Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)

[Roland Pulfrew]

will be largely down to him.


Let's be generous and say it might be partly down to him. Of course the BOI and its recommendations had nothing to do with it. Nor the review of airworthiness. Nor the review of engineering procedures. :ugh:

As Mad Mark has pointed out already Lies and Statistics, I guess if you pulled a print-off of all the IRs produced for each of the acft types we operate you would get several thousand hits. I know I have submitted a few, on all of the types I have flown. Most were fairly innocuous, the figures quoted above are meaningless without context!!

[nigegilb]

RP, think about it. How many BOI's have resulted in an instant apology from the Govt and agreement to pay compensation? How many Inquests have resulted in the Coroner declaring an ac unairworthy.

Browne did not answer any difficult questions on the day he deferred them to a QC.

You have no idea how much work TD and others put in to the Inquest.

Have you wondered how the MoD case was blown out of the water. I have been privvy to some of the work. It is very impressive.

Elements at Kinloss are in denial. I am not really surprised. 377 leaks in 20 years. It becomes part of the culture doesn't it?

If you want a copy of the QQ report PM me then you can have a look at the engineering standards and implementation of airworthiness regulations for yourself.

Edited to add, as usual MoD add the rider that ESF would not have saved this aircraft. This rider appears in the Herc lost to a mine at Lashkar Gah and the J Herc lost to IED on a strip in Iraq. (My own sources have indicated that this ac suffered a fuel tank explosion).

In the case of the Nimrod, I have been told this morning that design specs dating back to 1981 and 1982 included details of fuel tank protection, one in the tanks and one in the dry bays. If this is the case, Nimrod might have been saved with ESF in the dry bay.

Remember folks, MRA4 will enter service with less protection than an airliner.

[Mad_Mark]

Well done tuc. Yet again your selective use of quotes has placed my words out of context. The words directly following those quoted by you were You mean well but your constant misrepresentation of the facts and figures...

As you can see, I and others at ISK accept that TD has means well but is doing the case no good by using inaccurate information. A classic example has been covered in this thread several times, the most recent of which was by dodgysottie only yesterday, that to do with the definition of a fuel leak. How many times must those of us that maintain or fly the aircraft explain what can be classed as a leak and what makes up the vast percentage of leaks? Using straight figures without the detail is simply misleading those that know no better.

And tuc please, stop using the sympathy card to fight your arguments. We are fully aware of the pain that he and the other families are going through. We may not have lost family members but we lost a lot of good mates and colleagues. We have not parked the tragic loss of so many in some remote part of our brains, we too are reminded of our dear friends by the slightest thing - this weekend has brought their memories to the forefront of many peoples minds. We give the families 100% support in their grieving. I simply stated that TD has lost credibility due to the misinformation constantly being published mostly supported by his quotes.

MadMark!!! :mad:

[Edited for spelin mistaks]

[tucumseh]

Let's be generous and say it might be partly down to him. Of course the BOI and its recommendations had nothing to do with it. Nor the review of airworthiness. Nor the review of engineering procedures.

I’m sorry, but WHY did the BoI have to make recommendations relating to the implementation of MANDATED airworthiness regulations in the first place? And why was this necessary after previous BoI reports containing even more damning indictments? If you read those reports, the implementation failures simply relate to different paragraphs of the same Chapter in the same JSP. They were swept under the carpet, as Nimrod would have been if not for TD.

I’ve said here many times what happens to MoD staffs who disobey orders to ignore airworthiness regs. I know why the implementation has failed and I know many of the individuals who have stood back and let it happen (and in some cases directed it). I am quite sure in my own mind that if it were not for Tapper’s Dad their actions would not have emerged. Believe me, there is more to come.


Mad Mark – not a lot I can say. I express my sympathy in my own way and I know you do likewise. I feel your loss as keenly, but Graham knows why I support him in the way I do and that is between us. I’m sorry if you feel I have misrepresented you.

[nigegilb]

Mad Mark said "I am sorry TD, but your credibility is next to zero at ISK these days. You mean well but your constant misrepresentation of the facts and figures has done your case more harm than good amongst those that know the aircraft."

Just for balance madmark, I can safely say for those present on the day he gave evidence, whom I have spoken to, your [Nimrod] IPTL has absolutely no credibility either.

Which is more worrying?

[Tappers Dad]

Mad Mark


How many times must those of us that maintain or fly the aircraft explain what can be classed as a leak and what makes up the vast percentage of leaks? Using straight figures without the detail is simply misleading those that know no better


As you can see I am well aware of the differences in leaks but as we were told over and over again at the inquest all leaks in the fuselage are repaired as soon as they are found.


AIR COMMAND
RAF Business Secretariat
Royal Air Force
High Wycombe
Buckinghamshire
HP14 4UE


27 September 2007

Thank you for your e-mail to the MOD feedback website on the30 August 2007 requesting a detailed list of fuel leaks for Nimrod XV230 between 1 April to 1 September 2006.

1. Please see the attached Table 1 that provides a list of fuel of leaks with dates, fault and rectification details. The majority of these leaks are minor. Fuel leaks are categorised according to seriousness. The categories are follows:

Stain
Where fuel wets an area around the leak source not over 50mm (2 inches) in diameter in 2 hours
Seep
Wets an area around the leak source not over 160mm (6 inches) in diameter in 2 hours
Heavy seep
Where fuel appears to spread very slowly to cover an area larger than 160mm (6 inches) in diameter. However, it does not flow or drip
Run
When fuel is running and dripping at a rate less than 10 drops per minute. Alternatively, an area where fuel appears immediately to flow or run, following the contour of the skin where are is wiped dry.
Unacceptable leak
Where fuel is running and dripping at a rate greater than 10 drops per minute.


Stain or Seep are minor leaks that are recorded and documented on and periodically inspected during pre and post scheduled maintenance fuel leak mapping. Heavy Seeps and Runs are leaks that require rectification at the next tank opening or scheduled maintenance. Any leak more significant than those categorised Run are considered unacceptable leaks and repair and exceptional limitation action is taken

PS
If anyone wishes to see the pdf of the 2496 Incident reports on RAF Nimrod aircraft from 1987 to 2007,then PM me your email address and I will send you the whole 51 page file to you.

[nigegilb]

TD, remind me, where in this guidance does it state that in the event that the fault cannot be reproduced on the ground it is OK to send the aircraft up again, even though a massive fuel leak occurred?

[Tappers Dad]

nigegilb

Unless it is an
Unacceptable leak
Where fuel is running and dripping at a rate greater than 10 drops per minute

Then they are recorded and documented on and periodically inspected during pre and post scheduled maintenance fuel leak mapping. Heavy Seeps and Runs will be rectified at the next tank opening or scheduled maintenance.Maybe 6 months later.

If it doesn't leak on the ground nige then how can they fix a leak that can't be found ?? The only thing to do is keep sending it up until it does leak on the ground or some accident occurs.

[nigegilb]

TD, the tragic accident which subsequently happened, as a result of AAR, did not result in suspension of AAR, for anything more than a couple of days.

"So, we had a jet AARing over Kandahar 4 days after the accident!! Unbelievable. I can't see how that could ever possibly be considered to be good risk management."

And the AAR continued along with associated serious fuel leaks until November last year.

Sound engineering practice?

[Chugalug2]

TD, tuc and Nigegilb are variously told that they know nothing about what is being done at ISK, as though there is the centre and solution to Nimrod airworthiness. It is neither. They, and others, repeatedly state that they have no issue with servicing at ISK. The issue is with the CoC above ISK, at Group, Command and MOD levels. Despite this being restated over and over, all they get in return is rows of **** heaped in derision and contempt at their determination to see UK Military Airworthiness Regulations enforced in the UK Military Airfleets. Methinks some people do protest too much! Nimrod is only one facet of this dysfunction, I suspect that it exists in all the UK Military Fleets. The imperative must be to ensure that UK Military Airworthiness Regulations are properly and fully enforced herewith. It is my belief that can only be entrusted to a separate and independent MAA, for the MOD has shown itself to be endemically compromised and not to be trusted with such responsibility.

[airsound]

Roland P - a bit sad to see someone like you come up with such a sad generalisation as this (talking about TD)
Quote:
The Ministry of Defence decision to include the Nimrod was crass and insensitive.
Quote:
In the opinion of one person and one person ONLY!

I personally know of at least five others who agree with TD (including me), and I'd be very surprised if there weren't many more.

I believe it was a very strange decision of the RAF/MoD to fly the Nimrod in the flypast. OK, it was a logical extension of their decision that Nimrod was, contrary to the Coroner's narrative verdict, airworthy. But one of the arguments which they used in coming to that conclusion was that Nimrod was essential to the safety of troops on the ground. That may be difficult for us lay people to disagree with - but surely it doesn't mean that therefore it's sensible to fly it in a ceremonial flypast?

Had they decided not to fly it, and had anyone asked why not, the RAF could surely have reasonably argued that Nimrods were too busy, and no one would have been able to disagree.

I think it was a PR disgrace, and I'm quite surprised that almost no one in the media picked up on it.

airsound

[Roland Pulfrew]

I give up. I was going to write a long rebuttal but I cannot be @rsed.

Get real people, there is a war on. If the Nimrod is safe enough to fly on an operational or training sortie, it is safe enough to fly straight and level, in formation, along the Mall.

Perhaps the inclusion of a Nimrod in the QBF should have been seen as a tribute to those who died on that operational sortie, and those who continue to do so, supporting TIC. Time to put them first!

[RAF_Techie101]

I give up. I was going to write a long rebuttal but I cannot be @rsed.

Get real people, there is a war on. If the Nimrod is safe enough to fly on an operational or training sortie, it is safe enough to fly straight and level, in formation, along the Mall.

Perhaps the inclusion of a Nimrod in the QBF should have been seen as a tribute to those who died on that operational sortie, and those who continue to do so, supporting TIC. Time to put them first!

Here here! :D

[nigegilb]

Get real people, there is a war on.

And has been since the 90s on 47 Sqn and many other Sqns in the RAF, in case you hadn't noticed.

Do you know something we don't about what brought down XV230 regarding enemy action? Or was it simply engineering incompetence?

Along with the dangerously incompetent engineering/management decision to continue AAR after the crash?

Or are you in the camp that AAR should be continued tomorrow?

And how long do you think the war will last? 20 years? 30 years?

Get real people.....sound advice indeed, perhaps you need some advice of your own delivered with the appropriate level of charm.

If any nimrod crew member wants the QQ2006 professional report just drop me a line and i will send it to you.

The Coroner declared Nimrod to be not airworthy after some appalling witness evidence of substandard engineering practice. I would far rather trust his verdict than the unsubstantiated opinion of a former shop steward.

There is a war on, Britain needs you. I seem to remember that slogan from the first world war and the levels of competency then.

[Tappers Dad]

mileandahalf


TD is about as welcome at ISK as a French kiss at a family reunion.

It would appear I am not the only one, as not one of the widows was invited to the "Great weekend you had , with a chance to catch up with lots of old friends, remember those who cannot be with us and to celebrate the very proud history of 120 Squadron.” (Wing Commander Martin Cannard comments in the Press & Journal 14th June 2008)

:=

PS . I had nothing but kind words from those personel from ISK who attended the Inquest and gave evidence, although they did reduce Ben's mum to tears at times they were all great guys.

[Softie]

Nigeglib : Sir, you do need to get off your high horse.
what brought down XV230 regarding enemy action?No, 230 was not brought down by enemy action, but it was where it was to support OUR and NATO troops who were fighting and dying on the ground.
Along with the dangerously incompetent engineering/management decision to continue AAR after the crash?The IPT/airworthiness organisation banned AAR in Sep 06 except for operational necessity. It was the Operational Commander that ordered AAR to continue supporting the troops.

The continuing tic-for-tac on this thread is achieving nothing. Those family members contributing - and those winding them up - are just prolonging the distress and damaging their own health.

[Winco]

Graham,

Well said Sir, and I (and many more I'm certain) continue to applaud you and others like you.

Other than as a complete publicity stunt, I cannot see any just reason whatsoever why the Nimrod was included in the line up. The fact is, that it simply doesn't matter a jot what the rest of us think about it, the aircraft has been deemed as unairworthy by some fairly 'knowledgeable' people, not just by the coroner, and I wonder why some people are so hell-bent on dismissing all the unequivical evidence that abounds. Is the man from BAe wrong? Is the QQ report wrong? After all, we DID lose an aircraft (as pretty much predicted) and NOT to enemy action.

Whatever we think, to include the aircraft was arrogant, stupid and probably bordering on downright illegal, and I am surprised that the CAA haven't got involved in the matter yet - I'm sure they wouldn't allow a civilian aircraft to do the same had it been deemed as unairworthy!

[airsound]

Roland - your views, and those of Softie and Techie101, seem to have prevailed in the upper echelons of the RAF, if that gives you any comfort. I merely posted to reflect the oppposite view, and to show that you were wrong when you said that TD’s was
the opinion of one person and one person ONLY!:=

That opposite view does seem to be attracting some more people - and I’m surprised and delighted to find myself on the same side as Winco, as well as the usual suspects.

mileandahalf dear thing, lovely to hear from you again. Do give my regards to Genghis Khan when he pitches up somewhere to your left.

airsound

[nigegilb]

Softie said "No, 230 was not brought down by enemy action, but it was where it was to support OUR and NATO troops who were fighting and dying on the ground."

Then get a NATO aircraft that is airworthy to do the job then. We are all allies together are we not?

And just remind me why is it not operationally necessary to do AAR in a Nimrod today? You obviously place a different interpretation on the word "banned", than I.

I happily signed off this thread until people who I assume, sadly, wear the uniform, decided it was fun to kick a grieving father when he was down.

That is about as low as it gets in my book and I will stick around here with the low life until the disgusting insults stop.

"Soon it will be an offence to exist as an MR2 crewman for fear of offending Tapper's Dad."

"Why do you think that guys feel pushed into saying that TD is about as welcome at ISK as a French kiss at a family reunion."

I assume the answer to that one is because they weren't brought up properly by their parents.

You guys really are in denial, flying a Nimrod over London, breaking H&S rules in the process is entirely stupid.

Now then, lay off TD or we just keep cracking on.

[tucumseh]

I’ll have you know I am not a suspect, usual or otherwise. I have been found well and truly guilty of;


Trying my best to ensure the 3 Services have aircraft that are airworthy, safe and serviceable and, if they want to deem fit for purpose one that is not airworthy, safe or serviceable, then I’ll also do my best to ensure it comes back; and,
Trying my best to ensure each and every penny is spent wisely.
Despite these being legal obligations, a veritable constellation of Stars have found me guilty (apparently, both are offences) and, upon my appeal, they have advised an equally long line of Ministers to uphold their rulings. For my troubles I have been threatened with the sack and faced years of odium, so a few ill-chosen words from their supporters on this forum isn’t going to bother me.

If I am one of those accused of having the moral high ground, why thank you Sir. Why not join me? You can tell me what you did the last time a 2 Star gave you a direct order to make a false written declaration about your legal obligations. Or you can just stay behind him with the majority.

[thunderbird7]

i thought it was bloody good to see a Nimrod in the flypast.

[Winco]

mileandahalf

I agree entirely with you Sir, you are fully entitled to your opinion. But I don't think I ever said you weren't, but if that's what I implied, then I apologise.

The fact that you don't agree with me is neither here nor there frankly. The fact is that you don't agree with the experts at BAe and QQ, and that is what makes you wrong IMHO.

I have yet to see any attacks against any Nimrod crews or groundcrew either, so I'm not sure what the point of your earlier comments were, but I for one still have immense respect for the aircrew and groundcrew who are faced with a dreadful situation. It must be very difficult for them.

I suspect that the inclusion of the Nimrod in the flypast was a gesture by CAS and the rest (including SoS) to show the country that they don't give a damn about what the coroner thinks - they are right, and thats the end of it as far as they are concerned.........until the next time, God forbid.

[nigegilb]

"Nigeglib, I see you have finally signed off this thread......again."

Mileandahalf, that all depends on pond life like you behaving.

[BEagle]

There seem to be rather a number of people who cannot comprehend the difference between 'airworthiness' and 'serviceability'. Just because an aircraft is, according to the maintenance technicians and EngOs, 'fully serviceable', snag-free, no reds or greens (:hmm:), it doesn't follow that, ipso facto it is by definition 'airworthy'.

I'm sure that the R101 was fully serviceable before it set off on its fatal fight to India. But it wasn't airworthy.

I do wish some of the ISK folk wouldn't take the coroner's statement as a personal insult. Instead, let an independent competent authority decide whether the Nimrod actually is airworthy.

[Strato Q]

I'm not sure of your suspicions of the MoD's motive for the inclusion of the MR2 on Saturday. You're probably right, after all, couldn't the MRA4 have done it? Apology not needed but appreciated all the same.

BAES Warton don't work at weekends!

[buoy15]

Surely, the safe and genuine time a serviceable ac can be deemed un-airworthy is when it has reached the end of it's predicted life span
So how come we had a 60+ year old Lancaster, 3 Spitfires and a Hurricane in the fly-past?
They must have been airworthy and serviceable
By definition the Nimrod, a much younger ac, (in hours and years), must have been serviceable and airworthy - which was proven to the millions around the world who watched that fly-past:ok:
TD and Shona - if they ground the fleet tommorrow, will you both be happy that we will be denying valuable support to the lads out in the sandpit who rely on them during operations, so they can get back safely, to see their families?

[Winco]

b15

Let me assure you first of all that the Lancaster and ALL of the Spits and Hurricanes have flown nowhere near as many hours as any Nimrod has - fact. So your comment about them therefore being unairworthy on that basis is incorrect.

Secondly, you are correct of course about their age, however, compared to the Nimrod (if you can even remotely compare any of them) they are extremely 'simple' aircraft with very little to go wrong frankly.

And finally, they are serviced and maintained to a standard almost beyond belief. That is not a slur on the groundcrew at ISK (or anywhere else for that matter) after all, BBMF groundcrew are all RAF technicians also, but what I want to emphasise is that because they do not have the same operational commitments that nimrod does, they are able to be on the ground longer, in order for them to be fixed correctly and properly as and when they need it.

Please don't think that I am suggesting that ISK technicians are not as good as BBMF because I am not. I am trying to emphasise that because of the need to keep the MR2 in the air, the groundcrew are (perhaps) not always able to 'fix' them as well as they perhaps would wish.
(I hope that sounds better)

[RAF_Techie101]

Please don't think that I am suggesting that ISK technicians are not as good as BBMF because I am not. I am trying to emphasise that because of the need to keep the MR2 in the air, the groundcrew are (perhaps) not always able to 'fix' them as well as they perhaps would wish.
(I hope that sounds better)

Winco

I understand where you're coming from, and appreciate your efforts in making it sound like you aren't having a go at us, but I still take issue with the above sentance, if just in it's wording.

It is true that we do 'carry' problems from day to day, in the form of Aircrew Accepts, ADF's and Lims, however the decision to use these facilities given to us by the engineering authority does not come lightly. Obviously you'll appreciate that only certain people can sign these to enable the jet to fly, and even then that decision will be based upon either the Aircraft publications and/or the advice of the engineers. These are the checked by the aircrew before every flight, and if they have issue with them then it it is discussed and worked as required.

It is also true, as you've said, that because of the number of systems on the aircraft there is a lot more that CAN go wrong, making the use of reds/greens very useful in enabling the aircraft to fly, even if they aren't all working (ie, accoustics problems do not stop a Pilot training sortie).

please do not think I am having a go at you in any way for your last post, I simply feel the wording wasn't the best it could have been for the situation, and wanted to emphasise that the decision to 'carry' problems from flight to flight is not taken lightly by the groundcrew.

[Winco]

Techie 101,

I did go to lengths to explain that I wasn't having a go at the groundcrew at all, and I think you should read what I said, and be a little less sensitive about it.

I know that you guys are having to ADD and Lim no-end of stuff. It was just the same when I was on the fleet. The jet would land with a host of faults, but because there was a need to fly a Pilot trainer immediately afterwards, the snags got left. And so on and on it went, until it used to get to the stage where Eng Ops (or whoever) would say to the Sqns '"look, you can't have the aircraft, we NEED to fix it" endex!

The pressure brought on you guys is immense I know, and that was the comparison I was making between you and the BBMF guys, who are under a great deal less pressure I would suggest. Thats all.

Try not to take issue with everything that is written here, and read things for what they are. I was actually defending you and your colleagues especially with the work load that you more-often-than-not are faced with.

In the meantime, I will try to word things a llittle better!

[Vim_Fuego]

So will it be the case that whatever the Nimrod does from now on will be classed as 'Crass and insensitive' or just events where the public catch a glimpse of it?

Also I was under the impression that the CXX reunion was for people who have served on the squadron past and/or present or at least that was I thought when I got the email but sadly had to decline. The people who organise these events must have to draw a line somewhere otherwise they'd be swamped...

[Shack37]

My last post on this thread was a long way back when the carrying of F700 on the aircraft "on mission" was being discussed so I'm not a prolific poster and not being "current" try to avoid the more technical aspects of the debate. However I believe the question posed by Buoy15 merits an answer. Not necessarily from the specific persons he names but by those, in general, in favour of grounding the fleet on the coroner's say so.

"if they ground the fleet tommorrow, will you both be happy that we will be denying valuable support to the lads out in the sandpit who rely on them during operations, so they can get back safely, to see their families?"

Or is there doubt that this support is sorely needed?

Meanwhile the tragic losses continue, nine deaths in as many days.
RIP all of them and thoughts with the families.

S37

[Winco]

Shak and b15

If the CAS had said that the aircraft was unairworthy, would you have agreed with him? If ACAS had said the same, would he have been right? What is the lowest rank you would accept? Gp Capt? (as in the Stn Cdr at ISK) How low or high in the rank chain does someonbe have to be?

Maybe you could furnish us with a list of people who you would say have the 'expert knowledge' to class the aircraft as unairworthy, obviously BAe (the makers as I recall!) and QQ, the coroner and even SoS are not of sufficient expertise in your opinions?

So just who is able to make that call........maybe the 4th Dry eh? or the Sqn Adj?

[Shack37]

Winco, with all due respect, that is not answering the question regarding the support provided by the Nimrod and it's crews to the troops on the ground. Current Nimrod aircrew have posted here expressing their willingness to get on with their task. It seems agreed that Nimrod servicing crews are skilled and dedicated, if in some circles, not appreciated.

They all have my utmost respect and admiration for their determination to get on with the job, why don't we let them do that?

S37

[OmegaV6]

Once again it seems that some folks (with or without private agenda's ??? ) are deliberately confusing the terms "airworthy" and "safe".

An aircraft can be legally "unairworthy" simply because a piece of paper is missing or incomplete, or a faulty component is identified, this does NOT make it unsafe to fly, especially if that component will not be used.

I'm no Nimrod man (4 props and a truck are my line) but my gut feeling, from what has been posted and talking to those who fly it, is that the Nimrod is probably the safest now that is has ever been, simply because it has been under the microscope so much. The circumstances that lead to the appalling loss have benn "mitigated" against .. by stopping the use of the systems involved.

To say that the flypast was "dangerous" is IMHO stupid ... it might have been if the aircraft had been involved in a "wet" AAR as it transited the Mall, but it wasn't.

The aircraft is safe to fly, with limitations as to how it is used, or has common sense completely left the building ??

[Winco]

Shack

I left the Nimrod fleet in 1996. During my time on them I had only a handfull of incidents which had a potentially serious flight safety issue - usually rib2 overheats, a couple of engines that went bang, a fire down the back in an ac crate and probably a couple of others that escape me.

I never ever had the very serious problems that the fleet have experienced of late. So why do you think that was? Well I believe that it was primarily because the aircraft was relatively new back in the 70's, 80's and 90's, and the components weren't worn out and degraded.

I am not for a second questioning the value of the support that the aircraft is giving to our troops on the ground, and I am in no way denegrading or questioning the quality of the techies at ISK (or anywhere else for that matter) but we cannot run the fleet by simply saying "if the crews are happy to fly it, then let them get on with it" that is crass, surely you would agree?

The fact is that this aircraft and crew were lost, NOT because of enemy action, and NOT because of something that came out of the blue. These problems were known about, were discussed at length and were reported on and were, frankly, ultimately ignored by thos eat the top. The result was an avoidable tragedy.

But it's not down to you or me to decide whether the aircraft is serviceable or airworthy or not, it is down to others - the 'experts' and IMHO the likes of BAe and QQ are 'the experts'

Now if you disagree with that, then thats ok, you are entitled to your opinion, like everyone else, but unless you can come up with some 'expert' reason why BAe and QQ are wrong, then I'm prepared to listen to them and what they have to say.

As BEagle clearly states, the fact that an aircraft is signed up as Serviceable, does NOT mean it is airworthy. And as the coroner and others have said, XV230 was NOT an airworthy aircraft (but thats only according to 'the experts')

[davejb]

I'm far from an expert on the regs, but it would seem to me that if various experts from Qinetic and BAe considered the aircraft to be non-airworthy, then I'd consider it at least possible that they were correct. If you have two sets of experts at loggerheads then the normal procedure is to sit down and sift the evidence presented to try to extract the truth...not simply say 'we're right, everyone else is wrong' - that just isn't sensible decision making.

I certainly bow to people like Tuc regarding their knowledge of the paper trail involved in being able - under the RAF's own regs - to declare the aircraft airworthy, and from the sound of it (due to penny pinching over the years) that isn't so.

On the other hand - I too think it's probably safe currently, provided the restrictions to AAR etc are maintained, giving us an aircraft that is (probably) safe, certainly declared serviceable, but (I think) probably not airworthy by the RAF's own definition of the terms.

Commonsense dictates (my own opinion) that given an urgent operational task, provided people agree with the 'safe and serviceable' description, then if no other platform is available then flying Nimrod in theatre looks like what you have to do.

I would also expect everyone concerned to pull out all the stops to get MR2 and MR4 provably into the 'airworthy' category sooner rather than later - which despite earlier argument I cannot see extra cash hindering... if only as a quid pro quo for the crews who man the aircraft and who (some of whom) might well be less certain about safety.

One place it all really went very badly, and shows typical hamfistedness by the (upper reaches of the) RAF, who seem to have the most ineffective PR advice on the planet (Robert Mugabe gets his story across with more effect and a stronger ring of truth than most RAF attempts at managing the story)...it was a REALLY bad idea to let the Scotland football manager (or whatever he is this week on alternate days) declare everything in the garden rosy before the coroner had finished speaking - for heaven's sake, he could at least made some pretense of giving a toss what the inquest came up with, if the 'wrong' verdict came out then maybe a better performance from the RAF witnesses might have helped?

For those criticising Tapper's Dad, I think his work keeping this high vis has contributed to ensuring no more old mates are lost...if only because the top brass will go an extra yard to try to keep him quiet. Even if I currently violently disagreed with TD I'd still refrain from having a pop at him, out of respect for what he has done. If I had one of those spiffy hats with all the braid on the peak I'd have tried rather harder to get him onside than appears to have been the case...if TD is annoying people due to incorrect statements based on incomplete info, then I'd have thought there was a fairly simple answer to that.

Dave

[KeepItTidy]

Well as a serving member my employers have gone to great lengths to tell us the aircraft is fit to fly, BAE have not said the A/C is unsafe that im aware off , QintiQ who are doing major rework of the Nimrod have not said it cant be flown.

So as an engineer on type we have to take the word of our employers, after all many will and find it hard to take advice from somebody who does not or never has worked on an aircraft.

On that said , its very confusing from both sides. This thread will continue and continue with a constant argument between 2 sides of people , for us engineers who have 2 more years to get the MR2 through till the end we have no choice to get on with it and we will do our best we have with tools and resources just like the crews and all the support staff around us .

The decision for Nimrod lies with people way high up , till they decide we have to continue to the best we can.

[JFZ90]

Omega - good to see a reasoned post in amongst the drivel. You ask..

has common sense completely left the building ??


...it appears so...

I too think it's probably safe currently, provided the restrictions to AAR etc are maintained, giving us an aircraft that is (probably) safe, certainly declared serviceable, but (I think) probably not airworthy by the RAF's own definition of the terms.

Why are so many people (including the coroner) seemingly having so much difficulty with the concept that it "was unairworthy, but is now airworthy"?

[Mick Smith]

Why are so many people (including the coroner) seemingly having so much difficulty with the concept that it "was unairworthy, but is now airworthy"?

JFZ you accuse everyone else of not getting it, when you yourself dont get it either, and it seems are joined in that lack of understanding by others who are constantly slagging off the coroner because "how can he understand such things as airworthiness", when in fact it is they, and you, who do not understand his role.

The coroner deals with the evidence before him. He cannot second guess the situation. It is not his job to look at the wider picture, he doesnt have any evidence on which to do so. It is just his job to judge the evidence as put before him and the evidence put before him was that the aircraft was tolerable but not alarp. The experts said it had to be tolerable and alarp to be safe, ergo it was not safe. He therefore had no choice but to call for it to be grounded.

SoS, who does have to look at the total picture, is obliged morally at least to accept best advice from the defence chiefs on the requirement for the aircraft, and on what the risk associated with the aircraft currently is, and balance the risk to troops on the ground against the risk to the aircraft and rule whether or not the aircraft should fly. He has done that and it seems to me probably made the right decision.

But if you accept that there was a process of balancing the risks to the aircraft against the need for the aircraft in terms of saving lives on the ground, which many people seem to do, you must also ask yourself whether it was then justified to use the aircraft in the flypast, where it was certainly not saving anyone's life. You might then ask what the reason for doing so was. I have no doubt that the air chiefs were making a statement, whether it was the right statement to make is another matter.

[JFZ90]

JFZ you accuse everyone else of not getting it

Not everyone, there are quite a few on here that seem to grasp that the fact that an unairworthy aircraft can be made airworthy by taking measures to fix the problems that were making it unairworthy.

the evidence put before him was that the aircraft was tolerable but not alarp.

but here's the issue - I certainly don't question the problems and airworthiness issues leading upto the crash - the use of was in past tense may apply. But did any of the experts specifically say it was still not safe/alarp, or were they actually talking about the pre-crash design issue when talking about safety shortcomings? Or is this evidence coming from the much quoted QQ report? Is this still 'current' (its quite old isn't it?), or have things moved on?

If it was still really genuinely unsafe would it be flying over London? I'd certainly hope not.

He therefore had no choice but to call for it to be grounded.

I'd agree he had no choice but to say it should be grounded until the airworthiness shortfalls were fixed - did he ask if they had now been fixed? Did he ask what would need to be done to restore its airworthiness? Did anyone answer such a question? I have only read on here snippets of what happened, but if he had asked these questions and got answers it would have been posted here surely? I can only assume therefore that he didn't. It seems odd to me not to ask these rather important questions but then call for the fleet to be grounded.

[Mick Smith]

JFZ
He was told the current situation as it was then. The situation hadn't changed by the time the Times published that article on the QQ fuel system report on Monday, ie 21 of the QQ points being dealt with, so not already dealt with, four still being assessed, and six not deemed necessary because they related to AAR, which is no longer taking place.

This was the position on April 13 when the Sunday Times first reported on the QQ fuel system report, ie before the inquest. Two months on, nothing seems to have changed.

I'm not having a go at the fact it is still flying, just trying to point out that the coroner had no choice but to make his recommendation and leave it with the SoS. The coroner did his job and, contrary to what has been suggested here, moved the families much closer to closure than the BoI ever could have done. He does not deserve the grief he is being given by people who say he knows nothing about airworthiness.

I would add that this issue has not been helped by senior people within the MoD who have clearly decided to stick two fingers up to him.

We have no constitution, instead we have what has previously been a largely effective system of checks and balances. Ainsworth immediately coming out and saying there was nothing wrong with the aircraft was not only playing hard and fast with the truth, it was sticking two fingers up not just to the coroner but to the way this country's system of checks and balances work.

The behaviour of ministers in this has been disgraceful - witness Des Browne's pathetic attempt to get the courts to gag the coroner - and the air board seems to have simply followed the politicians' lead, putting the Nimrod into the flypast when by the MoD's own admission the 30 points which led to the coroner's decision are still being dealt with.

PS It seems to me that none of this should get tangled up with the issue of whether or not the aircraft should be flying over Afghanistan now. That is a risk assessment that ultimately Browne had to make. I believe the right decision has been made, whether it was made for the right reasons is another matter.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ

The coroner considered the aircraft state pre and post crash. In the main the evidence relating to the post crash conditions comes from the QinetiQ Fuel Systems Safety Report and Group Captain Hickman's inquest statement.

The QinetiQ report, which is dated October 2007 (do not confuse it with the 2006), and is the one mentioned by Des Browne on 4th Dec 2007, states the the level of risk is tolerable but not ALARP. It lists some 30 recommendations for making it ALARP. Angus Robertson was informed by SoS on 20th May 2008, that of the 30 recommendations, "21 are acceptable and being implemented, 3 are being considered and 6 are on hold as they relate to AAR". They was no indication in his reply as to when the "ALARP progaram" will be completed. In addition to these recommendations, MOD stated, at the inquest, that a number of hot air pipes in the engine bay areas were to be replaced by the end of this year. It would seem that these are pipes (ducts) mentioned in a 2005 BAe Systems report, following the XV227 incident, as being life expired and in need of replacement.

