part)
Qinetic--Nimrod Fuel Leak Study (Part)
Redacted for this forum --Integrated Project Team Leader--Nimrod maintenance policy, including pressure testing of fuel lines, disturbance of seals, the hot air bleed system - Pre the loss of XV230

Redacted for this forum --Integrated Project Team Leader--Nimrod maintenance policy, including pressure testing of fuel lines, disturbance of seals, the hot air bleed system - After the loss of XV230
Eaton Airospace--Designer's Recommendations -The Declaration of Design and Performance issued in 1968
Gp Capt Redacted for this forum --Fuel leak trends (video)
Sqn Ldr Redacted for this forum--Air Engineer
Sqn Ldr Redacted for this forum--OC Nimrod Line Squadron
Wg Cdr Redacted for this forum--OC Logistics Support Wing
Chief Tech SCO Redacted for this forum--Senior Aircraft Ground engineer
Chief Tech Redacted for this forum--SNCO Propulsion
Rolls Royce Engineer-Spey Engines

[nigegilb]

Equiv "Coroner states Nimrod has never been airworthy, following three weeks of confusing testimony from various expert and some dubious witnesses with varying degrees of interest in the case."

Right, would you please state from TD's list who provided confusing testimony and who were the dubious witnesses?

Equiv "Short, non-expert coroners inquiry results in various legal opinion aiming off in different directions? "

Please explain where the legal opinion goes off in different directions.

Did you mean the Coroner was non expert or the Coroner's Inquiry was non expert?

[JessTheDog]

Nige,
Stick your drivel up your sanctimonious @rse.
I am a Seaking pilot. Are you? I knew the aircrew. Did you?
It is not an IR strobe as anybody who knew anything about the aircaft would know if they hadn't got all their knowledge about a subject from reading frankly b@llox BOI's and Coroners inquiry's (unairworthy for 30 odd years, what c@ck!)

Drivel is in my opinion what this thread is full of anyway
I don't subscribe to Bouy 15's view that the families of the nimrod crew are after compensation, however, I honestly believe that that whilst their motives are good, their campaign is detrimental to current serving members of the armed forces.

The military must always fight with what it has, not what it would like to have, and our leaders chose to use Nimrod safe or not. It is part of being in the military that your leaders may knowingly send you on missions that you may not return from. Sometimes the mission is important enough to risk the aircraft and crew.
I do not understand why you all seem tobelieve that aircrew should not be subjected to the same risks as the troops on the ground.
Leaders must have the right to make tough decisions involving others lives, and even more importantly must be safe from legal action even if wrong in their decision. Could you imagine winning the second world war if every death caused an inquiry?
A leader who is watching his back will win nothing, and the legal costs of this and numerous other actions will all come out of our small budget.
Everyone involved was in the military. It comes with the territory.

Utterly ridiculous. There is something known as the "military covenant" that this government treats with contempt, which nevertheless provides an expectation of appropriate equipment amongst other things in return for risking one's life. Airworthiness of an aircraft should be viewed in exactly the same way as lack of body armour and NBC equipment, unservicable rifles - the key difference is that these shortcomings can be resolved far more quickly than aircraft technical problems. The military covenant has recently been given teeth by Mr Justice Collins' ruling on the applicability of HRA to troops in theatre, so if any lives are lost due to equipment failures or the lack of equipment, then the MoD are clearly liable. This is not about the fog of war, measures of last resoort as a direct threat to this nation, or commanders making a decision which with hindsight turns out to be wrong - it is about our Armed Forces being criminally starved of resources and pushed in to every coalition operation that there is, regardless of fitness to fight.

Even if you generally view lives as expendable in wartime, then the technical and operational knowledge and experience of the crews serving in the Nimrod (and other airframes) is a loss that can never be fully recovered. Also, the airframe and components - one of a very small fleet - should not be viewed so cheaply. Airframes should simply not fall out of the sky - these are not "accidents". We live in an age of force multiplication. During World War 2, losses of 100 ac on a bombing raid were viewed as acceptable because there were 1,000 ac dispatched and also because of different values of society and the fact the nation was at total war. An infantryman may be killed in action without taking the rest of his section with him - not so for aircraft where the entire crew (front and back) will be lost.

A note on capability - SHAR was removed from service early due to costs, leaving the fleet with no fixed-wing air defence...fine until it's needed and the GR9 isn't up to the job! So it is OK to remove a capability when money is involved, not when lives are involved.....

[Unsworth]

@ Tourist

Drivel is in my opinion what this thread is full of anyway

Well you don't have to participate.

The military must always fight with what it has, not what it would like to have, and our leaders chose to use Nimrod safe or not. It is part of being in the military that your leaders may knowingly send you on missions that you may not return from. Sometimes the mission is important enough to risk the aircraft and crew.

Your blind faith is touching.

I do not understand why you all seem to believe that aircrew should not be subjected to the same risks as the troops on the ground.

Is that what was said? And just who are 'you all'?

Could you imagine winning the second world war if every death caused an inquiry?

So all deaths no matter how caused are acceptable?

Everyone involved was in the military. It comes with the territory.

So it's just too bad then?

Do you believe that those who make decisions as to the use and design of equipment bear no moral responsibility for their actions? Maybe you do.

[Pontius Navigator]

While it may be acceptable in operations to send troops into harms way and indeed in training for operations too.

To send troops into a situation, in training, where risks are ignored is to open oneself to a charge of corporate manslaughter.

To send the Nimrod on operations is therefore an operational risk outside the scope of corporate manslaughter. Similarly to practise, for the same operation, in a way that places lives at risk is acceptable if that is the only means of preparation.

To conduct a routine training evolution with equipment that has a known risk of failure and killing those using it would open up the commander to a charge of corporate manslaughter.

At least that is how I understood the brief I had last week.

A couple of examples from the past. The Valiant was grounded as it was unsafe. It would probably have been able to conduct a war operation but the training risk was deemed too high.

The Comet 2 was authorised to fly with a cabin pressure of 25k as an acceptable risk. In the event the risk mitigation worked.

In Malta the MT fleet had contaminated brake fluid. The only mitigation was a notice telling of this contamination and to drive carefully. Given the way the Maltese used to drive you could argue that that was an unacceptable risk. I don't know of the accidents due to faulty brakes but today that risk would have stopped the fleet.

The issue thus is simple, not is the Nimrod FIT for operations but is it SAFE for training.

[OmegaV6]

Methinks some people are deliberately trying to confuse

Airworthy - in compliance with regulation(s)

Safe - in compliance with Risk(s) Analysis

Serviceable - in compliance with servicing schedule(s)

3 totally seperate functions

[Tappers Dad]

BBC PM Programme
Broadcast on Radio 4 Fri 23 May - 17:00
Question-Was the MOD to blame for this Accident . Answer -Bob Ainsworth- YES this aircraft had been flying for many years with a fundimental design fault.

Listen to it here (http://www.benknight.co.uk/BBC%20%20PM%20Programme.mp3) it takes about 40 secs to download.

[Chugalug2]

MadBob Post#857
Mod As Self Regulator Of Airworthiness

At the risk of thread creep what is the view of the MOD being both the end user and arbiter of whether its aircraft are airworthy or not.

I am not an expert here but surely in Civvy Street it is not allowed, nor would it be considered good practice, for an airline to set airworthiness standards for its ac. The airworthiness standards are set by the FAA, CAA, JAA or whoever and policed accordingly in a way that seperates the responsibilities between the operator and the enforcer.

It would seem that the MOD has the final say whether an ac, be it Nimrod, Herc, VC10 or whatever (all now getting very, very long-in-the-tooth) is still safe to fly or not. Surely this is a conflict of interest that can't continue. I think that this was also an issue in the RAN Shark 02 BOI where the RAN had run-down spares and support for their Sea King fleet anticipating a withdrawal from service that never happened. Result was old ac, shortage of spares, canibalisation, over-stretch in maintenance departments leading to short-cuts on the job to keep the cabs flying....sounds all too familiar.

Maybe there needs to be an independent body (perhaps QinetiQ) to oversee the airworthiness standards and remove the MOD's conflict of interest before there are more Coroner's inquests. There must be others on PPRuNe who could expand on this thought....it might even be worthy of becoming a new thread.

MB

MB

Good Post Sir! I have pushed this view not only on this thread but the Hercules one as well. My solution is for a separate MAA, but whatever it is called and however it is created it needs to be outside the MOD and fully independent. Who pays? The taxpayer of course. Safety costs money, the MOD won't/can't spend it so an MAA must. You won't get much acknowledgement here, rather "A man has to do what a man has to do" guff. Once the RAF saw Flight Safety as a force maintainer, ie it endeavoured to avoid avoidable accidents. Now it appears "**** happens, OK?". The whole application of Military Airworthiness needs to be in independent hands, fast!

[FE Hoppy]

chugalug

The problem arises in the level of acceptable risk which will vary with the type of ops required.

If the risk is acceptable one day but not the next who decides? a MAA as you sujest must only have safety in mind where as the authorising authority will always balance risk against requirement.

Where does the buck stop? When an ac is lost on ops deemed not safe by the MAA but acceptable by the authoriser does that then make the authorises guilty of manslaughter?

Who would accept the position of authorising against the advice of the MAA?

It just wouldn't work.

[nigegilb]

Would be a start to have airworthy military aircraft equating to civilian safety levels.

2nd point would be to establish minimum levels of defensive equipment before going into theatre, instead of the usual MoD exemptions.

Establish those 2 points and I don't see any problem with taking on risky missions.

Remember, enemy action had nothing to do with the deaths of 14 men on XV230. Likewise the Sea King collision, Tornado shoot down etc etc.

Nimrod MR2 does not even have TCAS Hoppy, and a very sharp Coroner has just decreed that MR2 is not airworthy and of course, been ignored.

Can you honestly say what we have now is actually working?

We could at least be looking at the idea.

"Mr. Ian Liddell-Grainger (Bridgwater) (Con): The Secretary of State is aware that Europe is trying to have a military aviation authority. Will he explain why Rolls-Royce, which has been pushing the Government to accept this standard for years, has been ignored? Will the Government sign up to the European military aviation authority, to bring military aircraft in line with civil aviation? If there is a problem, what is it? Will the Minister sign up to this as soon as possible?

Des Browne: I shall consider the issue the hon. Gentleman raises. I am not in a position today to give him a detailed response, but I shall write to him on it."

[cornish-stormrider]

FE Hoppy, I'm afraid your argument sounds like the aviation equivalent of the soldier who went on patrol with a weapon known to explode every 1 in 10,000 rounds....... It's an acceptable risk shooting 9,999 rounds and then running away.

The MAA's mandate is for an aircraft to be able to perform a mission as designed/specified to and that it is reasonably safe to do so. I.e. it's not going to explode or have a wing fall off unexpectedly.

With that in mind, the MAA say plane no good, RAF fix plane and fly it. it does not turn into MAA say plane no good, auth say bugger that and we fly it anyway.

It is about having an independant office whose only responsiblity is to the poor b4st4rds flying in the jet, not to some desk driving shiny arse in whitehall.

[Da4orce]

OmegaV6 - 100% Clarity :ok:


Methinks some people are deliberately trying to confuse

Airworthy - in compliance with regulation(s)

Safe - in compliance with Risk(s) Analysis

Serviceable - in compliance with servicing schedule(s)

3 totally seperate functions


I doubt that many would question whether individual jets were not serviceable. That's not in question.

Safe and Airworthy seems to be the sticking point!

Congrats to Radio 4 for a great interview with Bob Ainsworth, no punches pulled and squirming galore :ok:

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Just to add a comment to the post above (by Da4orce) (and I agree, I think some are misusing the terms somewhat).

Not all non-airworthy aircraft crash, and not all unsafe aircraft do either.

Absence of an accident is definitely not evidence of airworthiness or safety; it may simply be evidence of LUCK.

If I may add another civil example, to the discussion of "mission risk" versus basic "airworthiness risk" if you will ... the civil regulations implicitly recognise that there are levels of risk which are acceptable to different extents dependent upon the mission. Hence there are multiple "parts" to, for exqample, the US FARs, with the risk level which is acceptable for one Part being rather lower or higher than that for another. The extreme would perhaps be what is called "restricted" category, which applies to, for example, firefighting aircraft, where there is in effect a presumption that a higher level of "airworthiness risk" is acceptable, given the mission risk and overall benefit of the mission.

I think the key is that any acceptance of increased risk be a conscious decision taken in knowledge of the facts, not something that occurs by default or by accident.

[Chugalug2]

FE Hoppy: If the risk is acceptable one day but not the next who decides? a MAA as you sujest must only have safety in mind where as the authorising authority will always balance risk against requirement

I envisage that the MAA would have Airworthiness in mind, ie military aircraft would be supplied and kept airworthy. Of course it would be a Commander's call to send unairworthy and/or unserviceable aircraft into action if he so deemed. But he would account for that within the regulations to the MAA, a rather more grave version of the exercise of "Commander's Discretion" in the civilian system. In other words the need for Operational Necessity would be recognised and allowed for in the MAA setup.

[Unsworth]

I think the key is that any acceptance of increased risk be a conscious decision taken in knowledge of the facts, not something that occurs by default or by accident.


If there is 'increased' risk it follows that there is a baseline of risk. The precise nature of that baseline is currently open to conjecture. However as I understand it the Nimrod was not doing anything which was not routine when things suddenly went disastrous.

[Safeware]

Maybe there needs to be an independent body (perhaps QinetiQ)
Such a bad idea to have QQ on 2 fronts.

Firstly, they are a defence contractor. Picture the scene "No the Squid from SAEB isn't airworthy, but if you were to take our solution...."

Secondly, they would effectively become their own regulator, albeit on a much smaller scale than the MOD as a whole.

An independent body would have to wrestle with the twin issues of design and operational airworthiness. Meeting a set of design airworthiness and safety criteria is one thing, matching that to an operational need is another.

sw

[OilCan]

Just supposing the 'grounding' lobby were to succeed, do we;

a) Ground the fleet, rip them apart, change all the seals, put them back together again and call them safe.

or

b) Ground the fleet and scrap them.

...or is there another option?

If a) then who does it?
If b) then what do we do instead?

[Pontius Navigator]

Oilcan,

Option B of course. Option B sees an immediate saving in cash and manpower. Then we take a capability holiday (CAS's term) until MRA4 is on stream.

Seriously, I don't see Option B as an option as we can't afford an alternative in either time or cash.

Option A, for similar reasons won't wash either.

That said, if push came to shove money would be found.

ALFENS is about to die; MFMIS crashed and burnt; money was found to buy EAMS off the shelf AND install broadband connections and all in a 5 month timescale.

[OilCan]

PN ta,

If a) then who does it?

[Tappers Dad]

Oilcan
...or is there another option?

Yes make one airworthy and fly it then make another, then another etc...

Who wil do the work Qinetic, BAE. FRA SYSTEMS perhaps ?

Cost ? Gp Capt Hickman IPTL said money was not an issue when it comes to making the ac safe.

[OilCan]

TD

good idea. Can you put a time estimate on that?

[Safeware]

TD,Yes make one airworthy and fly it then make another, then another etc...Seems ok, but you can make an individual aircraft "airworthy" or "safe" by the implementation of limitations or procedures, thereby applying a sticking plaster. The issue here is more of the management of airworthiness across the whole fleet.

sw

[Tappers Dad]

Oilcan

Can you put a time estimate on that?

Simple answer NO. That is for others to work out

As it has been said on here before , if the captain does not think the ac is airworthy he won't fly it. So it is up to them now Russian Roulette or don't fly it.

NB; It was Gp Capt Hickman who said it was not ALARP so he knows what needs doing to make it ALARP.

[Mick Smith]

Just supposing the 'grounding' lobby were to succeed, do we;

a) Ground the fleet, rip them apart, change all the seals, put them back together again and call them safe.

or

b) Ground the fleet and scrap them.

...or is there another option?



No You just make the aircraft ALARP as soon as possible, not we might manage it by the end of the year. There is no need to change seals, with the risk that actually introduces, to think that is to misunderstand what the coroner said. The aircraft cannot be just tolerable it has to be ALARP. Until such time as it is, the SoS can sign it off - honestly - as a risk. But we might get ALARP by the end of the year is simply not good enough.

[EdSet100]

Mick, TD,
Are you suggesting that we risk another catestrophic event just because we have not put new seals onto the aircraft or changed the hot pipes?

If the existance of 25 year old seals makes the jet unsafe, I suggest that none of us flies on any old aircraft supplied by EATON Aerospace. There are hundreds out there. They too are not ALARP, apparently.

The hot pipes are not now hot.

You were misled by Hickman's poor evidence. He doesn't know his ALARP from his SCP elbow.

Ed

[OilCan]

TD,

that'll be option a) then.