With regards to Group Captain Hickman, IPT Leader, he accepted that the fuel system is not ALARP, but for some reason believes that he has until the end of the year to put things right.

So, from the current evidence it would seem that the aicraft is not ALARP (not safe), but is could be made safe by the end of this year.

DV

[Distant Voice]

JFZ

In addition to my comments in the previous posting, I should point out that there are other QinetiQ reports to be considered. For example, one relating to fuel seals, dated August 2007. In this report it is recommended "That every effort should be made to ensure that pipe deflections at couplings are within the manufacture's recommended limit of 1 degree". According to the IPT Leader this is being undertaken, where posible, using the Mk 1 "eye-ball". Couplings in vent lines are checked by pressurising the line and listening for "whistling" sounnds. Does not sound a serious approach to me.

MoD informed the inquset that over 300 seals will be changed at Major servicings. Sounds as though someone is trying to make a big effort, but there is little point in doing this if seals are not fitted correctly. Not to mention that some aircraft will not make EQ6 (Major).

DV

[RAF_Techie101]

Couplings in vent lines are checked by pressurising the line and listening for "whistling" sounnds. Does not sound a serious approach to me.


And exactly how would you test them DV?

[Winco]

techie 101

Instead of asking DV how he would check the seals for leaks, why don't you, as one the 'experts' tell us how to do it? or are you saying that the only way is to listen for a whistle??

If you are saying that is the 'correct' way of testing, then I would suggest that you need to find a more 'professional' way of checking for leaks! I hope the techies at BA aren't checking the seals on my aircraft by listening for whistles, farts, squeaks and bumps!

JFZ90
Sir, might I ask you why you are prepared to listen too and believe the likes of Aisnsworth, Browne, CAS and a few others over the experts at BAe and QQ?? After all, those at BAe and QQ have, tragically, been proven correct.

[RAF_Techie101]

As it happens Winco, you spent your entire Nimrod career flying on aircraft that had their Vent lines checked by just this method. Vent lines contain air - hence the name. During flight they allow the tanks to be vented and any excess spillage to 'vent' off to atmosphere. The only way to check them is to blank them off at all exits and pressurise using compressed air. Or do you have a better idea?

[KeepItTidy]

Yep its the same way that garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid , the same way your exhaust is checked at kwik fit a blowing gasket leak or hot air spillage.

Basic engineering people , as Techie says what other methods would you non engineers use.
These are the same practises used on every single aircraft in use today, everyone must be wrong , no only Nimrod sigh :ugh:

[dodgysootie]

Right! Listen in yous lot...
When the vent lines are pressurised to check for leaks, we dont just " listen for whistles", (although a whistle or a hiss is often a very good "leak indicator")! Each and every coupling on the vent line system from each tank to the vent outlet is also tested using "snoop", which is a soapy solution that "bubbles" if there is a leak present.
I hope this clears it up.
DS

[JFZ90]

JFZ90
Sir, might I ask you why you are prepared to listen too and believe the likes of Aisnsworth, Browne, CAS and a few others over the experts at BAe and QQ?? After all, those at BAe and QQ have, tragically, been proven correct.

Winco, its not as if I'm listening to one and not the other - I've weighed up the stories and issues from both sides, noting the limited info available here, and formed what I consider is a balanced view (although I recognise this maybe still incomplete, hence my continued open questions on some aspects).

On this basis I'm still not clear there is a remaining "smoking gun" issue that requires the aircraft to be grounded. It seems that this, in your eyes, makes me some sort of naive idiot for even considering that the "bad guys" in charge may have made a reasonable decision re airworthiness - the reciprocal question is why are you only open to views that support your obvious need to hate and criticise those in charge? Its clear that some only want to see evil wrong doing at every turn (noting of course it does help sell newspapers). IMO, the common sense view is that why on earth would they not ground it, given the media attention, if there was a serious issue? They did for Chinook HC3, in the face of enormous political pressure to get more helos into theatre (cf the current usefulness of MR2 in theatre).

Couplings in vent lines are checked by pressurising the line and listening for "whistling" sounnds. Does not sound a serious approach to me.

Perhaps he was just trying to explain the engineering approach in laymans terms - recent posts suggests he wasn't entirely wrong to try and do so! Having said that it does sound like the tone he took didn't win him any friends. Then again I don't know how he was being questioned - was he being badgered / lined up as the bad guy? There is a great saying along the lines "how can the way I treat you possibly affect the way you treat me?".

but for some reason believes that he has until the end of the year to put things right.


Its been discussed here before that there is also a time factor associated with ALARP judgements - Tuc posted on this earlier. If you look at FAA / CAA annoucements, they usually put a time limit on airlines to comply with mandatory changes they want to enforce - when considering what is "reasonably practical" this can be sometime for embodiment action. They don't normally ground aircraft in the meantime unless the issue is an immediate air safety issue. 747s still flew after TWA800 etc. I'm not convinced that Nimrod it isn't ALARP already - where are the incriminating QQ recommendations? What are they?


This was the position on April 13 when the Sunday Times first reported on the QQ fuel system report, ie before the inquest. Two months on, nothing seems to have changed.

The report is older than this, so are you sure nothing has changed? I thought you mentioned earlier you got "no comment" from MoD before publishing?

I eagerly await Wincos response to Techie101, KeepItTidy & DS.

[Creeping Line Ahead]

From the BBC:

Defence Secretary Des Browne has been on a flight in an RAF Nimrod aircraft while on a "private visit" to RAF Kinloss in Moray.
It came a month after a coroner ruled that the Nimrod fleet - which is based at Kinloss - has never been airworthy and should be grounded.
The MoD has confirmed that Mr Browne met crews on the base.
But it stressed that this was a private visit, like many others. The MOD has insisted the aircraft is safe.
The coroner's ruling followed a crash in Afghanistan two years ago, in which 14 servicemen were killed, after a fuel leak caused a mid-air-explosion.
The families of those killed have been seeking a meeting with ministers. On Saturday, the MoD came under attack for allowing a Nimrod to fly over Buckingham Palace during a flypast to mark the Queen's official birthday.

[Mick Smith]

Quote:
This was the position on April 13 when the Sunday Times first reported on the QQ fuel system report, ie before the inquest. Two months on, nothing seems to have changed.

The report is older than this, so are you sure nothing has changed? I thought you mentioned earlier you got "no comment" from MoD before publishing?


You're right JFZ. On checking the first article did elicit a no comment from the MoD. The first reference to the situation being as the Times described it on Monday, ie 21 being dealt with, 3 being considered and 6 irrelevant because of the ban on AAR, was in a Browne letter to Angus Robertson on May 20 and was stated to me by the MoD for the second Sunday Times article on the QQ October 2006 fuel system report which was published May 25th and included that same status report. Apologies.

[buoy15]

Crawling Line Behind - trumpeting the BBC - what is your point?
He flew and landed safely in an un-airworthy ac, and by all accounts had a good time with the groundies and the crew- that's mine:ok:

[airsound]

buoy15, you never fail to amaze. Quite aside from your asinine, vicious little bits of sneaky vitriol, it seems that you can’t even make the forum work for you. At 1950 you addressed Creeping Line Ahead - in a sarky one-liner - as “Creepie”. Then, four minutes later, you obviously thought - “Wow I can make this even more painstakingly hard-hitting” - and you changed “Creepie” to “Crawling Line Behind”. With the exact same sarky one-liner. Sad to say, you managed to leave both versions posted.

Well done. Impressive, hard-hitting stuff.

airsound

Oh, while I was writing this, you’ve cottoned on . And deleted the first one. Well done - at least you deleted the right one. Even more impressive.

[buoy15]

Airsound
You have gastered my flab - thank you - please tell Beags

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco said:

Instead of asking DV how he would check the seals for leaks, why don't you, as one the 'experts' tell us how to do it? or are you saying that the only way is to listen for a whistle??

As has been stated by Dodgie Sootie the only way to check for air leaks past a seal is to use snoop UNLESS the air leak is so large that the air going past the seals makes either a whistling noise or a gushing noise dependant on how bad the leak is or the seals are degraded etc.
I would say the people carrying out these checks are far more professional and 'expert' than someone who is not as engineer i.e yourself.

If you are saying that is the 'correct' way of testing, then I would suggest that you need to find a more 'professional' way of checking for leaks! I hope the techies at BA aren't checking the seals on my aircraft by listening for whistles, farts, squeaks and bumps!

I take offense at your tone.

I think you may find that the guys who undertake the leak checks at BA are probably unlicensed and the job will be signed off by an ALE.
As an RAF technician has rather more training than an unlicensed engineer I would be more worried about the state of their work than ours.

Leave the engineering to the engineers as I would not dream of telling you how to fly your jet.

[nigegilb]

Good to see someone is listening. Still a deafening silence coming from the MoD and Chiefs of Staff.

Wonder if they will regret flying the Mighty Hunter down the Mall.

I don't suppose the supporters of the mighty shop steward will be moved but at least the message is reaching the legislature. In a week in which 4 soldiers died in a thin skinned Land Rover this can only be a good thing.


ANGUS ROBERTSON MP (SNP)

Although the delays and budgetary increases in the Nimrod MRA4 programme are of course cause for concern, another particular and deadly problem has resulted. Owing to the important capability of the existing Nimrod and the need for its vital services in a range of theatres, the 40-year-old Nimrod MR2 fleet has been pushed to the limits. In the recent case of Nimrod XV230, it proved fatal. Shortly after refuelling over Afghanistan on 2 September 2006, the aircraft exploded near Kandahar, killing all 14 personnel aboard. It was the biggest UK loss of life since the Falklands war, and more than half the victims were my constituents.
On 5 November 2007, a further mid-air incident took place, this time when Nimrod XV235 was over Afghanistan. The crew noticed a fuel leak during-air-to-air refuelling operations. After issuing an in-flight mayday, the aircraft was landed successfully. The Minister of State admitted recently that there had been at least 111 fuel leaks since Nimrod XV230 exploded.
On 4 December 2007, the report of the findings of the official board of the inquiry into the loss of XV230 was published. Four separate factors were listed as having contributed to the accident, and are a matter of public record. On 23 May 2008, only a few short weeks ago, the coroner who led the inquest into the deaths stated that the entire Nimrod fleet had

“never been airworthy from the first time it was released to service”,and urged that it be grounded. The assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire, Andrew Walker, added:

“I have given the matter considerable thought and I see no alternative but to report to the secretary of state that the Nimrod fleet should not fly until the Alarp”—as low as reasonably practicable—

“standards are met.”The Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), said earlier that we needed answers. I agree. We have been given no detailed statement, or indeed any detail at all. What I would describe as a badly advised and badly timed press release was issued only minutes after the deputy coroner had announced his ruling. There cannot have been time for serious consideration of the points that he had made.
Last December, the Secretary of State assured Members that Nimrod was safe, citing a report by QinetiQ. It has proved difficult to establish whether that was factually correct. It has taken freedom of information requests to establish that the report said that the aircraft would not be fully safe until its 30 recommendations had been implemented. All but one of those recommendations related to a failure to implement mandatory airworthiness regulations.
The inquest heard that if the risk of something going wrong on a plane is only “tolerable”, MOD rules stipulate that it must be further reduced to make it as low as reasonably practicable—ALARP—before the plane can
19 Jun 2008 : Column 1174
be declared safe. The QinetiQ report cited by the Secretary of State as showing the aircraft was safe in fact found that it was only “tolerably safe” but, because of the 30 problems, it was not ALARP.
It is still not ALARP. In a letter to me, the Secretary of State for Defence said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted—using the present tense—by the MOD and are still being implemented. Six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods. Three more are still—again, present tense—being considered.
Group Captain Colin Hickman, who is in charge of the safety of the Nimrod fleet, admitted to the coroner that the remaining Nimrods were not ALARP and would not be so until the end of this year. Asked if this process could be speeded up, Hickman replied:

“No, it is driven by resources.”Reassurances need to be given about transitional arrangements from the MR2 to the MRA4 and about safety standards for ageing systems facing replacement as part of a managed procurement process. We need answers on this. I would welcome the Minister giving some detail of all the 30 recommendations. How many have been fully implemented and when will the rest of them be implemented? It is only fair that we have the answers.
Some say this is a technical point, but I think it is easily understood by the man in the street. The situation now with the Nimrod fleet is as if a driver had been notified of 30 improvements necessary for his car to pass an MOT and, nearly two years later, he is only partially through the mandatory work and is still considering whether to go through with some of the other repairs. It would not be allowed in a car. Why does the MOD think it is okay for a plane? Given that the ALARP standard is the MOD’s own standard, I do not understand why it is not complied with. I hope the Minister will explain that this evening.

[KeepItTidy]

Well I can say the MOD has listened and is now doing its bit to make the Nimrod as safe as it can, I cannot say why and how but I know I work a lot more than I ever have , I work that much Im at a point where I feel like im the only person that works (not true) but Im at a point where Im closed to giving up. We have a lot more burden on us now to keep the fleet going with half the manpower since last year, there is only so much people can take. Like most of though we will continue to what agreement we have signed for and then leave.
Only thing that keep us all going is helping our brothers in the Army on the ground in the **** and in need of help. That what Nimrod does the most helps guys in need and that is what keeps us all going.
Everyone has been let down by somebody , forces know we have always been let down by politicians and especially the current ones, but as they debate and try and justify there stuff people day in day out have to continue there job and that includes the UK Forces, we cannot sit around and wait for decisions , everyday is a push to so called better things.

It does sound good but I really think its running out of steam and people are getting fed up

[Winco]

MightyHunter AGE

What a stupid and totally incorrect thing to say, and you have shown your complete ignorance regarding civilian aviation. Do you really think that BA or any other large airline would even consider using unlicensed engineers? That displays yout total lack of awareness as to how things are undertaken outside of your small (very small) RAF world - and remember one thing, before you go off another ignarant rant, I too flew Nimrod and spent many years in the RAF. The RAF is NOT the best at everything it does, and that will become patently apparant when you leave it and go out into the real world.

I am currently in the US having brought one of Mr Boeings big birds in last night, but when I return, I will talk to my 'unlicensed engineers' at BA and find out how they do pressure checks and look for possible leaks.

In the meantimne, I would suggest you remove your slanderous comment before WW sees it and takes you to task.

[JFZ90]

In a letter to me, the Secretary of State for Defence said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted—using the present tense—by the MOD and are still being implemented. Six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods. Three more are still—again, present tense—being considered.

Does the fact that Des seems to have flown on a Nimrod last week give some feel for whether these are issues with a direct bearing on whether Nimrods will fall from the sky at any moment, or whether these issues are perhaps being blown out of proportion by an MP to achieve a political effect?

I don't doubt the forces are underfunded, and this should be addressed by any govt, but the way this debate is going I fear there is a risk that a lot of resource that is badly needed elsewhere could be diverted to achieve a political level of airworthiness, rather than a risk based technical one that may already have been achieved.

[JFZ90]

...but when I return, I will talk to my 'unlicensed engineers' at BA and find out how they do pressure checks and look for possible leaks.

So you don't know already how they do it? So why on earth did you rant on earlier about how the way the RAF does it was not professional?

I hope you don't make such assumptions and judgements during your day job.

[dervish]

JFZ90


I don't doubt the forces are underfunded, and this should be addressed by any govt, but the way this debate is going I fear there is a risk that a lot of resource that is badly needed elsewhere could be diverted to achieve a political level of airworthiness, rather than a risk based technical one that may already have been achieved.



I’ve followed this thread from a distance but it seems pretty clear from some knowledgeable posts that there is a quite robust set of regulations governing airworthiness of military aircraft. The Secretary of State has acknowledged they were not implemented properly but so far hasn’t said what parts he is referring to, although from references to the inquest and various reports the list looks extensive.


JFZ90, I agree the forces are underfunded, but the last part of your post seems to suggest a partial implementation of the regulations would be acceptable. May I ask what parts you, or anyone here, think can be set aside?

[JFZ90]

JFZ90, I agree the forces are underfunded, but the last part of your post seems to suggest a partial implementation of the regulations would be acceptable. May I ask what parts you, or anyone here, think can be set aside?

This is not quite what I meant. For me airworthiness "regulations" need to be fully implemented. Full stop.

The problem comes in when you look at some of the things that seem to have gone wrong when relating to Nimrod - care is needed to separate regulations that were missed, or regulations that were followed but still allowed a safety issue to be missed. The investigation into what went wrong is no doubt looking into this, and speculation is probably not helpful to try and guess exactly where the mistakes were made.

Noting this caveat, as an example, you could pick the safety case process that was conducted several years ago. It is important to remember that conducting a safety case based review of Nimrod was in line with regulations and best practice. It should, in hindsight, have noticed & actioned the hot pipe ignition risk (this is easy to say of course). The question emerges - so what went wrong? As I say the investigation will probably find the real answers, but imagine for the sake of argument the following outcomes:

a) safety case process was OK, it was 'just' human error. No change to regs / process needed, but perhaps improve training etc.
b) safety case process broadly OK, no major change, but recommend more user involvement to pick up on op usage issues, better training.
c) safety case process failed and hence must be totally revamped
d) safety case process failed, total revamp, can't be left with MoD/contractor and must set up MAA, and new army of "checkers/auditors".

Now this is very simplistic and I'm mixing up issues, but to illustrate my concern, it is possible that a) or b) could be the right answer from an engineering safety perspective, but politically they don't create the desired "we've made a big change to airworthiness so from now on everything is OK". Hence there is a chance that c) and d) may be pursued for these reasons, even if safety won't actually be greatly improved.

It could be argued that a, b, c, and d and all in line with the "regulations" - so I hope you can see that cutting corners is not what I'm getting at - its more about avoiding the risk that we gold plate the solution to achieve political effect.

Lastly - I'm NOT saying that c & d aren't the right answer - it may turn out that bits of these ideas make up part of the right answer - all I'm saying is bigger (more expensive) changes should be justified on their merits and done for the right reasons, not just because 2 MPs are writing letters to each other to score points.

[Chugalug2]

You're not so free of sneaky vitriol yourself you bloody hippocrite.


While others probably wiser than I have let this pass without comment I feel compelled to do so. At least it wasn't followed by the usual depressing posts of "Well Said", "Great Post", or just ":D". No doubt they will follow now! It is clear that many posting here are under considerable pressure and strain. I am not, being retired, and feel genuine sympathy with them. However the "P" in PPrUNe, or one of them at least, stands for Professional. Neither stands for p****d. This is a complex situation with historical, immediate and long term ramifications. It is not helped by contributions such as above. Everyone presumably wants to ensure that the Nimrod and all other military aircraft meet the required prescribed regulations. This thread should be about how to get there. Can we please conduct it with mutual respect and consideration please?

[Oldlae]

Mighty Hunter AGE, Winco,
Many companies employ unlicensed engineers (fitters), I myself, with a Halton Apprenticeship, left the RAF after 12 years and joined a company as a fitter for a few months before I became a LAE. There are many that do not want the responsiblity of certifying aircraft and are happy enough to carry on as there are very many jobs that can be done as a fitter. Some fitters have been apprenticed and trained to licence standard but are too young to take a licence and are gaining the required experience to take it.
Regarding pressure checks on important systems, a fitter might very well install the necessary blanks and set up the test but a LAE would
physically check the results of the test, which normally require that a nominal pressure is held for a certain time. Winco is correct when stating it is a lot different outside the RAF, thankfully.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90.

I do not believe that Angus Robertson raised the issue for "political effect". He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:

(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.

(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.

(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.

(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, in which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to be ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.

(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in opertion at the time the report was written.

(6) On 5th Nov 2007 there had been another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).

(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.

(8) MoD stated at the inquest that hot air pipes in the engine bay areas are to be changed by the end of the year, and 300 seals will be changes at Major. (As recommended by BAe Systems in Jan 2005).

Now, on top of all that we have the inquest findings and statements from the IPT Leader. Who, by the way, was told by the coroner after his confusing statement, "If you came here today, hoping to give reassurance to the families, then you have failed to do so".

So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?

DV

[RAF_Techie101]

Winco

just to keep you happy, or unhappy as it may be, please check here (http://www.flightglobal.com/jobs/job/licensedunlicensed-aircraft-engineer-bedfordshire-maintenanceengineeringmanufacturing--200042001.htm) to view evidence that UNLICENSED engineers are working on civilian aircraft. Heaven forbid.

MightyHunterAGE

Please have a look here (http://www.aviationjobsearch.com/employer.asp?employerid=2756&vacID=119068) for a job for when you leave the RAF...

We miss you back here on the Squadron...:ok:

[dervish]

JFZ90

Thank you for your considered response. Food for thought indeed. Perhaps the QC's review will end the speculation and state what specific failures there were and whether they apply elsewhere or just to Nimrod.

[Distant Voice]

RAF Techie 101.

You said

Vent lines contain air - hence the name

That of course is correct, but vent line can contain fuel, and that is the reason we test then. Leaking air is not a problem, leaking fuel is.

Once again, going back to Group Captain Hickman's statement, he said that it was difficult to test all seals/couplings in the vent lines, because not all were accessible. So here is an idea; knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel? Then we can see were the leak is, and those couplings that are not "accessble" to the human ear will most likely exhibit runs or drips that can be traced.

As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.

DV

[RAF_Techie101]

Once again, going back to Group Captain Hickman's statement, he said that it was difficult to test all seals/couplings in the vent lines, because not all were accessible. So here is an idea; knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel? Then we can see were the leak is, and those couplings that are not "accessble" to the human ear will most likely exhibit runs or drips that can be traced.

As KeepItTidy put it "when garages test your brakes for leaks they look for hydraulic fluid". They do not pressurise with air and listen for a whistle.



Of course they don't - that would be ridiculous, as the principle of hydraulics requires fluid under pressure to work to begin with. It's the same with aircraft hydraulics - you leak test them under full pressure. To do otherwise would be ridiculous.

The vent lines aren't under any pressure - they don't contain any liquid fuel as such, just the vapours from the tanks and any minor spillage which would become vapour instantly due to the high air-flow rate going through the lines during flight. You couldn't test them by filling with fuel - the pipes aren't designed to handle pressurised fuel (they aren't fuel pipes...), nor could you actually get the fuel in there to begin with.

[JFZ90]

I do not believe that Angus Robertson raised the issue for "political effect". He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:

(1) IPT tasked QinetiQ to carry out a Nimrod Fuel Systems Safety Report, the cost of which was some £147,000.

(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly. As they did with the highly critical 2006 report, the Combustion Analysis Report, Fuel Seals Report, and several others.


I think you maybe reading too much into this. It is surely good practice to review draft outputs from suppliers before they are sent out wider. What if the draft had mistakes in it?

(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.

The question surely is - is it right that "tolerably safe" is in the report or not. That is the question to ask. Did QQ object to it being put in?

(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, it which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.

(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in operation.

(6) On 5th Dec 2007 there was another major fuel system incident involving, XV235, and AAR was stopped (probably for ever).

(7) In May of this year it was confirmed that, whilst the 30 recommendations are at various stages of consideration, none have been implemented.


Is this true? It seems not from the letters?

(8) MoD stated at the inquest that hot air pipes in the engine bay areas are to be changed by the end of the year, and 300 seals will be changes at Major. (As recommended by BAe Systems in Jan 2005).


This seems to mean in your eyes that it shouldn't fly until these things are fixed. I'm not sure its that simple.

Now, on top of all that we have the inquest findings and statements from the IPT Leader. Who, by the way, was told by the coroner after his confusing statement, "If you came here today, hoping to give reassurance to the families, then you have failed to do so".

So, please tell me, what evidence, other than gusty feelings, and the fact the Des Browne made a "political" trip in a Nimrod, do you have that supports your belief that Nimrod is safe?


I've got an open mind, but I've seen nothing tangible reported here that shows there is an extant risk to its safety that means it should be grounded. Many are making much of the 30 recs, but no-one yet has quoted one, which may or may not have been implemented, which would support immediate grounding of the aircraft. Which recommendation that may not have been implemented are you most concerned about?

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco said:

What a stupid and totally incorrect thing to say, and you have shown your complete ignorance regarding civilian aviation. Do you really think that BA or any other large airline would even consider using unlicensed engineers?


Ha ha ha ha! That one made me smile.

Winco I suggest that you are nothing more than a Walt.

What are you, a retired ex-RAF acting Cpl Policeman or even better an ex-steward who heard the proper flyers talk about such things in the mess and decided to try it on?

You have shown your true colours by your complete lack of knowledge for someone pertaining to be an old sweat flyer and maybe now people on here will start taking note of just how little you know.

What a stupid and incorrect thing for you to say. Do you really think BA or any other large airline could AFFORD to have everyone in their employ licensed? You have just confirmed my guess that you have NO idea about what goes on engineering wise either in the civilian sector or in the military.

What world do you live in, imagine a disgusting world where 'unlicensed' engineers work on civilian aircraft, oh my god how could it happen.

You have just shown how out of touch and ignorant you indeed are on aviation engineering matters.

I am still in but actually work part time for an airline UNLICENSED at the moment as I am studying for my JAR66 and will be LICENSED by the time I leave the RAF next year.

Do you really think that everyone working on civvy aircraft is licensed? My my it must be great living in your world!!

I am currently in the US having brought one of Mr Boeing's big birds in last night, but when I return, I will talk to my 'unlicensed engineers' at BA and find out how they do pressure checks and look for possible leaks.

Well best you do and once you have can I suggest that you then get back in your box and let the big boys talk about things they understand i.e engineering and keep you ignorant opinions to yourself eh........


RAF Techie101

Thanks for the tips and comments mate. I do miss being on the Sqn but as you know, I was not happy with the way the fleet was going and decided to get posted and vote with my feet (pvr) as the RAF and Kinloss is run by buffoons and is now a shadow of what it was when we joined!

Keep the faith mate, the aircrew and everyone on here (that know what they are talking about) know how much hard work it takes to keep the Mighty Hunter in the air. Big respect to those guys and gals.

[glad rag]

Excellent retort :D

I think it is safe to say that Winky has shot his bolt!!


Rgds (still smilling at it)


glad rag.

[Distant Voice]

RAF Techie 101;

Here is a section from the QinetiQ Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment Report, dated Sept 2007:

"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)

The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"

The report also points out that another High Risk area is in the wing Root vent pipe couplings, and a Very High Risk is associated with the Tank 7 vent pipe connectors.

So, do you think you should be testing vent lines for air leaks, or fuel leaks? I am sure that you are well aware that FRS coupling seals behave differently for air and fuel. In fact the more you expose them to air, the bigger the problem because the dry out

DV

[Mick Smith]

you have to learn that your opinion is not necessarily shared by everyone and you can't force this on those that don't agree with you.

Sounds sadly like a lesson a few people could learn on this thread, including you mileandahalf!

[JFZ90]

Here is a section from the QinetiQ Nimrod Fuel System Zonal Hazard Assessment Report, dated Sept 2007:

"High Risk: Inboard ram-air inlet downstream of water separator (Port and Starboard)

The vent pipes that normally convey ram air from the inboard intake to the vent system run through a particularly cluttered bay (on both sides of the aircraft) inboard of rib 1. Hydraulic pipes, flying control cables, fire detectors, anti-icing and bomb-bay heating ducts, electrical looms and terminal blocks, as well as other fuel system pipework and components are all present. Whilst the pipes would normally convey air, fuel can find its way into the vent lines folowing an overfill or during aircraft manoeuvres and potentially, could leak into this hazardous area"

What is the context of this? Are they talking about risks in the context of AAR ? i.e. overfill of a tank during AAR and consequent venting down the fuse into the inboard intake mentioned?

It appears that this assessment is looking at the "what if" of fuel getting into the wrong places, and what may happen. You would expect this in a zonal analysis to perhaps highlight issues/problems and hence lead to some decisions - e.g. perhaps stop AAR in this instance, or mitigate the hazard in other ways. It doesn't necessarily mean you should redesign the air vent pipe to handle fuel or test it with fuel in.

Would you test for leaks in your cars aircon air vent system with petrol? No. Is there a risk that a leaking fuel pipe in the engine bay may allow petrol into your air con air vent system? Possibly. What do you do about it? You would try and remove the risk of fuel getting into the air con system. You don't redesign the aircon air vent pipes to handle petrol just in case. In the Nimrod case you would probably opt to redesign the fuel tank venting solution so fuel could never enter such ducts to avoid the hazard above, which I assume applies during flight with AAR only.

So, do you think you should be testing vent lines for air leaks, or fuel leaks? I am sure that you are well aware that FRS coupling seals behave differently for air and fuel. In fact the more you expose them to air, the bigger the problem because the dry out


I could be mistaken, but it sounds like you maybe confusing the seal issues on a fuel pipe that may not always contain fuel (hence seals can dry out), with an air pipe that should never come into contact with fuel and will always be dry (and hence the seal is probably totally different in any case).

[Distant Voice]

JFZ 90

I think you may be reading too much into this............What if the draft was wrong?

I do not think that I am. I have copies of several QinetiQ reports, each one contains an Administration page listing "Record of changes". Every report, except one, shows the first entry as being the "Initial issue". And why not? These are independent reports, compiled by a professional body and checked out by their own internal system. Why should they contact IPT, or anyone else and ask them "Does this seem OK"? The only report where that has happened is the "Des Browne" Fuel Systems report.

is it right that "tolerably safe" is in the report, or not?

Simple answer is, no it is not right. There is no definition for "tolerably safe". Tolerable refers to a level of risk, not safety. The only other time that I have heard the phrase mentioned was during Group Captain Hickman's inquest statement. If you read the report, you will see that the statement, which only appears in the executive summary, does not "fit" with the rest of the report.

Is this true? I think not from the letters?

I assumes that the letters being referred to are those between Angus Robertson and SoS. The latest one that I know about is the one stating 21 recs are accepted and being implemented. Remember, Group Captain Hickman believes that he has until the end of the year.

This seems to mean in your eyes that it should not fly until these are fixed

That is correct. Do you think that it is right to fly around with hot air ducts in the engine bay areas that were declared life expired back in 2005. Remember, a similar duct with regards to age, caused the XV227 incident. I am sure that some form of external examination is being carried, but that tells you nothing about internal corrosion.

Many are making much of these 30 recs

True, and you had better include QinetiQ as one of the "many", they wrote the report. Let me remind you, £247,000 was paid for this study, that's over £8,000 per recommendation, and only now are we starting to implement them with a back stop of the end of the year.

DV

[nigegilb]

Some interesting comments about leadership on the thread. Can't say I have noticed too much leadership at the top of the RAF but there is always hope. What is required right now is a bit of clarity from the MoD and Chiefs of Staff. Angus Robertson's questions deserve to be answered properly. I doubt they will be, but you know, a real leader might say that the Nimrod is not airworthy but it is needed in Afghanistan.

The deafening silence is unfair on everybody especially those who fly and maintain the Mighty Hunter. I suspect the QC's Inquiry will drag and drag. I rather hope he has an occasional look at this thread or at least understands that it is imperative that his Inquiry is concluded with haste.

Some people here have slammed the Inquest for only taking 3 weeks to reach a stark conclusion. Perhaps the detractors should question the immediate rebuttal by the shop steward who hadn't bother to consult his Chiefs of Staff.

Those suggesting that I dislike the way the MoD operates should read the following. I wrote to the Defence Committee before the UK Deployment to Afg in 2006 stating my concerns that it would turn into another Vietnam type insurgency
.
I wrote specifically about the lack of equipment and support and the likely failure to bring European allies on board. The Chiefs of Staff new better agreeing to fight a war on two fronts. Have a read of Thomas Harding's article in today's Telegraph.

This is a snippet.

"However, the single greatest symbol of what is going wrong with our campaign is the lack of helicopters. At some point a senior commander is going to have to find the courage to mortgage his career and say in public what so many have said to me in private – that we are losing lives needlessly because there are not enough.
The eight RAF Chinooks are being flown relentlessly, and fatigue must be setting in. The Ministry of Defence says that the answer is to fly them for even more hours per month, but that's a stupid argument: we need more airframes, more spare parts and more pilots.
This is a refrain that occurs again and again in conversations with senior officers and seasoned NCOs. "Helicopters would put you in places where vehicles cannot," says one. Another says wistfully: "If I could get my hands on four Chinooks for two whole days…"
The reason why the US Marines were so successful in southern Helmand this spring was because they were able to land 600 troops in one lift in one night. In the two weeks I was with them, the Paras could only muster one air assault of two helicopters that had to go in three lifts, hugely increasing the risk of the enemy assembling an anti-aircraft team to attack them.
Then, as we pushed further into Taliban territory, we were forced to travel on foot alongside vehicles, because there were no helicopters available. The Taliban probably just laughed and walked off into the next valley.
Even when we detained a suspected roadside bomber – after slogging through the desert for hours – we almost had to release him because there was no helicopter to take him back to a legal holding facility for three days – the maximum detention time is four days.
The MoD knows that what we have is not enough, and has done for years. But the bean counters have never listened. "If the Government really cared about troops, they would pull their fingers out and get the resources out here," says one soldier.
We can win in Afghanistan, but to do so we will have to find the courage and resourcefulness shown by the enemy – not to mention a few of those long-prayed-for Chinooks."

Time for some leadership indeed.

[Softie]

DV asks:
knowing that the real problem is not air leaks in vent lines, but fuel leaks, why do we not pressure test with fuel?The simple answer to your question is that pressurising a pipe and coupling with air will find a leak a lot sooner than using a fluid (water or fuel). In the latter case, it can require up to twice the pressure to be applied due to the higher viscosity of liquids [Source - BAES testing of Nimrod FRS couplings]. The last thing you want it to have fuel leaking as a result of a pressure testing. Therefore, in engineering and safety terms, using air to test the vent and other fuel pipes is correct practice. As pointed out, the solution is to stop fuel entering the vent system. This will be addressed, I believe, on the MRA4.

Non engineers on this forum should stop making such ill informed comments. We would not dare tell pilots how to fly (especially those who drive big Boeing ones).

[KeepItTidy]

Can just see a lot of info that DV has posted here that some may get mixed up or confused.

Fuel lines on the Nimrod are pressure tested with fuel not air, as you know air in a fuel system is not good

i posted my previous comments on how the system is tested and used a few examples to clarify what I was meaning not meant to be taken serious like brakes checked on car (it was example only)

If the fuel system has a leak you can smell , hear or visualise the leak.

im not aware of any other way of checking for leaks maybe using a pressure guage and having a noticeable drop might do the trick but that method is not used on the Nimrod.

[davejb]

This isn't intended as an argument for one side, and against another, but I'd appreciate it if somebody more knowledgeable would correct where I'm wrong regarding airworthiness - my 'understanding' is as follows:

1) The RAF considers an aircraft airworthy provided the risks associated with operating it are reduced to ALARP.

2) The RAF asked Quinetic to report on the MR2, and were told there were 30 items to fix to make MR2 ALARP.

3) Out of those 30 items a few are contested - the RAF believes the Nimrod will be ALARP without them being fixed. I can understand this might in fact be so, although I think they ought to explain why this is so if they want to reduce the criticism level.

4) Some items are no longer requiring a fix, as they relate to AAR which is now cancelled - a procedural fix, again I can see how this is okay.

5) 21 (was it?) items have been agreed by the RAF as requiring a fix, but the fixes haven't been done yet - until these are fixed presumably Nimrod MR2 isn't ALARP?

In light of (1) and (5) how can the RAF describe the aircraft as anything other than non-airworthy? This isn't a rant, it's a genuine question - I'm not after opinions about whether it's safe, or needed in theatre here, I'm simply asking which bits I misunderstood because as I read it the aircraft is non-airworthy according to the RAF's own criteria... is (1) true or not, and is (5) true or not? If 1 and 5 are in fact correct, then the aircraft isn't airworthy. (For what it's worth I'd like it to be okay, I just don't see how anyone can say it is).

Pipe testing - I'm not an engineer, here comes the almighty 'but'....BUT I'd have thought the way to test for a leak in any systrem was to pressurise it and monitor the pressure - if the pressure drops you have a leak. Whether you use a liquid or a gas to pressurise it in any given circumstance I'll leave to wiser heads, although I suspect a gas would be better. (Gases tend to escape from confinement more readily than liquids).
Not wishing to offend any engineers with this, but a pressure drop will guarantee (provided temperature isn't changing) that the gas is escaping somewhere. (PV over T Kelvin is constant and all that).

Dave

[Chugalug2]

mile and a half, OK so I'm hypocritical, out of touch and pompous in your book. Add to that I'm probably one of the "many arrogant, self-appointed know it alls", as well. As Homer would say: "Yeah? Well what can you do?". I certainly was not querying your professionalism, or for that matter any of your colleagues. I'm sure that the high standards of engineering professionalism in the RAF are as sound as ever. What I was criticising was the professionalism of the comments you made that I quoted. But as you say, I'm an OAP and don't do banter, which seems to be boorishness by a different name to me. You tell Mike Smith that:
the thread has been adopted by a niche group who are using it as a campaign against the MoD and it's failings in the area of flight safety, rather than a discussion of Nimrod issues.
Well, guilty again as charged! I feel strongly that "Nimrod issues" are directly related to the "MOD and its failings in the area of Flight Safety". Are we to not comment on the latter because a thread is seemingly about Nimrod, Hercules, Chinook, etc? At least we are agreed about our regard for tucumseh. He has illustrated repeatedly the pattern of cause and effect leading to the parlous state of UK Military Airworthiness. I'm afraid I intend to go on about relieving the MOD of its airworthiness responsibilities. If that is self appointed and arrogant so be it.

[JFZ90]

Davejb,

Re your points...

I've raised it a number of times, but there can be a time factor involved in airworthiness (ALARP) assessments. I don't know whether this applies to Nimrod, or any of the QQ recs, but its important to recognise that it could, and furthermore it is not unusual to do so in civil or military airworthiness circles.

The link below takes you to a mandatory civil airworthiness directive. It stems from the TWA800 accident in 1996, and this particular one (there will be lots of others) requires some mandatory changes to A330 & A340 aircraft to reduce the risk of fuel tank explosions, for instance by changing some of the clips used on wiring harnesses etc. This one came into force in 2007, but the A330/A340 aircraft involved must only comply by 2009. They do not need to be grounded in the meantime.

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2007-0278 *

I think your point 3 is valid - MoD could probably benefit from clarifying the situation and avoiding this speculation.

You can probably see from the above that your point 5 is not necessarily black and white. Note that you wouldn't expect the QinetiQ report to comment on timescales for embodiment - they probably wouldn't have had the complete picture to advise on this, though they could have been consulted since then - this is probably likely.

* I should add that if you have a fear of flying I wouldn't recommend browsing all the ADs on this site. As crimewatch used to say, "don't have nightmares".

[Chugalug2]

The quote was merely edited for brevity, not misrepresentation, maah. But while we comment on the missing part in my post let me make my position clear. I do not criticise the current maintainers, I do criticise the current operators. Let me emphasise by that I mean, in the civil sense, the "AOC" holder, ie the MOD. I am delighted that we find common cause in our wish to have the Operator and the Regulatory Authority to be separate and apart from one another. It seems that we are in violent agreement. Let us stop there and give thanks!

[taxydual]

From chugalug2's post

"Let us stop there and give thanks!"

Endex

[Oldlae]

Well said davejb, a pressure check must imply that a pressure guage is used, I forget to mention it in my earlier post but I assumed that a guage must be employed. I am very surprised that they aren't on the Nimrod. If they aren't used I am not surprised that the pipe system is checked by listening for whistles which implies that compressed air is merely blown into the piping system which would not apply any pressure to the seals. They should, ideally be pressurised to 150% of the safe working pressure, if the manufacturers do not recommend this test they may well be afraid that the system cannot meet this test.
I well remember RAF posters in my day quoting "Don't assume, check", and I am guilty of that.

[KeepItTidy]

I dont think any of the APs call for a pressure check , there is a few guages that are fitted on certain checks but I cant off my heart tell you what systems they are as they require guages to be fitted to overwing points on the tanks (think its jettison but dont quote)

Anyway we are not referring to pressure checks , I thought this was about leak checks. to pressurize a large aircrafts fuel system to 150% above standard operating pressure is not very practicle indeed.

May be prudent to ask others that work on different types how they go about leak checks , you may find people have very similar answers.

[davejb]

JFZ90 -
yes, if there is a caveat to the ALARP requirement that gives a timeframe for carrying out the necessary fixes, then I can see how the aircraft could still be operated "while attaining full airworthiness" so to speak... I'm unaware of any such grace period though, and if one exists then I'd have thought it would have been mentioned by now?

Oldlae - how the plumbing might be done I wouldn't dream of guessing, my 'expertise' amounts to the simple side of it... pressurise the pipe(s) and monitor the pressure, provided the temperature and pipe volume remain constant then so should the pressure. It may be that it would be difficult/impossible to do this in practise, but I would have thought it a more sensible approach than trying to eyeball a tolerance of one degree.
(No aspersions on the groundies there, by the way, who are doubtless working their c***s off with all this).

[nigegilb]

I am not so sure we can safely ignore the 6 recommendations concerning AAR, just because AAR is not currently being carried out.

"The important point about the more recent report - the one with the 30 recommendations - is that is it NOT acceptable for the MoD to say "We don't need to address those relating to AAR as it has been stopped".

There is an underlying problem that concerns ALL safety management - that they don't assess both physical and functional safety. If they can ignore this on high profile aircraft, how do they address it on routine work??"

Remember AAR was being carried out until November last year, the reasoning given here that all forms of ignition had been removed therefor it was OK.

"Partly correct, but it’s a valid engineering decision to stop AAR because, as QQ say, nobody fully understands the behaviour of the AAR systems. If you don’t, then how can you sign it off as safe? Only a fool would. Again, a basic process failure.

.......they’re using the argument that it’s never happened before (in that configuration) so won’t happen. This argument is specifically excluded by the regs when assessing risk. As before, invite him to read the March 06 report and see the wider picture. He may then say, on balance of probability I’m happy to fly, but I bet he twitches. And that makes for nervous aircrew whose confidence is eroded. Which is a human factors risk! You’re a pilot – do I make a valid point? This is one reason why aircrew are deliberately isolated to a certain degree – for example, not having direct access to the Hazard Log. It can be alarming. Confidence in the product is vital. Safety doesn’t necessarily improve with the passage of time – it needs human input. And we’ve seen the humans responsible in action. Put another way, if you plotted safety over the last 40 years, you’d see a few peaks and troughs. They would directly correspond to the availability of experience, competence, corporate knowledge and funding. We’ve been in one huge trough for some years now. "

I am afraid I do not share the confidence in engineering practice at Kinloss, in my view the endless practice of cutting costs, civilianisation and contracting out engineering support has caused great damage in the RAF in general.

The full quote from a snippet I posted previously.

"Perhaps the most damning was the FRA statement that they don't inspect holes and threads when they change a wing bolt (holding sections together) because "it's not in the contract". That single line demands deep investigation. It's simply criminal. Did they ask for it to be in the contract? Was it in their bid? Did the IPT remove it or omit it? But, the overarching principle, which should over-ride all these arguments, is "good engineering practice". Worse, if you're removing an aluminium bolt and replacing it with a steel one - itself a howler, explained very clearly by QQ. Think of something simple like the expansion bolts that hold your cylinder head and engine block together in your car. The manufacturer puts a matched set in, made from the same material, at the same torque setting for very good reason. What would happen if you took out half the bolts at random and replaced them with bolts of a dissimilar metal. The "expansion" characteristics change and you'd probably blow a gasket. You wouldn't do it in your car, so why do it in an aircraft in an area where the whole point is to seal fuel tanks. I am quite confident that if I saw this in an aircraft I was repairing, I'd raise an query on the Eng Dept, at least; and they'd raise a MF765 (UFR) on the IPT. perhasp it WAS spotted and concern raised? perhaps the plethora of organisations now at Kinloss obscured the boundaries of responsibility (although everyone concerned has a duty to report such things). I feel there is an element of blindly following the Tech Pubs, which we already know are out of date. As someone who has managed a number of workshops, I know this is the practical difference you find between fitters/technicians. Some are head down and don't say a word, read the book, do what it says. If you ask them if they doing what they were taught as apprentices, they'll smile and say "No, but not my problem". Many haven't a clue what they are repairing actually does or how it works in a system. They don't understand context and don't want to. Others actually pay attention to what they're doing and try to understand the processes before and after what they are doing. I suspect the problem is FRA, not RAF, if only because of commercial pressures to hit deadlines and make profit."

[JFZ90]

Nige - to be honest I don't really follow what point your post is trying to make - who are you qouting? Whats this stuff about alu bolts and steel bolts, have I missed something? Are you saying mistakes have been made fitting incorrect parts during maintenance?

[MightyHunter AGE]

Nigegilb I think you have hit the nail on the head.

The RAF is trying to run itself like a business and is sadly failing miserably. Constant cost cutting is taking its toll and contracturalisation of many parts of core RAF servicing is showing itself to be the wrong way to go.

I would say something in the defense of the technicians though by giving you a two wee stories I have been involved in on Nimrods whilst on Operational deployment in the Gulf.

Firstly:

A bolt holding a hot air clamp on the SCP ducting was sheared when removed due to corrosion wastage of the threads (a common problem on Nimrod). As there were no stock I informed the Engineering Officer who will remain nameless (he came from second line for a stint OOA to give the other EngOs a break).

He then disappeared for an hour and came back with a similar shape and size of bolt and said 'fit this'. I inspected said bolt and said point blank 'NO' as it was not of original spec and was in-fact a bolt that was used on ground equipment. He proceeded to 'order' me to fit the bolt to which I said 'charge me for disobeying an order. I am not putting my signature or sending an aircraft flying with that fitted as that bolt is not fit to be fitted to an aircraft and I am advising you not to do so'.

He then proceeded to go out himself and fit said bolt against my and sign off an ADF for that bolt.

Secondly:

A UTI came out to check a fuel pipe in the no7 dry bay going into 7 tanks. I informed Engops that due to the nature of the UTI I would carry it out at the next landing (it was flying at the time).

Upon inspection one side failed and I informed Eng Ops of the failure and that the jet was grounded until it was fixed.

I was then confronted by an non-Nimrod Engo from the base and told in no uncertain terms to ignore the UTI as it had a window of 28 days to be carried out (this in itself was wrong as a UTI only has 7 days validity) and I was to ignore the fact that the pipe was leaking until then!!!!!!!!!!!

I then told him to quote '**** off' un-quote. He took offense at this naturally and contacted the Nimdet XO who also told him the same.

Now if this is the kind of engineering officers we are getting who obviously doesn't have a clue and over-rides someone of immensely more knowledge and experience than him.

Now imagine what it is like being at Kinloss and having worse than this directed to NLS engineering personnel from upon high with supposed superior engineering knowledge than OC Eng and Sengo.

This is the reason why I left ISK and why I have put my papers in and am on my way out.

The lunatics are in charge of the asylum.

[davejb]

Nige,
I'm similarly confused (to a point)...for the Kinloss engineering side I believe the general trend has been to acknowledge that the lineys are doing their best, but for a long time now thw workload has been increasing, whilst the manpower and experience are decreasing - it's an acknowledgement that whilst this inevitably leads to a reduction in service (so to speak) it's not something the groundcrew have control over. The steel v ally bolt stuff - not familiar with the story at all, but if it - and other similar bodges - occurred then clearly the experience level was insufficient for the job...I and others are simply blaming those on high who make the decisions on manning rather than the poor devils who do ever more with ever less, when somebody at the base of the food chain says 'just doing what I'm told' I blame the guy at the top of the chain - what do you expect an SAC to do, when even Harry Staish's are expected to bend over and grin while the bat is inserted?

Have you posted the 30 recs here at all? Perhaps they're buried somewhere in this thread? If the 6 AAR recs are completely fixed by not AARing I don't see the problem, provided it is accepted that AAR will not happen, ie operational need or not.

Dave

[dodgysootie]

"The lunatics are in charge of the asylum."
Remember your incident well MHA, and well done you for sticking to your guns.
Sadly mate, your reasons for leaving ring a sad bell with myself. Feel bad about leaving the lads/lasses to carry on grafting, but my mind has been made up since the days following the Tragedy, not an hour goes by without me thinking of that day, and since the inquest, the knowledge that this tragedy could of been avoided, just makes it an extremely bitter pill to swallow. "the lunatics in charge of the asylum" and they know who they are, should be charged with manslaughter.. The Bast**ds.
RIP CXX/3
Take care Bud.
DS

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90

With regards to "bolts and holes", nigegilb is quoting from a highly critical report produced by QinetiQ in March 2006.

I am afraid that there are so many of these IPT tasked reports that do not filter down to people like yourself.

DV

[KeepItTidy]

Blimey MHA I never knew that story and good on you for sticking to your guns.

There is many stories like that that can be told but I dont think it would be appropriate to tell them here but all Fleets have some scary stories im sure. 100% agree and things like this maybe need to be said for changes to happen, nothing has made a difference so far.
Its just sad when so many good lads are quitting when we really need them people back , Its a ship that has been sinking for so long and I like a few are clinging onto hope that things may change.
To have some more men with good engineering skills would be a good start.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Cheers DS keep up the good work!:D

Keep it Tidy don't even get me started on the Wng Cmdr EngO at Al Udied who told me to send the Nimrod up for an inverted flight for a small piece of plastic (loose article). When I said that Nimrods don't do inverted flight he got shirty and said I was to get the crew to do a 'near rotate' aborted take-off to shake the offending loose article 'loose' to aid recovery.

When I again pointed out that wasn't a good idea as it could cause all sorts of problems he got even shirtier and shouted at me 'What do YOU suggest then Chief?!'. I said 'I suggest you sign the ADF off as the QR640 holder and then go to bed and let me do the engineering he scrawled his name and stormed off.

INVERTED FLIGHT, NEAR ROTATE ABORTS?:mad:

An engineering degree does not maketh an engineer......................:ugh:

[nigegilb]

Dodgy S

Not sure how widely known it is, but it was in the remit of the Coroner to consider a verdict of unlawful killing in the case of XV230. It is possible that senior officers could have been named and and action could presumably have followed.

I will leave it to one of the families to fill in the blanks about the possibility of an unlawful killing verdict and what their response was. I can tell you that the MoD allegedly threatened to appeal the unlawful killing verdict, which would have extended the process by another two years.

Again it is only fair for a family member to describe their reaction to an appeal.

I think the families showed remarkable restraint and did not appear to want one or two people to be singled out.

That there was clear evidence of unbelievable lapses in procedure and dire engineering decision making is something that few people would dispute.

The idea of hiving off whole tracts of engineering resource is, for me morally bankrupt. The last major round of redundancies involved hundreds of trained engineers being shown the door.

Again, for me, morally bankrupt in time of war and overstretch.

Very little had been done in the way of implementing QQ recs Hickman had the opportunity to show what work had been done and how much urgency had been applied.

I include the folowing quote for people who are arguing that more time should be given to allow ALARP to be reached.

Needless to say I reject the argument.

"The regs require tolerable and ALARP. The only "out" is "exceptional circumstances" which are usually held to be operational necessity of the highest order - for example a SAR mission which itself is designed to save lives. The ubiquitous Apache rescue is a case in point.

The general principle is that in matters of safety/regulatory compliance one is given a "reasonable period" in which to mitigate the risk after it is identified. Clearly, the impact is assessed and priority is determined by a combination of what is required and operational necessity. In cases of flight safety cost shouldn't really be a factor, but this changed in 1991 when funding was cut, and instructions issued not to even address safety problems (on equipment). that is the period when MoD started losing configuration control big time, and never recovered. What is certain is that, the moment the risk or error is recognised, one kicks off mitigation, if only by phoning the ADA and notifying God (as required by airworthiness letters of delegation). The regs actually permit the DA to immediately commit MoD funding without approval - a unique delegation of authority and the reason why the DA's named representative is approved by MoD. The delegation isn't much, amounting to a few man days work, but is designed to get things moving and give commercial a few days to issue formal contract docs. That is, the regs are implicit that MoD action WILL follow in such cases. The litigation clock runs from identifying the risk and takes into account reasonable period. This is where there is confusion over the evidence. The Air Cdre said they wrongly "graded" the hazard. This can only mean probability of occurrence or severity of harm. But, crucially (and this needs bottomed out) it was later claimed that they were graded correctly and the risk known, but someone wrongly entered in the database that the mitigation (fire suppressant) was installed. Either way there was an error, and the Air Cdre, quite properly, made no attempt to claim exceptional circumstances for the period *BEFORE *the accident.

However, the rules rather assume that all reasonable steps are taken through life to make risks ALARP. The concept of deliberately ignoring risks and hazards isn't even contemplated, or the cumulative effects of such actions - nor would anyone dare include this in the regs. This is where I sympathise, as the Gp Capt clearly inherited a situation not of his own making - and is why I believe IPTL is far too low to be stood up in court to explain MoD's actions. But, he has made a rod for his back by saying he disagrees with the JSP - he has effectively lost the protection of "reasonable period" and "exceptional circumstances" by inferring a deliberate decision to ignore the regs. He could have stated that his responsibility lay *AFTER* the accident (given the above error remained unrecognised) and he was doing something about it. If he had said this, then a higher authority would have to answer the question as to what discussions had taken place on what "reasonable" period he (IPTL) had been given to implement mitigation.

This is were the baseline (clock start) is important to establish. *HIS* baseline may be the post-crash investigation. But *MoD's* baseline is much farther back in time, evidenced by QQ and BAeS reports in the 00s, the VC10 conversions in the 90s and the specs prepared in the 80s. There is ample evidence that the basic problem (poor or incorrect risk assessment and mitigation) was evident long before the crash. I was right to be concerned that MoD would claim "we've identified the problem, we're fixing it". They are being reactive, whereas the book requires them to be proactive."

[JFZ90]

Nige,

Who are you qouting above? Sounds a bit like Tuc, but presented up to seem like its something formal from the inquiry. I assume its not infact formal with phrases like "MoD started losing configuration control big time" included.

There is a risk here that some may mix up the resourcing issues at Kinloss servicing / maintaining the aircraft day to day with the overall control of the aircraft design standard and safety case etc. Whilst there are interactions, some maybe misled into thinking that the recent reduction in engineering knowledge in Kinloss had a bearing on the design error under debate here. Indeed, it should be noted that while the safety case missed the issue only a few years ago, the real mistakes were made 10-20 years ago. Note I'm NOT saying the skills loss is a good thing - it clearly is not a good thing at all - just that be careful not to get the causal analysis of the mistakes wrong.

To be clear, I'm not arguing for more time for ALARP to be met - just that the issue of "time to fix" should be recognised as not an outrageous approach - it is sometimes portrayed here as such.

The TWA800 accident happened in 1996 - current airworthiness directives stemming from that apply to say an Airbus/Boeing aircraft built in e.g. 1999 that have features that are not ALARP with respect to Fuel Tank Explosions are still flying today and have been declared as not needing to comply until 2009. Now I'm sure the risk to the Airbus/Boeing here is tolerable in that period, but technically you'd have to say they are not ALARP under the definitions being touted here that make no allowance for time and seek immediate grounding. The example planes above will have been flying with non ALARP explosion risks with 300+ passengers a day for 10 years - double standards?

Do you think the Airbus/Boeings should be grounded - if so why? If not, then by the same token why should the Nimrod?

[nigegilb]

JFZ90, I should make it clear that I have a number of engineering sources each with varying levels of expertise. I sometimes find it easier to quote word for word because I am not an engineer and there is little room on this thread for error.

The whole subject is confusing for contributors interested in what happened to XV230 but not really sure who to believe. The passage in my last post was an informal comment as you quite rightly pointed out. In an effort to understand the situation I have been asking a lot of questions, some people at Kinloss have kindly helped as well.

With regard to TWA800, I can't really comment except to say that design engineers are now approaching the problems of fuel tank explosions in airliners in two very different ways. Witness the incredible amount of engineering that has gone into Airbus A380 and Boeing 787 Dreamliner, two markedly different engineering solutions.

I favour the Boeing approach which is to still provide a version of OBIGGS just in case. It is worth noting that the spec for dry bay protection in Nimrod can be traced back to 1981/2.

I don't buy the idea that Nimrod is safe just because obvious forms of ignition have been removed. There are many remaining issues Angus Robertson has asked for a detailed account of where we are in each of the QQ recs. There is a real need for the MoD to explain where it is right now, otherwise confidence will continue to ebb. One of my aims which I stated a long time ago is that military aircraft are routinely given fuel tank protection. A no brainer. I am deeply saddened that there is still no protection on MRA4.

There are big arguments to be won here, They might have to be won in Court. But when you witness the two fingered approach from Bob Ainsworth in reaction to the Coroner's verdict, and from RAF Chiefs of Staff RE the Nimrod flypast I have little sympathy and little confidence that the MoD is capable of being taken seriously as an airworthiness enforcer.

I will look into TWA 800 recs. I am aware of FAA proposed legislation I am also aware of the very simple fix that is now used on 747 400 to mitigate the threat of centre wing tank explosion. I will post back anything here of note.

With regards to the risk to passengers `I can tell you that I doubt if any airline in the land would fly passengers around in an aircraft deemed non-airworthy. As a result, Bob Ainsworth has placed himself in a very exposed position.

Eventually I believe that all airliners in the States will have fuel tank protection. The modern systems are very light-weight and efficient. There is obviously a balance to reach. And I have some sympathy with the argument that Nimrod is much safer now. That said I have no faith in the implementation of airworthiness regulations. Witness the fact that AAR continued til Nov 2007 long after QQ reports had been posted.

It is important to understand the relationship between, and roles of, the RAF maintainers, FRA and the IPT in the context of Nimrod line servicing. I would welcome a post from someone who understands the relationship. I confess my own knowledge is weak in this area. I do understand that merely placing 2 organizations side by side will not solve anything if there is an inherent lack of skills, experience, training etc.

Edited to add, JFZ90,If you've not looked already, the following might be of interest:

SFAR 88
Airworthiness Notice 55 issued by the CAA and EASA

Google those lines and a lot of information comes up: bottom line (one
of them)is that on modified fuel systems a lot of work / rework needs to
be carried out with regards to reducing risk of fire / explosion. This
is not only on old Aircraft, but also on more modern ac, eg BBJ (based on the B737-700). Operators that do not comply will have to have the Aux fuel system made inoperable.

Part of this mod is to install "dual wall" fuel pipes. At present, it is allowable to shroud a standard rigid pipe with a larger flexible hose type assembly, with a gland drain that can indentify the source of a leak to within a certain distance. The hose will go.

The MRA4 should be built now to Civil Standard, but of course, it does not even have dual wall fuel pipes. It also does not have probe inerting, fuel tank inerting systems, under floor fire protection, bomb bay fire protection, FDA, etc etc. This argument is as much about MRA4 as it is about MR2, but again nothing but deafening silence from MoD...........

[Papa Whisky Alpha]

Re post 1137

I have been reading the numerous posts on this thread with interest, but I also feel that anyone who did not hear what was said at the inquest and the statements made (under oath) by those giving evidence must be totally confused, I am, and I was present throughout the three weeks.

May I take up some space to give my understanding of what was said by various people during the inquest:

Firstly, at no stage was there any statement or inference that those servicing XV230 were not being thorough in the way in which they carried out their tasks. It was accepted that the work was being done in accordance with the instructions and procedures laid down in the relevant documents.

On the subject of airworthiness. The MoD requires that for an aircraft to be considered "airworthy" the risk to the aircraft and crew must be ALARP.
The MoD employed a competent contractor to undertake a Safety Case for the MR2 which identified several areas where a significant risk was identified and stated that if the risk was realised there was the likelyhood of the aircraft and the crew would be lost. The effect of the risk was graded as "catastrophic", but the likelyhood was downgraded to "undesirable" when the report was received, thus reducing the need for immediate action. Thus the MoD failed to reach their own standard for airworthiness and admitted this in court. The Coroner had no option but to state the aircraft had been unairworthy with the recommendation that they be grounded until they meet the MoD's own standard.

British legislation requires every employer to provide SFARP a "package of work" that is safe. To achieve this every employer is required undertake a risk assessment of his undertaking to identify risk and determine what remedial measures need to be put in place. This is the reason for carrying out a safety case on complex operations. Where the necessary expertise is not available "in house" then the employer is required to engage "competent" assistance. When the IPTL was asked if he was aware of the employers responsibilities in this respect he said he was not.

It was acknowledged that the BOI had done a thorough and professional job and they were thanked by the coroner for this, this was echoed by the counsel for the families.

My own feelings are mixed following the inquest. I feel a certain loyalty towards the RAF having served for many years, as did my surviving son, but I feel the crew of XV230 were let down, not at station level but by the MoD and those who make policy and control funding. To take an ageing design and keep asking it to carry out different tasks which in turn requires more equipment to be installed is short sighted. The MR2 is after all a development of the Comet IVc design, but they are as dissimilar as chalk and cheese.

The decision to downgrade the findings of the case study made by a competent contractor, presumably for financial reasons, was in my view nothing short of criminal.

With the suspension of AAR and the taking out of use of the SCP it is likely that the MR2 is now ALARP and therefore airworthy.


Sorry for the length of this, I promise not to write any more on this thread!

[Distant Voice]

PWA, you said,

With the suspension of AAR and taking out of use the SCP it's likely that the MK2 is now ALARP and is therefore airworthy

I am afraid this is not the case. These restrictions were already in place when the coroner gave his verdict, and when Gp Capt Hickman confirmed that the aircraft was not ALARP.

DV

[JFZ90]

With the suspension of AAR and taking out of use the SCP it's likely that the MK2 is now ALARP and is therefore airworthy


...leading to...

I am afraid this is not the case. These restrictions were already in place when the coroner gave his verdict, and when Gp Capt Hickman confirmed that the aircraft was not ALARP.


The question is, is the risk tolerable, and hence is it reasonable to fly the aircraft until the full recs are practically embodied in due course. Assuming that it is (as it is flying), it would seem that the Gp Capt was either taken out of context or has got his message a bit confused.

If you can give an Airbus 2+ years to embody known ALARP risk measures with respect to Fuel Tank Explosions, why should such a timeline not reasonably apply to the Nimrod in this case? The risks maybe different, but the principle is surely the same?

Nige - whilst I can see much merit in your Fuel Tank Inerting campaign, I think its really a different issue* to the basic airworthiness debate - a whole load of civil aircraft won't have inerting for many many years, if ever.

* Whether any RAF aircraft without fuel tank inerting should be expected to operate at low level (inc take off / landing) in a threat environment in which inerting could help mitigate is a different issue - I concur there is a very valid argument that says they should not.

[Nimman]

nigegilb

Ref your post at #1129 and remarks made. I think you do a disservice to the tradesmen employed by FRA at the NSG. I wouldn't equate them to the workshops that you have managed without yourself having some first hand experience of their method of operation.
Probably 99% are ex military aircraft technicians with the vast majority being ex RAF NCOs/SNCOs with most of those having a lot of experience on Nimrod aircraft. Certainly I would say more corporate knowledge about Nimrod engineering and maintenance problems and how to solve them than that of the current RAF workforce at ISK.

[nigegilb]

JFZ I agree it is a different issue, I got involved in Nimrod because I had some mates flying the Jet who were very unhappy with the events surrounding the accident and also because I believed all along that the aircraft had suffered a fuel tank explosion.

The point about talking about fuel tank protection in airliners is that they never have to go to war and yet Mr Boeing has decided to fit inerting systems to its latest airliners anyway. As you point out Nimrods flying in theatre are at risk from being shot at but XV230 was brought down specifically because of AAR, another discipline not followed outside of the military. AT aircraft self-protection is now receiving more attention but MRA4 has slipped through the net.

My main concerns are that two large aircraft have crashed with the loss of 24 lives and many issues are shared. Tuc believed they read across to other recent accidents as well. We are really talking about aircraft being airworthy but also fit for purpose. Fit to go to war. MRA4 will not be which suggests the MoD is not learning any lessons here.

I do not agree with your conclusions about the Airbus mod. Specifically, "Qinetiq says [of Nimrod],it’s tolerably safe, but not yet ALARP. Doesn’t make sense. While QQ said the aircraft was “tolerably safe” the application should be the risk(s) were tolerable. This still ignores the fact that if the risk is in the tolerable region, and the severity of harm is catastrophic (loss of aircraft/death) then the risk MUST be reduced to ALARP. Nor does it address cumulative risks. I maintain QQ report must have been altered as it more or less ignores the serious airworthiness failures reported in March 2006."

With regard to Airbus can you please state your reference to the severity of harm concerning the AD? And what is the level of risk? And where is the reference to ALARP? Forgive me if it is in your link but I didn't see it.

Remember other measures have already been implemented.

Edited to add, Nimman, I am referring to the QQ report in places, will post up a passage for you to comment when I get time. I also received this- my beef is with the higher ups BTW.

"Attached to the PPRUNE thread is a link to DEF STAN 05-130. This standard is very similar to that of an EASA 145 MRO. Going through the PPRUNE thread alone, if only half of it is true than the organisation / operation would have been shut down months (or years) ago. This is not a slur on the ground or aircrews, but on higher up the food chain.

The DEF STAN 05-130 is the equivalent of a civil aircraft maintenance facilities JAR 145, the European standard for aircraft maintenance, picking up from what used to be the CAA. The DEF STAN 05-130 does cover training, human factors etc and my concern is that the RAF is now falling way short of these standards, in particular on the Nimrod fleet.

MPI are a recruitment company http://www.mpi.ltd.uk/home.asp : my concern here is that the rate offered will not attract the capable and qualified staff that are so obviously needed. They are subbies, with none of the perks that a permanent employee would have. Moto "why do today what can be on overtime tomorrow."

MPI are trying to place more engineers' under contract to work both the line and hangars. If they get some qualified guys then that will help, but, at the rates offered I worry. Currently Subbies would look at the £14:50 per hour, inclusive of B and B. Latest jobs link, http://www.mpi.ltd.uk/viewVacancies.asp?jobCode=X9L6D2&mode=details"

Nimman don't wish to slur anyone, but can you comment on the ability to recruit at those rates? Assume many come in with a pension. Just wondered how the pay compares. PM me if you want a copy of QQ Report Regards,

Nige

[Chugalug2]

He proceeded to 'order' me to fit the bolt to which I said 'charge me for disobeying an order. I am not putting my signature or sending an aircraft flying with that fitted as that bolt is not fit to be fitted to an aircraft and I am advising you not to do so'......
I was then confronted by an non-Nimrod Engo from the base and told in no uncertain terms to ignore the UTI as it had a window of 28 days to be carried out (this in itself was wrong as a UTI only has 7 days validity) and I was to ignore the fact that the pipe was leaking until then!!!!!!!!!!!