Mick,

I think there are alot of people misunderstand what the coroner said, and also misunderstand what is being done to make the aircraft ALARP - ASARP -

A s S oon A s R easonbly P racticle


Ed,

Ha Ha, nice one. :D

[nigegilb]

Oil Can makes an interesting point. Hickman told the Inquest that they are working towards ALARP by the end of the year. I have done a lot of digging since Friday and I very much doubt that ALARP will be reached by the end of the year-WHAT THEN?. Had a chat with a senior officer at Kinloss, he suggested that the new maintenance regime regarding seals could make things worse. I sought the engineering opinion of someone I trust;

"This is generally true. But if you asked a design engineer how to mitigate this whole risk (leaking fuel lines) he’d say “fit mainplanes which are not of small modular/section construction”. This is what MRA4 will do. The many sections need joined together – the more joints the more fuel and hydraulic joints to match section joints (obviously). And if they use the wrong bolts and the joints flex in the wrong way – read the report. If you make the mainplane out of larger sections, then you reduce the risk. Fine, but the situation is compounded by MRA4 being 10 years late. The MR2 design, especially this mainplane/pipe area, is well past it’s sell by date (far end of the bathtub curve). MRA4 has a dependency on MR2 for build standard, MR2 in turn had a dependency on MRA4 to deliver on time, as they don’t have the wherewithal to SUSTAIN safety and airworthiness. The regs say you carry out an ageing aircraft review, which I believe they did. But that is not the same as having funding to implement recommendations. Did they carry out the review in the knowledge MRA4 would be 10 years late? Perhaps they did it when slippage was 3 years, and said they could cope. That is why every MRA4 slippage MUST force a comprehensive review of MR2. I’ll guarantee it didn’t. Not just physical ageing, but the cumulative effect of ageing, obsolescence, loss of expertise, reducing funding etc. Remember, for the past decades few engineers will have practical experience of dealing with and managing a 60 year old mainplane design. (NOT 1969 – the basic mainplane design dates to the 40s). They’re taught about modern large section designs, where leaks are rare and more easily managed. Again, a basic airworthiness requirement – corporate knowledge, competence, experience

There’s another way of looking at all this. Some may think that MoD is taking a huge gamble continuing to fly. My view is that they have already taken a long series of gambles."

Have to agree with you OilCan; this aircraft is effectively life-exed, but the replacement is not ready. Ainsworth declared the aircraft airworthy and safe to fly on Friday, without even consulting his Chiefs of Staff on the Inquest summation. That is some gamble.

Ed Set Have you had a chance to look at my points regarding the whistle test?

With regard to SW's management point, the following;

"I think the IPT will be very selective (only addressing 20 or so recommendations) and may indeed implement them this year. But many are process changes and easily done. The recommendations from the March 06 report are a different matter, and there is no way they can be done in quick time. (And even then, the report is diluted. You read the damning narrative expecting to see a raft of recommendations mapped to the criticism, but they are watered down. THAT'S the problem with the report. The single most important recommendations "Implement airworthiness regs" isn't there, yet it jumps out at you throughout the report). I think they'd find it difficult to work out the scope of any contract, never mind tender, negotiate and implement. They are concentrating on ALARP in the context of Safety risks, but missing he bigger picture of the overarching Airworthiness risk. If you like, they're bottom-up, not top-down. You need both. If there is no top down (higher policies which Nimrod IPT can't influence) then they will hit their ceiling, perhaps mitigate most Nimrod risks, but wider aviation is still at risk. Then the cycle begins again - they're not doing it, so we don't have to, and Nimrod degrades again."

[Mick Smith]

If the existance of 25 year old seals makes the jet unsafe, I suggest that none of us flies on any old aircraft supplied by EATON Aerospace. There are hundreds out there. They too are not ALARP, apparently.


I'm not interested in the seals at all. the reference in my post to seals was simply a reaction to Oilcan's post.

I'm interested in the 30 ALARP recommendations that QQ made. They are the issues. A week or so ago, the sky was going to fall in on your world if Hickman was right and the aircraft wasnt ALARP. Now it seems not to matter that much.

Your reasoning, seems to be that Hickman misled everyone. Easy target. But how did he mislead everyone, by saying it had to be tolerable and ALARP and it isnt ALARP. There are a wealth of MoD documents out there that make it clear that if the risk is only tolerable and if it is not ALARP the aircraft is not safe. The QQ fuel report says it is tolerable but not ALARP. The SoS has told Angus Robertson - after several weeks waiting to get to the truth - that 21 of the recommendations are currently being implemented, three are still being considered and six dont have to be done because there is no longer any AAR. So the aircraft is not ALARP and therefore currently not safe under the MoD's own regulations because the recommendations that would make it safe are still being implemented. Still being implemented? Following recommendations from a report that was brought out in October last year?

Hence what is actually an uncontroversial statement from me that this needs to be done as soon as, not by the end of the year, and the SoS will have to sign off the risk honestly as a risk until then instead of claiming, as he did in December, that the aircraft is safe.

[nigegilb]

Picking up on Mick's point. According to MoD regulations it was clear to Mr Walker and engineering experts including previous IPTLs that Nimrod is not airworthy. Work towards ALARP is not happening ASAP and resources are limited. Ainsworth stated that Nimrod is Airworthy and that he would never ask Nimrod crews to fly an aircraft that was not safe.

Does Ainsworth realise that Nimrod's tolerable risk has to be reduced to ALARP for it to comply with Health and Safety regs?

How safe are the British public?

Seems clear to me that Ainsworth's statement on Friday could be described as RECKLESS. He did not consult his Chiefs about the verdict and he does not have the qualifications to make such a statement. He cleared the Nimrod to continue to fly.

If anything does happen, it will be Ainsworth who takes the full responsibility.

[Tourist]

Thank goodness he has the balls to do the right thing and not bow to pressure from the litigious culture of todays British public.
Ainsworth for Prime Minister.

[kennymac]

There's so much bluff and bluster on this thread, it really amounts to little more than a hill of beans. ALARP is being bandied about with such abandon by individuals who either have a rather limited and simplistic grasp of the meaning of the concept, or are deliberately misinterpreting and overlooking finer points to advance their agendas.

Before forming conclusions based solely on what is discussed on this thread, I recommend anyone with a serious interest in this complex, important and emotive subject to have a long talk with a lawyer (with the requisite specialisms) on the precise definition of ALARP and all the legal caveats and nuances which can pertain to it.

It will shed a different light on most of what is written here.

[Da4orce]

Edset100 wrote:

You were misled by Hickman's poor evidence. He doesn't know his ALARP from his SCP elbow.

He's the Head of Airworthiness if he doesn't know his ALARP from his SCP elbow then you're all fcuked!

On the other hand maybe Ainsworth asked Hickman whether they were safe and Hickman not knowing his ALARP from his SCP elbow said yes and that is how we ended up with Ainsworth translating that to the a/c being airworthy.

"90% of politicians give the other 10% a bad name" - Henry Kissinger

Send three and six we're going to a dance! :D

[OilCan]

Nige,

....so is that an option a) or an option b) ?


Re-top-down, bottom-up

From the top, there is neither Dark nor Light. It is only Dark, because there is no Light.
From the bottom, It is either Dark or it is Light.

From the top, there is neither Safe nor Unsafe. It is only Safe, because it is not Unsafe.
From the bottom, It is either Safe or it is Unsafe.

(Old Scottish proverb circa 2008)
sorry couldn’t resist….:O

[Distant Voice]

Isn't it a criminal offence for an employer to, knowingly, operate a non-ALARP system?

By the way it was clear from Gp Capt Hickmen's sworn statements that it was him, or a member of his IPT, that introduced the phrase "tolerably safe" that appears in QinetiQ's Fuel Safety report of Oct 2007, and not QinetiQ. He clearly thinks that "tolerable" refers to a level of safety and not a level of risk. Such a statement resulted in Des Browne declaring the fuel system "safe" on 4th Dec 2007.

So the QinetiQ report should read "The risk is tolerable, but nor ALARP". And this was repeated by Hickman, on oath.

DV

[Biggus]

With regard to resoucres and money .....'not being an issue'.... in terms of carrying out whatever work (if any) intended to make the aircraft ALARP, I would direct people to my comments in post 820 of 26 May. Since nobody can be bothered to go back and look I repeat them here...

"If resources aren't an issue why aren't there Nimrods now at ever major aviation technical centre in the country, Marshalls of Cambridge, Heathrow, etc with civy techies swarming over them carried out BOI recommendations.

Or why isn't there a tented city of techies from Waddo, St Athan, Cosford, Leuchars, etc currently set up at Kinloss working 3 shifts 24/7 to get the work done.

I think you'll find resources aren't an issue when politicians/senior officers are asked, but when it actually comes to opening the chequebook and providing the manpower..............."

When I posted that someone said I must be joking, and to be honest I was. But the comments I made above would be the actions I would expect if resources weren't an issue, and changes were going to be made AS SOON AS POSSIBLE!! What they actually mean is, as soon as possible within the constraints of business as usual in a long winded ponderous organisation. It's funny how quickly things could be made to happen in the run up to the Falklands War!

Instead, assuming some rectification work is to be carried out, I expect it will be done by the usual suspects at ISK, after contractual negoitations with the civil firms involved, various committees have met, only part of the fleet gets done to save money, etc, etc, while senior officers and politicians talk of work being done..."as a matter of urgency.....highest priority....as quickly as possible", etc, etc. Actions speak louder than words, and the actions so far do not seem representative of something (anything) truely being done 'as quickly as possible'.

By the way, I am not, nor have I stated or meant to imply in any of my comments so far, advocating that the MR2 fleet should be either grounded or scrapped. Neither am I denograting the efforts of either aircrew or groundcrew at ISK.

[BlackTorch]

When considering the airworthiness of the current airframe what should also be concetrating minds is how much read across there will be from the old to new aircraft when clearing it into service. Discuss.

[OilCan]

....good point well made!! :}

Plank

Discuss.

[nigegilb]

Tourist, thanks for raising a laugh on the thread:ok:Ainsworth for PM made me chuckle.

Kenny Mac wrote;
"There's so much bluff and bluster on this thread, it really amounts to little more than a hill of beans. ALARP is being bandied about with such abandon by individuals who either have a rather limited and simplistic grasp of the meaning of the concept, or are deliberately misinterpreting and overlooking finer points to advance their agendas.

Before forming conclusions based solely on what is discussed on this thread, I recommend anyone with a serious interest in this complex, important and emotive subject to have a long talk with a lawyer (with the requisite specialisms) on the precise definition of ALARP and all the legal caveats and nuances which can pertain to it.

It will shed a different light on most of what is written here."

Kenny, forget the lawyer and talk to a highly qualified engineer then you will understand ALARP with all it's nuances, then you can pick any lawyer, it really doesn't matter. BTW who said anything about an agenda? Care to tell us what your interest is here? And what do you think a Coroner is, a bricklayer with an interest in law? Do you not think the MoD tried the mitigating circumstances line? Have the MoD appealed the decision?

Did you turn up to the Inquest and listen to the evidence?

Please, inform us...

[davejb]

There is conflict here between those who want the Nimrod aircrew (current) to be safe - in effect we want the aircrew to (1) only have to contend with enemy action from the Afghans, not MOD parsimony.

But....

(2) We also want the Nimrod on task, to provide much needed support to the troops on the ground, who are themselves suffering from lack of investment - it's not only Landies with Baco foil instead of armour plating, defective GPMG ammo (what a laugh that muse have been in a firefight), and terse memos from MOD if you use too much mortar ammo replusing attacks.

You know, there's a pattern emerging, and strangely enough it's actually one of our oldest traditions as well...
- Spit and Hurri pilots in WW2 during the battle of France were considered lily livered whoopsies for wanting armour plate behind their seats, ie where the BF109 cannon shells had a habit of arriving? Wanting adequate protection is OLDER than the RAF, and is traditionally opposed.

At present we have servicemen (I'm an equal opportunity bigot, I include ladies here) getting furious with other servicemen, and the odd onside civvy, when surely we all have the same aim - minimise 1 and optimise 2?

I'm amazed that some people apparently believe the BOI should be trusted 100% in one case, but ignored as dipsh1ts in another - surely BOI's are competent or not? They might vary a bit in competence, but surely not from divine revelation to complete t0sspots? I think the Nimrod BOI did a damn good job...I don't know they were %100 right, but I'm sure they did a good job.

The MOD resigned itself, before the coroner started work, to paying compensation because in the cold light of day - very soon after the loss of 230 - it was realised that there was no chance of defending any action. That compensation is going to provide schooling, and eventually University placings, for children who now don't have Dad around to help with the homework. If you'll forgive a rant at this point, for all those who are implying that losing Dad was a bonus, I know a number of the children and parents, and that is a gross, unforgiveable suggestion that says a great deal more about the poster than the family. To ask whether they will be donating the cash etc - you have wasted enough oxygen, rethink your ideas, and appreciate what it must be like to have a young family and suddenly Dad isn't coming home ever again... or try wearing a plastic bag.

The RAF and MOD realised very early on that a mistake had been made that rendered the Nimrod unsafe...nobody realised it in advance, it wasn't down to anyone deliberately screwing up, but a mistake was made, and our failure to implement our own regulations on safety led to that mistake being present but not spotted for almost 40 years.

I for one believe the BOI did a stirling job, almost certainly found the cause of the loss, and actually I think the aircraft is presently safe to fly...then again, I retired and it's not my kids' futures on the line, so I quite understand if current aircrew see it differently. I might THINK it's safe, but would I go for a quick circuit bash in it? Dunno - I do think Torpey and everyone from Wingco upwards should do a practise display in it before any old mates go up in it again.

I think Mr Walker made a very valid point - he emphasised it somewhat by repeating what expert witnesses said about airworthiness - that this was the time for the RAF to stop taking shortcuts with safety, and start to implement its own regulations. I cannot fault anyone for doubting Torpey or Ainsworth, why should they - they've said the same PR rubbish after every event... it's indicative of their ability to absorb and debate opinion that they had every faith in Nimrod before the ink was dry on the inquest.

We should not be fighting each other here - the ideal solution is a reliable Nimrod that nobody has to worry about. Money won't solve everything, but I suspect it will cause a lot of problems to reduce or be resolved faster - so spend some. Is Northern Rock really more important?

Labqueen #845: Spot on.

Equivaocator By your estimation then, anyone with more than 300 hundred hours should have been subject to a significant flight safety incident...

Yes, I'd say I had a major in flight heart attack on something like that periodicity...maybe a bit longer between engine fire warnings, locked controls, multiple birdtrikes , lightning strikes - maybe I'm a Jonah, but I probably DID have something untoward about that often. (I also sat on the pan three times waiting to taxy out, and watched three aircraft crash, killing crew each time - that was a right laugh). I also got quite airsick - never barfed but felt crap - on my first tour. On the plus side I got to attend a war and visited all sorts of places.

Mac : the Auth Off does not weigh the strategic or Tactical position up as risk v necessity of the op. The auth off is a very minor cog (sorry if this offends) far removed from the decision of whether the flight is necessary for the prosecution of the war.

Dave
(Being a maverick - not the Tom Cruise type obviously- I also think the Army and Navy should get a few quid more, I'm sure you need more than 5 tanks for an army, and you probably need more than 6 frigates to patrol the 7 seas).

[Tourist]

There are some on here who still seem to think that grounding the Nimrod is a good idea. I hope to dissuade you.

Let’s start with something that is not contentious.
We would all like to lose the minimum number of our servicemen whilst accomplishing our military aims.
(I accept that some would like us to just leave the war zones immediately, but that is a different issue.)
Moving on from there, let’s give the chance of servicemen in different roles dying in theatre a Total Risk Score. This score is made up of risk from (A). enemy action, (B). role (i.e. low level NVG, paradropping, low level over the sea, small ships operations etc), (C) poorly designed/serviced equipment, plus (D) anything else I have missed.
This Total Risk Score is the important score. Not any individual part, but the total. That is what decides whether you have a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of dying during your tour, or a 1 in 10.
It may be more vastly more obscene to die or have your loved one die of (C) rather than (A) or (B), but at the end of the day, the cause is immaterial.

To ground an aircraft just because it has a design flaw is foolish. That design flaw would only be grounds for grounding if, in combination with the other risks, the Total Risk Score was significantly out of kilter with the average Total Risk Score of other platforms.
Even with the design flaws, the Total Risk Score for Nimrod aircrew is significantly lower than that of many other aircraft types. I am sure one of you has the figures for Nimrod aircrew deaths vs Nimrod hrs flown in the last 30 yrs, and even taking into account the Canadian accident, I am willing to bet that you have more chance of surviving an airborne Nimrod hour than almost any fixed wing aircraft in military service, and don’t even get me started on helicopters!
It is not even as if Nimrod is the only Military Aircraft with serious design flaws. All military aircraft tend to operate close to the margins and have their foibles. Examples off the top of my head:-
Harrier:- Can’t land without all the engines working. Only has one engine. That one engine is working very hard. Doesn’t glide much better than a transit van.
Sea Kings:- The VRS1. If it fails in the dip at night, you ain’t walking away. It fails on occasion.
Merlin:- Slowly working it’s way through it’s own selection of killers.
Lynx:- Where do I start? The flot gear, the unfortunate habit of the engines feeling that if one goes it should take the other with it?