MH AGE, thank you for showing us that every one involved in aviation, civilian or military, AC2 to ACM, has the final responsibility to do what is right and to refuse to do what is wrong. From the posts on this thread and others I have a strong suspicion that the wrong has emanated from the higher end of that spectrum. This is a double betrayal at least. The very leaders responsible for maintaining high standards from the past have reneged on their responsibilities rendering a considerable part of the RAF fleet unfit for purpose. They have also compromised others who they command and they in turn attempt to compromise others as MHAGE tells us. This is a rotten system that has to be torn apart root and branch. The first thing to be dismembered from it is Airworthiness Authority. In my view the MOD has shown itself to be fatally compromised and unfit to exercise such responsibility.

[JFZ90]

With regard to Airbus can you please state your reference to the severity of harm concerning the AD? And what is the level of risk? And where is the reference to ALARP? Forgive me if it is in your link but I didn't see it.


As TWA800 exploded due to a fuel tank explosion with the loss of all onboard, you have to conclude that the risks of such an explosion are catastrophic. Other ground based incidents that have happened on (I think) 737s etc. either destroyed the aircraft or took off the wing in a way that would also have led to the loss of the aircraft.

ALARP is a principle. You can deduce how it applies to the Directive I mentioned by thinking about what is behind it. To take an aspect of it, the FAA/CAA/DA etc. have established that the "white clips" carry a greater risk of contributing to wire chaffing and hence possible explosion than "blue clips". The cost of changing these clips during routine servicing is potentially quite low. Hence whilst the risk of chaffing & explosion is probably very very low (as it needs other things to go wrong as in TWA800; the causes can be quite complex), the cost of changing the clips is also quite low - hence it is reasonably practical to undertake this measure. It is by definition therefore an ALARP measure. Should all the affected Airbus/Boeing aircraft be grounded until the clips are changed - in an ideal world you could say yes, as until its done the aircraft risks are not technically ALARP. You could also argue this would be an unreasonable, impractical approach to take, given the massive loss of revenue it would incur on the airlines for what is a very low risk. You could also argue that ensuring that all the clips are changed within say 2 years is taking an ALARP approach as it is reasonable to include consideration of practical embodiment timelines. When you look at the content of the AD, it is pretty clear I think that the last interpretation is what the CAA have adopted.

Remember other measures have already been implemented.

Same as Nimrod - no more AAR, no more hot pipes. The parallels are interesting, no?

[Distant Voice]

JFZ 90, re your #1142

Yes the risk is tolerable but not ALARP. By definition (MoD standards) it is not safe.

Where do you want to go from here?

DV

[Distant Voice]

I understand that Nimrods are no longer operational over Afghanistan.

DV

[JFZ90]

JFZ 90, re your #1142

Yes the risk is tolerable but not ALARP. By definition (MoD standards) it is not safe.

Where do you want to go from here?

DV

See #1146. Do you think my Airbus example and applicability of ALARP makes sense? It seems logical, no? If so in what way is the principle different for Nimrod?

[Safety_Helmut]

JFZ, I stand to be corrected, but from what I understand, the ALARP principle in the way you describe it in relation to TWA800 is not right. Large civil aircraft are certified against the numerical objectives as stated in FAR25/CS25. The 1x10e-7 hull loss target, which in turn leads to the 1x10e-9 target for critical systems. This is stated in requirement 25.1309 and the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) expands this, see CS AMC25.1309. You can download CS25 from EASA for free. ALARP is not mentioned in the context of certifying an aircraft of this type, you achieve the target or you don't get certification. The ALARP principle is really encapsulated in the target itself, this is based on the historical hull loss rate with a precuationary factor built in.

As I am sure you are aware, ALARP is a principle based in UK case law from 1947, and results from a case involving the coal mining industry. There are variations on this theme, eg AFARP.

S_H

[Safety_Helmut]

As TWA800 exploded due to a fuel tank explosion with the loss of all onboard, you have to conclude that the risks of such an explosion are catastrophic.
I'm going to be pedantic here. In the safety context, risk is not catastrophic. Risk is the product of severity or consequence and probability or likelihood. Therefore, catastrophic is a description of the consequence.

S_H

[JFZ90]

Safety Helmut,

You're right on both counts.

1. As you say, the civil rules have no latitude for ALARP per se, and only work to absolute safety target. But, it raises the supplementary question - what do you conclude from the AD, either:

a) an airbus with white clips doesn't meet the 10-7 hull loss safety targets, or
b) an airbus with white clips meets the 10-7 target anyway, but they are doing it to reduce the risk lower still

If a), then by rights it shouldn't be certified.
If b), then to be flippant why are they bothering as it already meets the targets?

Can you find out which it is?
b) seems more likely to me, and it has the hallmarks of an ALARP based judgement by the CAA as to whether to enforce it on airlines.

2. The risk is not catastrophic, the severity / consequence of the risk is. I was going to apologise, but on reflection that is quite pedantic - you clearly work in the safety field (the right character to have of course)!

[nigegilb]

I would like to set up a link to the QQ Report, I will place it on pprune. There are so many more than 30 issues, a close read of the report will confirm that. I also think the fine people of RAF Kinloss should have open access to the report.

Much distraction on this thread, hopefully a read of the report will dispel a few myths.

Bear with my computer skills.

[Safety_Helmut]

JFZ, it would certainly be interesting to know the answer. But there is obviously a lot more to meeting the standards. One of the requirements is for no SPOF that could lead to catastrophic hull loss, I wonder if this helped drive the AD ?

This is one of those subjects where the misuse of terminology causes confusion and misunderstanding, especially amongst the ill informed. You've only got to read through this thread to see that.

S_H

[nigegilb]

As promised link to QQ Report incl instructions from my IT experts.

The download link is: http://sharebee.com/cea1f5a6

Filename: QQ Fuel Leak Study 170306.pdf Size: 5.56 MB


When you access the basic link, it gives you a choice of which host to use (Megaupload, badongo etc). Click one of them. The megaupload then asks you to type a 3 letter combination - this is a simple security device to defeat automated systems. Then you click the link provided - on Megaupload you click "free download", wait a short period and your browser download window appears giving you the option to open or download the file.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

1. As you say, the civil rules have no latitude for ALARP per se, and only work to absolute safety target. But, it raises the supplementary question - what do you conclude from the AD, either:

a) an airbus with white clips doesn't meet the 10-7 hull loss safety targets, or
b) an airbus with white clips meets the 10-7 target anyway, but they are doing it to reduce the risk lower still

If a), then by rights it shouldn't be certified.
If b), then to be flippant why are they bothering as it already meets the targets?

Can you find out which it is?
b) seems more likely to me, and it has the hallmarks of an ALARP based judgement by the CAA as to whether to enforce it on airlines.

SFAR88, which is the US additional rules relating to risks of fuel tank explosions are a very special case for continuing airworthiness. The risk criteria used in determining actions taken to comply with SFAR88 are very much more stringent than for almost any other hazard type - in effect, the FAA said "no more exploding fuel tanks". The 'classical' 10e-9 etc probability criteria have been abandoned for that specific case. The likelihood is that most, if not all, fuel systems met the standard 25.1309 requirements for hazards before the SFAR came out.

However, as a general comment, the rules of 25.1309 (and equivalent regs in other jurisdictions) apply as an absolute only at the instant of type certification. If an issue is found in-service, you are generally permitted to accept an increased risk during the rectification period - and JAR.39 and the associated ACJ 39.3(b)(4) give a mathematical means to arrive at the level of risk which can be accepted for any given period of time - basically, the more you breach the 25.1309 requirements, the less time you have to get things fixed. Once you get a couple of orders of magnitude worse than the requirement, you usually end up being grounded, or taking other action to entirely eliminate the risk (operational restrictions, for example)

The following is taken from the ACJ

3.8 Thus a 'reaction table' can be created as indicated in Table 1 (the last two columns assuming a typical aircraft design life of 60,000 hours and an annual utilisation of 3000 hours per annum) showing the flying or calendar time within which a defect must be corrected if the suggested targets are to be met.

Table 1

Column 1: Estimated catastrophe rate to aircraft due to the defect under consideration (per a/c hour)
Column 2: Necessary reaction time for each aircraft at risk (hours)
Column3: On a calendar basis

4 x 10e-8 3750 15 months
5 x 10e-8 3000 12 months
1 x 10e-7 1500 6 months
2 x 10e-7 750 3 months
5 x 10e-7 300 6 weeks
1 x 10e-6 150 3 weeks
1 x 10e-5 15 Return to base

apologies for the poor formatting


Therefore an AD with a 2 year compliance period implies that the probability of a catastrophic hazard arising from the item being addressed in the AD is about 2.5*10e-8

[nigegilb]

I am rather impressed by some of the contributions to this thread.

[JFZ90]

Very interesting Mad Scientist. Now I must state upfront I don't know any details here but the interesting thing you could read into the white clip/blue clip AD is that they don't seem to be targetting any specific wires that may chaff and short circuit (e.g. allowing high [spark capable] voltages into low [not spark capable] voltage fuel tank wiring) - so the level of precision for specific failure modes doesn't appear to be behind the analysis. It reads to me like "it might make it safer, its cheap to do, so we should do it" - I think this logic is still sound by the way, but I can't reconcile it with specific numbers.

----

Nige, I've had a flick through the Fuel Report. I'm not sure which bits are particiularly contentious? It reads like a audit to look at some issues with leaks & possible maintenance procedure issues and highlights some aspects that need addressing and some shortfalls in some areas. It does however state:

Notwithstanding all of these difficulties, the repairs achieved by RAMS on XV250 were observed to be of a high standard. The work undertaken on that aircraft was far beyond the usual expectation and encompassed the comprehensive renewal of the fasteners and sealants at the port side rib 7 joint.

This reads quite postively to me - its not the "shut them down its 'Airworks + Tornado F3s' all over again" criticism that I was expecting on opening it.

Also the whole alu / steel bolt issue is not quite as I'd been led to believe by some posts on this thread. It reads as if the alu bolt is not used anymore and the steel bolt is a design approved replacement. QQ speculate about the consequences of its different material properties and what might happen if higher torques where used - but its all conjecture that maybe worth further investigation as I read it - not a criticism per se. I may have missed it but I can't see any statement from the DA that these bolts can't infact be mixed - this was implied by the "engine block" analogy earlier on in this thread.

[nigegilb]

"This reads quite positive to me."

JFZ, don't really know how to say this, but are we reading the same report? It might not be all doom and gloom but I have a marked up version of the report and it appears that you are clutching at positive comment but ignoring the rest. Check out the last page?

My marked up version of the report has;

* 50+ separate references to failures to apply/implement
airworthiness processes, procedures or regulations (which is what
this is all about, because 18 months later the BoI report admitted
such failures, in turn leading to Browne's acceptance of
liability) and,

* a further 20+ references to possible failures and mentions of
issues which the report doesn't explore. (And nobody except DV
discusses any follow-up action and the other reports which are not
available).

Please read the assessment below.



Some of these references are duplicated, but one could view this as emphasis! In short, this is a very damming report and yet has clearly been diluted by QQ management to avoid too much overt criticism of their main source of income (MoD). Long experience teaches you to read between the lines - believe me, this report is horrific for what it doesn't reveal.

As for the bolts, the report makes it clear they were approved by the DA, but it is the detailed engineering / design / servicing aspects which are criticised - i.e. the mandated processes to maintain the build standard. Torque settings. Routine hole/thread inspection. Random bolt changes with no advice on proximity of dissimilar bolts. Dissimilar bolt/thread materials. Stress. On the face of it, Form, Fit and Function are affected to varying degrees. This is the main test when determining whether it is a Change or a Modification. (Briefly, a Change is minor, not requiring a formal modification, perhaps just the Topic 3 calling up an alternate bolt - the inference being it is a Form, Fit and Function drop in replacement - which it clearly is NOT due to the need to amend servicing instructions and consider design stresses).

The report asks questions which should have been addressed as part of the task which resulted in the change, and the information should have been disseminated via the mod leaflet, AP amendments etc. Clearly QQ couldn't find this info, which infers Kinloss don't have it. The statement "It was approved by the DA" is a typical front line view - understandable as they MUST rely on this largely invisible support process working, but they are seldom exposed to the detailed machinations of maintaining the BS and few could explain the process.

In recent years this _observation_ applies equally to IPTs, but importantly it becomes a _criticism_ when talking of them. Their lowest technical grade, service or civilian, should understand this process implicitly, and should be very worried about this report. If ANY of their tech grades don't understand all this (the processes, procedures and regs, not the detailed design issues), then by definition they lack experience and expertise which is an airworthiness issue. This is not a criticism of the individuals, but of the system which for years has permitted inexperienced staffs to occupy these posts. Easy for me to say but I HAD to have at least 10 years on the bench and head down in aircraft, plus 2 years in a design office and 2 years in a HQ "Staff" post before I was even considered for the lowest tech grade in what are now IPTs. Now NONE of this is required yet they are still given the same level of approvals I had. THAT is the bit that can no longer be fixed and will always be the main argument for an independent airworthiness authority. Why can't it be fixed? Because the recruitment grounds have been privatised, witnessed by the ex-RAF / DARA staff working for FR etc.


JFZ a number of people have PM'd me since posting the 2006 QQ Report, I am more convinced than ever that there are very big problems with Nimrod IPT.

Regards,

Nige

[JFZ90]

Nige,

I'm not sure you can decide the report is damning or not in isolation. There is not enough information or context, or crucially DA input.

The steel bolt is DA approved, but it is NOT clear whether the DA has stated that they must not be mixed or if that indeed is permitted. QQ only speculate that it maybe an issue and it maybe wrong to jump a conclusion one way or another. To be fair on QQ they were probably not writing the report expecting someone to jump to that conclusion - they are writing it for a technically competent audience and they are highlighting issues for consideration (and future research perhaps!). You would have ask the DA whether it had been considered, or whether infact the steel bolts had been specified or torque settings changed to create an "equivalent" effect to the alu ones (possible despite the different material characteristics).

I agree it does beg the question as to where the DA information on correct installation is - but no conclusion is really reached in the report for me on this point.

My main point is that I was expecting alot worst, and you'd have to conclude that this quote....

Notwithstanding all of these difficulties, the repairs achieved by RAMS on XV250 were observed to be of a high standard. The work undertaken on that aircraft was far beyond the usual expectation and encompassed the comprehensive renewal of the fasteners and sealants at the port side rib 7 joint.

...does imply that the final result was upto scratch? Isn't that the bottom line, despite all the findings (noting a consultant will always come up with lots of findings to justify their not inconsiderable cost!)

[Squidlord]

I am trying to follow the discussion in this thread but really struggling to keep up. It's clear to me (and many others) that there have been very serious failings in safety management for the Nimrod over a number of years. I believe that these failings are to some extent endemic in MoD air safety management in general. Efforts are being made at senior levels within the MoD to address these failings and I believe that we are likely to see the biggest changes in MoD safety management since the Safety Case concept and culture was adopted (in the early-mid 90s, I think). Whether those changes are sufficiently wholescale to seriously improve MoD safety management and satisfy critics is to be seen.

Notwithstanding the above, I don't know whether the Nimrod is currently safe to fly. But I do believe that many of the claims and arguments being made in this thread in support of the view that it is not currently safe to fly are faulty.

First an absolutely key point.

The concept of safety, as defined by MoD policy and regulation (see Def Stan 00-56, POSMS, etc.), depends crucially on how a system or equipment is used and maintained. It makes no sense to talk of a system or equipment being safe (or that the risks associated with that system or equipment are ALARP) without a context of use and maintenance. Thus, statements about whether or not Nimrods are safe to fly (or whether the associated risks are ALARP) should only be made together with a context of use and maintenance that, for example, defines whether or not AAR happens or not. I suspect all of us fall foul of this issue from time to time, even those of us who understand it very well (and I include Qinetiq in this - see below).

Why do I make this point about context? Because people are talking/writing about things (e.g., Nimrods) being "safe" or "unsafe" when it's often unclear what context of use and maintenance is being referred to. I don't know whether the Nimrods should be flying at the moment. I.e., I don't know whether it is safe to fly Nimrods IN THEIR CURRENT CONTEXT OF USE AND MAINTENANCE (note, not how we used to fly them ... not how we hope to fly them in five years time ... but how we are currently flying them).

Those on this thread who say that the Nimrods are not currently safe to fly cite a number of Qinetiq reports; principally this one:

"Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report", Oct 2007, Issue 1

This contains the thirty recommendations that are often cited in this thread. In particular, Distant Voice and davejb (see below) both refer to this report. DV writes:


He, like many of us can not get our heads round the following:

[...]

(2) QinetiQ produce a draft report "for comments" in Sept 2007. This was a most unusual step, because QinetiQ normally issue the report directly.


For what it's worth, there is nothing remotely unusual about QQ issueing a draft report for comment. It happens all the time.


(3) The report was adjusted, where the pharse "tolerbly safe" was added. MoD refuse to comment on this, because they claim the all copies of the draft report have beem destroyed.


This intrigues me. DV, how do you know the insertion of the phrase was an adjustment? I find it all too believable that it was inserted on MoD request. In my experience, several air IPTs are inclined to make statements to the effect that their aircraft are "tolerably safe" (meaning that the risk is tolerable though not necessarily ALARP) as though this was some sort of important achievement. There seems to be a collective desire to ignore the fact that acheiving ALARP is the requirement, not "tolerably safe".


(4) Issue 1 of the report was produced in Oct 2007, in which it is stated that the system is not ALARP, and can not be considered to be ALARP until 30 recommendations are complied with. MoD's Def Stan states, not ALARP then not safe.


I can't find anywhere in the report where it says that all 30 recommendations have to be implemented before the Nimrod fuel system risk is ALARP. The report does state:


"the recommendations [...] should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate, before it can be considered that the equipment risks are ALARP"


The difference between this and what DV wrote is that QQ are only saying that the recommendations "should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate", not that they must be complied with (to achieve ALARP). This is probably because QQ do not know whether all of the recommendations are necessary to achieve ALARP. In general, determining that a risk is ALARP or even just determining whether a particular risk reduction is "practicable" (in the sense of ALARP) is a complex business. As far as I can tell, the QQ report contains no ALARP analysis at all, i.e. for none of the recommendations is there a comparison of the costs and benefits of implementing the recommendation (for many of the recommendations, this is for a very good reason - see below). QQ don't know whether all of the recommendations are "practicable". Consequently, they only conclude that the recommendations "should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate, before it can be considered that the equipment risks are ALARP". Effectively, they are asking the IPT to do the ALARP analysis and consider the costs and benefits of the recommendations. I don't know whether the IPT has done this but their statements concerning the recommendations are, I think, at least consistent with them having done so.

Changing tack, the QQ statement:


"the recommendations [...] should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate, before it can be considered that the equipment risks are ALARP"


is misleading in a few ways, in my opinion. Most importantly, I can not tell what context of use and maintenance is being talked about. If it's missing, this is quite a serious flaw in the report so I hope it's just that I can't find it - does the report clearly state the context of use and maintenance in question? Unfortunately, in the absence of such information, it's difficult to be clear what exactly QQ are saying about the safety of the Nimrod fuel system.

Having said that, I don't believe that the QQ statement above refers to the way that the aircraft was being operated and maintained at the time of the report. Why? Because the very first recommendation is (text in square brackets is mine):


"The current operating limitations imposed by SD [Service Deviation] and the additional maintenance activities invokeds through RTIs [Routine Technical Instructions] mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels. Changes to such mitigating action must be supported by appropriate evidence"


If QQ are saying that the risks are (currently) "acceptable", then they are saying they are ALARP. Thus it seems that QQ are saying that the risk of the Nimrod fuel system, in the context of use and maintenance extant at the time the report was written, is ALARP. Hence they must be talking about some other context of use and maintenance when they state:


"the recommendations [...] should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate, before it can be considered that the equipment risks are ALARP"


Unfortunately, as far as I can tell, QQ don't tell us what that context is (like I say, a serious flaw, in my opinion).

I also think the QQ statement is misleading because I think many of the recommendations are concerned with generic good safety management. They are not directly relevant to the ALARP status of the risk of the fuel system.

Back to DV:


(5) On 4th Dec 2007, Des Browne boasts "QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation and confirm that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate" - Wrong, wrong, so wrong. At the time none of recommendations had been implemented, and AAR was still in opertion at the time the report was written.


In respect of reporting QQ's conclusions, I'm not clear Des Browne was wrong - see above. However, whether QQ's conclusion contained in the first recommendation:


"The current operating limitations imposed by SD and the additional maintenance activities invokeds through RTIs mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels."


was correct or not is another matter. Was it the case that AAR was only still happening due to operational imperative (i.e., in perhaps the only context in which a failure to achieve ALARP could be allowable)?


If I'm right that QQ were claiming that the Nimrod fuel system was ALARP in its context of use and maintenance at the time the report was written, an obvious question is why did the coroner and Nimrod IPTL, Hickman apparently contradict this? The short answer is I don't know. When either of them were making their statements about ALARP, was the context of use that they were referring to well-defined? If not, it is very hard for us to know what they were speaking of. The coroner can only do as well as the evidence he is given so I'll ask the question of Hickman's evidence. Do we know for fact that Hickman was talking in the context of how the aircraft was being operated and maintained at the time he was questioned? If not, his statements on the ALARP status of Nimrod risks have no obvious relevance to the question of whether or not the Nimrods were safe to fly at the time of the inquest (or now).

I think it is entirely possible (I would even say quite likely) that Hickman made his claim about the ALARP status of the risk of flying the Nimrods in the context of how he hopes they will fly when all the QQ recommendations are implemented, not how they were flown at the time.

davejb wrote:


1) The RAF considers an aircraft airworthy provided the risks associated with operating it are reduced to ALARP.


This statement would certainly be correct according to regulation and policy if it said, "The RAF considers an aircraft *safe* provided the risks associated with operating it are reduced to ALARP". I don't really understand "airworthiness". I know the definition in JSP 553 but it is vague and has no obvious connection with ALARP.


2) The RAF asked Qinetic to report on the MR2, and were told there were 30 items to fix to make MR2 ALARP.


Not quite true - see above.


5) 21 (was it?) items have been agreed by the RAF as requiring a fix, but the fixes haven't been done yet - until these are fixed presumably Nimrod MR2 isn't ALARP?


Not necessarily. Let me rephrase (5) as, "until these are fixed presumably the risk of operating the Nimrod MR2 fuel system in its current context of use and maintenance isn't ALARP?" The answer then depends on what (different, I believe) contexts of use and maintenance relate to the recommendations in the QQ report and the way the aircraft is currently operated. It may be that the aircraft is currently operated and maintained in a way that renders QQ's recommendations unnecessary to achieve ALARP.

It's also not necessarily true in another way. As JFZ90 has pointed out a couple of times, the ALARP status of a risk depends crucially on how long that risk is incurred. It's perfectly possilbe for a risk to not be ALARP when considered over the life-time of the Nimrod fleet but to be ALARP over a more limited period, e.g. whilst various recommendations are implemented to make the risk ALARP in the long-term. This would be consistent with legal and MoD regulatory requirements in respect of ALARP.

[EdSett100]

Squidlord,
Its pleasing to see a balanced view for a change.

Nigegilb,
As usual, you are scaremongering by putting that report on the web. QQ were invited to Kinloss to provide an objective and independant study of the growing fuel leak problems that were giving rise to adverse operational capability. The QQ report did not mention that every one of the unacceptable leaks kept the aircraft on the ground until that leak was cured. This fact was not mentioned simply because it is a fundamental reason for the study: "Some important (role capable) jets are leaking, they cannot fly, they are limiting our capability. QQ do a study that we can act on, so we can get them flying again" Its nothing more than that: a very sensible project sponsored by the IPT.

Nobody was surprised that the wing leaked when a pod was fitted. Clearly the DA approved the concept of bolting a pod onto the wing of an old aircraft and would have done the calcs for stresses, etc. The only foreseen problem was the slight seepage from the wings, which is unacceptable near a pod.

You are making a mountain out of a molehill. Its not as though this is relevant to safety. As we have mentioned time and time again: if it leaks beyond acceptable limits (which are very tight) it doesn't fly. Therefore we met the airworthiness requirements to fly safely or not at all. We chose (through sound engineering policy) not to fly with those leaks and we still adhere to that policy. That report was required to provide guidance in engineering practices to alleviate availability problems; not highlight unsafe fuel leaks. We already knew the leaks were unacceptable for flight, we needed help in dealing with them.

Did you seek the permission of QQ to publish their work on the web?

Regards
Ed

[dervish]

I, for one, found this report very helpful in explaining many of the comments on the thread. As it has been redacted and obtained under Freedom of Information, I think it is fair to say it is in the public domain. Would I also be correct in saying QinetiQ are the MoD’s appointed independent advisors and, as such, their opinions are actually informed opinions based on significant expertise and background knowledge? If I were MoD I’d hesitate before dismissing such a report.

As for scaremongering, there is an obvious counter in that this report would seem to be one of several key documents which informed the BoI’s opinion that the regulations had not been applied properly, leading to the Defence Secretary’s admission of liability. Against this background, the Coroner heard evidence that the aircraft had not been airworthy for many years and had little option but to give the verdict he did. Rather than rounding on nigegilb, whose credentials seem impeccable, perhaps we should step back and simply ask the question “Is the thrust of the report, and the conclusions drawn by the BoI and Defence Secretary, correct?” If so, then should any ire not be directed at those who brought about this situation, not those who seek to correct it?

It strikes me that many here, while wanting their tuppence worth on their own areas of expertise, are actually like-minded. Wouldn’t it be good if these combined energies could help solve the problems, instead of arguing over minor points of detail?

[nigegilb]

Edset, Kinloss has been taking hits on this report for months, I thought you of all people would see the sense in making it available for everybody at Kinloss to read. It was obtained under FOI and is, indeed in the public domain, or are you against the FOI Act as well?

As for seeking permission, I didn't publish it on the internet so I can't answer that one. I am disappointed by your reaction, some very experienced engineers working at Kinloss at the time were not even aware the report was being carried out and had not read it.

JFZ has taken a different view and it has certainly prompted comment from knowledgeable people. Perhaps JFZ should declare an interest? Anyone on this thread have any connections with Nimrod IPT? As for scaremongering, it is a factual report, you might like to re-visit your comments.

As you are back on thread would you also like to re-visit your comments regarding AAR?

"Despite the criticism of leadership, the technical aspect, ie "it is as safe as it needs to be" still stands. I re-iterate that its in the present tense. I believe the report is at its final stage. I haven't read it, but the rumour is that CAS's words remain correct: the Nimrod is safe enough for AAR. But, there is a growing feeling that due to intrusive media and public pressure, the technical factor in the decision may be overruled for political reasons. However, growing media and public attention to the troops taking fire on the ground may encourage the politicians to provide those lads with the best surveillance support the RAF has to offer. Its being held back at the moment for no good technical reason."

Six outstanding recommendations from QQ have not been dealt with but you state that AAR is safe, are you sticking to that statement and in doing so ignoring these six recs?


On another thread P-8A is being discussed this is the Multi Mission Aircraft (MMA), B737 conversion for US Navy. Thought I would post this;

Feldman says: "It is not built for survivability as a commercial aircraft, so we have done significant live-fire testing and are incorporating the results into the design." A lot of the work involves the fuel system: protecting or relocating components double-wall tank liners sense and drain systems and dry-bay fire protection. "These areas have been dealt with and there are no outstanding vulnerability concerns," he says. Using a building-block approach, Boeing has conducted life-fire tests on critical areas of the airframe using surrogate structures. This has resulted in selection of an inerting system to protect the dry-bay areas around the cargo-bay fuel tanks.


Err, you won't be getting this in MRA4. Fit for purpose? I think not, neither do I think the MoD/IPT is learning lessons.

[Mick Smith]

Look guys I know this whole issue has raised a lot of heat on both sides but it would surely be more sensible and helpful to the debate if people on both sides stopped throwing pies at each other and simply discussed the points raised in the report. It has been released under FoI, it has been reported on in the press, I'm not sure that putting it up on the internet is a major issue. Wouldnt it be better and more helpful to the debate to make reasoned arguments on the points in the report and why they reflect either an unacceptable situation or a situation that is actually no problem.

[Chugalug2]

I believe that these failings are to some extent endemic in MoD air safety management in general. Efforts are being made at senior levels within the MoD to address these failings and I believe that we are likely to see the biggest changes in MoD safety management since the Safety Case concept and culture was adopted (in the early-mid 90s, I think).
The rot goes much much further back than the 90's Squidlord, and I cannot imagine what "Efforts" within the MOD could even begin to address its failings short of building the highest Chinese Walls ever. The bottom line is very simple, the present arrangement allows for the operator (the MOD) to be its own regulator. The result has been the farrago exposed in this and the Parliamentary Questions threads. Self regulation does not work. In aviation it does not work in a spectacular and devastating way. Forget the MOD's "Efforts", nothing short of an independant Military Airworthiness Authority will suffice.

[Distant Voice]

Dear Squidlord, welcome to the debate.

You said,
For what it is worth, there is nothing remotely unusual about QQ issueing a draft report for comment. It happens all the time

Can you give an example of another Nimrod related report?

DV

[MightyHunter AGE]

DV

Can you?

MHAGE

[Mick Smith]

Dear Squidlord, welcome to the debate.

You said,

Quote:
For what it is worth, there is nothing remotely unusual about QQ issueing a draft report for comment. It happens all the time

Can you give an example of another Nimrod related report?

DV

DV

Can you?

MHAGE

Well for this amount of money there bloody well better be more than two reports!:}

Nimrod Aircraft
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the cost of QinetiQ's consultations on Nimrod were over the last three years. [209727]

Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The cost of work relating to Nimrod aircraft carried out by QinetiQ over the last three financial years was £26.1 million.

[Distant Voice]

Mighty Hunter AGE

Perhaps I did not make myself clear. The point being made was that "there is nothing remotely unusual about QQ issueing a draft report for comment" I think there is. Of all the QQ reports that I have obtain, only one has been issued as a draft for comment, and that is the Oct 2007 report.

So in answer to your question, I have to reply no. Of course there have been several high profile Nimrod reports, such as the 2006 report mentioned by Nigegil, the combustion analysis report, several seal reports, a report on zonal analysis etc. None of these indicate that they have been issued in draft form for comment.

DV

[Softie]

DV

I assume that you are referring to the Word version and change history information to infer the issue status of the QQ documents. I have 2 points to make: one, it is known that this history is stored in the Word document and there are methods to prevent such information 'leaking' out (obviously not done in this case). Two, it is common within the MOD (and no doubt other organizations - government and commercial) for reports to be issued in draft to allow early visibility to the sponsor and to allow obvious errors to be corrected before a report is published (and paid for). I do not mean that unsavoury statements are removed or toned down (although this can happen), but to ensure that it is factually correct. There is nothing sinister in this practice - although I am sure you will find one.

[JFZ90]

Squidlord. Well balanced post. Your analysis is very compelling and points out many holes in the some of the conclusions being drawn (or jumped to) here.

I've resisted criticising the QQ report in the way you have, but the weaknesses/inconsistences you point out are spot on. In their defence you could argue they would not have expected particular phrases to have been latched onto in the way they have without consideration of the wider picture you outline.

Mick - does this shed any new perspectives on your April Sunday Times article on how Des misled the house of Nimrod safety and ALARP? Do you perhaps consider it is possible, given Squidlords analysis above, that he didn't?

As usual, you are scaremongering by putting that report on the web. QQ were invited to Kinloss to provide an objective and independant study of the growing fuel leak problems that were giving rise to adverse operational capability. The QQ report did not mention that every one of the unacceptable leaks kept the aircraft on the ground until that leak was cured. This fact was not mentioned simply because it is a fundamental reason for the study: "Some important (role capable) jets are leaking, they cannot fly, they are limiting our capability. QQ do a study that we can act on, so we can get them flying again" Its nothing more than that: a very sensible project sponsored by the IPT.


This is the real irony isn't it. The IPT commissions an independant investigation into fuel leaks well before 230s loss, and you could argue is therefore clearly taking proactive steps to try and find out why this is the case and what it can do to fix it.

In terms of the FOI status of the report - I assume the red text was added after it was released under FOI; this emphasises QQs rights that still therefore apply. So technically you are not allowed to publish on the net without QQs permission.

Nige - I have no connection with Nimrod in any way.

[davejb]

Squidlord,
a thought provoking and interesting entry to the discussion. I would like to emphasise however that the points from my own post that you have quoted were very much questions, rather than statements - struggling to understand it all myself, I have no engineering expertise unless feeding very strong coffee and curry to the FLt Eng counts - so my 5 points were an invitation to others to comment, as in 'have I got this right?' JFZ90 promptly added a bit, and right or wrong he (?) made me see there was (possibly) a time dimension I hadn't really considered before - my basic problem being I keep expecting there to be a set of rules by which a system is declared ok or not. Instead it seems to be a mental Gordian knot.