If for arguments sake we say that all platforms and personnel in theatre are of equal importance to the war effort, and of equal value as a life, then it is obvious that it is silly to remove one merely because nearly the whole of its Total Risk Score is made up of (C).
In fact it is worse than that, because by removing the Nimrod, when there is, as yet, no replacement in theatre, you are adding to the Total Risk of the soldiers on the ground.
The troops out there currently have an 11% risk of death or serious injury.
I think they are carrying a high enough Total Risk already, don’t you?

[Mick Smith]

To ground an aircraft just because it has a design flaw is foolish.

Jeez. How many times. The coroner did not call for the aircraft to be grounded because of the design flaw, which is presumably immaterial given the current lack of hot air. Nor did he call for the aircraft to be grounded because of any doubts over the seals.

Andrew Walker said: "I see no alternative but to report to the Secretary of State that the Nimrod fleet should not fly until the ALARP standards are met."

If the need for the aircraft's capability is so great the SoS can sign it off as a risk while it is being made ALARP. But the coroner can't make that decision for him, he has to deal with the evidence in front of him, which was that the risk was tolerable but not ALARP and therefore the aircraft was not safe.

[andgo]

FormerFlake, dear chap.
You talk about the 'Auth' for the trip, maybe you are not aware of who 'Auth'd' it?
You talk about Spins and DAS. Are you aware of the fit of the ac that day?

Never assume. (no offense meant)

[Tourist]

Ok Mick
I will change that sentence to" to ground an aircraft for any reason if its total risk is no higher than average is foolish"
My argument still stands.

[Tappers Dad]

Tourist

I accept that some would like us to just leave the war zones immediately


Thats strange I am sure the citation from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), we received after my son was killed in an un-airworthy ac said he was performing peace keeping duties !!!

[kennymac]

nigegilb

My interest here is simply interest, call it an engaged curiosity.

On the subject of agendas (whether valid or otherwise); then if you believe that no posters here have any, then imho you are being rather naive.

[nigegilb]

No worries, I have been called very much worse.

Would you care to explain what aspect or nuance of the law Mr Andrew Walker, Coroner, trained Barrister, missed in his Inquest verdict last week?

[kennymac]

He didn't necessarily miss any point of law on which he was asked to preside. IMHO he also didn't necessarily consider ALL pertinent aspects of the whole case at hand.

Finally, it is not my place, nor is it really possible to attempt to explain his reasoning in reaching the conclusion he did.

[davejb]

Tourist,
I agree with what you are saying to a large extent (oddly enough) - the point is that I also think the government should pay whatever it takes to visibly reduce the Nimrod risk, to ensure ALARP is what it says on the tin. It's the government's turn to take the extra step.

I also think that funds should be provided to fund our wars, if they can prop up N Rock then they can afford to keep squaddies in body armour - there is a difference between saying you want the best kit (Raptors instead of F3s, for example) and saying you want what you've got to work (keep the F3s but the wings don't fall off unexpectedly). The RAF has a history of not quite as good as the opposition kit (Hurris v 109's, Buffaloes v Zeroes, oh what fun it must have been in a Whitley or Coastal Hudson on the first 1000 bomber raid) but that doesn't mean they didn't rapidly fix problems when they arose. (Typhoons, for example, tended to lose their tails at first).

Regarding whether we ought to be in Afghanistan or not, and ignoring the shift in emphasis of our cousins over the years (the humble poppy wasn't always anathema to the CIA...Centre for Interesting Agriculture?) it's quite remarkable how we, a nation devoted to maintaining peace and responding vigorously to the evil doings of other nations, seem to be going to war quite so often. I imagine most on here share the 'we're in it, so support the troops regardless' bracket - I can't help but think that maybe the politicians deserve our support to a rather lesser extent., we get in more fights these days than a Glaswegian drunk wearing hoops down the Rangers end of the ground. It's a sad day when you start thinking Tam Dalyell might not have been so daft after all...

Dave

[davejb]

Kennymac,
are you suggesting that you know of material factors in the loss of 230 that the coroner was unaware of?

Finally, it is not my place, nor is it really possible to attempt to explain his reasoning in reaching the conclusion he did

Would being told by a raft of witnesses (including the company that built it) that the aircraft wasn't actually airworthy (although nobody knew that at the time) be a reason why he might have said the aircraft wasn't airworthy, perhaps?
Dave

[nigegilb]

KENNY MAC
"There's so much bluff and bluster on this thread, it really amounts to little more than a hill of beans. ALARP is being bandied about with such abandon by individuals who either have a rather limited and simplistic grasp of the meaning of the concept, or are deliberately misinterpreting and overlooking finer points to advance their agendas."

Sorry Kenny not good enough. You have criticised very many people with your last statement. Please explain our rather limited and simplistic grasp of the meaning of the concept.

You clearly think the Coroner was naive (just like me), in his narrow judgement, or lacking the real evidence to proclaim Nimrod not airworthy. Please enlighten us, otherwise disappear from wherever you came.

Edited to add that I can agree with one thing in your last statement. Original drafts of QQ reports strangely went missing and were not able to be presented at the Inquest. Funny that!? So yes, he didn't have all the facts at his finger tips.

[kennymac]

davejb,

are you suggesting that you know of material factors in the loss of 230 that the coroner was unaware of?No.

Would being told by a raft of witnesses (including the company that built it) that the aircraft wasn't actually airworthy (although nobody knew that at the time) be a reason why he might have said the aircraft wasn't airworthy, perhaps?Of course this would form part of his reasoning.

-----------------------------------------

nigegilb,

Please explain our rather limited and simplistic grasp of the meaning of the concept.No, do your own research on the subject, like I recommended everyone with an interest in this case should do in my post.

Please enlighten us, otherwise disappear from wherever you came.With pleasure... but do your homework everyone, and do it with a fair and open mind to ALL issues at hand. I genuinely hope (and believe) that a common sense and a just outcome is achievable here, but this will only be possible if an all encompassing perspective is maintained.

[nigegilb]

See Ya............

[andgo]

Now, now children. Back to the important stuff please:E

[EdSet100]

Nigegilb,
Re: the vent pipe whistle test: This is not within my area of expertise. As far as I know, the vent system wasn't tested at all before the accident. After all, it was designed to pass air through it, so a little bit of air leakage, either back into the tank, or elsewhere wasn't even thought about. It was the BOI investigators who first thought about fuel choking the vent pipes and they then enquired about any leak testing, to be told, no, it isn't done, for the reasons I've just indicated.

So, IMHO the whistle test is probably an additional test outwith the mandated servicing, as a consequence of the accident. I stress that this is only my personal view.

My apologies to Gp Capt Hickman, for a cheap shot.

I will read the QQ report again, including its recommendations, but I'm sure that the system, today, carries only broadly acceptable risks and not tolerable risks.

In fact, it would actually be risk free if we didn't have to open the crossfeed pipe to start the engines on the ground. The corroding hot air pipes are either out of service or in fire zones. The fuel seals are no more likely to leak than those in other old aircraft worldwide and even if one or two do leak (XV235) there is no consequent fire hazard if the leak is outside an engine (hot) zone. These are the bits of the jigsaw, Nige, that combine to produce the big picture of airworthiness.

Airworthiness, or otherwise, is not established by debate or discussion on line, in the newspapers or in a Coroners witness box under oath. Airworthiness is established by physical inspection, knowledge of the subject and identification of what is possible. I do not care one jot about what the politicians, air officers and IPTLs say to the media or the Coroner. I care only about what my colleagues and I know to be the facts.

We do not need anyone outside of our environment at Kinloss to patronise us by fighting a case for us. I can assure you all, that if we at Kinloss believe this aircraft to be unsafe, your opinions on the matter would be academic. Do not insult us, please, by inferring that we do not know what we are doing with our own aircraft.

Regards
Ed

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett 100: Sorry, but the QinetiQ report sets the risk as being tolerable (see para 1 of conclusions). Throughout the report it sets "Broadly Acceptable or tolerable and ALARP" as a goal, but we only achieve "tolerable and NOT ALARP". That is what drove Mr Walker to declare the Nimrod unsafe and not airworthy.

On the question of the whistle test, the problem here is that only certain couplings in the vent line can be tested, and leaks can come from any defective coupling within that line. By the way, blowing air through the line makes seals worse because it dries them out.

According to EATON the real problem is not the seals themselves, but misalignment of the connecting pipes at the coupling. The alignment should be within 1 decree, and Hickman said that this was being checked every 30 days "visually". The coroner said that if alignment was so critical then some form of alignment device should be used when assembling couplings. MoD stated, at the inquest, that 300 seals will be change at every Major (EQ6), which comes around every 5-6 years and means that some aircraft will never get them. However, this is a wasted excerise if couplings are not aligned correctly

With regards to hot air pipes, MoD stated, again at the inquest, that all hot air pipes in the engine bay areas will be changed by the end of the year. Because, they finally recognise that whilst the x-feed pipes have be isolated (in flight) there are pipes between the engines and the x-feed shut off valve that are still hot and pressurised. These pipies, along with those in the x-feed section were declared "life expired and require replacement" in a 2005 BAE Systems report.

Finally, can I remind you of what Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton said, when reviewing the BOI report: " Prohibiting the use of the SCP removes this ignition source but we must not allow ourselves to be convinced that consideration of other potential sources of ignition can be thereby be excluded".

So you see, we have a long way to go before the Nimrod is safe to fly.

DV

[OilCan]

DV...so is that a vote for;

a) Ground it, rip it apart, change all the seals (or not) and all the pipes, put it back together again and call it safe.

or

b) Ground it and scrap it.

[Distant Voice]

Oil Can: It is a clear vote for ground the aircraft, and put right all the items on the ALARP check list.

Let me ask you a question. If your car fails its MOT because of brake problems do you:

(1) Continue driving the car, because you haven't crashed it to date,
(2) Repair the brakes, then re MOT, or
(3) Apply the "Hickman solution". Continue driving, but inform everyone that you intend to get the brakes fixed by the end of the year?

DV

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett 100; You said,
I do not care one jot what the politicians, air officers and IPTL's say to the media or the Coroner, I care only about what my colleagues and I know to be the facts

Up until now I have always respected your views. I have not always agreed with them, but I have respected them. However, this statement takes your credibility rating to zero.

Many of your colleagues were in court to present the facts, for all I know you were there as well. All the facts were examined, and the end game was "ground the aircarft". Now if you, or any other member of MOD can present sound evidence supporting your "gut feeling" claim, then do so.

By the way, the families are not only trying to protect the current crews, many of whom do not know the full story, but also people on the ground over whom the aircraft fly.

DV

[Winco]

Ed,

I have also admired your in-depth knowledge of the aircraft and have enjoyed reading your cohntributions to the debate. They ahve always seemed well-balanced, sensible and reasoned but this latest outburst is most out of character for you, and I feel obliged to tell you that I do think you're wrong on this occasion.

The one and only absolute FACT here, is that an aircraft caught fire, was destroyed, and many of our friends died (unneccesarily IMHO)

Now we can keep hypothesising about what did or did not happen on that day, and you can convince us all with your own arguments and agenda, and as I said, I for one admire your knowledge, but I doubt if you speak for all Nimrod aircrew when you say that you and they know 'the facts' - suggesting that others don't! If you know 'the facts' then I suggest you tell us all and put us out of our misery please.

I still have many aircrew friends at ISK and some of them very experienced, and whilst some aircrew are happy to continue with the 'business as usual' attitude (typical aircrew 'can-do' attitude, dare I say?) quietly, many of them are extremely concerned about the state of the aircraft.

I'm not advocating grounding the fleet, but I do feel the time has come for a concerted effort to get them fixed once and for all, and if that is unachievable, then maybe we should just bite the bullett and scap them.

[cornish-stormrider]

Post 900 says it all. Well said that Man.

DV, re the cars brakes..........

Only a liar or a fool would do anything but option 2.

Here's a question (with obvious opsec implications.)

IF Nimrod was grounded NOW........ Is there a combination of packages and stuff that various members of the coalition can put together and achieve the same taskings and aims??

Now I expect there is and I would not be suprised if it initially was a right royal goat f**k to get going, funny thing is though, our service men and women are able to do these very difficult things.

If there is then I say we ground the damn things until they be airworthy, with a name on a piece of paper that says so.

Lets not forget that we have pushed the edge of the "airworthy" to the absolute edge and beyond.

I did get a pax trip on the mighty 'rod several years ago, would I go up in one now.......??

would I f**k.

I have nothing but the utmost respect for the crews and the engineers trying to make the best of this awful situation, I also have a horrible feeling that this is the thin end of the wedge and a lot of fleets are going to see this situation come up.

[OilCan]

DV

....(4) Sell it. Let sombody else sort it out. :p





Sorry, couldn't resist.
I need more info. What exactly is wrong with the brakes?

[Da4orce]

Cornish Stormrider:

IF Nimrod was grounded NOW........ Is there a combination of packages and stuff that various members of the coalition can put together and achieve the same taskings and aims??

The Reaper may go some way to plugging the gap, although Caroline Wyatt says it cannot replace the Nimrod.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/7419752.stm

[Distant Voice]

Oil Can: What is exactly wrong with the brakes? The seals in the hydraulic lines are leaking.

DV

[OilCan]

DV

Roger.... in that case...

Option 2) Replace the leaking seals then re MOT.

[tucumseh]

Winco

The one and only absolute FACT here, is that an aircraft caught fire, was destroyed, and many of our friends died (unnecessarily IMHO)


I could mention some other absolute, 100% verifiable facts.


In Nov 2007 ACM Sir Clive Loader stated in the BoI report that Airworthiness regulations were not implemented properly. This repeated similar, and in one case even more damning, statements in previous BoI reports; in addition to HCDC hearings, PAC Audit reports and internal MoD Audit reports.
In Dec 2007 Des Browne accepted this and acknowledged liability.
In 1991, 1992, 1993…………………….. MoD(PE), DPA, DLO, AML and AMSO 2 Stars and above were told this. None denied it; all ignored it.
In September 2005 Adam Ingram, when Min(AF) was told it, in writing. And denied it, in writing.
Perhaps if ANY of these people had listened………..

[Chugalug2]

Whether your depressing list is based on wickedness, incompetence or merely "obeying orders", tuc, it tells me that what goes around comes around. If after all the BoIs, Inquests, Reviews, Statements and Platitudes this corrupt system is allowed to pick up where it left off we will have more accidents, more deaths and more destroyed lives and all needlessly! The MOD is not to be trusted with Military Airworthiness which must be removed from its control forthwith, and placed into the hands of an independent authority similar but separate from the CAA, ie an MAA.

[tucumseh]

wickedness, incompetence or merely "obeying orders"

All of the above, plus a healthy dose of greasy poling and gong hunting.

[ShortFatOne]

Whilst I tend to agree with many of you erudite people in your general summation of the pros and cons of an independent MAA (and would probably vote for one) can I just plays devil's advocate for 2 seconds?

The Boing Boing 777 that pancaked into LHR. No definitive word on what caused @100 Tonnes of commercial airliner to swandive towards the green & brown stuff, yet not a word from CAA about grounding the fleet just in case it happens again and this time is unfortunate enough to land in Mrs Miggins' pie shop.

Why?

Winco,

I hope you are well, I apologise for our 'misunderstanding'several months ago. :)

[OilCan]

Nige, forgive me, I’m not clear on the difference,

We’re worried about Nimrods falling out of the sky when we know what happened to XV230 and something is being done,

Yet

We’re not worried about B777s falling out of the sky and nobody has a Scooby. :eek:

Thankfully there were no fatalities on the B777, but a few hundred yards shorter would have pushed Nimrod to the back page!!

..please don't tell me it's because the b777 was ALARP and therefore 'Safe'. :sad:

[Winco]

SFO

I am very well indeed, thank you. No apology needed Sir. I have read all of the posts on this forum many times, and with the benefit of hindsight and a clearer head, I think we have all been guilty one way or another of maybe 'overstating' our cases. How is the MR4 progressing? Are you able to offer us any good news on the project?

Best wishes

The Winco

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

DV

Roger.... in that case...

Option 2) Replace the leaking seals then re MOT

No stock of the seals
Brake pipes are corroded too
Not enough trade cover on shift to carry out functionals
Instruction manual out of date (just for Tucumseh)
Distracted by trivia
Management putting the pressure on
Shift change in a couple of hours
Someone else's problem

[dunc0936]

I have not read through the whole thread, however are these airframes totally knackered and in need of scrapping, or just in need of a danm good service (i.e. money spent on them) and some good tlc???

sorry for sounding very siomple

Duncan

[OilCan]

Old Fat One

MoD = easy target.....just like the NHS. (8 words)

..and I think Duncan has......a cunning plan. ;)




._. .. ._ _.


-----------------------------------------------------------

[dunc0936]

Well looking at this from a laymans position, the solutions do seem very simple, though it would mean spending a bit of money, in the long run the RAF would have a platform they could be really be proud of and it would stll be 100% british


Duncan

[Brian Abraham]

I have not gone back through the thread so please excuse if I'm doubling up. From Avweb today.

Coroner: UK Nimrod Fleet Not Airworthy

A coroner who led an inquest regarding the September 2006 midair explosion of a Nimrod sea control aircraft has said the aircraft "like every other aircraft within the Nimrod fleet, was not airworthy," but the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) does not have to comply the coroner's recommendations and likely won't. An RAF Board of Inquiry in December 2007 delivered a report that declared aging parts and lack of fire-suppression systems as contributing factors but in the end apparently served as a spark for investigations initiated by parents of some of the deceased fliers. Of all the parents, Graham Knight stood out for claiming to have e-mails from high-ranking officers that detailed problems with fuel leaks prior to the 2006 explosion and noted a 2005 recommendation from BAE Systems that fire-detection systems be installed on the aircraft. The assistant deputy coroner who led the inquest is now calling for the entire Nimrod fleet to be grounded, according to Defense Industry Daily. The UK MoD has taken measures it believes are satisfactory and will continue to fly the plane.

The UK MoD says it will continue to fly the Nimrod but has stopped air-to-air fueling and has ceased use of the "very hot air systems" in flight. According to the MoD, these measures remove the dangers in design noted by the coroner and along with enhanced maintenance and inspection procedures effectively ensure safe operation of the aircraft.

[dunc0936]

Still a old aircraft that either needs a major overall or replacing as follows

1) complete new design of airframe to put the exsiting kit inside, or buy off the shelf, Boeing/Airbus

2) Get Bae to build completely new airframes i.e. start the production line up again, and carry on with the Nimrod, because if it is such a crap aircraft as some people have said then why has it lasted so long?

I peronally believe that it is more of a case of lack of money to service them correctly and upgrade them when needed

Just a thought

Duncan

[Wader2]

I have not read through the whole thread, however are these airframes totally knackered and in need of scrapping, or just in need of a danm good service (i.e. money spent on them) and some good tlc???

sorry for sounding very siomple

Yup, spot on, knackered, scrapping or a damn good service

Well looking at this from a laymans position, the solutions do seem very simple, though it would mean spending a bit of money, in the long run the RAF would have a platform they could be really be proud of and it would stll be 100% british

Yup, spot on again. Indeed we have been spending a bit of money, over the last 15 years or so, giving it a damn good service, new wings and undercarriage even, and a new avionics suite.

Still a old aircraft that either needs a major overall or replacing as follows

1) complete new design of airframe to put the exsiting kit inside, or buy off the shelf, Boeing/Airbus

2) Get Bae to build completely new airframes i.e. start the production line up again, and carry on with the Nimrod, because if it is such a crap aircraft as some people have said then why has it lasted so long?

I peronally believe that it is more of a case of lack of money to service them correctly and upgrade them when needed

Just a thought

Duncan

Well we could have gone for Boeing or Airbus but 15 years ago it was deemed far better (ie cheaper) to go for a damn good service.

Well not completely new airframe but essentially the bits that were recycleable, such as the fuselage seemed a good idea at the time.

Now however for a personal opinion. Many years ago I used to wonder how our cousins could take an aircraft, like the B52, and do a root and branch refurbishment, new avionics etc, and keep the old airframe in use for ever - same with the KC135. OTOH the Vulcan could have been extended for years with improved avionics etc.

It all boils down to money and need. The cousins had both whereas we needed the money to buy TSR2/F111/F4/Buccaneer/Tornado etc.

Even the cousins ran out of money when it came to re-engining the B52 with 4 turbo fans vice 8 jets.

At the time new was not an option and, as ever, the Treasury is king. Also the Nimrod 3 AEW fiasco is too recent to follow suite with Numrod 4 MRA one even if it is a different Government (or perhaps because it is a different Government).

[EdSett100]

DV,Sorry, but the QinetiQ report sets the risk as being tolerable (see para 1 of conclusions). You must be reading a different document to the one I've seen. Putting aside the document, and whomever wrote it (I recognise the authors, incidentally) for the moment, can you explain to me, how a risk is tolerable when it doesn't exist? The reason I say it doesn't exist is this (my apologies to the grannies for the egg sucking lesson):

Lets say that a pipe containing a hydrocarbon liquid, anywhere, at any time, leaks; maybe even sprays out of the pipe. That, in itself, is not a fire hazard. A health hazard, maybe. Therefore, with no fire hazard, there is no risk.

However, it will become a fire hazard if there is any potential for it to ignite.

Oxygen abounds in the atmosphere, so the liquid needs only some form of ignition in its environment. Fuel is ignited only by heat (heat accelerates or provides the combustion/oxidisation process, otherwise known as fire). A spark contains heat, which is the only reason that a spark will ignite fuel. Some hydrocarbons are very volatile and vulnerable to oxidisation and require only a little amount of heat (or a small spark); gasoline is a good example. Clearly, an aircraft, unlike a car cannot stop if there is a fire on board, so jet-engine fuel has to be resistant to accidental/easy ignition. Kerosine fits the bill. Kerosene, unless atomized, is very difficult to ignite. Atomization of kerosene occurs under very high pressures only. Kerosine vapour will spontaneously ignite (flash point) at approx 45C. Kerosine liquid will ignite at different temperatures dependant on the time that it is subject to that heat, bearing in mind that it will vapourise under heat and, due to any air local currents, move away from the heat source (convection). Therefore, in order for us to deliberately ignite kerosine, we need either a huge spark (with sufficient heat) or an existing heat source. In a jet engine the latter is achieved by constant combustion, whereby we simply add more fuel to the existing hot fire. However, we still need to start that combustion process and to do that we have to generate lethal voltages to produce very powerful sparks in the igniters in the engine combustion chambers. Furthermore, the kerosine has to be atomised before it gets to the spark. Once it has lit, we have constant combustion and the ignitors can be switched off. If you believe we are overdoing it with the atomising process, we experience engine running problems with carbonised burners which do not atomise the fuel properly. The 7% lower flight idle RPM on the No 4 engine during the descent on XV230 was a classic example of carbonised burners (Mick Bell, my old friend: a fuel leak, not. A 1000 gall/hr fuel leak at flight idle would result in a flame out because the flight idle fuel bleed would be starved; I think you forgot that bit)

Conclusion1: Kerosine cannot be accidentally ignited by a low voltage spark. Therefore, in this aspect: no risk

It can only be accidentally ignited by a very hot surface or a very powerful spark. Outside of the engine bay ignition system, in all aircraft , incl Nimrod, there is no possibility of a spark of that magnitude occuring unless it is caused by a massive electrical failure. It would have be a failure so significant that the circuit protection devices will switch off that circuit before it reaches the magnitude required to ignite kersosine. We have been discussing fuel safety here, but electrical safety requirements in aircraft have always insisted that circuits are protected by high quality insulation, protected against arcing and sparking by fast acting cut-outs and good maintenance practice.

Conclusion 2: Although kerosine can be ignited by HE energy sparks, there has to be a triple failure in an aircraft for this to occur: the fuel must have leaked (1st failure), a nearby HE electrical system (200 volts?) must have failed in its isolation (2nd failure) and the associated circuit protection has not acted in time to stop the fuel igniting. Single point failure risk due to a HE spark in a Nimrod: none, because we do not have any 200V power supplies anywhere near the fuel pipes. The designer wasn't that stupid.

We've discussed hot pipes ad nauseum. But, to add to the growing knowledge in this forum, please note that, with the exception of the crossfeed pipe, all HP air pipes are inside fire zones. The crossfeed valves are inside the hotter (fire) zones of the outboard engines. Therefore, approx one third of the crossfeed pipe (ie the pipe between the valves) is inside a fire zone with the appropriate protection. We do not, now, open that pipe, except to start the engines. While that pipe is open we limit the engine speed such that the pipe's external temperature does not exceed the degree required to ignite fuel or hydraulic liquid that might come into contact with it. The IPT has sponsored tests to ensure that we are below that ignition temperature. We are not guessing and using our "gut feelings", here. We might be under-resourced, but we are professional and we will do the right thing and we will not assume we are right.

Conclusion 3: the kerosine on a Nimrod cannot now possibly ignite due to coming into contact with a hot surface. Fire risk: none.

This isn't a tolerable risk. Its a non existant risk.
(in the case of single point failures)

The copy of the QQ report, that I have read, fully supports my assertion. It states in the Summary:

"Principally, the key factor in the Very High and High risk assessments has been the proximity of a hot surface relative to the fuel system.....It is considered that these areas of risk are addressed as part of ongoing inspections or aircraft limitations, specifically, limited use of bomb bay heating, HP Bleed Air cross feed and the SCP"

These are the facts that I referred to in my previous post.

DV, I'm keen to know more about the document you refer to. The one I have refers to the only analysis that QQ has done in recent years.

I'm also prepared to discuss HP air pipes and any perceived associated risks.

Ed
ps. I had a pprune name faff over the weekend, so I've changed my name (slightly). Do not write privately to edset100; I will not receive it; edsett100 works.

[EdSett100]

DV:Ed Sett 100; You said,

Quote:
I do not care one jot what the politicians, air officers and IPTL's say to the media or the Coroner, I care only about what my colleagues and I know to be the facts
Up until now I have always respected your views. I have not always agreed with them, but I have respected them. However, this statement takes your credibility rating to zero.

You can't tell me that you believe politicians. Air Officers read from prepared briefs and don't take supplementary questions because they do not have the depth of specialist knowledge. I don't have any problems with that. Someone has to talk to the media. Its a shame that those who have the depth of knowledge required to answer the questions at the core of the matter are not trusted to stand up and speak for the organisation. Its not so much that I don't care what our air officers say. Its simply that they do not go to the depth that interests me or the media. Consequently, the media digs elsewhere and, regrettably, sometimes they come up with the wrong answers or use a dodgy source.

Regarding the Coroner's questions: I'm led to believe that the more coherent and relevant evidence from the RAF relating to the system failures came from the operators and the maintainers. Inconsistencies and prevarication from the IPT leadership in the witness box led to the mess in which we now find ourselves. I was wrong to say that I do not care about their words and terminology, because what they said has led us to this point.

All the facts were examined, Oh, no they were not. The only facts that were examined, and they were all available, were the ones that the Coroner wanted to examine.
and the end game was "ground the aircrart". Now if you, or any other member of MOD can present sound evidence supporting your "gut feeling" claim, then do so.

I refer you to my previous post about fuel fire risks. No gut feelings are used and I don't think I have ever indicated that I, or my colleagues, have any such feelings in this subject.

[Distant Voice]

Edsett100: I have a copy of your QinetiQ report (Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment), dated Sept 2007, but you need to read the report to which Des Browne referred. This is the Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report, dated Oct 2007. The September report is mentioned in this all embrasing report.

On the question of high energy electrical sources (200v), you will find several listed in Exhbit 62 to BOI report; 4 in No.7 tank dry bay area, and 14 in the Rib 1 area.

DV

[tucumseh]

EdSett


Your post displays impressive knowledge and I don’t pretend to know anything about the intricacies of the Nimrod design. But I’m afraid I don’t agree with your conclusions.

You can’t say the risks don’t exist – you identified them. The probability of occurrence may be incredible (e.g. caused by “massive electrical failure”) but as the outcome would be catastrophic that results in a Class C risk – Tolerable if ALARP. Most of what you write is an excellent risk assessment and could be cut and pasted into the Risk Register as evidence of proper management, competency and existence of corporate knowledge – all airworthiness requirements. Your mitigation plan may indeed be “do nothing” as you have assessed the risk as ALARP.

Importantly, the audit trail is maintained and if, sometime in the future, someone tries to put an ignition source next to a kerosene line in “Location xx”, then the chances increase of the conflict being spotted. (Because you will have entered key words like “Location xx” and “fire” in the RR and future designers will tap that into the database and your work will pop up with a flag). Your successors will benefit from this retention of corporate knowledge, as required by JSP553.

Just my way of looking at things. I believe what I describe is very close to what ACM Loader was referring to when he said the regs weren’t implemented. Certainly Air Cdre Baber acknowledged similar data errors in the Hazard log.

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Edsett
Kerosine vapour will spontaneously ignite (flash point) at approx 45C.

Er...I think you're wrong there.

I'll revisit this point. But while I'm away, could someone repeat the estimated temperature of the bleed air in the ducts.

About 30 pages ago I was uneasy about the ignition source

[philrigger]

If I may add.

According to MOD Manual; Fuels, Lubricants and Associated Products,
Def Stan 01-5, Issue 15, March 2007

NATO F-34 AVTUR-FSII Def Stan 91-87
TURBINE FUEL, AVIATION: Kerosine type with FSII
and
NATO F-35 AVTUR Def Stan 91-91
TURBINE FUEL, AVIATION: Kerosine type


Flash point, closed cup, min ... ... ... 38 degrees C

Does this help? Probably not.






'We knew how to whinge but we kept it in the NAAFI bar.'

[EdSett100]

SPHL:I'll revisit this point. But while I'm away, could someone repeat the estimated temperature of the bleed air in the ducts.


Good question. Except during ground starting only (see below) the bleed air is at ambient temperature, where the ducts are outside of the engine fire zones. Inside the engine fire zones (where there are hot gas leak detectors, firewire and extinguishers) the air inside the ducts can reach 500C and 288psi at max engine rpm. I suggest that this is not unusual in any modern aircraft where air is ducted to start the engines.

During ground starts, when we have to open the crossfeed duct, the engines are all kept below 80% by the pilots, which prevents the bleed air reaching more than 150C, which is well below the auto-ignition point of both hyd fluid and fuel.

Regarding the flash point: OK, I was approx 7 degrees out, but I don't normally have my Def Stan book of fuels at home. My thanks to Phil Rigger for the accurate info to keep us on a factual path.

I'm looking forward to reading SPHL's views on the flash point of kerosene vapours.

Regards
Ed Sett

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Wait no more!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_point

You'll notice I queried your

Kerosine vapour will spontaneously ignite (flash point) at approx 45C.

But we both now know that the 'Auto-ignition temperature' is not the same as the Flash Point

Therefore:-

Kerosine vapour will spontaneously ignite at approx 220°C (428°F)


On the C130, 14th stage (bleed) air can be up to 125psi at 635°F according to Lockheed.

[dodgysootie]

SPHL,
you said:-

"On the C130, 14th stage (bleed) air can be up to 125psi at 635°F according to Lockheed."

Forgive my ignorance, but wtf has this got to do with the Nimrod?

DS

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Wait your turn, and mind your language.

[Distant Voice]

EdSett100: You said,
Oh, they were not. The only facts that were examined, and were availailable, were the ones that the coroner wanted to examine

I am sorry, this is far from the truth, the coroner examined all paths, and if anyone presented delays it was MoD. If there was a problem with "selective" evidence it came from the BOI. Whilst it was agreed that they did did a 1st class job, the evidence was drived by a preconceived ideas as to what caused the accident.

If you were not at the inquest do not attempt to put yourself in the mind of the coroner.

By the way, have you read the Oct 2007 QinietiQ report. Get back to me when you have.

DV

[tucumseh]

Mileandahalf

Come on, everyones entitled to an opinion. Even Min(AF) admitted this when he wrote saying my opinion that provision should be made to maintain aircraft in an airworthy condition was not shared by ANYONE ELSE in the MoD.

I maintain I was right, but while he was wrong it would seem he was only slightly wrong.




We should be aiming at that level, not at each other. (Assuming you are not Adam Ingram).

[Distant Voice]

EdSett100; Please tell us, what facts were not examined. Did MoD withhold evidence? Think long and hard before you answer that one.

DV

[Distant Voice]

Mileandahalf: I can assure you that my views are closer to the true that you can imagine. EdSett100 is making comments based on selected information.

I say the same to you, come back to me when you have read the reports.

DV

[JFZ90]

DV, what are you implying from the posts above & the QinetiQ reports? Are you saying that electrical ignition risks are infact an issue here?