For what it's worth, and to avoid anyone mentally placing me in one camp or the other incorrectly, my thoughts run thus:

20-30 years ago we used to comment on Nimrods being exceptionally safe - every time you went through the OCU or NCF etc people would queue up to tell you 'we should have lost 2 by now' or similar. Had AAR never been fitted I suspect the Nimrod would have exited service renowned for its safety record...achieved, at times, by a mere whisker, admittedly. I imagine everyone who has ever flown on them has a fair stock of 'almost' stories.

My feeling is that sometime post '82 an approach of 'it's been okay so far' was substituted for rigorous safety procedures, and that has been exacerbated by declining experience levels in just about every trade, including aircrew. No aspersions here at all on competence, but experience and numbers do tend to count. Take away the money as well and it's a recipe for disaster. We ALL saw that coming though, frankly. EVEYONE (well, almost) tells you how much better it all used to be.....they did that in 1925 too.

AAR was a Heath-Robinson lash up in 82. In my OPINION it clearly wasn't rigorously tested at any point after the dust settled...otherwise, my brain says, we'd have had a good idea of how big a pressure spike the system could safely handle, for one thing. In 1982 it was forgivable, we needed it NOW - personally I don't think that an AAR system failure almost 25 years later says much good of the safety management of Nimrod, surely in all that time it could have been given a thorough going over to check it was really okay?

ALARP - I believe I get the basic idea, I also believe (perhaps wrongly) it is possible to fly the aircraft safely without it being ALARP, provided AAR isn't performed (for example) and perhaps other procedural changes are enforced. I can readily accept that some of those changes might not become public knowledge for a variety of reasons.

Overall, the RAF and MOD let some old crewmates and their families down, as usual it was the servicemen, and their families, who paid for that. I think it is up to the RAF and MOD to make it very obvious they are doing all that they can to turn this around - my OPINION post inquest is that they are still more determined to hide problems than address them.

Dave

[JFZ90]

Dave,

Some quick thoughts:

AAR itself is not potentially the most significant issue with respect to the loss of 230. The ignition source (hot pipes) were the most significant issue, and stem from decisions made long ago (pre 82 I think).

I may have this wrong, but the main issue with AAR seems to be that the system - system issues are not fully understand, there have been some strange occurances leading to leaks, and on that basis, even though there is no longer a clear/obvious ignition source/risk, it is not being cleared. It must be remembered that leaks on ANY aircraft are not categorised as "improbable" and hence all aircraft designs should be able to tolerate leaks. Even new aircraft that only leak rarely, still might leak - and hence to be safe must be immediately imperilled by such leaks. Despite this, the decision to suspend AAR is perhaps understandable.

The issue with the rigour of the safety procedures is that they were infact not as good many years ago. Things have moved on and analysis techniques, faliure mode understanding and processes now are much much better. The interesting issue is the fact that increasingly "better" approaches (including the adoption of saftey cases) have failed to spot problems that have haboured within this legacy system, without biting for many years. It is likely as you say that the "its been alright for years" mindset may have degraded the rigour with which more modern, best practice analyses have been applied. This is actually a human factors issue - its human nature - optimism bias if you like.

[Safeware]

Squidlord,

I haven't yet gone through the report but one of the points you make is not quite correct.If QQ are saying that the risks are (currently) "acceptable", then they are saying they are ALARP. Doesn't actually hold.
If some thing is "acceptable", it doesn't mean that the risks are ALARP, it means that the risks can be accepted, ie only that they are not "unacceptable" - the key phrase that an IPT doesn't want to hear. A bit like they don't want to hear the phrase "Release to Service is not recommended".

sw

[ShortFatOne]

"Copyright and restrictions

The Freedom of Information Act does not place restrictions on how you may use the information you receive under it. However, the Act does not transfer copyright in any information supplied under it. If you plan to reproduce the information you receive, you should ensure that you will not be breaching anyone's copyright by doing so."

Nige, understand your frustration and why you felt compelled to provide a link to the QQ report but you may find yourself in a bit of bovver if they decide to pursue it.

[davejb]

SFO,
that'd guarantee a huge shot to foot I suspect - which, admittedly, HAS tended to be the RAF PR dept's primary target for longer than I care to remember.

JFZ - I get your point re ignition, but I wouldn't blame that rather than the fuel leak. To my mind there was a source of ignition present for a long time, it didn't cause a fire because fuel wasn't also present. Unless I'm mistaken, and allowing for the absence of complete certainty in all this, the actual catalyst would appear to be the tanker type - as previous tankers used, such as the Victor, VC10 and Herc, didn't produce the same pressures... a case of it all actually being unsafe for years I suspect, but it was only when the final piece fell into place that the clock started to tick because finally pressure spikes started to occur that exceeded the systems ability to cope - and nobody seems to have known what pressures were being reached, and what the safe limit the system could handler were. (For anyone wishing to howl at this last sentence, I'm suggesting that both pieces of info were essential for safe operation, and that they weren't actually known - it was just assumed that everything would still go okay).

That may well all be a simplification, or just plain wrong...as I said, I too am struggling to understand it all.

[Chugalug2]

Nige, understand your frustration and why you felt compelled to provide a link to the QQ report but you may find yourself in a bit of bovver if they decide to pursue it.

Well they'll have to wait as we're due to be done under the OSA, hinted at by another low poster a few months ago!

[JFZ90]

Dave,

To my mind there was a source of ignition present for a long time, it didn't cause a fire because fuel wasn't also present.


Whilst that is true, the emphasis must be on the big NO NO being an ignition source. This was totally unacceptable in the aircraft design. Fuel as a liquid has a habit of getting in places it shouldn't, so you must take that into account in aircraft design and make attempts to ensure it can do no harm if it does. This is why you have to blame the ignition source, not the fuel. To put it in probability terms, you cannot preclude a leak from happening during the life of an aircraft by any stretch of the imagination - hence this shows that ignition sources must be absolutely totally avoided where fuel can come into contact with one otherwise you could never prove it met the required 10-7 hull loss rate (which is basically similar to saying never happens during an aircraft life) and hence could never be certified.

I'm not saying leaks are not a bad thing, just that you can't totally eliminate them, hence you MUST address the other risks.

[Distant Voice]

Squidlord

If QQ are saying the risk are currently "acceptable" then they are saying they are ALARP

Sorry, I can not agree. If you look up "acceptable" in the Concise Oxford Dictionary it say that it means "tolerable". So we are back to square one. It is just that "acceptable" gives a better (but false) impression of safety, as does "tolerably safe".

"Tolerably safe" may be a definition used among the IPT's, and it is my belief that that is where it came from. If you read the QQ GSN report, you will note that goals are set for systems to be "Broadly Acceptable, or Tolerable and ALARP" because QinetiQ, being a professional organisation, knows that is the standard set for a system to be safe. Nowhere in the body of the report do they talk about systems being "tolerably safe"

You mention Def Stan 00-56, can you tell me where the terms "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are defined in that document?

DV

[KeepItTidy]

So this entire thread and discussion is down to a meaning in the English dictionary when we refer to Tolerable or acceptable taken in the worng way ?

I can probably understand why they use the word Safe now , acceptable or tolerable are words that have been taken out of context it would seem.

This is the problem when you are dealing with law cases , screwing around of words can paint a whole diffrent picture. Good spot DV :)

[ZH875]

You mention Def Stan 00-56, can you tell me where the terms "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are defined in that document?

How about 00-56 (PART 1)/4 ANNEX A which defines 'Broadly Acceptable'

"Broadly Acceptable - A level of risk that is sufficiently low that it may be tolerated without the need to demonstrate that the risk is ALARP"

But it then defines "Unacceptable" as A level of risk that is tolerated only under exceptional circumstances.

So according to 00-56, Unacceptable can be tolerated, if the exceptional circumstance is that the UK government is broke.

[Distant Voice]

ZH875

Yes you are correct "broadly acceptable" is defined, but "acceptable" is not. That was the term used by Squidlord.

If something is "broadly acceptable" then it can be safe without being ALARP. However, "acceptable" is not the same, and is not defined. It is another word meaning "tolerable", and for that the system has to be ALARP.

As I said earlier, "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are not defined anywhere. In my opinion they are "spin" words and phrases to sell an idea. If you cast your mind back to "Blair's" Iraqi Dossier, the 14 min threat was never mentioned in the original draft, it was added later by Government in order to sell an idea.

DV

DV

[JFZ90]

Sorry, I can not agree. If you look up "acceptable" in the Concise Oxford Dictionary it say that it means "tolerable". So we are back to square one. It is just that "acceptable" gives a better (but false) impression of safety, as does "tolerably safe".

"Tolerably safe" may be a definition used among the IPT's, and it is my belief that that is where it came from. If you read the QQ GSN report, you will note that goals are set for systems to be "Broadly Acceptable, or Tolerable and ALARP" because QinetiQ, being a professional organisation, knows that is the standard set for a system to be safe. Nowhere in the body of the report do they talk about systems being "tolerably safe"

You mention Def Stan 00-56, can you tell me where the terms "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are defined in that document?

Yes you are correct "broadly acceptable" is defined, but "acceptable" is not. That was the term used by Squidlord.

If something is "broadly acceptable" then it can be safe without being ALARP. However, "acceptable" is not the same, and is not defined. It is another word meaning "tolerable", and for that the system has to be ALARP.

As I said earlier, "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are not defined anywhere. In my opinion they are "spin" words and phrases to sell an idea. If you cast your mind back to "Blair's" Iraqi Dossier, the 14 min threat was never mentioned in the original draft, it was added later by Government in order to sell an idea.

I think these posts reveal all you need to know about the lengths some will goto to try and defend their wonky arguments. Have you read what you've written DV? Read your bit in bold - are you a troll, or do you really believe this utter c*ck?

Right, so "Broadly Acceptable" is "good" but not the same as "Acceptable" which you think means "tolerable" in the dictionary which is therefore "bad". What does the dictionary say about "Broadly Acceptable"? If anything "Broadly Acceptable", (implying say 95% OK) is a looser phrase than "Acceptable" (which you could argue means 100% OK). You are, broadly speaking, a muppet.

[Distant Voice]

JFZ90

Clearly your rudeness indicates that you have lost the argument.

Why do you think we have DEF STANS with agreed definitions? -- To avoid ambiguity and the sort of political twists that people like you place on them.

DV

[JFZ90]

Clearly your rudeness indicates that you have lost the argument.

Not really DV. Not really rudeness, more dismissive contempt.

Still happy with your "broadly acceptable" is 'better' than "acceptable" argument?

Under the circumstances, I think my contempt was entirely justified.

[Safety_Helmut]

If anything "Broadly Acceptable", (implying say 95% OK) is a looser phrase than "Acceptable" (which you could argue means 100% OK).
The term broadly acceptable is well understod in safety management and safety engineering. If a risk is broadly acceptable, it effectively means that the probability of death is equivalent to the background mortality rate.

Some of you guys are making fools of yoursleves on here. Read the basics and digest it, then come back on here and offer up some reasoned thought instead of the half baked stuff. How about starting here http://http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.pdf (http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.pdf) This is nice basic stuff.

S_H

[JFZ90]

"The current operating limitations imposed by SD [Service Deviation] and the additional maintenance activities invoked through RTIs [Routine Technical Instructions] mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels. Changes to such mitigating action must be supported by appropriate evidence"

In the context above, if you had to chose a term that was

well understood in safety management and safety engineering,


does "acceptable" with respect to fuel system risk mean "tolerable" or "broadly acceptable" or were

QinetiQ, being a professional organisation,

actually using the term in some other unspecified way?

[Safety_Helmut]

The English language is notorious for its ambiguities. You may well be reading too much into the choice of words in some of these reports. You really do need to read some of the simple documents produced by HSE. These underpin (based on the H&SAWA) many of the other standards and regulations. I gave a link to an easy to read document earlier, Reducing Risks Protecting People, often referred to as R2P2. It's all in there, and in layman's terms. Acceptable and tolerable are used pretty much interchangably. But R2P2 makes it quite clear that this is linked to context, ie the situation, the benefit to be gained from the taking the risk and also reducing the risk to a level which is ALARP.

S_H

[taxydual]

BBC NEWS | Scotland | Nimrod families take legal action (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/7478219.stm)

[JFZ90]

When it suits,


The term (broadly) acceptable is well understood


and yet, when it doesn't

The English language is notorious for its ambiguities

I like to think I'm not guilty of

reading too much into the choice of words in some of these reports

as I try to look at them in context. I do however fear that many here do just that to meet their own ends. I think the last few posts prove that well.

[Safety_Helmut]

Oh dear JFZ !

It's not really worth wasting any more words on you !

S_H

[KeepItTidy]

Families are to sue the MOD ?

I thought that had already been done ?

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco

Re post 1109, nothing heard....................out.


JFZ90

Your contempt is wasted, save it for someone who actually knows what you are talking about.


MHAGE

[spanners123]

MHAGE,
I too have been looking for a reply from Winco, nothing yet, maybe there is an element of truth in your theory!:ok:

[Mad_Mark]

Yes, Wincos silence speaks a thousand words :hmm:

MadMark!!! :mad:

[nigegilb]

Just wanted to give everyone the heads up on this debate secured by Angus Robertson Tuesday 1st July 2008 on “Safety of the RAF Nimrod Fleet”.

The half hour debate between 1230 and 1300 in Westminster Hall will give the SNP MP 15 minutes to address the issue and an MOD Minister will have the same time to reply.

Debates in Westminster Hall are open to the public and there is also live web stream coverage on UK Parliament (http://www.parliamentlive.tv)

PM me if you need further contact details.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Also made Saturday's (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/2207784/Family-of-man-killed-in-Nimrod-explosion-to-take-legal-action-against-MoD.htm) Telegraph :

Family of man killed in Nimrod explosion to take legal action against MoD - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/2207784/Family-of-man-killed-in-Nimrod-explosion-to-take-legal-action-against-MoD.html)

Can't say I am surprised :hmm: and he says it's all about "justice". :rolleyes: I hope Knight realises that any compensayshun he receives will deny someone else the equipment that they need. Any comp payouts have to be found from within the existing Defence vote, that means more savings measures!!

[nigegilb]

I know Barrister Cooper personally, he has a formidable reputation. You only have to look back to the Sgt Roberts case to see how the MoD normally reacts when faced with having some well deserved accountability shoved down its throat - an offer of an out of court settlement complete with gagging order.

14 people dead, flying an aircraft that was never airworthy in over 40 years and all I have heard about so far is a promotion.

Not really sure this is about compensayshun RP, if Mr Knight is intent on getting some accountability it will be truly ironic, because I rather doubt that anything will buy him off. This will be even more worrying for the MoD and RAF Chiefs of Staff, because their normal cards will not work.

The other fact lost on your nasty little post, ( I saw the first version), is that any ruling made on grounds of Article 2 HRA will make deployment for personnel on Ops an awful lot safer.

But I don't suppose you are interested in the wider aspects of this case.
:rolleyes:

[nigegilb]

Too early to say. HRA is in its infancy. Especially regarding servicemen. I am not aware of a Govt Minister ever having been succesfully held to account but I can tell you that a charge of Gross Negligence Manslaughter against Geoff Hoon MP for the death of Sgt Roberts has been filed and is being looked at by Thames Valley Police and CPS.

This is all breaking new legal ground, so no, I don't agree with your post. And Minister Ainsworth declared Nimrod airworthy and safe to fly within minutes of the Coroner's verdict being known and no he didn't consult with his chiefs of staff before making the announcement.

[Roland Pulfrew]

But I don't suppose you are interested in the wider aspects of this case.


Get over yourself nigegilb.:hmm: As someone with several thousand hours on the jet and who new members of that crew of course I am. What annoys me is people who continually bleat on about an aircraft that was never airworthy in over 40 years which is blatent rubbish, despite what some non-expert coroner may have said.

I am not convinced by Knight's motives, I (like quite a few on here) am not convinced they are that altruistic. And I deleted 3 words from my earlier post, if you felt it was nasty so be it, personally I thought it slightly rude which was why I modified it!:ugh: As I have said to you before, I think Knight is achieving little except prolonging his own pain.

Minister Ainsworth declared Nimrod airworthy and safe to fly within minutes of the Coroner's verdict being known and no he didn't consult with his chiefs of staff before making the announcement. And do you have evidence to back that up? I think it seriously unlikely that the Minister would not have made such a pronouncement without some form of pre-brief agreed within the MOD/RAF.

I now retire from this topic, it has lost any balance.

[Tappers Dad]

Roland Pulfrew
an aircraft that was never airworthy in over 40 years

which is blatent rubbish, despite what some non-expert coroner may have said.

I suggest you watch this when Ainsworth said they were not airworthy as was proved, for many years

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrods 'will not be grounded' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7417498.stm)

And then wipe the egg off your face !!


I am not convinced by Knight's motives,


Has any action been taken against those with delegated responsibility for Nimrod airworthiness at the time of the Nimrod crash. As they failed in their duty?

No sir it has not, no demotions or court martial's 14 men killed through incompetence and someone is to blame.

Until I find out who was to blame I won't rest in my fight.

[Winco]

Nimrod Age
MadMark
Spanners

My apologies for the delay for getting back to you, but I have had a couple of days holiday and I purposely refrained from seeking out a computer to get logged on to Pprune! Nevertheless, as promised, I have spoken to some of our senior engineers at LHR and discussed the various points you raised, namely the Licensed engineers and also the checks for locating a fuel leak.

Let me explain the licensed engineers point firstly; and as I thought, you are quite wrong in your statement that unlicensed engineers ‘work’ on BA aircraft. They categorically DO NOT work on the aircraft, and for your information AGE (especially as I understand you are leaving the service soon) I am advised that this website will explain it all to you:
http://www.kingston.ac.uk/aircrafteng/licence/licence.htm (http://www.kingston.ac.uk/aircrafteng/licence/licence.htm)
One of the chaps I met at LHR said that he was confident that he knew who you were (DG??) He was also at ISK and was going to get in touch with you.

On the business of locating fuel leaks, I am told by our engineers that there are currently a number of ways of locating a fuel leak. (none of which included buckets and soapy water and compressed air!) They involve ‘sniffer’ devices that are fed into the various areas where a leak is suspected and are used to locate the general area of the leak. (http://www.adixen.co.uk/downloads/Extrima-ENG.pdf (http://www.adixen.co.uk/downloads/Extrima-ENG.pdf)) see page 2.

Litmus paper is then used to further narrow the exact location down. There is also some measuring equipment that is placed ‘in line’ within the fuel system to confirm firstly that there is a leak. I understand that the system is then pressurized to (I think they said 15lb psi) and a reading is then taken. After a set period of time, the reading is checked again, and if it has dropped then there is a leak. If it hasn’t then the system is OK. There are tolerances, but I don’t remember them. This method also helps in general location, as the pressurized system ‘forces’ out the fuel, thus staining the area of the leak.

(http://www.engineeringtalk.com/news/sis/sis105.html (http://www.engineeringtalk.com/news/sis/sis105.html)) This report highlights the importance of good leak detection, and in particular take note of the paragraph that states:
‘Soap bubble testing can detect very small leaks allowing the operator to pinpoint the location of a leak. However, the process is highly dependent on the skill and patience of the operator. This can be dangerous if the operator's perspective is limited. For example, small leaks may remain hidden on the reverse side of the component or in a recess, which is a common occurrence in the aerospace industry where components are usually packed into tight spaces.
Sometimes with soap bubble testing, larger leaks do not cause the formation of bubbles; instead, the compressed air blows away the soap solution, and operators frequently fail to observe such leaks.
Conversely, with small holes, the capillary force can be extremely strong.
The result is that liquid that has been sucked into a micro leak by capillary action, cannot be forced out with compressed air, and therefore no bubbles will appear.
Another widely used leak detection method in the aerospace industry is pressure decay, where compressed air is simply injected into a test object, and a decrease in air pressure over time signifies a leak.
So, I can just confirm to you, that the practice of draining the fuel system down and then blowing air through it and listening for whistles, is NOT used on BA aircraft, and I would doubt that it is used on any other major airline.
That is still not to say that I blame you or any of your colleagues for what happened on 230, because I do not. But what you must try to appreciate (and it took me a long time to get my head around this also) is that the RAF is NOT the best at everything it does. It does NOT have the best kit available and does NOT (always) employ the best practices. I would suggest that perhaps you didn’t even know about these other methods of fuel leak detection did you? I am pretty sure that had you known about them, that someone at ISK would have suggested that you get one. But that would mean money, and thereby lies the root of this disaster – lack of money.

Now, and finally, as to whether or not you think I am a Walter Mitty or a real aircraft Captain flying a damned great aeroplane backwards and forwards across the pond with a few hundred pax behind me, I would simply respond by saying that frankly, I really couldn’t care less one way or another. You are free and entitled to make your own decision, and it affects not one thing in my life, it’s entirely yopur call Sirs.
But please, try to stop taking offence at everything that is said that remotely involves the groundcrew. IMHO they are NOT to blame at all for what happened to 230. The blame lies squarely on the shoulders of the government, then SoS, then CAS, ACAS, AOC, and probably the Station Commander, although I note that he did pass on his concerns up the chain.

The Winco

[flipster]

Gentlemen,

Might I sugest that this e.mud-slinging is showing no-one in a particularly good light?

Might I also suggest that you all take a deep breath and count to 10...please?

Then, (forgiving and discounting a few hurtful remarks) perhaps it might be worth trying to see how the 'other parties' could be seeing this whole sad Nimrod episode and just maybe consider that, from their different point of view, it is understandable how the different people can feel the way they do?

If you could just try to imagine the hurt the families are going through, how hard engineers and crews are working at KSS/theatre and even how someone at the IPTs/DEC/MoD/Gp HQs are trying to get a quart of ambrosia out of the proverbial pint pot of p1ss. There may even be some pangs of guilt in some, or all, of the above.

Can you guys find something in this tragedy on which you can all agree?


For me, the real lesson from XV230 (and XV179) is that it illustrates how sorely underfunded are our Armed Forces?

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

Can I just say I totally agree with what Nimrod AGE, MadMark and Spanners haven't posted yet but will do soon. How's that for sticking my neck out. Don't let me down boys.

[nigegilb]

Here is the Ainsworth interview when he admits that the decision to claim the airworthiness status of Nimrod minutes after the Coroner's verdict was taken without any of his staff having heard the transcript of the Inquest, including himself. And he admits to a recent conversation with CAS but not immediately after the verdict was announced. And the 40 page conclusion had only just been read into court.




http://www.benknight.co.uk/BBC%20%20PM%20Programme.mp3

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco I thank you for your response, I know not who you refer to at LHA and he hasn't gotten in contact yet but I wait with anticipation.

In the meantime I am applying for an 'unlisenced' job at BA as I have looked at the following link:

BA Recruitment (http://www.britishairwaysjobs.com/baweb1/?newms=info167)

Imagine my surprise, unlicensed mechanics and technicians working on BA aircraft, tut tut.

Know your own company??

[davejb]

Umm,
technician and mechanic adverts carry the lines
, your work will always be inspected and signed off by a Licensed Aircraft Engineer.
and
Normally you would work alongside a Licensed Aircraft Engineer,

which I think was the point Winco made in his last post? Surely rather than heading now into another round of

'engineers are licensed - no they're not - yes they are'

it might be an idea to look at the description of leak testing methodology and see if there's an improvement that can be made to current practise? ie take a somewhat heated argument and obtain something of worth from it?

Dave

[nigegilb]

Good call, and should the RAF invest in some decent test equipment? And invest in enough sets so that it can be deployed with the aircraft?

One more thing. Before he signed off RP suggested that any compensation paid to the families would come out of the existing defence budget and that this would mean that soldiers would have to go to war without needed equipment as a result.

I understand that the MoD is intending to pay the families out of its own insurance policy designed for this purpose. I just wonder on what basis they are going to make the claim. If you do not have an MoT does that not invalidate the insurance?

Furthermore if Article 2 of HRA is upheld the British Govt would no longer be able to send its soldiers to their deaths in thin skinned Land Rovers.

There is a lot at stake here folks.

[RAF_Techie101]

the practice of draining the fuel system down and then blowing air through it and listening for whistles, is NOT used on BA aircraft

Who on earth mentioned this?

[MightyHunter AGE]

I quote from my post #1092
I think you may find that the guys who undertake the leak checks at BA are probably unlicensed and the job will be signed off by an ALE.

So I am therefore taking a stand back from this as requested and I am interested in the methods employed by BA.

Maybe someone at the IPT should contact BA and get engineering advice from them on how to keep our fleet flying as we seem to know nothing.

[Squidlord]

All references to "reports" below and to Qinetiq (QQ) statements, unless otherwise stated, relate to:

"Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report", Oct 2007, Issue 1

The main conclusion of my last post was that contrary to several claims in this thread, this QQ report does not claim that the Nimrod fuel system was unsafe in its context of use and maintenance at the time the report was written. No one's written anything to suggest that conclusion was wrong.


Chugalug2:


The bottom line is very simple, the present arrangement allows for the operator (the MOD) to be its own regulator. The result has been the farrago exposed in this and the Parliamentary Questions threads. Self regulation does not work. In aviation it does not work in a spectacular and devastating way. Forget the MOD's "Efforts", nothing short of an independant Military Airworthiness Authority will suffice.


The MoD is currently considering a separate MAA organisation but I doubt if they are seriously considering making it independent of the MoD. I don't know whether Chugalug2's claims hold water (no evidence is provided). Perhaps the idea of an independent MAA will be considered by Haddon-Cave's Nimrod Review:

http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/ (http://www.nimrod-review.org.uk/)



Distant Voice (DV) asked me:


Can you give an example of another Nimrod related report [that was released by Qinetiq (QQ) in draft for comment]?


No. But then I only know the issue history of one QQ Nimrod report (I've not bothered to check any others - I'm perfectly happy to accept DV's claim that they haven't been issued in draft for comment because it's just not an interesting aspect of this whole story).



JFZ90 wrote:


I've resisted criticising the QQ report in the way you have, but the weaknesses/inconsistences you point out are spot on. In their defence you could argue they would not have expected particular phrases to have been latched onto in the way they have without consideration of the wider picture you outline.


In my opinion, safety is just too important for any lapses in language and terminology to be acceptable. Ok, this thread doesn't, in itself, amount to much of a hill of beans, but formal QQ reports, etc. are another matter. My guess is that much of the farrago with authorities apparently making contradictory statements stems from the imprecise use of safety language and/or the use of undefined or misleading terms (like "tolerably safe").



davejb:


I would like to emphasise however that the points from my own post that you have quoted were very much questions, rather than statements


Absolutely, understood.


my basic problem being I keep expecting there to be a set of rules by which a system is declared ok or not. Instead it seems to be a mental Gordian knot.


There is a "set of rules" but they are not being followed carefully (on this thread, by the MoD, by QQ, etc.). "Safety" feels like it should be a fairly straightforward thing to talk about. But it's not. Much of the blame for this rests with the ALARP principle. It looks so simple but, in general, its practical application is very difficult! The ALARP principle, as a means for determining the acceptability of risk, is contentious and has its critics (AFAIK, the only country in the world that uses it widely is the UK, it has been challenged in the European Court, etc.). In my opinion, the strongest argument against it is the complexities involved in applying it.


My feeling is that sometime post '82 an approach of 'it's been okay so far' was substituted for rigorous safety procedures, and that has been exacerbated by declining experience levels in just about every trade, including aircrew.


In my opinion, that's all too plausible.


personally I don't think that an AAR system failure almost 25 years later says much good of the safety management of Nimrod, surely in all that time it could have been given a thorough going over to check it was really okay?


Notwithstanding JFZ90's remarks about AAR, I agree with the thrust of what davejb is saying. Strongly!


ALARP - I believe I get the basic idea, I also believe (perhaps wrongly) it is possible to fly the aircraft safely without it being ALARP, provided AAR isn't performed (for example)


Not really. The MoD's definition of safe (which is always relative to a context of use and maintainance) requires that risks are ALARP. However, it is entirely possible for the risk of flying an aircraft to be ALARP in a context of use that does not include, for example, AAR, but not ALARP in a context of use that does.

Think of your own car. In some sense, it is "safe" if driven in accordance with the rules of the road and properly maintained. Now suppose you never maintain it or MoT it, and/or drive it at 100 mph through crowded playgrounds. Same car ... but is it safe now?



Safeware wrote:


I haven't yet gone through the report but one of the points you make is not quite correct.
Quote:
If QQ are saying that the risks are (currently) "acceptable", then they are saying they are ALARP.
Doesn't actually hold.
If some thing is "acceptable", it doesn't mean that the risks are ALARP, it means that the risks can be accepted, ie only that they are not "unacceptable"

I don't really know what point Safeware is making here. Perhaps you could clarify, Safeware? E.g., when you use the term "unacceptable", are you using it in the generic English language sense, or in the defined risk management sense (POSMS, Def Stan 00-56, etc.). And are you defining the term "acceptable" accordingly?

One of the problems of safety management terminology is that a set of terms has grown up that has very specific meaning in safety/risk management but distinctly different meanings in general English language. Two very relevant examples are "unacceptable" and "tolerable". It leads to confusions whereby risks can be "tolerable" in the risk management sense but "intolerable" in the generic English sense. And risks can be "unacceptable" in the generic English sense but not "unacceptable" in the risk management sense (hence my question above to Safeware). I wish we (the UK) could junk such risk/safety management terminology and replace it with something better thought out but it's probably too late now.

Anyway, I firmly believe that QQ are using the word "acceptable", in:


The current operating limitations imposed by SD and the additional maintenance activities invokeds through RTIs mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels. Changes to such mitigating action must be supported by appropriate evidence


in its generic, English dictionary sense (they certainly don't provide any other definition and I'm not aware of one in any relevant safety/risk management documents, e.g., POSMS, 00-56, HSE guidance, etc. - all suggesting QQ are using the term in its generic English sense).

That's the same sense the word is used in:

1. HSE guidance - see, for example, Reducing Risks, Protecting People:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm (mhtml:{4F9ED4D6-C991-45FF-BE91-DA5583714C20}mid://00000025/!x-usc:http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/r2p2.htm)

(Incidentally, Safety Helmut's claim that, "Acceptable and tolerable are used pretty much interchangably" in R2P2 is wrong - see, for example, pages 3 & 8 which address the issue very specifically)

2. the MoD's Safety Management bible, POSMS (see, for example, SMP07, clause 10.1.5):

http://www.asems.mod.uk/posms_manual.htm (mhtml:{4F9ED4D6-C991-45FF-BE91-DA5583714C20}mid://00000025/!x-usc:http://www.asems.mod.uk/posms_manual.htm)

And if QQ are using the term, "acceptable" in its generic sense, then the only criterion I know of by which they could make a judgement that a risk is acceptable is that the risk is either "broadly acceptable", or "tolerable" and ALARP. Certainly, QQ give no other criterion in the report and I am aware of no other criterion defined by relevant safety/risk management documents, e.g., POSMS, 00-56, HSE guidance, etc., suggesting that they mean that the risk is either "broadly acceptable", or "tolerable" and ALARP. Hence, they are saying that at the time they wrote the report, the Nimrod fuel system was safe in its then context of use and maintenance.


Final point on this. Whatever QQ meant when they wrote:


The current operating limitations imposed by SD [Service Deviation] and the additional maintenance activities invokeds through RTIs [Routine Technical Instructions] mitigate the fuel system risks to acceptable levels. Changes to such mitigating action must be supported by appropriate evidence


it doesn't affect the validity of my claim that QQ's statement:


"the recommendations [...] should be considered and acted upon, where appropriate, before it can be considered that the equipment risks are ALARP"


is not referring to the context of use and maintenance of the aircraft current at the time the report was written. Thus, the QQ report does not claim that the Nimrod fuel system was unsafe in its context of use and maintenance extant at the time the report was written.



DV wrote:

If you look up "acceptable" in the Concise Oxford Dictionary it say that it means "tolerable". So we are back to square one. It is just that "acceptable" gives a better (but false) impression of safety

As with Safeware's post, I'm not sure what point DV is trying to make here. I'm not sure what the "square one" that DV refers to is. Do you, DV, mean to equate the "tolerable" you found in the dictionary with "tolerable" in the safety/risk management sense (see, e.g., POSMS, 00-56, R2P2, etc.)? To do so would be a mistake because they have very different meanings (see my para. above).


You mention Def Stan 00-56, can you tell me where the terms "acceptable" and "tolerably safe" are defined in that document?


AFAIK, they're not. What's the relevance of the question?



KeepItTidy:


So this entire thread and discussion is down to a meaning in the English dictionary when we refer to Tolerable or acceptable taken in the worng way ?


Hardly!

[nigegilb]

RAF Techie you asked about whistle tests, this is an account of evidence presented on 21 May. Usual cautions apply, this is not necessarily word for word, but was written down at the time, by someone I trust implicitly.