[Softie]

DV states:

If there was a problem with "selective" evidence it came from the BOI. This is an offensive statement. The BOI took many months looking at all possibilities and delving into the possible causes of this tragic accident. Nothing was excluded when it came to reporting the "facts". From reports, it would appear that some important information/facts were overlooked by the coroner in his short 13 days of focused questioning. Excluding BOI members present from contributing and clarifying was a mistake.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ: Simple answer, yes.

Softie: Please tell me, what important facts were overlooked by the coroner. I know that the "tea stain" track was overlooked by the BOI along with the non-activation of the temp probe in No. 7 tank dry bay area. Waht else do you need to know.

DV

[Softie]

DV. Sir. Neither point you list was missed. As you will never be satisfied, there is no point offering anything to you to trash around in this pointless discussion thread. Let it rest and please get on with your life.

[JFZ90]

"Principally, the key factor in the Very High and High risk assessments has been the proximity of a hot surface relative to the fuel system.....It is considered that these areas of risk are addressed as part of ongoing inspections or aircraft limitations, specifically, limited use of bomb bay heating, HP Bleed Air cross feed and the SCP"

Have QQ changed their view from that above now? If so in what way - what are they now saying?


the non-activation of the temp probe in No. 7 tank dry bay area

What is the significance of this?

"tea stain" track

I guess from some other statements above this issue casts doubt on the "venting after AAR" theory in the BoI. Can someone explain exactly how this was preseneted & what it means - does it rule out the "venting" theory completely or is it still a possibility & hence ultimately inconclusive either way?

[EdSett100]

DV,

EdSett100: You said,

Quote:
Oh, they were not. The only facts that were examined, and were availailable, were the ones that the coroner wanted to examine
I am sorry, this is far from the truth, the coroner examined all paths, and if anyone presented delays it was MoD. If there was a problem with "selective" evidence it came from the BOI. Whilst it was agreed that they did did a 1st class job, the evidence was drived by a preconceived ideas as to what caused the accident.

If you were not at the inquest do not attempt to put yourself in the mind of the coroner.

By the way, have you read the Oct 2007 QinietiQ report. Get back to me when you have.


EdSett100; Please tell us, what facts were not examined. Did MoD withhold evidence? Think long and hard before you answer that one.

DV

At the top of your next post after you have read this, I would like you to correct your error in quoting my words in Post 939. Your version of what I said could indicate that not all the evidence was made available to the Coroner. You must have another look at what I wrote, which is:The only facts that were examined, and they were all available, were the ones that the Coroner wanted to examine.
I think you will agree that there is a world of difference between what I actually wrote and what you have "copied" that I wrote. So much so, that even you have suggested, as a consequence of your mis-quote, that MOD held back evidence and that "I should think long and hard before I answer." Perhaps you should think long and hard before you answer ;-) Anyway, moving on... and our discussion about selective use of evidence:

Despite being informed by the Staneval air engineer, the air eng on the flight itself, the ground eng who saw it in after flight, that the No1 tank blow off valve did operate on XV230 2 weeks before the accident, and being further informed by the staneval eng that, despite the fact that it cannot be seen, "the circumstantial evidence stacked up". He then quizzed the engineer on what the circumstances were. The answer given was that the tank did not fill up and, after flight there was fuel discovered in the blow-off valve exit and a residual stain on the bomb bay door in the vicinity of that exiit. Now, the staneval eng didn't claim to be Perry Mason, but that has to be sufficient evidence that the blow-off valve did operate during that flight and, therefore, it remained a possibility that it could have operated on 2 Sep. The Coroner stated, in his summing up that, because no-one can see a blow off, he has to disregard it as a possibility.

Incidentally, I do agree with him that there is no evidence that fuel from the blow off valve flowed into the 7 tank dry bay. However, it clearly has to remain as a possible source of fuel for the probable cause of the fire.

He didn't really establish where and how the hot SCP pipe elbow fitted into the 7 tank dry bay. He said that only the crossfeed pipe is in the 7 tank dry bay and that the crossfeed pipe is too high up in that bay for the nearby fuel pipes to supply fuel onto it. The fact is that the SCP pipe elbow is inside a fairing that forms part of the rear portion of the dry bay floor panel. All fluid in that bay will fall onto that panel and, due to air flow (its not a sealed panel), flow rearwards onto the SCP elbow. He didn't accept some very logical thinking by the BOI.

He said that a fuel feed pipe (supplying a stbd engine at 25 psi) was probably the source of fuel for a sustainable fire. He didn't ask any of the experts present how that fuel was going to maintain its flow rate past the front spar (solid metal cast) and then the rear spar (solid as well). I can accept that an engine might run normally with a large fuel leak in its feed lines. The refuel pipes in the dry bay, within feet of the hot pipes were pressurized up to 50 psi for 6 mins with some spiking above that shortly before the fire became apparent. You don't have to be Perry Mason to work out where the fuel probably came from.

Broadly speaking, his summing up, despite thanks to the BOI, was IMHO an insult to their diligence and integrity in discovering serious failings in the airworthiness process.

I cannot say how I know this stuff, but it is all true.

I'll certainly get back to you about the October report. On the face of it, as JFZ90 has also noted, there appears to be a significant change in the conclusions on the same piece of work. We are closing in on the crux of the matter...

Ed

[EdSett100]

DV:I know that the "tea stain" track was overlooked by the BOI along with the non-activation of the temp probe in No. 7 tank dry bay area. Waht else do you need to know.

The tea stain track was indeed overlooked by the BOI because it was, indeed, a tea stain. We have a galley sink drain in the vicinity of the Stbd 7 tank dry bay. This caused some much needed laughter in the room.

I disagree that the temp probe was overlooked. I assume you are discussing an overheat detector. It is set to operate a red light immediately below the flight refuelling switches on the flight deck. The air engineer was one of the most experienced and capable individuals we had. It is standard practice to make a clear announcement on intercom if that red light illuminates. He was operating the refuel system and that light was directly in front of his eyes. He didn't mention it, so it didn't illuminate. What does this tell us? It tells us that there was not a significant hot gas leak in the stbd 7 tank dry bay. The detectors are cleverly placed to protect other systems (it is possible that these detectors were mistakenly thought to be the fire detection and suppression system quoted in the safety case; but I speculate). It is possible that a small leak played directly onto a fuel pipe coupling and caused the seal to fail. For that reason, the BOI correctly identified that scenario as one of the possible causes of the fire.

Regards
Ed

[EdSett100]

Tuc:You can’t say the risks don’t exist – you identified them. The probability of occurrence may be incredible (e.g. caused by “massive electrical failure”) but as the outcome would be catastrophic that results in a Class C risk – Tolerable if ALARP.

Tuc, IMHO, that is not a single point failure. Surely, we must only consider single failures in risk analysis, otherwise a whole stack of "what ifs" will combine to stop us flying. An example of this concept might be this: we must accept the possibility of an engine failing in flight, so we have engine failure drills and we go flying. However, if we consider that the engine will not only fail, but explode as well and send shrapnel into an adjacent fuel tank which will then catch fire, which we cannot extinguish, such that the aircraft will crash, we might view the aircraft as unsafe. If so we don't fly it. Thats not acceptable risk analysis, surely?

The point I'm trying to make is that a massive electrical fault is one failutre that we guard against with all of our protective devices and drills. We should not formally analyse further any what ifs regarding subesequent failures of the protective devices and further what-ifs, such as a leaking fuel pipe nearby.

We have to draw the line at single point failures. ie. What is the consequence of a failure of one item in a zone with other systems operating normally in that zone? eg, what is the consequence of a fuel coupling failure such that the fuel will leak onto an adjacent hot pipe, that is working at its normal temperature? Thats a valid risk assessment question.

I suggest, for example, that an invalid risk assessment would be:

What is the consequence to the aircraft if a 200V cable terminal on a 3 phase alternator was to corrode to breaking point, creating massive sparks and consequent voltage imbalance which is then not detected within the time that the voltage sensor is rated to activate within, so that the sparks continue for another second or two and ignite a possible simultaneous fuel leak from a nearby fuel pump? IMHO we must not consider these daisy chain scenarios in airworthiness decisions.

Regards
Ed

[tucumseh]

EdSett

The MoD issue Def Stans, but Design Authorities must also issue their own internal Safety Case Policy document, which articulates in detail how they apply the MoD's standards to their products. Extracts from a typical Aircraft DA Safety Pase Policy (in no particular order);



The Safety Assessment shall, in particular, assess the design for vulnerability to;

Common Cause Failures
Cascade Failures
Maintenance Errors
Flight Crew Errors
Hidden Faults
Faults in related systems
Environmental Effects
Lightning Effects
Zonal Analysis facilitates assessment of Cascade Failures. (A consecutive sequence of individual failures where each successive failure is a result of the preceding failure).


If a Hazard is considered and discounted, the reason must be recorded. It is not acceptable to expunge it from the list.


Any Safety Case which treats a (sub system) in isolation, and ignores the system or system of systems as a whole, is likely to be rejected (by Boscombe Down).


The environments within which the system functions (must be assessed), particularly defining where is passes from one environment to another (e.g. the passage of a fuel line from a wet environment to a dry one).


Where a Failure Condition resulting from a Functional Failure of a system can be made worse by additional Functional Failures or adverse events, either from within the system under examination or externally from a separate system, then this combination must also be considered.






If you mean MoD itself does not look at such detail, then you are correct as they seldom have the detailed knowledge. But DAs are required to and must demonstrate they have complied. As this particular book says, there is no point in not complying as they would be snagged by Boscombe. Of course, this always assumes MoD has the DA (and now Boscombe) under suitable and continuous contract to maintain the build standard. While mandated in airworthiness regs, the requirement is not complemented with funding.



In short, MoD have rafts of people with, in one hand (a) a letter of Airworthiness delegation warning them of the dire consequences of not complying, and in the other (b) an e-mail from bean counters telling them they can't have the resources to comply with the legal requirement of (a).

[Distant Voice]

EdSett100; As requested, in reply to

All the facts were examined

You said

Oh no they were not. The only facts that were examined, and they were all available, were the ones that the Coroner wanted to examine

Sorry for the misquote in my original posting, but my question to you remains the same, what facts presented to the court were not examined? Let us not forget that whilst the inquest was driven by the Coroner, MoD had its own legal team in court to ensure that all points were covered.

On the question of the "tea stain", you know very well we are not talking about a tea stain from the galley, we are talking about the statement made on oath by a Kinloss tradesman regarding fuel tracking after a possible blow-off.

"It was like a tea pot stain. Starting below the No1 tank blow-off outlet it was about 6-9" deep and below the bomb bay door hinge line. It followed the contour of the fuselage about a foot below the door hinge line before climbing up and crossing the hinge line near the galley drain"

This statement, along with the airflow diagrams presented by BAE Systems, were a clear indication that, even if a blow-off had taken place (and no one had ever seen one), the fuel would track below No 7 tank dry bay area and the SCP elbow. That is to say, that is most unlikely that fuel source came from the No.1 blow-off outlet.

Anyway, I believe that the bottom line is that the Coroner declared the current Nimrod fleet as not being airworthy, on the evidence presented to him by Group Capt HIckman and QinetiQ. Both said that the Nimrod system is not ALARP.

Sorry I can not send you a copy of the QinetiQ report, because I do not have an electronic version. The document is made up of 185 pages.

DV

[buoy15]

Mile
Good post - well said!!

[JFZ90]

Ed, Tuc,

I may have this wrong, but my take on your posts above would be:

It is usual to consider multiple failures in similar areas - hence the point of zonal anaylsis to look at issues that a straightforward functional analysis of failure modes might miss (i.e. a fuel system functional analysis might not consider consequential failures in a flight control system that is in its proximity etc.). This is especially relevant for the cascade failure modes that Tuc points out where you could have a situation where a fuel leak (e.g. prob 10-3) might saturate a theoretical flight control system component and make an aircraft crash. This would be a cascade failure where one not unlikely event (10-3) would cause a definate catastrophic event & hence wouldn't be allowed (though of course no flight control system would ever be designed that was susceptable to such a single point failure). This situation is similar I think to the "Nimrod hot pipe issue" in that fuel spilling on a 400C pipe will ALWAYS cause a fire and is therefore not acceptable.

Edset is right however that you wouldn't normally rule out combinations of events where the cumulative probabilities are infact low, but Tuc is right in that you should consider them. In the electrical spark scenario, you can say, e.g that prob of a electrical spark fault is say 10-4. Now this can't be allowed in a fuel tank where volatile vapours are very likely, but in a bay where the prob of a fuel leak is 10-3 this potentially would be allowed as the cumulative probability would be 10-7. It is worth noting that 10-7 would be well into the broadly acceptable category so the risk wouldn't even need to be reduced to ALARP - it already exceeds the acceptable risk threshold.

I've made the probabilities up - they are only to show the principle of cumulative probability. The risks of electrical 'sparks' in a fuel tank (TWA800 etc.) should not be confused with those in a normally benign environment.

[Safeware]

JFZ90,It is worth noting that 10-7 would be well into the broadly acceptable category so the risk wouldn't even need to be reduced to ALARP - it already exceeds the acceptable risk threshold.
Not necessarily. If you consider the EXAMPLE in 00-56 (because it is only an example although many projects followed it, and from Iss 2), then a Catastrophic event with a probability of 10-7 would be a Class A risk.

One has to be careful in considering the overall aircraft target versus individual system / hazard targets.

sw

[Laboratoryqueen]

I stepped out of this for a little while, for a few reasons, some is way over my head with techie terms, sat and watched for a while but mainly because I had a few days away, up at ISK.

One thing which I failed to see on here is the idea that while the fleet has continued to fly a massive amount of checks have been performed on the fleet since the accident and again since the inquest, also throughout the time between.

I'm sure, okay scratch that, I know, there are a lot of checks being made to attempt to identify possible faults and to remedy those faults. That while it may be perceived as a risk to continue to fly, the attitude at ISK is anything but irresponsible to the crews safety, a great deal of measures have been put in place.

Had it not been for the loss of 230, the majority of these potential flaws and even obvious design flaws, would not have come to light. The Nimrod is probably the safest now than it has ever been as it is constantly being checked and double checked.

As simple as this may sound the majority of documents which are quoted, past investigations which have taken place, majority of the techie nature means nothing to me compared to the fact that the fleet is being scrutinised and examined with the intention of keeping her crews safe to fly.

To those at Kinloss, I'm proud of you xx

[Secretsooty]

Lab Queen,
I pretty much tried to say the same thing re. all the checks and work being done just recently, but it seemed to fall on deaf ears.

I genuinely believe there are those on here (and I'm not trying to start a slagging match!) that just do not want to listen unless what is said suits their own personal beliefs and agendas, hence the conversation goes round in circles with counterpoints and arguments and gets nowhere :ugh:

Look at the recent suspension of one of the forum users - now, I'm not saying that I agree with all of what was said but I certainly didn't think it was bad enough to warrant the action taken, just because it didn't "toe the party line". It inferred one persons beliefs and as such that person surely has the right to express themselves just as much as some others on this forum, whether others agree with what he/she says or not?

NO-ONE at ISK wants to see an aircraft take to the skies in anything less than a safe condition to do so, certainly from the groundcrew side. But then what do groundcrew know, they are mostly ignored and trodden on or totally disrespected by the majority of commissioned officers, those same officers who refuse to believe what they are told by experienced groundcrew (in many cases, in the mistaken belief that a university degree gives them superior knowledge to a highly experienced techie - with specialist qualifications - who has been doing the job for many years!), then they suddenly put up their umberella's when something goes wrong! :mad:

[airsound]

EdSett100 and mileandahalf

Were either of you present at the inquest, at any time?

airsound

[dodgysootie]

SecretSooty
100 % spot on, The thing is, your last paragraph is one of the reasons why the "experienced Techies" are leaving. Alongside the backward rotating nights, evenings, dayshifts that leave everyone drained both physically and mentally. THREE shift handovers a day to just ensure we get LOSS of continuity on big rects tasks. Beggars belief but as you say, we are mostly IGNORED. "Experienced Techie" days to do, OUT..
DS

[Jayand]

I thought buoy 15 was banned!!!!

[buoy15]

Jayand
Yes, for some un-democratic reason, I was - but I've served my pennance and I'm delighted to be back, reading exciting posts from you:ok:

[Distant Voice]

EdSett100;

Have you been able to get hold of the Nimrod Fuel Sytsem Safety Report, dated Oct 2007, by QinetiQ?

DV

[JFZ90]

I asked you earlier DV - "Are you saying that electrical ignition risks are infact an issue here?". You replied: "Simple answer yes."

Where exactly are you getting or inferring this from - are you saying this is what the QinetiQ report you highlight above actually says? Are you sure about this? What exactly does it say - assuming its contents are repeatable here? I'm not convinced its as simple as you're implying but not having seen the report I've got an open mind on the subject.

[KeepItTidy]

The thing is, your last paragraph is one of the reasons why the "experienced Techies" are leaving. Alongside the backward rotating nights, evenings, dayshifts that leave everyone drained both physically and mentally. THREE shift handovers a day to just ensure we get LOSS of continuity on big rects tasks. Beggars belief but as you say, we are mostly IGNORED. "Experienced Techie" days to do, OUT..
DS

100% spot on DS nobody is listening to what groundies have to say , all this talk from the so called people who know Nimrod and yet all we say our bit but nobody here wants to listen to what groundcrew say. We know more on this subject than anyone can imagine yet nobody listens.

[Secretsooty]

DS and KeepItTidy, that's the very reasons that I myself left!

I'd been in long enough to see the wheel re-invented so many times and guess what - yep, it only ever worked when it was circular in form! Lol. The really annoying thing was when you tried to politely explain why some "fresh-from-uni-spotty-faced-little-know-it-all's" latest "great idea" was never going to work and you were either ignored or asked to be quiet in the interests of protocols. :ugh::mad::ugh::mad:
I loved working on the Nimrods, the best aircraft I've ever had the challenge of spannering on and I do still miss it. I miss the banter as well, but I just couldn't accept the changes being made all around me whirlwind style. 3 days, 3 nights, 6 off was hard work but it had the required continuity to get the job done, and when averaged out (for the benefit of those who said it was too much time off) you actually worked more hours than an 8 to 5 day worker!

Back on-topic slightly, we now have a situation where a lot of people who haven't ever used a spanner on the aircraft seem to think they know better than those who know the aircraft's systems (in some cases both airframe and propulsion) intimately.... I wonder how many are/were officers..... Please don't have a go at me for that gents, I'm having a laugh! I've learnt a lot from this thread re. the legislative side of airworthiness issues and I'm grateful to those who have taken the time to explain things in great detail, but guys, don't get so wrapped up that you can't "see the metal for the rivets", listen to the techies as well please.

Unfortunately DS, we no longer have the likes of Roddy to keep the "juniors" in their place, hahaha. Guessed who I am now?? lol.

[RAF_Techie101]

Ahh, Roddy - my first Flight Sergeant...

[Jayand]

Buoy 15, your posts aren't ever exciting, just confrontational, appeasing to the RAF and earlier in this thread downright disgusting and disrespectful.
Undemocratic or not I wish you would just **** off!

[BEagle]

buoy15, to put it more bluntly, you simply aren't welcome on PPRuNe.

Please go away and annoy someone else. Now.

[Donna K Babbs]

Buoy15: Jayand
Yes, for some un-democratic reason, I was - but I've served my pennance and I'm delighted to be back, reading exciting posts from you:ok:

So let's get this straight. You think that family members of those who died on XV230 are only posting on the forum to generate compensation. But almost everyone else on the forum thinks that your comments were despicable and warranted a temporary ban.

You were banned and you are now saying that this is not democracy. Stupid as well as crass, eh?:ugh:

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90.
"Are you saying that the electrical ingnition risks are in fact an issue here?"

Ask yourself this question, "why has AAR not been resumed?".

On the question of what is in the QinetiQ report; a statement that the risk level for the fuel system is "remote", and there are 30 reasons why it is not ALARP. And once again, if a system is remote and not ALARP, it is not safe.

This being the case, under the Health and Safety Act, MoD (as an employer) is failing in its duty to its employees and the general public.

DV

[Winco]

buoy 15

I am annoyed that you have been allowed back so soon (I would have banned you for life following your comments) - I expected more from Danny and the rest of the Pprune team frankly, but there you go.

I think BEagle summed it up perfectly, you are not wanted here. Please go away and pedal your sick thoughts elsewhere.

[JFZ90]

JFZ90.

Quote:

"Are you saying that the electrical ingnition risks are in fact an issue here?"
Ask yourself this question, "why has AAR not been resumed?".

On the question of what is in the QinetiQ report; a statement that the risk level for the fuel system is "remote", and there are 30 reasons why it is not ALARP. And once again, if a system is remote and not ALARP, it is not safe.

This being the case, under the Health and Safety Act, MoD (as an employer) is failing in its duty to its employees and the general public.

DV

Are you saying one of the recs in the QQ report comments on electrical ignition risks? I'm inclined to think they don't otherwise it would've been qouted here by now. If there is one, what exactly does it say?

I assumed the AAR limitation was related to some of the unknown system-system behaviour issues inflight & pressure spikes etc. - hence nothing to do with electrical ignition issues as you seem to imply above? Edsett - can you comment on this?

[Radley]

Dont know what he said, but it must have psd off a few chaps.

[Tappers Dad]

I understand that a Nimrod from 201 Squadron will be escorted by two Tornado F3s from RAF Leuchars in the flypast of 55 aircraft at 1pm will following the Trooping the Colour ceremony in Horseguards Parade, London.



So they are now flying un-airworthy a/c over the most densely populated area of the the country, or has this particular Nimrod had all it's fuel seals changed in the last three weeks!!!!! and all the risks are now ALARP ???

[airsound]

You are, as ever, quite right, TD. The Torygraph had the story set up for tomorrow, complete with picture of said MR2 and F3s in the rehearsal flypast. For some unfathomable reason, they’ve decided not to run it.

Channel 4 News and Today programme have pleaded more interesting political stories as their reasons for not publicising this strange decision by the MoD.

I’m hoping the flypast will be live on BBC News (News 24 as used to be) on Saturday.

airsound

[buoy15]

TD
Your emotive posts are not helping the situation
We do not have the luxury of the Shackelton sqn days - the Nimrod is part of the Kinloss Orbat (pool) and it's possible a 201 Sqn crew will be manning it for the flypast

Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely

It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?

I will now take this opportunity to apologise unreservedly to Pprune Mod and posters, and most importantly, the relatives and friends of my eleven fellow crew mates of XV230, who I flew with and trained over the years, for any offence or hurt I may have caused on this thread, regarding my previous posts

When you spend 32 years and 10,000 hours on type, you tend to get attached and supportive - I trust you will understand

God Bless and regards B15

[buoy15]

Beags
"Please go away and annoy someone else now"

Need some tips - youv'e been doing it for years my bonny lad:ok:

[Tappers Dad]

Buoy15



Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely

It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?


My point is this a/c is not ALARP and won't be for some time , had crew 3 XV230 known their a/c was not airworthy I am sure that would not have flown it that day. As Bob Ainsworth said the accident could have happenned to any of the nimrods as they were not airworthy.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7417498.stm

[Biggus]

Buoy 15,

I thought the crew of XV230 was 12 RAF (not 11) and two LOs? An apology to the relatives of the LOs might also be in order?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Today, 5 of your un-airworthy Nimrods got airborne on time for various sorties, and landed safely

It also happened yesterday, the day before, last week, last month - what is your point?

Airworthiness, or the lack thereof, does not equate to avoidance or occurrence of an accident.

In the case of a hazard which has a catastrophic consequence, there is a prescribed level of probability which is judged to be commensurate with the assessed hazard.

A hazard resulting in the loss of the aircraft in the civilian world would be termed 'Catastrophic'. the required probability of such an event is 'extremely improbable', which is considered to be not more than one event per 1,000,000,000 flying hours.

Approximately what percentage of that one billion do your on-time departures and safe returns amount to? Would you consider it a statistically significant sample? I doubt if I would.

(And before someone berates me about using civilian airworthiness risk numbers, I note that the various MoD regs which someone kindly supplied a link for earlier note that the MoD target/policy is to achieve levels of safety 'not worse than' civil. Even if you were a couple or orders of magnitude worse by policy, that's still one event per ten million hours. Even if you flew the Nimrod fleet to its design life and beyond, you'd never get a statistically useful fraction of that exposure.)

I feel the need to respond to this because the "we haven't had an incident so we must be ok" attitude prevails in my part of the industry too, and it's just as wrong.

[tucumseh]

MF Scientist

I feel the need to respond to this because the "we haven't had an incident so we must be ok" attitude prevails in my part of the industry too, and it's just as wrong.



Excellent. Spot on. And MoD's own Regulations specifically say this shall not be used to justify a safety argument. Unfortunately, it became the norm long ago and is the argument routinely trotted out by Ministers and MoD.

People (not least MoD themselves) continue to confuse airworthiness, safety, fitness for purpose and serviceability. The admission by the MoD was that the Nimrod fleet (and by extension most other aircraft as the processes, procedures and regulations are the same) was/is not airworthy. Given the extraordinarily long list of actions necessary to satisfy the MoD's own requirements, I doubt very much if they are today, or will be in the near future. I acknowledge this resurrection, if it happens, will be of biblical proportions, but that is the concern of MoD and the staffs who, over the last 20 years, knowingly accepted greater and greater risk. Until....... Their position is indefensible, made worse by the onus being on MoD to demonstrate airworthiness; whereas with a single phone call anyone can demonstrate it is NOT airworthy.


This list is not just QQ's "30 recommendations" - they just touch the surface. The reports are damning enough, yet in a way benign and clearly diluted because the recommendations go nowhere near addressing the issues discussed in the main narrative. This was touched on earlier when it was reported that the early drafts of the reports had mysteriously disappeared - that particular audit trail would have been illuminating.

[tucumseh]

People (not least MoD themselves) continue to confuse airworthiness, safety, fitness for purpose and serviceability.

And just to emphasise this, in response to criticism that an aircraft confirmed as unairworthy by the Coroner is taking part in todays flypast, the MoD respond "The Nimrod is safe to fly".

That is like asking "What day is it?" and getting the response "June".

Quite deliberate, and a gross insult to the families and the Coroner.

[Safety_Helmut]

A hazard resulting in the loss of the aircraft in the civilian world would be termed 'Catastrophic'. the required probability of such an event is 'extremely improbable', which is considered to be not more than one event per 1,000,000,000 flying hours.


Mad Scientist

You may cause some confusion with your numbers. The civil targets you discuss are to be found in EASA CS25. The target rate for hull (catastrophic) losses is no greater than 1E-7 per flying hour. The number you quote is for an individual critical system causing loss of the aircraft. EASA AMC25 explains this and makes the assumption that there are around 100 such systems onboard an aircraft. Hence the two orders of magnitude difference.

If you read JSP553, you will find the Nimrod target to be 1E-6 per flying hour. For a miltary aircaft derived from a civil airliner and used in a passenger carrying role the target should be 1E-7 per flying hour, eg VC10, Tristar.

S_H

[andgo]

Nimrod over London. So?

The coroner didn't "confirm the nimrod is not airworthy", he commented in his verdict as he can using rule 43 (I believe). He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.

If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.

TD. I understand your frustration

[buoy15]

Mad Scientist
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem
This survival record, which defies the designers and scientists, bears testament to the Ground and Aircrews who service and fly this remarkable ac
You only have to talk to the RN and Army to get an appreciation of what Nimrod provides for them, over land and sea
Unlike this government - this ac is fit for purpose and safe to fly

Profound apologies to all families - I was in the personal crew mode at the time of that post

Love Many, Trust a Few, Always paddle you own canoe:)

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Mad Scientist

You may cause some confusion with your numbers. The civil targets you discuss are to be found in EASA CS25. The target rate for hull (catastrophic) losses is no greater than 1E-7 per flying hour. The number you quote is for an individual critical system causing loss of the aircraft. EASA AMC25 explains this and makes the assumption that there are around 100 such systems onboard an aircraft. Hence the two orders of magnitude difference.

If you read JSP553, you will find the Nimrod target to be 1E-6 per flying hour. For a miltary aircaft derived from a civil airliner and used in a passenger carrying role the target should be 1E-7 per flying hour, eg VC10, Tristar.

S_H

I think we may be in violent agreement here ;)

Since we're talking about a specific catastrophic event, rather than any of the one hundred, the key is the 10e-9 rate, not the overall airframe design 10e-7.

Interesting that Nimrod uses one order of magnitude less. I assume it's the design rate i.e. equivalent to the EASA/FAR rate?

Incidentally the civil 'all-causes' expected rate is also 10e-6 (and is borne out by recent statistics) but that includes all the non-design causes, which I'd guess in military operations, even in peace, would be expected to run at a higher rate.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Mad Scientist
I can't get my head round your thinking
When Nimrod was concepted - as with other ac - a percieved loss (attrition rate) was predicted, based on it's employment and the extremes of conditions it was to operate in
During an ac's predicted life (48000 hrs for civil?) - but for Military? (turning and burning at 300ft at night in ****ty conditions on SAR or on Lo Level Ops?)
The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date
Accordingly, we should have lost half the fleet by now
Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem


Sorry, you're confusing design life - which addresses issues such as airframe fatigue, system wear-out and reliability - with safety terms. The design life (you quote 48,000hrs) is supposed to be the individual airframe life which can be reached without anything breaking due to passage of time that isn't foreseen. It's not related to the chance of an accident or other incident.

You emphatically should not have lost half the fleet by now.

Taking a service fleet of, say, 50 aircraft (I believe it was originally 46 MR1 + 3 R1 ?) with an average flight time on the current fleet of 20,000hrs as you say, and ignoring the aircraft no longer operating (which would drag the average down a bit) you've accumulated a total of 50*20,000 = 1 million FH on the feet. Not too shabby.

Now, from the statement that the original Nimrod design catastrophic loss rate was 1 per million FH (provided by S_H) that means that on average would one have expected to lose one aircraft due to a design fault in that time. Assuming a similar rate between 'operational'/'all-causes' losses and 'design' losses as in the civil world (i.e. a factor of ten) I would also therefore have expected to lose 9 other aircraft due to 'other causes' (weather/human error/etc). Given that the one million FH total is on the generous side, perhaps 6 'all causes' accidents would be expected.

You quote 1 'design fault error' and 3 'other causes' losses. Which is statistically about right for a fleet of that size and age.

The problem is that once you know of a specific design fault you did NOT account for in your original safety assessments you have to go back and re-account for it - even if your historical loss rate is ok, what it may now tell you is that your predicted loss rate is optimistic. Which means, if you can't simply absorb the new prediction and stay 'on target' then you have to do something.

[KeepItTidy]

Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.

But today was not about what the BBC are posting and saying the MOD was wrong, from our point of view it was a show of the Nimrod to the people of the UK that it is still here to do buisness and the flypast for us was more a tribute to the guys lost than anything else.
And can i say 201 done a mighty fine low pass on return , still a lovely sight coming over low then the roar as engines spool up :)

I understand the families concerns and do sympathise, everything on the news now is all doom and gloom about the Nimrod but surely for one day can we not have any media coverage that is negative. This was a salute to all the troops lost in the conflicts rather than the Queens birthday. Tonight im sure at the CXX birthday bash a few toasts will be raised.

[Tappers Dad]

buoy15 & The Old Fat One

Sorry Guys but do you really think there is nothing wrong with the Nimrod ??

Bob Ainsworth said it was flying around for years with a design flaw, the Coroner said it was un airworthy and Haddon-Cave has the following remit.

In light of the board of inquiry report:

· To examine the arrangements for assuring the airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod MR2 in the period from its introduction in 1979 to the accident on 2 September 2006, including hazard analysis, the safety case compiled in 2005, maintenance arrangements, and responses to any earlier incidents which might have highlighted the risk and led to corrective action;

· To assess where responsibility lies for any failures and what lessons are to be learned;

· To assess more broadly the process for compiling safety cases, taking account of best practice in the civilian and military world;

· And to make recommendations to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable, if necessary by way of interim report.



You can stick your fingers in your ears and go la la la la as much as you like but the question mark over the safety of the Nimrod isn't going away.

PS;
From the Nimrod-review.org website
23rd May 2008
CONCLUSION OF THE INQUEST INTO THE DEATHS OF THE FOURTEEN SERVICEMEN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE LOSS OF XV230 IN AFGHANISTAN ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2006
•
The Inquest into the loss of those on board the Nimrod XV230 before HM Deputy Assistant Coroner for Oxfordshire, Mr Andrew Walker, has now concluded after 3 weeks.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has taken a close interest in the hearing and the evidence presented. He has had counsel present throughout the proceedings, Mr Peter Ferrer. Much of the evidence has also been observed by Counsel to the Review, Mr Luke Parsons QC and Miss Caroline Pounds.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC and his team with be carefully studying the transcript of the hearing and the documents and statements in evidence, together with the narrative verdict of the Coroner.
•
It is likely that Mr Haddon-Cave QC will want to see, and further question, a number of the key witnesses who gave evidence at the Inquest.
•
Mr Haddon-Cave QC has noted the Coroner’s Rule 43 recommendation that the Nimrod fleet be grounded, pending demonstration that airworthiness risks have been reduced to ALARP. Mr Haddon-Cave QC will be closely examining all the currently available evidence, including that relied upon by the Coroner.
•
As he has previously indicated, Mr Haddon-Cave QC will issue an interim report if he decides any matter requires urgent action.