Rawlinson. The list of mitigations was to convert ac that was unairworthy into airworthy? Yes. That was by limiting some operating circumstances? yes. Crossfeeed pipe not used in flt? Correct.
Inspection every 30 days. Fuel couplings, elec systems for arcing. What chks on fuel system? Ev 30 days fuel system pressurised to 50psi with full tanks - pressurised by bowser. Ac level.
C- how do you chk for leaks? Depanel the ac and look. It’s the same test we’d do if we had repaced a fuel component.
Fuel coupling inspection (rib3 to rib3) and part replacement. Replace targteed fuel seals. This has come about after the Qinetiq investigation. Replace 40 seals in high risk areas - that’s to say where a leaking coupling wd hazard the ac.
C - suggests FRS couplings are unsuitable. Gp Capt doesn’t understand why they are not suitable. C says it’s because they dry out if not in contact with fuel.
Gp Capt says he takes his advice on that from the ac designer. (as opposed to the coupling manufacturer)
C - Qinetiq report says these seals deteriorate in 5 days if not in contact with fuel? It’s their advice you shd take? It’s a matter for the ac designer. Have you discussed it with them? Only in offline discussions. What was result? Not answered
C these couplings may turn out to be usnuitable? My point is that the mnfr wants these couplings, and it’s up to them.
Can you say this risk has been mitigated? And is it airworthy? we’ve done these checks and there’s an RTI. (Routine Technical Instruction, I think)

C - With this evidence how can you say you’ve mitigated? - this inquest needs to know what steps you’ve taken.
I understand. If the ac mnfr so decides , we’ll change the couplings.
C--should the ac be flying until this is sorted? I don’t follow that argument. We’ve seen leaks before.
C - (The coupling) manufacturer says they’re unsuitable couplings. Does your offline discussion (with ac mnfr) say they are? No they don’t. The hazard from fuel leaks in vent system is just a fuel leak. Not desirable, but a fuel leak on a nimrod shd not put it on the ground.
C- If the vent pipe passes throught the fuselage into the wg, then it’s a risk? - it’s unsafe? Yes, but following that incident we carried out an RTI to check the integrity - we did pressure chks on vent system. We blow air through it and examine for leaks.
Our reaction to leaks thro the vent system was to introduce a checking system by blowing air through it. Do you use soapy water like with a bicycle tyre? Yes. And we listen for hissing air. Done in hangar. We cease all other maint work while this is going on, so they can hear whistling of leaks.

Rawlinson You are sounding to the families as if you have a very casual attitude? No. I have no casual attitude to airworthiness.
What about reported leaks - some aircraft have as many as 11? Correct
A small number of those are due to misaligned pipes at the coupling? yes. What are you doing about that? It’s part of 30-day chks (that we’ve instigated as one of the mitigations.) It’s done by eye.
The manufacturer says misalignment is the no 1 cause of leaks? - and the maintenance guy said have you any idea how difficult it is to do this alignment above yr head? It’’s difficult. 1º misalignment is impossible to detect.
C- so seals are not the major prob? It’s alignment? Yes, but, gross misalignment will be found,
C In the video that we’ve all seen, what caused that leak? Don’t know. How can the IPT not know about that? We’ve had others.
C- what reasons? Incorrect assembly of ccoupling - no, sorry, scrub that.
C - was it to do with FRS seals? One was incorrect alignment, others had damage to seal, damaged during fitting inside coupling. Those are the only two I recall. But we have investigated several. What was front runner? Alignment.

Rawlinson Can technicians get physical access to all couplings withing venting system? Not all of them. How do you test those you can’t get at? If you can’t see them, you can hear the leaks. You’d need a techie to answer that. What is dist between hearer and the parts that can’t be reached? Can’t answer. But how can you satisfy yourself abour airwrthiness if there are clear areaa where you can’t be sure? That’s why we introduced full comprehensive tests to get a acess to all. That’s only annually? Yes. But where you have a seal that can dry out (in 5 days) and you’re only chkg every 30 days, how does that work? We do it as far as poss every 30 days, then follow up annually. But these mitigation steps were to say that an ac that was not airworthy is now so? - surely we can’t be sure, because you can’t chk them all, and you can’t give us enough detail to assure us it’s safe? I believe we have mitigated (the risks)
How do you know this leaking fuel isn’t in contact with ignition source? We know it leaks, and our strategy is to ensure the ac can tolerate leaks.

C - there are hot sources and electrical soureces? yes. Eg APU, plus electrical sources? yes there is a risk of fuel leaks onto an electrical component.. The advice from Qinetiq on electrical arcing at altitude is that it is unlikely to be a risk. Once ac is airborne, sparking is unlikely at altitude.
C-- But the ac has to get up there? yes. You satisfied with that? yes. Our independent fuel safety review redid the analysis. They said ac is tolerably safe to fly. This is not ALARP? Qinetiq says it’s tolerably safe, but not yet ALARP. .
C - Talking about JSP553 (Mil Airworthiness manual) - your predecessor as the ITPL, Air Cdre Baber, agreed that the requirement was to reduce risk to ALARP. Can you confirm that this ac is not ALARP? Yes. We are checking fuel couplings and replacing them. We’re replacing hot air ducts. But we haven’t done that yet so it’s not ALARP.

[RAF_Techie101]

Nige:

Thankyou for the long post, my problem with Winco's statement was his inference that
the practice of draining the fuel system down and then blowing air through it and listening for whistles, is NOT used on BA aircraft
IS undertaken on Nimrods.

This practice is undertaken with VENT lines, not fuel lines, as your post proves. To check the fuel lines with air would be non-sensical. People argue that the vent lines can contain fuel, and yes - they can. However, this is in the form of vapour, as the vent lines are blown through continually during flight, as the name would suggest. This is then blown overboard next to the jettison points.

[Winco]

Oh Dear, MightyHunter AGE,

There you go yet again! - this sad, pathetic 'little boy' attitude when you don't get your own way. For goodness sake man, do grow up a bit and try to stop all this ridiculous points scoring stupidity.

Forget about licensed engineers and all that nonesence and concentrate on the important matters here. The hard fact is that at ISK (and probably elsewhere in the RAF) you DO NOT use up-to-date kit to locate fuel leaks do you? You use a method that we have all used for years when we have had a puncture on our bikes! Unfortunately, as has been proven and shown (in my last posting) this is NOT reliable, and should not be used. ENDEX

I re-iterate that the probable reason for the lack of modern kit is lack of money. It's as simple as that. It's not your fault, its not OC Eng's fault, and its probably not even the Staish's fault. Its down to the constant cuts in the defence budget and lack of investment. So accept that, and stop trying to make excuses for everything.

It will become abundantly clear to you when you join BA, that things are done much differently outside, and in the main they are done much better.
Good luck with your application.

RAF Techie 101. I am fairly certain that somewhere in the past few pages, someone claimed that the fuel system on NImrods was checked for leaks by draining it and using compressed air. Indeed, I think that was one of the points that the EATON corporation commented on about the seals drying out wasn't it? Anyway, the point I was trying to make is that there are other, better, and more accurate methods of locating and identifying aircraft fuel leaks other than soapy water, and the same goes for the vents also.

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco please.

I did try and give you the benefit of the doubt but your last post has again made me chuckle.

It took you so long to reply to me before as you were searching the internet like anyone desperate to justify their argument. I could search all day long and find the same but to be honest I cant be bothered.

Have fun on Flight Sim 2000.

[Softie]

RAFTechie101 states: This practice is undertaken with VENT lines, not fuel lines, as your post proves. To check the fuel lines with air would be non-sensical. People argue that the vent lines can contain fuel, and yes - they can. However, this is in the form of vapour, as the vent lines are blown through continually during flight, as the name would suggest. This is then blown overboard next to the jettison points.Unfortunately, RT is wrong on 2 points. Post-major air/nitogen is used to test the integrity of the fuel system (MP41-??) before the aircraft is fueled for the first time after depth maintenance. The logic is that you want to ensure the fuel system has been correctly rebuilt after deep strip before risking putting fuel in. Second, the BOI determined that there is nothing to prevent fuel entering the fuel vent system especially using refuelling (air or ground) and during rotation on takeoff. There are no float valves on the No 1 tank vent outlets to stop it and it will sit there until the vent system is pressurised in flight by ram air.

[nigegilb]

Softie, is it significant that this test equipment is not available in theatre? I am thinking back to the serious fuel leaks where it was not possible to replicate on the ground. Is it possible that;

a. This equipment is available at Kinloss?
b. This equipment is not available to deployed aircraft and could not be used after fuel leak events in theatre?


This has been a point of confusion for some time,

Regards,

Nige

[Softie]

Nig
No, it is not significant. Should a serious leak be found in theatre, the aircraft and tanks concerned would be restricted/limited and flown back to UK for repair. If this is not possible or unsafe then a team and equipment would be deployed. This is no different from any other RAF fleet. Major work at a deployed base (of any type) is not desirable because of the lack of backup resources and expertise.

[PPRuNe Pop]

Gentlemen,

A few complaints have been made regarding the off topic, abuse, mud slinging and.....it goes on.

One or two of you have had their posts deleted for good reason and included in the above.

We are not going to tolerate this. Some of you have been close to a ban on this thread so I strongly suggest that you wind necks in and concentrate on a debate constructed from real knowledge and understanding.

Btw. Toys and prams are strictly forbidden too!

PPP

[Safeware]

Squidlord, you wroteSafeware wrote:

I haven't yet gone through the report but one of the points you make is not quite correct.
Quote:
If QQ are saying that the risks are (currently) "acceptable", then they are saying they are ALARP.
Doesn't actually hold.
If some thing is "acceptable", it doesn't mean that the risks are ALARP, it means that the risks can be accepted, ie only that they are not "unacceptable"

I don't really know what point Safeware is making here. Perhaps you could clarify, Safeware? E.g., when you use the term "unacceptable", are you using it in the generic English language sense, or in the defined risk management sense (POSMS, Def Stan 00-56, etc.). And are you defining the term "acceptable" accordingly?

What I was trying to get at, without getting into the arguments of "official safety" or "dictionary" meanings, was what an IPT will look for. This report doesn't provide definitions, which does occur in Release To Service Recommendations, but I don't think that is important at this stage.

In essence, and I'll use a range of words to cover differing angles and people's experiences, the question for the IPT is "is the problem UNACCEPTABLE/ is the risk INTOLERABLE" ie "is there something that it is ESSENTIAL to do to mitigate the risk?" If it isn't, then it is by inference, acceptable (whether this be Tolerable, Acceptable, Broadly Acceptable, Unsatisfactory or Satisfactory), ie it can be accepted. However, just because it can be accepted, doesn't make it ALARP (even unacceptable/intolerable risks can be accepted in exceptional circumstances (and I know that this may seem to contradict my earlier "ie only that they are not "unacceptable", but I was trying to be 'general' and describe the norm there)).

IPTs really don't like things that are Unacceptable or Intolerable (or the phrase Release To Service is not recommended) because it means that they have to do something about it (even if it is just justifying what they want to do to someone up the chain) and life isn't going to be as simple as they wanted. They *will* exert pressure on QQ not to use such words.

Of course, in the strictest sense, even an Intolerable Risk could be ALARP, since there may be nothing more that can be done. In "exceptional circumstances" you would want to demonstrate that even at that level of risk, you had done everything you could to reduce the risk as far as you could, it may just not be practicable to reduce it further. This shows that ALARP is about the practicality of risk reduction and tolerability about the willingness to bear that risk. The link between the 2 being the "sacrifice" ("sacrifice" wrt App 3, para 4 of R2P2) required to be made.

Some people want to discuss the meanings in great detail, I wasn't, only trying to point out that whatever words were being used, in anyone's books "acceptable" doesn't equal ALARP, as you inferred.

sw

[Tappers Dad]

MOD slammed for Nimrod safety delay

Minister admits measures put back another 6 months

The Ministry of Defence is coming under criticism for delaying the implementation of key safety recommendations in Nimrod aircraft.
The revelation came during todays Nimrod safety debate called by Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan which killed 14 servicemen.
The entire Nimrod fleet is based in RAF Kinloss in Mr Robertson’s Moray constituency.
During the Westminster Hall Debate Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009, in contrast to recent MOD evidence to a Coroners Inquest which promised completion by the end of 2008.

Following the loss of Nimrod XV230 the MOD commissioned a report by defence contractor QinetiQ, which concluded there were 30 safety improvements needed before the risk-level of the Nimrod fleet was at the acceptable standard of “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).

Speaking after the debate Mr Robertson said:
“It is a real concern that the MOD has delayed the implementation of key safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft fleet.

“The Minister gave no explanation for the slippage which is hardly going to provide the reassurance that so many people want to hear.

“Defence contractor QinetiQ made 30 key recommendations in October 2007 and the MOD has still not confirmed how many have been implemented in full and when the rest will be completed.

“Having paid more than £26 million pounds for this advice it is beyond me why senior MOD managers are dragging their feet.
“It is like your car failing its MOT and taking 20 months to make the necessary improvements. It wouldn’t be allowed in a motor vehicle, so I don’t see why the MOD think it is acceptable for an RAF aircraft.”

[nigegilb]

Moray MP Angus Robertson has now asked Defence Ministers the same question three times about the 30 QinetiQ recommendations without success: How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?

[SirPeterHardingsLovechild]

One of the reasons there was some mud slinging on this thread recently is that some armchair experts have consistently confused Fuel Tanks, Fuel Pipes & Fuel Vent Pipes, sometimes deliberately.

As for the spat about Licensed/Unlicensed Engineers -

Winco - Stop digging yourself deeper into that hole, you're wrong and you've had plenty of chance to back off.

[Winco]

sphlc

Thanks for the advice. I've decided to retire from this fiasco.
Let the 'experts' get on with it.

[nigegilb]

Winco please don't retire there are too many MOD trolls here and IPT look outs. I understand that MOD has gone into mini meltdown tonight over the revelation that Hickman may have misled the Inquest.

If anyone was there on the day he gave his evidence please PM me.

[waterhorse]

old fat one
I agree
the truth is that there is an awful lot of codswallop and trumpet blowing that goes on in this thread
which in my opinion disguises the real human problem
Nimrods are old, they need replacing and another is going to fall out of the sky unless they are replaced soon.
24 good men have died and both accidents were preventable
yes they were - before u all even think about arguing about it.
families are left to cope and dedicated airmen have been lost to the airforce and their loved ones.
who cares about ALARP they should be properly serviceable
not past their best
have u ever considered why they give u a number when u join up?
yes it hurts - but the truth is that is what u are to the MOD
at the end of the day more good men are being put at risk.
MAKES ME PUKE - (deliberate use of caps lock)

[EdSett100]

Winco:
Forget about licensed engineers and all that nonesence and concentrate on the important matters here. The hard fact is that at ISK (and probably elsewhere in the RAF) you DO NOT use up-to-date kit to locate fuel leaks do you? You use a method that we have all used for years when we have had a puncture on our bikes! Unfortunately, as has been proven and shown (in my last posting) this is NOT reliable, and should not be used. ENDEX

The RAF uses appropriate test equipment to check for fuel leaks, just like any other aircraft operator. I would go further and state that the Nimrod fleet is probably the only operator that checks vent pipes for leaks, in addition to post fit examination, etc. After all, they are not pressurized pipes, they are open to atmosphere and they direct air into, and out of, fuel tanks. 90% of the vent system is submerged in, or is routed above, fuel. There are some relatively short lengths of pipe, in the Rib 1 areas, that interconnect the fuel tanks. Air leak tests of these pipes, however they are achieved, ARE NOT MANDATED by the designer.

Its a matter of opinion if the absence of leak tests on vent pipes makes an aircraft unsafe. Therefore, its also a matter of opinion on how any such tests are best carried out. The fact that we are doing them, now, and the method employed does not necessarily infer that it was unsafe to omit them before. The IPT are simply acting on an observation made by 3 senior officers (the BOI).

[The Swinging Monkey]

Ed

I notice your use of the word 'appropriate' test equipment (sounds like something Torpy might say!) so are you saying therefore, that the 'whistle & soapy water' method, as has been described on this forum is now not used? or is now not the only method used for leak detection in the RAF?

Do you use either of the methods that the winco refered to in his earlier post (I notice a lack of response from anyone regarding that) ie the sniffer kit, litmus paper, pressure testing etc. The report from the scientist bloke is quite straight forward and states that the soapy water is completely unreliable, and yet some on here claim to be still using it. If proper modern kit is being used, I just wonder why no one has mentioned that before on here.

MightyHunter AGE - perhaps you can comment on the current kit that is used at Kinloss to detect fuel leaks? that is assuming you have some of course.

Regards to all
TSM

[EdSett100]

Nigegilb (to Winco):Winco please don't retire there are too many MOD trolls here and IPT look outs.

Who do you have in mind? Screen names, please, Nige.

I understand that MOD has gone into mini meltdown tonight over the revelation that Hickman may have misled the Inquest.

What revelation?

Its not a surprise that his testimony misled the Coroner. But, why am I not surprised that it has taken this long for the grown-ups to recognize the severity of his mistakes. "Its not ALARP" and "its tolerably safe". Its rubbish. All he had to say was that all risks of fire (catastrophic failure) have been mitigated, as confirmed by QQ, which means that the risks are minimal (broadly acceptable).

Therefore, risk reduction to ALARP is not required.

Of course, we all agree that this was NOT the case before the crash. The families have a good case for negligence, IMHO, and I am prepared to provide any technical or historical facts about the aircraft and its modus operandi before 2 Sep 06. But, they really should steer clear of any discussions about Nimrod safety management since the accident. Except to point out that the amount of (successful) mitigation work since the crash serves to support the case that the fleet was not safe before then.

[EdSett100]

TSM, I used the word, "appropriate" because it is the case that when we check for leaks from fuel pipes we do it in an appropriate manner. I don't doubt that BA uses the methods, described by Winco, to check fuel pipes and we would do something similar when required. But, importantly, the pipes we are discussing in this side topic are vent pipes, not fuel pipes.

Winco, can you ask your colleagues at BA if they routinely check the fuel tank vent pipes for leaks? I would guess that they do not do so. And, if I'm right with my guess, that would place the Nimrod fleet in better light than our national carrier, regardless of how we do the tests......Winco? Over to you.....

[nigegilb]

"I wonder again if the Coroner would take a view on this. Would his recommendation that the fleet be grounded have been expressed more strongly if he had been told the timescale was a year or more, not 6 months? As I said, he (coroner) would have assumed from the evidence that MoD had a clear way ahead agreed, knew the cost and had an agreed delivery / embodiment plan with industry. What would he have said, or what other evidence/witnesses would he have sought, had he been told "We've done cock all, and it could be December 08 or June 09, or....". he had in front of him a "senior" officer making (I think) a firm statement. If the IPTL had said "I'm not sure", surely the Coroner would have demanded someone who was sure."

EDSET, I don't agree with your post 1234 RE ALARP not required I have the technical argument why I believe you are wrong, will PM you later.

Also, the families are right to pursue the MOD over matters post crash. Just as in XV179 nobody wants this to happen again and it is now clear that IPT did hardly anything RE 30 recs until very recently. Just confirms what we have been saying about inability to implement airworthiness regulations. If he deliberately misled the Court, you do know what that is called don't you?

BTW ANY changes to the MR2 build standard by definition change the MRA4 contract. next thing they'll be announcing another delay to MRA4!

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett 100. Welcome back.

I am not sure where you got the idea that Nimrod is now at the "broadly acceptable" level of risk, and ALARP is not required. Quoting from BoB Ainsworth, yesterday, he said that all aircraft in service are at the tolereble level.

Whilst on the subject of "Bob", I found the following comment of his very interesting. It went something like;

" Having listened to all the evidence (two people reported to him on a daily basis), I knew what the verdict would be"

So clearly "Bob" came to the same conclusion as the coroner, but for some reason decided to go against it. What evidence does "Bob" have that the coroner did not have? And if such evidence does exist, why was it not presented to the court?

DV

[Winco]

Ed
Thank you for your explanation, however I do not understand your use of the word ‘appropriate’ I’m afraid. The point I was making is this; do you use modern, up to date, accurate and reliable test equipment? Or, as has been suggested on this forum, do you use an inaccurate, unreliable and disproven method that employs soapy water?

That’s all I want you, or Nimrod AGE, or Spanners or indeed anyone at Kinloss to tell us! What method do you use? I have tried to be as open as possible on how we test for leaks in the civilian aviation world, why can’t you or your colleagues do the same? Nevertheless, I will gladly ask the engineers the next time I see them, and will pass on their comments, but as some on here think this is all fabricated by myself, I’m not sure of the point, but I will ask.

What you and many others here fail to understand is that, in the main, the aircraft that I fly in BA and all the major carriers, are a lot lot younger than Nimrod (Yes, I know, someone is going to say that BA have some old aircraft, and I am aware of that, but none are as old as Nimrod I think) Couple that with the fact that the flight profiles of the aircraft are so vastly different, and it goes without saying that Nimrod will need a great deal more ’looking after’ than my B747 will ever do! I therefore have to reject outright your comment that because you check your pipes more often that it puts you in a better light than BA. The fact is that you probably have to check your pipes more often simply because of the age of them!

So Ed, it’s back over to you…..Just what bit(s) of equipment are being used at Kinloss to check for fuel leaks and to locate them? Is it some fancy bit of kit or is it a good old bucket of H2O and some Fairy liquid??

Yours Aye

[Da4orce]

'NIMROD CORONER MISLED BY RAF'

No surely not! Hickman wouldn't have deliberately misled the coroner would he?

Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009. Expected!

30 QQ recommendations = £26 million

MoD incompetence = priceless

[nigegilb]

Careful DA4 you might get the typo police on to you.

Wonder what the MRA4 team are making of all this. Let's second guess shall we. Could be that the June 09 target is the paper exercise, and implementation/embodiment is shelved because someone decides to wait for MRA4. It will be diluted to a task to ensure the same/equivalent recs are in MRA4. I am reliably informed that a 6 month slip doesn't happen in a few weeks on this type of work. It's largely a case of manhours, not materiel, so it's easier to plan, cost, schedule accurately. That's why we were sure it couldn't be done - MoD and Industry don't have the capacity as MoD ditched the concept of retaining flexibility about 15 years ago. "no real surprise - people who've done this for fun for years knew it was impossible to repair years of neglect in a few months".

Before anyone has a go for second guessing, think again, our predictions have been far more accurate than anything MoD/RAF have offered to date.

[flipster]

Gentlemen,

I am sorry to admit that I was caught reading a copy of the Jun/July BALPA magazine (which had been left on the flight-deck). However, there was within this fine publication an article on the recently updated law on corporate manslaughter - namely, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.

The article described how the law has been amended to make it easier to prosecute senior mangement of organisations who failed any, or all, of 3 basic tests as result of an inquiry following an accident/incident. The most important of these tests is:


"The duty (of care) owed by an organistion to its employees or others working for it."


To prosecute under this Act, one would have to ascertain a gross breach of conduct which -


"falls far below what can reasonably be expected of an organisation in the circumstances."


The article went on to list a number of failings that would
'make an organisation vulnerable' to this legislation.
One could argue that 5 out of 10 failings on this list might be appliacble to the Nimrod case:


"6. Poor communication with the workforce and contractors."

"7. Inadequate management, audit and review of safety systems and contractors."

"8. Inadequate attention to 'near misses'."

"9. Failures of lower managers to report failings up the chain."

"10. Senior managers/directors makinng decisions on incomplete or wrong information - such as cutbacks adversely affecting safely."


It is also arguable that the other 5 failings might also apply (you'll have to read the full article)!


However, the questions to which I would like to know the answers:


a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?

b. Do we have a 'we're at war, poke off' get-out clause?

c. Does this new Act apply to 'legacy' aircraft built before 2007?


If the answers are Yes, No, Yes.... then, as Sherlock Holmes would say,


"The game's afoot Watson!"


If so, now might be a good time for all lower-order managers (Cpl/JT upwards) to comply with Number 9 (above) and start telling their bosses (in writing) what the bosses don't want to hear (if you haven't already).

Furthermore, it could leave senior management at star-level most vulnerable if they themselves don't insist that HM Treasury provides funding to ensure the remedial action to the QQ recs is completed much, much sooner than the middle of next year.

flipster

[nigegilb]

Here is the Hansard link to yesterday's debate: "Safety of the RAF Nimrod Fleet":

http://pubs1.tso.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080701/halltext/80701h0007.htm#08070171000005

Try this if link does not work;

RAF Nimrod Fleet: 1 Jul 2008: Westminster Hall debates (TheyWorkForYou.com) (http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2008-07-01a.211.0)

The text version of the opening statement follows below. Media coverage from today's Scotsman, Daily Record, Press and Journal and BBC.

1 July 2008 : Column 211WH

RAF Nimrod Fleet

12.30 pm
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP): I welcome this opportunity to raise the important matter of the safety of the RAF Nimrod fleet, a subject relating largely to the tragedy that befell Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 in which 14 brave service personnel lost their lives. This debate is also about the lessons that have emerged since then from the board of inquiry and the coroner’s inquest; from information that has come to light through freedom of information requests; from the Ministry of Defence’s reaction to those developments; and in time, we hope, from the independent review conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave, QC, into the broader issues surrounding the loss of XV230.

The Minister will appreciate that, as the Nimrod MR2 fleet is stationed at RAF Kinloss in my constituency, the issues are of direct concern. Safety questions affect all air and ground crew as well as civilian workers, who take great and justifiable pride in their work and want to secure the highest safety standards. Safety questions affect the families of those who died aboard Nimrod XV230 and those who continue to fly the Nimrod fleet. Safety questions remain for many experts and former RAF personnel who have watched the developments and have significant concerns. Safety questions also remain for me as a constituency MP. In the absence of appropriate, detailed information from the Ministry of Defence, I have had to rely on FOI requests, letters to and from the MOD, and statements by Ministers in the media. Safety questions remain because the ageing Nimrod fleet has experienced continual fuel leaks; because there is a repeated inability to get planes airborne; and, most recently, because the coroner’s inquest expressly recommended that the fleet should be grounded until risk levels are as low as reasonably practicable.

On 4 December 2007, the official board of inquiry published its findings on the loss of XV230. The board believed that the No. 7 tank dry bay was the most likely location for the seat of the fire and the most probable cause was escaped fuel contacting a supplementary conditioning pack air pipe at 400º C

“after entering a gap between two types of insulation”.

Four separate factors were listed as contributing to the accident: the age of the aircraft, the maintenance policy, the failure of hazard analysis and the lack of a fire detection and suppression system, and the failure to identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.

In an oral statement to the House of Commons on the same day, the Secretary of State for Defence said:

“At the time of the accident, the Department took action to ensure that a similar scenario could not occur again on the Nimrod aircraft. Those measures have been revised as the board’s findings have emerged. The chain of command has accepted the majority of the board’s recommendations and continues to pursue the outstanding recommendations made by the board to enhance the safety of our aircraft.

The hot air system remains switched off so that there is no hot pipe against which any fuel could ignite, and we have an enhanced inspection regime to examine for any sign of fuel leakage. QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate.”

I shall return to that point. He went on:

1 July 2008 : Column 212WH
“Air-to-air refuelling has also been suspended subject to further investigation. The Chief of the Air Staff’s professional judgment is that the Nimrod fleet is safe to fly. I have accepted his advice.”—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 686-87.]

In my reply to the statement, I said to the Secretary of State:

“Only recently, another Nimrod aircraft suffered a serious fuel leak and it has proved impossible fully to understand why it happened. It is also a cause for concern that the inquiry confirmed the loss of experienced engineering personnel from RAF Kinloss. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the Ministry of Defence will do everything in its power to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet, which performs such a vital military role?”

The Secretary of State answered:

“I have no hesitation in giving him the reassurance that he seeks. The safety of those who fly in these aircraft is our priority; it is not secondary to any other consideration. I have given careful thought to the issue of age and to all the other issues identified in the BOI as contributory factors. I am assured—and I accept those assurances—by those who have the vast technical ability and experience to understand these matters, and having gone into them in detail myself, that this aircraft is safe to fly and airworthy. I would not allow it to fly if I did not believe that to be the case.—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 693-94.]

That statement of confidence by the Ministry of Defence was followed in May by the coroner’s inquest. During the proceedings, which I attended, the court heard about the development of the Nimrod in the 1950s from the world’s first jet airliner, the de Havilland Comet. To make the Nimrod into a military aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley company added extra fuel tanks and a whole new bottom half to the Comet’s fuselage. Crucially, it also changed the engines, which meant installing a hot air pipe system to start the new Spey engines.

The hot pipe system crosses the centre section of the aircraft to enter the wings, where the engines are, passing through an area called dry bay 7, which was to become well known to the inquest. It is the area around the new No. 7 tanks, and it also contains fuel feed pipes. That should not have been a problem, as the hot air system was used only for engine starting. However, when the early Nimrod MR1 was developed into the MR2 version in the late 1970s, an extra cooling pack was added for all the new electronic equipment. Such packs work off hot air, from the cross feed pipe, which meant that the pipe had to be used continuously.

In dry bay 7, the cross feed pipe, operating at temperatures of 400º C to 500º C, was next to the large fuel feed pipes. That was a serious fire hazard, and it should have alerted the continuous safety assessment systems operated by the RAF and BAE Systems, the present aircraft maker, to the potential hazards. The coroner, Andrew Walker, said:

“I am satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly. This serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the (Nimrod) Integrated Project Team and the manufacturer.”

Mr. Walker added that in a previous incident to a Tornado aircraft, fuel had been drawn into the lagging around a hot pipe and had ignited, causing the loss of the aircraft. There had been no follow-up on the Nimrod, despite a recommendation from the RAF board of inquiry. He said:

“This cavalier approach must come to an end. In my view, it was this very source of ignition that, on the balance of probability, caused the loss of Nimrod XV230 with all souls on board.”


1 July 2008 : Column 213WH
The coroner went on to detail failures of the so-called Cassandra hazard log, another matter to which I shall return. Had failures been recorded properly in the log and dealt with, the design flaw in the Nimrod fleet would have been discovered. He said:

“I simply do not understand”

how the Cassandra system could have assumed that there was a fire detection and suppression system in dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system and there never had been. That meant that the crew of XV230 could do nothing to prevent the fire from developing into an explosive ignition of fuel in tank 7 in the wing root. The coroner added in his final verdict that

“the deaths were in part the result of failures...on the part of the aircraft manufacturer and those responsible for the safety of the aircraft”.

Mr. Walker recommended to the Defence Secretary that the whole Nimrod fleet should not fly again until the risks thrown up by the inquest have been reduced to a level known as ALARP, or as low as reasonably practicable. The Nimrod integrated project team leader, Group Captain Hickman, had already said in evidence that that was not expected to happen until the end of 2008. Asked if the process could be speeded up, Group Captain Hickman replied:

“No, it is driven by resources.”

I appreciate that the situation presents the MOD with a huge problem. The Nimrod performs an important role for the UK armed forces and coalition allies. It is also true that there is no replacement aircraft immediately available for the work and that the replacement Nimrod MRA4 is a few years off. Nevertheless, it was a surprise to all who attended the coroner’s inquest that literally within minutes of his lengthy summing-up, the Minister issued a statement refusing to accept the inquest’s main recommendation. It was, in my view, a rushed reaction. It cannot have been considered, and it illustrates my concerns about the developments.

I shall highlight three areas on which there has been precious little considered information from the MOD. In the 15 minutes that the Minister has following my contribution, he has an opportunity to provide details that I hope will reassure everybody about the safety concerns with regard to risk management, the hazard log and responsibility. First, on risk management, as I have already outlined, the Secretary of State assured the House that Nimrod was safe, citing a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultancy. To establish whether that was factually correct has been difficult, and it took an FOI request to establish that the report said that the aircraft would not be fully safe until its 30 recommendations were carried out. All but one of those related to a failure to implement mandatory airworthiness regulations.

The inquest heard that, if the risk of something going wrong on a plane is only “tolerable”, MOD rules stipulate that it must be further reduced to make it

“as low as reasonably practicable”

before the plane can be declared safe. In a letter to me on 19 May 2008, the Defence Secretary said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted by the MOD and are still being implemented, six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods, and three more are still being considered.


1 July 2008 : Column 214WH
On 26 May, I wrote to Secretary of State asking:

“Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?”

I am still waiting for an answer! Two weeks ago, in the defence procurement debate, I asked the very same questions, and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), said he would write to me. Again, I am still waiting for an answer. Today, Minister, I expect answers, and the questions are the same: how many of the 30 QinetiQ safety recommendations have been implemented in full, and when specifically does the MOD expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?

Secondly, as the Minister must know, QinetiQ has already raised an issue relating to the structure of the Cassandra hazard log and linking of hazards to causes, controls and supporting evidence. It proved very difficult, if not impossible, to track the accident from the hazard back to the cause and the corresponding controls, and then to establish whether the controls had been fully implemented. In addition, it was found that the assessment of probability made assumptions concerning the implementation of recommendations that proved not to be valid, and supporting evaluations were found to be contradictory.

It was unclear which recommendations and controls required implementation to support the hazard probability. Furthermore, hazard controls often did not apply to all causes of hazard and, therefore, did not mitigate the hazard in full, but mitigated only specific causes. It proved impossible, therefore, to validate the hazard probability. QinetiQ recommended that the hazard log be restructured to facilitate ease of further review. It argued that that would clarify hazard-accident risk controls, the hazard causes to which they apply and the status of their implementation, which would in turn clarify the argument underpinning the evaluation of risk. In view of the importance placed on the Cassandra hazard log in determining Nimrod safety, what steps have been taken by the MOD and the integrated project team to implement QinetiQ’s important recommendations? With the current hazard log in such a confusing state, how can anyone claim that Nimrod is safe to operate?