[davejb]

On a personal note, as ex-Nimrod MR1 and MR2 aircrew, and bearing in mind the times I went flying with less than 100% faith in the aircraft
EG: Bahamas Mama - I was on a similar flight, I attended several 'we think X is the problem, it's safe to fly' briefings from (amongst others) probably THE most respected eng in the fleet - guess what? The same fault recurred at about 36000 ft over the Hebrides while my ar*e was glued temporarily to the seat.. He was talking complete bollocks, as this and subsequent events proved.


...I would not be surprised if the Nimrod weren't actually safe right now, the BOI and the coroner weren't that far apart in their reasoning for the loss of 230, and I think it highly likely that current measures have indeed made a repeat of 230 virtually impossible. BUT...

The coroner actually highlighted a systematic failure in the safety chain - the RAF itself had ignored its own regulations for airworthiness, and THAT was why 230 went in. The factors that led to 230 being lost should have been spotted decades ago... had the RAF actually done what it was supposed to have done then the problem would have been identified and a work round or fix implemented WITHOUT 230 going in.

So what else is out there, what other problem might arise from the gaps in effective safety management over the past 4 decades? Nimrod AAR had been going on for 25 years before the flaw in the operation surfaced - maybe next week one of the airframes reaches the 25000th cycling of the bomb doors and the wings fall off? The 'it's safe' merchants are short sighted, you are all arguing that 'we have fixed all known problems' whilst the REAL problem, as identified by the coroner, is that the lack of effective safety management means that we have no idea at all what problems are actually out there.

Keep it tidy:
Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.

- 230 was 's' on take off too, didn't help much, did it?


Since 1969, we have lost 1 to a birdstrike -1 to a Display error -1 to an engine failure - and 1 to an unforseen re-fuel problem


Since I first flew Nimrod in 1978, I doubt there have been more than 30 operational aircraft on the go, the number has dwindled somewhat over the years ...I'd say 30 aircraft for 'the fleet' was a generous exaggeration most years. Out of these 4 have crashed. Call me picky, but a 15% crash rate seems quite high (If you calculate it based on the number of actual aircraft eng coord declare each day the percentage gets rather more worrying. I think we've also been very lucky - I've certainly logged a few sorties I was surprised to survive over the years, I bet everyone here with Nimrod hours will say the same.


The majority of the fleet has averaged 20,000hrs to date


Jesus, this is even worse - 4 lost aircraft in what, let's be generous, 600,000 hours? Good job BA don't lose them that often, isn't it? I bet there are B737's out there with almost the same number of hours on as the kipper fleet!


If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.


Don't be...no, I don't want to wear the asterisk key out - the fact is that the RAF can operate anything they want in our airspace, the RAF have a get out of jail free card. It must be admitted that the chances of the Nimrod bursting into flames during the flypast and plummeting into Buck house, immolating the Royal family and causing a consititutional crisis whereby some distant cousin called 'Colin Haverthwaite' ends up as King Colin I is a little unlikely.

Look, for the hard of thinking out there - there are actually definitions of airworthiness and the like, it isn't a matter of opinion, it's a matter of meeting the standards laid down in the relevant docs. If you meet the standards in the docs then your aircraft is airworthy, if you don't, then it de facto is not airworthy. The problem is that the RAF has been saving money by not meeting the standards, figuring nothing will happen and nobody would ever know. Now it's been caught out, and to actually meet the standards laid down in its own docs will take years and lots of dosh...this happens when you put things off for 30 or so years, the costs sort of mount up. The RAF has neither (docs, dosh), so it's decided to ignore its own docs and insist everything is okay after all. This will work right up until the next big accident.

Keep it tidy: This is not a reflection on the engineers, Flems etc... the problem is above station level, nobody is now, or ever has been, pointing fingers at the line or the aircrews. The corner cutting has occurred at much higher level.


Edit to add:
Still looking good on the flypast guys - well done.

[tucumseh]

Andgo and TOFO


The coroner didn't "confirm the nimrod is not airworthy", he commented in his verdict as he can using rule 43 (I believe). He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.

If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.


Again, I’m afraid.

In the BoI report, ACM Sir Clive Loader stated the MoD’s airworthiness regulations had not been implemented properly and, recognising that the regulations are not aircraft-specific, recommended that the wider impact of this failure be addressed. In making this statement, he was (knowingly or otherwise) re-iterating long standing and oft-made advice to very senior MoD staffs and Ministers. For example, 18-24 months previously, before XV230 crashed, Min(AF) (Adam Ingram) was told the same thing, twice, in writing. He denied it, in writing. In 2000 the DPA 3 Star was told the same, in writing. He didn’t respond. His boss and numerous 2 Stars before that – they ignored it but did place in writing their ruling that refusing an instruction to ignore the airworthiness regulations was a disciplinary offence. (The direct results of their in-action can be read in the BoI reports). And so on, back to (in my personal experience) 1990.

In December 2007 Des Browne agreed with ACM Loader. (I concede he probably didn’t know he was contradicting a long line of his junior staffs, in the process making them look even more foolish. If he did know, I applaud him).

Last month, the Coroner heard numerous witnesses, who detailed specific failures (but by no means all of them). This added detail to the simple statement by ACM Loader, thus establishing more firmly (i.e. confirming) Browne’s admission that the regulations had not been implemented.

Given the above, I find any assertion that the aircraft is airworthy bizarre. Is there any evidence that the acknowledged failures to implement the regulations have been corrected? KeepitTidy made an illuminating and honest comment;

Well I can assure you the aircraft was serviceable today when it took off to what standards we have to work to.

Am I correct that there is a certain nervousness now that it has become known that maintainers have NOT been working to up to date or maintained standards – denied to them because the airworthiness regulations have not been implemented? Or have not been able to complete repairs because they lack proper tools and test equipment? Basics.

[BlackIsle]

Tuc you are indeed correct about a certain nervousness - as you will know there are many across the trades and amongst the crews who feel it and its hardly surprising is it

[Oldlae]

what standards we have to work to.
IMHO the maintainers are working to the inspections laid down, they would not be looking for design faults. I am sure that they are following the requirements most carefully as they have always done; when the aircraft is signed off it means that they are complying with the regulations in place. If test equipment was required for a check, I cannot conceive that an engineer would sign for compliance if the test gear was not available. It would probably require a red line entry by an eng. officer to clear it. It's a long time since I certified military aircraft as serviceable to fly but I do not think that the principles have changed that much.

[nigegilb]

The Coroner has come in for severe criticism from some quarters on this thread. Listening to the families of the dead he is described as something of a hero. I was there in person when he said Nimrod was not airworthy. I believe him. He has been so effective, the Govt passed legislation last week enabling them to appoint their coroner of choice for sensitive inquests and the right to ban juries. The Coroner's representative body was not consulted. Those with the blinkers firmly attached, just carry on. Pretty soon, no information about the deaths of British servicemen will be made available to the public. A form of censorship is already happening with the deaths of special forces personnel.

Thought I would post up a summary of some of the cases he has presided over.

Andrew Walker: the coroner the MoD couldn't gag

(Gill Allen/The Times)
Andrew Walker was appointed as coroner only temporarily
Nico Hines
Andrew Walker, the Deputy Coroner for Oxfordshire, has been defiantly standing up to the military since lambasting US forces twice in 2003.

He first called for criminal charges to be considered against US servicemen involved in the “friendly fire” killing of the ITN reporter Terry Lloyd and then criticised Washington for refusing to co-operate in the inquest of Lance Corporal Matty Hull, another victim of American weaponry.

In the five years since, Mr Walker’s criticism has often been reserved for the Ministry of Defence. The coroner is responsible for dozens of inquests into the deaths of British servicemen killed in Iraq and Afghanistan because RAF Brize Norton, where many bodies arrive back in the UK, is within his remit.

In his verdicts, Mr Walker has labelled MoD behaviour as “inexcusable”, “a breach of trust”, “penny-pinching” and “unforgiveable”.


Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, became so infuriated with Mr Walker’s damning verdicts that he called unsuccessfully for a ban on coroners using phrases such as "serious failures" or "serious failings" for soldiers killed in active service.

In September 2006 Mr Walker became embroiled in another row with the MoD. He was accidentally given a raft of documents while investigating the deaths of 14 servicemen in an RAF Nimrod. When the ministry demanded the papers back the coroner refused, saying he could not trust that the material would be seen again if it were returned.

Mr Walker was originally drafted in to help clear the backlog of military inquests in Oxfordshire on a temporary basis in June 2006. To the chagrin of the MoD, he is still there.

Inquests heard by Andrew Walker

Steven Roberts, 33 Sergeant Steven Roberts was shot dead in Iraq in 2003 after giving his body armour to a colleague because of equipment shortages. Mr Walker blamed the Army for "serious failings" in ensuring that soldiers had the necessary supplies. "To send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment is, in my view, unforgivable and inexcusable and represents a breach of trust the soldiers have in those in government,” he said.

Jason Smith, 32 TA Private Jason Smith died of heatstroke in Iraq in August 2003 after falling ill in temperatures of more than 54C. Mr Walker blamed his death on "a serious failure to recognise and take appropriate steps to address the difficulty he had in adjusting to the climate".

James Philippson, 29

Captain James Philippson of 7 Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, died in a gunfight with Taleban troops in 2006 in which British forces were “totally out-gunned”. Mr Walker said: “To send soldiers into a combat zone without basic equipment is unforgivable, inexcusable and a breach of trust between the soldiers and those who govern them.”

Sean Tansey, 26 Lance Corporal Sean Tansey died in August 2006. He was repairing a light tank in Helmand province, Afghanistan, when the supports beneath the vehicle slipped and he was crushed to death. Mr Walker said: "This court has heard evidence of the failure to provide basic equipment for the maintenance of vehicles, which has been described by one witness as amounting to a gross or serious failure."

Lee Hopkins, 35, Sharron Elliott, 34, Ben Nowak, 27, and Jason Hylton, 33 Mr Walker ruled that Warrant Officer Lee Hopkins, Staff Sergeant Sharron Elliott, Corporal Ben Nowak and Marine Jason Hylton were unlawfully killed on a river near Basra. He said that if the Royal Marines' boat had been fitted with an electronic counter measure it was "more likely than not" that the device would not have gone off in November 2006. The coroner concluded that the deaths amounted to "a really serious failure to follow basic procedure".

Matty Hull, 25 Mr Walker described the killing of Lance Corporal of Horse Matty Hull by a US pilot as "unlawful", not an "honest mistake" but a "criminal act". The Pentagon rejected his verdict. The inquest heard that L/Cpl Hull died because his unit was not supplied with Blue Force Tracker, an electronic device which could automatically have identified them as friendly forces.

Daniel Wright, 25 Mr Walker concluded that “MoD penny-pinching” resulted in Captain Daniel Wright dying a parachute accident at RAF Brize Norton because he was deprived of a £50 radio “Let there be no doubt — this tragedy happened for the want of a simple, inexpensive piece of equipment," he said.

Another Inquest verdict was heard last weekend just to show that Walker is not a lone trouble maker;

Armed Forces Minister apologises for 'avoidable' submarine deaths

IMAGE :1 of 2
Michael Evans, Defence Editor
A minister and the head of the Royal Navy made public apologies yesterday after a report into the deaths of two crew who were killed in an explosion on a nuclear submarine uncovered safety flaws and dangerously defective equipment.

Leading Operator Mechanic Paul McCann, 32, and Operator Mechanic Anthony Huntrod, 20, were killed on board HMS Tireless when an oxygen-generating device blew up as they activated it during a training exercise under the Arctic ice cap on March 20 last year.

Alan and Brenda Huntrod, parents of Operator Mechanic Huntrod, said the report by the Royal Navy board of inquiry showed “incredibly scant regard” for personnel safety. “We feel that if this was in any other walk of life, there would have been a prosecution for corporate manslaughter,” they said. “In our view the report sets out in clear detail overwhelming evidence of gross negligence, making the Ministry of Defence culpable for the death of our son, Anthony, and Paul.”

Bob Ainsworth, the Armed Forces Minister, sitting next to Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the First Sea Lord, at a press conference, confessed that the failings that led to the deaths had been avoidable and that the ministry was responsible. “I would like to apologise to the families,” he said. The devices have been recalled.


Sailors killed in sub blast named
Two British sailors killed in submarine accident
More troubled waters for Navy after sub accident
The board of inquiry discovered that 996 of the “Scogs” (self-contained oxygen generators) had been defined as unserviceable and placed in a hazardous waste store. But they had been put back into service, regraded “A1” and the relevant paperwork had been changed. Royal Navy military police also found that the sodium chlorate briquettes in the containers, which had to be ignited to produce oxygen, had been removed from drying ovens too soon, which had led to cracks.

The board of inquiry report, drawn up by Captain Jake Moores, said it was possible, “but cannot be proved”, that a number of the defective Scogs were among those sent to Tireless. After his 15-month investigation he concluded that oil had probably seeped into the device while it was stored in the submarine, and that the canister had been damaged previously. The combination caused a “huge explosion”.

The maker of the devices had said in a leaflet that if oil seeped into the generator it could lead to an explosion. Captain Moores added that despite recommendations that they be stored in a “clean, dry environment”, the Scogs for Tireless sat uncovered on a jetty for two weeks.

And another Coroner reached a verdict this week. Walker is not alone in criticising the Govt.

Soldier died in vehicle lacking defence system
By Nigel Bunyan
Last Updated: 7:22PM BST 13/06/2008
A coroner has called for a change in Army policy after a soldier fighting in Afghanistan died in an armoured vehicle that had not been fitted with electronic equipment capable of disabling roadside bombs.

Guardsman Neil 'Tony' Downes, 20, from Droylesden, Greater Manchester, was blown 20 metres into a ditch when insurgents detonated a bomb by remote control.

The vehicle in front of him was equipped with an ECM (Electronic Counter Measure) and therefore survived the attack.

Guardsman Downes' mother, Sheryl, 44, told an inquest in Stockport: "In my opinion, having the ECM fitted on Tony's vehicle might have saved his life.

"I cannot understand why all vehicles do not have these systems fitted. It will be preying on my mind for the rest of my life. I just do not want other family to go through what I have."

Her husband, Ronnie, 60, said: "I would say that it should be fitted as standard to all vehicles because it obviously saves lives".

The south Manchester coroner, John Pollard, said he would be writing to the Ministry of Defence over the issue.

In recording a verdict of unlawful killing, he said: "It is my view that all vehicles used in this type of operation should be adapted to be able to carry their own ECM equipment.

"If some vehicles are not so equipped, then it should be clearly understood that the order of march should be arranged to afford protection at all times to those vehicles and that the order of march should not be deviated from, save in exceptional circumstances."

The inquest heard that Guardsman Downes, described by commanding officers as "resolute and steadfast", was on a six-month tour with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards.

On June 9 last year he was a gunner in an armoured vehicle that was among a convoy of 10 dispatched to investigate reports of gunfire.

His vehicle had not been fitted with ECM despite the fact that it was carrying more than 200 grenades.

The bomb that killed him was detonated by remote control. ECM might have saved him by either jamming or scrambling the bomb's detonation mechanism.

[tucumseh]

Oldlae


It's a long time since I certified military aircraft as serviceable to fly but I do not think that the principles have changed that much.


Same here – a long time. But “in our day” we didn’t have extraordinary commercial pressures applied to our “business”. The boundaries of responsibility were clear and we did not have the complication of contractors working alongside whose management was not SENGO or AEO, but beancounters wanting to make as big a profit as they could. I simply can’t imagine what it must be like under these circumstances and I’m glad I laid my tools down long ago. But I do know what it’s like in the procurement side – beancounters from the same mould constantly cutting airworthiness and safety funding, and non-technical bosses making (and over-ruling) engineering design decisions, requiring precious time and money to track down and correct when they’re not looking. (And just praying you catch them all because the rules simply don't cater for such a ludicrous scenario).


If I may quote the QQ March 2006 report, which I’m sure most have read anyway;

“….overall control and quality of work was not helped by the loss of (Test Equipment/Ground Support Equipment), inadequate tooling and poor upkeep of the APs”.

“It is suggested that (up to date) documentation should be promulgated….”

“There is a lack of expertise and a critical loss of experienced personnel that has had a major impact upon efficiency…. “.

“No routine checks (or) examination for fatigue cracking, corrosion or damage” are conducted because there is “no contractual obligation”. FFS!!!!


While an obvious statement, I find this one particularly damning, as it (correctly) draws the MRA4 programme into the equation. It is easy for me to say this, but the fact remains if MRA4 hadn’t been 10 years late…………..

“The current fleet age is in excess of 30 years which is considerably beyond the initial design requirement for the aircraft. Furthermore, the replacement aircraft – Nimrod MRA4 – has a life expectancy of only 25 years which is representative of the expected performance of modern build standards”.