My third point is simple, but crucial, and relates to responsibility: has any action been taken in relation to those with delegated responsibility for Nimrod airworthiness at the time of the Nimrod crash? Safety worries about the Nimrod fleet will remain as long as concerning incidents continue. With more than 111 fuel leaks since the crash of XV230, and the regular grounding of aircraft, those concerns remain and will remain until the MOD maintains its aircraft to its own applicable risk standard which must be as low as reasonably practicable, and for as long as it fails to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet as promised.

Visits to RAF Kinloss by the Secretary of State are welcome—I have said that on the Floor of the House—and his participation in a Nimrod test flight was a statement of confidence, but that is not enough. Ministers have failed to make written or oral statements to the House of Commons when necessary, have imparted key information only after a coroner demanded it and released key studies only after freedom of information requests were made. Asserting from a television studio that the
1 July 2008 : Column 215WH
Nimrod fleet is safe is not good enough. I know that the Minister wants the best for our service personnel, as do I, and I strongly urge him to answer my questions, because otherwise this matter will not rest.

[incubus]

I am just a layman here so I am not going to juggle the technical aspects - there are plenty of people here who are demonstrably eager and capable of doing that.

One major thing which is apparent to me is that much of the argument concerns whether or not the risk is ALARP.

OK, ALARP = As Low As Reasonably Practical. This interesting but pivotal phrase encompasses three subjective aspects (which may well be defined somewhere but nevertheless give space for argument), namely
Low. What constitutes low and who decides what is low enough? OK, so this one is mitigated by the next 2.
Reasonable. What is reasonable to one person is not necessarily reasonable to another. What is reasonable in peacetime is not necessarily reasonable during hostilities or emergencies.
Practicable. This depends so much on resources such as parts, equipment, cash and time as to be a vague concept at best. If the government gave the project more money then better safety would be more practicable. Importantly, what is practicable in 6 months may not be practicable now.

There are too many factors in this for everybody to be able to agree on what standard constitutes ALARP at a given time so it has to come down to the chap who gets to make the call. If he says it is ALARP then it is. 6 months down the line the ALARP standard will have changed and the situation can be reassessed.

The real question has to be "is it safe"?

Is the MR2 safe? No. What is?
Is the MR2 safe enough? Yes, and it will get safer as time and resources allow.

What we cannot do with any system is rest on our laurels - there must always be a drive to improve the safety and survivability of the systems we use. Unfortunately, that ball is in the government's court.

[Da4orce]

From the Commons debate yesterday:


From yesterdays Commons debate:

[QUOTE]
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.


Well here's the problem Mr Ainsworth, that was not the view expressed by all of those stakeholders at the recent Coroners Inquest. In fact Grp Cptn Hickman (IPT) stated on oath that the fleet would not be ALARP until the end of 2008. This leaves us with a number of questions:

1. Has a miracle happened in the intervening period and the fleet has reached ALARP earlier than Hickmans' evidence suggested, if so great but where's the evidence?

2. Or does Hickman not know his ALARP from his SCP elbow?

[Da4orce]

Flipster you asked:

a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?

They answer is that the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was not in force at the time of the loss of XV230 and therefore does not apply to this case, hence the seeking of a legal ruling under Article 2 Human rights Act.

Were such an incident to happen today and the MoD be found to have failed in their duty of care then yes it would apply.

[nigegilb]

A laughable performance from Ainsworth. I have been in contact with the Coroner's office this afternoon to confirm what Hickman actually said. I am also in the process of contacting BAe and QQ to confirm that they agree with Ainsworth that Nimrod is airworthy IAW MoD regs and ALARP.

Ainsworth said he predicted the Inquest verdict the day before. That verdict confirmed that Nimrod was not airworthy and would remain not airworthy until the QQ recs were implemented by the end of the year. If Ainsworth predicted this verdict how on earth can he say that these recs no longer need to be implemented. His statement is a total contradiction and fools nobody. He refuses to deal with airworthiness issues and talks instead about safety. I believe he may have shot himself in the foot. His statement will be challenged by our own experts, meanwhile we will see what QQ and BAe have to say on the subject. There is no immunity from corporate manslaughter legislation for either.

"We do not need to implement all the recommendations of the Qinetiq Fuel Safety report for the aircraft to be ALARP. The recommendations relate to process and procedural issues which do not impact on the immediate risk of flying the aircraft. But their implementation will ensure that the aircraft remains ALARP throughout the remainder of its life."

The MoD claimed last night that Group Captain Hickman had been “misrepresented”. They said he told the inquest the target was to get the “majority” of the measures completed by the end of the year – not all of them.

[flipster]

DF

As I understand it, the older corporate manslaughter legislation needed proof that the top man/men/women had been party to the decision - does not Def Sec and his lap dogs' apparent incompetence support such an argument?:(:(

Although, I can see that these people were not directly involved in the airworthiness decision chain, as far as I am aware. Nonetheless, it would be safe to assume that the Def Sec knew of the value of the Nimrod to the UK Forces as well as its operation in a new high-threat theatre/role (since 2002). Therefore, any reasonable person acting as Def Sec would want to ensure the ac's continued safe operation in theatre and its overall airworthiness by asking the MoD to conduct a updated threat analysis/hazard log - not just regarding fuel leaks. Furthermore, this concern should have been applied to all our aircraft in theatre.

Was any such order issued to the IPTLs? I doubt it.

Whether this means the Def Sec is liable for manslaughter pre 2007 is a question only the legal people can really answer, I suspect. However, the new legislation certainly makes his position a load more vulnerable should we lose another aircraft, God Forbid!

flipster

[Wader2]

However, the questions to which I would like to know the answers:

a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?

Yes

b. Do we have a 'we're at war, poke off' get-out clause?

Of course

c. Does this new Act apply to 'legacy' aircraft built before 2007?

Yes.

The issue is such that we all received a specific top down briefing. As far as I can gather, if a problem is highlighted but the on scene commander choses to ignore it then he/she could be culpable. If a higher commander made the decision so the level of poo whole rise.

There is however an exemption in the operational theatre and, more significantly, in training for operations. That last little bit provides wriggle room and a steady source of income for the legal eagles.

Clearly a problem that occurs say on the air show circuit is not operational training. An exercise with the Army prior to one or the other working up to deploying on operations would be exempt. However what if there was an accident after the exercise serial had terminated and the crew was doing routine training circuits at an airfield? Would routine training not immediately working up to deployment be liable but similar training immediately before deployment be exempt?

[flipster]

wader

Thanks for that interesting insight. I would be keen to see the exact wording of the 'exemption' you talk about - anyone know where it can viewed? In any case, it may be arguable that any risk or threat that has been identified prior to the commencment of ops is not, per se, exempt and must be mitigated against.

In my view, we have so few assets (people and platforms) these days that it is almost culpably negligent not do provide our Forces with the best available defences - becasue to lose only a very small number of our assets impinges quickly and significantly on our operational output - that's before you consider the legal, or even the moral arguments!

Flight Safety and Airworthiness are even more important in war than in peace?

[nigegilb]

Two days ago Ainsworth claimed Nimrod was safe to fly, ALARP and therefore airworthy. MoD also claimed that Gp Capt Hickman had been misrepresented.

I now have the full transcript of Hickman's evidence, here is part of his evidence concerning aspects of ALARP and work still outstanding. Needless to say it presents a completely different picture to the one provided in Westminster Hall. Apologies for the length of this post, and the usual cautions apply, it is the official transcript but there might still be errors due to the quality of recording.

THE CORONER: So, to put it another way, the aircraft flying today and other days is not ALARP airworthy?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree. It is airworthy, it ‑‑



THE CORONER: No, ALARP airworthy.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.



THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.



MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...



THE CORONER: It is semantics.



MR RAWLINSON: My reading of 553 is the definition of airworthiness is in compliance with ALARP, which is either it being tolerable and ALARP, so that is the definition, unless I misunderstand it.



THE CORONER: Yes, but my point is that if one were to use the test for ALARP the aircraft is not airworthy.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.



THE CORONER: Yes. In other words if ALARP is the standard it is not airworthy.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not believe it to be the standard.



THE CORONER: Yes, but the answer is, it is not airworthy if ALARP is the standard. I do not know why it is so difficult to answer that question, it is simply dancing around the answer that you have already given.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think it ‑‑ well, for me it doesn’t answer ‑‑ it isn’t a question we should be asking.



THE CORONER: Your question is that the aircraft is airworthy.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.



THE CORONER: If it is tolerable?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: If it is tolerably safe then the aircraft is fit to fly, yes.



THE CORONER: Do you know whether that applies to civil aircraft, tolerably safe?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I don’t think they apply the same characteristics that we do for assessment.



MR RAWLINSON: Now, can I ask what timeframe you think is reasonable in the circumstances from the date that XV230 went down to the date when ALARP is achieved?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.



THE CORONER: When do you expect to?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.



MR RAWLINSON: So that would be about three and a quarter years post XV230 going down.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.



THE CORONER: So your target is in fact ALARP airworthiness?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I say, I do not recognise that term.



THE CORONER: What are you working towards then? I do not understand it.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I am working towards the position where I am tolerably safe and ALARP, I do not believe we can ‑‑ we are probably unlikely to get the position beyond tolerably safe, that is certainly the advice from QinetiQ, but we can reach the stage of tolerably safe and ALARP and that is ‑‑ that will be a perfectly acceptable position to be in.



THE CORONER: They are two different standards?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, effectively there is the ‑‑



THE CORONER: As low as reasonably practicable and tolerable are two different standards, or do they mean the same thing?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, they do not mean the same thing. No, the ‑‑



THE CORONER: So what do you understand ALARP to mean?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: The tolerably safe means that is the combination of ‑‑ that is effectively the risk that we are undertaking, so that is the risk to the aircraft.



THE CORONER: So your goal then is to get your aircraft to the state where it is ALARP airworthy?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: My ‑‑



THE CORONER: (overspeaking), is it not?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: My goal is to ‑‑ we are already tolerably safe, my goal at the moment is to reduce that risk to as low as reasonably practicable.



THE CORONER: Which is the term you do not recognise.



GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do recognise it. I do recognise the ALARP principle and it is the one that we have adopted, we are heading towards the tolerably safe and ALARP position.



MR RAWLINSON: Can you explain why it is that Air Commodore Baber had no difficulty with equating airworthiness to achieving ALARP?



GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.

[nigegilb]

And this is what Bob said in the Westminster Hall debate;

Another term that causes confusion—and I understand why—is ALARP or “as low as reasonably practicable”. I used to think—and one’s intuition makes one think this—that ALARP is a level of safety below perfection, but it is not. It is part of a process derived from the HSE policy guidance. We make ALARP judgments on an ongoing basis to ensure that we continually drive down the level of risk to equipment. The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.


Does anyone have a clue what is going on in the upper echelons of the RAF, MoD and Nimrod IPT? Because I haven't, apart from an awful lot of spinning.

[Tappers Dad]

Nigegilb
Strange that isn't it the Head of the Nimrod IPTL and for the airworthiness fo the Nimrod saying it would not be ALARP untril the end of the year.

Then less than 6 weeks later Bob Ainsworth claims the Nimrod was safe to fly, ALARP and therefor airworthy.

MoD also claimed that Gp Capt Hickman had been misrepresented.
I don't think so Mr Ainsworth not at all !!!!

Transcript from Inquest
MR RAWLINSON: So can we pause there for a moment. That for a risk, in fact, you have to demonstrate in order for ALARP -- forgive me, I will rephrase that: in order for a risk in the middle level to be acceptable you must prove that it is ALARP?
AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, we have to be satisfied it is as low as reasonably practicable.
MR RAWLINSON: Yes. And just touching base to our definitions, if it is not ALARP it is not in compliance with duties placed upon you by 553?
AIR CDRE BABER: Correct.
MR RAWLINSON: Can I put it this way, as cordially as I may, that the buck stopped with you when it came to ensuring the airworthiness of the aircraft type.
AIR CDRE BABER: I’m responsible for the airworthiness of the type.
MR RAWLINSON: Did anything equivalent to annexe C exist at the time that you were in post?

AIR CDRE BABER: Yes, but not in this format. For example, paragraph 4, I put it in my current capacity based on work I’ve done with the Australian Air Force. So portions of this existed but large portions did not. What I have been seeking to do in my current role, which is I am the Airworthiness Regulator, is to try and make clear the IPT leader’s responsibilities in a clearer way.

Note AIR CDRE BABER:IPT leader from 2002-2004 and Airworthiness Regulator

[Distant Voice]

Nigegilb;

Thank you for the Hickman transcript. As I have said before he was the first person to mention the non-standard term "tolerably safe". He rejects the the coroner's "ALARP Airworthy" statement because it is not defined anywhere, but insists on using his none defined term.

I know I keep bring up the "tolerably safe" topic, but I do so because I believe it to be political spin introduced into the QQ report by IPT. It is my understanding the the draft copy of the report did not contain such a statement, because QQ know that it has no real meaning. They were encouraged to introduce the term after the "for comments" review by others, outside the organisation.

If anyone has proof that the draft contained this statement, please PM me.

DV

[Da4orce]

May 2008 – Gp Capt Hickman, Head of IPT (giving evidence on oath to the Coroner)

GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am saying is the aircraft is airworthy but it is not yet ALARP.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, I understand the ALARP principle and that is my goal to achieve ALARP. I am just saying that we are not there yet.


July 2008 – Bob Ainsworth (speaking in the House of Commons)

The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.

------------------------------------------------------------

Something wrong Mr Ainsworth? You forgot to sit down with your co-defendants and get you story straight!

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Surely this difference simply comes down to whether the aircraft (and it doesn't have to be a Nimrod, or even military) is right now ALARP, or will be in the future.

If the aircraft is not yet ALARP, the issue then surely becomes whether that state is being approached "As Soon As Reasonably Practical". If it is then at any given instant in time the aircraft is ALARP given where it started from.

Almost even civilian aircraft out there with an AD against it does not meet the absolute standards for "safety" - but as long as you are proceeding towards that state in a timely fashion you are considered airworthy.

Therefore I don't see an inherent contradiction between "we have not yet reached the final goal for ALARP" and "we are ALARP at this instant" if you are in the middle of some kind of refit exercise. If you started applying the requirement for the final ALARP condition at the instant any issue was discovered, it would be practically impossible to keep aircraft in an airworthy state.

[nigegilb]

How many years do you want? 5, 10, until MRA4 comes in, will it ever get there, is all this just a ruse to pass the baton to MRA4 but continue to fly a non-airworthy aircraft? As has been stated it is very simple to work out how long it will take to reach ALARP merely a question of man hours. This has slipped from end of the year to an expected date of June 09. You are a clever chap scientist give me your best definition of "expected"? Now do you expect Nimrod to be ALARP next June? I don't. Now we hear from Ainsworth, that Nimrod was ALARP all along, IPTL was wrong. MoD just used up its last bit of credibility.

Hickman's evidence clashes with his predecessor, any sympathy for Hickman is removed because he is failing to recognise 553.

Fine old mess?

"For goodness sake, the BoI report was, if I recall, first circulated 13??? months ago. Am I right in saying it was reviewed again and delayed? Even if the IPT completely ignored it or were frozen out of this process (very unlikely) they would have known the criticism in Oct last year. But, 28 months ago they got the QQ report on fuel leaks, which is a catalogue of airworthiness failures. Very clearly indeed, they knew of the problems but did nothing."

Edited as per post below, ta. Point is the brackets are there, they were fitted for a reason, but the fire extinguishant is not there. Furthermore, dry bay protection was spec'd in 1981/2. Why wasn't it fitted?

[Secretsooty]

nigegilb, the brackets you refer to in the bomb-bay are most likely the brackets for fitting the supplementary fire suppressant system designed for use with the bomb-bay range extension fuel tanks, which, incidentally, have never ever been fitted at Kinloss. They are a myth, listed in old A.P.'s and training notes but never seen or used.

[Winco]

It's now just over 36 hours since I asked the question of Ed100, Spanners, MightyHunter AGE, Madmark and others.............

What sort of equipment is used at Kinloss to detect and locate fuel leaks?

MightyHunter AGE - I should have felt that as an AGE, you would have known the answer off the top of your head! So what is it please?

[Tappers Dad]

XV230 exploded on the 2nd Sept 2006 because it was not airworthy therefore not ALARP.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: As I have said, we have not achieved ALARP.

THE CORONER: When do you expect to?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Our target is to have the majority of measures completed on all aircraft by the end of the year; that is our target.

So if it is ALARP at the end of the year the RAF/MOD will have taken 2 yrs and 3 months since XV230.

ALARP is a level of risk, therefore for 2 yrs and 3 months this aircraft has and continues to fly with risks to the lives of the aircrew higher than it should be by the RAF'S own standards.

Depending on who you believe, Mr Hickman or Mr Ainsworth or neither.

[nigegilb]

THE CORONER: But what about fuel leaking say from the vent system on to the electrical components?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, well, as I have said, a leak tolerant design, there is I agree, there is a risk of fuel leaking on to electrical components, and we have examined that. The mitigation steps for that are a 30 day inspection of all the electrical components to look for signs of the arcing that might lead to that sort of ignition. But the advice from QinetiQ on the electrical hazard is that and I think it is in the combustion study report that the likelihood of electrical arcing at altitude is makes the likelihood of electrical ignition unlikely. So we have advice, I have advice from QinetiQ, which tells me that once the aircraft is airborne electrical sparking is very unlikely because of the altitudes that we fly at, and so that adds additional mitigation for that sort of electrical ignition.

THE CORONER: Yes, but you see, the aircraft has to get up there and come down, does it not?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, I accept that, yes.

THE CORONER: But there is a risk in those two processes.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: So when we add together all the little bits of evidence that we have heard you are still satisfied, are you, that there is no cause for concern for the members of the families that the aircraft is flying to an altitude where fuel is less likely to be ignited by an arc?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. It is not just me saying it, I have had an independent fuel safety system review conducted by QinetiQ, that was a very extensive piece of work, it took them six months to conduct that and they re did everything, they re did the zonal hazard analysis, they tell me that the aircraft is tolerably safe to fly and that is why I am reassured.

THE CORONER: Tolerably safe to fly is an expression we have not heard about yet.

MR RAWLINSON: Tolerably safe, I understand it is an engineering term, but being as neutral as I may, tolerably safe does not amount to being safe so as to be risk removed or reduced as low as reasonably practicable.

THE CORONER: ALARP, as low as reasonably practicable, is the test for airworthiness, is it not?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. I will clarify. The aircraft is, and the QinetiQ report says this, the QinetiQ report says the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP, and I would agree.

MR RAWLINSON: Yes, I accept that. But are we to go through JSP553 to reassure ourselves that the test for airworthiness is to achieve ALARP?

THE CORONER: Well, this witness has said that is not the test. It was set as a test that was given in evidence by the Defence Secretary before Parliament.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Can I refer you to (inaudible), if I refer you to DEF STAN 00 56?

MR RAWLINSON: Before we get to that can we go to JSP553 please. Were you in court when I cross examined Air Commodore Baber?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear me go through at some perhaps tedious length those regulations which applied to his office as IPTL?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Did you hear him agree with me the propositions that insofar as he was concerned the application was to reduce risk to the lowest level reasonably practicable?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Now, with that in mind, I wonder whether Mr Webb could provide you with volume 9.

THE CORONER: Before we go there, just to get this point, you are accepting in this court that this aircraft flying today is not ALARP but tolerably safe?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable, we have not taken them yet.

THE CORONER: Yes, I just wanted to clear that up. What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.

THE CORONER: I want to be clear, absolutely clear about where we are, before Mr Rawlinson goes on with his questions.

MR RAWLINSON: Do I really need to take you to paragraph 1.39, the requirements of the HSWA, the Health and Safety at Work Act, is to reduce risks so far as reasonably practicable.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I understand the regulations, yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Well, with your understanding of the regulations, can you please agree that in order to be airworthy the aircraft must be ALARP?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. What you are suggesting is the aircraft must be at the ALARP stage to fly and I am saying no, we have to demonstrate a route to ALARP, but we do not need to be ALARP to fly.

MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, I did not say that, what I said was to be airworthy, as defined in JSP553, it must be ALARP.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I do not agree.

MR RAWLINSON: Could you bear with me one moment, sir; I just want to dig out my notes. I will do it very briefly. First of all, let us have a look at 1.15:

“The Secretary of State requires that the airworthiness arrangements for military aircraft should be at least as effective as those for civil aircraft contained in the ANO, Air Navigation Order, and should comply with the Health and Safety at Work Act where relevant. This is particularly important in roles that are paralleled in civil operations, such as where passengers are carried.”

Now, can we accept that 1.15 brings into play the Health and Safety at Work Act?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Yes. Now, having drawn that into play, we will then go back to 1.39, having brought the HSWA into play, the requirements of the HSWA is to reduce risks so far as to be practicable. This is implemented by the adoption of the ALARP principle, which states that safety should be improved beyond the safety target baseline criteria when reasonably practicable.

THE CORONER: Did you know about that section?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: Well, what is the room for doubt? Please explain how it is that the HSWA incorporates to reduce risk if reasonably practicable, when that necessarily incorporates ALARP, or is it to be suggested that the IPT leader does not truly understand the nature of the duties imposed upon him?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am trying to explain is that you are in managing a risk you are allowed time to ALARP it, it does not have to be instantaneous, you are allowed to introduce measures to ALARP a risk.

THE CORONER: Where does it say that?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: DEF STAN 00 56, which is our safety management system.

MR RAWLINSON: No, no, DEF STAN 00 56, is that not the matter between you and British Aerospace?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: It is the defence standard for safety management systems.

MR RAWLINSON: No, no, no, is it not the defence standard that deals with the relationship between you and British Aerospace? I was corrected when I cross examined, I think it was Air Commodore Baber, on the DEF STAN, and he made it clear to me that the purpose of the DEF STAN is to set up a duty of practice. That is right, is it not, or do you misunderstand the nature of the DEF STAN, which one was it?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: My understanding is it is a defence standard, it is a standard to which we must comply for defence, so similar to 970, (inaudible) design, it is the standard that we must comply with, and in there are duties for the contractor, yes, but also for the duty holder, which is me.

MR RAWLINSON: I am looking at page 381, the preface to the DEF STAN, section a:

“This Part of the Defence Standard provides requirements for the management of safety. It can be applied to any MOD project and can be applied in any phase of a project’s life. This Standard shall be used by Defence Contractors as required by contract. The effective application of this Standard requires close cooperation between all parties, as the responsibility for the achievement of safety is shared.”

That being said, what part of DEF STAN does apply to you rather than BAE?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I think the most helpful paragraph, if I can just refer to my notes, I can probably ...

THE CORONER: To put it simply, as long as you are doing something about the risk it is safe to fly, is it?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: The paragraph is 10.7.1, Risk Reduction, page 11 on mine.

MR RAWLINSON: Tell me what it says; we will go through it together:

“Unless otherwise specified, the Contractor shall establish Tolerability Criteria based on relevant legislation, standards and MOD policy, in agreement with the Duty Holder. These shall form the basis for making an assessment as to whether a risk is broadly acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.”

We have been through this path before in this inquest, you can be tolerable, but if you are tolerable you have to be ALARP.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

MR RAWLINSON: So is that an acceptance?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: If I could just read, it says:

“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”

MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors? It is your aircraft; it is your aircraft you are trying to persuade us is now airworthy. We have not got to tolerability and ALARP because the report told you we are not at ALARP, and if we want to really bandy around 00 56 together, we have the definition of what is safe in annex A, risk has been safety, because risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is tolerably acceptable, or tolerable and ALARP.

THE CORONER: You would say there is a difference between tolerable and ALARP?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I would say that

THE CORONER: So “and” does not mean tolerable and ALARP, it separates the two?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: The position we are in is we are tolerable but we are not yet ALARP, and I would argue that I am able to introduce mitigation strategies to get there, before I get there.

THE CORONER: To put it as I did before you were reading, so you did not have a chance to answer, it is safe flying as long as you are doing something about the risk?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: And that pertains if all you have done about the risk is to have some off line conversations with BAE?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I think I’ve we’ve got comprehensive mitigation strategies in place and but we cannot argue, and my line is we cannot argue that we are ALARP; I could not argue we were ALARP yet.

[nigegilb]

"I notice that when Hickman was asked to justify his assertion -re time to achieve ALARP, he quoted 00-56 Ch 10.7.1. ("Risk Reduction").


Notwithstanding the fact that 10.7.1 makes no reference to the subject, except the general issue of Risk Reduction, there is much more to Ch. 10 and he was being disingenuous. The process requires MoD to DEMONSTRATE that safety has been achieved (be it broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP).

Def Stan 00-56....

*/(A system is safe) when risk has been DEMONSTRATED to have been reduced to a level that is ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given operating environment. /

/(A risk is ALARP) when it has been DEMONSTRATED that the cost of any further risk reduction, where the cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction./*



The key issues here are the *Tolerability Criteria* agreed between the contractor and MoD and the ability to demonstrate. The former is the baseline against which all risk assessments are conducted. I suspect that they have no such thing, or it has not been subject to continuous review. All this makes Ainsworth's statement all the more meaningless.

[JFZ90]

Nige

Your last (edit to add, last but one) post quoting the actual transcript is very illuminating. It comes across a quite a witch hunt. Until your post I had started to form the impression that the Gp Capt had made a mistake or got his facts a bit muddled, but infact his lines can be interpreted consistently with the most recent statements on the ALARP status of the aircraft.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: What I am trying to explain is that you are in managing a risk you are allowed time to ALARP it, it does not have to be instantaneous, you are allowed to introduce measures to ALARP a risk.


He actually acknowledges / tries to point out here that there is an intrinsic ALARP argument to be made when you are working towards taking all practical measures (though I can see how it could be confusing for those not familiar with such principles).

GP CAPT HICKMAN: If I could just read, it says:

“Where the risk from the system is assessed not to be broadly acceptable and ALARP or tolerable and ALARP [which is the one I am referring to], the Contractor shall carry out Risk Reduction by identifying and implementing a combination of mitigation strategies until the Tolerability Criteria are met.”

MR RAWLINSON: What on earth has this got to do with the contractors?


The questionner here completely misses the point he makes but then attacks him. It appears as if they weren't even listening or trying to understand the perspective he was putting forward.

On seeing the actual working and interruptions/overspeaking - the way in which he was being badgered and questioned is frankly incredible - I'm quite shocked at the way he was being treated/dismissed. The coroner spouts a load of nonsense like "ALARP Airworthy" and clearly sneers/snorts at the Gp Capt as if he's an idiot when he tries to point out thats not really a correct term. It seems clear from the above that the coroner only wanted to hear things that supported the conclusion he'd already decided he wanted to reach, rather than try and understand the actual facts and issues.

[Safeware]

Ref post #1250,

I don't think the coroner shows himself in a good light here:THE CORONER: No, ALARP airworthy.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.

THE CORONER: Well, there we are, you do not recognise that term, even though it appears in the military airworthiness regulation.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I do not recognise that term.

MR EVANS: It does not appear in the regulations, ALARP does, but not ALARP airworthiness, and that what the witness is ...

THE CORONER: It is semantics.
Arguing that his mis-use of "ALARP airworthiness" is "semantics" but then to go on and, purely from the transcript words, badger the witness about the semantics of his words does nothing for me. However, Mr Rawlinson seems to be much more switched on, but still isn't completely correct in his terminology.

sw

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

How many years do you want? 5, 10, until MRA4 comes in, will it ever get there, is all this just a ruse to pass the baton to MRA4 but continue to fly a non-airworthy aircraft? As has been stated it is very simple to work out how long it will take to reach ALARP merely a question of man hours. This has slipped from end of the year to an expected date of June 09. You are a clever chap scientist give me your best definition of "expected"? Now do you expect Nimrod to be ALARP next June? I don't. Now we hear from Ainsworth, that Nimrod was ALARP all along, IPTL was wrong. MoD just used up its last bit of credibility.

How many years do I want? Well, I don't know what the residual risk is while the retrofit is being conducted, but on the assumption - and we all know what that means - that the risk posed by the system configuration is ten times higher than the acceptable certification standard, then, applying the guidance of ACJ39.3(b)(4), the average reaction time to correct a deficiency of such magnitude is 25% of the aircraft design life. A hazard 100 times more likely than required by design must be rectified in an average time of 2.5% of life. And so on.

based on June 09 completion and Sep 06 awareness of hazard (and recognizing that THAT may be a very suspect date, but more of that later) then you have 33 months total reaction time, or 16.5 months average, assuming linear accomplishment. The design has a current service life of about 40 years. It probably originally had something like a 20 year design life. Split the different: 30 years, 360 months. So current end date for rectification is equivalent to an average reaction time of just under 5% of design life. That would be a hazard 50 times worse than design target.

Previously it was stated that the design risk targets for Nimrod were ten times that for civil. Hence the design risk for a specific system failure (which we'll define this hazard as resulting from) is 1 per 100 million FH. A risk 50 times that would be one per 2 million FH. So far there's been one incident, and substantially fewer than 2 million FH. So a probability based on event occurrence would suggest that the expected completion date is indeed aligned with the risk.

Add to that, additional mitigation is already in place, reducing the risk today from that at the time of the accident. Which in effect buys more time to complete the full mitigation.

Overall, from the outside, a 3 year total retrofit period does not seem out of line with the apparent residual risk, certainly from a civil/JAR viewpoint.

By comparison, look at the compliance times for typical recent airworthiness directives in the civil world. Compliance times in years are the norm, not the exception. Indeed, due to the FAA's legal constraints, any "non emergency" AD - which this would likely be considered, emergency ADs tend to be purely procedural - is treated as a new piece of regulation and actually has a public review and comment process. Six months to ISSUE the AD isn't that unusual.

I understand the frustration with an apparently slow pace to complete a rectification - I have a whole drawer of Tshirts for that - and I certainly do not buy the argument that a successfully completed flight is evidence of airworthiness. But the fact is that a three year rectification is no big surprise for these kinds of things I'm afraid.

Where there is an issue, as mentioned above, is if the date of awareness of the defect is not Sep 06. If there's a report in the 80s identifying the hazard that is at best highly embarrasing. But, again unfortunately, it's human nature for people not to want to hear bad news, and getting people to acknowledge and act upon the seriousness of a potential safety hazard is a great deal harder than after the event. It's not an excuse for not being proactive, but sadly reaction is very much the norm.

[nigegilb]

Scientist I am very familiar with the problems of convincing the military to be proactive, I guess that is why this thread and for a long time the Herc thread ran and ran. In this case, if dry bay protection had been fitted at any time between 1981 and 2006 we most probably would not have been having this discussion. VC10 received upgrades in the mid 90s but Nimrod didn't. Why is that?


I strongly believe implementation of airworthiness regs has broken down, which is why I am pushing this hard. RE JFZ's alleged witch hunt. Difficult for me to answer because I was not there, but I understand that Baber, Hickman's predecessor was a very strong witness and clearly Hickman was interpreting the regs in a different way. Until the ALARP discussion Hickman had been doing well and there is a lot of evidence presented by him before the ALARP passage. I read the Coroner's line of questioning as more exasperation, but perhaps someone who was there could comment. ALARP airworthy is not a phrase we are familiar with but we all know what he means. Tolerably safe is also not a phrase I am familiar with but Hickman uses this phrase and I do not know what he means. That said, I agree, the exchange does appear to be adversarial, which belies the myth that the Inquest procedure is non=adversarial, a line trotted out by the MoD when spinning about the families not needing legal representation. Remember the MoD were represented by a barrister in court who could have stepped in at any time, many of the families at these inquests cannot afford legal representation, the MoD has spent £100,000s on the best advice.

My point about the date slippage is how can this procedure slip 6 months in the course of 6 weeks? Thank you for your definition of expected, but the short answer is that this can also slip again indefinitely.

[EdSett100]

Everyone is missing the point:

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable, we have not taken them yet.

THE CORONER: Yes, I just wanted to clear that up. What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.


Hickman indicated that fuel couplings and (active) hot pipe replacements are the only outstanding projects that need to be completed to make the risk ALARP. The fact of the matter is that the active hot pipes are all in engine fire zones, which makes the extant risk acceptable (better than tolerable). If you are involved with aviation you will know that all large jet aircraft around the World have hot air pipes in their engine zones. Its an aviation standard acceptable risk if there is adequate fire protection in place. We have that protection on the Nimrod. If any of those old ducts burst, we will detect the failure and deal with it, within seconds of the failure. Although they need to be replaced due to age, which will reduce the risk of duct failure to ALARP, this is work that is above the safety line. It does not need to be done to make the aircraft safe, or even safer, to fly. I can assure all Nimrod aircrew and their families that the ducts in question are in the engine bays and are subject to failure detection systems: gas leak detectors and fire wire. Do not allow yourself to be convinced otherwise by people here who do not know the aircraft and are seeking to prove their point by legal argument only. Sure, Gp Capt Hickman should have represented these facts better and his words are now being analyzed, but whatever might be written here, the duct replacement program is not relevant to airworthiness.