[andgo]

nigegilb.
I am not trying to criticise the coroner, but unlike you I'm not jumping on the 'everyone in the Mil is covering up' band wagon just because a 'deputy assistant coroner' with 3 weeks Nimrod experience, says so.

The BOI spent over a year looking at this case with some highly respected Nimrod people on the board. They also examined the same evidence as the Coroner including the expert witnesses. The board came to their findings in an effort to make the ac safer such that the terrible events of 230 are not repeated. I was at the coroners and from the start he appeared to want to find a different outcome to the board. Sorry nige i'm just not in the 'coroners fan club' just because he's slagging off the military.

If you wish to put your faith in the opinion of a 'deputy assistant coroner' so be it. You don't fly the jet. I will personally pay more heed to the board members who have a real 'expert' opinion.

[Unsworth]

He cannot rule, confirm, or state airworthyness. Not his call.

True, the Coroner cannot do as you say.


If the ac is not airworthy it wouldnt be flying in British, or any body elses airspace.

Really? Can you verify this? If so I am greatly reassured....

[nigegilb]

andgo, people in the military have been gagged. They may not have a voice, but they do have a choice. Nearly 1,500 army officers left in the 12 months to April, 50% more than joined. The voting with feet option is being exercised.

Cover up?-No. Blinkers on?-Yes.

The Govt fights 2 wars on the cheap, the least it could do is provide people who are willing to lay their lives down, decent equipment. It might even stem the exodus.

If you would take your blinkers off for a moment, you would see that on introduction to service, MRA4 will not be fit for purpose. This argument about Nimrod MR2 is not happening in isolation, it is just one example of severe under-funding. Please do not feel that critical voices are picking on you.

General Dannatt has criticised this Govt, he has been passed over. According to reports the PM would rather have either of the 2 most senior RAF officers as the supreme commander. Now why is that? Because they won't rock the boat?

Funny thing is, one of those senior RAF officers, would rather have a cushty little job in industry.

Says it all for me.

[andgo]

Nigegilb

No blikers on, just trying to do a difficult job in very difficult circumstances.
You have done a great deal of good in the past bringing problems to the fore, I for one appreciate it. However We use the kit we have to, scaremongering the population into thinking that a Nimrod may just drop out of the sky is not helpful. XV230 was a tradgic accident, that could have been avoided. If people/organisations are found culpable then so be it.

The jet is safer today than it has been in years, more work is needed, and it is been done.

[nigegilb]

AG, as a civvy now, I appreciate the job you are doing, I have watched Torpy closely, I don't think he is prepared to take too great a risk with Nimrod. For me, the clincher is his reaction to the kandahar mayday, and the cessation of AAR. The deision was not entirely logical and could be lifted at any time to improve in-theatre capability. The arguments presented by people such as yourself would justify such a decision. My reading of the refusal to reinstate AAR is that it is mainly political. Either by Torpy or his defence minister. My conclusion is that Nimrod MR2 is now safe enough, but I still firmly believe that Torpy and his ministers are being dishonest in claiming the aircraft is technically airworthy.

MRA4 will be pushed into service without war-going protection, but arguably, safer to fly that MR2. Hardly a ringing endorsement of RAF wartime leadership.

I hope Torpy is replaced soon with a war leader prepared to make tough decisions and push the Govt around, publically if necessary, to get what he wants.

In the mean time I will keep pushing in my own way but at the same time, making absolutely clear my support for the guys on the frontline doing a very difficult job.

All the best,

NG

[andgo]

Nige.

Agreed on most points.

AAR will not be re-introduced in part due to the fact that a serious fault could not be reproduced on the ground, and in part as you say politics, even if we could fix it.

AG:)

[nigegilb]

andgo, a final point on your comment and without wishing to open up the hornets nest one more time. There is no difference between the Kandahar fuel leak and the previous fuel leaks that went before it. As fas as I know, it has never been possible to re-create the in-flight conditions. What was different about this incident was the massive publicity and the associated political fallout. Torpy was happy to take the risks on your behalf before Kandahar but not afterwards. Not sure if that should worry you or not. I heard a little rumour that some people criticised the captain for the Mayday into Kandahar. I hope they are not true. I fly a modern aircraft and modern aircraft do not leak fuel. Having spoken with some seniors at Kinloss there appears to be an acceptance that fuel leaks are OK and can be managed on the Nimrod. If you are happy with that, then again, you are in the military and you are all big boys. Nothing we say will change your mind.

The publicity and political fall out is not nice if you are in the middle of it and trying to do a bloody difficult job. All I can add, is that good things come of it in the end. I speak from experience on that.

It is now in the hands of the QC. Coroner Walker can say or recommend anything he wishes but the Govt does not have to comply. They will have no choice with the QC's recommendations. I guess we all now, need to be patient.

Barring anything new, I withdraw once more from the debate.

Safe flying. :ok:

[Exrigger]

Nigegilb

and modern aircraft do not leak fuel

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20373668/

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CWU/is_2005_Jan_4/ai_n8642342

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1B35C19F-120C-48FE-8B89-5774C72F9B6B.htm

http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn8692

These are just a few with a simple google search.

[nigegilb]

For the pedantics out there, modern aircraft do not routinely leak fuel. If you think carrying 11 fuel leaks is normal than more fool you.

In 18 years I have seen one fuel leak on a 35 year old Hercules prompting an immediate RTB and fix by Lye eng wg.

You have been conditioned to think that it is normal to get leaks and that the response of removing ignition sources is perfectly adequate.

Nimrod is beyond it's sell by date, over-torquing joints and sending the problem further down the line is hardly best engineering practice.

"..if you're removing an aluminium bolt and replacing it with a steel one - itself a howler, explained very clearly by QQ. Think of something simple like the expansion bolts that hold your cylinder head and engine block together in your car. The manufacturer puts a matched set in, made from the same material, at the same torque setting for very good reason. What would happen if you took out half the bolts at random and replaced them with bolts of a dissimilar metal. The "expansion" characteristics change and you'd probably blow a gasket. You wouldn't do it in your car, so why do it in an aircraft in an area where the whole point is to seal fuel tanks."

Nice use of Al Jazeera though.

Boeing 787 will have fuel tank protection it arrives in the same year as MRA4, a military aircraft procured for the front line. MRA4 will not have fuel tank protection.

And it won't have a whole lot of other protection either. You might want to question your own CoC for that decision making.

[davejb]

Tofo,
not wishing to get too involved in arguing the toss here, but since when have we had that many airframes on the eng coord boards? As far as I am aware there were 35 MR2, one of which didn't last all that long unfortunately, and 3 R1, from 46 MR1's originally delivered. I think 30 aircraft actually doing the flypro out of 38 max for the past 30 years is a very generous estimate, in fact I'd be surprised if for most of that time we got much into double figures.

Dave

[Exrigger]

Nigegilb, I was pointing out that your statement that modern aircraft do not leak fuel was not correct, you now add the word routinely which obviously changes your original statement quite considerably and I would not have posted my reply.

It is clear that modern aircraft do leak fuel, additionally, those I posted were just a small selection of those that have had leaks, I could have added quite a few more.

That aside, nowhere did I say that carrying leaks is normal, nor did I agree, disagree or give any indication of my views on the current discussion about the fuel leaks, wether I think the Nimrod is beyond its sell by date or for that matter fuel tank protection between Nimrod MRA4
(not getting apparently) and Boeing 787 (is getting apparently, by the way 707 do not have protection, but has starting to leak from wing spars and integral tank wing panels and are being carried as acceptable within Boeings maintenance procedures). I will state that I have never been conditioned into accepting anything that I do not believe as being correct and I am nobodys fool.

Your paragraph reference the aluminium bolt versus the steel bolt has no relevance to me in the context of my response to one part of your post.

[nigegilb]

I apologise for not pointing out the first time, that modern airliners do not routinely leak fuel, I thought the point I was making was obvious. We do, of course, have emergency procedures in the event that a fuel leak is discovered. But please, do not confuse MR2 with a modern aircraft. The first example you quoted was a 737 800, with a bolt pierced fuel tank. Design fault? "Continuously manufactured by Boeing since 1967 with over 7,800 ordered and over 5,600 delivered (as of 2008), there are over 1,250 of the type airborne at any given time. On average, a 737 departs or lands somewhere every five seconds." I am not surprised in the least that the odd one develops a fuel leak. Now, to bring us all back to reality, the Nimrod fragged to be flown down to Brize Norton at the beginning of the Inquest, reportedly had a fuel leak. If I asked every Nimrod pilot at Kinloss if they had flown in an aircraft with a fuel leak/weep what do you think the percentage of positive answers might be?

Ed Set, argued that the Captain of the Kandahar Nimrod did not need to divert, after all his serious fuel leak ceased when the ac stopped tanking. It is normal to have gallons of fuel swishing around the bomb bay, even if Torpy didn't see fit to tell front line crews that all sources of ignition had been removed. It is a Nimrod you see and it is designed to survive a fuel leak just like a modern airliner. The Captain should have flown back to base, hundreds of miles away.

Honestly, a reality caption is needed here. Sorry if you do not accept it as normal, exrigger, but I can assure you, many people at Kinloss do. It is even OK for the cabin to stink of fumes after the ac has been depressurized.
No need to ground evacuate old boy, it is just the air conditioning system, should have taxied her in.

I really will withdraw from the argument now, my head hurts from banging it against the wall.

[dodgysootie]

nigegilb said:-

"If you think carrying 11 fuel leaks is normal than more fool you."

Here we go again with people trying to scaremonger, people with no idea of the facts!!!

The classification of fuel leaks is obviously unknown to "some people". FFS!, a one inch stain around a screw is classed as a fuel leak ( forming 2 hrs after refuel)! It is quite common for an aircraft ( Military or Civil) to "CARRY" many such leaks on the under/over side of the mainplanes where it will obviously does/or would not cause a problem ( i.e it would be "dried" by the airflow). Do you really expect any tradesman to allow any leaks in or around the fuselage or engine bays?!!

If you do, I for one would gladly stamp your coupon!

Sorry about the language... Just getting a bit fed up with "scaremongers" with no real grasp of whats been happening at ISK since that TRAGIC day..

Great to see the MR2 fly over a heavily populated area. Well done to all at ISK that made this possible. It made me feel proud.

RIP CXX/3

DS

[Tappers Dad]

http://www.sundaymail.co.uk/opinion/we-say/2008/06/15/no-defence-78057-20607186/

A NIMROD flew over the Palace yesterday as part of the Queen's birthday party.
But this flag-waving show of military strength was no cause for celebration for the families of 14 servicemen killed in a Nimrod crash in Afghanistan two years ago.
The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.
Sadly, anyone who has followed their conduct over this whole sorry affair will not be surprised.

:D:D


2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorized as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..

355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks

The list does not include 'potential incidents' as they are not recorded as a specific category of information and so I will not be able to provide this information to you. You should also be aware that the majority of incident reports are submitted by aircrew. Although ground crew can raise incident reports, faults identified while the aircraft is on the ground would normally be reported and rectified in accordance with laid-down maintenance and repair procedures, and therefore these faults would not form part of the aircraft incident records held by DASC
Obtained under the FOI act.

[Roland Pulfrew]

From the BBC website:

Graham Knight, whose son died in the crash, said: "We have gone through a three-week inquest in which the coroner said the planes were un-airworthy.

"Then they fly it over the most populated part of the country.

"It is like sticking two fingers up at the coroner and the MoD saying we can do what we want to do."

What a load of old bo****ks!

mileandahalf:

Well said

The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.

In the opinion of one person and one person ONLY!:=

[Mad_Mark]

2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007, aircraft incidents are categorized as an occurrence involving an aircraft which results in the aircraft sustaining damage or a person receiving an injury or which discloses a flight safety hazard or potential hazard..

355 Incidents of Fumes/Smoke
78 Incidents of Fires
93 Incidents of Fire Warnings
377 Incidents of Leaks
184 Incidents of Parts Detached
229 Incidents of Equipment failed to operate
55 Incidents of Structural Damage
11 Incidents of Fuel Transfer Problems
32 Incidents of Fuel Contamination
8 FuelTX Probe Leaks

I would like to see the detail of these 'incidents'. How many are simply incident reports that were filed by the air/ground-crew but subsequently found to be non-hazardous? How many occurred in the air and were thus real flight safety incidents as opposed to potential ones that were rectified before they became actual ones? How many of the structural damage ones were the result of ground equipment striking a stationery aircraft? How many of the smoke and fumes turned out to be nothing more than conditioning smells or smoke from the oven? How many of the fire warnings were spurious? How many of those fire incidents were simply the lids of the hot meals catching alight in the oven?

Numbers without detail are purely used to scare those that don't know any better.

I am sorry TD, but your credibility is next to zero at ISK these days. You mean well but your constant misrepresentation of the facts and figures has done your case more harm than good amongst those that know the aircraft.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[tucumseh]

What a load of old bo****ks!

I am sorry TD, but your credibility is next to zero at ISK these days.

TD doesn’t need me to speak for him, but I have a sneaky feeling that the MoD is chock full of aviators and engineers who wish they, and especially their superiors, had the gumption to do what he has done in the furtherance of flight safety.

If he has zero credibility rating at an air station, then God knows what they think of the dangerous morons who stand against him. I suspect this attitude, if it exists, is borne out of embarrassment that it has taken a grieving father to shake up a world that is wholly unfamiliar to him. Who benefits? Not TD – he lost a son and will never forget. You can park it in some remote part of your brain, but it’s always there and the trigger for the rest of his life will be seeing a military aircraft flying overhead. The fact that the crew may feel safer will be largely down to him.

Reserve contempt for those who did nothing.

[nigegilb]

And also reserve contempt for those who felt it necessary to keep sending up the Nimrod after massive in-flight fuel leaks when the test equipment was unable to recreate the fault on the ground.

NFF, we all know what that means.

Today's Times.

June 16, 2008
MoD rejected RAF's safety fears over Nimrod design

Michael Evans, Defence Editor

Vital safety features were left out of the design specification for Nimrod surveillance aircraft despite being requested by the Royal Air Force, an inquiry has revealed.

Fuel tank explosion protection and a ban on carrying fuel in the fuselage were both listed as “air staff requirements” (ASR) by the RAF. But they were among several items not included in the final design blueprint known as the “aircraft specification”. The RAF’s comments about the design criteria were rejected by the Ministry of Defence when it drew up the specifications for the aircraft.

The investigation was commissioned by the MoD after the death of 14 servicemen in a mid-air explosion on a Nimrod XV230 over southern Afghanistan in September 2006.

No fuel-protection system was fitted and the Nimrods were flown with fuel in the fuselage, according to the report drawn up by the defence research company QinetiQ.

The inquiry also discovered that the number of maintenance specialists at RAF Kinloss, where the aircraft is based, had been cut by nearly 24 per cent and that many workers were inexperienced on Nimrods. Meanwhile, operational demands were increasing.

“Low confidence in the safety of the Nimrod will have an impact on those who operate the aircraft. Occasions may arise when some operators may be reluctant to fly,” QinetiQ says.

The unpublished report, released to The Times under the Freedom of Information Act, makes 30 recommendations to improve safety, 21 of which are already being implemented. Six have been deferred because they relate to air-to-air refuelling and three others are still under consideration.

The report says that its investigators noted a number of differences between ASR and the final design. “The ASR required fuel tank explosion protection. This has not carried through to the aircraft specification,” it says. However, QinetiQ repeatedly highlights the dangers of a fire and explosion on the Nimrod.

The report says that no risk assessment had been undertaken concerning the presence of an explosive atmosphere in the fuel tanks “as the nature of this potential risk is not fully understood”. Further study should be instigated, QinetiQ says, adding: “The most significant risk presented by the fuel system is associated with fire/ explosion.”

MoD officials said that a fuel protection system consisting of explosive-suppressant foam around the tanks would not have prevented the Nimrod disaster in 2006. It has now been fitted to Hercules transport aircraft after a barrage of ground fire caused one to explode in Iraq in January 2005, killing ten military personnel. The Hercules was flying at low altitude, whereas Nimrods operate from high altitude, beyond the range of ground fire.

After a highly critical board of inquiry report into the Nimrod tragedy, published in December, the MoD said it had already ensured that the suspected cause — fuel leaking from a corroded coupling and igniting on contact with a hot-air pipe — had been addressed. The RAF’s top engineer announced that the Nimrods were safe.

However, the QinetiQ report highlights longstanding shortcomings that may have led to the Nimrod disaster, focusing particularly on the maintenance manpower shortages and huge pressure placed on the ageing aircraft.

A third inquiry into the Nimrod crash is still under way.

And guess what, fuel tank protection will not be on MRA4 either.