The seal replacement project is work above the safety line. It does not need to be done to make the aircraft safe, or safer, to fly. Obviously, replacing a 25 year old seal will reduce the risk of that seal failing to ALARP and this is what the Gp Capt indicated. But, do we need to change all the old seals to make the aircraft airworthy? This is the question at the heart of the discussion. It is not a question that TD, DAForce, NG, DV, Winco, the Coroner, Rawlinson and Evans are qualified to answer. It is unfortunate that the man who should be qualified to answer, allowed himself to be drawn into JSP553 definitions rather than focusing on what needs to be done or, more to point, what has been done, to make the aircraft safe. The reason why the seals do not need to be replaced to make the aircraft safe is because they were originally manufactured to last forever. I listened very carefully to what the seal company man said about his seals. If they are not disturbed, they will not leak. The company placed a 25 year life on the seals after the accident. If the accident did not happen those seals would still be un-lifed. In any case if any coupling leaks outside a fire zone, for whatever reason (misalignment, flexing, dry then wet) the consequence will not be catestrophic because there is nothing (except for a co-incident and undetected massive electrical failure) outside a fire zone that will cause the leaked fuel to ignite.

The Nimrod is safer today than it has ever been.

Regards
Ed Sett

PS. Winco, As aircrew, I am not familiar with the equipment used by the technicians to test for fuel leaks.

[flipster]

For those dealing in semantics, it might interest you to know that there is, in fact, a reference to 'tolerably safe'.

The term is definitely not one of the standard definitions but I have found reference in Def Stan 00-56 at Part 2, Annex B, para B.1.4 d) which expands upon the risk assessment process.

Taking the Annex as whole, the term 'tolerably safe' infers Tolerable and ALARP - which we believe the Nimrod will not achieve until next year (despite the contradictory words in Westminster).



What I can't find in 00-56 is guidance for when something is not safe (either broadly acceptable or tolerable and ALARP). Also, I can't find reference to say that the Safety Management System has a certain time to rectify the problem, just that if a risk is assessed outside the above criteria, it cannot be tolerated except in exceptional circumstances.
Therefore, one might argue that the coroner was right to recommend the fleet be grounded (I don't believe that will be operationally acceptable, however - and neither would the PBI (poor bl**dy infantry) on the ground in AFG.)

However, I agree that in the civvie world, it is 'common practice' to give identified risks a certain amount of time to be rectified - but one might argue that even that is not 'good practice' (see Annex B)!

Anyone know where this common assumption and practice is defined?

[Tappers Dad]

Ed Sett
You said:

But, do we need to change all the old seals to make the aircraft airworthy? This is the question at the heart of the discussion. It is not a question that TD, DAForce, NG, DV, Winco, the Coroner, Rawlinson and Evans are qualified to answer.

Transcript

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Okay. There’s two parts to this programme. It’s a fuel coupling inspection and a chartered fuel seal replacement programme. This is the first part is one of the recommendations from the Board of Inquiry that we do a detailed inspection of all fuel couplings, rib 3 to rib 3, for correct alignment, assembly and locking. So the first part of that programme will be conducted during equalised maintenance on every aircraft. The first one has been completed, and it’s exactly that to check the fuel couplings. It’s an inspection a detailed inspection.
But the second part is a targeted fuel seal replacement, which is a result of the QinetiQ fuel system safety review, which identified the most hazardous areas of the aircraft which would arise should there be a fuel leak. So, what we’ve effectively chosen to do is replace the fuel seals in those high risk areas. There are 40 such couplings where we have targeted a fuel seal replacement, the end being to reduce that hazard by ensuring that we have a brand new at least a brand new series, not a brand new coupling in that area.
THE CORONER: Forty seals in a high risk area?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
THE CORONER: Forty couplings with seals?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.
MR RAWLINSON: Can I just explore with you for a moment how those 40 had been identified? Are they identified as high risk because if they fail they create a high risk, or are they identified as being at high risk of failure?
GP CAPT HICKMAN: They are the couplings which, if they leak, most hazard the aircraft.

MR EVANS: (MOD Solicitor) We have been through the various mitigation measures put in place and I do not want to repeat them unnecessarily, but I think one did not come out.

In addition to the targeted placement of seals that you have instituted under the technical instruction and the 40 critical seals that were replaced, every five years 180 of the 400 seals in the aeroplane are also replaced in addition to that 40.


So thats why the seals need changing then Ed Sett they are in a high risk area. But worry not they will be done by June next year.

[nigegilb]

If that is right Flip, IPTL referred to tolerably safe meaning tolerable and ALARP at the same time as admitting that Nimrod is not ALARP and that they were working towards a goal of the majority of mitigations implemented by the end of the year? Confused? I am.

Regarding whistle tests I think this clears it up once and for all;

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, we do check the integrity of the vent system. The vent system is primarily designed for air, and we’ve introduced an RTI which checks the system for leaks, so we in addition to the other checks I’ve talked about, we check the integrity.

THE CORONER: Were you here when we heard evidence yesterday from the maintenance personnel, that an aircraft, whilst being refuelled as part of maintenance, sat at 2 degrees, had fuel coming through a vent system, which we now know, from the manufacturer and your offline discussions, is an unsuitable coupling? You can see why members of the families start to become concerned. Putting these pieces of evidence together is not a matter which is difficult. It does not require an expert, but it may require action. What counsel is testing is what action has been taken. For example, as these pieces of evidence have fallen out from this inquest, what steps have been taken to try to recognise any hazard and mitigate any risk?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. No, I understand the point. What I’m saying is that we would if we are saying that if the aircraft designer does advise that they agree that FRS couplings are unsuitable for the vent system, then we will absolutely yes, of course we will take action.

THE CORONER: But this would surely mean that the aircraft should not fly until that has been rectified. The difficulty is that here we are having a discussion about whether they are suitable or not, and the aircraft still flies. Surely the safest point is to ensure that this discussion has come to an end with a conclusion, before aircraft fly?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, I don’t accept that. I don’t quite follow that argument. Your argument is that

THE CORONER: Let me put it simply. Evidence exists from the maintenance team that, on a routine maintenance, fuel came out through a vent system.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: The manufacturer has stood in court and given evidence on oath that these are unsuitable seals; these couplings are unsuitable for a vent system.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: Your offline discussions indicate they also may be unsuitable.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, they haven’t. Sorry, the offline discussions have not indicated that.

THE CORONER: What have they indicated?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: That we well, I think that there’s some work to do to decide whether they are or not for designers to advise whether they are or not.

THE CORONER: Do you not feel, therefore, that a question needs to be asked whether or not, in the light of these pieces of evidence when they stand together, this aircraft should, at least in the short term, have its flying duties curtailed?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. No, I don’t, because the what you’re suggesting at the moment is that fuel could leak from the vent system. I think that we’ve already established or I hope that we’ve already established that we do get fuel leaks on the aircraft, so what I contend is that the hazard from what you’re describing from a fuel vent system seal leaking fuel when fuel may enter the vent system is a fuel leak. And clearly that’s undesirable and we will clearly take action to mitigate that hazard, absolutely. But a fuel leak on a Nimrod wouldn’t result in a grounding, because if that was the case then we would have we wouldn’t be able to fly at all because, as you have heard, we have had fuel leaks.

MR RAWLINSON: Forgive me, but I understood Sergeant Whitmore to say that a Nimrod with a fuel leak in the fuselage does not fly; that is fixed. This is the other problem with this, that what undermines the system

THE CORONER: Just to put the point clearly, if the vent system passes from the fuselage into the wings, then with an unsuitable coupling in the vent system there is a risk of a leak in the fuselage and the aircraft would not fly.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: If we if we in fact, if we found a leak in the vent system, it would be fixed.

THE CORONER: Yes, but what we are saying is the evidence suggests that the couplings are unsuitable, and the evidence suggests that the seal would degrade in a very short period of time, making the system unsafe. So the only time in a vent system you would see a leak is if the vent system finished displacing all the air and started to displace fuel, which we have seen, in a test carried out as part of maintenance, does occur in the aircrafts on the ground.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, but what I was going to say was following that incident, we have carried out RTIs to check the integrity and the sealing of the vent system.

THE CORONER: How? Do you take them apart?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: We pressure check them.

THE CORONER: You pressure check the vent system?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, with air.

THE CORONER: How do you pressure test the vent system with air. What, do you put a cork in one end? How do you do it?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Effectively, we apply a ground air rig to the vent system and we pressurise it.

THE CORONER: Do you pressurise it or do you blow air through it?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, we blow air through it and then we examine it for leaks.

THE CORONER: How would you see an air leak?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, as it was described to me by a tradesman who had found a leak, by a whistling sound.

THE CORONER: I see, by a whistling sound.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: And the tradesman found a leak?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, he did, yes.

THE CORONER: Whereabouts?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I don’t recall.

THE CORONER: And yet you maintain, despite all this body of evidence suggesting that there could possibly be because of the degradation of the seals because they are in contact with air which you incidentally are blowing through the system to test it that this might not create a risk of fuel leaking in the fuselage?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, I think, you know, our reaction to the certainly the risk of leaks from the vent system and to that incident that we heard about earlier during a ground refuel, was to introduce a routine technical instruction to check the vent system for leaks.

THE CORONER: By blowing air through it.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: By blowing air through it at high pressure.

THE CORONER: And therefore degrading the seals?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: We don’t believe so, no. Our strategy is to pressurise it with air and look for leaks.

THE CORONER: Push air though it while listening for a whistling sound?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: The old way was to take some soapy water and run it around a joint and see if it bubbles. At least, that is what you used to use to discover a leak in the inner tube of your bicycle tyre.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, and we do a similar test, a soap test, yes.

THE CORONER: You do a soap test as well?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: It can be yes, you can do that, but that’s not

THE CORONER: That is not what you do, but you can do.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No, we don’t. We don’t call up we don’t call that up. It is a test, as I’ve described, listening for air leaks, because the pressure of the air means that you can hear the leaks.

THE CORONER: Is this done in the open air or in the hangar?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: In the hangar, normally, yes.

THE CORONER: Do you instruct that all other maintenance work is ceased while you listen for the whistling?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: I see.

MR RAWLINSON: Can I just continue with this. Do your technicians call for absolute silence during these tests?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: I don’t know.

MR RAWLINSON: Do you have any scientific or recent evidence of assuring ourselves that the whistle will be heard if it is produced?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, all I can say is I have anecdotal evidence from tradesmen that they have located leaks by hearing whistling, yes.

MR RAWLINSON: I have secretly (inaudible) you throughout the entire duration of this hearing, trying to inject a combative note where one was not needed, but you can understand why the families might gain the impression that the evidence that you give shows a certain casualness of attitude. You understand that, don’t you?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. I would have to say that if you are suggesting that I have a casual attitude to airworthiness, then, no, I don’t.

MR RAWLINSON: How many leaks have been detected since XV230 within the fuel pumps?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: We introduced following the accident, we introduced mandatory reporting of fuel leaks, so that all fuel leaks from the fuselage, from fuel couplings and the incidents where fuel is found collected in any areas on the aircraft is reported. We’ve had, from that, the data shows 111 fuel leaks.

[flipster]

Nige,

I think we are all somewhat befuddled - not least the Hickman and Ainsworth fellas!

What a mess!!!

Flip

[nigegilb]

Yea it is almost funny, Ainsworth now tells us Nimrod is after all ALARP airworthy safe tickety boo, and no-one demurs from this view, QQ, BAe, RAF, IPT, the cleaner etc etc, however buried deep in Hickman's evidence;

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No. I will clarify. The aircraft is, and the QinetiQ report says this, the QinetiQ report says the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP, and I would agree.


No need to worry, letters winging their way around the non-demurrers, is that really a word? Will retire from the fight for a while.

Nice weekend to everyone. Couple of questions to Edsett. Edsett you are keen to warn off the families from questioning the safety of Nimrod post XV230.

Why is it that Poseidon P8A has fuel tank protection, dry bay protection, bomb bay protection, flight deck armour etc etc and MRA4 has none of this?

Why is it that dry bay protection was spec'd for Nimrod back in 1981 and never fitted?

Why should we back off?

[Distant Voice]

Ed Sett 100, re your 1266

So now you have your own standard "acceptable is better than tolerable". Where did that come from?

Although they [ducts] need to be replaced due to old age, which will reduce the duct failure to ALARP, this is work that is above the safety line

ALARP is the safety line, and the hot air system is still not safe.

I am sorry but it is you who is misleading aircrew and families, with regards to duct failures. We are now replacing some 37 ducts in the engine bay and cross-feed systems, most of which were identified by BAE Systems in early 2005 (after the XV227 duct failure) as being life expired and in need of replacement.

A duct failure in engine bay area is classed as REMOTE CATASTOPHIC. Check you hazard log. And before you go any further on mitigation, a fire detection and suppression system simply buys you time. In QQ's words it does not mitigate the hazard. To do that you have to switch off the system.

So now we have two systems that are not ALARP, the fuel system and the hot air system. Any more?

DV

[MightyHunter AGE]

Winco in responce to post 1258 I cannot at this time comment as I am no longer an AGE at Kinloss having left in November.

Due to this it would be wrong of me to comment on the current equipment being used as it may have been updated since my leaving some 7 months ago.

You see I know when to be quiet when my knowledge is not up to date.

I was leaving this to rest but you seem keen to persue me.

Do you want me to ridicule you again on your lack of understanding of aviation engineering practices in your own company. I refer you to my post #1109 :ugh::ugh:

MHAGE

[flipster]

Now, now MHAGE! Don't rise to the bait Winco.:ok::ok::):)

[Winco]

MightyHunter AGE,

Well, as someone who has portrayed themselves as being pretty well knowledgeable on the MR2, I am dissapointed that you are now declining to comment on a quite simple request. I don't claim to know about engineering practices, which is why I have asked people who claim to be the 'experts' - like you for example.

As it is only 7 months since you left, you could have at least commented on what was being used when you were current on the fleet, and as this is well within the period of interest here, I wonder why you have declined??? Hmm, maybe you don't know eh? maybe you arn't even an AGE after all!!

I don't mind you ridiculing me over my lack of engineering knowledge at all. The fact is,I'm NOT an engineer!! I'm a pilot!

Now if you want some info about flying, then I'll gladly help you out, you just let me know what you want, and I'll do my best to help. One thing is certain - I wouldn't ridicule you for not knowing say the approach speed or the flap limitation speed for a B747.

[davejb]

The argument about ALARP and 'time to achieve ALARP' will doubtless run and run, with polarised views continuing, one camp failing to persuade the other as per the previous billion posts. As others have pointed out most of us on here simply don't have the depth of knowledge of engineering or of the legal profession to be confident of which way the cookie is really crumbling.

So - I think the MOD/RAF have a duty to ensure that current aircrew are happy that they are flying an airworthy aircraft. It may be that aircrew are privvy to extra reassurance over and above what has been seen in the public domain, I hope so because the public utterances from MOD/Minister/RAF APPEAR to me to lack consistency, and they don't impress me as reassuring. In fact mostly it looks remarkably like spin, I would have thought it obvious for any competent bunch to at least agree to say the same thing as each other - right or wrong, there's a kind of perception of truth if you say the same thing repeatedly, consistently, and loud enough....they haven't managed that even. 'They' should move heaven and earth to convince people it's safe, and to my mind they've managed far less than that so far.

I still don't see why pipe and seal integrity isn't tested by pressurising then monitoring the pressure over a reasonable period, any leak will appear as a fall in pressure - wouldn't that 'just' require access to each end of a section and a suitable gas, say nitrogen, to fill it with? Wouldn't this be a more certain test than listening for leaks? It was noticeable during Gp Capt Hickman's grilling - and that does look to be adversarial to me, and I can quite understand how he might well have floundered a bit under attack - but his evidence citing the 'whistling sound' as a valid test amounted to groundcrew had done this and found leaks thereby - which is the worst kind of error in my book...all he knows from that is SOME leaks are found this way, he has no idea if dozens more are missed!

Oh, and I think Winco IS a pilot, it would be more convincing to point out flaws in his description of the leak testing than to continue this 'you aren't a pilot because you didn't answer fast enough ' bolleux...had he been trawling the internet for info he'd have had it posted within hours. Go for the ball* chaps, not the man.

Dave

*as opposed to the plural.

[Oldlae]

Winco,
With respect, as an independent engineer, your sniffer device IMHO is only useful where a small leak or weep is evident but because of the source cannot be readily identified due to a number of fuel connections close together, such as on a FCU on an engine. The sort of fuel leak that caused a fire 90 seconds after AAR would probably not have needed anything than a mark one eyeball should the aircraft have survived and landed successfully. Regarding a soapy water test being used for an air leak there is no harm in trying it but it all depends on the make up of the solution and the leak being a large one, I agree that small leaks may not cause any bubbles to form.
On another angle, I am sure we used FRS coupling seals on a RAF aircraft a long time ago, and I recall that I thought that if they were disturbed there could be a problem, to remind me could anyone produce a diagram on how the seals are supposed to work?

[Winco]

Oldlae,

Thank you for that.
I am not trying to ridicule anyone here, not even Nimnrod AGE(its just a bit of fun banter) but I think that as there are better and more accurate and reliable methods of detection and location, it is of concern that the RAF does NOT appear to be using them. Instead, they are using the discredited method of soapy water.
I am simply seeking some clarification at to what WAS used and what IS used today. The lack of repsonce from the engineering 'experts' on this subject seems to say it all I think.
As an independant engineer, what would you use? Am I right in thinking that a small leak is likely to become a major leak with say an overpressurisation of the system, as occurs post AAR?

[RAF_Techie101]

Winco

Ok, the soapy water thing is bugging me...

For gaseous leaks, we use a liquid called 'Snoop'. It is designed to bubble when used on a system that is leaking (ie a pressurised nitrogen system - the radar for instance...) What it is made of, I'm not sure, and in times of dificulty, where none is available, any liquid would probably do the job. It's simply that Snoop is designed for it and is a recognised engineering method.

For actual fuel leaks, as Oldlae says, the mark 1 eyeball is the best method. A leak will normally be detected because it becomes visible, ie the coupling is wet, or it has tracked it's way out of the area it is in, and made it's way on to the ground. This is usually the first sign of a leak - when there's a puddle on the ground or in a panel when opened. If we're looking at the seal because it's jsut been replaced, then full pressure is applied, and the coupling observed. Any leak will be visible within a short amount of time. If there is none, it is coated in an anti-corrosive coating and jobs-a-good-un.

Integral tanks like the wings are a differnt method. Again, usually first spotted by visually seeing the leak, other methods are used when leak mapping. A powder is placed along all the areas where leaking is likely to occur, and this will highlight any fuel it comes into contact with.

[Oldlae]

Winco,
RAFTechie has beaten me to it, thanks Techie.

[MightyHunter AGE]

For god sake Winco.

I decline to comment on current methods because I cannot say whether new methods have been introduced since I left and now I am the walt? Things have moved at pace over at Kinloss so it would be wrong of me to comment but still you have a go.

Plenty of current Nimrod Air and Ground Crew on here will vouch for my identity and engineering integrity, can the same be said for you?

Many, many times I have been on Ops the success of those Ops have been down to my leadership of an engineering team in some very hostile and demanding circumstances where engineering decisions made by me (and the team) have resulted in our glorious flyers saving lives and getting bad guys.

On the reverse of that I have stopped aircraft that were unsafe from flying under some serious pressure from engineering officers who knew little about either engineering of the implications of fuel leaks on the Nimrod.

Stop making yourself look like a horses ass.:ugh:

Oh by the way the approach speed for a B747 is 180 - 150 kts @ Flap2 (Kyb 2), yes I too can use a search engine but just because I can look it up doesn't make me a pilot does it.:=

[KeepItTidy]

I can vouch for Mightyhunter Ages professionalism , being quite fortunate to have spent some time in the sandpit him and he takes nae ****e fae anyone. That is something that many these days lack and having the balls to tell somebody many times higher rank the simple words... no

And the fact he knows me sister for long time I best say something nice :ouch:

Going back to RAF Techies words of penetrant powder stuff on wing , bloody hell as sootie now I had the joy of doing that job one night and It took a very very long time spraying this white stuff on both wings upper and lower, of course the comedy C*** has to be done as well , but it sure does show seeps very well. Cannot be done of course in rib 1 area or bomb bay and the good old visual inspection or smell is only clues to a fuel leak , believe me if you have a leak you will see it , preferably done over a dry surface though. If there are other methods of doing these leaks then please tell me as I have not been taught them yet.

I like many now are all becoming multi trade and I can by law do sootie as well as airframe now including paperwork for these kind of jobs but I refuse to do it without somebody who is experienced to go through the AP and teach/show us how the system works , only when we all have had a few years experience on these things that we can be fully confident working them and of couse supervising. I get asked like many to do jobs courtesy of what I can do now but I like all the guys I work with if you dont know you refuse, winds the management up no end as they under pressure to get the jets up but this is the simple bare facts these days. The RAF let a few thousand experienced engineers leave and we really miss that now , same for all trades now. We are expected to do the same job with 1/4 of the manpower we had 5 years ago.

anyway Rant over , time to get pished !!

[flipster]

Now that MHAGE and Winco have stopped hitting eachother with their handbags (ya, boo, sucks), perhaps someone could point me in the direction of a reference regarding

"time to reduce to ALARP"

Essentially, I can't find anything in DS 00-56, JSP553 or R2P2 that says categorically 'an organisation has x amount of time to make the risks ALARP'.
This is a little strange, as otherwise the organisation could say ad infinitum

"Oh we've got a plan for that and we're working towards ALARP"

(does that sound familiar??)


The only thing that remotely refers to time, is a comment in R2P2 that infers that the risks should be assessed more than once in a year. Perhaps meaning 6 months to ALARP? If then if not ALARP, what happens next?

Any comment?

flipster

[nigegilb]

Flip I understand that the families are meeting the Defence Minister and CDS in a few days time, hopefully Sir Jock will be able to provide a few answers, a few references and explain the ridiculous contradictions coming from the RAF and MoD in this case, specifically concerning ALARP and airworthiness. Nobody appears to be able to explain why Nimrod did not get fitted with dry bay protection since it was spec'd back in 1981. Nobody has explained why Nimrod did not get the same modifications as the VC10 fleet in the mid 1990's, concerning AAR. It would also be very useful to know if a safety review was carried out on the Nimrod fleet when it's change of use came about over land in Afg. A change of use, safety review is a requirement to meet airworthiness regulations. Overland Afg Ops might have thrown up a need for dry bay protection, bomb bay protection and fuel tank protection.

Nobody has explained why the six recommendations concerning AAR were ignored in the QQ report and why the decision was taken to stop AAR sorties only after the November incident. Nobody has explained how many of the 30 recs have been implemented to date and whether it is true that the majority of these recommendations will have been implemented by the end of the year. Nobody has explained why it is, that NOT having a current in date set of tech publications, does NOT impinge on the safety of Nimrod.

Nobody has explained why it is that MRA4 has LESS protection than the aircraft it replaces.

Namely,

No flight deck armour,
No under floor fire protection,
No bomb bay protection,
No fuel probe inerting system,
No dry bay protection,
No fuel tank protection.

Unlike the MMA P8A due to come into service at the same time.

Nobody has explained if any lessons have been learned here.

Could be a long meeting.

[flipster]

Nige,

Cx ur emails - further help over timsecsales within.

flipster

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

... someone could point me in the direction of a reference regarding

"time to reduce to ALARP"

Essentially, I can't find anything in DS 00-56, JSP553 or R2P2 that says categorically 'an organisation has x amount of time to make the risks ALARP'.

Doesn't 00-56 have as a statement somewhere that civil rules will be used as targets/guidelines in the absence of specific military regs? In which case JAR39 and ACJ39 might apply, or at least be considered guidance and "good practice"?

For example, my organisation is not primarily JAA, yet we routinely use those JAA documents as guidance for determining reaction times.

[flipster]

M (F) S

Do you have any links to the right places in these docs, as I agree they could, perhaps should, constitute 'good practice' - which is indeed referred to in R2P2.

flip

[Tappers Dad]

flipsterM

Do you have any links to the right places in these docs, as I agree they could, perhaps should, constitute 'good practice' - which is indeed referred to in R2P2.

Thats because none of them do, the Coroner asked Hickman to point out where in JSP 553 or DEF Stan 00-56 it said that they could have time to make it airworhy.

He couldn't, his reply was it is understood we have time to make it airworhy.

[flipster]

M(F)S

Thank you for your tip-off,

After some googling I found the following reference to ACJ 39.3(b)(4) which

"provides guidelines to assist in establishing rectification campaigns to remedy discovered defects"

Sadly, it is in total mathematical/aero-eng speak - would you be able to decipher the tables and graphs into pilot-speak for us?

flipster

For those interested - the timescales vary from

"ground the fleet.... now"
to
"15 months to get it sorted"

- depending on the mathematical probability of further occurence and its consquence.

TD - you may wish to look this way yourself.

[Tappers Dad]

Thank you Flipster I found it here:
http://www.aia-aerospace.org/issues/subject/jaa_req_0302/acj39/rst02-2doc17c.doc
ACJ 39.3(b)(4)
SUBJECT TITLE DEFECT CORRECTION - SUFFICIENCY OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION
PURPOSE This ACJ provides guidelines (not regulations)to assist in establishing rectification campaigns to remedy discovered defects.

This ACJ contains guidance material of a general nature, not intended to be regarded as binding in specific cases, but, by being used in conjunction with engineering judgement, to aid airworthiness engineers in reaching decisions in the state of technology at the material time.

Table 1

Estimated catastrophe rate to aircraft due to the defect under consideration (per a/c hour) Necessary reaction time for each aircraft at risk (hours)
On a calendar basis
4 x 10-8 3750 15 months (How long has it been since 230-22 months)
5 x 10-8 3000 12 months
1 x 10-7 1500 6 months
2 x 10-7 750 3 months
5 x 10-7 300 6 weeks
1 x 10-6 150 3 weeks
1 x 10-5 15 Return to base

3.3 While it should clearly be the objective of all to react to and eliminate emergency situations i.e. those involving a potentially significant increase of airworthiness risk levels without unreasonable delay, an Authority must be able finally to rule on what is a minimum acceptable campaign programme. It has therefore seemed desirable to devise guidelines to be used in judging whether a proposed campaign of corrective actions is sufficient in airworthiness terms, and clearly this ought to be based on determining the summation of the achieved airworthiness risk levels for the aircraft and passengers during any periods of corrective action and comparing them with some agreed target.

4.3 It must be stressed that the benefit of these guidelines will be to form a datum for what is considered to be the theoretically maximum reaction time. A considerable amount of judgement will still be necessary in establishing many of the input factors and the final decision may still need to be tempered by non-numerical considerations, but the method proposed will at least provide a rational 'departure point' for any exercise of such judgement.

It appears as with everthing else the RAF has overran the maximum time this gives them to rectify the problems.

But thank you Flipster I will take it along with me when I meet with Bob Answorth and the Chief of Airstaff this wek.

[flipster]

TD

You might consider taking 'expert' engineering input on this (as I can't make much sense of the rest of that ruling) - but it would seem as if time is a commodity that the MoD do not have.

Of course, the outcome of all this is that the risks that our crews face are still significant - and that liability must rest with the MoD during the time left until the Nimrod is ALARP.

However, I fear that the risks to the guys and girls on the ground in theatre would be whole lot worse, if it were not for the Nimrod and so, it should stay flying. In view of this, the Nimrod crews and their support staff are to be highly commended for their continued courage and stoicism (as well as, of course, the people whom they are helping to protect!)

I would wholeheartedly agree that this is not a wholly palatable position, especially should another accident occur but I do wish the MoD would come out and admit the mess we are in.....and that the buck stops with them. (sadly unlikely).

This is what happens when the Military suffer funding cuts, year upon year and then try to do too much with too little!

flipster

[Terry K Rumble]

Gentlemen,

Without wishing to get involved in the bun fight between MH Age and the Winco, may I just politely ask any current or past Nimrod groundcrew, what methods of fuel leak detection were used at the time 230 was lost and what is currently used please?
The one true hard fact here is that the aircraft was lost due to a significant fuel leak of some description. It would seem logical therefore, that the methods of fuel leak detection would have been looked at in some detail.

many thanks
TKR

ps, I'm NOT an aircraft engineer, licensed or otherwise, and I am NOT an airline captain!

[nigegilb]

This is how Hickman described it;

MR RAWLINSON: The fuel system was to be limited to 50 psi. How was that to be checked? For instance, what is the system on board the Nimrod to ensure that the pressure does not exceed 50 psi?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: We’re not talking about these checks which are done at 50 psi.

MR RAWLINSON: (overspeaking) under which is …?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Okay, every 30 days the fuel system is pressurised through the refuelling probe, so that we pressurise the whole system. That’s done using a fuel (inaudible) at 50 psi.

THE CORONER: With the tanks full or empty?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, with the tanks full. So, we refuel so we refuel the aircraft through the probe, filling

THE CORONER: So, all the tanks are full?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Filling all the tanks up and then so the system is pressurised.

THE CORONER: Are all the tanks full when you carry out your pressure test?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, yes.

THE CORONER: Have you had a blow off yet?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No.

MR RAWLINSON: As a matter of interest, when you carry out the tests, do you ensure that the aircraft is flat enough and not declined or anything like that?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, we’ve learned from we certainly learned from that instrument report that you referred to earlier that if the aircraft is in a nose down attitude, then that causes problems. So, no, we make sure that they are at least level.

THE CORONER: What do you test, just as a matter of interest? The fuel comes into the tanks; how do you test the system that transfers fuel from one tank to another? The fuel-transfer system; is that tested at 50 psi. How do you do it, do you open everything, all valves?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: It’s the use of booster pumps for pressurising. They’re also turned on to make sure that both the refuel and the fuel feed systems are pressurised.

THE CORONER: So, every pipe that is connected to a fuel tank is pressurised to 50 psi?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: Except those feeding the engine?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: And this is done when all tanks are full?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: So it’s in fact a hydraulic test?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: It’s the aim is to look for leaks. We’re looking for leaks from fuel couplings.

THE CORONER: Yes. If you fill a system to its maximum so all the tanks are full, so you have a complete system full of fuel, then if you pressurise that you are, in effect, conducting a hydraulic test, is that right? Of the system.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, as you’ve heard before, we’re not going to see those sorts of pressures throughout the fuel system.

THE CORONER: No, we’re talking about the test referred to. If you fuel the tanks and every fuel system in the refuel gallery and the transfer gallery, you fill that up so all those tanks are full and then you conduct your pressure test, would you simply fill it 50 psi and watch for leaks? That’s what I am trying to understand. What do you do?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Well, we … what we’re doing is we will refuel the aircraft completely so that it would start off empty and then it will end up full. During that refuel, we will look for leaks.

THE CORONER: That is your pressure test?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: So you don’t do anything else other than that?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No.

THE CORONER: So you just refuel normally and watch. You refuel at 50 psi and you expect, therefore, that all components of the refuel system to be at 50 psi? It is an important piece of evidence and it is important to understand exactly what it is you test. Are you testing the system as part of a hydraulic test of the system, or are you simply refilling the aircraft and watching for leaks, knowing that the fuel going in is at 50 psi, and if there are no leaks by the time the aircraft is full, then the system must be able to withstand a filling pressure of 50 psi?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes. I mean, it’s an attempt to it’s certainly an attempt to reproduce what the aircraft will experience during air to air refuelling, by refuelling through the probe, and using the aircraft booster pumps to responsibility and pressurise the fuel feed system as well.

THE CORONER: So you are trying to recreate the system in flight?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: It is not a hydraulic test, then, is it?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: No.

MR RAWLINSON: Forgive me; the purpose of recreating the actual refuelling conditions is what AAR is now planning?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes, it was introduced when air to air refuelling was still instated, but because the system was still in the aircraft, we’re continuing to check that part of the system.

THE CORONER: To put it clearer, you refuel the aircraft using the air to air refuelling probe?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: That is all you do?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: And if there are no leaks, that is your pressure test.

MR RAWLINSON: How do you check for leaks?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: The aircraft is depanelled, as far as possible, and then it’s inspected by the tradesmen.

THE CORONER: What equipment is used for this refuel? Is it the same ground refuel system, only adapted an attachment for the probe at the nose?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: That test equipment was already in existence, the ability to refuel through the probe, so that part of the system could be tested. So we’ve simply introduced we’ve just adapted that maintenance procedure that was already in existence. Because when a component in a fuel system is replaced, it’s normal to pressure test it using this MP, and we’ve just pulled up that MP as a way of pressure testing.

THE CORONER: You can see the subtle difference between pressure testing, which is a natural test of withstanding pressure, and refuelling an aircraft and seeing if it leaks?

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: What you do, if I understand it, is refuel the aircraft and watch to see if it leaks.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: Yes.

THE CORONER: So it is not really fair to describe it as a pressure test.

GP CAPT HICKMAN: It’s the same test that we would conduct if we replaced a component in that system.

[Terry K Rumble]

nigegilb

Thank you for that, however, I am still confused as to how the groundcrew tested the aircraft for leaks. Did they de-fuel the aircraft and then refuel it through the AAR probe or what?
Where does the soapy water test come in? and has it now been replaced with some other method of detection as has been described earlier?
It strikes me that if what the winco says is correct, and there are now more modern and better ways of detecting fuel leaks, then that is the way forward surely, and not just for Nimrod.
If, on the other hand, the groundcrew are having to 'make do' (for want of a better phrase) with the old-fashioned method because of lack of funds to purchase the new kit, then that is a scandal and needs to be looked into.
Can anyone at Kinloss advise us as to what is used today please?
Thanks
TKR

[Safeware]

As regards the best practice time guidelines, what defect is it that *we* want to see corrected?

sw